

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

79th Congress

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 1

NOVEMBER 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

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[1]¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

All those in the auditorium will please be seated.

Before we start, the Chair desires to admonish the audience that we are glad to have them here, but in view of the difficult acoustics in this room, it will make it necessary for the committee to use these microphones. We must ask the audience to refrain from any sort of conversation or any sort of demonstration during these hearings, any applause or otherwise.

Also I think it is advisable to say to our friends, the photographers, we are glad to cooperate with you in getting all the pictures you may wish to take so long as it does not interfere with these hearings.

During the testimony, while the witnesses are on the stand, the photographers will not be permitted to occupy this space here in front of the committee.

Take whatever pictures you want to take and then leave this congested area here.

The last time I sat on a committee in this room, I could not see the witness half the time, because of the photographers standing between me and the witness, trying to take him with his hands up, or something like that.

We must insist that during these hearings, while the witness is on the stand and testifying, that the photographers will not occupy this space between the committee and the [3] witness and counsel.

I want to make the announcement in advance so that there will not be any misunderstanding. It applies to everybody alike.

I believe the members of the committee are all here.

Mr. Mitchell, as counsel for the committee, we are ready to proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman—

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed, I would like to make one comment for myself and others. I want to record my regret and protest, at the start of the hearings at this time, and as has previously been said, and I would like to have that entered in the record, and that is this:

It has only been within the past week that the members of the Executive Department have had the permission, under notification of the President's order to submit the exhibits so they will be in the best order, and I have been given a stack of papers, over a thousand pages, which it is essential to go over in order to conduct any intelligent cross-examination.

I hope my fears will be disappointed, my fears that this will result in confusion and delay, but I do think it ought to be made a matter of record at this time that we regret this somewhat premature beginning of this inquiry.

[4] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair desires to be reasonable in regard to that. The committee at one time, some 2 or 3 weeks ago, I forget the date, unanimously decided to begin hearings today; that is, those who voted.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like the record to show that——

The CHAIRMAN. Those who voted in the committee, voted without dissent to begin the hearing today. Two members were absent and two were present and not voting.

At a meeting later, a week ago, or a week or 10 days ago, a motion was made to postpone the hearings from today until the 23d day of November, which is the day following Thanksgiving, and that motion was voted down.

The situation that confronts us, that confronts all the members of the committee, is that documents have been given to us as quickly and as practicably as counsel obtained them. Inasmuch as these hearings will probably last several weeks, it occurred to the Chair that we will have, as we go along, ample opportunity to familiarize ourselves with the testimony brought before us today, without attempting to read any documents before we begin.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a statement on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I had made a request [5] previously that the committee be furnished these exhibit copies at least 10 days prior to the hearing. If I had had some assistance, I would have been able to have carried down the exhibits that had been given to me on Wednesday and on Tuesday. Over a thousand of them have been placed in our hands. Many of them it is impossible to read because of the job of photostating them. Therefore, it is just a physical impossibility to go over the papers prior to this hearing.

While I will do my very best, I do want the record to show that we have not had these exhibits in this form properly indexed.

Here is the first one. It is over 200 pages, and no index to it. It has been just a physical impossibility to go over them intelligently, although I want to say on the record, I will do my best to go over them as the hearing goes along, and it may be essential that we recall witnesses in order that we may properly examine and obtain all of the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if I may say so, there would be no objection to recalling any witness by the committee. The exhibits were given to all members at a given time. They have been given to members as soon as it was possible, and as fast as it was possible to obtain them. There are large quantities of them. We are all laboring under the same handicap, that we have not been able to read them all since [6] we got them.

As I said a moment ago, I think as the hearings go on, we can familiarize ourselves with them sufficiently to permit us to know each day what would be expected in the way of testimony, and prepare for that day.

Senator FERGUSON. The record ought to also show that I have made many requests for other things. We do not have all the files here at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. In order that the record may be correct, as the requests have been made, the records have been sought, and have been either delivered, or are in the process of preparation. It is manifestly impossible to provide all the exhibits at one time. As soon as they were ready, they were delivered to the committee, as soon as they could be obtained.

Senator FERGUSON. May I understand that it is a fact as to the exhibits that have been requested, that the staff has them but they are not at the present time ready for delivery? That is my understanding.

[7] The CHAIRMAN. The committee has no way to know what personal requests have been made either in writing or orally by members of the committee to the counsel, by individual members. Counsel explained to the committee that as fast as these exhibits could be obtained and could be copied for each member and for others, that they would be supplied.

Now, Mr. Mitchell, will you proceed?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, to open the record, there are some informal matters. I have some documents——

Senator BREWSTER. Before he proceeds I renew my motion.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's have order, please, in the committee room.

Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, to open the record formally, there are a few documents that should be entered.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MITCHELL. First is the concurrent resolution of the Senate under which the committee was organized.

(S. Con. Res. 27 follows:)

[S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Cong., 1st sess.]

[8]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original

selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

[9] SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of [10] the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman.

Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.

Attest:

LESLIE L. BIFFLE, *Secretary.*

Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.

Attest:

SOUTH TRIMBLE, *Clerk.*

Mr. MITCHELL. Then there is the record of the members of the committee.

(The list of the committee members is as follows:)

MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Alben W. Barkley, Kentucky (chair-	Jere Cooper, Tennessee (vice chairman).
man).	J. Bayard Clark, North Carolina.
Walter F. George, Georgia.	John W. Murphy, Pennsylvania.
Scott W. Lucas, Illinois.	Bertrand W. Gearhart, California.
Owen Brewster, Maine.	Frank B. Keefe, Wisconsin.
Homer Ferguson, Michigan.	

[11] Mr. MITCHELL. Next is a list of all counsel, including counsel for a number of witnesses who will be called.

(The list of counsel for the committee is as follows:)

Counsel for the committee:

Chief counsel, William D. Mitchell.
 Chief assistant counsel, Gerhard A. Gesell.
 Assistant counsel, Jule M. Hannaford.
 Assistant counsel, John E. Masten.

Executive secretary for the committee:

Mrs. Flo E. Bratten; office, 357 Senate Office Building; telephone extensions 1159 and 1189.

Counsel for General Short:

Capt. Patrick H. Ford, 2601 Munitions Building, War Department, extension 7-8109.

Counsel for Admiral Kimmel:

Charles Rugg, Building N, Room 1-N-90, Navy Department, extension 3292; Lt. Edward B. Hanify, Navy Department, extension 6-3036.

[12] Counsel for Admiral Stark:

Hugh H. Obear, Southern Building, Washington, D. C., telephone National 2155.

Lt. Comdr. David Richmond, Navy Department, extension 2326.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then there is the correspondence, with which you are familiar, between the chairman of the committee and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the White House, asking for the appointment of the liaison officers and the responses from those Departments and the President.

There is also a letter here from the estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt respecting the late President's files in the Archives Building.

(The correspondence referred to follows:)

OCTOBER 5, 1945.

The Honorable JAMES F. BYRNES,

The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the State Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of [13] witnesses from the State Department. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, October 13, 1945.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ALBEN: Replying to your letter, I have asked Under Secretary Acheson to make available any information the State Department may have which is desired by the committee with reference to the investigation referred to by you.

[14] Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES,

OCTOBER 5, 1945.

The Honorable ROBERT P. PATTERSON,

The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the War Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the committee or their counsel and that the committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings, and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

[15]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 10, 1945.

HON. ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

*Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: In accordance with the suggestion in your letter of October 5, Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe has been designated as the representative of the War Department for the purpose of assisting the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor. He will have full access to all pertinent files and records of the War Department and will arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the Army.

The War Department is prepared to furnish the committee and their counsel all information in its possession material to the investigation and to have the committee make free use of any pertinent evidence. Also, the War Department will be glad to assist the committee in its desire to hold public hearings.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON, *Secretary of War.*

OCTOBER 5, 1945.

[16] The Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL,
The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the joint congressional committee to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, I am writing to suggest that you designate someone in the Navy Department to whom counsel for the committee may apply at any time to aid us in obtaining information from the Department's records and to arrange for the attendance before the committee of witnesses from the armed forces. We believe such an arrangement should expedite the work of the committee.

Now that the war is ended, we hope that reasons of national security should not require that any information material to the investigation be withheld from the committee or their counsel, and that the committee will be free to use any pertinent evidence. The committee proposes to hold public hearings and all evidence material to our inquiry will thus be made public.

Respectfully,

ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

[17]

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, October 11, 1945.

The Honorable ALBEN W. BARKLEY,

*Chairman, Joint Committee on Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Senate.*

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: Reference is made to your letter dated October 5, 1945, suggesting the designation of a Navy Department representative with whom counsel for the committee may deal in matters concerning information and witnesses desired by the committee.

In accordance with your request, Rear Adm. O. S. Colclough, USN, the Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy, is designated to receive and act upon counsel's request for information from the Navy Department's records and for the attendance of naval witnesses.

In addition to the foregoing suggestion, your referenced letter expresses the hope that, by virtue of the war's end, reasons of national security do not require the withholding from the committee, or its counsel, any information material to the investigation, and that the committee, whose hearings will be public, will be free to use any pertinent evidence. Please be assured that the Navy Department stands ready to render full assistance to the committee and its counsel,

[18] making available from its records all information material to the investigation.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL.

[19]

OCTOBER 5, 1945.

The Honorable HARRY S. TRUMAN,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, I respectfully suggest for your consideration that someone in the Executive Offices be named by you, to whom the committee and its counsel may go to obtain information from the files in the Executive Office bearing on the matter under investigation, and that the committee may be free to disclose at its public hearings information so obtained.

Respectfully,

ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

[20]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 13, 1944.

Hon. ALBEN W. BARKLEY
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BARKLEY: Replying to your letter of the 5th, regarding the appointment of someone in the Executive Offices to consult with the committee and its counsel, I am appointing Judge Latta, who has been in charge of all the files in the White House for the past 28 years.

Any information that you want will be cheerfully supplied by him.

For your information all the files of the previous administration have been moved to the Archives Building and Hyde Park. If there is any difficulty about your having access to them I'll be glad to issue the necessary order so that you may have complete access.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

[21]

ESTATE OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
120 Broadway, New York 5, October 31, 1945.

Dr. SOLON J. BUCK,
*Archivist of the United States,
National Archives Building, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: On behalf of the executors of the estate of the late Franklin D. Roosevelt, it is hereby requested that you permit Miss Grace G. Tully to withdraw from the files of the late Mr. Roosevelt, now at the National Archives for storage and safekeeping, and make available to the Senate-House Joint Committee Investigating the Pearl Harbor Disaster such papers relating to the subject of the investigation as it may request.

This is to certify that such papers are being withdrawn and made available to said committee at the instigation of the President of the United States and with the approval of the executors of the estate.

Yours very truly,

EARLE R. KOONS.

[22] Mr. MITCHELL. Then there is a list of liaison officers who have been designated by the various departments, with their addresses and telephone numbers, which may be of service to the members of the committee.

(The list of liaison officers follows:)

[23]

LIST OF LIAISON OFFICERS, APPOINTED BY AGENCIES

War Department:

Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe; telephone, extension 2335; room 4D761, Pentagon.
Capt. R. M. Diggs; telephone, extension 2335; room 4D757, Pentagon.
Capt. C. Roger Nelson; telephone, extension 73157; room 2C886, Pentagon.
Lt. Bennett Boskey; telephone, extension 71470; room 4D757, Pentagon.

Navy Department:

Rear Adm. Oswald S. Colcough, Assistant Judge Advocate General; telephone, extension 3365; room 2307.

Lt. Comdr. John Ford Baecher, United States Naval Reserve; telephone, extension 2451; room 1083A.

[24] State Department:

Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson; telephone, extension 2101; room 203½.

Edward Miller; telephone, extension 2210; room 280.

Joseph Ballantine; telephone, extension 2210; room 288.

White House:

Judge Maurice C. Latta.

Miss Grace Tully (Roosevelt papers).

FBI:

D. M. Ladd, Assistant Director; telephone, Executive 7100, extension 2121; room 1742, Justice.

[25] Mr. MITCHELL. Then there follows the directive of August 28, 1945, by the President forbidding the disclosure of technique or procedures or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit, the agencies that break codes.

(The directive of August 28, 1945, follows:)

[26]

[Copy]

AUGUST 28 1945.

Memorandum for—

The Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The Attorney General.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Director of the Budget.

The Director of the Office of War Information.

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of: Information regarding the past or present status, technique, or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States Government or any Department thereof.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

[27] Mr. MITCHELL. There is the order of October 23, 1945, by the President lifting the ban of that directive for the benefit of this committee.

(The memorandum follows:)

[28] Memorandum for—

The Secretary of State.

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of Navy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to hold public hearings and make public pertinent evidence relating to the circumstances of that attack, a specific exception to my memorandum dated August 28, 1945, relating to the release of information concerning cryptanalytic activities, is hereby made as follows:

The State, War, and Navy Departments will make available to the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, for such use as the committee may determine, any information in their possession material to the investigation, and will respectively authorize any employee or member of the armed services whose testimony is desired by the committee to testify publicly before the committee concerning any matter pertinent to the investigation.

(Signed) **Harry S. Truman**
HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Approved October 23, 1945.

[29] Mr. MITCHELL. There is another order, of November 7, 1945, by the President respecting leave for men in the services to talk freely with the committee and volunteer information.

(The memorandum of November 7, 1945, follows:)

[30]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 7, 1945.

Memorandum for the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Section 3 of the concurrent resolution creating the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack reads as follows:

"SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs."

In order to assist the joint committee to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, you are requested to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, if they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to give any information of which they may have knowledge bearing on the subject of the committee's investigation.

You are further requested to authorize them whether or [31] not they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel to come forward voluntarily and disclose to the committee or to its counsel any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the committee.

This directive is applicable to all persons in your departments or agencies whether they are in the armed services or not and whether or not they are called to testify before the joint committee.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

[32] Mr. MITCHELL. Then there is a memorandum by the President under date of November 9, 1945, enlarging on the last-mentioned memorandum.

(The memorandum of November 9, 1945, follows:)

[33] *Memorandum for the chief executives of all executive departments, agencies, Commissions, and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

With further reference to my letter of November 7, 1945, addressed to the above executives, you are requested further to authorize every person in your respective departments or agencies, whether or not they are interrogated by the committee or its counsel, to come forward and disclose orally to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any reason to think has not already been disclosed to the committee.

This does not include any files or written material.

[Handwritten:] O. K.
H. S. T.

[34] Mr. MITCHELL. Those formal documents I hand to the reporter to open the record in that way.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it would also be proper and helpful if the record of the original presentation of the resolution by the chairman, and the discussions on the floor at that time—not subsequent—at that time, be inserted in the record so that there may be a full interpretation of what was the purport of the hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no objection in connection with the introduction of the joint resolution, the statement made by the author of the resolution, and the discussion that took place at that time, will be inserted in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the full discussion that took place at that time be inserted in the record.

Senator BREWSTER. That is what I intended.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understood the Senator from Maine requested.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

I would like also to have the request of the committee to the President, the final draft of the order, inserted, in connection with the order which was made. I think you are familiar with that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be inserted in connection with these papers.¹

[34a] (Excerpts from the Congressional Record of September 6, 1945, including the discussion and adoption of S. Con. Res. 27, ordered to be printed at this point, follow:)

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, inasmuch as I shall be compelled to leave the Chamber shortly on an important matter and may not be present during the entire call of the morning hour's business, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted at this time to make a brief statement and, following that, to introduce a concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Kentucky may proceed.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor occurred on December 7, 1941.

On December 18, President Roosevelt appointed by Executive order a board or commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

This commission was composed of Justice Owen J. Roberts, as chairman, Admiral William H. Standley, Admiral J. M. Reeves, Gen. Frank H. McCoy, and Gen. Joseph T. McNarney.

The commission made its report to the President on January 29, 1942, and this report was immediately made public.

In June 1944, by joint resolution approved June 13, Congress in effect directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to designate appropriate boards or courts of inquiry "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper."

The board appointed on behalf of the War Department was composed of Lt. Gen. George Grunert, as president, Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank.

This board made its report to the Secretary of War on October 20, 1944, and the report was released to the public on Wednesday, August 29, 1945. The report consists of more than 300 pages of typewritten matter detailing the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, indulges in criticisms of certain military and other officials, and makes no recommendations to the Secretary of War.

The board appointed on behalf of the Navy consisted of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, as president, Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews.

This board finished its inquiry on October 19, 1944, then adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

The report of the Navy board went into some detail concerning the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, and recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

This report was also made public by the President on August 29, 1945.

Since these reports were made public, I have spent a large portion of my time studying them, and also, in connection with them, I have reread the report of the Roberts commission.

The official report of the board appointed by the Secretary of War I have here, and, as I have said, it consists of 304 pages of typewritten matter on what we call legal size paper, not letter size. The report of the board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy contains various divisions, all of which add up to something like 100 pages of typewritten matter.

Reading these reports and studying them, insofar as I could in the limited time at my disposal, required my attention not only during the daytime since the

¹ See the suggested memorandum approved by the President in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5510.

reports were made public on last Wednesday, but required practically all of two nights, in order that I might read not only the reports, but the statement or summary made by the Secretary of War based upon the report of the Army board and the statement made by the Secretary of the Navy based upon the report of the naval board of inquiry, as well as other documents pertaining thereto. I have not been away from the city of Washington during the entire adjournment since the 1st day of August, when the Senate adjourned.

Mr. President, I shall not at this time attempt to discuss these various reports in detail, but after studying them to the extent possible in the time at my disposal, I am convinced that a further searching inquiry should be made under the authority and by the direction of the Congress of the United States.

In forming this opinion, Mr. President, I cast no reflections upon the ability, the patriotism, the good faith, or the sincerity of the boards which have thus far investigated and reported upon the Pearl Harbor disaster, nor on any member of these various boards. They are all outstanding American citizens and officials, who have rendered signal service to their country over a long period of time in various capacities. That includes the members of the Roberts commission, the War Department board, and the Navy Department board, as well as all those officials who have commented upon these reports or are in any way involved in them.

But these reports, Mr. President, are confusing and conflicting when compared with one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and inconsistencies within themselves.

Under these circumstances it is not strange that widespread confusion and suspicion prevail among the American people and among the Members of Congress.

In these several reports men in the armed services and in civilian positions of executive responsibility and authority are subjected to criticism, and the defenses are themselves inconsistent and contradictory. It would be easy now, if time allowed and if it were necessary, to point out these inconsistencies between the report made by the naval board and the report made by the Army board, and both of them as compared to the Roberts report. I do not deem it necessary to go into that at this time.

It is my belief, therefore, Mr. President, arrived at immediately upon the conclusion of my study of these reports, that under all the circumstances Congress itself should make its own thorough, impartial, and fearless inquiry into the facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing prior to and at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the attack.

This inquiry, Mr. President, should be of such dignity and authenticity as to convince the Congress and the country and the world that no effort has been made to shield any person who may have been directly or indirectly responsible for this disaster, or to condemn unfairly or unjustly any person who was in authority, military, naval, or civilian, at the time or prior thereto.

Ever since the day of Pearl Harbor there have been discussions of courts martial in the Army and in the Navy. We have here extended from time to time the statute of limitations pertaining to courts martial. The report of neither the naval nor the military board of inquiry recommends any further proceedings in these matters. It is my understanding that the law is that in the Army no man has a legal right to demand that he be court-martialed. Charges must be filed against an Army officer or an enlisted man setting out the offense which he is alleged to have committed. He has no right, as I understand the law, to go into the War Department and demand that he be court-martialed upon any accusation or any charge of misconduct on his part.

[34b] I understand that in the Navy any officer or man who is charged with an offense that would constitute a violation of the Articles of War or Navy Regulations has the right to demand or request—I am not certain that he has the right to demand, but has the right to request, and it may be to demand—that he be given a court martial.

So that as it applies to any Army officer who may have been responsible prior to or at the time of this attack, as I understand, he has no right to demand that he be given a trial in order that he may be vindicated or that the facts may be brought out. Whether in the Navy formal request has been made by any naval officer for a court martial I am not in position to say, though the newspapers have carried stories that such a request has been made.

But if it were possible or appropriate, Mr. President, to subject high-ranking military or naval officers to courts martial, the trials might be conducted in

secret, and would relate themselves principally, if not entirely, to the guilt or innocence of the person against whom the specific charges were leveled. I do not here feel called upon or competent to determine whether court martial should be inaugurated in any case involving any officer of the Army or Navy or any person in the armed forces.

But I am convinced that the Congress and the country desire an open, public investigation which will produce the facts, and all the facts, so far as it is humanly possible to produce them.

Such an investigation should be conducted as a public duty and a public service.

It should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any responsible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead.

It should be conducted in an atmosphere of judicial responsibility, and it ought to be so complete and so fair that no person could doubt the good faith of the report and the findings made in it, or those who make it.

It ought not to be conducted or undertaken for the purpose or with the sole view of vindicating or aspersing any man now in office, or who has been in office during the period involved.

It ought not to be undertaken or conducted for the purpose of enhancing or retarding the welfare of any political party, or any person now in office, or any person who desires or aspires to hold public office.

It should not be conducted for the purpose of attempting to bedaub the escutcheon of any innocent man, high or low, living or dead, with the infamy of imputed wrong.

It should not be conducted with the purpose of gratifying the misanthropic hatreds of any person toward any present or past public servant, high or low, living or dead.

It should not be conducted for the purpose of casting aspersions upon the names and records of men who have rendered outstanding service to their country and to the world; nor should it be conducted for the purpose of whitewashing any person who may have been guilty of wrongdoing in connection with the whole affair.

Such an investigation should look solely to the ascertainment of the cold, unvarnished, indisputable facts so far as they are obtainable, not only for the purpose of fixing responsibility, whether that responsibility be upon an individual or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which they operated or co-operated, or failed to do either. It should be conducted with a view of ascertaining whether, in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor and prior thereto, or even subsequent thereto, it might be useful to us in legislating in regard to the operations of our military and naval forces and the executive departments having control of them, or which are supposed to work with them.

In my opinion this investigation should be a joint effort of the two Houses of Congress. If the two Houses should undertake separately to investigate, going their separate ways, the result might be divergent reports made by the two Houses, which would contribute to further confusion in the minds of the public, as well as in the minds of Members of Congress. Whatever the findings may be, they will carry more weight and bear greater authority if both Houses of Congress jointly and concurrently conduct the investigation.

For these reasons, Mr. President, acting in my capacity as a Member of the Senate and in my capacity as majority leader of this body, I am submitting a concurrent resolution directing such an investigation by a joint committee of the two Houses, consisting of five Members from each House, no more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the respective Presiding Officers of the two Houses, with all the authority they will need; and, in order that there may be no unnecessary delay in making the investigation and the report to Congress, directing that such report be made not later than January 3, 1946.

It is now nearly 4 years since disaster occurred at Pearl Harbor. During the war, for certain military reasons, it was deemed inexpedient to do what I am now proposing. I believe that that decision on the part of the Congress and the Government as a whole was a wise decision. But the war is now over, and there is no military reason of which I am cognizant which would make it advisable any longer to delay a complete revelation of all the facts and circumstances leading up to this disaster, and the events which occurred while it was in progress.

Mr. President, I am submitting this resolution with the full knowledge and approval of the President of United States. After I had studied the reports and made up my own mind as to what my duty was, I called upon the President

and discussed the matter with him, because obviously I would not want to take such a step without discussing it with him or at least letting him know what I had in mind and what I thought about it. He not only approved but urged that I be not dissuaded for any reason from my purpose to submit the resolution calling for this investigation.

Also, since the preparation of the resolution, I have discussed the matter with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and I have his assurance that if and when the Senate acts upon the concurrent resolution, it will receive prompt consideration by the House.

Mr. President, I express the earnest hope, which the President shares, that the two Houses may promptly agree to the resolution; that the investigation may proceed forthwith, without further delay; and that the Congress and the country may expect a full and impartial report, without regard to the consequences, within the time limit designated in the resolution. I send the resolution to the desk and ask that it be read and appropriately referred.

[34c] Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I think it would be appropriate to ask that the concurrent resolution be immediately considered and agreed to.

Mr. BARKLEY. That is what I had in mind. I should like to ask that that be done. Under the rule, a resolution providing for an investigation and calling for the expenditure of funds is supposed to be referred to a standing committee, reported back, and then referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate. Personally I should like to obviate those necessities, and I suppose it could be done by unanimous consent. I make the parliamentary inquiry now as to whether, notwithstanding the rule, the Senate could, by unanimous consent, proceed to consider and agree to the concurrent resolution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It will be done by unanimous consent.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the concurrent resolution.

Mr. BARKLEY. I think it would be appropriate to read the resolution first, for the information of the Senate. If I could obtain unanimous consent for its present consideration, I should be extremely happy.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be read for the information of the Senate.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 27) was read as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

"(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman."

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, in view of the Chair's ruling that the concurrent resolution may now be considered by unanimous consent, without reference to a committee, I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the concurrent resolution and for its immediate adoption.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Kentucky?

Mr. White, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Lucas addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield to the Senator from Maine. I have promised to yield to the Senator from Michigan, and later I shall yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. President, in all ordinary circumstances I should be moved to object to such a request as has been made, for I think that by and large we progress most wisely if we observe the rules of the Senate as to procedure in this body. But I believe there is so nearly unanimous sentiment of approval in this Chamber in respect to a resolution similar, if not identical, to that offered by the Senator from Kentucky that I have no purpose to object.

I do wish to say, Mr. President, that I know of at least one resolution of similar purport prepared by a Senator upon this side of the aisle whose purpose it was to introduce it at some proper time, but I take it that the two resolutions are not dissimilar in their object. Their purpose is the same; and so far as I am concerned, I am not going to object to the request made by the Senator from Kentucky. I think the Senate overwhelmingly approves the purpose of his resolution and of his request.

Mr. BARKLEY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President—

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield now to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I had prepared to offer a concurrent resolution nearly identical in terms to the concurrent resolution which is now before the Senate. I merely had in mind that probably seven Members from each House would be better because of the question of attendance, but I should like in the time of the Senator from Kentucky to say a few things now in relation to why I believe a resolution such as the one which has just been read should [34d] immediately be adopted.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me to do so, I should like to make a remark in regard to his attitude and situation. I appreciate his attitude and his cooperation. I did not know that he contemplated the introduction of a resolution until I saw mention of it in the newspapers last night. But in the meantime I had already prepared mine and, as I have said, I had conferred with the President and with others about it. So it was not prepared and offered in any way for the purpose of interfering with the introduction of any other resolution. But I felt probably it should be offered and considered and, if possible, adopted immediately. So that the country will understand that the Senate, and, I am sure, the House of Representatives, feel that they owe a public duty to go into this whole matter; and I wish the Senator from Michigan and all other Senators to know that I deeply appreciate the cooperation which seems evident in regard to the matter.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I appreciate and I understand the situation. It is not a question as to who introduces or offers the resolution, but it is a matter of having the job done. I should like to make a few remarks at this time regarding why I believe such a resolution should be adopted.

At the very outset I want to make clear precisely what I think should be investigated. The question is why our Army and Navy were not able either to avoid or to cope with the initial attack launched by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. Everybody—those who opposed the war and those who favored it—was shocked at the swift liquidation of our Pacific naval strength; I am

sure that everybody, men of every point of view—will agree that we ought to have the whole truth about this unfortunate event. The only question is as to how this inquiry should be made.

I am sure that no one will question that some inquiry is necessary. The President of the United States dispatched Secretary Knox to Hawaii immediately after the battle to investigate, because he felt the people ought to know the truth. In 5 days the Secretary of the Navy was back with his report. He said:

"The United States services were not on the alert against the surprise air attack on Hawaii. This fact calls for a formal investigation which will be initiated immediately by the President. Further action is, of course, dependent on the facts and recommendations made by this investigating board. We are all entitled to know it if (a) there was any error of judgment which contributed to the surprise, (b) if there was any dereliction of duty prior to the attack."

Only a few days later, the President named a commission of five, headed by Justice Owen J. Roberts, to go to Hawaii and make a fuller investigation. However, the Executive order for the Roberts inquiry read as follows:

"The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment on the part of the United States Army or Navy personnel"—

We in the Senate must note that it referred just to Army or Navy personnel—"contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned; and, if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."

That meant that the commission could go only into the question of dereliction of duty or error of judgment of the Army and Navy personnel.

The report of that commission became a subject of endless discussion and questioning.

The last report of the War Department said that their Board had made a careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts commission. It further said that the Board had been materially helped and enlightened by the report and record of the Roberts commission, and that "we append to this report a section indicating the additional information and documents which have been made available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not come to the attention of the Roberts commission; or at least were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents, or report of the Roberts commission."

In June 1944 Congress by resolution directed the Army and Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe of December 7, 1941. Under that authority the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry filed their reports in October 1944. That was 9 months ago. But the nature of their findings was not made known until last week. This delay in turn created the impression in many minds that something was being suppressed. I do not wish to make any criticism of this myself. It can be argued that it would have been unwise to publish these findings while we were still engaged in active warfare and when unity of purpose and spirit against the enemy was essential. Some persons even claimed military security was involved. Nevertheless, men—being what they are—had their curiosity and their suspicions whetted about the contents of these reports by the very act of withholding them.

I am sure the officers charged with the investigations have performed their duties with a full sense of their responsibilities. Now that they have made known their conclusions the whole situation remains more clouded than ever.

Returning to the Army report, it says further:

"We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been secured."

We note that they do not say that all have been secured, but that "practically" all have been secured, "although we have found a few files from which important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we have found these documents elsewhere, or we were able to prove them through copies in other hands."

This quite clearly shows that the Army board felt the investigation was not complete. Neither the Secretary of the Navy nor the Secretary of War was

satisfied with the report from the respective boards. When the Navy report was delivered to him last October, Secretary Forrestal said :

"The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted."

[34e] Last October, when the Army report was delivered to him, the Secretary of War said :

"In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible, and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material fact can be obtained, and I have given the necessary direction to accomplish this result.

Thereafter the Army detailed Lieutenant Colonel Clausen of the United States Army to continue an ex parte investigation into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and the Navy Department detailed Vice Adm. Henry K. Hewitt to continue the Navy Department investigation as an ex parte investigation into the catastrophe.

While Admiral Kimmel was entitled to counsel and to take part in the proceedings before the Navy Board of Inquiry, General Short was entitled to counsel but had no right to take part in any of the proceedings. These continued investigations made by the Secretaries of War and Navy have not been given to the public. There is no evidence that the continued investigations dispose of the conflict between the two reports and fix the responsibility on the basis of persuasive evidence. That being true, Congress must try to find out the facts for the public and for itself. The two boards are quite far from being in agreement, and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have each issued critical opinions of the findings of their own boards.

The last published findings have added to the list of the accused names which are still more eminent than those of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. As matters now stand Admiral Stark, who was Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and General Marshall, who led our armies through the great struggle just crowned with victory, and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, have been held to share in the guilt of the defeat. The President of the United States has agreed with some of the findings and has disagreed with others.

Certainly no responsible statesman will quarrel with the curiosity of the people about this now badly confused episode. The curiosity of the people about their public affairs is the sole bulwark of a republican government. There are too few nations left in which there is a public opinion. This court of public opinion is a valuable institution in the United States, and must be able to function.

It is a citizen's duty to be curious. But it is also his right to have the whole truth about even small matters, and, of course, for a greater reason to have the whole truth about a subject which has cost so much in the blood of our sons, and the treasure of our people.

But there is still another force to be recognized here. I refer to the American's sense of fair play. It is a powerful feature of our national character. First, we had two distinguished officers who were accused of neglect of duty, and removed from their commands. Everyone expected they would be tried. But they have never been tried. And because they are officers of the armed services they are not at liberty to talk up with the same freedom possessed by an accused private citizen. They have not had a trial and they have not even had the opportunity of defending their honor in the public press. I do not want to enter into a discussion of the conditions which may have made this possible.

The only point I want to make is that our Government cannot behave in this way without creating in the minds of the masses of our people a feeling of sympathy for these men. Our Government cannot afford to do this sort of thing. To do so violates a fundamental principle of conduct which our boys and girls learn in the very first years of their schooling, namely, the great principle of American fair play. It violates the fundamental principle of the right of the accused to a fair trial with the opportunity of presenting his side in public.

Every consideration—the demands of public policy, the obligation of justice to the men who fell in the battle, the duty of fair play to those who have been

accused—cries out for some form of inquiry which will bring to light the whole truth.

Here we have Cordell Hull, a distinguished former Member of this body, publicly and officially charged with a dereliction of duty, partly responsible for the loss of thousands of lives. We cannot subject him to a court martial, but we must not permit that stain to remain on his name without invoking all the powers of the Government to uncover all the facts. He is entitled to have those facts produced. He is entitled to more than mere conclusions based on part of the facts. All the facts cannot be produced by an Army court martial of General Short, or a naval court martial of Admiral Kimmel. The Pearl Harbor tragedy was a single great episode in which many services, such as the Army, the Navy, and the State Department participated. The controversy relating to the subject cannot be settled by a group of trials and inquiries in which each service will be the judge of its own actions. There is in the Government no agency capable of examining the whole chapter and compelling the production of all the facts, except the Congress of the United States.

What is true of Mr. Hull is true of General Marshall. He has presided over our military forces in the greatest war of our history, and has, in the public mind, managed that great task with courage and ability, and certainly with success. On the very day of final victory he is confronted with the judgment of an Army board that the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, which began the war, was due in part to his failure to perform his duty. We cannot leave that slur upon the name of General Marshall without giving him the full benefit of a complete and unprejudiced publication of every fact. Here again we cannot do it in a court martial. General Marshall ought not to have to submit to a court martial. For if he escapes the judgment of any Army court martial he may run into a verdict of guilty against him in the eyes of the public by a Navy court martial of Admiral Kimmel, where he would have no right to defend himself.

All these men, Secretary Hull, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel, and General Short, have an inescapable claim upon the conscience of the American people for a full and honest inquiry into the whole incident, and that such inquiry be conducted by a Congress which will proceed in the open, with full opportunity for every side to participate in the proceedings.

I do not see how Congress can ignore the things that are being said throughout the country about all this subject. Newspapers and magazines have offered their versions of this distressful event, and millions of people have read the accounts. Whether they are true or false is not the question here. Some of them are certainly not true, because the numerous versions themselves contradict each other quite as freely as do the official versions. But this subject is one which must be set straight, and I can think of no way to do so except by a congressional investigation, and because it is so important, nothing less than a committee which represents both Houses of Congress should make the inquiry.

The reason why this inquiry is needed is as I have pointed out. The Roberts inquiry was limited by the Executive order. The Army report covers 304 pages, but when we reach page 241 it jumps suddenly to page 294. A whole chapter of 52 pages of the Army board's findings has been omitted by order of Secretary Stimson. The Navy report contains a clause which indicates that the Navy board of inquiry was directed to leave out certain testimony. In fact, the Navy board said:

[347] "The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these findings, the court having been informed that their disclosure would militate against the successful prosecution of the war."

This tells us plainly that the Army board of review and Navy court of inquiry left these details out not on their own motion but under orders from the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy. Let us concede that there may have been a reason for omitting this testimony during the war; there is certainly no reason for hiding it now. It is unthinkable that the Congress and the public shall not have access to this testimony in order to appraise justly the correctness of the findings of the Army board and Navy court of inquiry.

There are points of serious difference between the Army and Navy board reports. For example, one of them fixes the date when General Marshall and Admiral Stark petitioned the President that no ultimatum be issued to Japan as of November 5, the other as of November 27—a very vital difference.

A congressional investigation is the only means of producing all the facts. All we have now are the conclusions of the Roberts commission and the conclu-

sions of the Army and Navy commissions, but the public has been denied all the facts and testimony on which these are based.

There is a feature of these reports which is certain to impair public confidence in them regardless of their internal soundness. In this whole episode not only the conduct of the leading commanders but of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State is involved. The press has already caught the significance of who was responsible for appointing the Army board and the Navy court of inquiry. It has been noted that neither report makes any criticism of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, but that the Army report goes out of its way to castigate the Secretary of State, who had no hand in appointing his judges. These are reasons why neither the Army, the Navy, nor the State Department, or any tribunals within them, should make the final investigations. It is also a reason why courts martial cannot properly determine all the facts of this case. Actually this is no longer a case where Kimmel and Short, Marshall and Stark, Stimson and Knox and Hull, along with various subordinate commanders of both services, are on trial. Stated more correctly, the case brings in the responsibilities of so many that what we have on trial is the Army, the Navy, and the State Department, and only Congress has the authority to find all the facts.

The Army report puts blame on General Marshall and Secretary Hull. The Secretary of War criticizes the findings of his own board and disagrees with the verdict against General Marshall. The President of the United States approved the verdict in part and criticized it in part. He dissented from the criticism of Secretary Hull and General Marshall. As disclosed by the Army report, Mr. Stimson furnished most of the testimony against Secretary Hull. Secretary Stimson declares that Hull gave the Japanese an ultimatum on November 26, while Secretary Hull stoutly denies this.

Whatever point there may be in these differences, which are merely samples which come to mind, the fact remains that a great deal of information which has been withheld because the war was raging at top height 9 months ago must now be made public.

If we, the Congress, do not do this, history will do it, and will also appraise our neglect.

Mr. Lucas and Mr. White addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield, and if so, to whom?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I should like to make an inquiry with respect to the concurrent resolution. In section 2 I find the following:

"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941."

I should like to ask the able majority leader whether or not he considers that under this resolution the committee would have the power to investigate, let us say, what took place at Wake Island on the morning of the 7th of December 1941, or what took place in the Philippines on December 7, 1941, or the following day. In other words, are we going into the investigation of what transpired in the Pacific on December 7, 1941, or does the concurrent resolution confine the investigation solely to what happened at Pearl Harbor? Would the committee be able to make further investigation as to what happened in the Pacific at that time?

Mr. BARKLEY. In answer to the question propounded by the Senator, in my opinion the language of the concurrent resolution is broad enough to permit the committee to investigate anything which happened prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, or led up to it, the circumstances which produced it, as well as the consequences of the attack. I realize that it would be impossible to include in a single resolution reference to all the islands in the Pacific which were attacked either concurrently with the attack on Pearl Harbor or shortly thereafter. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the attack which precipitated the war, which brought us into the war, and all the controversy has revolved around the attack on Pearl Harbor. But I use the language "relating to the attack" so as to make it possible for the committee to investigate anything which took place prior to it, or any of the consequences which may have flowed from the attack. The Philippine attack, the Guam attack, and the Wake Island attack were all within a radius of a few hours, and they were related to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So I think the language is sufficiently broad to cover those attacks.

Mr. WHITE. What the Senator from Kentucky has just said about the language "relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor" in

part answers the question I had in mind. The language "relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941" is in itself rather restricting. But the Senator has said it is his intention, and he thinks it is within the authority of the resolution, to have an investigation of all the facts and all the circumstances and all the events preceding the day of the attack upon Pearl Harbor which had any relation to that tragic day's events, and also anything which may have happened subsequent thereto which throws any light upon the occurrences preceding December 7 and happening on that day.

Mr. BARKLEY. The Senator from Maine is absolutely correct. Anything which relates itself to the attack, whether it occurred prior to the attack or whether it grew out of the attack, all has to do with the attack, because without that attack presumably we would not at that time have been involved in the war, we would not have declared war on the following day. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the key attack of the Japanese armed forces in that area, and these other attacks were incidental to it. So I think they all relate to the attack on Pearl Harbor, whether they happened prior to it or after that attack.

Mr. WHITE. And the resolution gives practically plenary powers of investigation with respect to all matters which occurred before the time of Pearl Harbor or thereafter, which relate in any way to the occurrence of the attack?

Mr. BARKLEY. Yes. Whether those things happened in Washington, or whether they happened in the Philippine Islands, or whether they happened in Japan, or whether they happened anywhere else in the world—if they relate themselves, prior to or subsequently, to the attack, the committee can go into them. I think the language is broad enough to permit that.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

[340] Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. TAFT. I have some doubt whether the resolution should not be amended to be somewhat broader, to include the Philippines; to include, so to speak, the Japanese attack on the United States. I assume that the Senator's remarks, however, will be brought to the attention of the House of Representatives when it considers the resolution, and if the language is too narrow that his remarks may have the effect of broadening it.

Mr. BARKLEY. Of course, the Senator realizes that I have no pride of language. I consulted with our experts in the framing of the resolution, and it was thought that its terms were broad enough to cover anything that had any connection with Pearl Harbor. Inasmuch as the attack on Pearl Harbor constituted the key event or episode around which all this investigation revolves, it seems to me that the committee would have plenary authority to go into any matter anywhere in the world that had anything to do with it. But if anyone can offer better language I certainly would not stand in opposition to it. I think, however, the language is broad enough. If we name Wake Island, the Philippines, and some other place, we run a risk, by naming more than the Pearl Harbor incident, of by inference excluding other things that the committee would undoubtedly want to go into.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. BARKLEY. Yes.

Mr. TAFT. Does the Senator consider that the language is broad enough to go back to the beginning of the war, that is, I mean to the general policy, the application of the Neutrality Act, the shipment of scrap, and so forth?

Mr. BARKLEY. Yes. I think it is broad enough to go back to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria or to any other period in past history that can in any way be connected with or related to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, since the Senator is the author of the concurrent resolution, and since that is his interpretation of it, I am willing to accept that interpretation.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. The language I had prepared was that "the committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts surrounding the attack and the events and circumstances leading to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii December 7, 1941." But I am glad to have the explanation of the able majority leader that his language is intended to cover this entire field. I think that the battles of the Philippines and of Guam and elsewhere were merely battles in our war.

Mr. BARKLEY. We were practically at war when those things happened.

Mr. FERGUSON. Yes; that is right. The spark was ignited, or the button was pushed, as was said in the report, by the attack at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. BARKLEY. That is correct.

Mr. FERGUSON. That was the initial attack.

Mr. BARKLEY. Yes.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I wish to associate myself completely with what the Senator from Kentucky has stated today, and I think he has rendered a very great public service to his country. I do not mean to intimate any doubt as to the concurrent resolution containing language properly calculated to implement what the Senator has said.

I recognize, however, the very great importance of what we are doing, and that, under well-settled rules of parliamentary construction, the language of the concurrent resolution, if unambiguous, must control, irrespective of the very illuminating discussions here, and of anything which the Senator himself may have said.

I do feel that, having delayed 4 years the consideration of this matter by the Congress, certainly the public interest will not be seriously prejudiced if we should delay 24 hours, and send the concurrent resolution to an appropriate standing committee which may consider this whole question as to whether or not the language is calculated to carry out what is obviously the unanimous desire of the Senate.

I hesitate to be the only Member who apparently is concerned, but I frankly do feel that this matter should go to the appropriate standing committee.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator that I hope nothing will happen today in the Senate which will create the impression that we are quibbling over the adoption of the concurrent resolution. If any broadening or any change might have to be made to the language, since the measure must go to the House, I myself will take the responsibility of conferring with the Members of the House who will be interested in the matter, with the view of broadening the language as may seem necessary; and I hope the Senator, under those circumstances, will not object to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I frankly do not possess the agility of mind which is possessed by the 95 other Members of the Senate to render an opinion from the very hasty consideration given this matter on the floor of the Senate today, as to whether or not this concurrent resolution implements the marvelously adequate speech of the Senator from Kentucky. I do think that not only his interest but that of the country and of the Senate will be served by at least pausing to consider whether or not this concurrent resolution is well calculated to carry out what is obviously our unanimous purpose. I think the suggestion that the 24 hours delay, which is all that would be required to send the matter to an appropriate standing committee, cannot have great weight.

Mr. BARKLEY. Of course I do not know how long it would take a standing committee to meet and deliberate about the matter.

Mr. BREWSTER. To which committee does the Senator from Kentucky consider the matter should go?

Mr. BARKLEY. It would go, according to the advice I have received from the parliamentarian, to the Committee on Naval Affairs. It might go to either the Committee on Military Affairs or to the Committee on Naval Affairs, but inasmuch as Pearl Harbor was a naval base, and the greater proportion of the damage was done to the Navy, it has seemed appropriate that it go to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Mr. BREWSTER. Well, I feel that certainly that committee could meet quickly.

Mr. BARKLEY. There is another matter involved. If the concurrent resolution is sent to the Committee on Naval Affairs under the rule and comes back to the Senate it must then go to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, which would involve further delay. I think no substantial loss, either in the matter of broadening the resolution, or anything connected with it, would be incurred by allowing it to be adopted now without having to go through the routine of two committees before we can secure action.

Mr. BREWSTER. What I anticipate will almost inevitably occur, if the proposed action is taken, is that when it goes to the House the scope of the resolution will there be broadened, and I will much prefer that the Senate should now undertake to place in the concurrent resolution language which will carry out what is obviously now the unanimous desire of the Senate, rather than to rely on the House to amend language which may be deemed as not entirely clear, particularly as the Members of the House will not have the benefit of the very splendid

explanation made by the Senator from Kentucky as to what he intends by the [34A] resolution.

Mr. BARKLEY. I entertain no jealousy on my part toward the House in the matter of amending anything the Senate may adopt. We frequently exercise that right in the Senate. If the House should see fit to broaden the language, unless it, by broadening the language, thinned it out and watered it down, I certainly would have no objection. But I think it important that we get to work on this job at once without creating the impression that we are seeking to cause delay, through any technicalities, or through any effort of evasion, or in any other way.

Mr. BREWSTER. I certainly share the desire of the Senator from Kentucky for expedition, but as I said before, having waited 4 years, I am certain that we can safely wait 4 days more, and I think the country will be much more impressed with the deliberateness of our consideration if that course is taken.

Mr. BARKLEY. I do not think the country will have any doubt about our deliberateness. We have been talking about this matter ever since it occurred. We have debated it on the floor of the Senate time and time again in connection with the extension of the statute of limitations. I do not think that any impression of hasty action on our part, can be gotten from the adoption of the concurrent resolution now. I think it would be a wholesome example to the country and to every one concerned if we could handle it in the way now proposed.

Mr. BREWSTER. There is one thing about the language which gives me concern, and which I should certainly like to consider. The language is, "the facts relating to the attack by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii." As I understand, a very intimate part of that attack involved two silk-hatted gentlemen who spent the time during the attack with Secretary Hull. Whether they were a part of the armed forces may perhaps be a matter of debate. I believe that what occurred in connection with all those events is very intimately concerned with the attack, and I should not want any language to be calculated to limit our inquiry.

Mr. BARKLEY. The Senator is too good a parliamentarian and too good a draftsman to assume that the language ought to be amended so as to mention specifically the silk-hatted gentlemen to whom he has reference.

Mr. BREWSTER. But I do not like to exclude them by saying "Japanese armed forces."

Mr. BARKLEY. They are not excluded.

Mr. BREWSTER. They are certainly not included in that language.

Mr. BARKLEY. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred while they were here carrying on negotiations with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State received notice of the attack while they were in his office. Certainly that circumstance is related to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. BREWSTER. I think it might well be a debatable question as to whether they are included within the term "Japanese armed forces."

Mr. BARKLEY. These things are all related to that attack. Whether they were members of the armed forces or not is not very important, because they certainly did not themselves make the attack in person when they were conferring with the Secretary of State in Washington.

Mr. BREWSTER. I should say that they were a most essential element.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. VANDENBERG. The language contained in the resolution submitted by the able junior Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON] was given very careful consideration, and from our point of view it has had the sort of study which the Senator from Maine has indicated. I am sure the language fully meets the purpose of the Senator from Kentucky. Would there be any objection to changing the first sentence in section 2, which now reads, "The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii" so as to read "The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts surrounding the attack and the events and circumstances leading up to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii?"

Mr. BARKLEY. I see no substantial difference between the words "relating to" and the word "surrounding." However, I have no objection to the remainder of that language. I believe that the words "relating to" are more appropriate than the word "surrounding," but I certainly would have no objection to including the phrase "leading up to," which could be inserted after the words "relating to."

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I was somewhat concerned as to whether to use the words "relating to" or the word "surrounding." I think they mean the same thing in relation to this event. If the able senior Senator from Michigan would use the words "relating to," and then add the words "the events and circumstances," I think that would cover the objection of the Senator from Maine.

Mr. BARKLEY. I had in mind also the question as to whether additional language, which would specifically apply to previous events leading up to the attack, should be included; but I did not include it for the reason, as I have explained, that I thought the words "relating to" covered it fully, and included events both prior to and subsequent to the attack. However, I have no objection to inserting, after the words "relating to" the language suggested by the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. VANDENBERG. The language would then read:

"The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii."

Mr. BARKLEY. I have no objection to that language.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. May I ask whether or not that language would prevent us from investigating anything subsequent to the attack? We talk about everything leading up to the attack.

Mr. VANDENBERG. And subsequent.

Mr. LUCAS. The word "subsequent" is not in there.

Mr. BARKLEY. We can say "leading up to or following the attack."

Mr. VANDENBERG. I believe that would cover it.

Mr. BARKLEY. I have no desire to cut off the investigation at any particular date if it has any relationship to this attack, or the consequences of it.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has the right to modify his concurrent resolution.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I will modify the concurrent resolution by inserting after the words "relating to," the words "the events and circumstances leading up to or following."

Mr. WALSH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BARKLEY. I yield.

Mr. WALSH. Before the vote is taken on the resolution, which I hope will be unanimous, I wish to take occasion to compliment the distinguished majority leader upon the magnificent and generous manner in which he has responded to the overwhelming popular sentiment of the country. He has not only done that, but he has relieved us all of many hours of anxiety, lifted this question above partisanship, and made an appeal for what the country wants—a high-minded, clean, judicial investigation of all the facts connected with the Pearl Harbor disaster. I wish to say to him that he has exercised statesmanlike judgment on many occasions in the past, but never of a loftier character than today. He has never rendered a better public service. He has not only rendered a service by responding to the public demand, but he has removed all doubts or questions as to the sincerity of our present Government and of the Navy Department in their willingness to have the whole story told truthfully and candidly. As chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, before which this problem has been pending by reason of petitions filed with us, I wish to compliment the Senator from Kentucky and thank him for the service which he has rendered the country.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the remarks of the Senator.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Kentucky that the concurrent resolution, as modified, be immediately considered, without reference to a committee? The Chair hears none.

[341] The question is on agreeing to the concurrent resolution, as modified.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 27), as modified, was agreed to, as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than

three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

"SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.

"SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.

"SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

"(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties.

"(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed \$25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent funds of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman."

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I did not intend, at the outset, to take so much time at this hour, but I hope it has been well spent.

[35] (Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think if counsel spoke into the microphone we could better hear, rather than if he stood up.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have never tried a case with my nose in a microphone, but I will do my best.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure you will do all right, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. You would like me to keep my seat?

Senator BREWSTER. I think so.

Mr. MITCHELL. There are two master exhibits which have been distributed to the committee. They will be referred to by innumerable witnesses on the stand, and I think this the appropriate time to present them.

One is a document, printed in the Government Printing Office, entitled "Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government Between July 1 and December 8, 1941." These were messages, in code, intercepted by our services, decoded and translated. They were exchanged between the Japanese Government and its Embassy at Washington, and include the responses from Washington to Tokyo. There are a few of them that are diplomatic messages from Japan to their Ambassadors in other nations.

They are arranged chronologically in the order in which [36] they were sent. We will not refer to them this morning, I think, but will shortly. The document, of course, will be supported later au-

thentically by detail witnesses, but for the present we present it to the reporter as Exhibit 1.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those to be printed at this point in the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, they are already printed by the Government Printing Office, and they are available in this form to the committee. We will mark it "Exhibit 1," but the reporter will not have to transcribe it.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is one of the documents that was supplied to the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, not long ago; I think yesterday.

Senator BREWSTER. Are copies of that now available to the press?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. This is being received in evidence as exhibit 1?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It is filed with the committee as exhibit 1, and will be referred to specifically, as I understand it, by witnesses later.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it is wide open once it is offered.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted to be sure of. It is a part of the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

[37] Senator BREWSTER. That was the one that was received by us yesterday?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

The next exhibit, I have marked "Exhibit 2." This is another volume of Japanese messages from their Government and their people around the world relating to military installations, ship movements, and so forth. The first exhibit we will call the diplomatic messages, because they related to diplomatic negotiations, but this one is concerned with the military installations, reports from their espionage people in different places, and matters of that kind. That volume also includes documents in code, intercepted, decoded, and translated by our crypt-analytic units, and they are arranged in chronological order.

I present that as Exhibit 2 so that it may be available to every witness.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2.")

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry as to whether counsel claims that is all the information: are these two exhibits now complete?

Mr. MITCHELL. There may be additional information. I do not claim, Senator, that anything we have is final or complete. We will see after we get going whether you are satisfied with what is produced.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to have the record show as to whether or not it is purported that these are complete.

[38] Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir. These are selected messages that seem pertinent to the case, and it is always open, if there is any inquiry by anybody on the committee that we are asked to pursue, why, we will pursue it further.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not copies of Exhibit 2 have been supplied the individual members of this committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Were they included in the packet given us yesterday?

Mr. MITCHELL. They are earlier than that.

Senator BREWSTER. That was delivered to us on November 13, I think.

Mr. GESELL. I think it was early this week.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; Tuesday of this week, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, in the previous investigations that have been held, scores of witnesses and thousands of pages of testimony were taken on piecing together the story of the situation at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to describe the incidents of the attack.

If this committee were to pursue that same course, it might take 2 or 3 weeks for that kind of testimony.

We have, in an effort to save time of the committee, [39] had prepared by the Army and the Navy jointly, under our direction, a narrative and detailed statement, based upon reports and material available in those departments, of the conditions prevailing at Pearl Harbor on that day, and the events that took place. We have tried to eliminate, and I think we have, every question that is in controversy, every matter of fact that hasn't clearly been established, and any question of responsibility.

I think the officers who are presenting that for us have followed that schedule.

This isn't intended to foreclose the fact on anything. It is a picture of the conditions that existed on the 7th and things that happened, and if there is any question that arises later as to whether it is accurate or not, of course, it will be open to the taking of eyewitness testimony. And there are also many questions, doubtless, that aren't covered by the statement, because they are not yet fully established, or in controversy, that will have to be filled in by eyewitnesses.

The officers who have done this work for us are Rear Adm. T. B. Inglis, of the Navy, and Col. Bernard Thielen, of the Army, and we would like to have them sworn.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one do you want first?

Mr. MITCHELL. The narrative statement is a consolidated one. It is not a Navy or an Army statement. It is all [40] woven together, and these gentlemen ought to be sworn together, and they will pick up portions of it and pass the ball as they go along.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the two witnesses referred to arise, and be sworn?

(The witnesses were sworn by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I will ask that the men taking pictures complete their work before we get started.

The CHAIRMAN. The photographers may get their pictures and then clear this space in here.

The committee, in executive session, decided that the order of procedure, so far as the examination of witnesses is concerned, shall be that counsel should be first permitted to examine the witnesses without interruption; that upon the conclusion of his examination, members of the committee will alternate from the Chair right and left between the members from the Senate and the House, and they will ask such questions as they have, and following that, counsel for any witness who has counsel will be permitted to examine the witness himself.

So, gentlemen, we will now proceed.

[41] **TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS, UNITED STATES NAVY, AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN, UNITED STATES ARMY**

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Inglis, what is your status in the Navy now?

Admiral INGLIS. I am attached to the Office of Naval Operations as Chief of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. MITCHELL. How long have you been in that post?

Admiral INGLIS. I have had that particular post for about 1 week, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. What were you doing before that?

Admiral INGLIS. Before that I was Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you had in your naval work the task at times to prepare material and documents and review the facts and do work of that kind?

Admiral INGLIS. I have had something over 31 years of naval experience, and during this time I have served on several admirals' staffs. More recently, my duties in the Navy Department do require that I prepare evaluations and studies somewhat comparable to this we are discussing this morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. What duty were you engaged in on December 7, 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. I was commanding officer of the [42] U. S. S. *Algerab*, which was a ship in the Atlantic Ocean at that time. On that particular date, my ship and I were in port in New York.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you been stationed at the Pearl Harbor base previously to that?

Admiral INGLIS. I have never had shore duty at Pearl Harbor. I have visited Pearl Harbor on numerous occasions on board ships.

Mr. MITCHELL. So you are familiar with the locality?

Admiral INGLIS. I am generally familiar with the locality; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You prepared here, in connection with Colonel Thielen, a narrative statement from the official records and other data available to you?

Admiral INGLIS. I have, sir, with the assistance of officers under my control.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were instructed, or asked by counsel to eliminate matters that were in dispute or questions of responsibility, or questions where your reports and records showed a point of fact had not been clearly established?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, and we have done our best to carry out that directive.

Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel Thielen, what is your status in the Army today?

[43] Colonel THIELEN. I am a member of the War Department General Staff, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you been stationed at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. I was stationed there from 1934 through 1936.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where were you on duty on December 7, 1941?

Colonel THIELEN. I was instructor at the United States Military Academy.

[44] Mr. MITCHELL. Have you had occasion in your work to do the sort of thing that I asked Admiral Inglis about, preparing documents and related material?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. That is my normal duty.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you gentlemen proceed as you have prepared your work and give us this narrative statement of the conditions at Pearl Harbor on December 7, and what occurred there.

Admiral INGLIS. I propose to start this presentation with a brief description —

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, do we have copies of this statement?

Mr. GESELL. No, Senator; there are no mimeographed copies of the statement. There are before each member of the committee two basic folders which I show you now, the Navy folder of exhibits and charts, and the Army folder, which is the red envelope, large red envelope. I suggest that those are the two basic documents that each member of the committee will wish to have before him to follow this presentation.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, it was my understanding that if there were any prepared statements we would have them 24 hours in advance. Was that not the understanding?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it wasn't the Chair's understanding that that rule applied at this preliminary testimony here.

[45] The witnesses who were to testify after this groundwork was laid as to what happened on that day would present to the committee copies of their written statements in advance.

Senator BREWSTER. It is equally essential here, I think. Do you have prepared statements we can have now?

Mr. GESELL. We haven't considered these were prepared statements, Senator. The charts and schedules which contain the basic information are all before the members of the committee. There is going to be a good deal of ad libbing on the charts. It is not quite in the nature of a prepared statement. For that reason it is not before the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Has counsel had a copy of this prepared statement, and if so, when did he get it?

Mr. GESELL. We have no copy, Senator, and we have never had a copy of any prepared statements from either of these witnesses.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, will it be understood that after today the rule will apply?

The CHAIRMAN. It will apply to witnesses. Whether it will apply after today I don't know. I can't tell how soon these witnesses will be through.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. We didn't understand that this type of prepared statement came within the rule, but we will have it mimeographed and furnish it to the members of the committee as [46] rapidly as possible, and if you want the witnesses recalled we will be happy to recall them.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might also state that arrangements have been made with the reporters taking this testimony to provide each member a copy of the day's testimony on the following morning, and I think they will be able to furnish it to the members on the evening the testimony has been brought forward.

Senator BREWSTER. Fine.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have it as soon as possible.

Mr. MITCHELL. You may proceed, Admiral.

Admiral INGLIS. I propose to start this presentation with a brief description of the geography of the Hawaiian Islands and their relation to the whole Pacific Ocean area.

Commander Biard has a chart which has the title up in the upper right-hand corner "Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941."

I will ask the committee to refer to that chart and also to item No. 1, which is a reproduction of that chart, and which is contained in the white folder which has been given to each member of the committee.

It will be seen that Pearl Harbor is on the southern or lee side of the island of Oahu, which is one of the eight principal islands of the Hawaiian chain. These eight Hawaiian Islands lie in a strategically and commercially important [47] position in the North Pacific Ocean approximately 2,000 nautical miles west to southwest of San Francisco.

Commander Biard is pointing out these distances and directions as we proceed.

Oahu is the most important of the islands because of the excellent enclosed fleet anchorage at Pearl Harbor and the commercial port of Honolulu. It is 3,430 nautical miles southeast of Tokyo, 4,685 nautical miles northwest of Panama, 1,990 nautical miles south of Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands and 4,767 nautical miles east of Manila.

[48] A table of distance from Pearl Harbor and other important points in the Pacific is item 2 of the Navy folder. In this connection, it must be remembered that a nautical mile is approximately $1\frac{1}{6}$ land miles.

The islands have a mild subtropical climate with moderate seasonal changes of temperature. They lie in the path of the steady northeasterly trade winds; therefore, the northern portions of Oahu and the immediate adjacent waters are characterized by fresh winds from a northerly direction. The force of the trades is broken by the configuration of the lands so that to the south of Oahu the seas are relatively smooth.

Commander Biard, will you point to the other chart, please, showing the island of Oahu? That is the lee of the island, where the winds and seas are more moderate than on the windward side.

Much of the moisture of the trade winds is deposited on the high peaks to the north forming mist and clouds. Because of this, the visibility to the south of the islands is better than to the north. Further, the northern fringe of the trade belt lies roughly about 300 to the north of Oahu—will you point that out? Three hundred miles to the north of Oahu there is a belt characterized by low ceilings, poor visibility, squalls, and rain.

[49] The Hawaiian chain of islands and adjacent waters are shown in item 3 of the Navy folder. It may be seen from this chart that the sea area around the Hawaiian Islands was on December 7, 1941, divided into certain restricted fleet training areas where units and aircraft of the fleet might carry out exercises and target practices. This same chart also shows two defensive sea areas off Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe. These defensive sea areas were designated by the Presi-

dent of the United States and entry of all merchant ships, both United States and foreign, and of all foreign men-of-war was prohibited unless specific permission for such entry had been granted by the Secretary of the Navy.

The next item is a rather puzzling question of time, difference of time, in different parts of the world.

Time varies throughout the world. For instance, when going from Washington, D. C., to Chicago it is necessary for a traveler to adjust his watch upon arrival in Chicago, because Chicago time is 1 hour behind that in Washington. Comparable changes of time occur whenever the traveler moves about the world.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor at 7:55 on the morning of December 7, 1941, it was 1:25 in the afternoon of the same day in Washington, D. C., and was 3:25 a. m., December 8, in Tokyo.

[50] Item 4 of the Navy folder is a table showing comparative times and dates for Greenwich, England, Washington, D. C., San Francisco, Hawaii, Tokyo, and Manila on December 6, 7, and 8, 1941.

The time of sunrise on the morning of December 7, 1941, the beginning of morning twilight was 5:06 a. m., Hawaiian time, and sunrise was 6:26 a. m., Hawaiian time. That is an hour and twenty minutes before sunrise.

Proceeding next to the composition of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, on the 7th of December 1941 the Pacific Fleet was numerically two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet but the Pacific Fleet contained more modern and more heavily armed vessels.

Next, the commanders of major units of the United States Pacific Fleet:

The commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, who was also the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, was Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

The force commanders were commander, battle force, Vice Adm. W. S. Pye; commander, scouting force, Vice Adm. Wilson Brown; commander, base force, Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun.

The type commanders, and by "type" I mean the type or classification of the ships which they commanded:

[51] Commander aircraft, battle force, Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey.
 Commander battleships, battle force, Rear Adm. W. S. Anderson.
 Commander cruisers, battle force, Rear Adm. H. F. Leary.
 Commander mine craft, battle force, Rear Adm. W. R. Furlong.
 Commander cruisers, scouting force, Rear Adm. J. H. Newton.
 Commander destroyers, battle force, Rear Adm. M. J. Draemel.
 Commander submarines, scouting force, Rear Adm. Thomas Withers.
 Commander aircraft, scouting force, Rear Adm. J. S. McCain.
 Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Rear Adm. C. C. Bloch.

And in explanation of the relationship between the Fourteenth Naval District and the commander in chief, the Fourteenth Naval District was a subordinate command of the commander in chief Pacific Fleet and in this respect differed from the then usual practice in the continental United States.

The Fourteenth Naval District included the Hawaiian Islands,
 [52] Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton Islands.

Commander Biard, will you just draw an imaginary line about the Fourteenth Naval District? Just circle it with your wand, will you?

The disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet outside of the continental United States at 8 a. m., December 7 was roughly as follows:

The main body of the fleet in Pearl Harbor comprised 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 49 other vessels such as submarines, mine craft, tenders, transports, and miscellaneous small craft.

Those are the ships that were in Pearl Harbor. We will go into greater detail on that a little further along in the discussion.

You may also refer to the chart in item No. 1, Navy folder, for the location in detail and the naming of these ships.

In addition to that, item 5 of the Navy folder contains a complete list of every ship in the Pacific Fleet.

Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey consisted of one aircraft carrier (*Enterprise*), three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers. It was about 200 miles west of Oahu, en route to Pearl Harbor after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island.

[53] That task force was coming back from Wake Island to Pearl Harbor.

Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton consisted of one aircraft carrier (*Lexington*), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. It was about 460 miles southeast of Midway, en route to Midway from Pearl Harbor with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers.

Task Force 3 under Admiral Wilson Brown consisted of one heavy cruiser and five destroyer minesweepers. It had just arrived off Johnston Island to conduct tests of a new type landing craft.

One heavy cruiser, with four destroyer minesweepers, was in the fleet operating area about 25 miles south of Oahu conducting exercises.

The heavy cruiser *Pensacola* with an eight-ship convoy west-bound was in the Samoan area. More will be said about convoys later.

The heavy cruiser *Louisville* with a two-ship convoy east-bound was near the Solomons.

Two submarines and a cargo ship were in the Midway area and a similar group in the Wake area.

Two tankers were about half way between Hawaii and the west coast of the United States.

Some smaller units of the fleet were in positions as [54] follows: One destroyer (*Ward*), concerning which more will be said later, was patrolling off the entrance of Pearl Harbor; one destroyer in company with a submarine was about 60 miles southwest; three submarines were 200 miles east of Oahu; the seaplane tender *Wright* was 300 miles west, and four auxiliaries were in Honolulu and Lahina Roads.

The remaining units of the United States Pacific Fleet are shown on the chart as item 1 of the Navy folder.

A detailed list giving the names and locations of United States naval ships of the Pacific Fleet is item 5 of the Navy folder.

Turning next to the location of cargo ships and troop carriers:

About 25 cargo and troop carriers which were United States owned or chartered were west of Hawaii at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. As shown on the chart (item 1, Navy folder), eight of these, including one Navy and three Army troop transports and four ships

carrying general cargo bound for the Philippines, were in the Samoan area, escorted by the heavy cruiser *Pensacola*. Two Army troop transports were in the Solomons area bound for Pearl Harbor, escorted by the heavy cruiser *Louisville*. Four independently routed ships without escorts carrying general cargo were between 700 and 1,200 miles southwest of Hawaii westward bound, while [55] another, east-bound, was in the same area. One vessel was at Canton Island, four in Australia, one in New Guinea, one in Java, and three in the Manila area. All troop carriers were being escorted.

All of the west-bound ships had left Honolulu from 2 to 9 days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, routed and dispatched from there by the port director, Fourteenth Naval District.

A detailed list of these ships and their locations is item 6 of the Navy folder.

There was no United States or Allied shipping of consequence along the North Pacific trade routes west of the 180th meridian on December 7, 1941.

Those thin black lines represent the great circle course to the Orient from Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Puget Sound.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the regular ship lanes?

Admiral INGLIS. The regular, normal shipping lanes used in time of peace.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Those great circle courses are the shortest distances between those points. That is because of the Mercator projection on the chart. A straight line is not the shortest distance between two points on such a chart.

[56] The Chief of Naval Operations, on November 25, 1941, directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea.

Senator FERGUSON. May I have that date again, please?

Admiral INGLIS. The name? Torres.

Senator FERGUSON. No, the date.

Admiral INGLIS. Oh, the date? November 25, 1941.

Therefore, the usual shipping lanes, as shown on the maps of the North Pacific, were not being followed, but rather all ships were being routed as indicated—from Honolulu via Suva in the Fijis and thence to Australia, or via the Torres Strait to the Philippines. Ships destined for Guam were routed via the Philippines, thus avoiding as much as possible the sea area controlled by the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific.

Trans-Pacific shipping lanes, both the usual lanes and those being followed just prior to and on December 7, 1941, are shown in item 1 in thin black lines.

Passing next to a description of the Navy installations ashore in the Hawaiian Islands; except for Pearl Harbor itself these are all classified as minor United States naval installations and were naturally integrated in the over-all defense of the islands, of which Pearl Harbor was the focal point.

[57] I will ask the committee now to refer to item 3-A of the folder and Commander Biard is going to point to the Army chart, on which we have a Navy overlay.

On the island of Molokai there was the Homestead Field Naval Air Base, which consisted of a runway, a warming-up platform and supporting installations.

On the island of Maui there was the Puunene Naval Air Base, which consisted of runways, a warming-up platform, and a CAA Territorial landing field.

Also on Maui was the Maalaea naval emergency landing field, which consisted of two runways and other supporting installations.

On the island of Hawaii, the largest island in the group, there was the naval radio station at Hilo.

On the most important island of the group, Oahu, although not the largest, there was a naval air station at Ewa, which consisted of a mooring mast, a landing mat, and supporting installations.

At the naval air station, Kaneohe, on the opposite side of the island, was a landing mat and warming-up platform and supporting installations and also a seaplane base.

At Kahuku Point, up at the north end of the island, there was an emergency landing field.

At Lualualei, a naval radio station, transmitting station.

[58] At Wahiawa, in the interior, a naval radio receiving station.

At Heeia, a naval radio transmitting station, and at Wailupe a naval radio receiving station.

I would like to make it quite clear at this point that these radio stations were radio stations for transmitting and receiving messages and were not radar stations.

Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, was a major fleet base capable of berthing the entire Pacific Fleet. If the committee will now turn to item 7 in the Navy folder you will find a chart of the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

That is a reproduction of the smallish chart that has just been mounted on the easel.

You will see that the only entrance is from the south via an entrance channel blasted through the fringing coral reef which had formerly blocked the entrance to the harbor. This channel extending to the harbor entrance proper was 375 yards wide and 3,500 yards long, with a minimum depth of 45 feet. The entrance proper to Pearl Harbor is between Keahi Point and Holokahiki Point. From here the channel leads to the various lochs and passages which form the harbor.

I think I should explain at this time that the word "l-o-c-h" is used occasionally throughout this presentation and indicates an arm of the harbor, or perhaps the Scotch [59] would call it a "wake," although it is not fresh water. It is not a "lock" as used in connection with canals.

The ramifications of the harbor are shown on the chart, item 8 of the Navy folder, and also on the chart which has just been mounted on the left-hand easel.

You will see on that chart that the water surface is illustrated by a blue color and the land surface by a white color. The positions of certain ships are marked in red, but I will ask you to disregard that for the moment. We will come back to those later on.

There were varying depths in the harbor, as shown by soundings on the chart. Those tiny black figures show the soundings.

The major channels or the main channels and water in the vicinity of the major ships' berths had a depth of 40 feet. From the sea buoys to the large drydocks a portion of the channel had a minimum depth of 45 feet to provide for the entrance and docking of damaged vessels.

The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets. Here the channel through the coral reefs was about 400 yards wide and the depth was from 41 to 50 feet. The nets themselves consisted of a combined antitorpedo net and antiboat boom to seaward and an inner antitorpedo net without the boat boom.

[60] You see, there are two nets there. The barrier one has anti-boat booms, which are usually cross-armed with spikes to prevent surface craft from sliding up over the boom. Of course, the nets down below the booms are to stop torpedoes and also submarines proceeding under water.

The standard net is 30 feet deep and when suspended covers a depth of 35 feet. Because the channel was of a greater depth, the Chief of Naval Operations instructed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to suspend the inner net 15 feet, making a total coverage of 45 feet.

The Pearl Harbor fleet base included every type of naval activity. Many of the installations operable at that time were new, having been built subsequent to August 1939. Major installations in operation were, at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor: One battleship dock, built 1928; one battleship dock, under construction; one floating drydock, 18,000 tons; one large repair basin, supporting industrial establishments for repairs to anything afloat; one fuel depot with two tank farms above ground—as you all know, a tank farm is a collection of fuel-oil storage tanks; one submarine base—all services for war conditions; [61] one section base—inshore patrol and harbor entrance control post.

And then, of course, there was the administrative office of the Fourteenth Naval District which was inside the navy yard.

At the naval air station—Ford Island, which is the large island at the center of the harbor—there was a large flying field, warming-up platform, seaplane parking areas, and supporting installations.

Next we come to the ships present at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. You can refer again to item 8 in the white folder.

Eight battleships of between 29,000 and 33,000 tons each were among the ships of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Units of the fleet were located as follows:

The battleships *Nevada*—Commander Biard is pointing those out now; those battleships are shown in red and they are as precisely as we can make them to scale.

The *Nevada*, *Arizona*, *West Virginia*, *Tennessee*, *Oklahoma*, *Maryland*, and *California* were moored on the southeast side of Ford Island; the *Pennsylvania* in drydock No. 1 at the navy yard.

Two heavy cruisers, *New Orleans* and *San Francisco*, of the 10,000-ton type, were at docks in the navy yard repair basin.

[62] Four light cruisers of the 10,000-ton type were berthed as follows: *St. Louis*, *Honolulu*, *Helena* at navy yard docks, and *Phoenix* moored northeast of Ford Island.

Two light cruisers of the 7,000-ton type, *Raleigh* and *Detroit*, were moored on the northwest side of Ford Island.

Twenty-nine destroyers (all but three of which had been completed since 1933) were moored to the north and west of Ford Island.

There were five submarines, four of which were tied up at the submarine base, and the fifth at Ten-ten dock in the navy yard.

That dock is called Ten-ten dock because it is 1,010 feet long.

One gunboat was tied up at a navy yard dock. Nine minelayers (eight of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) were located at navy yard docks and in middle loch.

Eleven minesweepers (five of which were converted flush-deck destroyers) moored in middle loch and at navy yard docks.

Twenty-three fleet auxiliaries, such as repair ships, oilers, tenders, store ships, and tugs were located at various berths throughout the harbor.

There were no aircraft carriers in port.

All battleships of the Pacific Fleet except the *Colorado*, [63] which was in the Navy Yard, Puget Sound, were present, in Pearl Harbor.

Item 9 of the white folder gives a list of the vessels present at the time of the attack.

In accordance with existing fleet orders, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet except those undergoing navy yard overhaul maintained condition of readiness 3 while in the harbor. This condition at that time varied according to the armaments of the various types of ships but, in general, required that about one-fourth of the antiaircraft batteries and necessary control stations be manned and that ready ammunition be at the guns. Vessels likewise were limited in the degree to which they could disable their propulsive machinery. In general, most vessels were on 12 hours' notice.

By "12 hours' notice" I mean that the ships were required to be able to get under way 12 hours after receiving the order to get under way.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to pick up from this point.

Colonel THIELEN. Very well.

[64] The Army's report, of course, roughly parallels that which Admiral Inglis has just completed for the Navy. That is, it takes up the Army organization in that area and the disposition of Army units, with their strength indicated.

The Hawaiian Islands were organized for joint defense as the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The Army command was designated as the Hawaiian Department. On February 7, 1941, Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short relieved Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department.

The principal elements of the Department were two infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery command, consisting of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air Force.

On December 6, 1941, General Short had approximately 43,000 troops under his command, disposed as shown in detail on pages 1 to 5 of the Army exhibit which the committee has and which lists the unit locations by district, with an indication of the strength of each unit and the station at which located.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Army exhibits are in the brown folder.

Mr. GESELL. It is the mimeographed folder in a brown folder, I think.

Mr. MITCHELL. Go ahead.

[65] Colonel THIELEN. On the small chart there is the indication of the major units as distributed in the various islands of the group. A reproduction of that chart, is in the hands of each member of the committee.

In the Kauai district we had the Third Battalion, Two Hundred and ninety-ninth Infantry—less Companies K and L—and attached troops; Company C, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry; First Platoon, Signal Company Aircraft Warning; Air Corps Detachment.

In the Maui district we had the First Battalion, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry, less Company C, and attached troops; Company K, Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry, Molokai; Fourth Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft Warning Air Corps Detachment.

In the Hawaii district we had the Second Battalion, Two hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry and attached troops: Camp Detachment, Kilauea Military Camp; Fifth Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft Warning Air Corps Detachment.

On the principal island of Oahu we had the following lesser units: The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division—less Two Hundred and Ninety-ninth Infantry Regiment; Twenty-fifth Infantry Division; Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command; [66] Hawaiian Air Force; Thirty-Fourth Engineers; Eight Hundred and Fourth Engineer Battalion, Aviation; Eleventh Tank Company; Company A, First Separate Chemical Battalion, and Hawaiian Pack Train.

The Twenty-fourth Infantry Division was responsible for the ground defense of the northern half of Oahu, and the Twenty-fifth Division for that of the southern sector. Most of the components of these divisions were located at Schofield Barracks.

The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, under Maj. Gen. Henry T. Burgin, consisted of the following harbor defense units: Fifteenth Coast Artillery Regiment, harbor defense; Sixteenth Coast Artillery Regiment, harbor defense; Forty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, railway; Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery Regiment, 155 millimeter, tractor-drawn; and of these antiaircraft units: Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile; Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile; Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery Regiment, semimobile; Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery Regiment, mobile.

The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command were as shown on page 6 of Army exhibit.

[67] Other large-caliber guns available for defense but manned by field artillery were two 240-millimeter howitzers and thirty-two 155-millimeter howitzers. The seacoast guns were installed principally in permanent fortifications. The fixed antiaircraft guns were emplaced generally to defend the seacoast artillery, and the mobile antiaircraft units were normally stationed at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and Camp Malakole.

Liaison between the Coast Artillery command and the Navy was maintained prior to December 7 by one Army officer and one enlisted man stationed at the harbor patrol station at Pearl Harbor. The harbor patrol station was controlled and operated by the Navy. The purpose of this liaison was to coordinate identification of waterborne craft and other possible targets.

The principal units of Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin's Hawaiian Air Force were the Fifth and Eleventh Bombardment Groups, the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Pursuit Groups, the Eighty-sixth Obser-

vation Squadron, and the Air Corps Services. The Air Force was generally disposed on four fields, Hickam, Wheeler, Haleiwa, and Bellows.

Prior to the attack on December 7, alert No. 1 of the local defense plan set up by the Hawaiian Department was [68] in effect. This alert, one of three provided in the plan, was therein defined as a "defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without." Military installations and equipment, planes, hangars, ammunition, communication centers, highway bridges, and the like were protected by standing guards and patrols.

I will now explain the dispositions as indicated on the chart, on the large map of Oahu, under alert No. 1.

The two divisions, as I have already indicated, had all their principal elements located in Schofield Barracks. There were, however, a number of patrols and standing guards primarily on the road around Kakanoe Island from Honolulu, around to the east, up past Kaena Point, and back down the central valley. These patrols were located at intersections, highway bridges, and other critical points.

The yellow squares indicate antiaircraft weapons, and, as I remarked, it will be noted that in general they are situated down on the south coast, protecting the seacoast installations, except for concentrations of these weapons at Schofield Barracks, the regiment at Fort Shafter, as previously mentioned, and several mobile batteries out at Camp Malakole.

Most of the white squares are either seacoast weapons of various types, those that have the general appearance of [69] cannon, and the aircraft installations at the field which I have mentioned.

That concludes the Army's indication of organization and strength and I believe the Navy will now resume.

[70] Admiral INGLIS. The next topic is "Offshore reconnaissance." There is no written record available of any searches having been made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway. However, Midway had orders to have one squadron of aircraft search daily a circular area with a radius of 100 miles. Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea forces were operating—that is, surface forces. In general, the operating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Midway to Oahu.

I would like now to invite the attention of the committee to item 10 of the Navy folder, which is a reproduction of the large chart that is on display on the right-hand easel. That chart shows in green and white diagonal lines the air searches conducted on the 6th of December and in black and white horizontal lines the searches conducted just prior to the Japanese attack on the 7th of December and then in red and white vertical lines the searches after the attack on the 7th of December.

Of course, in reproducing that chart for your folders the colors do not show, but the identity is preserved by the direction of the stripes—horizontal, vertical, and diagonal.

[71] Patrol squadrons from Midway were also ordered to perform searches wherever sea forces were operating. In general, the operating areas for fleet units were south of a line drawn from Midway to Oahu.

Although there is no record of regular reconnaissance flights being made on this date, the U. S. S. *Enterprise*, 375 miles west of Pearl Harbor and traveling due east, did at 1 in the afternoon launch 15 torpedo bombers which searched, ahead of the ship, an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles. At the time of the above search, the *Enterprise* had six other planes in the air as an antisubmarine patrol ahead of the ship.

On the morning of December 7 there were three patrol planes of the PBY-5 type from Kaneohe Air Station engaged in a routine search of the fleet operating areas approximately 120 miles south of Oahu. That is shown in the black and white horizontal stripes.

According to the operations plan then current, each plane was to be fueled with 1,000 gallons of gasoline which would give it a patrolling range of 800 miles. The planes were to take off at dawn, 5:27 Hawaiian time on the 7th, carrying two depth charges and with all machine guns fully armed. However, these planes did not take off until about 6:40. Later, when the attack took place, these planes were [72] diverted to the northwest to search for the Japanese forces.

Four patrol planes were also in the air when the attack came, engaged in intertype tactical exercises with United States submarines near Lahaina Roads. They also were diverted after the attack to search for Japanese forces. All their machine guns were fully armed but they carried no depth charges. Thus there were a total of seven Navy patrol planes employed in the search.

In addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S. *Enterprise*, 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, launched 18 scout bombers armed with machine guns, shortly after 6 a. m., which searched to the eastward ahead of the ship an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles. The mission of these planes was to search an area around and ahead of the *Enterprise* and then to land at Ewa where they were to be based while the ship was in port. They arrived there during the attack on Pearl Harbor and engaged Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes landed at 9:40 and 10 at 10:15. The other five never arrived.

There is no written report available of any inshore reconnaissance and by "inshore" I mean a distance up to only 30 miles—flown by the Navy off Oahu the afternoon and evening of December 6 or the morning of December 7, 1941.

From neighboring islands on the morning of December 7 [73] there was a reconnaissance of five patrol planes armed with machine guns and a full allowance of ammunition, which took off from the naval air station, Midway, at 7:50 Hawaiian time. Their mission was to patrol the area to the south and southeast of Midway to a distance of 450 miles. Although this reconnaissance was scheduled before, it actually occurred after the attack and is shown on the chart in vertical stripes.

Two additional planes of the same type took off at the same time to rendezvous with the U. S. S. *Lexington* at a point 400 miles from Midway in a southeasterly direction. These planes were to escort the 18 marine scout bombing planes being brought in by the *Lexington* as reinforcements for Midway. This marine flight was canceled after news was received of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Five additional planes, armed with two 500-pound bombs each, were on the alert at Midway ready to take off on 10-minutes' notice.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here again.

[74] Colonel THIELEN. As for Army reconnaissance, there is no evidence that any inshore patrol was maintained by the Army Air Forces on December 7 or on the days preceding the attack. Neither is there evidence that Army bombers were patrolling offshore on December 7 prior to the attack.

Closely related to this subject, however, is the flight of B-17's being ferried from the mainland, which arrived in Oahu about the time of the attack.

Beginning at 9:30 p. m., December 6, 1941, six B-17's of the Eighty-eighth Reconnaissance Squadron and six B-17's of the Thirty-eighth Reconnaissance Squadron took off from Hamilton Field, Calif., at 2-minute intervals. These airplanes were to travel to the Philippines via Oahu. They were not armed.

The aircraft did not maintain formation or visual contact with each other, and made landfall at Oahu at various places. The course from the mainland followed the arc of a great circle which would bring the planes into Oahu from the northeast. However, one plane approached Oahu from about 100 miles north-northwest of the island and another from Kauai, about 75 miles west-northwest of Oahu.

All planes landed on Oahu between 8:30 and 9 a. m., December 7. One landed at Wheeler Field, one at Bellows Field, one on a golf course, two at Haleiwa and the remainder at Hickam Field. Three planes were badly damaged and one was [75] destroyed during landing.

As to the air warning service which was in effect at this time, this air warning service included the radar detecting stations and related equipment and was under the control of the Hawaiian Department signal officer. The warning net did not include any system of ground observers.

By December 7, the Hawaiian Department had received all components for three fixed detector stations (SCR 271). At the time of the attack, construction work had not been completed on the fixed installations at Mount Kaala (Oahu), Kokee (Kauai) and Haleakala (Maui), for the use of this equipment. Six mobile, long-range radar sets (SCR 270) had been received, five of which were in operation early on December 7 at the following points on Oahu—Fort Shafter, Koko Head, Kaaawa, Opana and Kawaihoa. This mobile set (SCR 270) has a normal range up to 150 miles, depending upon the height of the station and height of aircraft. Detection of planes at a distance of 150 miles and flying at 20,000 feet may be expected from sea-level positions. The set consists essentially of four large, heavy truck units. It takes at least 4 hours to place the set in operation. Its full operating complement requires four crews of six trained men to each crew. The equipment is accurate to within 2 miles in range and 3° in azimuth, that is, in direction.

[76] As a matter of interest, the range and other characteristics of the fixed sets were substantially the same as those of the mobile sets.

In use radar indicates the presence of an airplane by a luminous pip on a dark screen. A large number of airplanes at a great distance flying in formation would appear as an abnormally wide pip. At the radar station one of the crew observes the indication of the airplanes on the screen and periodically calls off the distance. Another reads

direction from an azimuth scale. From these data are plotted positions on a chart. There was no way on December 7, 1941, of distinguishing between the images formed by enemy planes and by friendly planes.

When he placed alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed that the Aircraft Warning Service operate all mobile aircraft-warning stations from 2 hours before dawn to 1 hour after dawn—specifically, from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of the mobile radar detector stations was daily from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., routine training from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. except Sundays, and daily except Saturday and Sunday from 12 to 4 p. m. for training and maintenance work.

May I call your attention to the chart which represents a consolidation of the recorded plots at the Opana station [77] before and after the attack; also, in the Army exhibit, page 7, is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of the record of early flights on December 7, 1941, obtained by the Opana detector station. This chart on the easel is taken from the photostatic chart.

On page 8 of the exhibit is a reproduction of a photostatic copy of mobile detector-station records obtained prior to 7 a. m. on December 7, 1941. The dots indicate the location of aircraft. Going back to the chart on the easel, the blue arrow represents the direction of approach of the B-17's previously mentioned as being ferried from the mainland.

I perhaps should mention that those planes were not recorded by the radar station. Their direction is put on the chart merely as a matter of orientation.

At 7 a. m., December 7, 1941, all radar detector stations closed down except the Opana station at Kahuku Point, which remained in operation in order to continue the training of a new man, Pvt. George E. Elliott, who had volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose.

[78] At 7:02 a. m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and Pvt. Joseph L. Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132 miles, bearing 3° east of north, indicated by that pip at the top of the chart marked with the time 7:02.

The soldiers kept tracking the target. At 7:20 a. m. Private Lockard called to inform Lieutenant Tyler, the watch officer at the information center, Fort Shafter, of his observations, but that officer decided to take no action.

Shortly after 8 a. m. Lieutenant Tyler received a telephone message that Wheeler Field was under attack. Lieutenant Tyler thereupon directed that all radar crews be recalled to their stations.

Sound detectors: In the Coast Artillery Antiaircraft Regiment there were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included three gun batteries and a battery of ten 60-inch searchlights.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a minute, Colonel. Will you put the map back there? I would like to ask him a question.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you have anything to say about those purple ink marks on your exhibit, "6:45" and "6:48"?

Mr. KEEFE. I can't hear your question, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am sorry. I have to put my nose in [79] the instrument.

Have you anything to say about those indications of interception at earlier hours to the left of that, as you pointed out?

Colonel THIELEN. As I mentioned, that chart was taken from the historical plot, so-called, of which the committee has a photostatic copy. I reproduced the information in those pips on the chart for the sake of accuracy, but I am not in a position to interpret them.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is, the Army hasn't any information, from its records, to interpret what the radar station showed, what the record of the radar station showed, to the left, I mean?

Colonel THIELEN. Any interpretation would be speculation, I think, on my part, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I just wondered, as it is shown there, whether something ought to be said about it.

Colonel THIELEN. They are taken, as I said, for the sake of completeness from the historical plot. They do appear on the plot. They were plotted on the Opana station. As I indicated, with the state of radar at that time, it could not be definitely stated whether any image was that of a friendly or hostile aircraft.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

[80] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise the point of order. If we are going to have a rule it ought to be followed.

Senator FERGUSON. Since the point of order is raised—

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have a point of order that we agreed to follow, otherwise we will be breaking down the rules before we start. Go ahead.

Mr. MITCHELL. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel THIELEN. As for the sound detectors—

Senator FERGUSON. I assumed, Mr. Chairman, when the counsel asked questions and no one else asked questions, that it would naturally come around to ask him a question.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair's interpretation of the rule is that the committee members are not to ask questions until the counsel has finished with the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. That means completely finished with the witness and he turns him over to the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. It might be quite in order for the committee members to suggest questions, so if they have any suggestions to make they make written suggestions. I think it might clarify the record as to procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

[81] Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel, may I ask you also if there is anything you have to say about the purple arrow going from 10:39 to 10:27 on that map? What does that mean? Why is that on there?

Colonel THIELEN. Because those two points were plotted by the Opana station at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. After the attack?

Colonel THIELEN. That is correct. We could see definitely that they were going away, those at 10:27 having been plotted earlier than that at 10:39.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is all. You may go ahead.

Colonel THIELEN. As for the sound detectors, in the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft Regiment there were generally two battalions of guns, each of which included 3 gun batteries and a battery of 10 60-inch

searchlights. One sound detector generally worked with each searchlight. The primary purpose of the sound detector was to pick up an airplane by its sound and then to point the searchlight; consequently detectors were employed only at night.

The sound detector in use at the time had an optimum range of about 10,000 yards.

I believe the Navy will now discuss their radar.

Admiral INGLIS. Before discussing Navy radar I would like to reconcile one point that might seem inconsistent to [82] the members of the committee.

You will recall, in describing the search of the patrol planes, I said that the planes were to take off at sunrise, 5:27 Hawaiian time. That word "sunrise" was taken out of the report, but I think it was a typographical error because sunrise was actually an hour later, at 6:26.

It is my understanding that the plan did call for the planes to take off at 5:27, an hour before sunrise, which is usually considered as dawn in those latitudes.

With that explanation, I would like to pass on now to the Navy's radar equipment. The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship search radar at that time, on December 7, 1941, were the battleships *Pennsylvania*, *California*, *West Virginia*, and the seaplane tender *Curtiss*. The radar equipment on these ships was not manned since the height of the land around the harbor would have made it ineffective. The equipment on the *Curtiss* was put into operation at the beginning of the first attack and that on the *Pennsylvania* began to operate 15 minutes later, both with negative results.

Facilities for aircraft spotting: On board the naval vessels at Pearl Harbor, aircraft spotting was a function of the crews manning their stations at condition of readiness then existing. Every ship's organization bill provided for certain members of the watch [83] at the gun and control stations to act as aircraft lookouts. There were no naval air lookout stations ashore. However, crews of the signal tower at Pearl Harbor had certain air lookout duties as part of their general signal duties.

Character of antisubmarine patrol operations, December 7, 1941: On the morning of December 7, 1941, the United States destroyer *Ward* was assigned and was carrying out an inner antisubmarine patrol off the Pearl Harbor entrance. Commander Biard is pointing to that locality. This patrol searched the navigable waters between bearings 100° to 250° (true) from entrance buoy No. 1 to a distance of 2 miles.

The mission of this patrol was to detect and prevent unidentified submarines and unauthorized vessels from entering the approaches to the Pearl Harbor entrance channel.

Although not part of the antisubmarine patrol, the United States minesweepers *Condor* and *Crossbill* were conducting minesweeping operations in the channel and approaches thereto.

The fleet units at sea were screened by both a surface and air anti-submarine patrol.

Account of Japanese attack on ships and installations at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941: Possibly the first Japanese contact off Oahu was made at 3:50 a. m. Pearl Harbor time—9:20 a. m. Washington time— [84] when the United States coastal minesweeper *Con-*

dor sighted the periscope of a submerged submarine. At that time the *Condor* was conducting minesweeping operations approximately 13¼ miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. At 3:57 a. m. the *Condor*, by visual signal, informed the destroyer *Ward*, then patrolling off the Pearl Harbor entrance, of this contact.

The *Ward* thereupon immediately instituted a search and at about 6:40 a. m. sighted the periscope of an unidentified submarine apparently trailing the United States target repair ship *Antares*, then en route to Honolulu Harbor.

Commander Biard, will you show the relationship between Honolulu Harbor and Pearl Harbor entrance?

That is Pearl Harbor [indicating] and that is Honolulu Harbor, about 10 miles apart.

[85] Upon sighting the submarine, the *Ward* ordered all hands to battle stations, increased her speed from 5 to 25 knots, and started the attack. The *Ward* opened fire with her guns at 6:45 a. m. and a depth charge attack was commenced. The second gun salvo scored a direct hit upon the conning tower of the Japanese submarine. As a result of these attacks, the submarine is believed to have gone down in 1,200 feet of water. A large amount of oil came to the surface.

At 6:54 a. m., the *Ward* sent the following dispatch by voice transmission to the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District:

We have attacked, fired upon, and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area.

At 7:15 a. m.—12:45 p. m. Washington time—this message was reported delivered to the district officer, Lt. Comdr. Harold Kaminski. In turn, at 7:16 a. m., Lieutenant Commander Kaminski notified the duty officer of the commander-in-chief, United States Fleet. This was the first information received at the Pearl Harbor headquarters of the commander-in-chief, United States Fleet, that unidentified forces might be in the Hawaiian area. Twenty-five minutes after this telephone report, a second was received at the headquarters, commander-in-chief, United States Fleet, from the operations officer of patrol wing two relaying a report received at [86] 7:32 a. m. to the effect that a patrol plane had sunk an unidentified submarine south of Pearl Harbor channel entrance buoy. This was the same submarine reported by the *Ward*. This report was followed by another telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District duty officer in which it was stated that the *Ward* was towing a sampan into Honolulu. This last report was undoubtedly erroneous since there is no mention in the *Ward's* administrative log of her towing a sampan.

Upon receipt of the *Ward's* report by the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, the commandant ordered the ready-duty destroyer U. S. S. *Monaghan* to proceed to sea, to close the net gate, to attempt to verify the contact report giving full details, and to notify the commander in chief's staff duty officer. A dispatch was sent to the *Ward* at 7:37 a. m., asking verification of the report and details of the attack on the enemy submarine.

After the *Ward's* message and prior to the Japanese raid, no other reports indicating or verifying the enemy's presence were received at the headquarters, commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

At about 7:55 a. m. Pearl Harbor time—1:25 p. m. Washington time—the navy yard signal tower telephoned the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

[87] Enemy air raid—not drill.

Almost simultaneously, Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battle-ships. From then on until 9:45 a. m., Pearl Harbor time—3:15 p. m., Washington time—there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor. However, there seemed to be separate periods of greatly intensified activity. On this basis, the narrative of the attack may be divided into five phases.

The five phases of the attack are:

Phase I: Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting from 7:55 a. m. to 8:25 a. m.

Phase II: Lull in attacks lasting from 8:25 a. m. to 8:40 a. m.

Phase III: Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8:40 a. m. to 9:15 a. m.

Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9:15 and 9:45 a. m.

Phase V: Waning of attacks and completion of raid after 9:45 a. m.

The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the heavy combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and the industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement of the heavy ships and aircraft based ashore.

[88] *Phase I—7:55–8:25 a. m.—Combined torpedo and dive-bomber attacks*

The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time—namely 7:55 a. m.—Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the naval air station on Ford Island, concentrated on the planes parked in the vicinity of hangar No. 6.

At the time of the attack, our planes—patrol flying boats, float planes, and scout bombers, carrier type—were lined up on the field. These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford Island was pitifully weak. Then as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made during the day. Except for a direct hit on hangar No. 6 resulting from a bomb which was apparently aimed at the battleship *California* and which fell short, the damage to the station itself was comparatively slight. However, 33 of our best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged.

[89] As soon as the attack began, commander, Patrol Wing 2 broadcasted from Ford Island the warning: "Air raid, Pearl Harbor—This is not a drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar message from the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the Kaneohe Naval Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low-flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15

minutes, the attacking planes drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight. Several other contingents of bombers passed over, but none dropped bombs on Kaneohe Bay.

About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes similar to one of our light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe and commenced bombing and strafing. Number 3 hangar received a direct hit during this attack and four planes in the hangar were destroyed. The majority of the casualties suffered at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes or to save those [90] planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew, some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were commenced, but it was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until only its steel structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 35 planes at Kaneohe escaped destruction in this attack. Six of these were damaged and three were in the air on patrol south of Oahu as previously described.

Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack. Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2 minutes. It was delivered by two squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater fighter planes using machine-gun strafing tactics, which came in from the northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. These enemy planes would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of the ground, attacking single planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they would pull over the tree tops, reverse their course, and attack from the opposite direction. Within less than 15 minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned upon our utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for repair, and upon the Marines themselves.

Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid had subsided. Pilots, aching to strike at the enemy in the air, viewed the wreckage which until a [91] few minutes before had been a strong air group of Marine fighters and bombers. All together 33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa had gone up in smoke. Some marines, unable to find anything more effective, had tried to oppose fighter planes with pistols, since the remaining 16 planes were too badly damaged to fly.

Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor Japanese dive bombers were effective, the torpedo planes did the most damage. They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed their attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach for torpedo attack against selected heavy ship objectives. Thus they indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths and the berths ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of our fleet. At least in the great majority of cases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor did not prevent the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured by the use of specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack.

Four separate torpedo-plane attacks were made during phase I. The major attack was made by 12 planes which swung in generally from the southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry Point. After splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low al-

titudes (within 50 [92] to 100 feet of the water), and from very short distances, aiming for the battleships berthed on the south-east side of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships, namely, the *Nevada*, *Arizona*, *West Virginia*, *Oklahoma*, and *California*, were effectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing was simultaneously conducted from the rear cockpits. A recovered unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds.

During the second of these attacks, the *Oklahoma* was struck by three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding the efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers.

The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared from the west and was directed against the light cruiser *Helena* and the minelayer *Oglala*, both of which were temporarily occupying the berth previously assigned to the battleship *Pennsylvania*, flagship of the Pacific Fleet. One torpedo passed under the *Oglala* and exploded against the side of the *Helena*. The blast stove in the side plates of the *Oglala*. Submersible pumps for the *Oglala* were obtained from the *Helena*, but could not be used since no power was available because of damage to the ship's engineering plant.

The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and attacked the seaplane tender *Tangier*, the target [93] ship *Utah*, and the light cruisers *Raleigh* and *Detroit*. The *Raleigh* was struck by one torpedo, and the *Utah* received two hits in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a. m. At first it was feared that the *Raleigh* would capsize. Orders were, therefore, given for all men not at the guns to jettison all topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help keep the ship from capsizing.

The *Utah*, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had recently returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombardment. As soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to port. After she had listed to about 40°, the order was given to abandon ship. This order was executed with some difficulty as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island safely. Later knocking was heard within the hull of the *Utah*. With cutting tools obtained from the *Raleigh*, a volunteer crew succeeded in cutting through the hull and rescuing a fireman second class who had been entrapped in the void space underneath the dynamo room.

An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowledge is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the *Utah* and *Raleigh* were placed were [94] designated carrier berths and that a carrier was frequently moored in nearby F-9.

The *Detroit* and *Tangier* escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo passing just astern of the *Detroit* and burying itself in the mud. Another torpedo passed between the *Tangier* and the *Utah*.

It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in these four attacks was 21.

In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types of bombs were employed—light, medium, and incendiary.

During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14-inch powder magazine on the battleship *Arizona* and caused a ravaging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby inter-

fering with antiaircraft fire. The battleship *Tennessee* in the adjacent berth was endangered seriously by the oil fire.

The *West Virginia* was hit during the third of these attacks by two heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the *California*, she had to be abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer, the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the *Tennessee*, where he organized a party of *West Virginia* survivors to help extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash, and oil which [95] covered the water between the *Tennessee* and Ford Island.

The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at 30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers and accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.

Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in four groups were active during phase I.

Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8:25 a. m. All the outboard battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the *Oklahoma*, which took four torpedoes before it capsized, and the *Pennsylvania*, which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the first phase, the *West Virginia* was in a sinking condition; the *California* was down by the stern; the *Arizona* was a flaming ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.

Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise, defensive action on the part of the fleet was prompt. All ships immediately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns likewise opened fire at once, and within an estimated average time of less than 5 minutes [96] practically all battleships and anti-aircraft batteries were firing.

The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers, although opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.

During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within the harbor proper. The destroyer *Helm*, which had gotten under way just prior to the attack, was outside the harbor entrance when at 8:17 a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of the entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately submerged. The *Helm* opened fire at 8:19 a. m. when the submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.

[97]. *Phase II—8:25–8:40 a. m.—Lull in attacks*

This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air activity continued during this phase although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard, the battleships *Maryland*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*, and *Pennsylvania*, and various light cruisers and destroyers.

Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull, these appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under that heading.

At 8:32 a. m. the battleship *Oklahoma* took a heavy list to starboard and capsized.

During phase II, there was still relatively little ship movement within the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer *Monaghan* had received orders at 7:51 a. m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immediately and contact *Ward* in defensive sea area." At about 8:37, observing an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the *Curtiss* and *Tangier*, the *Monaghan* proceeded at high speed and at about 8:43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight. The *Monaghan* thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.

The *Curtiss* had previously scored two direct hits on [98] the conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The *Monaghan* then proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At the same time that the *Monaghan* got underway, the destroyer *Henley* slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the *Monaghan* down the channel.

Phase III—8:40-9:15 a. m.—Horizontal bomber attacks

The so-called lull in the air raid was terminated by the appearance over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, inflicting serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame. According to some observers, many bombs dropped by high-altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor area.

During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the *Pennsylvania* was hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated, causing a fire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.

The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the *California* with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with tail vanes which [99] penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.

Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had participated in earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.

Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, approximately 18 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.

It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable damage to the *Nevada*, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also to the *Shaw*, *Cassin*, and *Downes*, all three of which were set afire.

During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping 1 bomb on the seaplane tender *Curtiss* which detonated on the main-deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other unaccounted for.

During this same phase, the *Curtiss* took under fire one of these bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit squarely by the *Curtiss*' accurate gunfire, the plane crashed on the

ship, spattering burning [100] gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.

Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a. m. the *Nevada* cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded down the South Channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship was trying to reach open water, they sent dive bomber after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry-dock No. 2, and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to make a turn in the channel, the *Nevada* ran aground in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.

Meanwhile the repair ship *Vestal*, also without assistance, had gotten underway at about 8:40, had cleared the burning *Arizona*, and at about 9:10 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.

Soon after the *Nevada* and *Vestal* had cleared their berths, tugs began to move the *Oglala* to a position astern of the *Helena* at "Tenten" Dock. The *Oglala* was finally secured in her berth at about 9:00, but shortly thereafter she capsized.

At 8:42, the oiler *Neosho* cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship *Maryland*.

[101] Next, phase IV, from 9:15 to 9:45, dive-bomber attacks—

The CHAIRMAN. Under the program of the committee, 12 o'clock having arrived, I think we should now recess until 2 p. m., and complete your testimony then.

Admiral INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, if I may have 30 seconds longer, I could finish this particular part.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You might as well come back at 2. (Whereupon, at 12 m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[102]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

Admiral INGLIS. In this morning's portion of the presentation I finished phases I, II, and III. I propose now to take up the story with phase IV, which lasted from 9:15 to 9:45 and was characterized by dive-bomber attacks.

Phase IV—9:15–9:45 a. m.—Dive bomber attacks

During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In all probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted previous attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the horizontal bomber attacks previously described in phase III.

Phase V—9:45—Waning of attacks and completion of raid

By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading our aerial searches, both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force retired to its home waters without being contacted by any of our units. For summary of Japanese planes participating in attack see item 11 in the white folder.

The foregoing has been a discussion of the attack phase only. The details of our aircraft and antiaircraft action will be given later.

[103] Summary of percentage of personnel mustered on station: Fleet orders at the time of Pearl Harbor directed that one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted personnel be on board at all times.

Excerpts from a summarized report of personnel actually on board at the commencement of the attack on December 7, 1941, are as follows:

	On board
Commanding officers of battleships.....	5 out of 8
Commanding officers of cruisers.....	6 out of 7
Commanding officers of destroyers.....	percent... 63
Damage-control officers of battleships.....	6 out of 8
Average percentage of officers:	
Battleships (approximate).....	percent... 60-70
Cruisers, battle force (approximate).....	do... 65
Destroyers, battle force (approximate).....	do... 50
Average percentage of men:	
Battleships.....	do... 95
Cruisers, battle force.....	do... 98
Destroyers, battle force.....	do... 85

There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval shore installations.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here.

[104] Colonel THIELEN. In presenting the Army's story of the attack, I propose to describe what happened at each of the three major airfields, Hickam Field, Wheeler, and Bellows, and after that to describe the action taken by our ground forces, and our coast artillery command in response to the attack.

Our planes on Hickam Field at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up aprons three or four abreast, with approximately 10 feet between wing tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose of another.

If you will note the plan of the Hickam Field as displayed on the easel, you may be able to distinguish the aircraft on the warming-up apron. They are actually drawn to scale. They may not be legible. However, each member of the committee has a photograph of the plan of each of these airfields.

Hickam Field observers report that the first indication of an attack was at 7:55 a. m. when nine enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, were observed southeast of Hickam Field hangar line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, five planes in the first and four in the second. These airplanes did not attack Hickam Field.

[105] At almost the same time, however, nine dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hangar line from the south, and three additional planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the southeast. Immediately thereafter, seven additional dive bombers attacked the

Hickam Field hangar line from the east. All planes dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet. Bombs were released at about 1,000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives from 800 to approximately 300 feet. Machine gun fire was employed before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes.

The second attack on Hickam Field occurred at about 8:25 a. m., when between six and nine planes approached from the south and attacked No. 1 aqua system, which is a hydrostatic pass for the fuel pumping system, and also the technical buildings immediately behind the hangar lines, and the consolidated barracks. These planes when first observed were flying level and released their bombs from level flight at an altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this bombing attack our planes on the parking apron were attacked with gun fire. About 1 minute later (8:26) a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond [106] from a high altitude, possibly believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.

The third attack at Hickam occurred about 9 a. m., when six to nine planes (presumably those that had previously bombed from level flight at 150 feet at 8:25) attacked with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the hangar lines and certain planes which by then were dispersed.

These attacks came from four directions almost simultaneously. At the same time a formation of from seven to nine planes, flying in V formation at an altitude estimated at 6,000 feet approached from the south, releasing bombs which struck the consolidated barracks, the parade ground, and post exchange. The third attack lasted about 8 minutes. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were single engine, low-wing monoplanes. The type of high altitude bombers was not definitely established. Largest bombs used were believed not to exceed 600 pounds. Gun ammunition was identified as 7.7 and 20 millimeter ammunition.

At Wheeler Field, our planes were parked in the space between the aprons in front of the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines approximately wing tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.

[107] About 25 Japanese planes approached at 8:02 a. m., generally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They passed well to the east of the field, circled counter-clockwise, losing altitude and approached for attack from the north at about 3,000 feet, generally perpendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the entire group was roughly a V—with five sections of four planes each forming the V formation—that is indicated on the chart and on the photographic reproductions thereof—with a fourth plane extending the right leg of the V.

A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the formation. They dived at an angle of about 45° and struck the hangar line and vicinity over a length of about 900 yards, starting from the engineering hangar which is at the extreme southwest of the hangar line. Out of approximately 35 bombs dropped, 4 were about 600 pounds, 3 were about 250 pounds, 8 were about 100 pounds, and the remainder were smaller, some of them appearing to be oil or other type incendiary bombs. Machine gun fire was employed during the dive bombing attack. Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and points in the rear

and were released at altitudes of 200 and 250 feet. After releasing bombs, the planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled out at about the same angle as at the [108] start of the dive.

After the first dive bombing the formation broke, apparently in all directions, with individual planes continuing gun fire without regard to the possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on from altitudes of approximately 200 feet and the only semblance of order appeared to be that planes circled counterclockwise. Principal targets for this gun fire were our planes on the hangar line and buildings, and personnel in the immediate vicinity. All planes in the first attacking formation appeared similar and were single-engine, low-wing monoplanes. While not positively established, it is presumed from evidence of 20 millimeters fire that this attack included fighters in support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15 minutes.

Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9 a. m. This attack consisted of seven enemy planes which approached from the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the airdrome, but it is believed that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven planes were single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, two-seaters. They withdrew to the north. The whole second attack lasted less than 5 minutes and could very reasonably have been [109] made by a group of planes expending the remainder of their ammunition.

During the first raid at Wheeler Field, personnel were employed in rescuing the wounded, fighting the numerous fires and in removing airplanes from danger. As soon as undamaged aircraft had been rolled away to a safe place, the crews began arming them.

On Bellows Field at the time of the attack the P-40's were parked in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals. The reconnaissance planes were also parked in a line at slightly greater intervals.

I might point out that those aircraft on the white squares represent the original formation as it was at the time of the first attack. We have also represented aircraft in blue squares dispersed over the field. Those are the same aircraft represented as being initially in line. After the first attack they were all over the field.

A single Japanese fighter plane initiated the attack at approximately 8:30 a. m. It came directly from the east and employed machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expending all its ammunition in this one attack.

At about 9 a. m., the nine fighters attacked Bellows Field from the north in three groups of three planes each in V formation. This attack lasted about 15 minutes and [110] consisted of gun fire only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all nine planes, after which the three formations of three each peeled off and attacked from various directions. The antiaircraft defense during this attack on Bellows Field consisted of small-arms fire by elements of the Two Hundred and Ninety-eighth Infantry.

After the single plane, tent-area attack, one of the B-17's which had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land at Hickam Field, attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off the runway. And that can be seen on the chart in the orange circle, the approximate position where it left the runway. This plane was repeatedly machine-gunned by the nine attacking planes.

The attack at Bellows Field appeared to be well planned, rehearsed, and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by the Infantry troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the sea for identification.

At Haleiwa—you might point that out, Captain, on the big map—the planes of the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron were parked in the open in close formations. However, Haleiwa Field was not attacked.

In all these attacks on Oahu airfields, strafing planes came down to a very low altitude. They used .50 caliber, 7.7 millimeter and 20 millimeter ammunition. Rigid flight discipline was [111] demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. Such attacks could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Every movement was well executed. The evidence indicates that the attacks on the airfields were made by a maximum of 105 airplanes; the number may have been less since some of the planes may have taken part in more than one attack.

After 9:45 a. m., December 7, there were no further attacks on Oahu installations. Despite numerous false reports, no landings were attempted.

A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu, but probably this was the result of individual planes clearing their bomb racks before departing. There was some strafing and a few bombs were dropped on Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. Several bursts of machine-gun fire were delivered at targets other than military objectives.

When the first bombs were dropped and machine-gun fire commenced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps 2 or 4 minutes elapsed before General Short was informed by his chief of staff that an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that all troops be turned out under alert No. 3.

This alert required all units to occupy battle positions shown on this map— [112] which I will explain in a moment—in the shortest possible time and to defend Oahu. All troops accordingly moved to their prescribed positions. The advance command post of the Hawaiian Department was operating in Aliamanu Crater by 8:45 a. m. with limited personnel, and the advance command posts of the Twenty-fifth Division and of the Hawaiian Air Force by 11 a. m. Rear echelons remained at their normal locations—which, for the department, was Fort Shafter; for the division, Schofield Barracks.

At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding the Twenty-fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at about 8:05 a. m. Within a few minutes his chief of staff had issued instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft positions, to increase the standing guard and to send patrols throughout the division sector—which was the northern half of the island—to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8:50 a. m. the division received word from department headquarters that alert No. 3 would go into effect at once. Approximately 90 percent of the Twenty-fourth Division troops were present for duty on the morning of December 7, according to a report made shortly after by the Hawaiian Department. The division was in position in [113] the north sector by 5 p. m. with ammunition except for the 240's, 240-millimeter howitzers.

The disposition of the division, Twenty-fourth Division, as shown on the map, can be picked up by the crossed rifles for Infantry positions, by the cannon for Field Artillery battalions, and the main line of resistance on the east coast can be seen following the ridge line of the Koolau Range on the east and the Waianae Range on the west.

Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray, commanding the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, stated that the attack began about 7:53 a. m. Some machine guns were in firing positions on the roofs within 10 minutes. Alert No. 3 was placed in effect at about 9 o'clock. Some ammunition—other than high explosive—had been moved into the barracks which meant that most of the men had as much as 30 rounds. About 85 percent of the Twenty-fifth Division troops were reported present for duty at the time of the attack. By 4 p. m., on the 7th all units of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Division were in war positions in the south sector with ammunition, except for the 240-millimeter howitzers. Map shows sectors and subsectors of responsibility in the south sector.

The yellow squares, the antiaircraft, which I will discuss in a moment, of course, were not under division control. Again, the crossed rifles indicate the Infantry [114] and the wheel cannon the Field Artillery, indicating the disposition under alert No. 3.

Under alert No. 1, the harbor defense troops of the Coast Artillery Command were at their gun positions while the antiaircraft units remained at their home stations and guarded against sabotage. On December 7, some of the AA units got into position in 15 or 20 minutes, but others had to go to the other side of the island and were not in position until afternoon. A detailed account of the movement of anti-aircraft units is given on pages 11 and 12 of the Army exhibit. An estimated 87 percent of the Coast Artillery personnel were present for duty at 8 a. m., December 7. No Coast Artillery Command officers were reported absent at the time of the attack except one who was killed trying to get back to his place of duty.

Maps captured from planes shot down in the attack indicated that the enemy had complete and up-to-date information concerning the exact dispositions of military forces, depots, and engineering establishments.

Percent mustered: A summary of a report compiled by the adjutant general of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent of the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a. m., December 7.

[115] Now, going back to the subject of aircraft, and the results of the attack, also the condition of aircraft before the attack, at the time of the attack the Hawaiian Air Force, in common with other units of the Hawaiian Department, was operating under alert No. 1. General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, had informed his subordinates that it was a real and not a practice alert. He had further instructed that aircraft would not be dispersed and that all units would continue training under condition "Easy 5."

"Easy" being phonetic for "E."

"Easy 5"—E-5 under the standing operating procedure—meant that all aircraft would continue to conduct routine training operations, with none in readiness for combat operations, and with 4 hours' time allowed for the first plane of each unit to be in the air, armed, and prepared for combat.

Page 10 of the Army exhibit shows when and in what numbers planes took off from Oahu Army airfields after the attack, and page 9 of the same exhibit shows the status of all combat planes before and after the attack as reported by the Hawaiian Air Force. In this connection attention is invited to the fact that final reports to the War Department show that total plane losses was somewhat greater than initially reported. In explanation of the disparity it [116] should be stated that to meet the emergency created by the attack certain damaged planes which normally might have been repaired were stripped for parts and destroyed.

The attention of the committee is invited to the chart which has just been placed on the easel and which is a blowup of the exhibit previously referred to, the status of combat planes before and after the attack. The color code is applied to the number of planes in each column. The blue indicating planes in commission, the buff out of commission, and finally the total on hand, and at the head of each column where the numerical designation of the plane is given, if that designation is on the green background, that plane was considered obsolete by the Air Force.

The yellow code, which occurs only in the columns "After Attack," indicates those aircraft which were destroyed.

At Hickam Field, prior to the attack, 6 heavy bombers—B-17—20 nonmodern medium bombers—B-18—and 5 modern light bombers—A-20—were in commission but were not ready for immediate use because they were not loaded with bombs and ammunition. The following planes were on hand but out of commission for reasons indicated:

Six B-17's—engine repair, fuel tank repair, 50-hour inspection, 200-hour inspection, and carburetor repair;

Twelve B-18's, overhaul, damaged landing gear, damaged [117] elevator, and first echelon maintenance;

Seven A-20's—damaged wing flaps, repair and first echelon maintenance.

First echelon maintenance is maintenance of a nature which can be performed by the crew of the plane; 50-hour inspection is an inspection and overhaul of each plane which is required to be made after each 50 hours of flight; and 200-hour inspection is a more thorough overhaul made after 200 hours of flight.

After the attack, 8 B-17's were on hand of which 4 were usable; 20 B-18's were on hand of which 10 were usable; 10 A-20's were on hand with 5 usable. Eighteen of our combat planes were lost on Hickam Field. It was 11:27 a. m.—as shown in another exhibit—when the first four A-20's took off from the field for combat.

At Wheeler Field and Haleiwa prior to the attack, the following planes were in commission but not ready for immediate use since they were unarmed; 82 pursuit, 52 P-40's, 20 P-36's, 10 P-26's; 2 medium bombers, 1 B-12A, 1 B-18; 2 light bombers, A-12; 5 reconnaissance 1 O-47, 1 OA-8, 3 OA-9's; and 3 advanced trainers, AT-6; which are not shown on the chart, the chart including only combat aircraft.

On hand but out of commission for maintenance work were [118] these additional planes: 2 B-12's, 35 P-40's, 19 P-36's, 4 P-26's and 1 AT-6—not shown on the chart.

After the attack, the number of usable planes by type were as follows: 27 out of a total of 57 P-40's, 16 out of 35 P-36's, 4 out of 8 P-26's, 1 B-18, 1 out of 3 B-12's, 1 of 2 AT-6's, 1 O-47, 1 OA-8 and 1 OA-9.

Forty-two combat planes were lost in the attack in this airdrome. At 8:30 a. m. the first aircraft, four P-40's and two P-36's took off for combat.

Planes assigned to the Forty-seventh Pursuit Squadron, which was in training at Haleiwa Airfield—and they have been included in this Wheeler chart—consisted of 17 pursuit, 13 P-40's, 2 P-36's, 2 P-26's, and 1 medium bomber, B-12. That is the table of organization strength of the unit.

The exact number of planes at Haleiwa on the morning of December 7 is not known. The field was alerted at 8:15 a. m. Between 8:15 and 10 a. m. two flights were made, each consisting of four P-40's and one P-36. Four enemy planes were downed by the first flight while the second flight downed three. One pilot was lost over Schofield Barracks.

At Bellows Field 12 pursuit planes, P-40; and 6 reconnaissance planes, 4 O-47's, 2 O-49's; were in commission prior to the attack. However, none of these were ready [119] for immediate use because their weapons were not loaded with ammunition. An additional two reconnaissance planes, O-47, were located at Bellows Field but were out of commission for engine change. It was 9:50 a. m. before the first O-47 took off. Three of our combat aircraft were destroyed on this field.

After the attack on December 7, about 11:40 a. m., four A-20's and two B-17's took off. Also at 3:20 p. m., three B-17's were dispatched, as a result of a request of the Navy, to search for an enemy carrier. The search was unsuccessful and they returned at 6:25 p. m.

As for the antiaircraft their activities subsequent to the attack, shown as previously mentioned on pages 11 and 12 of the Army exhibit, show the time required for the various units of the Fifty-third Coast Artillery Brigade, Antiaircraft to take battle positions after the attack of December 7 and the extent to which they engaged the enemy.

Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the [120] mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry and Artillery units of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Divisions had only a small amount of machine-gun and rifle ammunition. All divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and mortar shells were in the ordnance storage depots, principally at Schofield Barracks.

The 3-inch antiaircraft gun issued to units in Hawaii at that time had a maximum effective range of about 10,000 yards. It had a minimum effective range of about 2,000 yards.

The 37 millimeter antiaircraft gun had a maximum horizontal range of 9,300 yards, and a maximum vertical range of approximately 6,300 yards.

This concludes the Army's story of the attack.

[121] Admiral INGLIS. Turning now to the Navy's aircraft and state of readiness of aircraft and antiaircraft guns, the committee will find in item 12 of the white folder the locations, squadrons, numbers

of planes in commission, types, numbers available, numbers in operating condition, readiness in operating condition, readiness of crews, numbers participating in combat and service assigned to land based naval and Marine planes in the Hawaiian area.

Item 13 of the white folder contains this information summarized on a chart showing location of the fields and stations.

The planes in flight at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor were armed for combat as follows:

The 7 patrol flying boats in the air, 3 from Kaneohe and 4 from Ford Island, all carried machine guns and were fully supplied with ammunition. In addition to machine guns and ammunition, the three planes from Kaneohe searching the fleet operating areas south of Oahu were armed with two depth charges each for use against submarines. These planes were working with the destroyer *Ward*. One of these aircraft dropped one depth charge in an attack on a submarine in the defensive sea area off Pearl Harbor at 6:45 Hawaiian time. Utility Squadron 3, stationed at Maui Airport, which was the new naval air station at Puunene, seems to have had some [122] planes in the air prior to 7:50. Hawaiian time, on the day of the attack. These planes are not combat planes and do not normally carry armament. Available reports do not indicate the state of armament of the scout bombers from the *Enterprise* that arrived over Pearl Harbor during the attack. As they engaged the enemy, it appears that machine guns were equipped and ammunition provided.

Next, antiaircraft: There were no naval antiaircraft shore batteries in or around Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack. All naval antiaircraft batteries were ship-based, and were composed of the following types and number of guns:

Gun types	Number	Maximum range		Maximum effective range yards
		Ceiling-feet	Yards	
5-inch, 38 caliber antiaircraft.....	136	37,200	15,900	12,000
5-inch, 26 caliber antiaircraft.....	96	26,300	13,500	7,000
3-inch, 50 caliber antiaircraft.....	121	21,700	11,000	5,000
Antiaircraft machine guns from 1.1 inch to .30 caliber.....	427	(1)		

1 Effective ranges of 500 to 2,500 yards.

Effective range is that range at which fire should be opened with reasonable chance that fire would produce damage on the target.

[123] Antiaircraft guns by ship classes and types of guns is shown in item 14 of Navy folder.

Official reports indicate that all naval antiaircraft batteries were in operating condition. The number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be negligible and when such momentary stoppages occurred, except as guns were knocked out in battle casualties, they were quickly remedied.

All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on board except in a few cases where removal was necessary because of repairs in progress.

All ships had ready ammunition at the guns in accordance with existing directives. Battleships and cruisers had 15 rounds per gun for two guns of the 5-inch antiaircraft battery and 300 rounds per gun for half of the 50-caliber machine guns. The destroyers present

all had 50-caliber ammunition available and some 5-inch ammunition. Although the initial attack was launched as a surprise, ready machine guns opened fire at once and all batteries except those on ships undergoing overhaul took up the fire within approximately 7 minutes after the attack was initiated.

The considerable amount of ammunition available is shown by a tabulation of all rounds expended.

There were 1,665 rounds of 5-inch 38-caliber antiaircraft ammunition fired. [124]

There were 1,523 rounds of 5-inch 25-caliber antiaircraft ammunition fired.

There were 1,741 rounds of 3-inch 50-caliber antiaircraft ammunition fired.

There were 275,807 rounds of machine-gun ammunition fired.

At the time of the attack, roughly one-fourth of all shipboard antiaircraft guns were manned, and within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and firing.

Ready antiaircraft machine guns opened fire immediately and within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4 minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action. Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10 minutes after the beginning of the attack.

Turning next to the question of sabotage, there is no record of any sabotage during the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Next the subject of first aid: The dead and wounded were handled by a number of naval medical activities; battle dressing stations and sick bays of [125] the warships; hospital ship *Solace*; United States Naval Hospital; dispensaries of the two naval air stations; Marine Corps air station at Ewa; defense battalions of the Fleet Marine Force; navy yard dispensary; section base dispensary; ammunition depot dispensary, and at a "field hospital" which was set up in the officers' club of the navy yard shortly after the attack.

Three hundred thirty dead and 1,113 wounded were brought to naval hospital stations during the period December 7-10. Many others died who were trapped in capsized or sunken ships.

Colonel Thielen will take up from here.

[126] Colonel THIELEN. As to the miscellaneous subjects of hostile agents, sabotage, and civilian protection I have a few remarks.

Prior to the attack, all known Japanese, Italian, and German agents had been listed by Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Naval Intelligence. Within a few hours after the attack the Japanese agents were being apprehended and assembled in the Immigration Station, Honolulu. All agents were subsequently assembled in the Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being 370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians.

There are no proven instances of sabotage before, during, or after the attack, although the jamming of radio frequencies which occurred immediately after the attack and which made communication difficult may have been due, in part, to sabotage.

By noon the roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every direction. Under the direction of Mr. Addison Kirk and his civilian

relief committee, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., which operates a large number of busses, immediately moved into Hickam Field and Fort Kamehameha, and started evacuating civilians from these areas. All during Sunday afternoon and the following day the evacuation of civilians continued, most of them being quartered in schools and homes [127] throughout the city. At Fort Shafter, where the headquarters of the Interceptor Command was being constructed in a spur of the Koolau Mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter and a few from Schofield barracks were accommodated. Slit trenches were being dug at all the posts and in parks, school grounds, and all open places accessible to civil communities.

Admiral Inglis will take on from here.

[128] Admiral INGLIS. With respect to damage to Navy ships, a general description of the damage to naval vessels has been given in the narrative. In item 15 of the Navy folder the members of the committee will find a complete detailed description of this damage, with the first sheet being a summary.

Item 16, Navy folder, describes the loss of 87 nonairborne naval aircraft, and the loss of five airborne planes from the carrier *Enterprise*, for a total of 92 planes, and itemizes also the damage to installations at Ford Island Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and the Marine Air Base at Ewa.

Now, turning to the damage to Japanese, it was estimated that the Japanese lost a total of 28 planes, most of which were dive bombers and torpedo planes, due to Navy action.

Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each and carrying two torpedoes were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered.

From reports available to the commander in chief, it is estimated that the Japanese lost, due solely to Navy action, a minimum of 68 killed. An estimate of wounded cannot be made. One officer, an ensign, was taken prisoner when he abandoned the small submarine which grounded off Bellows Field.

[129] The above report on the Japanese damages or losses does not include operational losses, only losses in combat.

With respect to efforts to track the Japs after the attack, air searches to track the Japanese striking force were ordered and carried out without result.

Colonel Thielen will take over now.

[130] Colonel THIELEN. As to the Army casualties and the damage suffered by Army installations, on page 13 of the Army exhibit there is a list of Army casualties in the Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941. They were:

Killed in action.....	194
Wounded in action.....	360
Missing in action.....	22
Died, nonbattle.....	2
Declared dead (Public Law, 490).....	1
Died of wounds.....	21
Total.....	600

In addition to the extensive damage to installations on airfields shown by the various photographs submitted herewith, final reports show that 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action on

December 7. This figure includes aircraft destroyed in depots and also those damaged planes which were stripped for parts.

As to the damage done to Japanese, General Short reported that 11 enemy aircraft were shot down by Army pursuit planes and antiaircraft fire.

[131] Admiral INGLIS. The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven hundred and fifty-nine wounded survived. None were missing.

Next with respect to the conduct and behavior under fire of the personnel.

In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired.

References to individual valor are replete with such acts as—

- (1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treatment while they themselves needed help.
- (2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame and from flooded compartments.
- (3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.
- (4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and strafing.
- (5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.
- (6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or while ships were sinking.

[132] (7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being blown off their own sinking vessels.

For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor have been awarded and 60 Navy Crosses.

Colonel Thielen will now take over.

[133] Colonel THIELEN. On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 65 Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during the December 7 attack.

That concludes the Army's narrative of the attack.

Admiral INGLIS. That also concludes the Navy's formal presentation.

[134] Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, the Navy had the Fourteenth Naval District and the Pacific Fleet. This story you have developed covered both?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. As I pointed out, the Fourteenth Naval District in this particular instance was under the command of the commander-in-chief and the presentation that I have given covers the activities of both the forces afloat and the forces ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, as I understand it, the Navy commands had for antiaircraft defense only the antiaircraft guns based on the ships?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You said something about marines on shore setting up machine guns. I was not so clear about that.

Admiral INGLIS. The marines that I mentioned ashore as firing back at the Japanese planes during the attack were the personnel of the Marine air squadrons at Ewa and those machine guns, I think in most cases, were stripped from the—perhaps not stripped, but taken from

the armory and comprised the guns which normally would be used by the aircraft themselves.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, the only other defense the naval command had when under attack was in the airplane defense?

[135] Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. MITCHELL. And those planes, as I understood you, were carrier planes that came in and became land based at Ford Island as their carriers came into port, except for some that were on the cruisers, two or three per cruiser?

Admiral INGLIS. The planes that I mentioned from the carriers were en route—no, I take that back. They were sent out by the *Enterprise* on search and then when the attack developed they were diverted in an attempt to repel the Japanese attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. Could you sum up and state how many naval planes of the fighter type capable of fighting enemy planes got into the air before the attack was over?

Admiral INGLIS. Before the attack was opened—

Mr. MITCHELL. Over.

Admiral INGLIS. Oh, before the attack was over?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, after it commenced and before it ended. I am not interested in those which got into the air after it was over.

Admiral INGLIS. I have a table here which I think will give you the information that you asked for.

At the naval station, Ford Island, there was a total of 70 planes before the attack started. Of these 19 were destroyed, [136] 14 were damaged and 37 were left undamaged. Of those 37 planes, 31 were utility planes, not designed for combat, 4 were the patrol planes already in flight and 2 were in the shop under repairs, so that there were no planes at Ford Island available to engage in combat except the four which were already in flight. That is from the Ford Island Station.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you say none of them got into the air at all?

Admiral INGLIS. None except four which were already in the air. They were in the air before the fight started.

Mr. MITCHELL. They were in the air before the fight started?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

At Kaneohe 37 planes were attached to the air station. 28 of those were destroyed, 6 were damaged, 3 were undamaged and those 3 which were undamaged were in the air before the attack.

At Ewa 49 Marine planes were based at that naval air station and of those 49, 33 were destroyed and 16 damaged, leaving none in operating condition.

At Maui there were a total of eight planes but all of those planes were utility planes and not designed for combat operations. None of those, of course, were damaged.

At Johnston Island there were two PBY's undamaged. I have [137] no information on the employment of those, but Johnston Island is a long way from Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. A PBY is an observation plane?

Admiral INGLIS. The PBY is a long range airplane.

Mr. MITCHELL. Not a fighter?

Admiral INGLIS. Not a fighter; no, sir; but equipped with fairly respectable armament.

At Midway there were 12 PBV's. None of these 12 was damaged, of course, because Midway was not attacked, but these planes were on the search, as has already been described.

Now, in addition to that the *Northampton*, a heavy cruiser, launched two or her observation planes which are not very efficient as fighters but, nevertheless, they did succeed in shooting down one Japanese plane off the Island of Niihau.

That is about the extent of my information in answer to your question, sir.

[138] Mr. MITCHELL. Colonel Thielen, as I understand it, the Army exhibit, in accordance with the statement on page 10, covers that information from the Army standpoint, does it? Is that complete?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; that is complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Mr. MITCHELL. According to that, on Hickam Field the first plane that got into the air was at 11:27?

Colonel THIELEN. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. The attack was over by that time?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; the attack was well over.

Mr. MITCHELL. At Wheeler Field you got some P-40's up at 8:34?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is a fighter group?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. I believe that is a significant point. The airplanes at Hickam Field were bombers and those at Wheeler Field were pursuit ships, as they called them in those days, fighters as we call them now, which did get up all right.

Mr. MITCHELL. You got some up at 8:20, some at 8:55, an hour after the attack started, some at 9:15 and some at 9:30. Those were all the planes at Wheeler Field that had gotten into the air?

[139] Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir, since 9:35 is taken as the definite termination of the attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. What are those at 7:47 at Bellows Field and that one that you say got up at 9:15?

Colonel THIELEN. Those are observation airplanes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you a summary of your figures to show how many planes of fighting type the Army forces had in commission and how many of them got into the air before the attack was over? Could you secure that for us? Could you sum that up for us without too much trouble?

Colonel THIELEN. I think the exhibit on the preceding page, taken in connection with that which you cited, sir, on page 10 do tell a complete story. The exhibit on page 9 is that which I have displayed on a chart. I will be glad to recall the chart.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. I thought maybe you had a total. Well, that is satisfactory; the committee can see it.

Will the committee inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly. [140] Admiral, as I understood you, on December 7, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was about three-fourths the size of the Atlantic Fleet, but I understood you to say the Pacific Fleet was more modern and stronger or had larger vessels? Is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, Mr. Congressman, except that the figure was two-thirds.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Two-thirds?

• Admiral INGLIS. Rather than three-fourths.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And I also understood you to say that there were no searches made on December 6, 1941, by aircraft.

Admiral INGLIS. That is not correct. We have no written record of any searches except the search from the *Enterprise* which is shown on the chart.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were there any searches made the day before that anywhere near this approximate time?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not prepared to answer that specifically. I might hazard an opinion that there were.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then one other question, if I may, while along the line of General Mitchell's inquiry.

According to item 11 of the Navy exhibit presented here, it is shown that the Japanese aircraft participating in this attack totaled 105. Is that correct? Item 11 of your white exhibit here, the second page of that, it shows there, total [141] number of planes making attack, including those which repeated, and out at the right hand column, "Total 156." Then under that, "Total number of planes, exclusive of those which repeated," it totals 105.

Admiral INGLIS. I have those figures now, sir. I must say that that number—that is the number of planes which repeated their attacks and, therefore, are counted as more than once in the first figure, is necessarily an estimate but our best estimate, according to the records that we have available, is 105 as the total number of planes which actually attacked.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As far as the Navy and Army can ascertain—

Admiral INGLIS. No, these are only Navy figures.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I understood the colonel to give the same figure in his statement. You agreed on that. So far as the Army and Navy knew at that time there were 105 Japanese planes that participated in the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, are you prepared to tell us what the United States air strength in Hawaii was at that time?

Admiral INGLIS. I can tell you what the Navy air strength was. That is contained in one of the exhibits.

[142] In item 12 in the Navy folder you will find a table giving, among other things, the number of planes attached to the various squadrons and stationed at the various naval air stations.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I have examined that, Admiral, in an effort to get the information I am now requesting. At least, it is not put up in the same form as the Jap planes and I was wondering what the total was.

Admiral INGLIS. I would have to qualify any answer that I might make to your question by pointing out that a large number of those planes given in item 12 are utility types and not suitable for combat.

For instance, all of those marked "VJ" are utility type planes and that takes out a large proportion of the total as being suitable for combat operations. Those planes are used for towing target sleeves for antiaircraft fire and for transport and things of that nature, duties other than combat.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, in an effort to not detain you unduly as I am sure other members of the committee want to inquire, could you gentlemen give me a figure that would compare with the 105 Jap planes which made the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; if you will bear with me just a moment while I add them up. I come out with the answer 52.

Mr. GESELL. That is Navy planes?

[143] Admiral INGLIS. Those are Navy planes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Navy planes 52?

Admiral INGLIS. 52 Navy planes comparable in design to the Japanese planes which made the attack. That excludes the utility planes and the PBV's.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. In other words, this 52 would be the number of combat Navy planes?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral INGLIS. I think I should add, to make the story complete, that that does not include the planes from the carriers, that is, the *Enterprise* and *Lexington*. These are only the planes based on Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, how many carrier planes were in a position that they could have been used?

Admiral INGLIS. The *Enterprise* was 200 miles away from Pearl Harbor at the time and any planes that she might have had available to participate in the attack would have been nearly at the extreme limit of their radius of action. However, there were 18 *Enterprise* planes which did get into the general area of the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Eighteen?

Admiral INGLIS. So if you cared to you could add the 18 to the 52, making a total of 70.

[144] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, at what stage of the attack did these 18 get into it?

Admiral INGLIS. Those planes took off from the *Enterprise* shortly after 6 a. m. The attack was launched at 7:55 a. m. and 3 of the planes landed at 9:40 and 10 at 10:15. I would gather from that that the *Enterprise* planes reached the scene of the attack at an estimated time of perhaps 9 o'clock.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would that be during the time the attack was in progress?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Were there any other carrier planes that were available there, such as you have described about the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; no other carrier planes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And no others that did participate?

Admiral INGLIS. The only other planes that we have not already covered were the two planes from the *Northampton* and, again, those planes are not of combat type. They were observation planes but they did shoot down one Japanese plane in spite of their comparative weakness.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the colonel for the same type of information so far as the Army is concerned.

[145] Colonel THIELEN. First, sir, I would like to correct what I believe is your impression that only 105 planes were involved in attacks on both Army and Navy installations. Is that correct?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the way I understood it.

Colonel THIELEN. I want to say that is not the Army view. We consider that 105 airplanes is our estimate of the number that were involved in the attacks only on Army installations and I believe it is a mere coincidence that the Navy has the same figure.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the figure is the same in both statements. Does that mean, then, that there were just exactly 105 planes that attacked the Army and just exactly 105 planes that attacked the Navy?

Colonel THIELEN. I am not prepared to say how many attacked the Navy, but our estimate is 105 aircraft attacking Army installations only.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will give you later the Japanese story showing how many planes they sent. This is only confusion and guesswork, these figures that are given here.

Colonel THIELEN. It is purely an estimate. It is obtained by adding up the total number of aircraft reported by observers at the three Army fields attacked. It is entirely possible that there is considerable duplication, as no one [146] was in a position to observe more than one airfield at a time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I had this figure. I had just assumed from what I heard you both say that there were 105 Japanese planes engaged in the attack and I had assumed that that was the total number of Japanese planes.

Colonel THIELEN. As I say, the Army considers that 105 aircraft attacked Army installations.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What do you have to say about that, Admiral?

Admiral INGLIS. I have the same thing, Mr. Cooper. The figure of 105 is just an estimate.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood that.

Admiral INGLIS. It is just impossible to arrive at a precise figure because, as you know, there was a great deal of confusion at that time and this is just the best that we can make of the reports that we have and the estimate is 105 planes engaged in the attacks against naval ships and naval shore installations.

You remember that in answer to your question I tried to bring out that these were Navy figures. These presentations that the colonel and I have been making were made up separately. There is no, if I may use the term, collusion between us except insofar as we have arranged for certain portions [147] of the presentation to go to the Army side and then certain portions to go to the Navy side, but we have not tried to reconcile our figures.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It had not occurred to me, Admiral, that there was any collusion but I was rather in the position of hoping to congratulate you gentlemen if the Army's estimate of the number of Jap planes and the Navy's estimate of the number of Jap planes happened to be the same. I thought you were doing remarkably good estimating if you were both estimating the same.

Admiral INGLIS. I am afraid in all modesty I will have to admit that that is a pure coincidence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What I was trying to find out was how many Jap planes were attacking us.

Admiral INGLIS. As Mr. Mitchell has said, Mr. Cooper, a later presentation will give the Japanese side of the story and I think we will get much more accurate figures from that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. I was hoping to ascertain, so far as you could tell us, the number of Jap planes that were attacking us.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the strength of the United States aircraft in Hawaii at that time, combat planes that might have been used in meeting or repelling that attack.

[148] Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what I was hoping to get.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. I think you have the whole figure. It is 70 in the case of the Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Seventy in the case of the Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir, and our best estimate of the Japanese planes that were making the attack, that is, from the American point of view, without the Japanese intelligence before us, was 105 against naval targets.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, let me see if I can get some help from you, Colonel.

Colonel THIELEN. I would like to point out first that no aircraft were armed and equipped for combat against these Japanese, but of the pursuit aircraft in commission on Oahu at the time of the attack we had 94 pursuit aircraft before the attack and 53 after the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Ninety-four before the attack?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And your total number was what, Admiral?

Admiral INGLIS. My total was 52 shore-based planes, plus the 18 from the *Enterprise*, making 70.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is 164 for the Army and Navy.

A question to both of you gentlemen. Are you prepared to [149] give us some estimate of the number of Japanese planes that attacked both Army and Navy installations?

Admiral INGLIS. The only way I could answer that would be to add Colonel Thielen's figures to mine and that would be 210, but there again, Mr. Cooper, we must qualify that by saying that some of these reports have been duplicated. Perhaps the same plane attacked both a Navy ship and an Army air station.

[150] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can well understand that. I would expect that to be the best guess.

Admiral INGLIS. I would say the best estimate we can come out with would be 210.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George would like to ask a question.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral, I believe you stated this morning that United States shipping along the northern route had been discontinued as of November 25, 1941; is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you assign any reason for that order for discontinuing the shipping on that route?

Admiral INGLIS. This presentation that we have made has omitted all reference to any reasons for action taken.

Senator GEORGE. I merely wanted to get clear in my mind what you said. You did not assign any reasons?

Admiral INGLIS. I did not; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, in the earlier part of your testimony you gave to the committee some facts with respect to the reconnaissance planes which took off on the morning of December 7. I am not sure that I thoroughly understood just why the delay existed there, or whether the evidence, or the records of the Navy disclose the reason for that hour's delay of these planes taking off for reconnaissance work.

[151] Admiral INGLIS. That, as I recall it, was the case of the planes taking off from Midway——

Senator LUCAS. No; not from Midway.

Admiral INGLIS. You remember, Senator Lucas, I corrected that word "sunrise" to make it read "dawn." The plan was to have these planes take off at dawn, which is usually considered as 1 hour before sunrise. That was the standing order, that they were to take off at dawn, which was 5:27.

However, these planes did not actually take off until about 6:40, which is even more than hour late. Those were the three patrol planes from Kaneohe air station.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. Are there any records which disclose the reason for the delay in taking off?

Admiral INGLIS. There again, Senator, in our presentation we have purposely avoided——

Senator LUCAS (Interposing). I am not asking for your conclusion, I am asking you whether or not you have discovered any records in the Navy Department giving or disclosing any reasons why these three reconnaissance planes were over an hour late in taking off on the dawn patrol.

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I do not know the reason.

Senator LUCAS. One other question with respect to those reconnaissance planes: Do the records disclose the distances that these reconnaissance planes covered on their usual dawn [152] patrol flight?

Admiral INGLIS. Those patrol planes were described in the exhibit which is number——do you remember the zebra stripes?

Mr. MITCHELL. Item 10.

Admiral INGLIS. Item 10. Item 10 in the Navy folder, you will find the horizontal stripes due south of Oahu. As I recall it that distance was 120 miles.

Senator LUCAS. 120 miles?

Admiral INGLIS. 120 miles.

Senator LUCAS. Now one other question. Do the records disclose as to how long that patrol had been in existence previous to December 7?

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot answer that question, sir. I do not know whether they do or not.

Senator LUCAS. Will counsel please take these questions that I am asking and supply, if he can, the answer for the record?¹

You also discussed the sighting of the submarine at 3:50 in the morning on the morning of December 7. You also stated that the commander of that ship notified the commander of the destroyer *Ward* that at 3:57 he had sighted the periscope of the submarine.

It is my understanding of your testimony that the *Ward* [153] opened fire at 6:45 on that submarine, after sighting it at 6:40, and

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1687 et seq.; see also Part 11, p. 5484 et seq.

then the commander of the *Ward* reported to the commanding officer at 6:54 that the submarine had been sunk.

Now who was the commanding officer at that time?

Admiral INGLIS. The name of the commanding officer of the *Ward*?

Senator LUCAS. Yes; the name of the commanding officer of the *Ward*—or, I mean the name of the commanding officer to whom the commander of the *Ward* reported.

Admiral INGLIS. The *Ward* sent the dispatch to the office of the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Senator LUCAS. Who was in charge of it at that time?

Admiral INGLIS. The dispatch was delivered to the district duty officer, who was Lt. Comdr. Harold Kaminski.

Senator LUCAS. It was delivered to Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, but who was in charge of the Fourteenth Naval District at that time?

Admiral INGLIS. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was Admiral Bloch.

Senator LUCAS. Do the records show where Admiral Bloch was at the time this message was delivered?

Admiral INGLIS. To the best of my knowledge and belief, he was in his quarters.

Senator LUCAS. Do the records show whether or not he [154] was notified by Lieutenant Commander Kaminski with respect to the sinking of this submarine?

Admiral INGLIS. I am afraid I cannot answer that question.

Senator LUCAS. Do the records show whom Kaminski—or whatever his name is—notified about the sinking?

Admiral INGLIS. Kaminski was notified and he in turn passed the message to the headquarters of the commander in chief of the United States Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Who received that message at the headquarters?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got that information. I can get it for you.

Senator LUCAS. I wish you would get it. Admiral Kimmel, of course, was the gentleman in charge of the fleet at that time.

Admiral INGLIS. Admiral Kimmel was commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the Pacific Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Does the record show whether or not Admiral Kimmel received the message at any time before the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot answer that question either, sir.

Senator LUCAS. According to your testimony the attack took place at 7:55.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

[155] Senator LUCAS. The submarine was sunk by the *Ward* at 6:54. I should like to know whether or not, during that hour's time, Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel received any direct notice of the sinking of that submarine.

Now of course we will ask the officer who made the report on the sinking of the submarine to have it with him in the morning, to see what importance was attached to the sinking of this submarine, as far as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned.

Admiral INGLIS. Senator, I would not expect that any of those authorities or officials would have received the report that the sub-

marine had been sunk, because the report of the *Ward* was "We have attacked"——

Senator LUCAS. Whatever the report was—I do not care for the report itself, but whatever the report was that went in.

Admiral INGLIS. I will get that information for you.

Senator LUCAS. I want to know why it happened, and if they made a report on it, and whatever the report is, and to whom it went, and especially would I like to know at what time—if there is any time—that Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel received that report.

Admiral INGLIS. We will get that information and insert it in the record, if it is available.¹

Senator LUCAS. One other question and then I will be [156] through.

When you say that the Fourteenth Naval District was under the commander in chief, you mean the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; Admiral Kimmel.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, before you go to Congressman Clark?

Do the records disclose as to whether or not those on patrol duty around Pearl Harbor looking for submarines discovered at any time previous to the morning of December 7 anything that would direct their attention that submarines were in that area previous to the morning of December 7?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; the records on that subject are completely negative.

Senator LUCAS. That is, up to that time, up to the morning of December 7, as far as the record is concerned, there is no record that shows that there was any danger from the standpoint of looking for submarines, or a submarine attack, even though they were on guard and the boys were looking for submarines?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, to the best of my knowledge.

[157] Senator LUCAS. That is all, Admiral Inglis.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Admiral, you showed a diagram this morning on the extent of the plane patrol. The impression I gained was the extent of the patrol immediately after the attack is shown in red.

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Would you mind having that map put back?

Admiral INGLIS. Commander Biard, will you put up the chart showing the patrols.

Mr. CLARK. Now what I was trying to get clear in my own mind, if the red diagram there shows the extent of the patrols by the planes around Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack—is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Is that a larger or a smaller area of patrol than had been the case immediately prior to the attack?

(The roll call buzzer sounded.)

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to the committee that that is a roll-call vote in the Senate on the substitute offered by Senator Byrd to the amendment offered by Senator Donnell to the reorganization bill.

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5298.

The committee has been excused from attendance during the hearing here.

Senator FERGUSON. Without waiving my right to examine the [158] witness, might I be excused just long enough to vote on that? I think it is an important matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if the Senator wishes to, and if any other Senators wish to vote I think they may also be excused.

Senator LUCAS. I am willing to give you one vote here.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the wish of the committee?

Senator BREWSTER. I am willing to stay here and allow Senator Ferguson to go.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a very important vote. That is the only reason why I ask to be excused.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator may be excused. The Chair will ask the Vice Chairman to take the Chair while he goes and votes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. You have my question.

Admiral INGLIS. I believe your question was: Did the patrol which was ordered immediately after the attack cover a greater area than that which had normally been covered before the attack?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that question is "yes."

Mr. CLARK. Now you gave us a very graphic picture of Pearl Harbor, and the military establishment there, including [159] everything on the airport and so forth. I am interested to know, and I assume you would be the proper witness to ask, how that establishment on the Hawaiian Islands, the military establishment, compares with any other base or military establishment we may have had in the Pacific area at that time, including the Philippine Islands, as to size and strength and equipment, and munitions of war.

Admiral INGLIS. You wish me to compare Hawaii with any other United States base or establishment, military installation?

Mr. CLARK. In the Pacific area.

Admiral INGLIS. In the Pacific area?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir.

Admiral INGLIS. Of course that perhaps is a matter of opinion, but my opinion is that it was by far the strongest United States base in the Pacific area.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I will waive questions at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, in answer to Mr. Clark's question as to whether or not the patrol afterward, after the attack, was larger than before, your answer was, in your opinion, "yes."

Isn't it true that the black lines indicate the patrol before and the red, which includes the area of the black, was [160] afterward, and therefore the necessity much larger than it was before?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now then, it is my understanding that you and Colonel Thielen are prepared only to discuss the details of the attack and not to go into the whys and wherefores.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir, speaking for myself.

Colonel THIELEN. I concur in that.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to know from someone in the Navy, and I assume you are not the one, I would like to record to show that I want to know whether or not there was any inspection order within a week prior to Pearl Harbor, the effect of which would be to put the ships out of commission.

One member of the committee has intimated that such an inspection was ordered. I would like to meet it squarely just as soon as we possibly can.

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot answer that question, but perhaps I can throw a little light on your inquiry, and that is this, that a careful study of the damage sustained by the ships at Pearl Harbor on that day was made by some competent officers in the Bureau of Ships, and as a result of that study they concluded that the *California* was the only ship where the opening of the compartments had any effect or was in any way a contributing factor to the damage suffered by the ship.

[161] Mr. MURPHY. Now then, so far as the other ships are concerned, they were not under a condition of inspection that would call for open compartments and other conditions that would disable them in case of combat; is that right?

ADMIRAL INGLIS. No, sir; I did not intend to give that impression in my answer. I do not know the answer to that specific question. All I can say is any openings did not contribute to the spread of the damage or the flooding of the ships, except on the *California*.

Mr. MURPHY. May I indicate to counsel on the record, and to the Navy, that I hope some witness will be called who will be able to give any details of what inspection, if any, was ordered within a week of December 7; what effect, if any, that had on the ships on the morning of December 7, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would say, Mr. Congressman, that we are hard at work on that now.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. We haven't the story here today because we haven't gotten to the bottom of it.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. We are cutting out of this statement anything that has not been definitely established.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. That very point is under inquiry now. [162] We have some information about it, but it is not complete.¹

Mr. MURPHY. My next question, Admiral, is that in your exhibit you have given a list of the ships that were sunk, damaged, and capsized. That was Exhibit No. 17.

Admiral INGLIS. That is item 15.

Mr. MURPHY. Item 15. That contains a list of battleships, light cruisers, destroyers, repair ships, mine layers, seaplane tenders, and miscellaneous auxiliaries.

The Navy did make a public statement, did they not, through Secretary Knox, within a few days subsequent to December 7, 1941, as to the damage to ships at Pearl Harbor, including those sunk and those damaged?

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347, for all communications on the subject of water-tight integrity of vessels at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have some witness from the Navy testify on the record as to how the list given today compares with the public notice given immediately after Pearl Harbor.

Admiral INGLIS. I will have to get that for you, sir, and insert it in the record.¹

Mr. MURPHY. The next thing I would like to ask, Admiral, and I would like to ask of you, Colonel Thielen, and that is what reconnaissance was ordered by Admiral Kimmel or by General Short subsequent to the messages received by them on November 27 down to and including December 7, 1941, and I [163] assume that neither of you are prepared to answer those questions at the present time.

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot answer.

Colonel THIELEN. I cannot give a definitive answer, I can only point out the condition of alert that was placed in effect at that time, which did not envisage the possibility of attack from without.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to have a specific answer. In addition to the fact that alert No. 1 as to sabotage was ordered, I would like to have a specific answer as to what reconnaissance, if any, was ordered by the Navy and Army immediately subsequent to November 27 and prior to the morning of December 7, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have other witnesses that are going to be brought on that will cover that, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now then, the two figures of 105, they, of course, would make 210, but neither of you, as I take it, would attempt to say that the planes that were used in the Army attack were not also used in the Navy attack?

Admiral INGLIS. Speaking for myself, I see no way of unscrambling those figures.

[164] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson would be next but he has been temporarily excused. Mr. Gearhart, of California.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Inglis—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Here is Senator Ferguson. He is your turn, Senator Ferguson. Will you defer, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. I defer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, can I inquire as to when you first knew that you were to be the witness to give these facts?

Admiral INGLIS. At 3 o'clock last Friday afternoon, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And up to that time, what did you have to do with assembling the facts? Up until 3 o'clock Friday, what did you have to do in relation to assembling the facts?

Admiral INGLIS. As Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, my officers had been engaged for perhaps a week before that in getting up this presentation.

Senator FERGUSON. From whom did you get your instructions as to what was desired by the committee?

Admiral INGLIS. The instructions were relayed to us through the Judge Advocate General's office.

[165] Senator FERGUSON. Are they in writing?

Admiral INGLIS. Are they what, sir?

¹ See Hearings, Part 6, p. 2674 for a table submitted by the Navy Department showing a "Comparison of actual damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and that stated in the report that was released by Secretary Knox on 15 December 1941."

Senator FERGUSON. Are they in writing?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the instructions you were given by the Judge Advocate General's office?

Admiral INGLIS. The instructions were to be prepared to make a presentation before the committee of the factual evidence concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you instructed to give no conclusions, or no orders?

Admiral INGLIS. Those instructions evolved in the course of time. I don't believe that they were specifically stated in that form when the instructions were first passed along to us.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get the instructions not to draw any conclusions or not to give any orders; that is, to cite any orders?

Admiral INGLIS. We were given an outline of the subjects which were to be covered.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the outline? Was it in writing?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it off, sir?

[166] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. It is two pages.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the same outline we gave the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see it?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

(A copy was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Admiral INGLIS. The Senator may keep that copy if he wishes.

Senator FERGUSON. You have others?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who selected you, Admiral, to be the spokesman?

Admiral INGLIS. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Edwards, gave me the directive.

Senator FERGUSON. Can I inquire from the colonel as to when he first learned that he was to be a witness?

Colonel THIELEN. I didn't receive positive information until just before the past week end, Friday or Saturday. I had been told before that time that I might be called upon to actually present the story.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did you first know that you were to present the story?

Colonel THIELEN. As I say, I was informed positively [167] on Friday or Saturday last.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drew up your presentation?

Colonel THIELEN. I belong to a section of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, which is continuously engaged in research of this type, in examination of after-action reports, and other such first sources, to prepare digests similar to this. We work together. We have a procedure whereby a number of researchers, both officers and enlisted personnel, are given their task, and the material is assembled and edited.

Senator FERGUSON. When was your report assembled?

Colonel THIELEN. The first draft, a week or 6 days ago.

Senator FERGUSON. A week or 6 days ago. When did you first furnish counsel of the committee with a copy of your draft?

Colonel THIELEN. No such copy has been furnished to this time, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Up until the present time. Admiral, when did you first furnish the committee or any counsel with a copy of your draft?

Admiral INGLIS. I beg pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first furnish the committee or counsel with a copy of your draft?

[168] Admiral INGLIS. I don't believe I have given the counsel a copy of the draft. I have given the committee, I mean the counsel, copies of the exhibits, but as far as I know, not of the draft of this script.

Senator FERGUSON. Of what you read to the committee?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't believe so; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I noticed one conclusion that you drew, and that was in relation to the radar, that the man was practicing after 7 o'clock.

Admiral INGLIS. No; that was the Army.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, will you give us what information you have on that?

Colonel THIELEN. Would the Senator care to have me repeat the story?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I don't want the story repeated. I would like to have what information was given to you that he was actually practicing. Who told you that?

Colonel THIELEN. You mean my sources on that, sir? This copy is documented. The fact that these two enlisted men picked up an indication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7:02 a. m. on the morning of December 7 comes from the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of Private McDonald.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you examined [169] the Roberts report in order that you might give us this summary?

Colonel THIELEN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What other reports did you examine?

Colonel THIELEN. I have a rather long list here, Senator. I did not examine that all personally. It so happens I did examine the Roberts report personally. I examined the Grunert report personally, and various other sources. There is a list of some 74 documents which were examined by the various members of the section of which I am a part.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, when you examined these various reports, were they in conflict with the reports on the items which you have given us?

Colonel THIELEN. None came to my attention, sir. I was not looking for any conflicts. I was deliberately omitting any conflicts or controversial subjects from my report.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us if these witnesses testified in any other hearing besides the Roberts, as to whether or not this man was actually practicing?

Colonel THIELEN. I don't believe I am the best witness on that, sir. I don't know. I am not an authority on all of the various reports.

[170] Senator FERGUSON. Why would you give us the conclusion out of the Roberts report when you know that that was a cursory report?

Colonel THIELEN. Because there is, apparently, no conflict, as far as our researchers were able to determine.

Senator FERGUSON. You say there is no conflict at all on that question?

Colonel THIELEN. Apparently not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand your statement is hearsay on that?

Colonel THIELEN. Everything that I have said today is hearsay, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Everything that you have said here today is hearsay?

Colonel THIELEN. That is correct, and none of this material—I was not present at Pearl Harbor, nor was I in the War Department on December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. How much comes out of the Roberts report on Elliott's training?

Colonel THIELEN. On his training?

Senator FERGUSON. On Elliott being in training at that particular moment.

Colonel THIELEN. I believe merely the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did he telephone?

[171] Colonel THIELEN. I won't say to whom Elliott telephoned. I will say, as I said in the script, that the telephone report was made by the Opana radar station to Lt. Kermit Tyler, the watch officer at the information center, Fort Shafter.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his title at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. He was known as the watch officer.

Senator FERGUSON. At what particular station?

Colonel THIELEN. At the information center for the various radar stations.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many people were present at that community center on that morning?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the Roberts report show, or any other report that you examined?

Colonel THIELEN. I have no recollection of that being given.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Navy had a watch there at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not either Tyler or Elliott, or the other man with Elliott knew that B-17's were coming in that morning?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I don't know what the extent [172] of their knowledge was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give us the exact plan of what was shown on the radar design plan?

Colonel THIELEN. It was a copy, as faithful as we could make it. It was not a mechanical reproduction. It was done by an artist. It was as good a copy as we could make of the so-called historical plot.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you the original?

Colonel THIELEN. I have an original.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce it for the committee?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

(The document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who made this original?

Colonel THIELEN. It is authenticated by an officer named Murphy.

Senator FERGUSON. Back to the Admiral, now. I have to keep skipping back and forth.

Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the Pacific; is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. I said that the numerical strength of the Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. I beg your pardon. One third was [173] in the Pacific and two-thirds in the Atlantic?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. We still haven't got our fractions right.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that?

Admiral INGLIS. We still haven't got our fractions right.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic?

Admiral INGLIS. In the Atlantic Fleet were 6 battleships. In the Pacific Fleet were 9 battleships. Six in the Atlantic and 9 in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. And eight out of the nine were destroyed, or damaged?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many were?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, I have to distinguish between damaged and destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. How many were hit. Put it that way.

Admiral INGLIS. Well, the *Colorado*, of course, was the ninth one, and she was not present at Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Were all the others hit?

Admiral INGLIS. All the others were hit to a greater or lesser degree.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was only one battleship [174] in the Pacific that was not hit?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how many battleships were in the Atlantic?

Admiral INGLIS. Six.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I read from Battle Report, Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6:

In the Atlantic there were eight battleships.

Reading from page 6.

Admiral INGLIS. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list of the specific ships—

Senator FERGUSON. I read you the first part of this book:

Notes on the background and writing of this book. When the authors of this book were directed by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to begin a preparation, a few months before his death, the instructions were brief and to the point—

indicating that he had something to do with the preparation of this Battle Report, and the Navy officers that wrote this book.

It says:

Prepared from official sources by Commander Walter Karig, and Lt. Welbourn Kelley.

Admiral INGLIS. I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except what you have told me now, [175] but, if I may, Senator FERGUSON, I will read the list of ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. In the Atlantic were the *New York*, the *Idaho*, *Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, *Arkansas*, and *Texas*.

In the Pacific, the *Pennsylvania*, *California*, *West Virginia*, *Arizona*, *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, *Tennessee*, *Colorado*, and *Maryland*.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the Secretary of the Navy Knox's memorandum or report that he drew up or had drawn up at the time of—after the incident?

Admiral INGLIS. You mean immediately after the attack?

Senator FERGUSON. No. Did you use anything from that report in making up your report here?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He gave a report at that time; did he not?

Admiral INGLIS. I read such a report in the newspapers. You mean about a month after Pearl Harbor?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Didn't you try to get that as a part of your source?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, I am not too familiar with the sources that were used by my researchers, but I don't [176] believe that was used.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the report the President used sometime after was used in making up this report?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not familiar with the President's report.

Senator FERGUSON. How are we going to check the accuracy of this report?

Admiral INGLIS. All I can is that my presentation was made from the official reports, not those that were prepared for the President, but from the original reports of the Roberts inquiry, and the Murfin board inquiry, and documents of that nature. Wherever possible, they were documents that contained sworn testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. How many battleships did we have in December 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. Fifteen, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Fifteen?

Admiral INGLIS. Fifteen that were attached to the Fleets. There were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their shake-down duty.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were they?

Admiral INGLIS. It is my recollection that the *Washington* and *New Mexico* were on shake-down duty in the Atlantic. [177] One of those ships, I am sure, from personal observation was in the navy yard at New York—Brooklyn.

Senator FERGUSON. Two of those then were in the Atlantic even though on shake-down duty?

Admiral INGLIS. That probably accounts for the discrepancy between the six and eight.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that this book was a little more accurate than your figures.

Admiral INGLIS. That would indicate my figures contain the number of ships attached to the Atlantic Fleet and the number attached to the Pacific Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long after the attack came at Pearl Harbor, it came at the Philippines? Will you name the attacks that were had by the Japs on the date of the 7th, or if it was across the international date line, on the 8th, and give us the hours of those attacks?

Admiral INGLIS. I have confined my studies to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands. I can get that information for you.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you get us that? Get us the hours of the attacks.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you any knowledge of what reconnaissance there was on or about December 1, from Pearl [178] to Johnston to Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I have nothing earlier than December 6 readily at hand.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that on or about the 3d that there was some reconnaissance from Wake to Midway to Pearl, arriving on the 5th?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I have no information readily at hand earlier than the 6th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know each flight was with at least 1 squadron and 12 PBY's?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. I have no information readily at hand earlier than the 6th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 5th or 6th, did the *Lexington* proceed to Pearl from Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. The *Lexington* was en route to Midway from Pearl.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Who was in charge of the *Lexington*?

Admiral INGLIS. The *Lexington* was in a task group commanded by Admiral Newton.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Halsey have charge of—Admiral Halsey?

Admiral INGLIS. Just a minute, sir. I want to be sure I have got those correct.

[179] Senator FERGUSON. Did he have the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. The *Lexington* group was under Admiral Newton.

Senator FERGUSON. It was going from Pearl to what? Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. It was going from Pearl to Midway with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether they did any reconnaissance?

Admiral INGLIS. I understand because of the additional Marine Corps planes on board, the flight deck was so cluttered that they weren't able to launch any.

Senator FERGUSON. So there was no reconnaissance from that?

Admiral INGLIS. Not from the *Lexington*.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there from the *Enterprise*?

¹ A table showing "Time of Jap attacks in the Pacific 7 and 8 December 1941, supplied by the Navy Department, appears in Hearings, Part 6, p. 2675.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What reconnaissance was there from the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. As given in the presentation, the *Enterprise* launched a squadron of 18 planes to scout through a sector of 110° immediately forward of the ship's course to a distance of 150 miles.

[180] Senator FERGUSON. How far south would that be of the line where the Jap planes were supposed to have been?

Admiral INGLIS. The Japs what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Planes; the carriers of the Japs.

Admiral INGLIS. You mean the carriers?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. How far would this reconnaissance be south of that?

Admiral INGLIS. That will come out in the Japanese presentation, but I would say about 200 miles, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About 200 miles.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read the article in the Saturday Evening Post by Lieutenant Richardson about his orders?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. From the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know anything about those orders?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what caused the delay in having the planes leave the ground on the various occasions that you have mentioned, that they were an hour or two late, they were also late at Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I do not know the reason.

[181] Senator FERGUSON. Did you look it up or try to find out?

Admiral INGLIS. I didn't personally. Perhaps some of my researchers may have.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any transports left our west coast on the 6th?

Admiral INGLIS. In answer to that question—whether they left the west coast of the United States?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether one had left and came back because of the assault on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. I have no positive knowledge of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you find out?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Senator George asked you about why the traffic was diverted from the north route. Have you that data or did you ever see it?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got it; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. From whom did you get your information that it was diverted on the 25th?

Admiral INGLIS. I have got the source right here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the source?

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1680, for a report, dated Dec. 13, 1945, from the Navy Department showing the recall of merchant ships to the West Coast, by names of ships, dates they sailed, and dates they returned.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. That was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 25, 1941.

[182] Senator FERGUSON. I didn't hear you.

Admiral INGLIS. That source is a dispatch originated by the Chief of Naval Operations on the 25th of November 1941, carrying the reference number 252203.

Senator FERGUSON. That was Admiral Stark?

Admiral INGLIS. Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That came out in Washington; is that true?

Admiral INGLIS. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether a copy of that was ever sent to the admiral in charge of the Fourteenth District?

Admiral INGLIS. I am practically certain that it was addressed to him among others, but I am not positive of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you the order with you?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you get me the order?

Admiral INGLIS. I will, sir.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you use that in your report and not bring us the order?

Admiral INGLIS. The material from which this presentation was made is tremendously bulky. I haven't got it all here.

Senator FERGUSON. Who determined to put that in?

Admiral INGLIS. Who determined what?

[183] Senator FERGUSON. Who determined to put that item in the report?

Admiral INGLIS. That was presented to me by the researchers and I made the decision to include it in the presentation. I felt that it was quite pertinent.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who gave the order for the B-17's to leave Hamilton Field, San Francisco?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I do not know. That is an Army activity.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to the colonel, do you know who gave the orders for the B-17's to leave Hamilton Field, Colonel?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you look into that?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the orders were given?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time they left?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What time?

Colonel THIELEN. At 9:30 p. m., 6th December, San Francisco time.

Senator FERGUSON. And what field were they destined for?

Colonel THIELEN. They were destined for the Philippines [184] by way of Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. What was their destination at the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel THIELEN. I could only guess that it would be Hickam Field, the biggest field, a bomber field, and therefore suitable for B17's.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they equipped with radio?

¹ The dispatch, subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 3," was read into the record; see p. 82, *infra*.

Colonel THIELEN. I can't answer that definitely. Presumably they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any information that they had been in touch with any radio station on the islands prior to the flight of Japs coming in?

Colonel THIELEN. I have only the negative information that they flew without contact with Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they flying blind or without contact?

Colonel THIELEN. Apparently they were, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why they were unarmed at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. They were being ferried to the Philippines. They were not on a combat mission.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand from that that [185] all planes not on combat missions are unarmed? Have you any personal knowledge of that, Colonel?

Colonel THIELEN. That is a rather broad generalization, sir. A state of war did not exist at the time of their departure. They were on a ferrying mission. In time of peace it would be normal for them to be unarmed.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you why it was that on the *Enterprise* that, as the lieutenant says, they had war orders?

Colonel THIELEN. I have no knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just 200 miles west of the Hawaiian Islands. Can you tell why the B-17's didn't have any orders and those from the *Enterprise* did have orders?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look that up and try to find out?

Colonel THIELEN. I believe that is outside my scope, but I will be glad to do it.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean that you are limited in what information you will be able to get for the committee?

Colonel THIELEN. I have not been designated by the War Department to coordinate all witnesses who are to appear before the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you that. I am asking you to get that particular order, if you can, why one didn't [186] have and one did have.

Colonel THIELEN. Very well, I will make an effort to get that order.

Mr. MITCHELL. I might say we have witnesses on the list for all these things.

The CHAIRMAN. We have reached the hour of 4 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. I have considerable more, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, in view of the fact that we cannot finish with these witnesses this afternoon, we might as well recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. GESELL. Senator, I have something for each member of the committee before we break up.

(Documents were handed to the committee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committees recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, November 16, 1945.)

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5293-5294.

[187]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF
THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[188] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Chair understands that counsel wishes to make a brief observation before we proceed with the further examination.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, there is a little confusion in regard, I think, to these requests of witnesses to produce information and documents.

Now, Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen had a special job to do, simply to prepare a narrative statement compiled from records of the Departments. We have a liaison staff, as the committee knows, whose job it is to respond to every request from the committee or counsel for documents, and, of course, it is a little confusing to a witness who isn't on that liaison staff to be asked to produce something.

Counsel is delighted to have the members of the committee state in the open hearings here anything they want produced, but we would like to have it understood that when a request of that kind is made for information to the Navy, for instance, that the people that have been set apart by the Secretary of the Navy to respond to those requests are the ones supposed to dig it up.

For instance, Admiral Inglis has the custody of these records and all he could do would be to pass it on to the secretary of the staff.

So we would like to have it understood that when a member of the committee makes a request while the witness is testify- [189] ing, a request to have matters produced, why, we will have to channel it through the liaison staff, because the witness isn't in that category. If he is, all right. If he has personal custody of that document.

I am not suggesting that the committee not make requests but I want them to understand that to avoid confusion it will have to be handled that way.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, any requests made of these witnesses will be——

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a request to the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. The documents will be furnished but it will be furnished by the staff that is charged with looking up the documents?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir. The witness will have to turn the request over to the proper people in the respective Departments.

The CHAIRMAN. The main object is to get the documents.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is no difficulty about that. Simply the witness is sometimes embarrassed a little bit in being asked to produce things personally.

Among the things asked for yesterday which we have already been able to obtain, one of the members of the committee requested a copy of the order which routed shipping to the south. We have already obtained that and I will read it into the record to have it out of the way, if it is agreeable.

[190] This is a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations. The commander to whom it was directed for action is the commander of the Twelfth Naval District. I understand that is San Francisco. Copies were sent to four commanders. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District—that is at Honolulu—and the commander of the Sixteenth Naval District. I understand that is at Manila.

And the dispatch reads in this way:

Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits. The commander in chief, Pacific Fleet; commander in chief Asiatic Fleet, providing necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.

It is marked "Top Secret" in purple. Certified to be a true copy by Ralph W. Lundberg, lieutenant commander.

Mr. GEARHART. What is the date of that?

Mr. MITCHELL. November 25, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chief of Naval Operations at that time was Admiral Stark?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And who was the commander in the Twelfth Naval District at San Francisco, does the record show?

Mr. MITCHELL. It doesn't.

Admiral INGLIS. I think it was Admiral Greenslade.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I have the exhibit?

[191] I requested it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Do you want it offered in evidence?

Senator FERGUSON. I will offer it in evidence after I have identified it with the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Ferguson.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

Sentor FERGUSON. Admiral, this exhibit which has just been read—

Route all trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits, Cincpac and Cincac provide necessary escort, refer your dispatch 230258—

when did you first see that?

Admiral INGLIS. The dispatch you have in your hands?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[192] Admiral INGLIS. I first saw that piece of paper this morning at about 9:30.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you see to give us the information yesterday?

Admiral INGLIS. The information that I gave you yesterday was from a brief or script which was prepared by my research staff with the notation that that dispatch that you have in your hand was the source.

Senator FERGUSON. You had your staff go over the files?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did any counsel sit with you to prepare your script?

Admiral INGLIS. I have no personal counsel. Is that what you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. I am not figuring that you personally are interested here. You are acting as an admiral of the Navy.

Admiral INGLIS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. As an admiral, did you have any counsel with you?

Admiral INGLIS. The Judge Advocate General's office had representatives at various times when we were going over this script.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the committee have a counsel [193] member present?

Admiral INGLIS. On one or two occasions the script was discussed with the committee counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom did you discuss it?

Admiral INGLIS. With Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they see this exhibit?

Admiral INGLIS. Not until this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Not until this morning. Do you know why it was not delivered to the committee before?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not, sir. It wasn't asked for.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do I understand they only get what they ask for?

Admiral INGLIS. I am afraid I can't answer that. I was only given a specific job, Senator Ferguson. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see these instructions?

Story of the actual attack and Japanese plans will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under the direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and question of individual responsibility.

Admiral INGLIS. I did not see that paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that?

[194] Admiral INGLIS. I did not see that paper. I did have an outline, and I was told pretty much the gist of the material you have just read, but it was given to me verbally.

Senator FERGUSON. In preparing the conclusions that you prepared, did you furnish to the committee the data upon which it was founded? For instance, you gave the substance of this message. You said it was routed, but you didn't give the committee the exhibit. Do you know why they were not furnished with the exhibits so that the committee might draw the conclusion?

Admiral INGLIS. I didn't feel that that was part of my function.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your function?

Admiral INGLIS. My function was to prepare a presentation for this committee, giving the facts that were not controversial, and were substantiated rather conclusively, in my opinion, by the documents we had available in the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, were you to furnish the documents, or just the narrative form?

Admiral INGLIS. I personally was furnished with a narrative prepared by my researchers. In certain cases I asked them to produce the source of the data for my own inspection. Also we produced the folder which has been [195] called the Navy folder, in the white cover, and which does contain certain factual material, but that again has been digested from the basic documents.

[196] Senator FERGUSON. You furnished me yesterday a blue sheet with information?

Admiral INGLIS. That is the outline.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And that differs somewhat from the one that was handed to the committee by the counsel?

Admiral INGLIS. That outline was subject to modification from time to time as we worked up this presentation.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, who modified it?

Admiral INGLIS. I would say it was probably a joint effort. The Judge Advocate General and I might have had a little something to do with it. We collaborated with the Army in arranging the sequence of presenting the various items.

Senator FERGUSON. How many times did you confer with Mr. Mitchell?

Admiral INGLIS. I would say three; three times.

Senator FERGUSON. And how many with Mr. Gesell?

Admiral INGLIS. About the same number of times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they change anything that you had in your exhibit?

Admiral INGLIS. They did not change anything. They suggested a few changes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did they suggest?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, wherever there was anything that was controversial or that might have been interpreted—

[197] Senator FERGUSON. Tell us some of the things that they took out.

Admiral INGLIS. They did not take out anything, Senator Ferguson, I want to make that quite clear. They only suggested that—

Senator FERGUSON. All right, what did they suggest that you take out?

Admiral INGLIS. There was one paragraph, for example, that I remember that I had in suggesting that the country as a whole was not unified just before Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who told you that?

Admiral INGLIS. That was my own opinion and, therefore, I agreed that it was not proper to put in the presentation. There were some other items.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked over with anyone the fact that you wanted to put that in?

Admiral INGLIS. I talked it over with my staff; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And who was your staff?

Admiral INGLIS. Captain Davis, Captain Phelan and Commander Hindmarsh and a number of others.

Senator FERGUSON. How did that happen to come into this question of what actually happened at Pearl Harbor? Were you trying to fix responsibility?

[198] Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, why would you suggest even putting in that the people were not prepared?

Admiral INGLIS. I thought that it might give a little background that would be good for the—

Senator FERGUSON. You used the word "united," that the people were not united?

Admiral INGLIS. The people of this country were not united.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand the President said something to that effect about the time that the reports were issued. You did not get the suggestion from that, did you?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. I got it from my own understanding of the psychology of this country at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the American people?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, with whom did you discuss that item?

Admiral INGLIS. I discussed it with Captain Davis, with Captain Phelan. I am quite sure, with both Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.

Senator FERGUSON. What did they say about it?

Admiral INGLIS. After considerable discussion it was agreed, and I concurred in the decision, that it should be [199] omitted.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the discussion?

Admiral INGLIS. The discussion was whether or not that was appropriate to put in a factual presentation of this kind.

Senator FERGUSON. What did it have to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, we all agreed—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the people were to blame?

Admiral INGLIS. Are you asking for my opinion?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you put it in the memo and they persuaded you to take it out. I am asking you whether that is your opinion?

Admiral INGLIS. My opinion is that they did contribute to some extent to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you explain how that contributed to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Admiral INGLIS. Because the armed forces were not as strong as they might have been had the country been unified and had the appropriations been larger for the Army and Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; now, do you know anything about the appropriations?

Admiral INGLIS. I only know that the Navy kept asking for more than they could get.

[200] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know this, that when the Navy asked for an item that on many occasions the Budget Director and the Executive branch of the Government cut it down?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Congress often put them up?

Admiral INGLIS. I did not know about the latter. I did know about the former.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the people, the Congress for the people, did put those up?

Admiral INGLIS. Now that you mention it I believe very likely that there were certain specific instances where the Congress did increase appropriations.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, how could you blame the people for not getting armament?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not blaming them, Senator. I am just saying that that was my opinion, that that was the frame of mind that this country was in at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you furnish to the committee your original drafts where you had that in and I would like to see all the other things that were taken out, and will you now give us the other things that were taken out?

Admiral INGLIS. I will furnish that if I can. I am afraid that was destroyed. Now, the other things that were taken out—

[201] Senator FERGUSON. Why would you destroy anything like that afterward?

Admiral INGLIS. I did not see any reason to keep it if it was not to be presented.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any notes or any memorandum in relation to the preparing of your memo?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not sure, sir. I will have to look through my papers; I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you furnish to the committee, so that the committee may have them, all your notes and all your memoranda?

Admiral INGLIS. I will furnish anything I have.¹

Senator FERGUSON. All right; now, what else was taken out?

Admiral INGLIS. The other things that were taken out were historical items dating back to 1931.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they?

Admiral INGLIS. An outline of the Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the Marco Polo Bridge incident, of the aggression of Italy toward Ethiopia, of Germany towards Austria, the Saar, and showing the rise of nazism and fascism.

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just take this outline and tell me how many of the items, including the blame on the American people, are included in the request?

[202] Admiral INGLIS. They are not in the outline and, therefore, they were taken out.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how did you come to put them in at all? The Navy was not going to make a defense, were they?

Admiral INGLIS. That is why they were taken out, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Because the Navy was attempting to make a defense, is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. That was my own personal idea and I soon saw that it was not sound and, therefore, they were taken out.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you discuss it with the Judge Advocate?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he consented to put it in?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; no, sir; I was advised by everyone that I talked to that it should come out.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you show it to Mr. Mitchell?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not sure whether it was Mr. Mitchell or Mr. Gesell that I talked to about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you show them your memo?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a memo prepared of that?

[203] Admiral INGLIS. I had a rough draft of this material.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you try and look to see whether you have your rough draft?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; I have already agreed to get anything that I have available.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk with Admiral King—

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. (continuing) —about preparing it?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Secretary of the Navy Forrestal?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; that was my own idea, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you discuss it with anyone?

Admiral INGLIS. I discussed it with the people whom I have already enumerated.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that data?

Admiral INGLIS. From my own recollection of the history of the world from 1931 on.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think that had to do with the actual physical facts at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. It was only background material that I thought might be of some value.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, on this exhibit, we will call it exhibit 1—Mr. Chairman, I now offer it in evidence.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 3.

[204] Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 3.

Senator FERGUSON. I offer Exhibit 3.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3".)

Senator FERGUSON. The first that you saw of this particular exhibit was this morning?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got your testimony before you? Have you got your page where were referring to the shipping route?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

Admiral INGLIS. I quote from the testimony of yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS (reading):

The Chief of Naval Operations on November 25, 1941 directed that all trans-Pacific shipping be routed through the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that is all you said about it?

Admiral INGLIS. That is all I said about it except under cross-examination.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and I asked you some questions [205] on cross examination. I asked you to get the original.

Now I will ask you why you did not put in the part that was to provide for escorts?

Admiral INGLIS. I think that was perhaps omitted by my staff because it might have been somewhat controversial.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that this part of the message is controversial, "Provide necessary escort"?

Admiral INGLIS. It might lead to controversy because of the word "necessary." That would be a difference of opinion as to the disposition of ships for escorts as opposed to the need for keeping them concentrated for combat.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did any member of this staff, of this committee staff, check your memorandum that you were going to write here prior to its writing?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir, not the draft. There was some discussion about it.

Senator FERGUSON. There was some discussion. Did any member read it prior to the time that you gave it here?

Admiral INGLIS. Not to the best of my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever see the exhibits upon which it was founded?

Admiral INGLIS. Do you mean by "exhibits" these things in the folder or that—

Senator FERGUSON. No; I mean such as Exhibit 3.

[206] Admiral INGLIS. I don't know what they saw, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any idea whether they ever saw it?

Admiral INGLIS. I think that a great many records were available to the counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean "available"?

Admiral INGLIS. Were turned over to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Why was this not turned over?

Admiral INGLIS. Perhaps it was.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel now, when did counsel get this Exhibit 3?

Mr. MITCHELL. I first saw it about 10 minutes ago.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I think, to make the record clear—

Senator FERGUSON. That is what we would like to have.

Mr. GESELL. (continuing) —There is in the file of counsel a very substantial number of dispatches.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no, let us keep the record clear.

Mr. GESELL. I beg your pardon, Senator. I am answering your question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get Exhibit 3?

Mr. GESELL. That particular dispatch is very likely among the group of dispatches which we have had in our office for a considerable period of time. If you are talking about the piece of paper in your hand, we saw that this morning.

[207] Senator FERGUSON. Well, did he make the statement of yesterday based on very likely whether this was in your file or not?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any dispute about the authenticity of this Exhibit No. 3?

Admiral INGLIS. None whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any dispute on the part of any member of the committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Am I to take that that I am not supposed to examine the witness about that?

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all; I just want to know whether there is any dispute about the authenticity of this document that you are talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. The question is why it has not been produced to the committee, that we are on right now.

Will you give me all the information in the Navy in relation to the part of this message that says, "Provide necessary escort?"

Admiral INGLIS. I am authorized to say that the Navy Department—or to say for the Navy Department that any information requested by the committee which is available to the Navy will be produced.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, but do you take that request as not from one of the committee?

[208] Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; from the committee as a request which will be complied with to the best of our ability.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any information, personal information, on this "Provide necessary escort?"

Admiral INGLIS. I have not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at any time that there was any message including this "Provide necessary escort?"

Admiral INGLIS. The only information that I had was what I gave the committee yesterday, until I saw that message which you have in your hand.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave us a list yesterday of the location of all ships in the Pacific, did you not?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you where the *Boise* was between the 23d of November 1941, and the 6th of December 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. The *Boise*?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. My recollection is that the *Boise* was in the Asiatic Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where the *American Leader* ship was?

¹ See memorandum from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5499.

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; never heard of that ship.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the *American Leader* [209] left Honolulu on November 23, 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not, sir. I rather gather from the name of the ship that she is a merchant ship.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is right.

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. My information——

Senator FERGUSON. What is your information on the *Boise*?

Admiral INGLIS. On the *Boise*?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't anything in writing here, but my recollection is that she was attached to the Asiatic Fleet out in the Philippines at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I will ask you whether or not she was not convoying many other ships, or, at least, convoying the *American Leader*?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know that?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. I don't know anything about the *American Leader*.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, so that the record may show, what we would like to get the information on, as to who was the captain of the *American Leader*, whether or not she left Honolulu on November the 20th and arrived in Manila on December the 6th, whether she was in a convoy or not, in convoy during any of that time. Do you have any information on that?

[210] Admiral INGLIS. If we have any we will produce it, sir.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Well, have you?

Admiral INGLIS. I have not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And whether or not one of the convoying ships, at least one was the *Boise*; whether or not the ships were blacked out at night. Do you know whether that was true?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the definition of what was meant by "a convoy" in this message of November the 25th?

Admiral INGLIS. In its common term a convoy is a collection of ships steaming together as a group under escort.

Senator FERGUSON. Did any ships leave the Pacific coast after the 25th in convoy?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe my presentation described two convoys.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were they?

Admiral INGLIS. The heavy cruiser *Pensacola* with an eight-ship convoy was west-bound, located in the Samoan area.

Senator FERGUSON. When did she start on convoy?

Admiral INGLIS. All of those ships left between 2 and 7 days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as I recall it, but I cannot give you the precise date. I will get it [211] for you, though; at least, the Navy Department will get it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I would like to have on that *American Leader* and also on the *Boise* a record of orders for blackouts and when they were given and how they were distributed.

¹ See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127, for a statement re the *American Leader* based on information received from the Navy Department.

See also "Exhibit No. 68," the log of U. S. S. *Boise*.

Admiral INGLIS. The Navy Department, I am sure, will make all that information which they have available also.

Senator FERGUSON. And when the first order of convoying was in the Pacific.

By the way, had you any evidence when you were getting this up, or any evidence that there were German submarines in the Pacific?

Admiral INGLIS. I know of no evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Or battleships?

Admiral INGLIS. I know of no evidence; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You know of no such evidence. As one of the Intelligence officers do you know of any reason for convoys in the Pacific on the 25th of November 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. Of course, I was not an Intelligence officer at that time and all I can do is express an opinion that the——

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you furnish to counsel for the committee all the information that you have as to the [212] convoying, whether there were German subs or German battleships or other instruments, or anything that would be of danger?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. The Navy Department will make that information available.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you prepare your statement from original data?

Admiral INGLIS. My staff did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see all the data?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not check it with your statement?

Admiral INGLIS. Only in certain cases.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state some of the cases that you did check it?

ADMIRAL INGLIS. I checked some of the distances from Oahu to other strategical and geographical points on the chart. I asked the staff to verify several points that came up.

Senator FERGUSON. What are some of those points?

Admiral INGLIS. The relationship between the Fourteenth Naval District and the commander in chief was one of them. There was some argument about the spelling of some of these Hawaiian words and their pronunciation; the depths of water in Pearl Harbor and in the channels approaching, I think.

[213] Senator FERGUSON. Did you say anything in that report about torpedo nets?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; that is another thing I questioned my staff very closely on, because I wanted to be sure I had the basis for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what you were talking about when you referred to torpedo nets?

Admiral INGLIS. A torpedo net.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you get me the part in your testimony?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir, if I may quote from my yesterday's statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS (reading):

The entrance to the harbor was closed by two protective nets; into the channel through the coral reefs it was about 400 yards and the depth was from 41 to 60 feet, and the nets themselves consisted of a combined antitorpedo and antiboat net.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute now. You were then referring only to torpedo nets at the entrance to the harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. The two torpedo nets; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At the entrance to the harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. At the entrance to the harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. How far would they be from ships?

[214] Admiral INGLIS. We can get that from the chart, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well——

Admiral INGLIS. About 2 miles.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the torpedo nets in relation to the ships.

Admiral INGLIS. Oh, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you refer to them in your report?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; the torpedo nets I referred to were across the channel entrance, as shown on the chart.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see a message that was intercepted at Fort Hunt in Virginia?

Admiral INGLIS. A message about what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That was translated on the 6th.

Admiral INGLIS. A message from whom?

Senator FERGUSON. A message from Japan—Honolulu.

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I have not had——

Senator FERGUSON. From Honolulu to Japan, rather, or Tokyo.

Admiral INGLIS. Japanese message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. I have not had access to any of those messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you refer in your statement to barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor?

[215] Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not know, sir. That would be an Army question.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not know that?

Admiral INGLIS. I would not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any torpedo nets close to the ships, the battleships?

Admiral INGLIS. Not to the best of my knowledge. There were no nets, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to check on that, as to whether or not there were any nets?

Admiral INGLIS. As long as nobody said there were, I did not see any reason to check it. It was my personal understanding that there were no nets about the battleships at that time.

[216] Senator FERGUSON. Going to the colonel, Colonel, in your testimony yesterday, on page 168 you referred to page 116, and you say [reading]:

You mean my sources on that, sir? This copy is documented. The fact that these two enlisted men picked up an indication of hostile aircraft by radar at 7:02 a. m. on the morning of December 7 comes from the Roberts' report, page 116, affidavit of Private McDonald.

I have the Roberts' report before me here, and the last page in my copy of the report is No. 21.

Colonel THIELEN. I think I can clarify that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give me the item of the report that you were referring from?

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness clarify his answer to that question, Senator Ferguson. He is entitled to do that.

Colonel THIELEN. The reference which I gave was to the testimony, not to the report itself. I was not referring to the conclusions, the findings, or any element of the Roberts' report other than the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were you talking about the page in the transcript of the testimony in the Roberts' report?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; I believe that is the reference.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there an individual in there, a [217] man by the name of McDonald?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not have that transcript of testimony before me so I cannot answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got something before you there?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; I have some extracts which I had made last night of testimony given before the Roberts commission relative to the radar question.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us that testimony?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now this is what you founded your statement on?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Colonel THIELEN. General Short's testimony before the Roberts commission, page 65 of the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. You had read that before you made up your report?

Colonel THIELEN. My researchers had read it. I had also read the Roberts report, but not closely, with the view to incorporating it into the statement which was prepared, merely by way of acquiring some background for this assignment.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you instructed to avoid any controversial matters or matters of opinion?

[218] Colonel THIELEN. I was instructed to avoid them in the statement; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; I was instructed to avoid them in the statement which I was to present to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first show the counsel for the committee, or any member of the committee, your report?

Colonel THIELEN. I never showed the counsel or any member of the committee my report.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you confer with anyone?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did you confer with?

Colonel THIELEN. I conferred with counsel for the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the counsel?

Colonel THIELEN. Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell.

Senator FERGUSON. And did they make any suggestions as to what should go in or come out?

Colonel THIELEN. Their only suggestions, as far as the Army presentation was concerned, had to do with bringing the presentation

within the scope of the directive; in other words, of eliminating controversial material. Also some mechanical suggestions, such as eliminating tedious lists of equipment that could be transferred from the oral presentation [219] to the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us some of the controversial matters that they suggested that you take out?

Colonel THIELEN. I recall none, sir. I believe they were very minor. I do not remember any body of testimony. It may have been a word which could be improved here and there.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you last confer with them?

Colonel THIELEN. On last Monday, sir. That was the only conference I had.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Monday of this week?

Colonel THIELEN. The past Monday.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have your statement finished at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. I had a statement finished; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give it to them to read?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you confer on it if they did not read it?

Colonel THIELEN. It was discussed with them. I told them orally what I was going to say. I quoted pages from my script.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got your original script?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not have it. It has been revised since then, largely in a mechanical way, to [220] improve co-ordination with the Navy, as far as the presentation is concerned, and to eliminate tedious details which were later incorporated in the Army exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you show it to them after you revised it?

Colonel THIELEN. No, I did not; nor did I discuss it with them after revision.

Senator FERGUSON. Now going back to that item that you want to read from General Short, will you read it?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. General Short's testimony before the Roberts Commission, page 65 of the transcript, and I quote:

This Opana station is along the ridge here, somewhere along in here [indicating]. It is not marked on the map; up to the north. That station, just on its own—they work normally for training from 7 to 11 every day and apparently they just thought they would not knock off just because it was Sunday, and the staff went ahead and worked.

And I close the quotes there.

I have also the testimony of Colonel Powell, who was the Hawaiian Department signal officer, before the Roberts Commission, page 358 of the transcript, and I quote:

It is almost fantastic the way these things operate, and the men are all anxious to learn about them. This [221] particular one wanted to work longer to get more training, because we were to put control sets on the other islands, and he wanted, I suppose, to become one of the operators on the other islands. That he did not say, but that is what they were working for, to be able to operate those sets on the other islands.

That closes the quotation of Colonel Powell.

I have also an extract from the testimony of Sergeant Elliott before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Now he did not testify before the Roberts Commission—Elliott did not, did he?

Colonel THIELEN. I cannot answer that question offhand.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, go ahead.

Colonel THIELEN. This is page 1001 of the transcript and I quote:

Well, that, sir, is: After our problem was over at seven o'clock, I was to get further instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, and at that time I was at the controls. However, Lockard was instructing me as to the different echoes that I would see, and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know at what time they started work that morning?

Colonel THIELEN. I know what the schedule called for. [222]
It called for work from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Three hours?

Colonel THIELEN. That would be correct; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find in the Army report that it was 4 hours?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not believe I thoroughly understand that question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, look at page 1029, where it says:

Lieutenant LOCKARD. Well, sir, each group had four hours on, and—let's see—we were divided into three groups, four hours on and eight hours off; but we had four hours on the 'scope, then four hours guards, then we had four hours off.

Colonel THIELEN. That was the weekday schedule, I believe, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a different schedule on Sunday?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. I can review the schedule as I gave it in my testimony yesterday. On weekdays other than Saturday and Sunday the schedule was specifically from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. actually tracking aircraft.

Senator FERGUSON. What time does the record show that they actually shut down the radar?

Colonel THIELEN. On 7 December?

[223] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. I doubt that the Opana station was shut down, sir. They continued operation at 7 a. m., as indicated on the historic plot, so-called. That plot indicates echoes well into the morning, and we have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that he recalled, or states, that after he was notified at, I believe, about 8 a. m., that Wheeler Field was under attack.

Senator FERGUSON. You examined all of the Army and Roberts report before you brought in your conclusion about the practice, and so forth?

Colonel THIELEN. I did that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you say that anything that was brought in here is beyond dispute, that it is not disputed in any way?

Colonel THIELEN. That is a relative term, I believe, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well—

Colonel THIELEN. Any statement could be disputed. We have tried to confine it to statements concerning which there has been no controversy.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, let me review page 1105 from the Army report in relation to Colonel Tyler; let me read General Grunert's remark. [Reading:]

[224] General GRUNERT. And there was nothing for you to do, there, between 7 and 8, but twiddle your thumbs?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; there was nothing to do.

General GRUNERT. Then it appears that the organization seemed to be faulty, and if instruction faulty, and there seemed to be a lack of organization and common sense and reason on this. You went up there to do duty as a pursuit officer in the information center. There was nobody to do the work with, because the controller was not there, and the Navy liaison man wasn't there, and probably some others were missing, so you couldn't do your duty, as a pursuit officer, because there was nobody to do duty with; and then, at the end of the tour, at 7 o'clock, everybody disappeared except the telephone operator and you; and the telephone operator remained there for apparently no reason. You had no particular duty, did you?

Colonel TYLER. No, sir; we hadn't.

General GRUNERT. It seems all cockeyed to me—and that, on the record, too.

Did you read that part of General Grunert's statement there in the testimony?

Colonel THIELEN. I did not personally read that, sir. I believe I can clarify a possible faulty impression in that the testimony which you just read refers to the information [225] center, which was located at Fort Shafter and not to the radar unit at Opana, out at Kahuku Point.

Will you point that out, please, Captain?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you say that the reason these boys were at the radar station after 7 that morning was that the truck did not come to pick them up? That is the reason they were there?

Colonel THIELEN. The evidence I have indicates that Private Elliott volunteered for additional training. I know nothing about the delay of the truck in picking them up.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the reason that they were not picked up was that the truck did not pick them up?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read all this testimony?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I did not read it all. Perhaps I should explain my position is very similar to that of Admiral Inglis. I did not perform any appreciable quantity of research on this testimony. It was done by other staff officers.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you permit Mr. Murphy to interpose?

Senator FERGUSON. For what purpose?

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering whether or not the witness had finished the question that you asked 15 minutes ago. He read three paragraphs. In my impression, that question is still [226] not answered.

Senator FERGUSON. I will go back to that.

Colonel THIELEN. I have some further testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You read what you claim you founded your statement on.

Colonel THIELEN. After reading the testimony of Sergeant Elliott that he wanted to get some instruction on the use of the oscilloscope on which Lockard was instructing him, and that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard, I go on to further testimony by the same witness.

In response to a question by General Frank, "Who wanted to shut it down?" Sergeant Elliott replied:

Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down, and since I was to get the instruction on it I wanted to continue operation. Finally, after insisting on that, we did continue the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have just shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it was approximately 15 or 25 miles from the island of Oahu, and the flight was lost.

That concludes the testimony which I wish to quote.

Captain, put the radar plot up, please.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got the testimony there? Look on page 1004.

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not have that.

[227] Senator FERGUSON. What?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not have the testimony. I have only the pertinent extracts.

Senator FERGUSON. He says this [reading]:

The oscilloscope, from the beam that is sent out, has a back echo, and at that particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impossible to pick up any flight whatsoever at that particular point, and that was as far as we could follow the flight, and at approximately 7:39 is when we started to shut down the unit, and at 7:45 our truck came from our camp (incidentally, which was 9 miles away from the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon arriving at the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl Harbor.

Does not that indicate the reason that they were there with the machine, that they were waiting on their truck?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir. May I point out the time that that flight was picked up, at 7:02, as indicated on the chart, and it was tracked continuously to, I believe, the testimony that you quoted said 7:45.

Senator FERGUSON. 7:45 is when the truck picked them up.

Colonel THIELEN. When it actually picked them up?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He says [reading]:

At 7:45 our truck came from our camp to pick us up.

Colonel THIELEN. What opinion did I give you on that, [228] Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. In answer to this question, "What time did the center close up where Tyler was?"

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Taking Sergeant Elliott's other statement [reading]:

No, sir; there was no time. I am sure there wasn't. Another point, sir, that I might bring out, our clock at the unit I said showed 7:02 at the time that we sent in the first plot. However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while we were operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there was 6:54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time check whatsoever that morning.

Do you know whether or not the main board closed down at 6:54?

Colonel THIELEN. I believe that is highly controversial, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that is highly controversial. Is that the reason it is not in your report?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; that would account for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not these controversial matters are going to be presented to the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. I could answer that. We have all the evidence on this radar report, the witness is prepared to [229] testify about

it. It is one of those things that we are going into fully. This witness was instructed to keep out of fields where that situation existed.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, do you know anything about the operations of the radar after the attack?

Colonel THIELEN. Only the statement which I gave in my script yesterday, that Lieutenant Tyler, after receiving word from Wheeler Field of the attack, recalled all crews to their stations. What the results of that call were I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, there is a vacuum here then, as far as we are concerned with any information as to the operations of the radar after the attack. I am talking about the movable sets. The permanent sets were not completed. The movable sets we are talking about; are we not?

Colonel THIELEN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any information you obtained or you can give us in relation to the operation of these sets after the attack?

Colonel THIELEN. Only those Opana plots which show on the radar chart which is on the easel.

Senator FERGUSON. From what set did those come?

Colonel THIELEN. Those are Opana plots.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who was operating that set at 10:27?

[230] Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any records to show whose information this is? I cannot see because of the light. Between 9 and 1027, 651, 652, and 648.

Colonel THIELEN. That entire record is authenticated by Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator FERGUSON. From what machine?

Colonel THIELEN. From the Opana station.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why these machines were not used to get the enemy going out? When you knew they would come in on the machine, why were not the machines used to get the enemy going out?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know that they were not, nor if not, why not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know of any information or any place that the committee can get information on that?

Colonel THIELEN. I am sure that the committee can, through counsel, obtain the best available witnesses on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what general—was it General Powell?

Colonel THIELEN. Colonel Powell.

Mr. MITCHELL. He is on the list of witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what he stated in relation to that?

[231] The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Powell, I will say, is on the list of witnesses to appear here in person. Whatever he stated, or whatever he has to state, will be brought before the committee by him in person.

Senator FERGUSON. I was just trying to get at what might be in their files in relation to this.

Colonel THIELEN. I am not a very good authority on what is in the War Department files, sir. Another procedure has been set up for obtaining any information which the War Department has.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the B-17's had radar in them?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know. My opinion would be that they did not. I do not believe that radar—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not they had radio?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I submit, the witness ought to have an opportunity to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you answer that question?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir, I have not completed my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you may complete your answer.

Colonel THIELEN. The presumption would be that they were not equipped with radar, considering the status of development of radar at that time.

[232] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether they had radio upon them?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir, I do not know definitely. Presumably they would have.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you look into that?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not any station on Hawaii operated all night with Hawaiian music that night, the 6th?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not it was played for the purpose of these B-17's tuning on it?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether at the same time the Jap planes tuned on it too?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir, I have no information on that whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read all of Tyler's testimony?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any information in relation to whether or not these radars would pick up whether it was enemy planes or friendly planes?

Colonel THIELEN. That, as I testified yesterday, is not practicable, for that type of radar, at least. They could [233] not distinguish between hostile aircraft and friendly aircraft.

Senator FERGUSON. Who has charge of the submarines? That would be the admiral, would it not?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, did you state yesterday anything about what submarines had been in the Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. The submarines that were in the Harbor, the United States submarines that were in the Harbor were listed in the script.

Senator FERGUSON. How many Japs got into the Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. The best evidence we have indicates that only one got in. There was some evidence that might lead to the supposition that a second submarine got in, but on further research my people told me they did not think there was more than one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that the one sub came in at 4:30 in the morning and went out at 5:30?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not know about that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any information on that?

Admiral INGLIS. Nothing conclusive; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find any maps, or have you any maps in your possession showing the log?

Admiral INGLIS. I was told there was no log, and I was told that there was a chart which was recovered from—I [234] believe it was the submarine that went aground at Bellows Field, showing the track around Ford Island, but that we thought was only a prospective course and not one which was actually taken by the submarine.

There is a little confusion that comes in in translating the Japanese characters. Some of their tenses are hard to distinguish between the present tense and future tense.

Senator FERGUSON. Then that is a disputed item, is it, as to whether or not a sub came in and went around Pearl Harbor, around Ford Island, and came out?

Admiral INGLIS. The evidence on that is certainly not conclusive.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be one of the reasons why it would not be put in your statement?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. I would like to add, Senator, to that that our best evaluation of the information is that only one submarine entered Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. We have in this battle report, at one point on this chart, to bolster the evidence of his better vision he wrote in Japanese, "I saw it with my own eyes." Did you read that?

Admiral INGLIS. I did not; no. No, I did not read it.

Senator FERGUSON. What about it? Do you know whether that is in your evidence, in your Navy Department?

[235] Admiral INGLIS. I presume—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). That is on the log, isn't it, that you recovered?

Admiral INGLIS. If you are talking about the submarine that went ashore at Bellows Field, I do not believe that that is in the log.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is there any evidence at all in the Navy Department on that item?

Admiral INGLIS. The only evidence that I know about is what one of my officers told me, which is to the effect that they recovered a chart in that submarine showing, as I said, a track around Ford Island and out again. They think, from the translation of the Japanese characters on that chart now that is what it was.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the witness might finish his answer.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought he did.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not.

Admiral INGLIS. The translation of the Japanese characters were somewhat confusing. A great deal of time was spent on that chart trying to determine whether or not the submarine actually entered the harbor or only planned to enter the [236] harbor, and the conclusion which the experts came out with was that the submarine did not probably enter the harbor.

[237] Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that we are taking the opinion of the expert here?

Admiral INGLIS. Perhaps I should not have used the word "experts." I will correct that to "translators."

The CHAIRMAN. If I may say there, that would be another matter that would be left out, because it is speculative and controversial.

Admiral INGLIS. Exactly, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further on that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Might I say, Senator, while you are questioning with respect to this item, my understanding is that these two officers from this grounded submarine were captured by the Army.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEEFE. And that the information obtained from those officers was obtained by the Army and not by the Navy. I wish you would inquire into that question from the Army, because there seems to be a sharp line of cleavage between the two services.

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I have no information on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I might suggest to the committee—

[238] Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire—you captured those men, did you not, with these charts? The officer you captured on the sub, and the operator you took, with the charts, did you not?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Let the witness answer this question.

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Haven't you any information that he was captured and the sub was captured?

Colonel THIELEN. I personally have no such information.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral Inglis—

Mr. MURPHY. My request for the gentleman to yield is that we have been given an outline as to what the testimony is going to be that will be gone into subsequently, and it is on that very subject.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to find out what information these gentlemen have.

Mr. MURPHY. You are anticipating the statement of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. Let us make progress.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to the admiral, did Admiral Halsey's ships have radar?

Admiral INGLIS. The carrier did, yes, sir.

[239] Senator FERGUSON. The carriers had radar?

Admiral INGLIS. His carrier had radar; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the memo that went to you, Admiral, on page 2 [reading]:

Summarize percentage personnel mustered various departments—summary testimony showing no drunkenness.

Was that on yours?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; that was scratched off.

Senator FERGUSON. Why was it scratched off? Did you go into that question at all?

Admiral INGLIS. It was discussed just very briefly, and the opinion seemed to be that there was not any drunkenness that had anything to do with the case.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose opinion was that?

Admiral INGLIS. Of the researchers.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it then, we are getting the opinions of your researchers, that do not come up here. Is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. Senator, I would like to make again the same statement that I made several times, that this presentation which Colonel Thielen and I have given is an attempt to give the committee just the high lights of the attack on Pearl Harbor, we only covering those matters which are not controversial, and which are fairly well [240] substantiated by the evidence available to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, you say "fairly well." Is anything controversial if it is only fairly well shown?

Admiral INGLIS. May I delete the word "fairly" then?

Senator FERGUSON. You want to take the word "fairly" and leave only the word "well" in; is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir, or conclusively.

Senator FERGUSON. How well?

Admiral INGLIS. Conclusively.

Senator FERGUSON. And in whose opinion is it conclusive?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, it is a combination of the opinions of the people that are working on the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, can you give us from your evidence why it took from 9 a. m.—or until 9 a. m. to put No. 3 alert into effect?

Admiral INGLIS. That is an Army question, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel, did you ever put the No. 3 alert in for the Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. We did not have No. 1, 2, and 3, alerts. That is an Army term.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you have?

Admiral INGLIS. We have condition 1, 2, and 3.

Condition 1 is general quarters with all battle stations [241] manned. It is just the opposite with the Army. They have 1, 2, and 3 in the opposite order.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, at 6 o'clock in the morning, at Pearl Harbor, on the 7th, what alert was in effect, as far as the Navy was concerned?

Admiral INGLIS. It is my recollection that condition 3 was in effect. That, as I have described, calls for, roughly, one-half of the anti-aircraft battery to be manned—or one-fourth.

Senator FERGUSON. At 6 o'clock?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the condition on the 6th?

Admiral INGLIS. On the 6th?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Well, I would assume that the same condition prevailed. It is my understanding that condition No. 3 was the routine condition that applied at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the routine condition?

Admiral INGLIS. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that alert change?

Admiral INGLIS. Of course there are routine drills at scheduled times during every day, when they go to condition 1. But for the purpose of this inquiry, I think, to answer your question, I should say that that condition changed at [242] the time of the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long it took to put another alert in at that time?

Admiral INGLIS. It probably would—of course, it would vary with different ships, but I would say on the average, about 3 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you look into the question of inspection Sunday morning, whether or not there was inspection of the ships?

Admiral INGLIS. Inspection of what nature, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Any inspection. Were any of the bulkheads open, or any of the doors?

Admiral INGLIS. You mean inspection of watertight integrity?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. That question was raised by one of the other members yesterday. It is being looked into now, and I am sure complete information on that subject will be made available.

Senator FERGUSON. Up to date have you looked into it?

Admiral INGLIS. I have not personally, but some of my people have worked on it last night.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot give us an answer on that?

[243] Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; but that information—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). As I understand—

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. The witness was about to say something else. Let him finish.

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot give you anything at this time, but that information will be available.¹

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it now, the alert changed then from No. 3 to No. — what?

Admiral INGLIS. One.

Senator FERGUSON. In about how many minutes?

Admiral INGLIS. I estimate 3 minutes.

[244] Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask the colonel why it took until 9 o'clock to change their alert, when the Navy said they changed theirs in 3 minutes.

Colonel THIELEN. I cannot answer why, but I would like to review this much of my testimony yesterday. [Reading:]

When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced—

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, will you give us the time of the first report of a bomb dropped?

Colonel THIELEN. The first report of a bomb dropped was at 7:55 a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead now.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Colonel THIELEN (reading):

When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps 3 or 4 minutes elapsed before General Short was informed by his chief of staff that an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that all troops be turned out under alert No. 3.

Later, in speaking of the two divisions, I say:

At Schofield Barracks, Brig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, commanding the Twenty-fourth Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at about 8:05 a. m. Within a few minutes his [245] chief of staff had issued instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the antiaircraft positions, to increase the standing guard, and to send patrols throughout the division sector—which was the northern half of the island—to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8:50 a. m. the division received word from department headquarters that alert No. 3 would go into effect at once.

¹ See footnote 1, p. 70, supra.

Senator FERGUSON. What time was that?

Colonel THIELEN. What is that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. What time was that again?

Colonel THIELEN. At 8:50 the division received word.

Senator FERGUSON. My question was about 9 o'clock.

Colonel THIELEN. In the case of the other division, it was the figure given, as 9 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all the information there is in the Pearl Harbor file, is in the Army file here in Washington?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir. There is unquestionably additional testimony on that subject. Of course the actual extent of the alert is a question of debate. The reason I referred to my testimony is to point out that action was taken immediately on hearing the sounds of fire.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you prepared any other reports, Colonel, on the Pearl Harbor matter?

[246] Colonel THIELEN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the only one?

Colonel THIELEN. This is—I would like to point out that I did not personally prepare this report. I am presenting it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand you were just sent here to read it?

Colonel THIELEN. That is not exactly true. I had a hand in the preparation of the report, but I did not do the research into the first sources.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would you say prepared it?

Colonel THIELEN. A number of officers in my group in the War Department General Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give their names; all the people who worked on it that you know of?

Colonel THIELEN. I can give the name of Lieutenant Colonel Carroll, Lieutenant Colonel Root, as the two principal researchers under whose direction various enlisted personnel looked up specific points.

[247] Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, have you prepared any other reports on the Pearl Harbor incident?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; I have a report which, I understand, is scheduled for presentation as soon as this cross-examination is finished, on the Japanese attack. That is, the attack as viewed by the Japanese, which is digested.

Senator FERGUSON. Any others beyond that?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only other report that you prepared?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir, on this subject.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you, Admiral, first confer with Colonel Thielen?

Admiral INGLIS. Colonel Thielen? Oh, I think it was Monday morning, this week.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that when you had a rehearsal here in this room?

Admiral INGLIS. It might be described as a rehearsal.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you describe it as?

Admiral INGLIS. It was a discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. A discussion?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; and we came to an agreement as to the sequence in which various items would be presented.

[248] Senator FERGUSON. Were all these maps prepared especially for this committee hearing?

Admiral INGLIS. Speaking for the Navy maps, I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, Colonel, were your maps prepared especially for this hearing?

Colonel THIELEN. These maps were prepared under my personal direction for this presentation.

Senator FERGUSON. It was stated yesterday, Colonel, that the radio was jammed. It was said there was no evidence of sabotage, but the radio was jammed. What do you mean by that?

Colonel THIELEN. In general, the jamming of a radio means setting up signals over a frequency band which will interfere with the transmission of signals from other stations. This can be done in several ways mechanically. It can be done by the old-fashioned spark set. There are any number of ways of obstructing radio channels.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know how this was done?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I don't have that information. Perhaps the Hawaiian Department Signal Corps officer does.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you don't know?

Colonel THIELEN. I don't know; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it be done from the Japanese [249] carriers out at sea?

Colonel THIELEN. That is a technical question which I prefer not to answer because I don't know definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you, Admiral, any orders not to sink any subs, to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral INGLIS. I have nothing on that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there were any orders issued?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, Colonel, whether or not there was any limitation on the distance that Army planes could fly to sea?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I don't know whether there was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there was a 10-mile limit?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not any planes were diverted and shipped elsewhere than to Hawaii a few weeks or months before?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any information on that?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir.

[250] Senator FERGUSON. We spoke yesterday about Kaminski, Kaminski was a naval or Army man?

Admiral INGLIS. That was Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, who was the duty officer in the office of the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood that you were to give us the message he gave. Was it in writing?

Admiral INGLIS. I was to find out, as I understand, when this message was delivered personally to Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find that out?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; not yet.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned Admiral Bloch. You stated yesterday that he would make reports to Admiral Kimmel. Is that true?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I don't recall making that statement. The normal channel for such a report would be from the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, duty officer, who was Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, to the fleet duty officer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he ever made any report directly to Washington, Admiral Bloch?

Admiral INGLIS. To Washington?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[251] Admiral INGLIS. I don't have that, but I am quite sure Washington was informed of the attack shortly after the period.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you spoke yesterday about the aid to the injured at the time.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not all of the physicians turned out on the island to help the Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. The only information I have on that is just the impression that I gained from reading reports in the press and other sources shortly after the attack happened, and my impression is that the performance of the Medical Department was beyond reproach.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you get any evidence at all that the supplies were locked up in such a way that they couldn't be obtained and it was necessary to go to the private physicians to get help?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I hadn't heard that.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no information on that?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the private physicians did render service?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any evidence on that, one [252] way or another?

Admiral INGLIS. I have no evidence; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart, I believe, is the next member of the committee.

Mr. GEARHART. Colonel Thielen, I have listened to some of your testimony with increasing amazement and for that reason I would like to ask you a few questions.

First, concerning the portable radar set at Opana. During the course of your testimony, you have referred to it is a "practicing event."

May I ask you if, in your conferences with your staff, in the preparation of your statement, that you decided to refer to it as a "practicing event" for the purpose of belittling the report that came from those men that were there operating the machine on December 7, 1941?

Colonel THIELEN. First, I don't place your reference, but I can assure you that I had no intention of belittling the men.

A "practicing event" was that?

Mr. GEARHART. You spoke of some men practicing there.

Colonel THIELEN. I don't recall using that term. May I check my script for a moment?

Mr. GEARHART. You have heard the term used by others [253] in this room, haven't you, since you have been testifying?

Colonel THIELEN. I recall no instance of that.

Mr. GEARHART. You didn't hear the admiral, your associate there, and colleague, use the word "practicing"?

Colonel THIELEN. I think the admiral would have no reason to refer to our use of radar.

Mr. GEARHART. Haven't you testified here these boys continued, these young men continued, the use of that machine in operation after 7 o'clock because they wanted to practice?

Colonel THIELEN. I did not use that term, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What term did you use?

Colonel THIELEN. May I quote my testimony on that point?

Mr. GEARHART. I am not only confining myself to your written testimony, but the other testimony you have given orally. You say you haven't used the word "practicing."

Colonel THIELEN. May I take it from the transcript?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose you read what you said from your paper while somebody is looking it up in the transcript, if that is agreeable.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

At seven a. m., 7 December, 1941, all radar detector [254] stations closed down except the Opana station at Kahuku Point which remained in operation in order to continue the training of a new man, Private George E. Elliott, who had volunteered to remain on the job for this purpose.

At 7:02 a. m. this station, manned by Private Elliott and Private Joseph L. Lockard, picked up an indication of airplanes at 132 miles, bearing 3 degrees east of north.

The soldiers kept tracking the target.

I believe that is all that is applicable.

Mr. GEARHART. I will read you from the testimony of Lt. Joseph Lockard, given on the 30th day of October 1944, at the Pentagon Building. [Reading:]

Question. In order to operate the machine you had to mount the truck?

Answer (by Lieutenant Lockard). We had to unlock the vans and open them.

Question. There was nothing in this van except the machine itself?

Answer. That is right.

Question. Was Elliott doing the actual computation or were you?

Answer. I was doing the computation. Elliott was doing the plotting and keeping the log.

Question. What do you mean by "operating the [255] equipment"?

Answer. Operations consist of controlling the movement of the antenna and reading the information from the oscilloscope both on the screen and on the mileage scale.

Question. As you were operating this thing you didn't see anything at all until about two minutes after seven. When seven o'clock came, what did you say to Elliott?

Answer. We mentioned the fact that the truck hadn't arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out on the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

Question. At about two minutes after seven, you were the first to notice anything on the scope?

Answer. Yes.

Does that indicate to you that they continued after 7 because Mr. Elliott, who had already had instructions, day after day and week after week, under Lieutenant Lockard, because he wanted a little more training?

Colonel THIELEN. I have already quoted testimony which does indicate the situation as I testified yesterday, and, by the way, I find that my oral presentation agrees with that which I gave you.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; and, as a matter of fact, the truck was late to take them to breakfast, and didn't come until [256] 7:45—you know that to be a fact?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you testified a moment ago in respect to the hours in which the radar at Opana was in use. Will you give that again, please?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

When he placed Alert No. 1 in effect, General Short also directed that the aircraft warning service operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn, specifically from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. Thus, the operating schedule of the mobile radar detector stations was daily from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m.; routine training from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m., except Sunday, and daily, except Saturday and Sunday from 12 o'clock to 4 o'clock p. m. for training and maintenance work.

Mr. GEARHART. Where do you get that information?

Colonel THIELEN. I have that documented, sir. I can look it up I take that from General Short's testimony before the Roberts commission, volume 2, page 43.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you think Lieutenant Lockard ought to know when he was working and what his hours of duty were, since he was on the job?

Colonel THIELEN. Presumably he would; yes, sir; although [257] at that time he was a private, and would naturally be under the orders of someone else.

Mr. GEARHART. He was a rather capable private, to be a lieutenant today; doesn't that demonstrate that he was a capable private?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; but his capabilities, I don't believe, are the issue. It was his actual position at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Let's read more of his testimony given when he was a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps, and after he had been commissioned. [Reading:]

Answer. There were approximately six men per unit. We had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 5 o'clock.

Question. Nobody operated at nighttime, so far as you know?

Answer. If there was an alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something of that kind, there were not night operations.

Question. From 7 to 5, except for lunch period, you were on daily?

Answer. Yes; during the week.

Question. Sunday was a day off, normally?

Answer. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened [258] to be my Sunday.

From that it would appear that they worked Sundays and presumably holidays, from 4 in the morning until breakfast time, 7 o'clock; that on weekdays they worked from breakfast time, 7 o'clock, until 5 in the afternoon.

How do you account for such a discrepancy in the testimony that you have quoted in opposition?

Colonel THIELEN. Admitting the discrepancy between my closing time of 4 p. m. and that testified as 5 p. m., I believe the discrepancy is in the term "work." I broke that down to actual operation of the detector in picking up aircraft from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., and training, which might not actually involve tracking aircraft, from 7 to—I don't remember the exact time—from 7 to 11, and training and maintenance from 12 to 4, which agrees, I believe, substantially with—

Mr. GEARHART. I think, you, Colonel, picked the wrong word from the wrong place, when you stress the word "work." It was I that used the word "work." It doesn't appear in the testimony I read. He called it operating the machine.

Have you another explanation?

Colonel THIELEN. Operating the machine would not necessarily be "on the alert for the detection of aircraft."

Mr. GEARHART. I want to ask you, Colonel, as a military [259] man, whether or not you think there is anything significant in the fact that, according to your orders, this machine should have been turned off at 7 o'clock, and the further fact that the range of these machines was about 136 miles and no farther, that the Japanese planes should fly into that oscilloscope 2 minutes after it ought to have been off the air?

Colonel THIELEN. I draw no conclusion from that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Does it suggest to you, as a military man, that the Japanese had knowledge of the orders that we had under which these machines were operated?

Colonel THIELEN. Not necessarily, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Would you give consideration to that?

Colonel THIELEN. It is a very definite possibility; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think it strangely significant that the Japanese planes flew into the range of that machine just 2 minutes after it was supposed to be off the air?

Colonel THIELEN. It might have been.

Mr. GEARHART. Who made the order?

Colonel THIELEN. The order, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. The order fixing the time for these radars to be on the air.

Colonel THIELEN. General Short was responsible for that [260] order.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you a copy of that order?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir. I have a reference to it in my testimony.

Mr. GEARHART. I will remind counsel that I asked him weeks ago for copies of that order, together with a statement of the history source, and the name of the person who signed it, and I have not received it.¹

Now, radar is operated in the daytime as well as nighttime?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In daytime they will record the approach of planes that are far beyond the range of human vision, will they not?

Colonel THIELEN. With exception taken to the term "record," yes, sir; they indicate.

Mr. GEARHART. Using that distinction, it will indicate on the oscillograph?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

¹ Reports from the War Department on orders governing the operation of radar in Hawaii prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were subsequently introduced as Exhibit No. 137.

Mr. GEARHART. On the oscilloscope, that the airplanes are approaching from a very great distance?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the range of those portables, the only radars they had on the islands, six of them, was 136 to [261] 138 miles?

Colonel THIELEN. My figure is 150.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there have been many different maneuvers down through the years in the islands over there in which an air attack upon the islands was under contemplation, maneuvers in which cups were bestowed upon attacking forces, simulated attacking forces, for taking the islands, for instance, in these maneuvers. One was held a few months before, and at that time it was found by the judges that the proper time to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor is to ride in on the rays of the sun; is that not correct?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know that, as an Army officer, that that is the generally accepted thesis among military and naval people?

Colonel THIELEN. You refer to coming in on the sun?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. It is a commonly used tactic; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, the Japanese didn't have to have any imagination in planning this attack; all they had to do was to read the newspapers and listen to speeches, and know that that was the accepted idea among American officers as to when the islands should be attacked with the [262] greatest possibility of success, was to ride in on the rays of the sun, as the Japanese did later; is that correct?

Colonel THIELEN. I don't know, sir. I say it is a recognized tactic. That is as far as I can go as an Army officer.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think it was strangely significant that the order keeping these radars on the air should provide that they should be off the air at a time that an attack of that kind could be made with the greatest chances of success, according to the accepted views of the Army and Navy?

Colonel THIELEN. Do I see significance in that?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Does it suggest that possibly somebody was exerting a tremendous influence over the writing of orders somewhere along the line, in headquarters at Honolulu or America?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; it suggests nothing of the kind to me.

Mr. GEARHART. When we had six radar machines over there, why were they all on at once, and all off at once? Why wasn't it provided that they should spell each other off over the 24-hour period of the day?

[263] Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. No, sir; I don't think I will.

Colonel THIELEN. I am no expert on radar, which is a highly technical subject. I can suggest an answer to your last question—and he might drop the chart showing the radio stations. Let me say, each radar in general covers a certain sector. No one radar detector on the island could determine an approach from any direction.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you think that answer justifies the taking off of the air radar during the dangerous hours of the 24-hour period?

Colonel THIELEN. By no means, but it accounts for the simultaneous operation of several radar stations.

Mr. GEARHART. If you were in charge, don't you think you could think of a way of getting six machines in operation over a period of 24 hours a day?

Colonel THIELEN. I would want complete coverage. It would not be a solution to alternate the operation of radar around the island. You would have to have coverage of each sector while that particular station was operating.

Mr. GEARHART. Considering the terrain of Oahu, there are high points on the mountains, on the top of which these machines could be placed, and they could cover larger theaters than assigned to these fixed machines when you scattered them [264] along the coast; isn't that correct?

Colonel THIELEN. I believe that is correct in general. There are technicalities in the field of radar that I wouldn't want to testify on.

[265] Mr. GEARHART. Now, were there any orders from Washington to General Short or to any other person directing that no fire be had on any Japanese vessels or any Japanese installations—

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). Until the Japanese fired first?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You know that such an order was issued to General MacArthur, do you not?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. GEARHART. You know that the provision of the Constitution of the United States is that war shall be declared by the Congress of the United States?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the Constitution.

Mr. GEARHART. You know that is a fact. Was any order issued from Washington that you know anything about, either to General MacArthur or to General Short, reminding them that they should not take any offensive action because of this constitutional provision?

Colonel THIELEN. I was in no position to have any such knowledge and I do not have any.

[266] Mr. GEARHART. Is that the reason—

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. Is that the reason why they have you people come up here to read hearsay testimony to us, so that whenever we ask you a question in connection with that testimony you can always reply, "I am only here to give you the information I was sent up here to give you"?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; in my case, at least, that is definitely not true. I can explain the reason I was sent up here, I think, satisfactorily.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, there are admirals and generals available to subpoena by this committee who went through this attack. Why are they not here to read these statements instead of yourself?

Colonel THIELEN. Because the directive setting up this particular testimony was merely, I might say, to orient the committee by giving a narrative of the facts of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mr. GEARHART. And there are others that could give the narrative from reference to documents, as you have, and also to give testimony in respect to actual personal experiences and they are not here.

The CHAIRMAN. If that kind of thing is going to go on here the Chairman desires to say for the record that this [267] method of procedure was unanimously agreed to by the committee as the procedure to be followed. It was understood that this narrative recital was to be made by a representative of the Navy and a representative of the Army. The men who were on the ground and know what happened will be called, but they cannot all be called en masse.

Mr. GEARHART. With all due respect to the chairman of this committee, I want to say at this particular time that I never agreed and neither did any other member of the committee agree that they would consent to calling the witness in question just to get hearsay statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel for the committee for an hour and a half explained this procedure to the committee and no member of the committee, all members being present, raised any objection.

Mr. GEARHEART. Yes, but we expected to get witnesses who knew something about what they were talking, not hearsay.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman the Chairman has stated something on the record that is not as I understood it at all. There was no consent given, there was no consent passed about the manner of producing this. We were told that this was a tentative outline and I want the record to emphatically show that I never consented to trying this matter in this way.

[268] The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't care to get into a controversy here, but I don't want the record to be misrepresented. There was no objection expressed on the part of any committeeman to having a representative of the Navy and a representative of the Army come up and from documents and reports and evidence within the two departments give us a narrative recital of what happened physically at Pearl Harbor. They did state that evidence would be produced during the hearings by eye-witnesses and that will be done.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, may I speak—

Mr. GEARHART. I yield to the Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't want to add to any confusion on this score, but I certainly do not want to be recorded as one who ever assented to this method of procedure. I had very grave doubts regarding the method when it was proposed, I expressed considerable concern; I urged very strenuously, as the record shows, that this matter be deferred until we could acquire a more proper understanding of it from the various exhibits and records and twice renewed my motion for postponement.

I think that the developments to date have amply demonstrated the inexpediency of this method of procedure, with two men here to occupy 2 days, who had no information what- [269] ever, who had no connection whatever with Pearl Harbor and who evidently have very little familiarity with the records and I think it is most unfortunate that the first 2 days have been so largely wasted by this work.

Mr. GEARHEART. Mr. Chairman, may I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Gearhart, proceed, but as a mat-

ter of information, whether this is wise or unwise, it is the method that we agreed to and I hope that it can be speedily accomplished.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I again want to make this record clear that I did not agree to this method of procedure. My motion was to adjourn it so that we could get the original records here and so that we might go over the matter before we brought witnesses in.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, neither the Senator nor any other committeeman objected to these representatives being brought here for a narrative recital, as explained by counsel. The Senator did move to postpone it. The Senator from Michigan moved to postpone it on another ground entirely; but go ahead, Mr. Gearhart.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to—

Mr. GEARHART. I want to proceed. It is only a few minutes before noon.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go ahead with the witness and let [270] the committeeman continue without any further interruption.

Mr. GEARHART. Addressing my next question to Admiral Inglis, I will ask you, Admiral, whether or not there were any orders issued either from Washington or in the islands, directing the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District not to fire upon Japanese ships or installations until we were fired on first?

Admiral INGLIS. I have no knowledge of such an order.

Mr. GEARHART. You know of orders that were issued by Admiral Kimmel which were to the opposite effect, do you not?

Admiral INGLIS. I have no personal knowledge of such orders; no, sir. I would have to look that up.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I will refer you to the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry wherein they refer to certain orders issued by Admiral Kimmel in violation of Washington instructions, the admiral assuming the responsibility on the theory that he would act first and explain later. Do you remember that part of the report?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, have you read the report?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you are not giving us [271] information that is based upon the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Admiral INGLIS. The information which I have given you has been based on the research work of the people who work for me and I assume that they have read some of those things. I might also say that, in my opinion, from what I know at this moment, that that is controversial and also has something to do with fixing the responsibility. We have omitted those subjects from this presentation.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know a man in the Navy by the name of Commander Clarence Earl Dickson, or Clarence Earl Dickinson, Jr.?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. A flying naval officer, serial No. 74369?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not know him, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, in addition to being a competent flying officer he is also a very capable author. He wrote a story for the Saturday Evening Post which appeared in that publication on the 10th of October issue of 1942, which he entitled "I Fly for Vengeance." I want to read you just one paragraph. Maybe this will refresh your

memory on some orders that were issued at that time. It is the second paragraph of the story. [Reading:]

It was not that we pilots did not sense the tension that lit up the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere all the time. The mission from which we were returning—

I will interpolate, on December 7—

had the flavor of impending action. We had been delivering a batch of 12 Grumman Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron 21 to Wake Island where they were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from Pearl Harbor on November 28 under absolute war orders. Vice Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., the commander of the aircraft battle force, had given instructions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in the sky and pound anything we saw in the sea. In that way there could be no leak to the Japanese.

And I might point out to you that at the time that was written Clarence E. Dickinson was a lieutenant and that the last time I recall he had been promoted twice and is now a commander, so evidently there wasn't any objection in the Navy Department to that which he said.

Now, do you anything about that of which Lieutenant and now Commander Dickinson wrote?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. We did not attempt to read magazine articles and things of that character in making up this presentation.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you get me, Mr. Counsel, [273] the orders under which Lieutenant Dickinson flew on that trip and if those orders were in part verbal will you please ascertain for me what the verbal part of the orders were?¹

Senator LUCAS. I would suggest you get the witness also, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. GESELL. The witness is on our list. Admiral Halsey is on the list to testify. He was in command of those flyers. He seemed to us to be the logical person to give the facts that the Congressman is interested in.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. I merely advert to this because of all of this being a surprise. Why should anybody be surprised when we are making war orders?

The CHAIRMAN. Does any member of the committee think that this is argumentative matter that should appeal to the committee and not to the witness?

Mr. GEARHART. That is to the entire country, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have no doubt of that.

Mr. GEARHART. And that will, accordingly, include our distinguished Chairman as well.

The CHAIRMAN. No doubt and I accept my part of the responsibility.

Mr. GEARHART. It is a very heavy burden for you to bear, I admit that.

[274] Now, Admiral Inglis, do you know where the United States cruiser *Boise* was about that week of December 1 to December 7?

Admiral INGLIS. I understand the *Boise* was in the Philippines.

Mr. GEARHART. In the Philippines?

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5476 for a letter from the Navy Department.

Admiral INGLIS. She was attached to the Pacific Fleet, but actually present in the Philippines if my information is correct. I just obtained this information just this moment.

Mr. GEARHART. Who was commander of that ship?

Admiral INGLIS. What is that?

Mr. GEARHART. Who was commander of that ship at that time?

Admiral INGLIS. Captain Robinson. I am not sure of his initials.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know who is commander at the present time?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know a Commander or Captain Moran?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Mike Moran?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. He at one time was in command [275] of that ship and at one time preceding that was executive officer of that ship; is that not correct?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Can you tell me whether or not the Japanese fleet, the attacking force that was proceeding to rendezvous 200 miles north of Oahu—if that ship did not sight the Japanese fleet?

Admiral INGLIS. I know of no sighting of the Japanese fleet at all. My information is that the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was not sighted.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you make an investigation and determine whether or not there is a report on file indicating that the officers and crew, somebody in an official position on the cruiser *Boise*, sighted the Japanese attacking fleet during the first week of December?

Admiral INGLIS. If there is any evidence, either written or from witnesses, I am authorized to state that the Navy Department will make that available to you and the committee, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It will not be forgotten now that I have raised the question, I trust.

Admiral INGLIS. It will not be forgotten.¹

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there is another thing that I would like to ask you about.

[276] Were any orders issued from Hawaii or from Washington or from any other place placing restrictions upon the use of ship radios, radios of the type, for instance, on the cruiser *Boise*? I am now referring to the fatal week in December.

Admiral INGLIS. I am answering that question now from my own personal memory, Mr. Gearhart, and I have a recollection that I am not too sure of, because this was nearly 5 years ago, that there was a general order in effect about that time which applied to both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets, instructing them to maintain radio silence. I cannot be positive that that applied to the Pacific Fleet, but my recollection is that it applied to the Atlantic Fleet and in all probability it applied also to the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. When was that order enjoining silence upon ships at sea made?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got that information available. The Navy will try to get it for you, sir.²

¹ The log of U. S. S. *Boise* was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 68."

² See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5294.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, it was made just shortly before, around the latter part of November or the early part of December, 1941, wasn't it?

Admiral INGLIS. It is my recollection that the order was issued long before that, sir, but my recollection may be faulty.

Mr. GEARHART. By the way, was that phrase, [277] "task force" used in 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe it was, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I was told that it came into use and was borrowed from the Japanese nomenclature on or well along in 1942.

Admiral INGLIS. That is not my understanding.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think it is strangely significant that there should be an order directing all of our ships to sail south of Hawaii, that there should be a radio beam directed to be held on all night for the benefit of B-17's which the Japanese availed themselves of? Don't you think it is rather significant that there were naval orders enjoining silence upon all of our ships at sea, which would forbid them from reporting anything that they might obtain by way of information on the high seas? Don't you think it is strangely significant that the radar should be turned off the air during the danger hours of the day?

What effort has been made by the Intelligence Service to break down and ascertain how all these strangely significant things could occur, all of which, every one of them, operating to the benefit of our enemy and to the vulnerability of our own crews and ships?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I object to that on the ground that the witness has been asked five different [278] questions and I think they should be propounded one at a time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him answer all the five.

Mr. GEARHART. I think the five together is what makes it significant.

The CHAIRMAN. The question of significance will not be gone into at the moment, but answer, if you can, Admiral, all five together or ad seriatim.

Admiral INGLIS. Congressman Gearhart, that covers a lot of territory. Two of these questions, if I recall them, refer to Army matters, the B-17's and the radar going off the air at 7 o'clock.

Now, you ask me my opinion of the significance of those five things? I am not sure that I understand what the point is that you are making, but I will do the best I can to give you my opinion of the significance.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you say you don't understand why I have raised this question, or what I mean by it?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't understand what—

Mr. GEARHART. I understand that the Intelligence Service is an agency of the Army and an agency of the Navy, created for the purpose of taking these strange circumstances and finding out what they mean. Therefore I asked you have you made any investigation to determine why this long list of events, all of which tied the hands of America and [279] all of which benefited the Japanese, why they should all occur at one time, in one picture? Has that been a study of the Intelligence Bureau of which you are a part?

Admiral INGLIS. I would like to leave out, if I may, from the record any discussion of the functions or success of the Intelligence Service

at present. Insofar as it affected Pearl Harbor I think I can answer the gentleman's question.

My opinion is that the significance of those three things is accounted for by the tense relationship which existed in world politics at that time and it was only natural, for instance, that under the circumstances information concerning the movements of our fleet should be denied to any country with which our relations were strained. That is the only significance that I can read into the five items that the gentleman has just given me.

Mr. GEARHART. In your testimony yesterday you said that there was a condition existing on the battleship *California* which prevented it from performing its best service under the crisis. You said you had a report from the Chief of Naval Yards and Docks.

Admiral INGLIS. The report came from some officers in the Bureau of Ships who had made a study of that and the gist of the report that I gave yesterday was that the *California* was the only ship where any openings or lack of closures, let [280] us say, of watertight doors and hatches contributed in any way to the damage which resulted.

Mr. GEARHART. The words which caught my attention was that—in any way contributed to the inability of that ship to fight.

Now, were there other ships that had their doors opened, other ships that had themselves in such a condition that they could not fight in the most efficient manner?

Admiral INGLIS. The openings, of course, would not stop the ship from fighting but might possibly lessen the ability of the ship to stay afloat.

Now, as I said earlier this morning, we are getting that material together for you in response to that question and the Navy Department will make available to you and to the committee everything that they have on the subject.

Mr. GEARHART. Very well, but why put it off when you have right in your hands a report from which you can give us that.

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got it right in my hands.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you read this report of the Yards and Docks, the Bureau of Ships or Yards and Docks, whichever it was?

Admiral INGLIS. I read no report. This is the Bureau of Ships, Mr. Congressman, that is responsible for that sub- [281] ject, not the Bureau of Yards and Docks; the Bureau of Ships.

Mr. GEARHART. The Bureau of Ships?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got a report, in response to your question. I was told by my staff that they have received verbally this information that I have given you about the *California* being the only ship where the openings contributed in any way to the damage which was suffered by any of the ships there.

Mr. GEARHART. Did your staff tell you what the conditions were on the *California*?

Admiral INGLIS. Not in detail, no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Generally what did they tell you?

Admiral INGLIS. They told me that because of some difficulty in closing the watertight doors and hatches after general quarters were sounded, which changes the conditions of readiness from three to one, because of that difficulty that the flooding and perhaps resulting fire spread more rapidly than otherwise might have been the case.

Mr. GEARHART. Why were the doors and hatches of the *California* opened on that day?

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot answer that question at present, but we will get that information.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, this is one of these [282] things we are going into and it has got to the point where we feel we have to call witnesses who were actually on those ships to be sure to know what the conditions were and we are going to do so and I hope we will get it all here.

Mr. GEARHART. Counsel will recall that I have asked for all written orders which might have produced that condition or a similar condition on our ships, verbal orders, ship orders or district orders or commander in chief orders or Washington orders.

Mr. MITCHELL. My impression is that things of that kind are individual ship matters. As the matter stands we may have to call officers or men who were on the vessels themselves, but we are going ahead to try to get the facts.

Mr. GEARHART. It is now past 12, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. No. I say it is now past 12. We have reached our adjournment hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, we will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[283]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Before proceeding further with the witness, in view of the discussion that took place this morning among members of the committee, the Chair feels that in the interest of accuracy there ought to be placed in the record at this point a memorandum prepared and submitted to the committee by Mr. Mitchell, the general counsel, which is described as a "Tentative order of proof." Then a

Preliminary statement, covering committee procedure, relations with agencies concerned, and introduction of letters exchanged with Secretaries Forrestal, Patterson, President Truman, Roosevelt estate, plus Truman directives—

which was done previously, when we started.

Then on the following page of this memorandum it is stated [reading]:

The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the [283a] public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.

And following that there is subdivision "A," under the heading of "The Attack," and under that subdivision "A" there are 17 points, outlined by the counsel, and discussed in the committee. That memorandum is dated November 7, and which is a revision of a previous memorandum dated November 1 and distributed to all members of the committee on the 1st of November.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it was the 2d. I think the meeting took place on the 2d. The memorandum is dated the 1st.

The CHAIRMAN. The memorandum is dated the 1st, yes and the meeting took place on the 2d, and the following meeting probably on the 8th, because the following memorandum was dated the 7th, which was the day before.

Under subdivision "A" there are 17 different points which were discussed with the committee in a session that lasted from 10:30 in the morning to about 1:30 in the afternoon.

Then there is a subdivision "B," which is "The Jap Plan." That is, the plan of the Japanese as discovered from the records since obtained from Japanese sources, captured Japanese ships, and so on, and which is to come later under Admiral Inglis' testimony.

These 17 points were thoroughly discussed by the committee and the list of witnesses was gone over and what they would testify to, or a general outline of their testimony was [284] discussed, and there were three or four or five witnesses added to the list, including Sumner Welles, Mr. Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Tyler, whose name has been mentioned here, and Mr. Lockard, whose name has been mentioned here, and also Captain Zacharias, whose name was suggested by Congressman Keefe of Wisconsin.

The only other changes made to this tentative suggestion of procedure was that under Item No. 12, which was headed as follows, "Summarize Percentage Personnel Mustered Various Departments," and then in parentheses "perhaps here summary testimony showing no drunkenness"—the committee decided to strike out No. 12 and not go into that in this preliminary statement because that would be a matter that would have to be testified to, probably, by witnesses who were on the ground and in addition it was thought in any preliminary statement it would not be wise to go into that phase of the question.

Outside of those changes, this memorandum was discussed at length and no objection was raised to it, and every name, every additional name suggested by the members of the committee was added to the list of witnesses, and has been published.

I ask that this document, with these additions and corrections, be printed at this point.

(The document appears in full at pp. 125-129, inclusive.)

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to it being printed in the record, but I don't want my cross- [285] examination interrupted with it. I ask unanimous consent that it go in the record immediately after the conclusion of my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is entirely satisfactory.

Mr. GEARHART. I have only two or three questions to ask anyway, and I don't want my remarks interrupted.

The CHAIRMAN. That is entirely satisfactory.

Mr. GEARHART. I want to say in explanation, if that is offered to establish any point, that there is no objection to that order of proof, that the only objection I have raised has been against the people who have been brought here to establish the things that are set forth in that document.

I objected to it on the ground that they are hearsay witnesses and I have never been in a court room where they allowed hearsay evidence when there were live witnesses to furnish direct evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It was understood during this whole discussion that this presentation, this preliminary presentation, was not to be made by eyewitnesses, that it was to be made by a representative of the Army and a representative of the Navy, and that that relation and that delineation and narrative recital of what happened, the physical situation surrounding it, was to be given by a representative of the Army and of the Navy from the records in the War and Navy Departments, and [286] not by eyewitnesses, which would require, as everybody understood, as the committee understood, and as counsel explained, probably 2 or 3 weeks, to get eyewitnesses to everything that transpired out at Pearl Harbor.

I think it is due the committee, and the public, to say that there was no objection to this procedure, and that every suggestion of additional witnesses or modification of procedure was agreed to at the time.

Senator BREWSTER. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to amend your statement.

In the first place, as to the extent of the discussion, it is my very clear recollection that most of our discussion was centered, in all of our recent meetings, on much more controversial matters, which have been fully aired on the floor, and need not be discussed here.

This matter was brought up, this memorandum you speak of was submitted, and I recall very distinctly—which, apparently, the chairman does not recall—that I urged the point of view of Representative Keefe, of Wisconsin, who, out of a considerable experience as a trial lawyer, preferred to approach this in chronological order, starting back and bringing the events in in chronological order, in order that we might make a proper record for posterity.

It was the recommendation of counsel, and it was, we [287] gathered, the opinion of the majority, that this was the way to proceed. This discussion of which you speak followed three or four votes in which there had been a sharp difference between the majority and the minority and there was no reason to think that any further agitation would have resulted differently.

I am not prepared—I was not prepared, at any rate—to hold too strong an opinion as to which course was better and I so stated, but I do feel that events have demonstrated that it has not been as fortunate as, perhaps, was anticipated. I think that is a fair statement of the attitude.

[288] The CHAIRMAN. I might add to that that it was discussed in the committee and presented by the counsel as probably the most logical way to proceed so as to describe the actual attack, what took place on the day of the attack and the conditions which surrounded it and then bring it out in that method. It was the general understanding that that would be the course pursued.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I want the record to be clear. Mr. Chairman, it is true that item No. 12 was discussed and the question of drunkenness was taken out. The discussion was not as full as indicated by the chairman. I distinctly remember protesting doing it in this manner because I asked the committee to have counsel give us the exhibits at least 10 days in advance so that the members of the committee would be fully acquainted with all of the facts.

It was stated then that we would get the exhibits either that Friday or Saturday or possibly Monday. As a matter of fact, I received mine on the Tuesday and Wednesday, the day before the hearing.

Now, it appears that we have not received all of the exhibits. I want this record to show that there was no vote taken on this method of handling the matter; there was no consent, as far as I know, of any member concerned. We were [289] given this outline, it is true. There was no vote taken as to whether that was to be the method or not and I protested, as I did on the floor, that this method of trial would be a trial such as the Army and Navy and the various services wanted it to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, there was no stenographic record taken in any of the executive sessions of what discussion took place. Any Senator or any Congressman or any member of the committee could have moved that this method not be adopted as the procedure, and that we should adopt any other method of procedure. No motion being made, no vote was taken. The whole thing was discussed, each item was read by the counsel, Mr. Mitchell, item by item and discussed, each witness that was to be called and what he was expected to testify to in the various divisions of the tentative procedures of proof and the fact that no vote was taken on whether this should be the procedure was due to the fact that nobody made any motion about it, and it was generally accepted as the procedure which would be followed.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I don't think it is proper, Mr. Chairman, to carry this discussion to any great extent, but I am quite sure that you are correct in stating that each item was read. That is not my recollection as to what was done. We had it for 2 or 3 days to examine it.

[290] The CHAIRMAN. You had it for a week before that meeting, every member of the committee had it for a week before the meeting and that memorandum was dated the 1st of November. Every committeeman was given a copy of that and had it a week before we had the following meeting.

There was this new revision which had come about by the consideration of the November 1 memorandum and that was discussed, as I said a little while ago, in a meeting which lasted for about 3 hours. I don't say that that was the exclusive thing that was discussed. There were motions made to postpone the hearing that were voted upon also, but this memorandum was read and explained by the counsel to those present and that means all the members of the committee.

Put this in the record.

Mr. MURPHY. At a previous meeting when the plan was before the committee certain members asked that it be put over to the following meeting because they did not have enough opportunity to study it; that was the meeting previously to the November 8 meeting. And after the meeting on November 8 I dictated to my secretary a memorandum of what actually took place there, and I have that memorandum that was made that afternoon, and it is in accord with what the chairman outlined except as to the 3 hours of discussion. I have a record here of what each member brought up at that time.

[291] Senator BREWSTER. I trust that the Secretary's records will be presented to the committee and that they will be more accurate than the only other one that was presented to the Chairman and that we had to ask to have corrected because it was inaccurate.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not correct. The Senator had demanded a roll call, which was not taken in the committee by a vote; it was taken by a show of hands, and I asked the Senator from Maine that if there was any way by which the Government Printing Office could indicate a vote by showing of hands that I would accept it. The vote was later taken as if it was by a show of hands, and it was put in the record that way. That is why that mistake was made.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. I haven't said very much in this hearing, and I am not going to say much now. It seems to me this is much to do about nothing anyway.

There is just one thing that I want to direct to the attention of the committee and that is this: This case is being prepared by General Mitchell anyway, but the committee employed him and unanimously accepted him as general counsel. I doubt if there is any individual here that would probably try the case the same way that he is trying it. However, we [292] selected him to do it, and I am thoroughly satisfied with the way he is handling this case.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead, Mr. Gearhart and finish your interrogation.

Mr. GEARHART. Let me conclude this discussion by pointing out that the principle for which I contend, the violation of which I will constantly protest, is the calling of hearsay witnesses to prove facts when there are eyewitnesses available to the same point. I am not questioning what is in that paper at all; I never have, and this is not in the nature of impeachment to offer it in the record. For that reason I will welcome it at the conclusion of my cross-examination.

The CHAIRMAN. I will be glad to have it put in at the end of the Congressman's examination. Go ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. There is just one thing, Admiral Inglis, that I want to conclude my cross-examination by asking you about, and that has to do with the order of May 1941 transferring three battle-ships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers to the Atlantic. Then there was much discussion about two-thirds and one-third which left me with confusion confounded.

Before any of the ships were transferred to the Atlantic you would say that that was a hundred percent of our fleet. What you mean is when they transferred these ships that numer- [293] ically, at least, the Pacific Fleet was reduced one-third, is that it?

Admiral INGLIS. I will try to make that just as clear as I can, Mr. Gearhart. I cannot give you the precise dates when various specific ships were transferred from one fleet to another.

Mr. GEARHART. By that you mean that the ships were, at different times, under different orders?

Admiral INGLIS. I presume so.

Mr. GEARHART. Did that all occur during the month of May 1941, or was it over a larger period than that?

Admiral INGLIS. It would be my impression and understanding that it was over a considerable period of time. There was some shifting of ships around from one fleet to another for—well, as a matter of fact, that has been going on forever, but as of the 7th of December 1941 the numerical strength of the ships of the Pacific Fleet was roughly two-thirds that of the numerical strength of the ships of the Atlantic Fleet.

Now, the question has been raised about several ships which were not a part of either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet. Those are the battleships *North Carolina* and *Washington* and the aircraft carrier *Wasp*,¹ in particular. Those ships had recently been completed and commissioned, they were still on their shake-down periods.

[294] I have a personal recollection of one, the *North Carolina*, which was in the Brooklyn Navy Yard undergoing some repairs, having some very serious defects remedied. Those defects show up on a shake-down cruise and must be corrected before the ships are ready in all respects to join the fleet.

Those ships I did not count in my numerical summary and they have no effect on these proportions which I have given you of two-thirds numerical strength.

I think I should also say again that that is numerical strength and not necessarily battle efficiency or battle fighting efficiency or power, because it so happens that the numbers in the Atlantic Fleet were increased to a good extent by the preponderance of destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet. On the other hand, there were more battleships in the Pacific Fleet, but I have counted each ship by one regardless of whether it was a battleship or a submarine or a destroyer.

In other words, of the aircraft carriers there were three assigned to each fleet and that again does not count the *Wasp* which had not yet joined either fleet and was still in the shake-down period.

Does that answer your question, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. It clears it up considerably.

Now, what was left in the Pacific Fleet when the ships that I have just enumerated were transferred to the Atlantic?

[295] Admiral INGLIS. I have the list of ships that were in the Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941. Is that what you wish, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Are you going to draw a distinction between the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral INGLIS. I have the figures for the Asiatic Fleet also if you wish those.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, give those separately so that the record will be clear on it.

Admiral INGLIS. I can give those by ships, that is, so many battleships, or I can give them by names of specific ships. Which way would you prefer it?

Mr. GEARHART. By ships.

Admiral INGLIS. All right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you the record in the other way, that is, by name?

Admiral INGLIS. I have it any way you want it; yes, sir. It is much longer by names of ships. It runs into seven pages of tabulated data.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let us have it by type then.

Admiral INGLIS. Taking first the battleships: There were six assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, nine assigned to the Pacific Fleet, and none assigned to the Asiatic Fleet.

In the case of the aircraft carriers, there were four [296] assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, three to the Pacific Fleet, and none to the Asiatic Fleet.

Well, I might add parenthetically that I have not counted the *Long Island* in my ad lib testimony. The *Long Island* was a very inferior

¹Subsequently corrected to *Hornet*. See p. 199, *infra*.

type of carrier. She was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and makes the fourth one.

Heavy cruisers: 5 assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, 12 to the Pacific Fleet, and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Light cruisers: 12 to the Atlantic Fleet, 10 to the Pacific Fleet, and 1 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Destroyers: 97 to the Atlantic Fleet, 54 to the Pacific Fleet, and 13 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Submarines: 58 to the Atlantic Fleet, 23 to the Pacific Fleet, 29 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Minelayers: None to the Atlantic Fleet, nine to the Pacific Fleet, and none to the Asiatic Fleet.

Mine sweepers: 37 to the Atlantic Fleet, 26 to the Pacific Fleet, and 6 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Patrol vessels: 5 to the Atlantic Fleet, 13 to the Pacific Fleet, 14 to the Asiatic Fleet.

Now, the numerical totals of all of those are Atlantic Fleet 224, Pacific Fleet 159, Asiatic Fleet 64.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, prior to May 1941, which was prior to the transfer of any of the ships that I have listed [297] from the Pacific to the Atlantic, was the American Navy in the Pacific numerically stronger than the Japanese Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. Prior to May 1941?

Mr. GEARHART. That is a date that I take from the Navy court of inquiry report as the date when the transfer of these ships occurred.

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't those figures readily available. Again will be very happy to get them for you.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did you have the list of ships that were transferred?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I thought by one order and you tell me by several orders, to the Atlantic.

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I haven't got that readily available. What I have here is a list of the ships and the assignment of those ships to their respective fleets as of December 7.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I will ask the question in this way: You are an expert in naval affairs. If you would add to the Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers, would you say that the American Fleet in the Pacific would be numerically superior to the Japanese?

Admiral INGLIS. If you will give me those figures again [298] I will answer that definitely.

Mr. GEARHART. Three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers.

Admiral INGLIS. That would give our battleship strength in the Pacific Fleet as 12 opposed to 10 Japanese battleships; aircraft carriers 4 opposed to 8 Japanese aircraft carriers; 16 heavy cruisers as compared to 18 Japanese heavy cruisers; 10 light cruisers as compared to 17 Japanese light cruisers; and 63 destroyers as compared to 109 Japanese destroyers.

On balance I would say that the Japanese Fleet was superior to the Pacific Fleet with the increments which the Congressman has just given me.

Mr. GEARHART. So while we were inferior in May of 1941, we reduced our relative position to the Japanese Navy still further, that is the effect of it.

Admiral INGLIS. Any transfer of ships from the Pacific Fleet resulting in a reduction would, of course, result in a deterioration of our own position.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, where do the orders effecting a transfer from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet emanate?

Admiral INGLIS. That would be Chief of Naval Operations. Just what reasons would bring about those I am not prepared to say. I don't know whether they would come from any higher [299] source or not, but the orders would be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, whatever that higher authority would be the orders would probably come in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral INGLIS. As far as the fleet is concerned that is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know anything about these particular orders?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. May I ask counsel to endeavor to secure them? I would like to look at them.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the order transferring ships to the Atlantic Fleet in May 1941?

Mr. GEARHART. Beginning in May of 1941.

Mr. GESELL. I take it you want transfers both ways.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. If there are any transfers indicated from the Atlantic to the Pacific I would like to see those, too; that is, the orders providing for them.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all the cross examination?

Mr. GEARHART. I am through; yes.

(Tentative order of proof—Preliminary statement covering committee procedure, submitted by Mr. Mitchell and referred to at p. 119, follows:)

[300]

TENTATIVE ORDER OF PROOF

(Draft of November 7, 1945)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT COVERING COMMITTEE PROCEDURE, RELATIONS WITH AGENCIES CONCERNED, AND INTRODUCTION OF LETTERS EXCHANGED—SECRETARIES FORRESTAL, PATTERSON, PRESIDENT TRUMAN, ROOSEVELT ESTATE, PLUS TRUMAN DIRECTIVES

[301] The story of the actual attack and the Japanese plans for attack will be presented by an Army and a Navy officer, who will summarize all available data. The summary will be prepared under direction of counsel along the lines suggested by the following outline. Care will be taken to avoid all matters of opinion and questions of individual responsibility. The summary will be subject to amendment if proved in error through subsequent witnesses. This procedure will save calling scores of witnesses and will give to the committee and the public the first organized comprehensive account of the attack.

A. THE ATTACK

1. Disposition Pacific Fleet 12/7. Show in *map* form.

2. Description:

(a) Transports west of Hawaii on 12/7.

(b) Fleet base and Oahu ground and harbor installations—*Map*.

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, pp. 5502 and 5504 et seq. for documents supplied by the Navy Department in this connection.

- [illegible]

B. THE JAP PLAN

1. Chronology:

- Date plan completed.
- Date left port.
- Date Dec. 8 fixed.
- Date instructed carry-out plan.

[304] 2. Route taken to and from:

Fix position various key days before and after attack.

MAP—noting mileages from possible reconnaissance points, shipping lanes, etc.

- 3. Details of execution.
- 4. Projected losses compared actual losses.
- 5. Sources data used in planning.

NOTE.—The Jap Plan will be reconstructed from captured plans and statements made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.

[305] TENTATIVE ORDER OF WITNESSES

WASHINGTON*

Witness

Admiral Richardson

Principal subject examination

Re Complete story of the reasons why the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, his trips to Washington in July and October, 1940, his discussions and disagreement with President Roosevelt and conversations with other officials, his relief, his part in the Bloch report of December 30, 1940, endorsed January 7, which led to the Knox-Stimson correspondence, and other matters pertaining to his Hawaiian command.

(At this point introduce Knox letter to Stimson dated Jan. 24, 1941, Stimson letter to Knox dated Feb. 7, 1941, plan for employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu, Martin memo. of Aug. 20, 1941, and read into record excerpts from defense plans.)

Witness

Principal subject examination

Mr. Hamilton, formerly Chief, Far Eastern Division, State Department
Re Jap negotiations, details of information available to State Department, exchange of information with Army-Navy representatives, and State Department attitude toward basing fleet Pearl Harbor.

Captain McCollum*
Captain Safford*
Colonel Bratton*
Re Information available Army and Navy concerning Far Western developments, Jap military preparations, fleet location [306] etc., reports made to responsible officers, State Department and White House, handling of "magic" intercepts and distribution of messages generally.

General Miles*
Admiral Wilkinson*
Re Function and organization of intelligence units; information available to these officers and action taken thereon except as to events of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later; warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.

General Gerow*
Admiral Turner*
Re Function and organization of War Plans units; information available to these officers and action taken thereon (except as to events of 12/6 and 12/7 to be considered later); warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.

*Whenever witness will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this is indicated by asterisk.

128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Witness

General Arnold
Admiral Ingersoll*

[307] FCC monitoring report
Commander Safford
Commander Kramer*
Admiral Noyes
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Sadtler
Colonel Clausen
Monitoring witnesses

Commander Kramer
Commander Safford
Captain McCollum
Admiral Turner
Admiral Schuirmann
Admiral Wilkinson
Admiral Ingersoll
Colonel Bratton
Colonel Dusenbury
General Miles
General Gerow
Colonel French
Admiral Bearsdall
[308] Miss Grace Tully

Admiral Stark

General Marshall

Mr. Thomas E. Dewey

Mr. Hull

Mr. Stimson

[309] Knox papers

Principal subject examination

Re Warnings sent to Pearl Harbor, drafting of messages, conferences held, agencies and persons consulted, action taken on replies received to warnings, related conferences at White House, Marshall-Stark joint messages on military situation.

Re Winds message. Interception and decoding of original message giving winds code and second message Nov. 19. Steps then taken to monitor the Jap weather broadcasts. All available proof as to whether the "execute" message was ever heard or obtained. Also any information developed on hidden word messages. Exhibits may include excerpts testimony of officers at various points.

Re The events of 12/6 and 12/7 including handling of final 14-part Jap message and messages re code burnings and 1:00 o'clock delivery, Marshall warning message, conferences among Cabinet officers and others, transmission of messages to White House and State Department.

Re Presidential files. Any documents which may be found in the Roosevelt papers bearing on the Pearl Harbor situation will be introduced through Miss Tully.

Re All events, including information available to him, conferences with Cabinet officers and President Roosevelt, handling of warning messages, extent of knowledge of impending attack, conferences with War Department, etc.

Re All events, including information available to him, conferences with Cabinet officers and President Roosevelt, handling of warning messages, extent of knowledge of impending attack, conferences with Navy Department, etc., and Dewey incident of 1944.

Re Communications with General Marshall and any additional information available to him.

Re All events, with particular reference to conversations and meetings with President Roosevelt and other Cabinet officers, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, the question of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, information available to him and handling of crucial messages, participation in warnings, and the events leading up to the Nov. 26th note to the Japanese Government.

Re All events, with particular reference to information available to him, his part in the warning messages, and his conferences with President Roosevelt and Cabinet officers.

We are advised by the Knox estate that the only papers which may be available are at the Navy Department, and this is being investigated.

(NOTE.—Throughout the testimony in this branch of the presentation, particularly that directed to high-ranking officials, a detailed inquiry will be made

*Whenever witness will be recalled for further examination on additional subjects, this is indicated by asterisk.

into just what information was available to President Roosevelt and the Department of State as to impending attack, and what part, if any, either took in giving or withholding warnings to Pearl Harbor.)

PEARL HARBOR

<i>Witness</i>	<i>Principal subject examination</i>
General Herron	<i>Re</i> Condition of Pearl Harbor defenses prior to Short's appointment, earlier alerts, and general background information.
(To be determined)	<i>Re</i> Delay construction fixed radar and additional airfields.
Captain Layton	<i>Re</i> All classes of information including ship location reports and intelligence bulletins, messages of various classes intercepted before and after Dec. 7, activities of Jap consular agents, Mori tap, Merle Smith cable to Short, Wilkinson Manila report, etc.
Commander Rochefort	
Admiral Mayfield	
Mr. Shivers, FBI	
Colonel Fielder	
Colonel Bicknell	
Admiral McMorris	
[310] Admiral Bellinger	<i>Re</i> Pearl Harbor air defense, reconnaissance, and all points bearing on air aspects of situation, including details of Martin-Bellinger annex.
General Martin	
General Davidson	
Commander Taylor	<i>Re</i> Radar installations, efficiency of information center, adequacy of equipment and personnel.
Colonel Powell	<i>Re</i> All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.
Colonel Phillips	
Admiral Smith	
Admiral Bloch	<i>Re</i> All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.
General Short	<i>Re</i> All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.
Admiral Kimmel	<i>Re</i> All events, including plans made to meet surprise attack, knowledge of information available Washington and Hawaii, and steps taken in response to warning messages.

[311] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have had no occasion to say anything up to date.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been very quiet, I will say that.

Mr. KEEFE. May I say, as one member of the committee, I presume I am correct in the assumption that the weight to be extended to the testimony given by these two witnesses who have testified in behalf of the Army and Navy will be governed by the sources of their information, the character of the information, whether it is of their own knowledge, hearsay, or what not.

Does the Chair so understand the situation?

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will, of course, consider the nature of the testimony, the source from which it comes, and the weight to be given to it.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Now, I understand from both the Admiral and the Colonel that you have heretofore testified that your evidence, in the main, is purely hearsay; you have no definite knowledge from personal observation of any of the events which occurred at Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack, or immediately after and that the sources of your

information are based entirely on material which you have discovered as a result [312] of searches made, and analyses made by those working for you on your respective staffs; is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. Speaking for the Navy, that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that correct also for the Army?

Colonel THIELEN. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. I have been asked a few questions on cross-examination in my professional capacity, which I answered to my own knowledge.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to the Army?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you qualify as an expert on all matters relating to the Navy, Admiral?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that neither of you qualify as experts in the accepted sense of the term "expert witnesses."

Now, I have a few questions that I would like to ask which have apparently not been heretofore developed in connection with the cross-examination. I direct my attention first to the statement made by you, Admiral, to the effect that certain orders were issued declaring certain waters—they were issued as the result of the Executive order of the President—around the Hawaiian Islands to be defensive [313] borders, as I understood it.

Admiral INGLIS. That order, if that is your point, sir, was, as far as the Navy was concerned, contained in a general order issued by the Secretary of the Navy, and it defined two defensive sea areas which were outlined on the chart in the course of the prepared statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you refer to your prepared statement and see if I am in error, that you referred to it as an Executive order of the President designating certain prohibited areas?

Admiral INGLIS. It is not in my prepared statement. I gave that ad lib, because general orders of that nature usually derive from Executive orders, and I personally assumed, as I gave that statement, that it was derived from an Executive order.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that a mere assumption on your part?

Admiral INGLIS. If that is a question at issue, I will be very happy to verify that. I still think it did derive from the Executive order.

Mr. KEEFE. You have not seen the Executive order?

Admiral INGLIS. Not recently; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever see it?

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot say whether I ever did or not.

[314] Mr. KEEFE. Do you know the content of that order?

Admiral INGLIS. Not now, no sir. I can look it up.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know the date of the general order, if any was issued pursuant to the Executive order?

Admiral INGLIS. Not at this time; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you a copy of that general order in your possession now?

Admiral INGLIS. No. We will get it for you, though.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, may I state, Mr. Counsel, that I would like to have, for purposes of identification, the Executive order issued by the President, if any, establishing the prohibited waters around the Philippine Islands.

Mr. GESELL. The Philippine, or the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. KEEFE. I mean the Hawaiian Islands. Pardon me.

Well, if there is one relating to the Philippine Islands it might possibly be included in the same order, I don't know.

I would also like to have a copy of the order issued by the Navy, the general order, if such an order was in fact issued, including the date of that order.

Admiral INGLIS. The Navy Department will produce that.¹

Mr. KEEFE. Now, what is your present recollection, from the source of the material which you have, and which you studied, as to the purpose and intent of that order? What [315] did it generally establish?

Admiral INGLIS. My recollection is that it established a defensive sea area. It gave the boundaries of this area, and it required that no merchant vessels, either foreign or U. S., be permitted to proceed through that area, nor no foreign men-of-war be permitted to proceed through that area without the approval of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know how extensive the area was?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. That was outlined on the chart during yesterday's presentation. It was not very extensive. It did cover the approaches to Pearl Harbor and the Kaneohe air station.

[316] Mr. KEEFE. Was that a secret order?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it published to the world?

Admiral INGLIS. I am morally certain it was; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So foreign ships would have notice of the existence of such an order?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did the order provide as to what action the Navy was to take in the event any foreign ships entered that prohibited area?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not believe the specific action was prescribed, but certainly the Navy was to prevent any movement of that kind with all resources at its command.

Mr. KEEFE. Your evidence, as I recall, indicates that the Navy did so on the morning of December 7 before the Japanese attack.

Admiral INGLIS. That is a fair assumption.

Mr. KEEFE. In the matter of sinking the submarine by the destroyer *Ward*.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have, as the result of the search which you have conducted, any knowledge of any other ships or [317] vessels of any character having been sunk other than those which you have testified to?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. You mean prior to December 7, on or prior to December 7?

Mr. KEEFE. On or prior to December 7.

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now I believe you testified that the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* on December 7 was proceeding eastward.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do your records indicate what that group of ships was composed of?

¹ Copies of the orders appear in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1681-1686.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That were escorting the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you identify them, please?

Admiral INGLIS. That task force consisted of the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, the heavy cruisers *Northampton*, *Chester*, *Salt Lake City*; the destroyers *Balch*, *Mauzy*, *Craven*, *Gridley*, *McCall*, *Dunlap*, *Benham*, *Fanning*, and *Ellet*. The total was one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers.

Mr. KEEFE. That task force had been taking some material out to Wake Island?

Admiral INGLIS. It had been taking airplanes to Wake Island; yes, sir.

[318] Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand that the cruisers and destroyers were acting as convoys for the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. The word that we used for it is "escort," sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Escort?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. The convoy is or are the ships which the escort escorts.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me. I am not very familiar with Navy practice. The convoy is the whole works and the escort are those that escort the convoy; is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. We usually speak of a convoy as the ships to protect.

Mr. KEEFE. In this case the convoy was what? The *Lexington* or the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. The flagship was the *Enterprise*.

Mr. KEEFE. What were the ships that were being protected on their way along from Wake Island?

Admiral INGLIS. In this particular case it was called a task force rather than either a convoy or an escort. However, I will try to clarify that by saying that the *Enterprise*—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). Let us get it right there.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him complete the answer.

Mr. KEEFE. On the way out, when we were taking planes out to Wake, and other material was that a convoy?

[319] Admiral INGLIS. We would call it a task force in that case, because there were no noncombatant ships in that group of ships.

Mr. KEEFE. So on both occasions then this group of ships that left Pearl Harbor and went out to Wake was a task force?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was a task force on the way back?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, we will strike the word "convoy" out of this discussion then.

Now what time did that task force leave Wake on the way back to Pearl Harbor? Do your records indicate that?

Admiral INGLIS. I am afraid I cannot give you that offhand. We will find it.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have available the log of the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. We can get it. It may take some time, though. These logs are not readily available. We will try to get them.

Mr. KEEFE. In connection with your examination of the facts immediately before and after Pearl Harbor, did you have [320] access to the logs of the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. The log itself was not available, but a number of extracts from the log were included in the court of inquiry and the Roberts Board report, and war diaries, things of that nature.

Mr. KEEFE. What do you mean when you say the log of the *Enterprise* is not available? Do you mean it cannot be obtained?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I do not mean that. I mean it was not readily available in the time we had to conduct this research.

Mr. KEEFE. Now in order that this record may be clear—because I am a boy from the country and do not understand all these things—will you explain in the record just what the log of a ship is supposed to contain?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

The log of a ship in the Navy consists in general of two types of information. One is contained in columns which tabulate meteorological data such as temperature, humidity, height of the barometer, such data as the speed which the ship is making, the number of miles, nautical miles that have been steamed during each hour of the day, the drills that have been held, the ship's position at 8 o'clock in the morning, at noon, and at 8 p. m.

Then the other classification is under the term "remarks," [321] and the remarks in the log contain a journal of events of interest, and those are divided into the various watches, that is the midwatch is from midnight to 4 a. m., the morning watch from 4 a. m. to 8 a. m., and so forth.

The watch officer, the officer of the deck, signs in person the remarks, or the diary pertinent to his particular watch. That signature is also taken as an authentication of the corresponding data which appears in the columns, such as the meteorological data and the speed and mileage that the ship has covered.

Mr. KEEFE. Does the log ordinarily contain information as to orders received by the ship?

Admiral INGLIS. The log would probably contain the briefest sort of reference to the reason for the ship getting under way. I do not think for the purposes of this committee that would be particularly valuable, because it usually is couched something like this:

"In accordance with signal from division commander got under way and stood out of the harbor."

That would not give the source of the division commander's order.

Mr. KEEFE. Would it contain information, for example, as to when a flight of scout bombers or planes left the deck of a ship?

[322] Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would it contain memoranda as to any orders relating to the conduct of those planes after they left the ship?

Admiral INGLIS. Will you repeat that question?

Mr. KEEFE. Read the question, please.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Admiral INGLIS. In general; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then if the *Enterprise*, either on the 6th of December 1941, as it proceeded from Wake to Pearl Harbor, toward Pearl Harbor, or on the early morning of the 7th of December, had escort planes in the air patrolling the area ahead of this task force, would that information be found in the log of the *Enterprise*?

Admiral INGLIS. I would expect the information as to the time and number of planes which were launched would appear in the log; also the time and the number of planes which returned to the ship would appear in the log, and probably a brief word or two about the mission of those planes would appear in the log.

[323] Mr. KEEFE. Would the log also indicate whether those planes were armed or unarmed?

Admiral INGLIS. Under those circumstances, on December 6 and 7, I would be inclined to think that it would not contain that information.

Mr. KEEFE. I have indicated, I believe, that I would like to have the log of the *Enterprise* available.¹

Well, now, you testified, as I recall, in your general statement as it appears in our record of the testimony, page 72, that in addition to regular scheduled reconnaissance flights, the U. S. S. *Enterprise* 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor launched scout bombers armed with machine guns shortly after 6 a. m. which searched to the eastward ahead of the ship, an arc of 110° to a distance of 150 miles.

Where did you get that information?

Admiral INGLIS. That information was taken from the action report of the *Enterprise*, and from various other original sources. I would hazard a guess that some of that came from the interrogation of the pilots on those planes.

Mr. KEEFE. You say the action report of the *Enterprise*. What is that?

Admiral INGLIS. Whenever a ship of the Navy is in action involving any shooting, the commanding officer is required to submit a report of the action, which contains numerous details, [324] such as the number of rounds of ammunition fired, the damage to his own ship, the estimated damage to the enemy, a narrative of the events.

Mr. KEEFE. Was the *Enterprise* in action that morning at 6 a. m.?

Admiral INGLIS. Her planes were in action at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. In action against whom?

Admiral INGLIS. Against the Japanese planes that attacked Pearl Harbor. Not at 6 o'clock, but in the course of that flight.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, but, my dear sir, let us make this clear. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 7:55, according to your testimony. These ships left the *Enterprise*, these planes, according to your testimony, shortly after 6 a. m., nearly 2 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. They certainly were not engaged in any action at that time, were they, against the Japs?

Admiral INGLIS. They were engaged in action against the Japs sometime after 7:45 and before they landed at Ewa Field at times varying from 9:15 to 10:15, which I believe were the figures.

Mr. KEEFE. When they left the *Enterprise*, they were equipped and ready for action, were they not, at 6 o'clock [325] that morning?

Admiral INGLIS. I think that is a fair assumption, because they were firing at Japanese planes on their way into Ewa landing field.

Mr. KEEFE. You stated in your general statement that they were armed.

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And after leaving the *Enterprise* they were supposed to proceed on and land at Ewa; is that right?

¹ The log of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 101.

Admiral INGLIS. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As they were coming east that morning, and finally came over the island, they engaged the Japs who were then attacking Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. That is the story as I have it; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you deduce from any of the information you have been able to obtain, that the commander of that task force had any knowledge that there was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor that morning at 6 o'clock?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Where is the action report of the *Enterprise*? Have you seen it?

Admiral INGLIS. It is now in the archives and records of the Navy Department.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you seen it?

[326-7] May I ask, Mr. Mitchell, that that action report of the *Enterprise* be produced?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. For use in connection with this examination.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.¹

Mr. KEEFE. Now, may I ask you this question:

So far as the world knew, and the people of America knew, and so far as the records show, this country was at peace with Japan at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 7th day of December; was it not?

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot speak for the people of the world, but speaking for myself, that was my impression, that we were technically at peace; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. We were technically at peace?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that the way you want to say it?

Admiral INGLIS. That is the way I want to say it, because with a task force approaching Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making a surprise attack on the Navy and Army at that location, I would say it was highly technical.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Do your records disclose, in the action report of the *Enterprise*, as to why these planes were launched in making reconnaissance on the morning of the 7th at 6 o'clock?

[328] Admiral INGLIS. I am advised that the purpose given was routine flight training.

Mr. KEEFE. Routine flight training?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; I hope you will not try to pin me down too closely on that, because I am really not too well informed.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well; we will try to go into that maybe at the time when Admiral Halsey, or someone who was on the job, testifies to it, perhaps.

Then, am I to understand that so far as the information available that you have from the record, the log of the *Enterprise*, the action report of the *Enterprise*, or whatever record you may have examined, or your researchers may have examined, that while we were technically at peace at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 7th day of December, the *Enterprise*, returning as part of the task force from Wake Island with the ships which you have described and enumerated, did have out

¹ The action report of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 103.

in front of that task force a patrol of planes, 18 scout bombers fully armed, ready for action?

Admiral INGLIS. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that those bombers, as they proceeded east, learned of the attack at 7:50, and proceeded then to Pearl Harbor and engaged the enemy?

Admiral INGLIS. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

[328a] Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, at 7:55 when this attack came on Pearl Harbor, where do you locate this task force of Admiral Halsey specifically?

Admiral INGLIS. Two hundred miles west of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. KEEFE. Directly west?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, there was another task force, was there not, in which was included the aircraft carrier *Lexington*?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was in command of that escort?

Admiral INGLIS. Admiral John Henry Newton.

Mr. KEEFE. Where was that task force on the 6th of December 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. I have that as 460 miles from Midway, en route to Midway.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, where was it with respect to Pearl Harbor, and with respect to Halsey's task force?

Admiral INGLIS. Will you get the other chart, No. 1, giving the disposition of the task fleet?

I make it as roughly, 350 miles, a little north of west [329] of Admiral Halsey's Task Force 8.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you point on the map, just for the purpose of observation, about where the Halsey task force was, and where the Newton task force was.

Admiral INGLIS. There is Task Force 12, that blue dot, at which Commander Biard is pointing. And then he is going to draw his wand in the direction immediately south of east to Task Force 8. I just made a very hasty estimate here of the distance between the two, and it comes out about 350 miles.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Now the task force commanded by Admiral Newton was on the way to Wake Island, was—or Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. Midway.

Mr. KEEFE. Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. To deliver certain Marine planes?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. To Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you enumerate the ships that composed the task force commanded by Admiral Newton?

Admiral INGLIS. The ships were the aircraft carrier *Lexington*, the heavy cruisers *Chicago*, *Portland* and *Astoria* [330] and destroyers *Porter*, *Drayton*, *Flusser*, *Lamson*, and *Mahan*. A total of one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, nine altogether.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any information as to whether reconnaissance was conducted by Admiral Newton by the use of planes?

Admiral INGLIS. The evidence on that, Mr. Congressman, is a little bit—in fact, it is very vague. In the testimony of Admiral Newton I believe he said that planes were out scouting, but he did not say what planes they were. They may have been planes from the *Lexington*, or they may have been planes from the heavy cruisers.

There is also something to indicate that the *Lexington* carried a heavy deck load of these Marine planes, which cluttered up her flight deck, making the launching of planes difficult.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to clear this situation up if I can.

On page 179 of the testimony which you gave yesterday, under cross examination by Senator Ferguson, referring to the *Lexington* group under the command of Admiral Newton, Senator Ferguson asked you this question:

Do you know whether they did any reconnaissance?

Your answer was:

I understand, because of the additional Marine Corps planes on board, the flight deck was so cluttered [331] that they were not able to launch any.

Senator FERGUSON. So there was no reconnaissance from that?

Admiral INGLIS. Not from the *Lexington*.

Is that your testimony?

Admiral INGLIS. I presume it is, sir; and that was my understanding yesterday. My attention was invited last night to—

Mr. KEEFE (interposing). Well, that—

Mr. GESELL. Wait a minute, Congressman. Let him finish.

Admiral INGLIS. Because of this cross examination of Senator Ferguson's, my staff attempted to look this matter up a little more thoroughly, and the best they could give me this morning was there was some doubt as to just what planes there were in the air. So I would prefer Admiral Newton to answer that.

Mr. KEEFE. After you so testified, Admiral—which, of course, I understand you are testifying just from your recollection of the material and papers and files, so on and so forth—you were not there, and necessarily you have no personal recollection of it.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As a matter of fact, when you got through your testimony yesterday, some of your staff called your at- [332] tention to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt, did they not?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not sure to whom the testimony was given, but that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I now call your attention to the testimony of Admiral Newton himself given before Admiral Hewitt in the so-called Hewitt investigation which appears on page 318, questions 29, 30, and 31 on that page. This question was asked of Admiral Newton by Admiral Hewitt:

Do you recall having any particular concern over the fact that the mission was advancing your course over 1,000 miles towards Japan?

Answer. I consider that I was going into waters that had not been frequented by our ships for some time, and there might be more danger from submarines than we had considered in the past. I set a speed of 17 knots in daylight, and zigzagging. I also had scouting flights made by planes to cover our advance.

Did you read that testimony of Admiral Newton himself?

Admiral INGLIS. That was invited to my attention either late last night or early this morning, the very selection you just read.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, as a matter of fact, whether the planes came from the flight deck of the *Lexington*, the [333] carrier, or whether they came from some other ship that was part of that task force, the record, as given in the testimony of Admiral Newton himself, said that he had not only scout planes covering his advance, but that also because he was in waters that our ships had not theretofore been traveling for some time, zigzagging his ships to avoid possible attack by submarines.

Did you gather that from the testimony?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; that is precisely what the testimony says.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, then, what submarines would be liable to attack at that time?

Admiral INGLIS. I am afraid that is a conjectural question which I am not prepared to answer.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like, for a moment, to address my remarks to the Colonel, and I would like to have placed back on the easel that map or plot showing the—

Colonel THIELEN. The radar, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. The radar chart.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question while the testimony is waiting?

Mr. KEEFE. A question of whom?

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. KEEFE. You want to ask me a question?

[334] Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

I wonder if the gentleman is reading from the Hewitt report, or the Hart report?

Mr. KEEFE. When I said Hewitt I meant Hart. Will you correct the record? I am reading from the Hart report.

Mr. MURPHY. That is not the Hewitt report at all. It is page 318 of the Hart report.

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you very much for your diligence in correcting me.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to the date of the Hart report?

Mr. KEEFE. It is dated February 12, 1944, to June 15, 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it the report or the testimony?

Mr. KEEFE. It is testimony in the hearing conducted by Admiral Hart.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to correct the record in any way, making it show it is testimony rather than report?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it is all included. The testimony is included in the report.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, can I inquire whether or not Admiral Hart filed a report?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Congressman know whether he [335] did or not?

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest it would be better to call it the Hart record.

Mr. GESELL. I think the confusion comes because the transcript, which is the record, is called the report. As I understand it, that is the reason for the confusion.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I have understood it to be. In reading references to it in other parts of these very voluminous records, it is referred to as the Hart report.

In this report, of course, is contained the testimony of innumerable witnesses, and I quoted from the testimony of Admiral Newton.

Now, I call your attention particularly to this chart. I will get over here so I can see it myself. My eyesight is not good.

As I understood from your testimony, colonel, this streak that you have indicated on the exhibit—

Is this going to be an exhibit? The record will not be very good, because the record will not show what I am pointing to unless we have it as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an exhibit that has been submitted to all of us here, which is not in color.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the number of the exhibit? Army exhibit No. 10.

[336] Mr. MITCHELL. That is going to be offered.

Colonel THIELEN. That is page 8 of the Army exhibit, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Just so the record will indicate what we are talking about.

[337] Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest that is the exhibit that has been verified by Colonel Murphy.

Mr. KEEFE. And further authenticated by Congressman Murphy. That ought to make it unanimous.

At least here is a map blown up, as you testified, from an Army exhibit, showing what I understood you to say was information that was obtained from this mobile radar unit located, on the morning of the 7th of November, up here at Opana, is that right?

Colonel THIELEN. The 7th of December, sir. Otherwise your statement is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now these dots in the center starting at 7:02 and going down through 7:39, 7:40, 7:43, indicate a flight of planes coming in?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Coming in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is taken from the chart made out there at this radar detecting apparatus, is that right?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not know exactly how that record was made. We have it as an authorized record of the plot of the Opana radio station, signed by the assistant signal [338] officer of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. KEEFE. What are these dots over here on the purple arrow pointing toward the island? What do they indicate?

Colonel THIELEN. Those are plots which were made at the times indicated by the Opana station.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the times of those are 6:45, 6:48, 6:51, so on and so forth.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. There is no implication that those were Japanese planes.

Mr. KEEFE. They may have been our own planes, so far as the evidence shows?

Colonel THIELEN. They may have been.

[339] Mr. KEEFE. There is no evidence to show what those planes were then?

Colonel THIELEN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. KEEFE. I notice also, to the left of the large purple arrow pointing toward the island, two streaks, with an arrow pointing in the opposite direction, and two times indicated, 10:39 and 10:27.

What does that arrow indicate?

Colonel THIELEN. That is taken from the plot. That was indicated on the plot as an arrow. The clear arrow is an attempt to reproduce the arrow shown on the basic document, an original of which was offered to the committee yesterday afternoon.

Mr. KEEFE. My question related to this arrow to the left. What does that indicate?

Colonel THIELEN. It is the blue arrow. I am explaining the blue arrow which lies within the purple arrow. That is the arrow formed by the mask which was placed over the purple arrow.

Mr. KEEFE. I am talking about the arrow which has to the left of it the time 10:39 and 10:27. What does that arrow indicate?

Colonel THIELEN. It indicates a plot. That is the way it was given on the document from which that exhibit was taken, [340] as an arrow rather than as a succession of pips.

Mr. KEEFE. Does that indicate, if the pips were on here, would it indicate planes flying away from the island?

Colonel THIELEN. It appears to indicate one or more aircraft flying away from the island.

Mr. KEEFE. Why aren't the pips on here the same as on the other arrow?

Colonel THIELEN. I can't answer that. That is the way it was on the original.

Mr. KEEFE. At least, so far as your testimony is concerned, then, the arrow to which I have referred which is pointed toward the top of the exhibit, and to the left of which appears the times 10:39 and 10:27, refers to planes that were leaving the island?

Colonel THIELEN. Two or more planes.

Mr. KEEFE. Going away?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, I would like to know this: In your examination of the files relating to this aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor, did you find a record of the transmission to any authority in the island of the planes as they left?

Colonel THIELEN. There is no such statement in my testimony nor did I encounter any such statement in any other testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether or not the records [341] contain information furnished from this mobile unit which was ultimately given to the authorities out there at Pearl Harbor which indicated the flight of planes away from the island?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir. All I know about the outgoing flight is that it appeared on the historical plot, so-called.

Mr. KEEFE. And you have no knowledge as to when that information appearing on the historical plot may have been given to the authorities on the island?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I have no such information.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you ever checked the records to ascertain whether there was in fact any such transmittal of information as to this outgoing flight?

Colonel THIELEN. I have not personally done so. I know that this whole Opana station question was gone into very thoroughly by the researchers working with me.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, from your knowledge and the information gained from your gleanings of this material that you went over and that your researchers went over, could you say whether or not when information was obtained at this mobile station whether that information was transmitted to the commanding officer, General Short, or anybody else in command out there at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. It divides itself into two parts, sir. I have testified concerning that long inward plot which starts [342] at 7:02, which was reported to the watch officer at Fort Shafter, and I have further testified that the watch officer took no action in that connection.

Mr. KEEFE. Well now, in order that I might be perfectly clear, I understood that this particular radar station had shut down some time after 7 o'clock.

Colonel THIELEN. I didn't say that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was it in continuous operation all during the attacks?

Colonel THIELEN. The plot indicates that it was in operation from 7:02 to 7:43. We have the testimony of Lieutenant Tyler that when he received notification of the attack at 8 o'clock he recalled all radar personnel to their stations. Whether they actually so returned or not I do not know. What happened after 8 o'clock I have only the knowledge indicated by the plot which we have been discussing.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the historical plot which gives you the information that certain planes were spotted leaving the island, certainly would indicate that that radar station was in operation at the times indicated on the exhibit, 10:39 and 10:27?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; that would so indicate.

Mr. KEEFE. So if this station was in operation at 10:39 and 10:27 and picked up flights of planes, one or more, [343] leaving the island, going away, would that information normally have been immediately transmitted to General Short's office, or somebody in command on that island?

Colonel THIELEN. It would unquestionably have been transmitted as far as the information center in order that the proper action could be taken by the Air Forces. Whether or not it would have come to General Short's personal attention or not I can't say.

Mr. KEEFE. The plotting also indicates the direction that those planes were taking and the distance they were away at the time the radar picked them up.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So if they had had the information they would have known that these returning planes were flying away from the island in this direction, would they not?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the task forces at sea, both of them were out there for the purpose of going into action, weren't they?

Colonel THIELEN. They were out there for that purpose?

Mr. KEEFE. You can't answer that. You are from the Army. Pardon me.

Do you know whether or not in the search of your records and all of the material that came to your attention—radar [344] being on land under the control and jurisdiction of the Army and the Navy not having any land-based radar—do you know whether or not there are any records available as to when General Short's office, or anybody else in command, was notified of this plot showing these planes leaving the island?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir, I have no such information. I should, however, like to point out in this connection that we have no definite information that those were hostile planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. Just a moment, please.

I would like to ask the Admiral, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have available—strike that out.

Colonel, may I have your attention a moment, please.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There has been offered the duly certified record of the plotting of these planes, an instrument which is certified to by Lieutenant Murphy—Lieutenant Colonel, I guess—

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think that should be offered. I understood it was.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to have it identified and offered in evidence now.

Mr. MURPHY. That will be Exhibit 4, Mr. Chairman.

[345] The CHAIRMAN. This is the one that was asked for yesterday and obtained. It was not put in the record as an exhibit.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you have it identified as an exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will make it Exhibit 4 and offer it in evidence. Exhibit 4 will be this chart showing the plotting by the radar station at Opana on the morning of December 7. That is enough, isn't it, Colonel?

Colonel THIELEN. That is a sufficient description.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit No. 4, Mr. Congressman.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4.")

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Colonel, this exhibit 4 is supposed to be a correct record. I note that you have, in preparing the big chart which has been exhibited to the committee, you have left off two words that appear in red ink opposite the numbers giving the time 10:39 and 10:27, the words being "enemy return."

Did you see those?

Colonel THIELEN. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who put that on there?

Colonel THIELEN. Presumably Lieutenant Colonel Murphy. May I explain the omission from this chart at this time?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. In addition to the words "enemy return" appears a question mark. I have deliberately omitted from [346] my testimony all questionable material.

Mr. KEEFE. That is why it was left out?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to point out that on the exhibit which we have prepared to offer the words "enemy return" and the question mark appear. Item 7 of the Army exhibit.

Mr. KEEFE. We have offered this and this shows the same thing. This is the original.

That is all of this witness. I want to talk for a moment to the admiral.

Do you have a printed pamphlet known as, I think it is 2CL-41, a certain security order?

Admiral INGLIS. That is in the archives of the Navy Department. We haven't got it at hand but again we will produce it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in preparing your statement for the Navy did you examine this security order issued by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral INGLIS. My staff did; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you familiar with what it contains?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir, not personally.

Mr. KEEFE. Beg pardon?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not personally familiar with that document.

[347] I have just been informed by my helper here that he did look at that and decided that it was outside of the scope of the outline handed to us.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it related, did it not, to the manner in which these ships were to be berthed and moored in the harbor at Pearl Harbor for security purposes?

Admiral INGLIS. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I am not familiar with the order.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am sorry that in making your presentation you have omitted this very, very important and highly important matter.

Mr. GESELL. It is controversial.

Mr. KEEFE. Is there anything controversial about it, Mr. Gesell? Is there anything controversial about the fact that such an order was issued? It is a printed order.

Mr. GESELL. If that is the order that has to do with the disposition of vessels in the harbor, so as to effect the maximum antiaircraft opposition, and matters of that sort—we felt that should be taken up with the officers who ordered the disposition of the fleet so they could give their reason and explain what was done, when it was done, and why it was done.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the order was issued by Admiral Kimmel, wasn't it?

[348] Mr. GESELL. I believe so.

Mr. KEEFE. And, which I understand is in a printed pamphlet, although I haven't been able to get it yet. As a member of the committee I am interested in it.

Mr. GESELL. We have it; if you ask for it we will be glad to give it to you.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, we are going to ask for a lot of things as we go along in this matter, and maybe we will get them. We hope so.

I am now making the request that I be furnished with this order. And are there additional copies available so that the committee may have copies?

Mr. GESELL. I believe it is a printed order. Therefore there should be copies.

Mr. KEEFE. There shouldn't be anything controversial about the fact. Here is an order which is printed. What could be controversial about it?

Mr. GESELL. Are you asking me, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. KEEFE. You said it was controversial.

Mr. GESELL. The question of why it was ordered and who it was ordered by is controversial.

Mr. KEEFE. So that I may understand, wasn't it an order issued by Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. GESELL. I so understand.

[349] Mr. KEEFE. Then there is nothing controversial.

Mr. GESELL. As to the content of the order, I take it not.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss that matter, Admiral, with our counsel?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; not personally. This is the first time I ever heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will ask counsel to attempt to secure sufficient copies of that printed order to furnish each member with a copy.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, a couple of other questions.

You gave some testimony as to the reconnaissance of planes around the Fourteenth Naval District. That includes Wake, doesn't it; Midway, Johnston?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, there were 12 PBY's that left Pearl Harbor on the 30th of November, were there not?

Admiral INGLIS. My presentation did not go back before the 6th of December in that connection.

Mr. KEEFE. So you have no knowledge of that?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

[350] Mr. KEEFE. You didn't make any examination of anything prior to the 6th of December?

Admiral INGLIS. Not in connection with reconnaissance; no, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So you are not in position to testify as to any reconnaissance that took place on the 5th or 4th or any other time except the 6th and 7th; is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask a question or two.

In regard to this map—will you put that radar map back, the one that was just there? I guess Colonel Thielen can answer this question.

This long purple line in the center indicating an arrow, as far as the radar is concerned, shows the direction in which planes were flying?

Colonel THIELEN. That is a graphical representation which we made to indicate that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. That arrow indicates what was recorded from 2 minutes after until 7:30; is that correct?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. The white squares actually indicate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Those white squares were put in to indicate [351] the time that synchronizes with the particular portion of that arrow?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir. More accurately, the white squares are the basic data. They represent the plots which were made. The purple arrow was added to indicate, make it more graphic to the committee, the direction of the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the purple arrow, the long purple arrow, indicates incoming planes?

Colonel THIELEN. For the purpose of that attack; yes sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I understand you to say that there is nothing on the plot, as you call it, which indicates whether they were friendly or hostile planes?

Colonel THIELEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. How close would they have to get to the point of attack before those in charge of the radar station would know whether or not they were enemy or friendly planes?

Colonel THIELEN. As I understand the development of radar at that time there would be no indication whatsoever purely by radar. It would have to be either by visual recognition, or by an identification signal sent out by the plane radio independent of the radar.

[352] The CHAIRMAN. Now, some question has been raised about these radar operators remaining at this Opana station after 7 o'clock, in view of the fact that their duty required them to stay until only 7 o'clock. Would you be able to say from the records, whether the reason they remained there was because the truck was late, or whether they wanted to get some more training.

Colonel THIELEN. Well, it appears to me immaterial why. They had the option of resting while the truck arrived, or actually continuing to conduct training. They took the latter alternative.

The CHAIRMAN. Some importance seems to be attached to the fact that the truck was late, and I am wondering whether, if the truck had been on time, if they would have been there between 7:02 and 7:39 and would have made these records which you have exhibited.

Colonel THIELEN. I don't think anybody could answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is speculative.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And while they were waiting for the truck they decided to operate a little?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. They showed commendable zeal.

The CHAIRMAN. The small purple arrow pointing the other [353] way indicating the direction of the planes being at 10:27—is it?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And going down to 10:39—

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 12 minutes.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was nearly an hour after the attack had ceased, as I understand it from your testimony, the attack having been over at 9:45.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So, if that is a correct representation of the flight of enemy planes—which could still be unidentified, I suppose, so far as the radar was concerned—

Colonel THIELEN. Even more likely because of the range—the range is greater.

The CHAIRMAN. That would have indicated that 45 minutes or an hour, 45 minutes approximately, after the attack was over, the departure of these planes was caught on the instrument at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. An outgoing flight was picked up.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I don't know whether you testified, Colonel, or whether the admiral testified yesterday, stating that on the 6th of December there were no searches made by [354] airplanes from Pearl Harbor; is that true?

Admiral INGLIS. My testimony was that we had no written record of any searches.

The CHAIRMAN. No record—no written record of any searches, and that is limited to the searches that would have been made from Pearl Harbor as a base, is it? The reason I ask, on your item No. 10, which is the reproduction of that map there [indicating] in your black space, you say "Air searches flown in Hawaiian area." Then you have in that diagonal square, "6th of December, 1941," indicating that in that square there was some air flight in progress. Was that the airplanes from the *Enterprise*?

[355] Admiral INGLIS. Those were the airplanes from the *Enterprise*. My statement that there was no written record of any reconnaissance flights applied to shore-based planes, but there were aircraft in flight from the *Enterprise*, as shown on the diagonal stripes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there is no contradiction between your statement yesterday that there were no flights from shore bases on the 6th of December and this indication that from the *Enterprise*, which was 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, that there were these flights participated in by the 18 planes that attacked from it?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir; no contradiction.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, at the time that these planes took off from the *Enterprise* in what direction was it going?

Admiral INGLIS. The *Enterprise* was traveling almost due east.

The CHAIRMAN. Toward Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. Toward Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in what direction was the *Lexington* traveling?

Admiral INGLIS. The *Lexington* was going a little north of west—a little north and west.

The CHAIRMAN. Toward—

[356] Admiral INGLIS. Midway.

The CHAIRMAN. Midway?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were about how far apart?

Admiral INGLIS. At the time of the attack, as we have just brought out, they were approximately 350 miles apart and rapidly drawing further apart.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. One of them was going northwest and the other coming east?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, now, do the records from which you have taken your statement and upon which your statement is based indicate whether these planes that were armed, apparently, when they left the deck of the *Enterprise* had any knowledge of an attack or impending attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. The record is completely negative in that respect and I would certainly assume that the pilots had no knowledge of that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me ask you about these planes that left Hamilton Field, is it, San Francisco, Hamilton Field? That, I believe, is the colonel's statement; it is in the colonel's statement.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At what time did you say they left on the night of the 6th? [357]

Colonel THIELEN. 9:30 p. m. the 6th December.

The CHAIRMAN. 9:30 p. m.?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Unarmed and without radar, as you said?

Colonel THIELEN. Unarmed; presumably without radar.

The CHAIRMAN. And probably having radio sets?

Colonel THIELEN. Probably, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably, but you have no positive evidence on that score?

Colonel THIELEN. No positive evidence. It would be extremely unlikely that they did not have.

The CHAIRMAN. They were headed for the Philippine Islands but were to stop at Hawaii for what purpose—for refueling or do you know?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir, that would unquestionably be one of the purposes of the stop.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And when they got there they found this attack in progress, is that right?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And being unarmed they had no facilities with which to engage very effectively in the battle, did they?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir. They all attempted to land.

[358] The CHAIRMAN. They all attempted to land?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And some of them were destroyed in that process?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony, the testimony of both of you gentlemen has been referred to here as hearsay evidence. I suppose that you knew when you were asked to present this chronological narrative or physical narrative of what happened out there, not being there yourself, understood that you were not to testify from personal knowledge but from records that you were able to obtain in these various departments and that there is no misunderstanding that what you were to say here is, technically speaking from the standpoint of a lawyer, hearsay evidence.

Is that true, Admiral?

Admiral INGLIS. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that yours also?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, as a matter of law we all understand what you do not see yourself and testify about is legally referred to as hearsay, and there was no misunderstanding about that. Nobody expected it to be anything else, so far as I know.

[359] Is that your understanding of it?

Admiral INGLIS. That was my understanding, yes, sir.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all I want to ask him.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I did neglect to ask one or two questions that I had in mind, that I would like to complete if I may do so at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Colonel, I would like to ask you this: How many fixed antiaircraft batteries were there on Oahu at the time of this attack?

Colonel THIELEN. That will take a little counting, sir. There were a good many of them and in the Army exhibit, section 1, page 1—or, rather, beginning on page 2, we have a list of Coast Artillery units. In general this could be narrowed down to the gun, I am sure, and made very accurate with a little further study, but, in general, units other than the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery Regiment—the six batteries at Schofield Barracks and the seven batteries at Camp Malakole—all of those other yellow squares situated at Fort Weaver, at Fort De Russy and Fort Ruger and at Black Point, which is down at the top of Diamond Head, are fixed batteries situated to protect the coastal defenses, the seacoast defense guns in that sector.

[360] Mr. KEEFE. Now, how many mobile batteries were there on the island that day?

Colonel THIELEN. The only fully mobile unit was the Sixty-fourth—let me check that—the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery Regiment which would contain 3 batteries having 3 gun batteries, a total of 9—well, wait a minute; the Third Battalion, with semiautomatic weapons, has 4 batteries. That would give us 10 full mobile batteries.

The semimobile armaments had three Coast Artillery regiments with weapons which could be transported but for which the prime movers, as we call them, the trucks to tow them, were not available in sufficient quantity to move the entire regiment at one time.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I assume in making up your statement you had opportunity to and did read the Army Board's report?

Colonel THIELEN. I read it, sir, not as closely as did my researchers. I read it not with the idea of extracting anything but for the purpose of acquainting myself with the background.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was General Burgin?

Colonel THIELEN. General Burgin commanded the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, which embraced two major divisions, the seacoast regiments and the antiaircraft regiments.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, on the morning of December 7, [361] 1941, when the attack took place, how many of these fixed batteries were ready for action?

Colonel THIELEN. I believe that that could be figured out. May I invite your attention to section 7 of the Army exhibit, from which we can probably deduce those facts? None, of course, were loaded.

Mr. KEEFE. None were loaded?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was the ammunition available?

Colonel THIELEN. The ammunition was, in general, in boxes at the position.

Mr. KEEFE. It had to be unboxed and taken out of the boxes to the guns to be loaded?

Colonel THIELEN. That is for the 3-inch guns, the primary armament, that is true.

Mr. KEEFE. That is after the so-called No. 3 alert went into effect?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; no fixed guns were in position with ammunition at the gun positions under alert No. 1.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, but I mean they were not loaded, you said.

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; they were not loaded.

Mr. KEEFE. In order to put them in position to fire, the ammunition would have to be taken out of the boxes in places where it was adjacent to the battery; is that right?

[362] Colonel THIELEN. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, where was the ammunition for the mobile units?

Colonel THIELEN. That was located at Aliamanu Crater.

Mr. KEEFE. And how far away from the mobile batteries?

Colonel THIELEN. That was quite close. That was near Fort Shafter, which is the nerve center of the island defense and the intersection of the road net which goes down along the south sector and critical area. There was also antiaircraft ammunition at Schofield Barracks.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the ammunition for the mobile gun batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in an old volcano; is that right?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And all the mobile batteries, wherever they were located, had to send up to this crater to get their ammunition; is that correct?

Colonel THIELEN. Well, not all. As I pointed out, some was at Schofield Barracks, where some of the mobile batteries were situated.

May I review my brief, which I believe covered that? Would you care to hear it, sir, hear the discussion that I gave yesterday directly pertaining to this question?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if you care to repeat it. I haven't [363] asked for it, but I haven't any objection to it if you want to do it.

Colonel THIELEN. It is directly responsive to your question, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Colonel THIELEN. Under alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft. However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in connection with your testimony, did you read the testimony of General Burgin as he gave it to the Army Board?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I do not recollect it.

Mr. KEEFE. May I call your attention to the fact that General Burgin testified before the Army Board, which is cited and referred to in the Board's report, and I quote:

They were all ready to get into action immediately with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the sea [364] coast, those batteries imbedded in concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on that to General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition moved up into the seacoast to the battery positions and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out.

Ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions.

Is that correct?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir, as applied to the mobile batteries. As I pointed out, they were located at Fort Shafter, Schofield Barracks, and Camp Malakole.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ascertain the facts with reference to the issuance of ammunition and why it was that ammunition had not been issued to these mobile batteries?

Colonel THIELEN. I am not prepared to give a why, to give an answer as to why that was not done, sir. I may say that I have had a discussion with the people who were doing the researching on this subject and they assured me that testimony, [365] including that of ordnance officers, places us on very firm ground in the testimony which I gave yesterday and which I just repeated.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I call your attention to the testimony of General Burgin on that issue, in which he testified:

They didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of a person who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazine. We tried the ordnance people without result. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the Field Artillery; I asked for ammunition for antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time and that we would have warning before any attack ever sprung up.

Did you find that, review that testimony before you made your statement to the committee here?

Colonel THIELEN. I was generally familiar with that testimony and I know that my researchers knew it in detail.

[366] Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, it is safe to say, is it not, that so far as the mobile units were concerned after the attack came they had to be dispersed to their positions and had to send to this crater in order to get their ammunition before they could enter the fight?

Colonel THIELEN. To the crater and to Schofield Barracks.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. The ammunition was centrally located.

Mr. KEEFE. How long did it take to get it, to get that done after the attack came, normally?

Colonel THIELEN. That would, of course, depend upon the location of the various batteries. May I point out that the bulk of the anti-aircraft not in position, the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, was located at Fort Shafter, which was only a mile from Aliamanu Crater.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, let me ask you this question: In your research and in your examination to present this situation you have disclosed a good many other pertinent and very technical facts. Do the records any place disclose how long it actually did take?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And how long did it take?

Colonel THIELEN. We have a schedule of that in the Army exhibit.

[367] Mr. GESSELL. It is right in the exhibit for each particular battery.

Colonel THIELEN. For every battery.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you may have seen it, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. GESSELL. It is before you, Congressman. It is the schedule that was discussed yesterday. I was calling your attention to it. It gives the time intervals.

Colonel THIELEN. That is on page 11 of the Army exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We went over that.

Mr. KEEFE. He went over that?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I want to ask one or two questions; maybe you testified about it yesterday. If you did, I don't want to repeat.

You stated, I think, that there was a net strung across the mouth of this channel into Pearl Harbor but that notwithstanding that net a Japanese submarine did get in. Is that true?

Admiral INGLIS. That is true; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that record show when the net was spread and when the submarine got in?

Admiral INGLIS. The record does not show when the sub- [368] marine got in and the record is not clear as to when the net was opened.

You see, those nets have a gate, as we call it, which usually can be opened to allow the passage of friendly ships, and I am not prepared to give the information as to just when that gate was opened and when it was closed. I would say from the construction of the net that the submarine must have gone through that net at some time when the gate was open because the net seems to be very effective in stopping the passage of any ship except when the gate was open.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether it was customary to open the gate in the daytime or at night or both?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know what the custom was at that place at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. How far was it from the mouth where the net was that this channel that had been chiseled out, how many miles is it to, we will say, the Ford Island?

Admiral INGLIS. Roughly about 2 miles, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. About 2 miles?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, one other question and I think that is all.

You testified here that the Pacific Fleet—which is independent of the Asiatic Fleet, I believe?

[369] Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no reference to that. The Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, was about two-thirds the size of the Atlantic Fleet. Now, how much of the Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. You will find that in the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not want to repeat.

Now, yesterday you said that there were six battleships in the Atlantic Fleet and attention was called to two others that were doing what you call—

Admiral INGLIS. Shake-down.

The CHAIRMAN. Shake-down.

Is that a naval term for practicing or try-out? Were they new ships that had not yet joined the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, I did not include in my statement any ships that were in the blueprinting stage, that were being built and had not yet been launched, or that had been launched but were not commissioned, or that were commissioned but had not been ordered to join the fleet. The ships are in various stages of completion from the time the blueprints are drawn until the shake-down cruise is completed.

Now, after a ship goes into commission with her full crew and her ammunition allowance and become a working organization, a period called a shake-down cruise or shake-down period is allowed the ship to work out all the kinks in the machinery and [370] in the organization, to teach the crew their ships, and that, depending on the type of ship, may take anything from perhaps a month to some times as much as 6 months or even, in cases where they run into a great deal of difficulty with the machinery, perhaps as much as a year.

Now, those two battleships, the *Washington* and *North Carolina*, were of that status. They had been commissioned, they had their crews and their ammunition on board, but they were still under shake-down and had not yet joined the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that they were in the Atlantic Ocean or in some body of water adjacent to it, they were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. I understand that Senator Brewster wants to ask you a question or two.

Senator BREWSTER. I have said I wanted to ask some questions. You said I wanted to ask a question. I would like to ask some questions. I haven't asked any questions so far.

I think 4 o'clock has rung.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield to get some information here, Mr. Chairman?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. We are constantly referring to Army exhibits, which I now have before me, and reference was made to the placement of the various batteries and the time they got into action. [371] Has that exhibit been offered in evidence in this case, or do you intend to offer it?

Mr. MITCHELL. I was just waiting for a chance, Mr. Congressman. At the close of their testimony I was going to make a formal offer. You have copies of it, but I was going to put it into the record by a formal offer.

Mr. KEEFE. I want to concern myself with that. I understand, then, that you are going to offer this Army exhibit formally?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will do it now, if I may. I would like to get it over with before I forget it.

The CHAIRMAN. And also the Navy.

Mr. MITCHELL. I offer as Exhibit 5 the Army folder of documents, maps, and so forth, that was produced by Colonel Thielen in connection with his part in the narrative statement.

I also offer as Exhibit 6 the Navy folder, with all papers therein contained, which are those produced by Admiral Inglis in connection with his statement, and that includes the document that you just have in your hand. They are all offered.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, as a matter of information: Of course, the testimony given by these gentlemen went right through these exhibits that were presented to each member of the committee. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is true, but I am offering the exhibit- [372] its complete so that they will be formal parts of the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 5 and 6," respectively.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I make a request from counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to request counsel to get the original plotting chart made by Private Elliott at the Opana station on the morning of the 7th of December 1941.

As I understand it, they have been talking about originals here and this seems to be a photostatic copy and at the next session I will want to ask some questions upon that plotting.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where would that be, Colonel? Is it in Washington?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I think not. We have never come across that, the plotting that was actually made on the plotting board at the station.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you talking about the station at Opana or the main station? I am talking about the one that Elliott plotted, that he actually plotted.¹

Colonel THIELEN. I have never encountered any—this is one point that I have gone into in some detail. I have never encountered any reference to the plot that was made by the enlisted men when they were tracking a plane. We have heard of Colonel Murphy's authenticated document which presents the plot that was made.

[373] Mr. MITCHELL. Who is he?

Senator FERGUSON. Where was Murphy when this plot was being made? Why can't we get the original plot to show the line of flight and whether or not planes came in at six something and whether or not they went out at 10:45 and 10:25? What I want is the original plotting made by Elliott, that he describes in his testimony.

Colonel THIELEN. I am sure the War Department will make every effort to get it.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the counsel indicate in connection with the presentation of the Navy and Army exhibits the number of items included which, as I think, were illustrated numerically, so that they can be identified in that way?

Mr. MITCHELL. In the Navy folder they are itemized as items 1 to 20.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

¹ The plot referred to was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 155.

Mr. MITCHELL. And in the Army folder I don't think they are. I doubt if it had a list. The mimeographed part of it is a document divided into sections, with 13 pages. In addition to that there are six charts.

Senator BREWSTER. Can the radar records of any one distinct station from the other stations for this period from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock at all the stations on Hawaii and during the later part of the morning, whenever they were in operation, be made available, or copies of it?

[374] Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; anything that is in existence will be made available. I will give you my personal opinion as an artilleryman, though, that ordinary computations made at the time by personnel in the operation of such a device would not ordinarily be a matter of permanent record.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you think, Colonel, and would it be likely that records of the morning of December 7 would be destroyed?

Colonel THIELEN. I believe, and again I am giving you a personal opinion based on professional experience, that Colonel Murphy, foreseeing the situation and the possible demands for information of this type, deliberately made this historic plot of information that was available.

Senator BREWSTER. Colonel Murphy was in charge of all the radar stations, was he?

Colonel THIELEN. He was a signal officer in the Hawaiian Department. The chief signal officer, Colonel Powell, was in charge of the aircraft warning system.

Senator BREWSTER. Are either of those officers available here now?

Colonel THIELEN. I believe Colonel Powell is. I understand Colonel Murphy has since died.

Senator BREWSTER. Colonel Powell, is he expected to appear, do you know?

[375] Mr. MITCHELL. He is on the list.

Mr. GESELL. He is on the list.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Murphy a witness before any of the boards?

Mr. GESELL. No, not that I know of.

Colonel THIELEN. I believe he died shortly after that time. I cannot state definitely.

Senator BREWSTER. Would you, Mr. Mitchell, advise Colonel Powell that we would be interested in whatever original as well as transcript of those records are available of those records?

Mr. MITCHELL. I will ask Colonel Duncombe to get ahold of him. Even if he hasn't these records here he can explain to you where he saw them and what was done with them.

Admiral INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, may I make one brief correction in the statement that I made yesterday?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. It won't take but a moment.

In my original statement I said that the three patrol planes from Kaneohe were to take off at sunrise, 5:27 Hawaiian time on the 7th, but that they did not take off until about 6:40. I later corrected that by saying that the plan was that they take off at dawn, 1 hour before sunrise.

I have since found that I was mistaken in both cases and the facts are that the order was for them to take off at sun- [376] rise,

which was at 6:26. They actually took off at 6:40. In other words, they were 14 minutes late instead of 1 hour and 13 minutes late.

Senator LUCAS. Will you produce those records that show that also?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. I have two requests to make: One, that I be furnished with a copy of the summary of far eastern documents, the G-2 and Signal Corps documents as I understand, and I would like to have a copy of the log of the cruiser *Boise* for the last 5 days of November 1941 and, say, the first 10 days of December 1941.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, if there is nothing further we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow and the chairman will express the hope that we will conclude with the testimony of Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen before 12 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock p. m., Friday, November 16, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock a. m., Saturday, November 17, 1945.)

¹ Exhibit No. 68.

[377]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[378] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in session.

When the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster, was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses. Senator Brewster?

The Chair just announced that when we adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses. You may now proceed.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear what you said. I cannot hear you.

The CHAIRMAN. I said that when the committee adjourned yesterday the Senator from Maine was on the verge of cross-examining the witnesses and that he would now proceed.

Mr. KEEFE. Before he proceeds may I inquire from the Chairman? There has been a lot of inquiry directed to me. May I inquire as to whether it is contemplated to hold hearings this afternoon?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair would hope not, we hope we can finish these witnesses by noon, but if we do not finish them we will try to finish them by going as late as 1 o'clock if necessary and not adjourn at 12 as we have been. Neither house is in session today.

Go ahead, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Inglis, covering one or two points which you have not fully developed in connection with [379] the hypothetical submarine entrance into Pearl Harbor at 4:30 on the morning of December 7, have you any further naval theory or record to that effect? You intimated that you did not consider the maps which were shown of the so-called battle area were, possibly, authentic. I assume that you have made some explorations of that situation.

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot add anything to what I said yesterday. I am not sure that I have the map which you have just mentioned

in the book of battle reports precisely identified as identical with that map that I had in mind. I am not sure that we are talking about the same map.

Senator BREWSTER. So when you intimated that the entry—I saw it with my own eyes—was not on the map, did you find another map?

Admiral INGLIS. It may have been a different map than the one in that book.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. But all I can do is repeat the general statement that I made yesterday, that the best picture or estimate that we can make from the evidence available to us is that one submarine definitely did enter Pearl Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, that is not a matter of anybody's opinion, is it? You got the submarine, didn't you, that you captured or sank at the time?

[380] Admiral INGLIS. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. So that there isn't any dispute about that.

Admiral INGLIS. If the Senator will permit me, I was just reviewing what I said yesterday, which was that one submarine did definitely enter Pearl Harbor. A second one may possibly have entered Pearl Harbor but we rather think it did not.

Senator BREWSTER. And what became of the map which was captured with the submarine at Barbers Point?

Admiral INGLIS. I think that that, or a photostatic copy of it, is in the Navy archives.

Senator BREWSTER. And you do not agree with the interpretation of that by the Army or FBI, or by the so-called battle report account?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not personally familiar with the opinion of the Army or FBI on battle reports. My own translators, after considerable research and considerable study of the Japanese symbols on that map, have decided that the evidence tends to be against the conclusion that that submarine entered the harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. And what is your theory of how the submarine did enter into the harbor that actually did get in there?

[381] Admiral INGLIS. Well, that is in the realm of speculation, Mr. Senator, but if you wish me to speculate I would speculate that the submarine probably followed a United States ship through the gate, the gate having been opened for the admission of a United States naval vessel.

Senator BREWSTER. What are the records on the ships coming in that morning?

Admiral INGLIS. We haven't got that. We tried to find it and we haven't got that and I suggest that that material could better be obtained from some of the witnesses who were present at the time.

Senator BREWSTER. What was the arrangement between the Army and Navy about offshore patrol; what was the understanding between them?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know what the understanding was. So far as I know there was no off-shore patrol conducted by the Army. There was an off-shore patrol conducted by the Navy, as I have described in my previous testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. And what was the nature of that?

Admiral INGLIS. The Navy's off-shore patrol?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. It consisted of the searches by aircraft that were shown on the charts.

Senator BREWSTER. I am speaking now of the routine, not [382] of the ones which you have described, but of the routine throughout the weeks or months preceding that. Were there any regulations covering that in that period?

Admiral INGLIS. We did not attempt to cover that prior to the 6th of December. Our presentation only took up from the 6th of December and from then on, because that is all that was in the outline.

Senator BREWSTER. And you are not, then, prepared to testify as to what the understanding was between the Army and Navy as to the patrol around the waters of Hawaii?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. What was the range of the PBY's? What was the range of the PBY bombers?

Admiral INGLIS. I am just speaking off the cuff now, but as I recall it the figure was 800-mile radius of action. It would be something more than twice that much for the range. They would go out 800 miles generally on the course followed and then back again, making a triangular track.

Senator BREWSTER. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, did you not?

Admiral INGLIS. I did not hear your question.

Senator BREWSTER. You had some of those PBY's there at Hawaii, did you not?

[383] Admiral INGLIS. Oh, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. How many of them, do you recall?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not certain. Referring to item 12 of the Navy exhibit, at Kaneohe there was a total of 36 PBY's. At Ford Island a total of 31—I beg your pardon, 33.

Senator BREWSTER. Thirty-three; that makes a total of 69 PBY's.

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that is substantially correct, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Those were suitable at that time for this long-range patrol?

Admiral INGLIS. That type of plane was suitable for that type of patrol, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. How long have you been in Intelligence, Admiral?

Admiral INGLIS. How long have I been in Intelligence?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Since the 1st of June of this year.

Senator BREWSTER. Has your experience before that been any in that field or in operations?

Admiral INGLIS. More in operations and communications, general service that most of us have, no unusual type of duty, except that I was a specialist in communications for a while.

Senator BREWSTER. And it would not require any special training to know that the Japanese had in previous wars in- [384] dulged in these sneak attacks, would it?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that is a matter of history.

Senator BREWSTER. So that if there were likely to be trouble between the Japanese and the United States, provoked by the United States,

it was altogether likely that it would be started in that way, wouldn't that be right?

Admiral INGLIS. I think that would be a safe conclusion to draw, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And that it is rather accepted in military and naval strategy to aim at the jugular?

Admiral INGLIS. I did not get the last part.

Senator BREWSTER. To aim at the jugular. You try to strike at the strongest spot, where you can do the most damage?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, I—

Senator BREWSTER. Let me put it this way: Hasn't that been what the Japs have always done? In their previous wars didn't they always hit the enemy where they would do the enemy the most damage at one time in those sneak attacks?

Admiral INGLIS. Of course, that is a pretty broad, general statement, Senator. I guess I could agree with you as a general statement.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; so that if there were to be trouble it would be reasonable to anticipate that it might [385] come in Pearl Harbor, would that be a fair statement?

Admiral INGLIS. I am afraid you are going out of my field now, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you are the Director of Intelligence for the Navy, so you are assumed to have a certain competency in this field. You are handling this responsibility now and you must be looking to the future.

Admiral INGLIS. Well, I feel flattered at your compliment, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I am quite serious. I have a very high respect for your accomplishments, I think you have exhibited them already and we are trying to learn, of course, by experience to avoid trouble hereafter.

What I am coming to is this, that if there were any reason to anticipate trouble at Pearl Harbor, where most of our Pacific fleet was concentrated, most of its striking power, it would have been possible by the use of the PBY patrol bombers readily to have ascertained whether any striking force or carrier force were approaching, would it not, by a patrol?

Admiral INGLIS. I am not sure whether the number of planes available for that type of search at that time was sufficient to allow a continual search all day every day.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, would it have required anything more than an 800-mile patrol from Pearl Harbor over [386] the areas which were not covered by your shipping each day to have made it impossible for a hostile fleet to have approached?

Admiral INGLIS. I think again you are getting a little bit out of my field and more into the field of aviation officers, but from my broad general experience as a naval officer I would say that probably that number of planes was not sufficient to cover all possible avenues of approach of a hostile force 24—

Senator BREWSTER. That is not what I asked you and you are intelligent enough to answer my question.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to the questions of the Senator from Maine.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Senator from Maine proceed in order.

Admiral INGLIS. Will the Senator please repeat the question?

Senator BREWSTER. You ask the question—read it.

(The question referred to was read by the reporter as follows:)

Well, would it have required anything more than an 800-mile patrol from Pearl Harbor over the areas which were not covered by your shipping each day to have made it impossible for a hostile [387] fleet to have approached?

Admiral INGLIS. I beg your pardon. I did not understand the question.

Senator BREWSTER. I thought you did not.

Admiral INGLIS. The answer to that question is "Yes," with this qualification, that again speaking now in general terms, the areas which would be hypothetically covered by your own shipping could probably not be counted upon. In other words, to carry out such a thorough search as the one you have in mind we would have to cover almost the whole 360° arc.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, that may be true, Admiral, but isn't it also true that, exactly as the Japanese planned, they would not be likely to approach through areas where our shipping was frequenting the courses?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. They would be desirous of avoiding us.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. So that if at the time we abandoned our shipping on the northern route patrols had been carried out on the northern area, with the limited range of the battle planes from carriers, it would have been, let us say, at least exceedingly difficult for the Jap force to have approached?

[388] Admiral INGLIS. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. And, of course, that is one of the things which I think is of serious concern and in my visits to Pearl Harbor before and after it occurred there was always great discussion, the Army feeling that if it had been permitted to carry out these patrols with their long range bombers they could have detected this and the Navy holding the Army strictly accountable for the defense of Hawaii; but, as I understand—and I will ask the counsel or you to have this verified—it was a matter of agreement and orders that the Army was not to participate in a patrol beyond a very limited area, a hundred miles or so, I believe, while the Navy was to take care of the longer range patrol because of the existing controversy at that period which, I am sure, both of you gentlemen are thoroughly familiar, as to the control of long-range aircraft and the function and the mission which they were to perform.

Mr. MITCHELL. It may help the Senator if I say that at a very early stage of the case, in fact, within the next day or two if we take the normal course, we will produce all the defense plans that show the respective duties of the Army and Navy about that reconnaissance and we have a very splendid document here prepared by General Martin, I think, in the summer of 1941 that answers every question that you [389] have asked about the patrols that could have been carried on, how many planes were required to do it and quite a complete picture of the thing that you are interested in.

We have that and it is coming in with the defense plans which show the respective duties of the Army and Navy and what was required in the way of equipment to execute it.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I should be glad to have that. I did not assume that this was a matter which was in controversy in any way, as to what were the Army and Navy arrangements, so I think it is a little regrettable that the Army and Navy did not agree to give us what were the actual arrangements, unless it was at the suggestion of counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, these gentlemen were only giving the facts as to the actual conditions on the day of the attack and the available equipment, and the Army and Navy plans for defense prepared during the summer of 1941, over the months prior to Pearl Harbor, being a series of plans, each of them all arranged, with these things in them that you are interested in and you will get a more accurate story from those than you would from possibly a witness who was called on another matter and has not studied it lately.

Senator BREWSTER. Very well, I will be very happy to waive the presentation of that until the proper time.

Admiral, I want to take one other phase, which is all I [390] care, I think, to examine you about, and that is the matter of the distribution of the fleet.

You have realized, I presume, in your position that that has been one of the matters that has been much agitated in connection with this matter, as to the allocation of the fleets between the Atlantic and the Pacific, have you not, Admiral? There has been considerable discussion as to whether or not there was a good disposition.

Admiral INGLIS. There has been considerable discussion, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And also as to the reasons for it and where the orders were developed, so that speaking from that background and your position you would gather also that that is one of the questions that will very likely be considerably discussed in this case.

Admiral INGLIS. I would expect that.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, when the matter came up you spoke of the Pacific Fleet as being two-thirds of the Atlantic Fleet in strength.

Admiral INGLIS. That is numerical strength, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. That is based on the unit. And you were then asked further by Senator Ferguson about the allocation of the units. I want to read you your evidence and ask you your comment on it. I read quotations from your [391] evidence on page 172:

Admiral, you said—

this is Senator Ferguson speaking—

Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet was in the Pacific; is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. I said that the numerical strength of the Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller than the Atlantic Fleet.

And then after some other colloquies, turning to page 173, Senator Ferguson again:

Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic?

Admiral INGLIS. In the Atlantic Fleet were six battleships. In the Pacific Fleet were nine battleships. Six in the Atlantic and nine in the Pacific.

Now, at that point it seems to me, Admiral, you were a little less than careful. Your first statement was absolutely correct. Your ad-

dition was absolutely incorrect and it occurs to me that hearing of this colloquy you must have been rather well aware of what Senator Ferguson, at least, was asking.

I will read the next page, after some further colloquies:

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how many battleships were in Atlantic?
[392] Admiral INGLIS. Six.

On the basis of the subsequent evidence which was finally extracted from you that statement was unqualifiedly false; is that not correct?

Admiral INGLIS. I think the Senator is drawing some conclusions with respect to the—

Senator BREWSTER. I am quoting your testimony before this tribunal and that statement, as you have now admitted after we finally elicited the information, was unqualifiedly false.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will permit—

Senator BREWSTER. The chairman can do anything he likes. I am making a statement of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair feels that this inquiry ought to be conducted with decorum and respect and for a member of this committee to charge a witness with making an unqualifiedly false statement seem to the Chair, whether it seems to other members of this committee proper, to be out of order.

Senator BREWSTER. I will continue the quotation:

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I read from battle report, Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6:

"In the Atlantic there were eight battleships."

[393] Reading from page 6:

Admiral INGLIS. I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list of the specific ships—

I go on:

Admiral INGLIS. I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except what you have told me now, but, if I may, Senator Ferguson, I will read the list of ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of those in the Pacific Fleet. Still it is apparently contemplated that we were wishing to discover the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

You then proceeded to read the list of the two fleets. I want to go now to another page and quote. This has gone on now for five pages trying to extract the simple facts as to the disposition of our fleets, of our battleships, which is what Senator Ferguson repeatedly asked you, and he finally, and I might say at my suggestion, because I was completely bewildered by what you were trying to tell us, on page 176 Senator Ferguson says:

How many battleships did we have in December 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. Fifteen, sir.

There again is a statement which, on your subsequent [394] evidence when you finally admitted the existence of the *Washington* and the *North Carolina* ready for their cruises and shake-downs, is a statement that does not correspond with what up in our part of the country would be considered as the truth.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. No; let the Senator proceed without interruption.

Senator BREWSTER (reading) :

Senator FERGUSON. Fifteen?

Admiral INGLIS. Fifteen that were attached to the fleets. There were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their shake-down duty.

At last we are permitted to find out what is the answer to this conundrum.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were they?

You then testified as to the *Washington* and the *North Carolina* on shake-down in the Atlantic.

All I have to say is this, Admiral, and I say it in all charity. I have served on the Naval Affairs Committee during my period in Congress; I have been interested in the Navy; we have the Navy up in Maine in large measure and everybody else is interested in it and, of course, for 4 years we have been dealing very definitely with preparedness and defense and I speak not only from observation but the thoughts [395] of most of the members of our committee involved in that task and of its distinguished chairman, President Truman,¹ in regretting profoundly that there has developed an attitude of mind on the part, particularly of the Navy, that does not seem to recognize the rights and interests of this Congress to receive full, frank, and fair answers to the questions that have come up and I say particularly in the process of this hearing for yourself and your fellow officers and for the future welfare of the Navy; which is the great problem in this country in building up the confidence that it wants to command, by a freer and a franker approach to the aims of myself and other members of the committee it would do much to increase that confidence that I think we all want to establish.

[396] Senator LUCAS. Is this going to be a lecture school, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever it is, it will speak for itself.

Go ahead. Admiral, if you want to comment on that dissertation you are at liberty to do so.

Admiral INGLIS. May I comment in full, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine has impugned my honesty and my motives. I resent that. I gave the facts to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The point he has brought up about the *Washington* and *North Carolina*, and the other ships which had not joined the fleets was fully covered in a statement which I made yesterday afternoon. I said in that statement that, of course, you might count battleships or other ships which were still in the blueprint stage, you might count battleships or other ships still in the building ways, you might count battleships or other ships which had been launched but which had not been completed, you might count battleships or other ships which had been commissioned but had not joined the fleet, but I was counting the ships that had joined the fleet, and I thought I made that quite clear in my statement.

I have done my very best in this presentation to give all the facts to the best of my knowledge and ability. I [397] don't believe the Navy, and certainly not the organization, is attempting to withhold any evidence whatsoever. I repeatedly stated I was author-

¹ Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program

ized for the Navy to state that we would produce any facts that we were asked to produce.

Senator BREWSTER. I think the record will speak for itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Does any other member of the committee wish to ask Admiral Inglis any questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask the colonel some questions.

Colonel, I show you the exhibit that is in evidence here, this map of the radar.

Colonel THIELEN: Will you put the radar plot up, Captain Barnes?

Senator FERGUSON. Was the chart that is on the board here made from the exhibit that you have?

Colonel THIELEN. It was made from an exhibit which I believe was identical.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you looked for the original charting done of the Opana station?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir; a radiogram was dispatched to [398] the Hawaiian Department since the last meeting asking for the original plots from all radar stations on December 7, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. I show you a photostat that is exhibit 3-B in evidence, and I ask you what that is.

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 3-B in evidence where?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, 3-B of what?

Senator FERGUSON. The exhibit itself does not show, but I am of the opinion it is of the Army exhibits. Does counsel agree with that? I shall just identify it from the mark on the paper itself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, just as a matter of information, I understood the Senator to say it was in evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. I was reading what was on the sheet. That is on the sheet.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a part of the Army file which was yesterday put in evidence along with the Navy white folder.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me clear that up. The document which the Senator just produced is not in evidence in this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understood him referring to it as having been in evidence in some other investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. I merely read off the identification numbers, what is on the blueprint itself. It is only for the [399] purpose of identification. That expression I used is on the sheet itself.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is a memorandum on the sheet showing it is in evidence, it ought to show in what proceeding it is in evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. It does not show that. I would like to make that clear for the record. Will the colonel read what is on the corner of the sheet so the record will be clear?

Colonel THIELEN. I see the statement "Exhibit 3-B in evidence."

Senator FERGUSON. That is exactly what I read. That is for identification purposes.

Have you examined it?

Colonel THIELEN. For the first time now.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you compare it with the board and with the exhibit now in evidence?

Colonel THIELEN. I have compared it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they alike?

Colonel THIELEN. Exhibit 3-B, so-called, appears to include the information on the board.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not what I asked you. Are they alike?

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness explain in what particular they differ, if they do differ.

[400] Senator FERGUSON. Cannot I have an answer to my question first? Are they alike?

The CHAIRMAN. He was in the process of answering your question, Senator, when you interrupted.

Go ahead and give your answer.

Colonel THIELEN. The exhibit 3-B in evidence, so-called, appears to include the plots referred to on the board and on the exhibit which you handed me previously, sir, and in addition appears to have other plots which were made later in the day.

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you tell us how they differ? Will you give us all that is on the exhibit that I gave you this morning, exhibit 3-B in evidence, the way it is marked?

Colonel THIELEN. It contains numerous additional plots.

[401] Senator FERGUSON. Will you give them to us?

Colonel THIELEN. It would be very difficult to do that orally, sir. I see pips and plots all over the area.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to say you cannot give us any of them? Are your eyes not able to read them?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. I start up in the upper left-hand corner and I see a spot—

Senator FERGUSON. What is the time marking?

Colonel THIELEN. 10:3—and the final digit is illegible. Below that is 10:35. Below that is 10, and then illegible and the digit 3. Below that is 10:30. Below that is 10:2 and an illegible digit. Below that is 10:27 and an illegible digit. About an inch below that is a spot with illegible digits. Below that about a half inch is a spot 10:31.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, are not they illegible just simply because the photostat is not clear?

Colonel THIELEN. I believe that is true, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, go ahead.

Colonel THIELEN. That appears to conclude that plot of the 10:00 series.

Senator FERGUSON. Give us the other plots.

Colonel THIELEN. Which are you referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. On the map, that is not on the one [402] shown to us.

Colonel THIELEN. About 3 inches due north of Kaena Point, I find a single spot, and to the southeast is a dotted line, about an inch, and another spot surrounded by numerals, some of them illegible, one of which I make out as 7:50 or 7:56.

Senator FERGUSON. They are to the left of what is on the chart here, 7:39?

Colonel THIELEN. It would be in the neighborhood of a point on the chart marked 6:59.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. Below the broad arrow.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the mark on this chart I gave you?
6:30?

Colonel THIELEN. I read 7:50 here.

Senator FERGUSON. 7:50.

Colonel THIELEN. There is no indication, however, that that is the same plot as the one on the board.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what else is on that chart that is not on the one on the board?

Colonel THIELEN. There are—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). I am talking about the Opana chart, 3-B in evidence, so marked.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, this is marked "Opana" down in [403] the lower left-hand corner. Out to the east-northeast—or west-north-west of Kaena Point is a series—I should estimate the distance on this scale of about 50 miles—is a series of arrows pointing out spots, no one of which, as near as I can make out, has a time indicated on it. South of that, in the general area off the Hawaiian coast of the island are a number of white dots which may be caused by faults in the photostat, or may be plots.

Senator FERGUSON. Just there it is very important then to get all of the facts that we should have the original instrument and not be depending upon a photostat which can be so defective that you cannot read it; is that right?

Colonel THIELEN. Since the last meeting, sir, the War Department has dispatched a radiogram to the Hawaiian Department asking for the originals of the plots of all stations on December 7, 1941.

[404] Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us why you produced the plot you did and did not give us the one in the Army board records? I understood the evidence was to be evidence not disputed, that you were to bring in. How do you account for that?

Colonel THIELEN. For one thing, sir, this appears to include all plots made during the day and not those made during the attack, with which I was dealing.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you bring in your 10:39 then?

Colonel THIELEN. Because that occurs on Exhibit 4, which I clearly specified was the one from which I had taken the chart.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not Exhibit 4 a plot made up by an individual and not the original evidence?

Colonel THIELEN. Both plots are authenticated by Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you whether the one I gave you, 3-B, the Opana photostat, is not purporting to be from an original?

Colonel THIELEN. That appears to be, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I show you another photostat, exhibit 3-A in evidence—and I take it for granted that means it was in evidence at the Army board, and I just use that for identification purposes—and ask you if you [405] ever saw that?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir. I have not only seen that but I have had it reproduced as an Army exhibit on page 8.

Senator FERGUSON. That one is reproduced. Did you use that information on the chart that you gave us?

Colonel THIELEN. Not on the chart of the Opana station, sir, because the chart to which you have last referred is not the chart of the Opana station.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you to read the notes down in the corner and see whether part of it is not of the Opana station.

Colonel THIELEN. This says:

Detector station records at Kaena, Opana, Kaala, Shafter, Kokohead on December 7, 1941, prior to 7:00 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think we only wanted, in your verbal evidence here, the Opana station?

Colonel THIELEN. As I pointed out, Senator, the chart to which you refer was offered in evidence as Army exhibit, page 8.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that. Why did not you include the showings on this map?

Colonel THIELEN. The only significance I see in this chart is that it confirms the plots earlier in the day of the Opana station, indicating that that station was tracking [406] correctly.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we understand then that we have received here on the board a corrected chart?

Colonel THIELEN. By no means.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you to look at page 116, that you gave me the other day as the page from which you got the evidence on this radar, about what Elliott was doing. Do you find anything on that? That is the Roberts evidence. You gave me page 116 as the report as I told you I could not find it in the report because the report did not have so many pages and then you said it was in the evidence.

Now I show you page 116 of the evidence and ask you if you find anything on that?

Colonel THIELEN. I will check my documentation on that, sir. It is entirely possible that my documentation is incorrect; but I read them correctly. It is exhibit S of the Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of Private McDonald.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got the affidavit of Private McDonald?

Colonel THIELEN. It is in the files of the War Department; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could he give what Elliott was doing when he was the telephone operator down at the center? Why would you rely upon his affidavit?

[407] Colonel THIELEN. Let me check that to see just what that referred to, sir. I see that that evidence refers to the location of the aircraft as picked up by Private Elliott and Private Lockard, which was presumably reported to Private McDonald.

Senator FERGUSON. Now might I inquire from counsel whether or not they have the affidavit in the Roberts report?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I haven't them in court this minute.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you whether you have them.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have the Roberts record, if that is what you mean, all the exhibits in the War and Navy that the Roberts commission is presumed to have had.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel try and locate that affidavit for the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. My chief assistant suggested that you may have the Roberts record. We were passing these things out.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not have the affidavit. I did not know there were any affidavits until the witness has been giving affidavits.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will look up our records and see who has that information. What is it exactly you want, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. I want the affidavit in the Roberts investigation.

Mr. MITCHELL. All the affidavits?

[408] Senator FERGUSON. All the affidavits in the Roberts investigation.

Colonel THIELEN. I learn that my citation in my document was incorrect originally, page 116. I should have cited volume 2 of the Roberts report, pages 66 and 67, General Short's testimony, as to the facts mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now on this map that you have given us the Opana station shows 6:45, 6:48, 6:50, 6:51, 6:58, 6:48, 6:51, 6:52, and 6:59.

Now referring to the testimony of Elliott on page 997, transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on Thursday, August 17, 1944, and reading back one question:

General FRANK. What I am trying to ascertain is whether on the morning of December 7 there was more activity than usual or whether there was less activity than usual, or was it average?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Well, sir, during our problem on Sunday there was practically no activity at all.

General FRANK. Prior to this time?

Sergeant ELLIOTT. Prior to 7 o'clock; yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center and had no targets.

Now how do you reconcile that evidence with what you are giving the committee? I show you the original.

Colonel THIELEN. I consider this evidence of the plot [409] authenticated by a signal officer responsible at this station to be evidence that is worthy of being presented to the committee, under my directive of giving them the facts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Over and above the sworn testimony of the man who did the charting, is that correct?

Colonel THIELEN. There is no evidence that he was on the set at that particular time.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about Elliott.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are we then going to get from the Army the conclusions of some officers later on and not the eyewitnesses to these facts? Is that what we are getting here?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is a question for counsel, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness cannot answer what we are going to get hereafter. As everybody has been advised, Mr. Lockard and Mr. Tyler are both on the list of witnesses. They were in charge, making these records, and certainly their testimony will be produced here.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I correct my statement, but I cannot speak for the future. I am talking about what we did get.

Is that correct, that it was the conclusions of officers rather than the testimony of eyewitnesses?

[410] Colonel THIELEN. I see no conclusion in what purports to be and is authenticated as the record of the plots of the Opana station.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not see any—

Colonel THIELEN. I do not say it is a conclusion to reproduce a plot.

Senator FERGUSON. Where the witness himself, who made the chart, says there were no other targets that morning, in the statement, and you bring in the conclusion of an officer that there were?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not consider it a conclusion, sir. It is a plot.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

Colonel THIELEN. It is a written record, sir. It is a plot.

Senator FERGUSON. Who made it?

Colonel THIELEN. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he make it from? Did he make it from the one I gave you?

Colonel THIELEN. From the records of the Opana station. I cannot say what he saw when he made this record.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for two records of that station then?

Colonel THIELEN. One of them covers the entire day, sir, [411] and one covers the critical period.

Senator FERGUSON. How could the one that followed, that covered the entire day, be any different than the one that gave them the exact period, and that is up to 7:39?

Colonel THIELEN. In what way, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. How could they differ? The one that covered all day, how could it be different from the one that covered it up to 7:39? I take it the 7:39 chart up to that point, would be complete up to that time, would it not?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir, that would be the supposition.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it would not have any thing on that was not on this chart. Now where do you get this 6:50 and 6:45, if this man who made the chart said he did not have any other targets on that day?

Colonel THIELEN. Where do I get it, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. I get it from the so-called historic plot.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now will you give us when the first bomb was dropped again?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman suspend a minute until I can look at the report and the exhibit on which he questioned the witness?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[412] Mr. MURPHY. Will you pass them over, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Will we have to suspend in order to do that?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I just made the request.

Senator FERGUSON. I want them back. I have some other questions.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, in just a minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read my last question?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. What do your records show?

Colonel THIELEN. The observers at Hickam Field saw aircraft at 7:55 a. m. and the attack was initiated immediately, presumably the first bomb dropped within a matter of seconds after 7:55 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. 7:55 a. m. All right. How do you account for the planes that came in at 7:39 to 7:55? How do you account for their action from 7:39 to 7:55?

Colonel THIELEN. Well, I am not prepared to state positively that those planes appearing at 7:39 off Kahuku Point were the planes that appeared at Hickam Field at 7:55.

Senator FERGUSON. How far is the point 7:39 from Hickam Field?

Colonel THIELEN. I should estimate that at approximately 60 miles.

[413] Senator FERGUSON. About 60 miles. Do you know what Elliott said about how far he followed these planes in? Fifteen to twenty miles, did not he say?

Colonel THIELEN. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the radar was doing at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. What the radar was doing, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel THIELEN. I do not believe I understand the question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

Colonel THIELEN. I understood the words sir, but not the intent. I do not understand what is wanted.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the question.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how the radar would function at that time?

Colonel THIELEN. How it would function?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, whether it would take it 15 or 20 miles from the radar itself.

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir. I know that the lobe, so-called, sent out by the radar, behaves very erratically. I am not technically qualified to state how it would behave at that short range.

[414] Senator FERGUSON. Have you examined Lockard's or Elliott's testimony about these targets before 7:02, during their so-called, as you call it, regular shift?

Colonel THIELEN. I did not direct their attention specifically to that; no, sir. They have unquestionably read that testimony in researching this particular phase.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, instead of what the testimony shows you gave us a plot that was made up by Colonel Murphy.

Colonel THIELEN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way you leave the record, and that is the way it stands, is it not?

Colonel THIELEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just one observation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. On Exhibit No. 4 which was offered in evidence there is a statement "Record of early flights December 7, 1941, obtained by Opana detector", and then the signature of Lieutenant Colonel Murphy.

On the exhibit which the gentleman from Michigan questioned the witness about there is a notification "Opana detector" and then some word that is illegible, "Record of early flights". [415] and then a notation which would seem to bear the initials of some other witness.

[416] So this record, Exhibit 4, is of the early flights, and this other notation by someone else appears not to be on the record in question, and I wish the witness would find out what the last of this notation on the lower right-hand corner of exhibit 3-B is, so we might see what the difference between the two exhibits is.

Colonel THIELEN. I will endeavor to find that out, sir. I learned that my researchers are familiar with that, consulted radar experts on it, and determined that it was generally illegible.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Any further questions?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for information from Admiral Inglis? He has been very accommodating up to now. I want to follow up the naval strength in both the Pacific and Atlantic.

I have in my hands a rough draft of what I would like to see in the record in the form of a chart. It asks for the strength of the German Navy as of May 1, additions from the then Vichy France, the Italian strength, and for the augmentation from Axis, Allies, or from other sources.

Then, in the last column, the total naval strength from all sources in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

I ask for that same information as of December 7, 1941.

Then, information to the same effect of Japanese strength [417] as of May 1, 1941, and as of December 7, 1941, in the Pacific, and for American strength in the Pacific with Allied augmentation both in respect to the Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet.

If you can have that prepared, Admiral, and insert it in the record of today's proceedings, I would appreciate it very much. But if that is too short a time, I hope you can get it in by Monday.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will hand it to the Navy Department.¹

Admiral INGLIS. We can have it ready for you by Monday. I am afraid we cannot by today.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you concluded, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask now to put into evidence these two exhibits that I handed to the witness for identification, and I ask now that they be part of the record.

Mr. Counsel, will you tell us what numbers they will be?

Mr. MITCHELL. I will mark them as soon as I have them.

Senator FERGUSON. So they will get the correct numbers.

Mr. GESELL. One of them is already in evidence.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want them both? We already have [418] one.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the large one.

Mr. MITCHELL. At the request of Senator Ferguson, the document he has produced, which for identification has on it the words "Exhibit 3-B in evidence," apparently from some earlier proceedings, is now marked Exhibit 7, and offered in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7.")

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to myself, as a member of the committee, I just simply want to say I do not share the views expressed or the remarks made to the admiral who has been

¹ Admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 86.

appearing before us as a witness. I think both of these gentlemen have acquitted themselves with great credit and distinction, and are a distinct credit to the great services they represent.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed now with anything further he has.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to make a statement along the same line as Mr. Cooper.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me suggest that these two witnesses will be here for a while longer and at the conclusion of their testimony, it might be appropriate to have a testimonial [419] meeting with respect to the opinions of the committee with regard to this very testimony.

Senator LUCAS. I want to be the first one to testify when the testimonial meeting starts.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to join in that too.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman wants to be in that too. Go ahead.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Inglis, one question. You spoke about Jap submarines entering Pearl Harbor. Are you referring to the midget submarines, so-called?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Not the large seagoing submarines?

Admiral INGLIS. Not the large seagoing submarines; no, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. As to those midget submarines, what does the record show as to how many men were in the crew?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe they were manned by a crew of two men—that is, two persons, I should say.

Mr. MITCHELL. A very small vessel?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, I ask you if you have brought here, at my request, all of the documents in the Navy from Japanese sources relating to the Japanese account of the attack at Pearl Harbor?

[420] Admiral INGLIS. Substantially everything except the communication intelligence material which I believe counsel has from other sources and not from me.

The CHAIRMAN. A little louder. We could not hear the last remark. (The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not understand, I thought you produced here all of the material from Jap sources which have made any disclosure as to what they did in respect to this attack.

Admiral INGLIS. I wanted to be quite meticulous.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the espionage documents, do you?

Admiral INGLIS. I mean the material you referred to as cryptic analytical.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. I think you have that. You did not get it from me.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right. Now, let us look at this material and see what it is. I hand you a bundle of loose sheets in the Japanese language. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, does the record show clearly when counsel received these papers? Have you made clear on the record when you received these papers, counsel?

[421] Mr. MITCHELL. I think I received these original documents within the last 24 hours.

Senator FERGUSON. About when did you get them?

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the exact hour?

Senator FERGUSON. When? There are two sets of them and I would just like to know when counsel got them.

Mr. MITCHELL. My assistants says these documents reached me approximately 2 p. m. yesterday afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Two p. m. yesterday afternoon.

Has counsel had time to examine each one of them?

Mr. MITCHELL. We went over them in a rough way. I have not spent much time on this document in the Japanese language, but we thought we would get back to the original source here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they give you translations?

Mr. MITCHELL. They are in the papers here.

Senator FERGUSON. They are among the papers?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. May I ask him about what these are, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I do not know.

Mr. MITCHELL. I want you to know.

What is this document, this bundle of photostats here in the Japanese language? Will you state generally what that is?

Admiral INGLIS. There are photostat copies of two documents in the Japanese language which my translators inform me are Japanese top secret operation orders No. 1 and No. 2. [422]

Mr. MITCHELL. That is a staff plan, do you mean, a staff order?

Admiral INGLIS. It is a plan and an order, in effect.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you look over these other documents and just generally describe what they are.

Admiral INGLIS. This first one I have is a translation of a captured document; the title is "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire from counsel when counsel requested these documents from the Navy?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I think these particular documents I asked him to bring in here sometime yesterday, because I understood the committee wanted all the original material on which any testimony was based.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand it has not been requested by counsel prior to yesterday.

Mr. MITCHELL. We had the operational order in English, the translation of it, but I did not have the Japanese rendition, if that is what you mean. I had a translation of it for some days, I think.

Senator LUCAS. You should have translated them right, Mr. Mitchell.

[423] Mr. MITCHELL. I could not swear to that.

Senator LUCAS. I know there are going to be a lot of questions about that.

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not suppose anybody can settle that question. Will you go on, Admiral—if I may proceed uninterruptedly.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead, gentlemen.

Admiral INGLIS. Are you ready, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. All right. Go head.

Admiral INGLIS. The next document is entitled "Translation of a Captured Japanese Document. The professional notebook of an ensign in the Japanese Navy." The date is February 25, 1944.

Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the date on that is January 12, 1941.

The next document that I have is dated March 2, 1943. The subject is Kuboaki, Takeo. That is obviously the name of a Japanese. "Superior class engineer petty officer, interrogation of." That is the subject.

[424] The next document that I have is entitled "Japanese Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor." This is an evaluation prepared by intelligence officers.

Mr. KEEFE. Jap intelligence officers?

Admiral INGLIS. United States intelligence officers.

The next document is entitled "Intelligence Report." The subject is "Japan Navy submarines." The date on this is April 22. The year is not given. It might be deduced, however, that the year is 1944.

The next document is 16 August 1943. It is marked "Interrogation Report No. 148 of Yokota, S." Yokota is the family name and S the initial of the given name.

The next document is entitled "United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944."

The next document is dated 30 June 1943. The subject is "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 472, Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii.

"ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai."

"ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 474, Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands."

The next document is dated 25 July 1945, Translation [425] No. 290. Subject, "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki", Kuramoti being the family name and Iki the given name.

The next document is a translation of combined fleet top secret operation order No. 1.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that a translation of the Jap script we have here, or is supposed to be?

Admiral INGLIS. This is a translation of the Japanese script. I am informed by my translators that there are a few corrections which they feel should be made in this document here, and those corrections will be produced at the proper time.

We haven't got the photostatic copies now.

The next document is entitled, "Enemy Lists of Sorties by Sub-carried Planes." There is no date on this. Its precise source is not indicated.

The next document is a memorandum dated October 13, 1945, addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the fifth Marine Amphibious Corps. The subject is "Prewar Espionage in the Hawaiian Island," and it pertains to an interview with Yoshio Shiga, lieutenant commander, Imperial Japanese Navy. In this case Yoshio is the given name and Shiga is the family name. That memorandum is signed by Robert N. Tate, special agent of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, attached to the Four Hundred Ninety-sixth CIC Detachment of the Fifth Marine Division, and contains several endorsements through official channels, showing its [426]

receipt in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations yesterday, November 16. I believe counsel ought to have the copy, which is not included in these papers, of reports submitted by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, from headquarters at Tokyo.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. At this point I will read into the record a paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary of War to General MacArthur, as follows:

The War Department has been requested to provide the joint congressional committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack with information concerning the attack available in Japanese files and records, to include Japanese agencies involved or informed of plans, date the attack was first planned, sources and nature of information on which plans and operation based, details of plans as they developed, composition of attack force, Japanese losses, routes followed by attack force before and after attack, and Japanese knowledge of damage inflicted. Request suitable measures be taken to obtain above information. Advise by cable information now available, steps open to you to obtain desired material with estimate of time required, summary of additional information as available. Air mail pertinent documents.

Now in response to that message the War Department has produced three documents: One, cables from General MacArthur, [427] dated the 14th of October—this is a preliminary report—and a further detailed report dated October 26, 1945.

Then you just spoke of another one. That last one came in last night, that was a Navy report, is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. That came from the Marines through Navy channels.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you had this report from General MacArthur's headquarters in this message before you?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And examined that?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now the War Department handed me last night, or early this morning, another message from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. That means General MacArthur, Tokyo. That is dated November 8, 1945. Have you examined that?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir, we have also examined that.

Mr. MITCHELL. How would you classify this material, as to the type of material it is? First there is an operational order and other captured documents from the Japs, is that it?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then you have also a number of documents recording interviews of captured Japanese prisoners?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

[428] Mr. MITCHELL. Then you have the report from General MacArthur?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, and those are interviews of Japanese officers who were not in the status of prisoners of war.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is there anything else in that file that is classified in a different way, that you can think of?

Admiral INGLIS. The only remaining item is the report which originated with the Marine detachment and which was forwarded through Navy channels, and that is largely the interrogation of Lieutenant Commander Shiga, Imperial Japanese Navy.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is not he a prisoner of war?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; he is in more or less the same category as the others, an officer who was interviewed after VJ-day.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the document that came in last night, isn't it?

Admiral INGLIS. That is the document that came in last night.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now previous to the receipt of that document, and the one of November 8 from General MacArthur, have you prepared a summary digest of these documents?

Admiral INGLIS. I had, sir. I would like to add to my [429] answer to your former question that this last document which has just been presented, the one that was received last night—

Mr. MITCHELL. By the Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. Through Navy sources, through Navy channels—also contains an endorsement, or rather a carbon copy of an endorsement from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, which pertains to some investigations we have made out there, in an effort to corroborate or contradict some of the testimony of this Lieutenant Commander Shiga.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, since the receipt of these last two documents that came through Navy sources and Army sources within the last few hours, have you gone through them to see whether your digest requires any additions?

Admiral INGLIS. I have, sir; and it does require some substantial changes and additions.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you made those?

Admiral INGLIS. I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had to do that last night and this morning, is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you have already put in motion mimeographic machines so that copies of them may be supplied?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now I would like to ask the Admiral if [430] you will please give your digest of these original documents that you have there.

Admiral INGLIS. I would like to say, first of all, that throughout this presentation which is to follow, the dates will be expressed in Japanese time. Thus the date of the attack will be given as December 8, which is Japanese time, rather than December 7, which is Hawaiian time. Wherever I deviate from that practice I will specifically so state, as I proceed.

With respect to that difference, we should add 19½ hours to Honolulu time in order to get Tokyo time; we should add 5½ hours to Honolulu time in order to get Washington time, and we should add 14 hours to Washington time in order to get Tokyo time.

I would also like to make the preliminary comment that some of the phraseology used in this presentation may sound a little strange to American ears. That is because of peculiar Japanese usage, where the Japanese are directly quoted.

The first item concerns the formulation of the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is reported that a surprise attack—

Mr. MITCHELL (interposing). When you say "it is reported" you mean it is disclosed in these documents? Is that what you mean?

[431] Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. That expression

"it is reported" is used advisedly, to indicate that it has not been confirmed by other sources, and we cannot guarantee its accuracy. All we have is the report.

Mr. MITCHELL. You are not guaranteeing the Japs?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

[432] It is reported that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was originally conceived and proposed in the first part of January 1941 by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief combined fleet, who, at that time, ordered Rear Adm. Takijiro Onishi, then chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. In the latter part of August 1941, Admiral Yamamoto ordered all fleet commanders and other key staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminary to a final formulation of operation plans for a Pacific campaign which included a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was held continuously at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to September 13. On September 13 an outline containing essential points of a basic operation order, which was later to be issued as Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, was completed. This operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders on November 5, 1941. Therefore, this date, November 5, 1941, is to be regarded as the date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed.

Operation order No. 1 under heading of "Preparations for the Outbreak of War" states that—

When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be [433] issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War."

That completes that quotation.

The operation order continues to say that—

The time for the Outbreak of War (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters Order.

The details of the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as set forth in operation order No. 1, were worked out by members of the naval general staff operations section, combined fleet operations staff and first air fleet operations staff.

III. Determination of December 8 as day of attack; under date of November 7, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued combined fleet top secret operation order No. 2 saying "First preparations for war. Y-day will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y-day as given in operation order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approximate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial naval order issued from the Imperial general headquarters under date of December 2, 1941 states:

The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on 8 December.

This order is in effect the announcement of X-day as defined in operation order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative approximate date for the attack [434] selected on November 7 and defined as Y-day is reaffirmed on December 2 as X-day. In other words, the original tentative date—Y-day—and the final precise date—X-day—are in fact the same date.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is December 7, our time?

Admiral INGLIS. The date of attack is December 7.

Mr. MITCHELL. You explained in the beginning that Japanese times were given, but to just point it up, I am asking if that December 8 was December 7 Honolulu time.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct. Unless I make some parenthetical, all times will be Tokyo time.

To repeat, in other words, the original tentative date—Y-day—and the final precise date—X-day—are, in fact, the same date.

In discussions prior to November 7, the Imperial headquarters navy section generally recognized December 8 as suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the combined fleet. For a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area in December, the 10th would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon.

Mr. MITCHELL. That you are taking from the documents; it is Japanese opinion?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct. This is all oriented [435] to the Japanese point of view.

However, it was expected that the United States Pacific Fleet, in accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday—Hawaiian dates.

That is Friday and Monday, Hawaiian dates.

Therefore, Sunday—Hawaiian date—was decided on. In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn as possible—approximately 1 hour after sunrise.

Here I come to the deviation from the original script.

Mr. MITCHELL. A deviation resulting from these last documents?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct.

The following statement is made by a Japanese officer pilot who participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor:

On October 5, 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, aboard the *Akagi* in Shibushi Bay, by the chief of staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Rynosuke Koshika. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, that on "December 1941 (Japan time), a Japanese naval air force would strike the American Fleet at Hawaii." Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoroku Yamamoto, also addressed the group, saying that, "Although Japan never wanted to fight [436] the United States, they were forced to because they would be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China and its oil embargo. The United States Fleet," he said, "was Japan's strongest enemy, so if they could strike it unexpectedly at Hawaii it would be 2 or 3 months before it could maneuver. By that time occupation of Borneo, the Philippines, Singapore, Java, and Sumatra would be complete."

The next title has to do with the date of leaving port.

It is reported that on or about November 14 CINC of the combined fleet ordered the units of the Pearl Harbor attacking force to assemble in Hitokappu Bay.

Commander Biard, will you point to Hitokappu Bay? That is the Island of Etorofu.

It is further reported that about November 21 the situation seemed to be approaching a stage where commencement of hostilities were inevitable. The navy section of the Imperial general headquarters therefore issued the following order:

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such [437] that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the situation promptly.

I would like to say at this time that upon introducing the subject of "Date of leaving port," I went back to the original script as prepared a few days ago.

On November 25 the commander in chief, combined fleet, issued the following order to the striking force, which had, since November 22, been assembled at Hitokappu Bay.

(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first aid raid is planned for dawn of X-day—exact date to be given by later order.

Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close coordination and guarding against enemy counter attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan.

(b) Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.¹

[438] (c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of November 26 and advance to 42° N. and 170° E.—standing by position—on the afternoon of December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling.

Commander Biard, will you point to that position?

The actual time of departure was 9:00 a. m., November 26, Japan time—1:30 p. m., November 25, Hawaii time.

V. Date of instructions to execute plan: Combined fleet top secret operation order No. 2, issued by Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the combined fleet, and dated November 7, 1941 is the basic order or instruction to execute the detailed plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

On December 1 the Cabinet Council approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States. On the same day, an Imperial naval order issued on instruction by the Imperial general headquarters stated:

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a position (sic) to declare war on the United States of America.

On December 2 an Imperial naval order issued under instruction from the Imperial general headquarters stated:

The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on December 8.

There is no copy of this order available nor is there conclusive evidence that [439] it constitutes the formal X-day order referred to in operations order No. 1. Its effect, however, is clearly equivalent to the final determination of a specific time for the outbreak of the war, and it may be regarded therefore as a final determination of X-day.

VI. Details of plan: Hitokappu Bay was selected as the point of departure from Japan because it was recognized as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new developments in the situation as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

In formulating final plans, it was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships in Pearl Harbor was the most effective method

¹ See p. 205, *infra*, for correction by Adm. Inglis.

of putting the main strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaii area out of action for a long period of time. The following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow.

(b) The fact that Pearl Harbor was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

In regard to point (a) it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

In regard to point (b), since success could not be [440] counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

I must deviate again from the text prepared the other day and refer to this last source received just yesterday.

Evidence indicates that as late as 29 November—Japan time—the Japanese force expected to find six United States carriers in Hawaiian waters; they were aware that the U. S. S. *Saratoga* was, in late November, on the west coast of the United States and also that the U. S. S. *Enterprise* would be “two or three days out of the attack.” On 31 November, Japan time, when the striking force was well out to sea, it received a report that only one or two carriers were in Pearl Harbor. On December 6, Japan time, word was received that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor, but that 8 battleships and 15 cruisers were in the harbor. At a briefing, which took place on or about December 5, Japan time, each pilot was furnished a photograph of a map of Pearl Harbor on which each pilot made notes on courses, anchorage areas, or missions.

Now I return to the script of 2 or 3 days ago.

Three courses were considered for the Hawaii operation: The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following the Hawaiian Islands, and a southern route passing through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south.

[441] Commander Biard, would you roughly indicate those three routes?

That would be the northern route (following Commander Biard's pointer), that would be the central route, through the Mandated Islands and the Hawaiian chain and the southern group just out of the Mandated Islands, up to Hawaii.

On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy, United States, patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were important. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages were generally just the opposite to those of the northern route. Although it may be assumed that the central and southern routes would be preferable for the purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes lie near Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston Islands, and so forth. Consequently, it was hardly expected that a surprise attack could be made. The ability to refuel and the necessity of surprise were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed, the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be as- [442] sured by Japanese strength alone. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

By routing the striking force to pass between Midway and the Aleutians, it was expected to pass outside the patrol zones of United States patrol planes. Moreover, screening destroyers were sent ahead of the fleet, and in the event any vessels were encountered the main body of the force would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection. If the striking force had been detected prior to X-2-day, it was planned to have the force return without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1-day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions. If the attack had failed, it was planned to send the main force in the Island Sea out to the Pacific in order to bring in the task force.

I would like to remark again, that this is Japanese phraseology and may appear a little strange in its reasoning processes.

Returning now to the prepared script, item 7 is entitled "Sources of data used in planning the Pearl Harbor attack were as follows."

These sources—I am speaking now from the point of view of the Japanese—were:

- [443] (A) American public broadcasts from Hawaii.
- (B) Reports of Japanese naval attachés in Washington, D. C.
- (C) Reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack. A Japanese pilot states that at no time were visual land signals used from Hawaii.
- (D) Information obtained from ships which had called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.

Those are the only four sources which the Japanese have admitted. We know, however, that there is a fifth source:

(E) Espionage network in Hawaiian Islands, being uncensored cable communications with Japan.

That last is from an American source, not from the Japanese source.

Mr. KEEFE. Under (C), with respect to signals, I didn't quite catch that. It doesn't appear here.

Admiral INGLIS. I beg your pardon. I am glad you brought that up. That last sentence "a Japanese pilot states" came from this last source which we just received last night. That was a change in the script.

Mr. KEEFE. That will be included in the mimeographed corrected statement which we will receive later?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that goes under what?

[444] Admiral INGLIS. Under source (C).

Now, again I must deviate from the original script and quote this last document which was just received yesterday.

A Japanese officer pilot has reported his belief "that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting station." Source was certain "that there was a Hawaiian Nisei"—a second-generation American of Japanese descent—"who was a Japanese naval officer, aboard the flagship *Akagi*, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts and decoding them." Source said "that in his opinion the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast the German attaché lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left Pearl Harbor. If the German attaché wanted a cook or houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor."

Source states "that the information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6:30 a. m., 12 noon, and 7 p. m. He was prone to think that time following the 7 p. m., broadcast was

used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information concerning a whole day's activities.

[445] I would like to say at this time that the endorsement which the authorities at Hawaii, the FBI, ONI, and MIS, have placed on this last document indicates that they cannot find any substantiation for this plan to use Honolulu commercial broadcasting stations to convey information to the Japanese task force. They also pointed out that this procedure would not have been necessary since the Japanese consul, who was the center of the espionage network, had full access to a direct connection via cable uncensored directly from Honolulu to Tokyo.

That completes the deviation from the original script, and I return now to item 8, which is "Details of execution."

[446] VIII. Details of execution: Study of the Japanese plan of operation indicates the Japanese high command made the following assumptions with regard to the United States Fleet:

(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Sunday, Hawaii time.

(b) That a carrier force could be moved from home waters across the Pacific to within striking distance of the main islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive reconnaissance.

(c) That should assumptions (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy naval units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force in a decisive engagement with the American Fleet. The other task forces of the Japanese Fleet (southern force, northern force, and the south seas force) would be available for this purpose. Implied in the plan is the assumption that, in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of available Japanese major fleet units would be sufficient to defeat the American Fleet.

(d) A powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic result of crippling the American Fleet; that such a strike would achieve also the [447] destruction of American land-based air power and thus permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage.

The omission from the Japanese plans of provision for landings on Oahu was decided upon during discussions held on September 6 and 7 when operation order No. 1 was being put together. It was decided that no landing operation should be included because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities; it was further recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could be accomplished without detection; it was further recognized that insuperable logistic problems rendered landings on the island impractical.

The complete plan of the Pearl Harbor attack was known in advance to members of the Navy General Staff, the commanders in chief and Chiefs of Staff, and staff members of the combined fleet headquarters and first air fleet headquarters. Part of the plan was known in advance to the Navy Minister, Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval officers.

It is also reported—again I use that expression advisedly—it is also reported that the Emperor knew in advance only the general outline of the plan and that none of the Japanese officials who were in the United States, including [448] Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, knew anything about the plan in advance.

Parenthetically again, that last sentence, referring to the knowledge or lack of knowledge of the Emperor and Nomura and Kurusu, is only based on a single report purely from recollection of a Japanese officer.

[449] The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, were predicated on the desire for military conquest, security, and enhancement of the Empire by occupation of areas rich in natural resources. With regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, operation order No. 1 says that:

In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation, and supply lines to the Orient, will be cut. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight.

Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawaiian area were the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built around a carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting a successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the following allocation of forces for the Pearl Harbor attack was made:

Refer now, please, to item 17 in the Navy folder, which gives the composition of the forces in some detail. I will summarize by saying that it consisted of:

Striking force: Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo.

[450] BatDiv 3 (1st Section) (Hiei, Kirishima), 2 BB.

CarDiv 1 (Kaga) (Akagi).

CarDiv 2 (Hiryu, Soryu).

CarDiv 5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku), 6 CV.

CruDiv 8 (Tone, Chikuma), 2 CA.

DesRon 1 (Abukuma, 4 DesDivs), 1 CL, 16 DD.

11 train vessels.

ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi Shimizu.

Isuzu, Yura, 2 CL.

Katori, 1 CL-T.

I-class submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3), 20 SS.

(I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74)

Midget submarines, 5 M-SS.

6 train vessels.

Of the 11 train vessels allotted to the striking force only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually accompanied the force. In addition, 3 submarines of the advance expeditionary force accompanied the striking force, the other submarines having proceeded from the Inland Sea independently of the striking force.

The striking force departed Hitokappu Bay at 9 a. m., November 26, and in accordance with orders from CinC Combined [451] Fleet, proceeded to its destination 200 miles due north of Oahu. It was fueled en route.

At this time I would like to pause to advise the committee that the reproduction of this chart to which Commander Biard is pointing is included in the Navy folder as item 18.

On leaving the harbor, the striking force was joined by three submarines which, with several of the destroyers, took station as scouting screen. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the need for fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts were posted but no searches or combat air patrols were flown. It had been anticipated that North Pacific weather would cause difficulty in refueling at sea and those ships whose capacity in relation to consumption was small were loaded with oil in drums for emergency use.

Now, off the script, the next paragraph is modified somewhat by this document which we just received yesterday through the naval channels.

The weather, however, proved uniformly calm, and fueling from the tankers was carried out as planned. A participating pilot states that the weather was foggy part of the time. On or about December 2, all ships were darkened and condition two (second degree of readiness, gun crews stationed) was set.

That condition of readiness was set about December 2.

[452] On December 4, Japan time, the rendezvous point (42° W., 170° E.) was reached and the combat ships of the force fueled to capacity from the tankers, which were dropped that night. The task force then turned southeast, probably at increased speed. The carriers *Hiryu* and *Soryu*, whose fuel capacity was small, had been oiled daily while in company with the tankers and now had to be fueled by bucket brigade from the oil drums taken on board. The cruise up to this date had been uneventful; no ships or planes had been sighted and no false alarms had been sounded. When the force was 800 miles due north of Hawaii, on December 6, Japan time, it received from the Japanese Navy Department a radio message "Climb Mount Niitaka"; this was the signal for the attack and the force proceeded south at 24 knots to its destination. On the night of the 7-8th of December, Japan time, the run in was made at top speed, 26 knots.

Again I would like to say that radio message concerning "Climb Mount Niitaka" was derived from this last source which we just received yesterday.

Returning now to the original script:

The problem of defeating enemy—United States—radio intelligence was met by a program of deceptive traffic—false assumption of call signs, padding of circuits, and so forth—to simulate the presence of a striking force, carriers and carrier air groups [453] in the Inland Sea. In contrast, no effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observation of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy.

Again ad libbing, just to be sure that there is no misunderstanding, the movement southward that the Japanese are speaking of in this connection was a movement of other forces from Japanese Empire waters south toward the French-Indochina coast, and not the movement of the task force, the Japanese task force, from its position 400 miles north of Hawaii to its position 200 miles north of Hawaii.

Returning to the script:

Upon arrival at their destination, 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers of the striking force launched on schedule a total of 361 planes in three waves, commencing at 6 a. m. and ending at 7:15 a. m., December 7, Hawaii time.

I might add here at this point, which is not in either script, the note that I have: "It was planned that the force be protected during the attack by a combat patrol of 18 fighters to be launched about 0545—5:45. That, presumably, is in addition to the 361 planes forming the attack group.

Returning now to the script:

[454] The planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes launched at this time, it was planned to launch two type Zero reconnaissance seaplanes to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage just before the attack.

I must deviate again from the script which was distributed 2 or 3 days ago and say that from the source just received yesterday we derived this additional information.

Apparently, one seaplane from a cruiser took off at about 0430 Hawaii time for observation purposes at 16,404 feet altitude.

Returning now to the original script:

Upon completion of the launchings, the force withdrew at high speed, 26 or 27 knots, to the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between 10:30 a. m. and 1:30 p. m., December 7, Hawaii time. The striking force then proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving December 23, Japan time. En route carrier division two—*Hiryu*, *Soryu*—Cruiser Division Eight—*Tone*, *Chikuma*—and two destroyers—*Tanikaze*, *Yurakaze*—were detached on December 15, Japan time, to serve as reinforcements for the Wake Island operation. Original plans called for the retiring task force to strike at Midway if possible, but, probably because of the presence of a United States task force south of Midway, that strike was not made.

[455] Until completion of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the striking force, the advance expeditionary force of submarines was under command of the striking force commander. The precise movements of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed that most of these units departed from home waters in late November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area via Kwajalein; a few of these submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, changed course and proceeded directly to Hawaii.

The functions assigned to the submarines of the advance expeditionary force were carried out as planned in operations order No. 1, namely:

(a) Until X-3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe and report on any strong American forces discovered.

(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking force in advance of the movement of that force to ensure an undetected approach.

(c) Until X-5 the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.

(d) On X day the submarines in the area were to—

observe and attack the American Fleet in the Hawaii area; make a surprise attack on the channel leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves out to fight, he will [456] be pursued and attacked.

During the evening of December 7 (the day before the actual attack), the force of I class submarines took up scouting positions in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor; these submarines were ordered not to attack until the task force strike was verified.

Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, 5 midget submarines were launched from specially fitted fleet submarines as a special attacking force to conduct an offensive attack against American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air strike. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor; it inflicted no damage on American units and none of the five rejoined the Japanese force.

After the actual attack, the I class submarines maintained their partols in the Hawaiian area and at least one of the group (the I-7) launched its aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of the American fleet and installations. The operation plan provided that, in the event of virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, one submarine division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic; in fact, at least one submarine (the I-17) was dispatched to the [457] Oregon coast on or about December 14. One large submarine (pilot rescue) was stationed east of Kauai.

That last also comes from this latest source, about the rescue submarine stationed east of Kauai. Kauai is northwest of Oahu. I might also say parenthetically that this is the first information we have ever had that the Japanese used the submarine rescue tactics which were later so successfully employed by our own forces.

The next subheading is "Projected Losses Compared with Actual Losses."

During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that one *Akagi* class carrier, and one *Soryu* class carrier would be lost. No mention is made of probable plane losses. A very slight expectation was held that some of the five midget submarines would be retrieved but all midget submarine personnel were prepared for death. The losses actually incurred were 27 aircraft and all of the 5 midget submarines.

The Japanese assessment of damage inflicted on the American forces was made from reports of flight personnel upon their return and from studies of photographs taken by flight personnel. No reconnaissance planes were used during the [458] attack to assess results, although one plane was launched from a submarine for this purpose well after the attack had been completed; one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to make observations. The official Japanese estimate of damage inflicted and the contrasting actual damage inflicted is as follows:

In this table I give material both from Japanese sources and American sources. In the left-hand table is the Japanese estimate. In the right-hand table is the actual damage as reported from American sources.

The Japanese estimated that they had sunk four battleships, two cruisers, and one tanker.

Actually they sank four battleships, a converted battleship, the *Utah*, and also one mine layer, the *Oglala*.

The Japs estimated that they had heavily damaged four battleships and five cruisers.

Actually they had heavily damaged one battleship, two light cruisers, three destroyers, and one repair ship.

The Japanese estimated that they had lightly damaged one battleship. Actually they had slightly damaged three battleships.

I beg your pardon. Three battleships, one light cruiser, and one aircraft tender.

The Japanese estimated that they had destroyed a total [459] of 450 aircraft. Actually they destroyed 92 Navy planes.

Perhaps the colonel can give the number of Army planes destroyed and then we will have it all at this point.

Colonel THIELEN. Yes; we have some figures on that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have 105 here, Admiral.

Admiral INGLIS. You mean Navy planes?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One hundred and five Navy.

[460] Admiral INGLIS. That figure of Navy damage has been bandied about among my staff, and we have had reports all the way from something down in the 80's up to 136. The other day we gave as our best estimate 105. We have revised that to our best estimate of 102.

Colonel THIELEN. Our figure was 96 Army planes lost, and I should explain that is greater than the initial reports primarily because some of the planes were cannibalized to put other aircraft in the air. But the final figure is 96 Army planes lost as the result of enemy action.

Admiral INGLIS. I think it is fair to state that the Japanese estimated that they had destroyed 450 planes; that they actually destroyed, in round numbers, 200 planes, perhaps a little less than 200.

Finally, it may thus be concluded that the Japanese estimate of damage to United States ships was highly conservative, whereas their estimate of damage to United States aircraft was grossly exaggerated.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want to put up the map there, Admiral, that shows the reconnaissance?

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I note the time, and before any cross-examination, as far as we are concerned, we would wish to have an opportunity to look at the exhibits, other than the Japanese language ones—we would not be able to [461] read them. There will perhaps be opportunity during the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announced a while ago that we might run to 1 o'clock. What is the wish of the committee?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let us hear from counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. We are willing to stop or go on, as you please.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the desire of the committee with respect to an afternoon session?

Senator BREWSTER. I think we better go over to Monday morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that the witness has not yet concluded his direct testimony.

Senator BREWSTER. He has completed the statement.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand counsel is now referring to some charts.

The CHAIRMAN. He had finished his statement.

Senator GEORGE. I suggest we go over to Monday.

The CHAIRMAN. He had finished reading his statement, whereupon counsel was going to ask him some questions.

Admiral INGLIS. I have just two more charts.

Senator FERGUSON. Could we have counsel ask his questions and then recess?

The CHAIRMAN. We can determine about the recess, but I [462] think in the meantime counsel should be permitted to conclude.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is what I mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral INGLIS. I would like, before concluding my direct statement, to invite the attention of the committee to two charts, which are also included in the folder which has been presented to you, in reduced form.

The first one is an outline of the island of Oahu and shows the track or path of the two attacking units. I think you can see by the chart, without any great amount of explanation from me, the track which the Japanese pilot reported that the attacking units took. That is the first one there.

The first wave is on the left. It shows how it is split up into several parts to attack various objectives.

Then, the other arrows, on the right, show the second wave. It shows how it is split up to attack three different objectives.

Now, if we could have the other chart showing the searches.

That chart is item 19 in the folder, and the next is item 20—I beg your pardon. It is the other way around.

Mr. MURPHY. In order to keep the record straight may it be noted that the witness is now referring to item 20 in the Navy folder.

Admiral INGLIS. I have just completed referring to item 20.

[463] Item 19 is a reproduction of searches that were shown in the previous testimony but now we have added to it, superimposed on it, the track of the Japanese task force, and you will notice there is one point where the track of the Japanese force overlaps a searched sector. However, the best evidence that we have is that by the time the search planes got out to that point the Japanese task force had left the area and was on its way northwestward at high speed and no contact was made.

That concludes my statement.

Mr. GESELL. One or two questions, Admiral, on the statement.

You stated that the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed on November 5, Jap time. I gather from that you were talking, at that point, about the war plan as opposed to the operational decision to put the plan into execution; is that right.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, by the 5th of November, Jap time, the Japs had worked out how they were going to accomplish this attack, but you did not mean to indicate that by that time they had reached a decision of a final and binding nature to attack; is that correct.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct.

[464] Mr. GESELL. Coming over to the order of November 25, to which you referred I think on page 4 of your statement, where you said the commander in chief of the combined fleet issued an order to the

striking force, and directing your attention particularly to subparagraph B, which reads as follows:

Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

I want to ask you whether there is any evidence in any of this material that that order, and specifically the portion I just read, was ever revoked by any Japanese authorities prior to the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. That order was not revoked. By inference it might be perhaps assumed that the order to climb Mount Niitaka was, in effect, a final firm commitment.

Mr. GESELL. And when was that order received, did you say, by the striking force, to climb Mount Niitaka?

Admiral INGLIS. That was on the 6th of December Japanese time, or the 5th of December United States time.

Mr. GESELL. Now, what time of day; does your information disclose what time of day?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

[465] Mr. GESELL. Will you point to the chart and indicate approximately what distance from Pearl Harbor you would estimate that the Japanese Fleet was at the time that order was received?

Admiral INGLIS. That will take a minute to figure out.

Mr. GESELL. All right.

The Vice Chairman: While we are waiting, could you spell that name, the name of the mountain, for us?

Admiral INGLIS. Niitaka. That is N-i-i-t-a-k-a.

The best estimate that I can make is the point where that track intersects the 160 meridian.

Will you point to that, 160 west.

That is, necessarily, just pretty much of a guess, but I would say that it was at about this location, where the Japanese striking force is alleged to have received the message to climb Mount Niitaka.

Mr. GESELL. I didn't understand whether that message was purported to have come from Tokyo.

Admiral INGLIS. We understood that message came from Tokyo.

Mr. GESELL. At the point you estimated the message was received the striking force was about ready to start its direct run toward Oahu; is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. Almost; yes, sir.

[466] Mr. GESELL. Now, with reference to the sources of data used in planning by the Japanese. You stated that source "E," espionage network in Hawaiian Islands, using uncensored cable communications with Japan, was a source which you had added from your own knowledge of Jap sources; is that not correct?

Admiral INGLIS. Not from my own personal knowledge but from the United States records.

Mr. GESELL. You were referring, were you, to intercepted Japanese messages concerning military installations, which were classified as the "magic" material or the "ultra" material by the Navy and Army?

Admiral INGLIS. The sources that I have indicated here are the FBI and ONI. These are derived from investigation reports of our agents in the Hawaiian area, not cryptanalytical material.

Mr. GESELL. I thought I understood you to use the word "crypt-analytical" material when discussing that paragraph?

Admiral INGLIS. Not intentionally. I said using uncensored cable communications with Japan. That would be to forward the results of the Japanese espionage. They would use uncensored cable communications.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, we would like to direct the committee's attention to Exhibit 2 at this time, which is already in evidence, containing the Japanese messages concerning [467] military installations and ship movements, and particularly to the section concerned with Hawaii. The committee will there see a series of messages between Tokyo and Honolulu, some of them translated after December 7, many of them before, all of them concerned with the disposition of the fleet in the harbor, the nature of the reconnaissance, questions as to whether or not torpedo nets were down, the area in which the fleet conducted its regular maneuvers, and other information of a direct military espionage nature.

I think subsequent testimony will indicate that at least most of these messages were sent by cable facilities from Hawaii to Tokyo or vice versa.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, do you mean commercial cable facilities?

Mr. GESELL. Commercial cable facilities; yes, sir.

We would like particularly to call attention to a message which appears at page 117 under the heading of "Other Messages of Particular Interest," which indicates that on February 15, 1941, general notification was sent out concerning the nature of the espionage data that was wanted from various points by the Japanese authorities.

Now, you referred, Admiral, to "train vessels." What are "train vessels?"

Admiral INGLIS. Train vessels are what we call auxiliary [468] types, such as tankers, supply ships, repair ships.

Mr. GESELL. Now, in discussing the actual activities of the Japanese aircraft at the time of the commencement of the attack you stated that the planes rendezvoused to the south and then flew in for coordinated action. Did you mean to indicate by that that the planes came to Oahu from points in the south?

Admiral INGLIS. By no means. Of course, this is Japanese language, that I have been quoting, or translations of it, but the intent of that statement was that the Japanese planes would rendezvous south of the carriers which were north of Oahu, and then proceed from that rendezvous on farther south to Oahu itself.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, they would simply gather south of where the carriers were, but still north of Oahu, to make their formation for the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. Correct.

Mr. GESELL. As a matter of fact, your item No. 20 sketch indicates plainly, does it not, that, at least according to those records, the planes did come into Oahu from the north?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I was somewhat puzzled by the time shown on item 20 and I wanted to see if you could verify those times with the times that we have been discussing heretofore. The [469] times that appeared on the radar maps that the committee has been considering were, of course, all Hawaiian times, starting with the early pick-ups at 6 and 7 o'clock.

Now, the times that appear on this map, if I read it correctly, say 3:10, 4:10, 3:20, 4:25, and some of the notes indicate other times in about that area.

I wonder if you could reconcile that difference for us?

Admiral INGLIS. As I understand it, this sketch is a reproduction of one drawn by the Japanese officer who was interrogated and the best we can make out of that is that that time given was Tokyo time.

If you subtract $19\frac{1}{2}$ hours from 3:10, that should convert it into Hawaiian Honolulu time.

Senator FERGUSON. What would that be, will counsel inquire?

Mr. GESELL. I was going to make the computation, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. It is on the map, I understand.

Admiral INGLIS. Another way is to add $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours in 1 day. That would make it at 7:40. That would make the figure on the left-hand arrow 7:40 instead of 3:10.

Mr. GESELL. Where it appears as 3:10, that was 7:40.

Admiral INGLIS. That is the best we could make out of it; yes, sir.

[470] Mr. GESELL. Now, that somewhat closely coincides, does it not, with the information contained on the historical plot that we have been discussing?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, it does.

Mr. GESELL. That showed that the planes were in fairly close to the northern tip of the island by, I believe, 7:39?

Admiral INGLIS. Right, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, this tract does not show any Japanese air activity earlier than 3:10 or 7:40, does it?

Admiral INGLIS. That tract does not, no, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Have you given in your statement all the information which is available as to the preliminary scouting activities of Jap planes prior to this main flight that actually made the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. I think we have quoted verbatim the statements that these two pilots made.

Mr. GESELL. Now, with respect to the discussion of the submarine movements—

Admiral INGLIS. Mr. Gesell, may I interrupt a minute?

Mr. GESELL. Certainly.

Admiral INGLIS. I don't think that I gave you a final definitive answer to your question. My answer was that to the best of my knowledge and belief we have quoted precisely the translations of the statements made by the two pilots [471] and also, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that is the only evidence which we have.

Mr. GESELL. I did not mean to interrupt; I am sorry.

Now, with respect to the disposition of the submarine forces which you have considered, you reported that at least one body of the submarines went to Hawaii via Kawajalein, did you not?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. That is in the Marshall group of islands, is it not?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Have you any information as to when those submarines arrived in the areas of the Marshall Islands?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. In discussing whether or not midget submarines penetrated into the harbor you again indicated that your data pointed

to the fact that only one submarine had penetrated into the harbor but that involved, did it not, the same qualitative judgments on your part as have already been considered by the committee in connection with your previous statement concerning submarines in the harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. I have nothing to add regarding submarines than I stated in my previous statement.

[472] Mr. GESELL. This is merely a repetition of your statement on this score?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Japanese in any way report how many submarines got in the harbor?

Admiral INGLIS. We have no such report.

Mr. GESELL. It is known, is it not, that none of the submarines returned, none of the Jap submarines returned?

Admiral INGLIS. The Japanese admit that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is midgets.

Mr. GESELL. We are talking about the midget submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Admiral INGLIS. The five midgets did not return.

Mr. GESELL. Now, you say that they were these midget submarines from a mother ship. You mean that the small submarine was inside a larger submarine, or just how did it work?

Admiral INGLIS. Those midget submarines are carried as a deck load on the larger submarine.

Mr. GESELL. Under water or on the surface?

Admiral INGLIS. Under water or on the surface.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, the mother submarine can submerge taking the midget submarines with it?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. Of course, with some loss of military effectiveness because of the unusual [473] load.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, I imagine so.

Now, I wanted to ask one question of you concerning the reconnaissance map item which we had, on which the track of the Jap striking force was presented.

You stated that there was one overlap of the radius shown there. I am not clear whether the reconnaissance as shown on that chart is the actual distance flown by the reconnaissance airplanes or whether it takes into account the visual reconnaissance which would be possible from the end of the radius of a flight.

Do you understand what I mean?

Admiral INGLIS. I understand what you mean and I am not clear on that either.

Mr. GESELL. The question, of course, arises, if it is the former rather than the latter, whether from the terminal points of the actual flight it would have been possible to see the departing or incoming Jap forces. I take it the incoming clearly no; the question only relates to the departing Jap forces.

Admiral INGLIS. Of course, that is a highly speculative matter from my point of view, as to just what the visibility was, what the altitude of the planes was and how far they could see and I am afraid I cannot answer that question except [474] to say again that no sight contact was obtained.

Mr. GESELL. Could you, when you get to it, also let us know whether the chart has charted the flight of the planes or whether it has taken

into account the additional reconnaissance possible by eyesight from the extremity of the reconnaissance?

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that the chart was only intended to show the actual flight of the planes and not the extension because of any radius of visibility.

Mr. GESELL. Have you any opinion as to what the maximum area of visibility might be?

Admiral INGLIS. I am afraid I cannot answer that.

Mr. GESELL. That would depend on the height of the planes and the atmospheric condition at the time, I take it.

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. As well as the eyesight of the pilots?

Admiral INGLIS. Correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just one question, Admiral.

This reconnaissance we have just been talking about on the vertical lines was the reconnaissance made after the attack in an effort to locate the carriers?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. The horizontal lines west of Pearl Harbor represent the only reconnaissance, I understand, that was [475] made on the 7th, prior to the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that reconnaissance, whether you can see 50 miles beyond the limits of the plane's flight, was obviously nowhere near the Jap fleets or the Jap carriers or the incoming planes?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Mitchell, I wonder if you would inquire from the witness what the initials "GMT" mean in connection with time?

Mr. MITCHELL. Greenwich meridian time; over in England somewhere.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the starting point of all time.

Mr. GESELL. Congressman, you will find all times transposed from that base in one of the schedules in the Navy folder.

Mr. GEARHART. I see the exhibit here. In one of the items here they classify the time as "GMT December 8." What would that mean in United States, what would that mean in Hawaii and what would that mean in Japan?

Mr. MITCHELL. There is a table that gives all that. We can look it up for you. It is in an exhibit in evidence.

[476] Mr. GESELL. Item 4, Mr. Gearhart, of the Navy exhibit. It is transposed into our time for the fifth, sixth and seventh, so that we can tell from any time we have what time it was at the key points, any different kind or type of time we want.

Mr. GEARHART. Thank you very much.

Mr. GESELL. I think that will prove helpful as the hearing goes along.

Mr. GEARHART. Thank you.

Mr. GESELL. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have another exhibit of that Opana marked "15," in evidence. This may be clearer than the one I put in. I wonder whether we should also put this exhibit in? The other one was not so clear.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is it a photostat of that other one?

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot tell without comparing the two.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose we look at it over the week end and see what it is.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, for the record, in view of the fact that the witness was asked about the other one I would say that they both should go in.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I had in mind, that they both go in.

The CHAIRMAN. I see no objection to them both going [477] in, but counsel say they want to see over the week end what it is.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire if the witness over the week end will compare it, compare the three to show the differences? I think this is much clearer and it will be helpful and he will be able to see the differences between them.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I had in mind.

Admiral INGLIS. This is not mine.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, this is the Army's?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Senator Brewster asked about these sources of material exhibits on the last statement. Would you like to have them over the week end?

Senator BREWSTER. I would like over the week end and for the convenience of counsel to have them for 2 or 3 hours. I will send them back to counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will turn them over to you and leave them in your office and if any of the other members of the committee want to see them they can do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the English translation on the exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will give him one with the English translation on.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator from Maine wanted the English translation. I thought if the Senator from Maine [478] wanted the English translation I would take the one in Japanese home with me over the week end.

Senator BREWSTER. I might comment that I think probably the examination would be as much as the Senator has made of any of the other exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine has no information on that subject.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the Chairman had no information from me either.

The CHAIRMAN. As is the similar case on many subjects which he discusses.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire when Senator Brewster will get them, so that we may be able to see them in Senator Brewster's office?

Mr. GESELL. Why doesn't he put them under his arm and take it right now?

Senator FERGUSON. That is a good suggestion.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of the Senator from Maine?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. May I be permitted to see the Hewitt report?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. There is one question that I am not quite clear on and I would like to have the witness give the information. He may have given it but I am not quite clear on it, [479] and that is the question as to the approximate mileage distance from Pearl Harbor of this task force, the Japanese task force, at the time the message was received.

Admiral INGLIS. I gave it as closely as I could estimate it and you will remember, Congressman Keefe, that they were 800 miles north of Oahu at the time they turned due south. That was 800 miles north of Oahu.

Now, the point at which—I just guessed and I must insist that it is only a guess—at which they probably received that radio message is where that track crosses the one hundred and sixtieth meridian, and again just guessing, I would say that was 200 miles further back toward Japan or, let us say, a thousand miles roughly.

Mr. KEEFE. About a thousand miles north of Oahu when this message was received?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, a thousand miles back along their track. Of course, that was not due north because it was a zigzag course.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is there any further clarification desired by anybody of the Admiral's testimony before we recess?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have one more initial clarified. "GCT", what does that mean?

Admiral INGLIS. Greenwich civil time.

[480] Mr. GEARHART. What is the difference?

Admiral INGLIS. I am a little rusty on my navigation at the moment, but as I recall it Greenwich meridian time starts at midnight and Greenwich Civil Time starts at noon, or just the other way around.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to ask you to help me in deciding what kind of time we have got here.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't want any two-timers.

Mr. GEARHART. But the message was broadcast over the radio in Japan at 2 o'clock, I think it was GMT December 8, 1941. Do you know whether that refers to Japanese time or to time within the United States?

Admiral INGLIS. If it is expressed in that way that would be London time.

Mr. GEARHART. London time?

Admiral INGLIS. That would be London time, when it says "GMT". That is what it says, isn't it, "GMT?"

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. GMT would be that time in London with the base point noon rather than midnight.

Mr. GEARHART. Then if I should look at the chart in the Navy folder and find London time, in a moment's calculation I can take the time for London and determine what it is in the United States and what it was in Japan?

[481] Admiral INGLIS. I think you can, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., November 17, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, November 19, 1945.)

[482]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[483] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

General Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, you apparently concluded your examination of the witnesses on Saturday. Is there anything further you wish to ask them this morning before the committee examines them?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, Mr. Chairman, but the committee ought to say whether they want Colonel Thielen to take up the radar chart business that one of the Senators asked him about, or whether we should go on with the Japanese attack. Would you like to have the radar matter come up first?

Senator FERGUSON. Personally, I would like to go along with the Japanese attack, to keep the sequence.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then counsel have no further questions at this time about the Japanese attack.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I want to go into the radar matter, but I will postpone it until later.

The CHAIRMAN. We will let the radar matter slide until we get through with Admiral Inglis.

The Chair wishes to make this statement. In the committee a few days ago, when we decided the order in which the examination of witnesses would take place, the Chair, as a matter of courtesy to all the other members, suggested that he postpone any examination on his part until all the members of the [484] committee had an opportunity to examine the witnesses. The Chairman had no thought that there would be any advantage or disadvantage in whether he asked any questions at the beginning or waited until the examination was over to ask such questions as had not been covered by other members of the committee.

However, in view of the fact that that may be regarded as an effort to get the last word—which no member of this committee really has,

because even after formal examination, and after committee members have examined the witnesses, if a Senator or a Member of the House thinks he has some other question to ask, he can do it freely—but in order that there may not be any question about it, the Chair will exercise the right to proceed to examine the witnesses before he alternates among other members of the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I should like to make clear there is no objection, as far as the ranking minority member is concerned, to the Chairman making the final examination. The suggestion which I made was that I, as a member of the minority, would not like to precede you, that is all. That would be probably helpful all around, as the Chairman himself originally conceded.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say to the Senator from Maine, it is entirely immaterial to me, as a member of the committee, [485] and as Chairman, whether I examine the witness first, or wait until all other members have examined the witnesses. I personally see no advantage or disadvantage in the particular position that any member of the committee occupies in examining the witnesses. I do not know that the ranking minority member or the ranking majority member, if it is divided up into minority and majority, in the interrogation of witnesses, has any particular significance. But for the time being, in regard to this witness, the Chair will go ahead and ask only a few questions, if that is agreeable to the committee.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, the acoustics are so bad, I can hardly hear at this end of the bench what you are saying.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman thought he was talking loud enough to be heard. He will elevate his voice and move the microphone in more proximity to his mouth.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the information which you have given us in your statement of Saturday is based entirely upon the captured documents since the end of the war with Japan, the documents captured by American forces and also conversa- [486] tions had with captured Japanese?

Admiral INGLIS. Not necessarily since the end of the war, Senator Barkley. Some of those documents were captured during the progress of the war. Some of the interrogation was made of prisoners of war who were captured during the war, and who were interrogated during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your statement as outlined here is based upon captured documents before and since the surrender of Japan and conversations had with prisoners of war captured before the end of the war, but who were still in custody of the American forces?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to the end of the war?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And also statements made by Japanese officers, or men who were not prisoners of war; is that true?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir, with one exception; there is one statement in the prepared statement which was based on reports

of FBI and ONI investigators, just one sentence. Aside from that, all of this material came from Japanese sources.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, will you explain—of course the FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation— [487] what is the ONI?

Admiral INGLIS. The FBI stands for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the ONI stands for Office of Naval Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think I care to ask any further questions.

Admiral INGLIS. Mr. Chairman, may I make one correction of the testimony that I gave on the 16th of November?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. On page 293, line 23, and on page 294, line 19, I would like to correct "*Wasp*" to read "*Hornet*."¹

The CHAIRMAN. Well, both of them have quite some stingers.

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I have no questions at present, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.

Admiral, you are familiar with this document here, containing messages, reports, and information forwarded by General MacArthur?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

[488] The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I understood it, anything contained in this document was included in your statement presented here on Saturday.

Admiral INGLIS. The gist of that document, which is dated October 26, 1945, was considered in preparing the statement, and we feel that all of the pertinent and essential material contained in there was incorporated into the statement where it was appropriate, and where we felt it was properly confirmed or where it was not contradicted in some other document.

[489] The VICE CHAIRMAN. This material was handed to me and other members of the committee by counsel on Saturday and I understood that you had had the benefit of this material and that your testimony Saturday embraced the information contained in this.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One other question, if I may, please, Admiral.

In your statement presented to the committee on Saturday, I would like to invite your attention to the bottom of page 11, the last sentence, continuing to the top of page 12, in which it is stated:

In addition to the attack planes launched at this time it was reported that two type zero reconnaissance seaplanes were launched at approximately 5:00 a.m. 7 December, Hawaiian time, to execute reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina anchorage just before the attack.

Now, especially this sentence:

Available evidence indicates that these reconnaissance planes reached their destination one hour before the arrival of the attack planes.

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that was in the former draft and was not presented Saturday. That was corrected later on—or changed later on.

[490] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know you called attention to some changes in that paragraph and I didn't know whether that sentence was supposed to be changed or not.

¹ P. 123, *supra*.

Admiral INGLIS. That sentence was struck out and another one substituted for it. If the Congressman desires I will read the statement that was made Saturday morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, we have been provided with a copy this morning of your statement as you gave it with the necessary changes and corrections included.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So the correction would appear in this draft.

Admiral INGLIS. It should appear, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then that sentence to which I have invited attention, or, rather, two sentences, that did not reflect the situation then, is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. We think that the statement as made in the corrected draft which was given Saturday more truly reflects the information that we had.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then the information that the reconnaissance planes reached their destination an hour before the attack planes, is that accurate or not?

Admiral INGLIS. We have no proof of that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No proof of that?

[491] Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, just one or two questions.

The draft which was submitted by the Navy and presented to the committee on Saturday last was prepared, as I understand it, by the Navy officials?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That draft, as I understood it, was based upon, primarily upon captured documents by the United States Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. United States Navy and in some cases Army.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in the main, the investigation in the first instance was made by the officials of the United States Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. Some of the interrogations were made by Army officers, as well as Navy officers.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that. I am talking primarily about the captured documents. That was a Navy undertaking?

Admiral INGLIS. The study of those which transposed that into this prepared statement was made by Naval officers, yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Then you have prepared a draft to submit to the committee before you learned of the last information [492] which came from General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo?

Admiral INGLIS. There were several drafts prepared, Senator Lucas. The last of them, the one that was used was altered, as compared to the one just before that, by the receipt of a document forwarded through naval channels. Not from the Senior Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo.

Senator LUCAS. That was the first alteration and that was based on additional information which was received by the Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Then a third alteration was made and that was based upon information received from the Allied headquarters in Tokyo?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. Just the other way around.

Senator LUCAS. Will you just make it clear for me?

Admiral INGLIS. I will try to make it as clear as I can. The first draft was prepared without the benefit of the material which was received from the Tokyo headquarters of General MacArthur. The second draft was prepared with the benefit of that material. And the third and final draft was prepared with the benefit of a paper which was received through naval channels late Friday afternoon.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you.

Now, the Army and the Navy both have been working [493] independently upon this, have they?

Admiral INGLIS. The Army has had no direct connection with the preparation of this script.

Senator LUCAS. But insofar as the examination of witnesses and talking with prisoners, and any other thing in connection with the investigation, the Army followed the course that they thought was correct and the Navy followed the course that they thought was correct in working up this case?

Admiral INGLIS. Throughout the war the interrogation of prisoners was a joint effort of Army officers and Navy officers, and also in some cases enlisted men, working together in the interrogation of Japanese prisoners. Also there was a complete interchange generally of documentary information and intelligence as between the Army and Navy throughout the war.

Senator LUCAS. Insofar as the information which came which caused you to make some changes in the second draft, that was information which was received by the Navy from the Army operating under MacArthur in Japan?

Admiral INGLIS. That information was obtained by officers attached to General MacArthur's headquarters.

Senator LUCAS. And the Navy had nothing to do with that?

Admiral INGLIS. I would be morally certain that naval officers assisted in the interrogation but they were attached to General MacArthur's command.

[494] Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you one further question.

Is there any material difference between what the Navy originally found, upon which the draft was prepared, and what General MacArthur and his forces found and sent to the Navy, upon which this second draft was prepared? If so, please state.

Admiral INGLIS. Speaking in general terms, the material obtained from General MacArthur merely confirmed information which we had previously received from other sources. There are a very few cases where there was a conflict between the two. Wherever there was a conflict we tried to resolve, the staff tried to resolve, the conflict in favor of the most credible evidence.

However, I think, speaking in general terms, that the conflict was not particularly significant.

Senator LUCAS. Upon all major points, as I understand it, the two reports more or less agreed?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I understand, Admiral, that the translations which you presented on Saturday covered all of the Japanese documents which you turned over?

[495] Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, in what examination I was able to make over the week end there was some 300 pages of Japanese material that was not translated. Can you explain that discrepancy?

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that the translation is complete.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, have you the exhibits there?

[Pause.]

Admiral INGLIS. Senator Brewster, I am informed by the translator who is sitting at my elbow that this material was received by microfilm and that at the end of the microfilm there was some additional Japanese documents which had nothing to do with the Pear Harbor case but in the mechanical process of turning it out that is included with the material which has to do with Pear Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. That would mean there were approximately 118 pages of material bearing on this and 300 pages bearing on other matters.

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that is correct, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, that would explain the discrepancy.

That other material, what did it have to do with?

Admiral INGLIS. Those were combined fleet orders which were issued subsequent to the attacks and had nothing to do with [496] the attack itself; concerning Japanese operations after Pearl Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, you, in the summary which you gave, cited the Japanese estimate of damage as 450 planes. From what examination I was able to make there appeared to be an estimate of 250 planes that were damaged, plus 10; another estimate of 157. They apparently were different estimates. Estimates of different pilots. I didn't find the figure of 450. Was that a cumulation, or what was the basis of it?

Admiral INGLIS. The source of that figure of 450 is a combination of sources A, B, and C. There was one statement that 250 planes were known to have been destroyed plus an indeterminate number of others presumably in the hangars, and therefore not subject to photographic reconnaissance and observation.

Senator BREWSTER. Two hundred and fifty plus ten.

Admiral INGLIS. Some of the other sources increased the figure and said specifically that their estimate was 450.

Senator BREWSTER. That specific figure appeared somewhere didn't it?

Admiral INGLIS. That figure is in the diary of a Japanese ensign captured at Tarawa. The committee has that exhibit.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, I have that. What is the citation on that?

[497] Admiral INGLIS. I am sorry, that we haven't got.

Senator BREWSTER. What I have is page 15, showing this estimate of 157.

Admiral INGLIS. The only copy of any of those documents in existence are in the hands of the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, for the record may we have what the Senator is reading from, page 15 of what?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator state what that was that he was reading from?

Senator BREWSTER. It was the document the witness now has.

Admiral INGLIS. I have before me a document entitled "Translation of Captured Document, Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the Japanese Navy, Captured Tarawa, 24 November, 1943."

Senator BREWSTER. Is that the diary to which you are referring?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And that shows, on the page I pointed out, the figure of 157?

Admiral INGLIS. On page 4 of that document, at the top of the page, fifth line, is the figure "shot down, 450 planes".

Senator BREWSTER. That is right. What was the later record, how did he distinguish between these two? What is the [498] discrepancy between them?

Admiral INGLIS. The official figure which the Japanese announced shortly after the attack was 450 planes. I am informed that later on, in a more detailed analysis of the evidence which, apparently, was available to the Japanese, that they became more conservative and cut this down to 157, but that was never incorporated into a subsequent official announcement. As far as the public knew they stood by their original announcement of 450.

Senator BREWSTER. What does that purport to be, on page 115, where the figure of 157 was used?

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that this purports to be just the ensign's recollection, apparently, of an order from the Navy Ministry, but the text is so obscure that I wouldn't like to state just what the significance of that is.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, about the records of the Hawaii broadcasting stations to check up on the report as to espionage, are those station records available for that period?

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that the Army will have those, if any, and I would like to inform the Senator that I only had about 5 minutes to look at this last document which came in, and I am not too familiar with the substance contained in that document; and, of course, with respect to any intelligence or counter-intelligence material that the Senator may be interested [499] in, I would like to refer him to the then district intelligence officer out in the Fourteenth District, naval district, Admiral Mayfield, who is listed as a witness, and also Admiral Wilkinson, who was then the Director of Intelligence, and who is also listed as a witness.

I am not prepared to answer questions on that.

[500] Senator BREWSTER. Well, as I understand, this possible tip as to the broadcasting from Hawaii to inform the Japanese fleet came on October 13, that they made this extension "Tokyo" at the suggestion of the authorities here and that an immediate check was made then to find out whether transcripts of those Hawaiian broadcasts during the period just preceding Pearl Harbor, December 7, were available.

That, I assume, came under your office.

Admiral INGLIS. From a very hasty look at that document I would have that same impression.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; and that it then appeared that those records were missing. Is that also your impression?

Admiral INGLIS. That is my impression.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; so that the records for that period apparently disappeared. The suggestions were made that some of them

think that might possibly have been turned over to the Army or the FBI.

Admiral INGLIS. I believe that is what the paper says, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, can the Army find out? Colonel, have you any information about this?

Colonel THIELEN. No, sir; I have no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the matter will be followed up.

[501] Under which jurisdiction would that matter come?

Admiral INGLIS. Well, I would suggest that the Senator address a question of that nature to Admiral Mayfield and Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, no, I am speaking to the Director of Naval Intelligence now, as this is apparently a current matter. It apparently is obvious that there are no past records about this and the question is to determine what did become of those records and not under whose authority they were destroyed.

Admiral INGLIS. According to our records, those documents were turned over to a Major Putnam, an Army major, who was on duty in Hawaii at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I know you don't want to do an injustice to the Army, but I think there is great doubt on that score. I think Major Putnam expressed some doubt as to whether he got them. In any event, the station claims it did not turn over any but limited ones, which may or may not have had any relation to this particular episode, but would it come within your purview now as Director of Naval Intelligence to pursue that matter and to find out as fully as possible whether or not there may have been any relation?

Admiral INGLIS. The Office of Naval Intelligence has already inquired into that matter and the best information [502] that we have is that these documents were turned over to Major Putnam of the Army.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with the message of—or the battle orders of November 25 and December 2 as appear in your evidence on page 437 in our text, it may not be particularly material, although it has sufficient significance so that I am sure you would want the record correct.

According to the exhibits which we examined, the battle order which you cited on November 25 was actually the one of December 2. The phraseology was somewhat different in those two orders.

Have you those there? That is subhead B on page 437, at the bottom of the page. You will find that under the transcript that you presented to all the members of the committee from General MacArthur's headquarters on complying with your orders of October 26th.

Admiral INGLIS. Is the Senator referring to the quotation:

"Japan now understands her self-preservation and self-defense has reached"—
"Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America"?

Senator BREWSTER. No; have you the transcript of the evidence? Well, yes, it is after that order, but it is 4-A, [503] and in your testimony there cited as "B" at the bottom of page 437.

Admiral INGLIS. I have that, sir. Your question is, what is the source of that?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, yes.

Admiral INGLIS. The source of that is the material from headquarters in Tokyo.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, my point was that the language which you used—I think you have transposed them between the 25th of November and December 2.

Admiral INGLIS. If the Senator will refer to the so-called MacArthur paper on—

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; I have it before me.

Admiral INGLIS. Sir?

Senator BREWSTER. I have it before me.

Admiral INGLIS. On page 3, at the bottom of the page, subparagraph 4-A.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

Admiral INGLIS. Issued in December.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, is there a copy of that to be made available to all the other members of the committee?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, you have that.

Mr. MURPHY. You are reading from the copy?

[504] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Then the—

Senator BREWSTER. I have it before me.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That was issued on December 2, is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, you show that in your testimony on page 437 as issued on the 22d of November.

Admiral INGLIS. Now, if the Senator will bear with me and refer to page 8 of that same document, down near the bottom of the page, there is a shorter version of that same paragraph.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

Admiral INGLIS. Now, that version on page 8 was issued on the 22d of November.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right, and that is the one which should appear at the bottom of page 437 as the 22d of November order, is that right?

Admiral INGLIS. To be chronologically correct, I believe that is the case, yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't know that there will ever be any material distinction between them but I think it would be well if you would see that the record is corrected so that [505] whatever variation there is in language between the order of the 22d of November—on the 25th of November, that is the date, the 25th of November and the December 2 order is clarified in the record in whatever way you find most practicable.

Admiral INGLIS. May I ask the reporter now to make this correction on the record? At the bottom of page 437, lines 21 to 25, inclusive, substitute the following:

(b) Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful the task force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and reassemble.¹

Senator BREWSTER. Now, the other is on page 464, which is the order of—well, that refers again to the erroneous order. You subsequently put in the message of December 2. It seemed to me it might have some importance that on December 2 they did issue the order which you have erroneously quoted. Perhaps you can put it in at

¹ P. 180, *supra*.

that same point, at page 437, if you wish to, and substitute for that on December 2 that further language was used in the battle order.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes; will the reporter please add to that previous quotation that on the 2d of December the longer version, as shown in the original transcript, volume 3, was issued as an Imperial naval order.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't know what the significance is. [506] They call it a Naval General Staff instruction. Does that have any significance in your documents.

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that the Japanese procedure in a case of that nature is for the Imperial General Headquarters to issue instructions to the Navy section. The Navy section then converts those instructions into an order.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, will you properly complete the text as shown in the MacArthur report of that December 2 Navy General Staff instruction?

Admiral INGLIS. The version as contained in the so-called MacArthur paper is:

Naval General Staff instruction (issued 2 December) Bear in mind that should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to re-assemble and to return to their bases.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, the only other comment I have, Admiral, and I don't want to seem too meticulous, but it did seem, at least, we are dealing in connection with the question of visual hand signals.

You remember that was a matter of discussion, as to whether or not that ever occurred and you reported from the Japanese manuscripts reports that the Japanese pilots stated [507] that no visual signals were received.

I noted in the report of it that he added—it may or may not be significant—the words “to his knowledge,” and it seemed to me it might be illuminating as indicating that he did not presume to say as to whether anybody else might have received them but as far as he knew none were received. I am sure that was simply—

Admiral INGLIS. I agree with the Senator and think that the same reservation should be applied to nearly all of the verbal testimony given by these prisoners of war.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Inglis, as I understand it in the printed testimony at page 422 you outlined in the record the sources of material upon which you based the summary which you gave to the committee, is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, as I also understand it, the committee were furnished with a group of papers, the first one dated November 8, 1945, and headed “General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers”, continuing down to a paper which appears to be a questionnaire, all of these papers [508] apparently having been forwarded to us from the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Are there any of these papers that are not covered by the originals or the photostats of originals given to the gentleman from Maine? In order to make myself clear, have you seen these papers which we were handed as coming from the Allied headquarters?

Admiral INGLIS. I am quite sure that is the same document as this, although this is mimeographed and mine is not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, may I inquire of counsel of these papers are to be put into the record so that they will be available to whoever reads the record? Are they going to be offered as an exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will offer them.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, when the Navy Board sat in order to go into this question of the Jap invasion they had in that record, as I understand it, the testimony of the Japanese ensign, or the reports of the Japanese ensign's testimony, as well as the prisoner at Pearl Harbor, did they not?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And they had the major part of the material which you have supplied to the committee, with the exception of the additions which were furnished by General MacArthur during the recent several weeks since October, is that right?

[509] Admiral INGLIS. This plus the letter that was received Friday night through naval channels; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the prisoner who was captured at Pearl Harbor, is he still living and available?

Admiral INGLIS. We have been trying to find the answer to that question and so far we have been unable to.

Mr. MURPHY. But there was some testimony in the several reports, were there not, concerning his version of the map that was taken from the submarine?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And there are two maps, are there not, two submarine maps or charts?

Admiral INGLIS. There is only one, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the submarine that was beached at Pearl Harbor, was there a chart taken from that?

Admiral INGLIS. There was no chart taken from the submarine that was destroyed in Pearl Harbor. The chart was taken from the submarine which beached itself near Kaneohe.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there was one beached—I mean there was one map taken from that submarine; you got the chart out of that, didn't you?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And then there was another beached in the bay area, or did that approach Pearl Harbor?

[510] Admiral INGLIS. That submarine that was beached or destroyed inside Pearl Harbor had no—I shouldn't say it had no chart because I don't know, but they did not obtain a chart from that submarine.

Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that there was testimony concerning two different charts. Am I correct in that? You say there was only one?

Admiral INGLIS. The other one, I think that was a chart that was made by aviators.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the operational orders and the plans concerning which you testified and concerning which we have photostatic copies here, now where are the originals?

Admiral INGLIS. The best evidence that we have indicates that after that original was photostated it was purloined by a souvenir hunter.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, on page 422 you referred to a captured document. The title is, "Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Where is that document, do you know?

Admiral INGLIS. The original of that document, I understand is in the files of the Joint Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the operational order about which you [511] testified on page 422, where is that, the original?

Admiral INGLIS. The committee has the original of that document.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that one of the papers that was handed to the gentleman from Maine?

Admiral INGLIS. That was handed to counsel, I guess. It was in that sheaf of papers.

Mr. MURPHY. To the Senator from Maine?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the next document on page —

Mr. MITCHELL. Let us straighten that out.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to clear that up, as to whether or not that was a photostat or the original instrument.

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that that particular document was the original.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you identify it here?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir, if you will pass the papers to me.

I will have to correct the statement that I made. The original was not turned over to the committee. A copy of that which was turned over to the committee is photostated but the original itself is here in Washington but it is in such bad shape physically that it cannot be handled. It will [512] disintegrate if handled.

Mr. MURPHY. And was it in the same shape as it is now when the photostat was made?

Admiral INGLIS. Approximately, yes. I am informed it was under water for 4 months.

Mr. MURPHY. The next document you testified about was on page 423, "Translation of a Captured Japanese Document. The professional notebook of an ensign in the Japanese Navy." The date is February 25, 1944.

Where is that notebook?

Admiral INGLIS. The original of that document is also in the Joint Intelligence Section of the Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. For the record I want to note that the witness corrected the date of the second document and said it was January 12, 1941.

Is that the date you were correcting at that time? You said "the second document." Now, were you referring to the Japanese ensign's notebook or were you referring to some other document? I am talking about page 423.

Admiral INGLIS. The document which is referred to on page 423 carries the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area's letterhead with their date February 25, 1944. The document was captured at Tarawa on November 24, 1943. It is [513] the same document.

Mr. MURPHY. But what I am trying to clear up, that in your testimony on page 423—and do you have a copy there before you?

Admiral INGLIS. I have, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You said:

Perhaps I should go back to the second document and say that the date on that is January 12, 1941.

You were speaking about some other document, other than the notebook, were you?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir. That is a different document that I had inadvertently entered previously without giving the date.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the next document you talked about you said was dated March 2, 1943, and the subject is: "Kuboaki, Takeo," and you said, "That is obviously the name of a Japanese." "Superior Class Engine or Petty Officer, interrogation of."

Where is the original of that?

Mr. GESELL. Is this it, Admiral, here? He is handing you another one now.

Admiral INGLIS. No. That document is a photostat of a letter from the Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces. I am not sure where the original would be [514] but I presume that it is in Pearl Harbor with the files of Commander, South Pacific Area.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, when my examination is concluded, Admiral, I am going to have the Navy liaison officer that is working with the committee to see that every one of these originals and every one of these documents are made available for the inspection of the committee in Washington get in touch with you.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you say that you concluded on that, Admiral, as to where the original was?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the next document that you referred to on page 424, "Japanese Submarine Operations at Pearl Harbor." You said that was an evaluation prepared by United States intelligence officers. Where is the original of that?

Admiral INGLIS. This document is the original of an evaluation. It is undated.

Mr. MURPHY. And that is before the committee?

Admiral INGLIS. It is before the committee. It is undated and unsigned but I am informed that it was prepared by Captain Pearson.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the next one you referred to is entitled, "Intelligence Report on the Subject of Japan Navy [515] Submarines." Where is the original of that? That was a paper prepared by American intelligence, wasn't it?

Admiral INGLIS. I have the paper here; yes, sir. I am trying to examine it. The document in question was prepared, was mimeographed from a stencil and this is as close an approach to an original as we could provide. The stencil itself was destroyed.

Mr. MURPHY. I see. The next document you referred to was dated August 16, 1943, marked, "Interrogation Report No. 148 of Yokota, S."

Where is the original of that document?

Admiral INGLIS. Presumably the original of that document is in the files of Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

Mr. MURPHY. The next document you talked about was, "United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of December 8, 1944."

Do you have the original copy of that here?

Admiral INGLIS. The document which the committee has is as close to an original as could be produced, as that is a periodical.

Mr. MURPHY. The next document you spoke of was dated June 30, 1943. The subject is, "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item. No. 472, Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii."

[516] Where is the original of that document?

Admiral INGLIS. The Japanese version of that document is in the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area, Pearl Harbor. This document which the committee has, the translation is a mimeograph and, therefore, as close an approach as could be made to the original of the English translation.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you also testified about an "ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item. No. 473, Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai."

Where is the original of that?

Admiral INGLIS. 472, 473, and 474 are all included in the same document.

Mr. MURPHY. The next document you spoke of is dated July 25, 1945, translation No. 290. Subject: "The Southern Cross by Kuramoti, Iki."

Where is the original of that?

Admiral INGLIS. May I ask, Congressman Murphy, whether you want any of the Japanese version or the English translation?

Mr. MURPHY. The original source.

Admiral INGLIS. The original source is in Japanese and is here in Washington. The committee has been given a mimeographed copy of the English translation, which is as close an approach to the original as could be provided.

[517] Mr. MURPHY. Now, the next document referred to is a translation of combined fleet top secret operation, order No. 1. Where is the original of that, I mean the original Japanese version?

Admiral INGLIS. The original in Japanese of that document is here in Washington but it is in such an advanced state of deterioration that it could not be handled.

Is the photostat presented as a photostat of it in the condition in which it now is?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The next document referred to is: "Enemy Lists of Sorties by Sub-carried planes."

Where is the original of that? You stated, "Its precise source is not indicated."

Admiral INGLIS. The original is probably in the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean area at Pearl Harbor, although I am not certain of that.

Mr. MURPHY. The next document you referred to is a memorandum dated October 13, 1945, addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

of the Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps on the subject, Prewar Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands.

Is the paper you have an original copy of that?

Admiral INGLIS. The paper that has been submitted to the committee is the original copy. In fact, it is the only [518] copy in Washington.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there was some testimony concerning the paraphrase of a message dated October 6, 1945, from the Secretary of War to General MacArthur and, as I understand it, all committee members have been furnished a copy of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. They have it. It is a paraphrasing for the protection of our codes.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. The committee understands that.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

And then there was testimony on the bottom of page 426 concerning cables from General MacArthur dated the 14th of October and a further detailed report dated October 26, 1945, and then the report of the night preceding your testimony.

As I understand it, all of those are originals in here, is that right?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, those are copies furnished by the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. To the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. To us and to the committee. They were reproduced so that everybody would have copies of them.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. The original dispatch from MacArthur may be in the files of the War Department.

[519] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the committee have a copy of it.

Mr. GESELL. The originals are right here, Congressman, if there is any question as to whether they were correctly reproduced.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. And would that hold true, too, as to the message from General MacArthur dated November 8, 1945?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Congressman Murphy, I have just been handed a note here that says:

There were several charts recovered from the submarine that was beached at Bellows Field. These are now held and will be produced by Captain Layton.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand there was more than one there, that was why I asked about it.

There were certain corrections, Admiral, made in the record as a result of the testimony of the previous questioner, the Senator from Maine, and do we have in the exhibit which will be offered a copy of each of the papers from which you read, each of the orders?

Admiral INGLIS. The basis of those corrections are contained in the headquarters Tokyo report.

Mr. MURPHY. Which is part of the exhibit, as I understand it. [520]

Admiral INGLIS. Which is part of the exhibit.

Mr. MURPHY. And, counsel, it will be offered?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I have no other questions, Admiral, except to say that I expect and hope that all of the originals will, insofar

as possible, be made available for the inspection of the entire committee.

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; they will, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Inglis, when you received this present data—now, I am talking about the data prior to the MacArthur data—who evaluated it so that you might put it in your statement?

Admiral INGLIS. Commander Hindmarsh and Lieutenant Kurts, who are now sitting at my right elbow, did most of the work on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Who else worked on it?

Admiral INGLIS. A Lieutenant Ebb also worked on these and much of the source material was in the form of translations received from the Southwestern Pacific area headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it evaluated out in the field at [521] all?

Admiral INGLIS. It received an evaluation in the field and then a second evaluation here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what evaluation are we getting in your statement, the one that was made in the field or the one that was made here?

Admiral INGLIS. Fundamentally you are getting the evaluation made here. However, there is no conflict of significance between the two evaluations.

Senator FERGUSON. When was it evaluated?

Admiral INGLIS. The people who have been doing this work have been working on it since the middle of June of this year.

Senator FERGUSON. I see by the press that Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State, made a statement using some of this information. Do you know who evaluated it for Mr. Byrnes?

Let the record show Admiral Inglis is conferring with his aides.

The CHAIRMAN. He might also give the names of his aides and their qualifications, that he conferred with.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. The evaluation which has been presented to the committee, that is, the evaluation before it was affected by the last two documents, in substance was [522] presented to the Secretary of the Navy—I mean the Secretary of State, some time ago.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice also by the press that the Secretary of the Navy used a certain amount of this data. Who evaluated his information?

Admiral INGLIS. He received a copy of the same document that was presented to the Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. And when was that document presented to the Secretary of State?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got that date at hand, but we can get it, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you be able to get the document itself that was given to the Secretary of State as well as to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Counsel General Mitchell, will you get that then for the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.¹

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5352.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will ask you, Admiral, when these gentlemen, your aides here, evaluated this information did they use the diplomatic messages between Japan and America?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. I want to make that quite clear, that none of the material contained in this presenta- [523] tion was obtained from crypt analytical sources.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Did they use in order that they may evaluate the evidence that they obtained from the Japanese prisoners and evidence that they obtained from maps, and so forth, did they also check it with the diplomatic messages?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know as an intelligence officer how you could evaluate that and not check it with the diplomatic messages from Japan?

Admiral INGLIS. We evaluated it by checking with all of the source material which we had available. We did not have available to us the crypt analytic material which the Senator has just mentioned.

[524] Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you did not have in your possession, when you evaluated this for the committee, Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth, which is the instrument with the yellow cover on it?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; we did not have them.

Senator FERGUSON. It is Exhibit No. 2 in this case. Have you ever had this?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you made this evaluation of the Japanese information from prisoners when you had in your files at least, direct evidence from the Japanese officials, and did not use this official information to evaluate evidence?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call the Senator's attention to the fact that Exhibit 2 does not contain any Japanese intercepts; this Exhibit 2 contains messages passing to and from Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that, but they gave an outline of the source of their information, and they intimated that certain sources were used, and certain sources were not used.

Now, I want to refer you to this instrument which is marked "Exhibit No. 2," and call your attention to page 22. Have you got a copy of it?

[525] Admiral INGLIS. I have not got a copy of it. I have never seen a copy. Those messages were not in the files of Naval Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you refer to page 22?

Admiral INGLIS. If I may have a copy; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Here is one.

Mr. GESELL. What page is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 22.

(A document was handed to Admiral Inglis.)

Senator FERGUSON. This is from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 3, 1941.

Admiral INGLIS. I have it before me.

Senator FERGUSON. You have it?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you make inquiry to see whether or not that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the posses-

sion of the Navy by 1:30 and not [526] later than 2 o'clock on December 6, 1941? Do you know whether that is a fact?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not understand your question, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know from your aides whether or not that instrument was not translated in the rough and in the possession of the Navy at 1:30 and not later than 2 o'clock on December 6, 1941?

Admiral INGLIS. I cannot answer that question, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to ask if your aides know.

Admiral INGLIS. They cannot either. If you will let me complete my answer?

Senator FERGUSON. I will let you complete it.

Admiral INGLIS. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I will let you complete it. Go ahead.

Admiral INGLIS. I would like to say all of this crypt analytical material comes in the cognizance of Naval Communications, rather than Naval Intelligence. There are several witnesses who are listed to appear before the committee who can give first-hand knowledge or evidence along this line. I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot?

Admiral INGLIS. No.

[527] Senator FERGUSON. Look on page 23, to the KGMB want ads. Was that considered by the evaluators when you gave your statement?

Admiral INGLIS. I am informed that the material was obtained by us from another source.

Senator FERGUSON. As a matter of fact, it was obtained from the Army staff here in Virginia, was it not, at Fort Knox?

Admiral INGLIS. Our source was a man by the name of Otto Kuhn who was interrogated on this subject.

Senator FERGUSON. He was later tried, was he not, in Hawaii?

Admiral INGLIS. I understand that he was; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you say that the Navy's source of this information was Kuhn and not a translation?

Admiral INGLIS. I say that the source available to my staff was Kuhn.

Senator FERGUSON. Kuhn was not apprehended until after the 7th of December, was he?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did your staff use that instrument or that information in evaluating the Japanese information?

Admiral INGLIS. It was considered. That was considered, but it was also understood from another source that that [528] particular scheme or system was not actually used, and therefore it was not considered.

Senator FERGUSON. Give us that source.

Mr. MURPHY. While they are looking for it, will the gentleman yield for one observation?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, the exhibit says it was not translated until 12/11/41, and then in parentheses (7). I do not know what that (7) means.

Senator FERGUSON. We will develop later it was translated on the 6th at noon.

Admiral INGLIS. In reply to the Senator's question I would like to quote from a carbon copy of an enclosure to an endorsement which is contained in a letter received through naval channels originating in the Fourteenth Naval District.

On page 10, paragraph 13, of this carbon copy appears the following:

The KGMB want ads morning programs from November 24 to December 8, 1941, were checked by FBI Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded phrases regarding the Chinese rug, chicken farm, or beauty-parlor operator. It appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attaché, had they appeared on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by the agency conducting that investigation.

[529] Senator FERGUSON. Did they examine the original broadcasts or scripts?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we understand then there is quite a bit of controversy on these items you have given us? Are we to understand that you evaluated it without using any of these codes or the coded messages?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And we also understand that they did not use in any way diplomatic messages?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether more weight was given to the information obtained from the so-called prisoners of war than was given to the MacArthur information, that came directly from the Navy in Tokyo?

Admiral INGLIS. There was very little conflict between the two. Where there was conflict, all I can say is we resolved the conflict and gave the material which in our judgment most accurately presented the case.

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you look on page 452 of our transcript—I will withdraw that.

Are the ads that you cannot substantiate from the same evidence as this message "Climb Mount Niitaka"?

Admiral INGLIS. Are the ads from the same evidence, as [530] the message "Climb Mount Niitaka"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. What is the Senator's question?

Senator FERGUSON. Is it from the same source as the rug ads and the climb the mountain?

Admiral INGLIS. It is mentioned in the same document but not from the same source.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it in the same interview?

Admiral INGLIS. No, Sir. The want ad, the paragraph about the KGMB want ads is derived from the FBI investigation in Honolulu. The "Climb Mount Nittaka" material is derived from one prisoner of war and one Japanese who was interrogated after VJ-day.

[531] Senator FERGUSON. Was not the clue, though, from the same source, the information that you were investigating?

Admiral INGLIS. The pilot Shiga, who was interrogated at Sasibo, and the report of his interrogation contained in this last document which we just received Friday, did mention a want ad code.

Senator FERGUSON. He mentioned the want ad code, did he not?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why did you accept, at his suggestion, the climbing of the mountain and not the want ad proposition? Do you have any reason for that?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir. The item about climbing the mountain was also mentioned by another Japanese prisoner of war, and had some confirmation. The item about the KGMB want ads had been investigated by the FBI in Honolulu and could not be confirmed. In fact, the information seemed to be negative. Therefore, the "climb Mount Niitaka" was included and the KGMB want ads was not.

Senator Ferguson. In the United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area Weekly Intelligence, the one you gave to the committee, states the information as to climbing Mount Niitaka was in Order No. 1, combined fleet secret order No. 1, that is, that was his memory of it?

[532] Admiral INGLIS. We have no positive evidence of that, Senator. If I may give you as complete a story as possible on that, I would like to do it, at this point, sir, on this "climb Mount Niitaka."

Senator FERGUSON. Will you wait until I get through, and then give your version of it.

Admiral INGLIS. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look on page 11 of the analysis there of the lieutenant, and see what he says about this Mount Niitaka?

Admiral INGLIS. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 11.

Admiral INGLIS. Can you identify the document?

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 11 of what document, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to point it out. There [indicating].

Admiral INGLIS. Paragraph 14, about the Japanese consulate general?

Senator FERGUSON. No; paragraph 15.

Admiral INGLIS. I have that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

Admiral INGLIS (reading):

Inasmuch as Shiga's information was reportedly given to him by another officer aboard the *Akagi* following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt.

[533] Senator FERGUSON. And who says that? Is that Lieutenant Peterson of the United States Navy?

Admiral INGLIS. R. H. Peterson, lieutenant, United States Navy Reserve, signed that report; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. With that doubt in mind, then, and with MacArthur's information as to order No. 1, do you still place much credence to that information? Order No. 1, as far as the MacArthur information is concerned, does not include that at all, does it?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. We still think—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). Did you analyze it with that in mind?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, let the witness answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness complete his answer.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Admiral INGLIS. We still think that the statement made in the presentation is the best estimate that we can make, sir, because it was partially confirmed from another source.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is that source?

Admiral INGLIS. That source was a Japanese prisoner of war, who was captured at Saipan in the Marianas campaign.

In his interrogation—remember, please, this was a year [534] before VJ-day—in his interrogation, he said it had been planned to use that phrase “climb Mount Niitaka” to confirm the launching of the attack. However, he did not say, and was not able to say, that that phrase was ever actually used. He did not know whether or not it had ever been received.

So in the first draft all mention of “climb Mount Niitaka” was omitted, because it could not be confirmed. Then later on when we got this other report from Shiga which said he had been out with the Japanese striking force, and that the message had been received, we then felt there was sufficient confirmation of that to incorporate it into the presentation.

Senator FERGUSON. But operational order No. 1, that is, what purports to be operational order No. 1, does not contain it?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. There were a number of things from operation order No. 1 which had been deleted. Presumably the Japanese did not give operation order No. 1 in full to any ships except those which were in the striking force. I presume that would be for security reasons. There was no need to give it to those who did not need to know it. Therefore operation order No. 1, which we had and which was captured in the *Nachi*, which was not in the striking force, had some deletion from the operational order, and it is quite possible “climb Mount Niitaka” was one of the deletions since [535] the *Nachi* was not one of the striking force.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say it was possible? Was there anything in there about climbing the mountain?

Admiral INGLIS. There was nothing in the operation order No. 1 which we received that mentioned “climb Mount Niitaka.”

Senator FERGUSON. You received it from two sources, one from the ship and one from the MacArthur source, is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. You are referring to “climb Mount Niitaka”?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am talking about operation order No. 1.

Admiral INGLIS. Operation order No. 1 that we had was received before VJ-day. It was translated from a document captured from the Japanese cruiser *Nachi*.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you also get a copy of it, or information concerning it, from MacArthur?

Mr. MITCHELL. MacArthur's report does not contain it. His report states that the documents in Japan, in Tokyo, had been destroyed.

Admiral INGLIS. The MacArthur report contains some reference to operation order No. 1, but does not contain the operation order itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it give any information or any [536] intimation that the information given about climbing the mountain was on the same day?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account why our Navy has not the record at least of receiving the messages sent to this fleet?

Admiral INGLIS. I have no specific information on that. Again, that would come from Naval Communications rather than from me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any check to ascertain whether or not we intercepted the radio at the time it was sent, and this information is in line with that radio interception?

Admiral INGLIS. I made no such check, because the instructions were to exclude from my presentation anything from a cryptanalytical source.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state that again? Is your answer that you were supposed to exclude from your presentation any decoded messages?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir, on the understanding it would be brought before the committee by later witnesses.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

[537] The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to make the observation that Captain Layton is coming, and that he will be available on the very subject about which he is asking the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. I am concerned now with one thing, and that is about the instructions to the admiral, not to use in his information anything that was decoded.

Mr. MITCHELL. I can answer that.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would.

Mr. MITCHELL. The instructions to the admiral were to prepare a statement of the Japanese attack from Japanese sources, and confine himself to that, and that is what I think he has tried to do. These things you refer to are not Japanese sources at all. The full information about all these intercepts is going to be covered by other witnesses. The admiral was asked not to present anything except what he had obtained from the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, the decoded messages are certainly from Japanese sources.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I did not so treat them in my instructions to the admiral.

[538] The CHAIRMAN. Decoded messages would be messages decoded by the War or Navy Department. As far as the Navy Department is concerned, they would be here in the possession of the Navy and not in the possession of Japanese prisoners of war; isn't that true?

Admiral INGLIS. That is true, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now going back, Admiral, have you any reason why you did not use the source of information that came from the Japs prior to the outbreak of the war, the bombing, that we decoded and which came from the prisoners after the attack?

Admiral INGLIS. We used all the information from the prisoners. We did not use any of the information from cryptanalytical sources, because we did not have access to the latter, and it was not within the scope of the instructions which we received.

Senator FERGUSON. And was it also because of the instructions from counsel?

Admiral INGLIS. It was the instructions which my staff received. I suppose they originated with counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. And did the exclusion that you were not to use the information also exclude the so-called diplomatic intercepts?

Admiral INGLIS. It did, sir.

[539] Senator FERGUSON. And also the information in our white papers, our messages? Did it exclude that, that you were not to consider that when you were giving us an evaluation of the evidence?

Admiral INGLIS. I do not know what the Senator refers to as the "white paper."

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know what the white papers are?

Admiral INGLIS. Not by that name, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The papers that have been printed, the information by the State Department that may be known to you as peace or war.

Admiral INGLIS. I think the Senator refers to a State Department paper which did not contain any reference to deciphered or crypt-analytical material.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Admiral INGLIS. And that material was used in making up this presentation, or at least it was considered.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that from Japanese sources?

Admiral INGLIS. That was from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the original source the Japanese? Will you find out? In other words, the messages on the diplomatic relations, November 20, to our State Department, was that considered in evaluating any of this information?

[540] Admiral INGLIS. I am informed by my staff that that was considered by them as background, but no quotations were made from it.

Senator FERGUSON. I see one statement in the MacArthur information, and I want to know what credit they gave, and what value they gave this question No. 12.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman give the page number?

Senator FERGUSON. They are not paged. It is under November 1, 1945.

When was the final confirmation of this plan made?

Answer. 1 December, 1941.

Have you got it before you?

Admiral INGLIS. I have that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And now will you turn to operational order under October 26, 1945, the letter of transmittal, and then read under "(a)" the information? Will you read that? Have you got the instrument I am talking about?

Admiral INGLIS. I will read it, if I can find it, Senator Ferguson. I have the first reference which you made, December 1, 1941. You say this is the other document?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[541] Admiral INGLIS. The first reference which the Senator made—

Senator FERGUSON. Read the imperial order.

Admiral INGLIS. On page 3, paragraph 1 (a), 3 (a):

Imperial Naval Order, issued 2 December:

The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire—

Senator FERGUSON. No. Read No. 1, the imperial naval order, No. 1.

Admiral INGLIS. No. 1:

Imperial Naval Order, issued 1 December. Japan under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start action will be given later.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going over to 12, that I read into the record, when was the final confirmation of this plan made, the 1st of December 1941, is that correct?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator from Michigan yield to the Congressman from Pennsylvania?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. In the broadcast of the 5th of December, which might be what the gentleman is looking for, there was a [542] message:

In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon.

That seems to be pointing to some additional order. That is on page 234 of the examination of Captain Layton in the Hewitt report.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you, Admiral, any information as to what the Congressman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, is speaking about?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; I have not had that message available.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had the privilege of talking with Captain Layton?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't discussed this with him?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What date do you say that the fleet left the bay in Japan?

Admiral INGLIS. The actual time of departure was 9 a. m., November 26, Japan time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar in the diplomatic messages that there had been a time limit of the 25th put on the negotiations, that they had to be ended by the 25th?

[543] Admiral INGLIS. No, sir, I am not familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the fact that then it was extended to the 29th?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. I may have some vague recollection of reading something like that in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you know of anything that would make the date of leaving, which is the 26th, being the 25th here—is it not?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The same date as the order from CNO to divert all shipping south and to start convoys—is there any relation between those two?

Admiral INGLIS. There is no relationship that I know of; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you tried to analyze those dates, that they are on the same date?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; that hadn't occurred to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you ask your aides and see if they put any significance on those dates?

Admiral INGLIS. I am sorry I can't be helpful, Senator. [544]
The staff who prepared the Japanese plan are not the staff who prepared the American plan and the staff who prepared the Japanese plan felt that that was not relevant to their plan and wouldn't attempt to make any evaluation.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not—when was the time, what was the date of the order to "Climb Mount Niitaka"?

Admiral INGLIS. Climb Mount Niitaka?

Senator FERGUSON. The 3d of December?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir; that was later than that. Our information is that that message was received by the Japanese striking force on the 5th of December, Hawaiian time.

Senator FERGUSON. 5th of December, Hawaiian time?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be on the 6th, our time?

Admiral INGLIS. On the 6th, Japan time.

Senator FERGUSON. Japan time?

Admiral INGLIS. Not our time. On the 5th, Hawaiian time.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral INGLIS. Which would be the 6th, Japanese time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, have you made a search to ascertain whether or not any of our monitor systems, any of our radios picked that message up?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. That again would come under communications rather than intelligence. I think that later [545] witnesses can give a better answer than I on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. May I interrupt, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't believe we quite understand what these gentlemen have been asked do. In the outline of the case and the nature of the proof which was furnished to the committee on the 2d of November is found first an analysis of the attack from the American point of view and second the attack from the Jap point of view and it contains this statement:

The Jap plan will be reconstructed from captured plans and statements made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.

Now, these gentlemen haven't been asked to go into the other fields, crypt analytical things, and they are really not prepared to do it, because their instructions were to confine themselves to a reconstruction of the Jap plan as far as they could from captured plans and statements made by Jap prisoners obtained after the attack.

All this material, about the diplomatic intercepts and exchanges, and other crypt analytical material, was all listed on our analysis here for presentation by other witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not going to spend much time on it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think your questions are pertinent, Senator, but I think other proof will cover it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what weight we [546] should give, as a committee, to this testimony, and since we have the General MacArthur statements, I ask, Mr. Chairman, I note from what

counsel has said that they were not asked for, therefore I ask that the information from General MacArthur be made a part of the record.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That request was made 15 or 20 minutes ago by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Senator FERGUSON. Has it been made a part of the record?

Mr. MURPHY. Counsel said he would offer it and make it a part of the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. I proposed to do that several days ago.

The CHAIRMAN. I am quite certain it wasn't necessary for either of the members of the committee to ask counsel to make that a part of the record but now that it is done it will be done.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few questions.

Admiral, when I had you under examination on Friday last, I asked you to supply any evidence that might be available in reference to the condition of the ships in Pearl Harbor.

[547] Admiral INGLIS. You asked that, I believe, to be furnished through the usual Navy liaison channels, and I would like to recommend at this time to the Congressman that Captain Kniskern, of the Bureau of Ships, I believe, is best informed on that subject.

Mr. GEARHART. K-i-s-k-e-r-n?

Admiral INGLIS. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was Captain Kniskern at Pearl Harbor at the time of the catastrophe and before?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't think so, but he has made a detailed study of all the reports for the Bureau of Ships.

Mr. GEARHART. I wonder if I could have those reports upon which which he has based his conclusions; is that possible?¹

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; I presume it is, although I would hazard a guess they are very voluminous.

Mr. GEARHART. Who was commander of the Task Force No. 1 on that day?

Admiral INGLIS. Admiral Pye.

Mr. GEARHART. May I inquire of counsel if Admiral Pye will be one of the witnesses?

Mr. MITCHELL. He is on the list.

Mr. GEARHART. Who was the executive officer of Task Force No. 1?

Admiral INGLIS. We don't have an executive officer of the [548] task force commander. The chief of staff, I think, was then Captain Train, although I am not positive.

Mr. GEARHART. Is the chief of staff second in command?

Admiral INGLIS. He is the chief of staff. Very often another officer in the task force may be senior to the chief of staff and would succeed to the command in case of disability of the commander. But the chief of staff is the senior staff officer and next senior to the admiral on his own personal staff in his official family.

Mr. GEARHART. Who is the officer in such a fighting contingent who would have possession of all orders, written and unwritten, which would have to do with the management of the task force?

¹ See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2677-2678; see also Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127.

Admiral INGLIS. I would think that the flag secretary would probably come closest to that.

Mr. GEARHART. May I ask counsel if he will be a witness?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't know who he was. What task force are you referring to?

Mr. GEARHART. Task Force No. 1, under the command of Vice Admiral Pye.

Mr. MITCHELL. We haven't listed him.

Mr. GEARHART. Can you tell me the name of the officer you have just mentioned?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir. The Navy will try to find that [549] out for you.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you received any report on why the one battleship was in drydock?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't got the information as to why she was in dock; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The battleship that was in drydock on December 7, 1941, was the battleship *Pennsylvania*; is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Who issued the orders for the lining up of the battleships in Pearl Harbor opposite Ford Island in pairs?

Admiral INGLIS. That was contained in a circular letter issued by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and contained the berthing plan for the ships in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GEARHART. Has that order been supplied for the record yet?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, Your Honor.

Mr. GESELL. Talking about 2CL41, Security of Fleet at Base in Operating Areas? I think that is the one you are talking about.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is not in port, is it? That is in operating areas.

Admiral INGLIS. In order to save time, I will say this [550] in response to the Congressman's questions, that if that has not already been furnished the committee, it will be furnished.¹

Mr. GEARHART. What is the date of it?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Who issued it?

[551] Such an order would come from the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet rather than the commander in chief of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral INGLIS. You will remember that the Fourteenth Naval District at that time was under the command of the commander in chief. I think that in all probability the plan issued by Admiral Kimmel would be an outline; the details probably would be carried out by the Fourteenth Naval District. But without the document, I can't discuss that too accurately.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you recently read the order to which you have just referred?

Admiral INGLIS. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I would like to ask you professionally, not so much about what transpired there, but what could transpire there.

What is the descriptive name or term that is applied when the ships are under the highest form of inspection?

Admiral INGLIS. I am sorry, Congressman.

¹ See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5127.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you ever hear of a military inspection, that phrase being used?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes, sir; there is a military inspection and a material inspection.

Mr. GEARHART. All right, military inspection, is that the term under which you have the most complete inspection of [552] vessels?

Admiral INGLIS. They cover two different subjects. The material inspection covers a very searching inspection of the material condition of the ship. Its state of corrosion, or lack of corrosion, the structural strength of the ship and condition of machinery. Military inspection is directed more toward inspection of the efficiency or effectiveness of the ship as a fighting unit of the fleet and includes such factors as the state of discipline among the crew, and the effectiveness of the battery, matters of that kind.

Mr. GEARHART. You can have a military or a material inspection of an entire contingent, or it can be directed to special ships within the contingent; is that correct?

Admiral INGLIS. The usual practice is to have a progressive schedule of inspections. In general, the division commander would inspect the ships of his own division, and it is quite possible that inspection of two ships might coincide on the same day, but as a general rule they probably would be staggered throughout the year.

Mr. GEARHART. What are the names of the ships, the battleships, which were in Pearl Harbor on the day of the catastrophe, that did not belong to Task Force No. 1?

Admiral INGLIS. I haven't that information readily available, sir.

[553] Mr. GEARHART. You know as a matter of fact that Task Force No. 1 had six battleships, did you not?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As regular contingents?

Admiral INGLIS. I don't know; I haven't got that information.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you happen to know from other sources that there were three battleships in the harbor at the time of the attack which belonged to Task Force No. 2?

Admiral INGLIS. I am sorry; I don't know the organization of the task forces by ships.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, when Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands on his missions, or task, leaving behind three battleships in the harbor, under whose command would those three battleships be during his absence?

Admiral INGLIS. In the case which the Congressman has cited, I believe they would be under Commander of Battleships, who was Admiral Anderson.

Mr. GEARHART. Where was Admiral Anderson headquartered at that time? Where was he stationed?

Admiral INGLIS. His headquarters would be on a battleship. We haven't the information here as to which battleship it was. Probably the *West Virginia*.

Mr. GEARHART. In the harbor?

[554] Admiral INGLIS. The *West Virginia* was in the harbor, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, when Admiral Halsey left with his Task Force No. 2, leaving behind his three battleships in the harbor, where

Task Force No. 1 was anchored, would those three battleships become attached to Task Force No. 1 subject to the orders of Admiral Pye?

Admiral INGLIS. Not necessarily, sir; the organization by task forces differs from the administrative organization, and in this case that you cite, the battleships would have fallen under the commander, the administrative commander, rather than the task force commander.

Mr. GEARHART. May I inquire of distinguished counsel, whether there will be a witness here who can give testimony on that subject?

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, yes, these gentlemen have only been prepared within narrow limits to testify here. Of course they can't furnish all of the information that the committee ought to have and is anxious to have.

Mr. GESELL. And which we are anxious to present.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, and which we are anxious to present, but we can't try the whole case with one witness. We have a lot more down the line, witnesses who have personal knowledge of these things.

[555] Mr. GEARHART. I am very anxious to know the details.

Mr. MITCHELL. I appreciate that.

Mr. GEARHART. I am hoping I can get them a little in advance.

Now, referring to your statement of yesterday, to your description of Operational Order No. 1, and Operational Order No. 2—

The CHAIRMAN. If the Congressman will permit, the hour of 12 o'clock has arrived, and unless he can conclude very soon, we might recess here.

Mr. GEARHART. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Until 2 o'clock, then.

(Whereupon at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 p. m., of the same day.)

[556]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

When the committee recessed, Congressman Gearhart was examining the witness. He may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. T. B. INGLIS AND COL. BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

Mr. GEARHART. I notice, Admiral, from your report, that in your report given to this committee, I find the following words, which I will read:

Under date of 7 November, 1941, Admiral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2, saying "First Preparations for War. Y Day will be December 8." In accordance with the definition of Y Day as given in Operation Order No. 1, this establishes December 8 only as the approximate date for commencement of operations. An Imperial Naval Order issued from the Imperial General Headquarters under date of 2 December 1941 states: "The hostile actions against the United States of America shall be commenced on 8 December." This order is in effect the announcement of X Day as defined in Operation Order No. 1. Thus it becomes apparent that the tentative approximate date for the attack selected on 7 November and defined as Y Day is reaffirmed on 2 December as X Day. In other words, the original tentative date (Y Day) and the final precise date (X Day) are in fact the same date.

[557] That is the end of your statement.

In the light of that testimony, and substantiation of it, I desire to read an abstract of certain decoded or cracked Japanese messages, which are referred to in the memorandum of the Judge Advocate General for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Report.
Board Report dated 25 November, 1944.

The first one is:

5 November translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy, setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.

The next one I desire to read is the following:

16 November translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline to 25 November and to press negotiations with the United States.

The third one, 19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the United States consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off."

The next one, I call the committee's attention to is the following:

22. November translated 22 November, Tokyo to Washington. [558] Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. After that things are automatically going to happen.

The next one I desire to read from this same summary of the Judge Advocate General is the following:

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto. Kurusu stating United States will not yield, that he could make no progress.

Now, I read one more:

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. States that in spite of Ambassador's superhuman efforts the United States has "presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as a basis for negotiations." Therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days. After that negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield?

Mr. GEARHART. And finally, and in conclusion of my readings from the summary of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, I read this one:

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.

I thought it would be very interesting, because it [559] absolutely sustains the position here.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield to a question?

Mr. GEARHART. I have concluded.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that a question or a statement?

Mr. MURPHY. I am making a request, asking the gentleman from California whether he will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to inquire of the gentleman from California whether what he read was in the nature of a question or a statement on his part.

Mr. GEARHART. As I read it, it is a statement, but I can convert it very quickly into a question by asking the witness:

Are you familiar with those documents?

Admiral INGLIS. Officially, no; but they do sound strangely familiar to my ears. I may have read them in the newspapers or certain portions of them.

[560]- Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

Mr. GEARHART. I have concluded.

The CHAIRMAN. You decline to yield?

Mr. GEARHART. No, I don't; I said I have concluded. If the gentleman wants to make a statement he can be recognized in his own right.

Mr. MURPHY. This time is in the hands, as I understand it, of the gentleman from California.

What I wanted to say was that the paper to which he referred, the Army Pearl Harbor Board report from which he read, those very same messages are already in evidence in this case in Exhibit No. 2.

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit No. 1, I believe.

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit No. 1.

Mr. GEARHART. I wanted them at this point.

Mr. MURPHY. I also wanted to make this request before the gentleman concluded his questioning, if he would yield.

There has been a request made for the log and certain other papers from the *Boise*. According to the newspapers it is in connection with whether or not the *Boise* had sighted the enemy force on the way to Pearl Harbor.

In connection with that I want to make the request that the officer in charge of the *Boise* be produced at the time of [561] the logging and that the general officer of the ship who was the informant of the gentleman from California also be produced so that we might have the information first-hand.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Give the name to counsel.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know the name, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have already taken steps to get the log of the *Boise*. I don't know who her commander was, but if he is still alive he will be produced.

Mr. MURPHY. I understand the log itself will show certain notations, but since the gentleman from California has raised the issue I think we ought to have before us the informant, who was an officer of the *Boise* and the officer in command of the *Boise*, so that we might give the American people a full picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Navy furnish the committee the name of the commander of the *Boise*?

Admiral INGLIS. The committee has been furnished the names of Commander Robertson and Commander Moran. Perhaps the gentleman from California can repeat the name of his informant. I am not sure that I know that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. May I request the gentleman from California, Mr. Chairman, to state the name of the officer who was his informant about the *Boise* incident so that the committee, and the American people, might have all the facts?

[562] Mr. GEARHART. I will have to obtain the name from my files in my office.

Furthermore, I am not a witness on the stand and I am not subject to cross-examination by any member of the committee, unless called as a witness.

If you think that I am going to divulge of my informants you have seven or eight guesses coming. Anybody who gives me information can rely on the fact that their confidences will be kept.

¹ The log was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 68.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would simply observe that if members of the committee do not wish to be put in the attitude of witnesses they ought not to testify.

Mr. GEARHART. I hope the Chairman follows his own admonition.

The CHAIRMAN. I have done so up to now and will try to do so in the future, Congressman.

Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions by any member of the committee of Admiral Inglis?

Senator FERGUSON. One question. I think Admiral Inglis, when I was examining him, wanted to make a statement, and I suggested that he wait. I would like to have him make that statement now. I don't want him to feel that he was not [563] allowed to make it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I made a note at the time. The Admiral indicated that he wanted to make some further statement about the "Climb Mt. Niitaka" message.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted him to have the privilege of making any statement for the record that he desired.

Admiral INGLIS. Thank you, Senator. I have already cleared up that point to my own satisfaction.

Senator FERGUSON. By the questioning?

Admiral INGLIS. Yes; just following that question.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. I should like to make one observation in view of the colloquy between Congressman Murphy and Congressman Gearhart.

It does seem to me that if we are going to obtain all the facts, that any informant, or any individual who has any knowledge about Pearl Harbor, the full committee should know about that individual. The name of that individual should be given to counsel in order that he, that individual, may be requested to come and testify, and if he does not want to testify, and we think his evidence is pertinent and material, he should be subpoenaed. That is the only way you are going to get all of the facts which, as one member of the committee, [564] I want.

These rumors that are being spread by individuals and are occasionally used, at least as a portion of the truth, we should be able to get to the bottom of those rumors.

The Congressman from California says that anyone who wants to tell him anything will have his confidence, which means that he is not going to give to the committee the name of that individual, and yet we are asking, all of us are asking the Navy and the Army witnesses to give us the facts completely.

That is what we want and certainly if any member of the committee has the name of an important witness about Pearl Harbor, who hasn't the courage to come before the committee and tell his story, then, it seems to me, such information, or statements, should be seriously discounted.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. I want to say for the benefit of the distinguished Senator from Illinois that I intend to exercise a wise discretion in the

matter of revealing the names of those who give me information, and if any citizen of this country comes to me and gives me valuable information which will lead me to believe he is a proper witness to be placed upon the stand I will call that witness' name to the attention of the [565] committee and I will keep the confidence of the man who tells me of that witness and the testimony that he will give.

If I am to be deprived of the right, or if any member of the committee is to be denied the right of receiving information from people by reason of the necessity of revealing their name, that means that you have closed the door of investigation in our face. I can't think of any better way of discouraging people from coming forward than to announce in advance that any information they convey will result in their own subjection to publicity and perhaps to personal embarrassment. I will keep their confidence, if it should be kept.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the Congressman from California concluded?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. The Chair wishes to make this observation, that the record will show that in order to obtain the fullest information from those in the Government services, whether they are in the military services or in civilian life, the President issued an order lifting any ban against them coming forward and giving to the committee, or to its counsel, or to individual members of the committee, any information they had in their possession, or thought they had, [566] which had not otherwise been disclosed.

It has been the understanding, at least it has been my understanding, that when any such person came forward and gave to the committee or its counsel information, that that information would be divulged and the name of the informer would be brought to the attention of the committee, so that it might determine whether to call such person as a witness.

There was no need for lifting of the ban so far as persons not in the Government services are concerned. Not only are they free, but I think it is their duty to come forward and give to the committee, or any member of the committee, or committee counsel, any information that they have that will shed light upon this Pearl Harbor situation.

In view of the fact that it was understood that any person in the Government of the United States, in any capacity, who came forward with information to the members of the committee, the member receiving such information would make it known to the committee. The Chair, of course, has no desire to regulate the attitude of any member on that subject. The very object of lifting the ban, so far as Government employees was concerned, was so that the committee might have all the information.

[567] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I might say the only reason I brought up the subject is that I understand from reading the papers that the gentleman from California was informed by someone of the crew, an officer of the *Boise*, as to something relative to the Japanese force having been sighted. That is a question now that we have to decide and certainly that is pertinent evidence; it is important evidence.

If there is an eye-witness in the world, we ought to have him, and if the gentleman from California knows of that eye-witness, I think he ought to put his name on the record.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. As one member of this committee, down at the tail end, the last one, may I suggest that I am interested in getting on with this proceeding. Let's call the witnesses and get the facts. I would like to get on with this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes enthusiastically to confirm and commend the gentleman from Wisconsin in that desire.

Are there any further questions by any member of the committee of Admiral Inglis?

(No response.)

[568] The CHAIRMAN. Is there any further question any member desires to ask Colonel Thielen?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. If not, the Chair will—

Does the admiral wish to make any further statement?

Admiral INGLIS. I think I can make one statement that may be helpful to the committee. It concerns the Japanese operation order No. 1. I just want to clear up one point that might be confusing.

The copy of this order which we have does not specifically direct the striking force to attack Pearl Harbor. An examination of the document shows that an attempt was made by the Japanese to delete all reference to the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Apparently this was done before the document was forwarded by the Japanese to the heavy cruiser *Nachi*, because the *Nachi* was not allocated to the Pearl Harbor striking force.

However, apparently, due to an oversight by the Japanese official who forwarded this to the *Nachi*, several brief references to the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor were left in the document as recovered from the *Nachi*.

That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to thank Admiral Inglis [569] and Colonel Thielen on behalf of the committee for the diligence with which you have carried out the assignment given you, in undertaking to bring to the attention of the committee a vivid picture of what happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the circumstances surrounding it.

The Chair feels that you are entitled to have it said that you have both had a very distinguished career in the armed services of the United States.

I understand that you, Admiral, were appointed to Annapolis, the Naval Academy, from the State of Michigan, by Congressman Woodruff, who is still a member of the House of Representatives, and that you have had, in service in World War I, and World War II, an outstanding record, that you have been cited numerous times, decorated for that service. It is a matter about which I know you would not speak, but I want to commend your enthusiasm and your diligence and commend you for the patriotic service that you have rendered the United States in World War No. I and in World War II.

To you, Colonel Thielen, I wish to say that the committee thanks you.

You were appointed, as I understand it, to West Point by competitive examination from the Army, and that you have [570] also had a distinguished career in the Army and have rendered outstanding service in this war, have been decorated and cited a number of times for heroic service, evidence of which you bear upon your bosom, and on behalf of the committee I wish to thank you and commend you for the task which you undertook and for what seems to the Chair to be a successful accomplishment of that task.

Admiral INGLIS. Thank you very much.

Colonel THIELEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will first offer in evidence as exhibit 8, the material from the War Department, which contributed to the summary of the Japanese attack. This includes the preliminary message from General MacArthur's headquarters, dated October 14, the follow-up message of October 15, and then the other documents which he sent along by air mail, and which have been referred to by the witnesses.

Now, there are many other documents which have been used as the basis of this summary of the story of the Japanese attack, and unless some members of the committee have a different view, I would suggest that instead of being put into the record, and making a big printing job, these documents be just held for the use of the committee members here. If you want them in the record, I will offer them.

[571] The CHAIRMAN. Are they sufficiently numerous that each member may have a copy?

Mr. MITCHELL. There is only one copy here. We could have a set made of all of them, and if you want them in the record later, we can offer them.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair suggests that for the time being they not be printed as a part of the record, but if members of the committee desire them individually, they can have them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I didn't quite understand Mr. Mitchell's statement. Are these additional messages, or additional information received from General MacArthur?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 8 I offered, because one of the members of the committee requested I do so. It includes everything that came from MacArthur.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the same one that all of us were given a copy of?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything in addition to that?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I thought you were referring to these Japanese exhibits. Were those the documents you were referring to?

[572] Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 8 includes all the documents that came from the War Department through General MacArthur's headquarters on which the Japanese story of the attack is based.

I offer that separately, because some members of the committee requested me to do so.

If that request had not been made, I would have made the request as to all of this material, both Army and Navy, that we not put it in the record at present, unless somebody wants it, but have it copied and distributed among the members.

The committee already has copies of the MacArthur material.

Senator BREWSTER. I understood that the request was that the MacArthur material should be in the record. I thought you were now referring to the other exhibits which offered all of these translated Japanese documents, which I think certainly wouldn't be at all necessary to put in the record, but simply have available.

[573] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is just what I am thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. As the Chair understands it, the MacArthur information has already been made part of the record.

Senator BREWSTER. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Mr. MITCHELL. I have just offered it as Exhibit 8. That is the MacArthur material and I offer it because some members of the committee wanted it in. Now, the Navy material, I have not offered that.

Senator BREWSTER. Just a minute. I thought that was going in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is.

Senator BREWSTER. He is offering it as an exhibit and it is a part of this record and is going to be in the record, is it not?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not according to a lawyer's point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the exhibit may or may not be printed in the hearings and it is my understanding that this exhibit is to be printed in the printed record.

Mr. MITCHELL. Maybe the Senator, when he speaks of the record, is referring to documents being read in the room and transcribed by the reporter. Is that what you have in mind?

Senator BREWSTER. When I referred to the record I meant [574] to the typed record which we are receiving as opposed to any exhibits which are, of course, part of the record, but are not incorporated in the printed records.

Mr. MITCHELL. This exhibit will not be written out at large in the reporters' transcript, but when the record is made up, the whole record, the exhibit will appear as a part of the record of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking now about exhibit 8?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 8.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, the other exhibit that you referred to, which you suggested not be printed as a part of the hearing, what is that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, unless some member of the committee thinks it necessary—

The CHAIRMAN. What was that exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. This was the material, the captured documents, statements from captured Japanese war prisoners, that the Navy received.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it agreeable then that that be held for the information of the committee subject to later action if it is desired to have them made a part of the hearing?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I think they should be made part of the record for only this reason. The people of America want to know all the facts and this hearing is being held for the people of America as well as for the committee [575] and, certainly, these documents are such that in order for the ordinary citizen to judge the record they ought to be spread on the record for them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if the Congressman feels that way I would have all the material, both Army and Navy, on which the story of the Jap attack has been based, introduced in evidence and I am doing that in Exhibit 8.

Now, Senator, do you want this MacArthur material transcribed at length in the daily transcript, is that what you want?

Senator BREWSTER. That was my understanding. You say "at length." It is not, of course, at all at length compared with what we have, but this, it seems to me, to be a most excellent summary, comparable, certainly, to the summary which we received.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the wish of the committee that these exhibits referred to, the MacArthur information, and also the Japanese exhibits upon which the statement has been based, as has been already detailed by Admiral Inglis, be printed now as a part of the daily record of the hearing?

Senator BREWSTER. As far as I am concerned, I sense counsel's distinction between the MacArthur report and the captured Japanese documents. I think that Representative Murphy's suggestion is that it might be well to have those printed as exhibits as well, but I think that we may want [576] put them in the transcripts as well.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me see if I can settle it this way:

I offer in evidence as Exhibit 8 all of the material, Army and Navy, on which the story of the Jap attack has been formulated here, with the understanding that that part of Exhibit 8 which came from MacArthur's headquarters will be copied into the daily transcript by the reporter and the Navy material will not, but will be printed later on as a part of the exhibits. That is what you want, is it?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That is agreeable.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that satisfactory?

Senator BREWSTER. Now, then, that includes the captured Japanese personnel material in the later part of the record, is that correct?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Japanese captured material will not be written in the daily typewritten transcript.

Senator BREWSTER. No.

Mr. MITCHELL. But it will be attached to the record as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That is understood then.

(The documents referred to above were marked "Exhibit No. 8," and in part follow herewith.)

[577]

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE DATED 14 OCTOBER FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary information received from the Japanese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 1941, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North—170° East by afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Akagi (Akagi)), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu

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and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zulkaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.

Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships (*Oklahoma* and *West Virginia*) sunk, [578] 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.

[579]

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.
2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.

[580]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
8 November, 1945.

AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45) GB

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/S/ H. W. Allen,
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[581] Doc. No. 1668

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE

26 October 1945

The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack, are contained herein.

NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty in the Intelligence Department at that time.

14. Sources of intelligence?

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES FLEET in the HAWAII area, the condition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc.; were used as basic intelligence material. This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff [582] and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:

1. Naval attaché to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.

Incl 1

15. Characteristics of intelligence?

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in "14".

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined [583] from information provided by the previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was underway?

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?

None.

19.-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.

Applicable facts not available.

48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the attack?

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of information mentioned in "14".

[584]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (1 Nov 45) GB.

1 November 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945), GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October (referred to above) and includes

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detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text. [585]

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[586] Doc. 1032

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[587] Doc. #1032

DRM/FMO/HDP

[Pp. 1] I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraphs 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

[Pp. 2] (NOTE: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji.)

1. *Who conceived and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack?*
Adm YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.

2. *When was this done?*

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMMOTO ordered Rear Adm ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

3. *Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plans?* [588]

No.

4. *If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans.*
(No statement.)

[Pp. 3] (NOTE: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. *When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?*

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.

6. *Who made the foregoing decision?*

Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

7. *If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.*

It was not made in conference.

4. (NOTE: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Comdr MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operation Sec-

tional Naval General Staff; and Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent [589] the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan?

Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. When was the above undertaking started?

In the first part of September 1941.

11. Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

[Pp. 5] **12. When was the final confirmation of this plan made?**

1 Dec 41.

13. Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?

(NOTE: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

[590] Chief of the Naval General Staff
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff
Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff
Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff
The Commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff
Navy Minister
Navy Vice-Minister
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry
Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some of their personnel
Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government [591] had been delivered.)

(NOTE: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONULULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

[Pp. 7] (NOTE: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer of the AKAGI Air Unit, Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the [592] destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately E. Long. 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

- (a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.
- (b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.
- (c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.
- (d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

b. *Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?* There were none.

c. *How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate selected (surface forces and air forces)?*

[Pp. 9] Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car [593] Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As far as possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.

d. *What were the reasons for the actual course selected?*

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages [Pp. 10] are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON [594] Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. *What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery en route?*

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.

[Pp. 11] (3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. *In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken?*

The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 Day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an [595] attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. *What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?*

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. *If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken?*

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.

PP 16 (b) Attack Unit

UNIT		COMMANDER		TYPE OF AIRPLANE	NUMBER OF AIRPLANES	TYPE OF ATTACK	ARMAMENT (EACH AIRPLANE)	TARGET
1	1 Attack Unit	Group (SHUDAN)	Comdr. FUCHIDA		15			
	2 Attack Unit		Lt Comdr. HASEGUCHI		15	Horizontal bombing attack	One 800-kg armor piercing bomb	Battleships
	3 Attack Unit		Lt ABE	Zero 97	10			
	4 Attack Unit		Lt Comdr. KUSUMI	Carrier	10			
First Attack Unit	1 Special Attack Unit	Comdr. FU-CHIDA	Lt Comdr. MURATA	Bomber	12	Torpedo bombing attack	One 800-kg aerial torpedo	Battleships Aircraft carriers
	2 Special Attack Unit		Lt KITAJIMA		12			
	3 Special Attack Unit		Lt KAGAI		40			
	4 Special Attack Unit		Lt MATSUMURA		8			

PP 14 24. Explain in detail the organization of the Task Force (ships and air strength).

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was then commander of the AKAGI Air Unit.)

(1) Ships.

UNIT	COMMAND	STRENGTH	DUTY
Air Attack Force	Under direct commander	Six aircraft carriers AKAGI ZUIKAKU YAGA HIRYU SORYU SHOKAKU	Air attack
Screening Unit	Com Des Ron 1 Rear Adm ONORI, Sentaro	One light cruiser YAGARA Nine destroyers	Screen; cover

[Pp. 12] 22. *State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.*

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday [596] and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

[Pp. 13] 23. *How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?*

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). (Sunrise that day was at 0230 hours.)

[598] [Pp. 15] (2) Air Strength: (a) Reconnaissance Unit.

Type	Type of airplanes	Number of airplanes	Ships on which based	Duty
Airplanes for reconnaissance just before the attack.	Type Zero Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	2	{TONE (1)..... CHIKUMA (1).....}	{Reconnaissance of PEARL HARBOR and LAHAINA Anchorage just before the attack.
Search-patrol planes..	Type 95 Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	4	{HIEI (1)..... KIRISHIMA (1)..... TONE (1)..... CHIKUMA (1).....}	{Patrolling waters around OAHU.

[601] [Pp. 18] 25. *During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?*

(NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.

[Pp. 19] 26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.

(1) First Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
Target: Battleships.

[602] Reasoning:

(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.

(2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.

(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible, however, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:

(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.

(b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires special technique.

(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs [603] abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

b. Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.

Reasoning:

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)

c. Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Air bases.

15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD Island.

16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at WHEELER.

Reasoning:

(1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet [604] temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our main attack units—the horizontal bombing and torpedo bombing units.

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

d. Fighter striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.

6 Fighter Striking Unit—KANE OHE.

Reasoning:

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

[605] (2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Air bases.

6 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.

5 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANE OHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.

Reasoning:

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.

Reasoning:

[606] (1) Although the 250-kg. bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleships, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

(c) **Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).**

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and KANEOHE.

Reasoning:

Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

[607] Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers at OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

[pp 26] The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is shown in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit:

Dive Bombing Unit—WHEELER Field—0325 hours.

Torpedo Attack Unit—Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage—0327 hours.

Horizontal Bombing Unit—Same as above—0235 hours.

Fighter Striking Unit—Began ground strafing—0330 hours.

[608] **Second Attack Unit.**

All three units—Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit—attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(NOTE: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

[pp 27] d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

[pp 29] **27. How were midget submarines used?**

(NOTE: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

[609] b. How many were used?

Five.

c. Were they expected to return?

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

[pp 30] The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack [610] on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.

[pp 31] 28. *Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?*

(NOTE: This reply is based on the recollections of capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(Replies by FUCHIDA:)

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counterattacked.

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

[pp 32] (NOTE: The following replies, Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the recollections of Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, [611] Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

30. *When did the Task Force begin to form?*

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. *Where was the rendezvous?*

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. *When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?*

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.

33. *Was there any provision to receive word of a settlement while this Task Force was underway? What steps would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?*

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. *Did everything proceed according to plan?*

Yes.

[pp 33] 35. *If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?*

(No statement.)

36. *Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?*

No.

37. *Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?*

[612] None.

38. *If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?*

(No statement.)

[613] [pp. 34] 39. *Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?*

(NOTE: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

[pp 35] (NOTE: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr. FUCHIDA, [614] Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Unit at that time.)

40. What damage did the Japanese receive?

In the First Attack:

Fighter planes.....	3
Dive bombers.....	1
Torpedo bombers.....	5

Total..... 9

In the Second Attack:

Fighter planes.....	6
Dive bombers.....	14

Total..... 20

Grand total..... 29

41. What was the estimated damage to American forces?

(1) Naval vessels:

Sunk: 4 battleships

1 cruiser

2 tankers

[pp 36] Heavily damaged: 4 battleships

Lightly damaged: 1 battleship

(2) Airplanes

Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.

Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes.

Total: Approximately 260 airplanes.

[615] It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(NOTE: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

[Pp 37] 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?

(NOTE: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

Apart from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

[616] [Pp 38] (NOTE: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)

45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR:

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.

b. What were their operation orders?

The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of [pp 39] 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict [617] orders not to attack until the Task Force strike had been verified.

c. Were reports made during and after the attack?

When the Task Force and the midget submarine strikes were completed, the midget submarines reported as follows:

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the night of December 8.

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack succeeds".

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarmies and that it was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been tried.

d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?

One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the entrance [pp. 40] to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.

47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters?

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the [618] attack, until early January of the following year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

[619]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB.

26 October 1945.

Subject: Additional data with reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attn: A. C. of S., C-2)

1. Compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished the Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage possible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN.

Colonel, A. G. D.

Ass't Adjutant General.

[620] 5 Incls:

Incl 1—Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.

Incl 2—Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.

Incl 3—Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.

Incl 4—Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.

Incl 5—Map, routes of Jap Fleet.

[621] LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

8 October 1945.

N. D. No. 108

To: Colonel F. P. Munson, USA.

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

K. NAKAMURA,

Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,

Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

(Incl. #1)

[622] *General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with Oral Instructions by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy.*

I. Operation Orders

A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters

(1) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 1 December)

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later.

(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General staff under the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).

(a) (Issued 1 December)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

(3) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 2 December)

[623] The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.

(4) Naval General Staff Instruction

(a) (Issued 2 December)

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and other Headquarters.

The subject matters are being investigated through memners connected with the said forces of that period.

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources.

(1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)

(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.

(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding the outbreak of war.

[624] (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

III. Organization of Attacking Force

First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)

Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)

Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku)

Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)

Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)

First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division.)

Supply Force (8 Transports)

Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy.

Sunk—2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma), 1 Destroyer, 1 Transport.

Seriously Damaged—4 Battleships, 4 Heavy Cruisers.

Aircraft shot down or burned—over 350

VI. Losses of Japanese Navy

Failed to Return—27 aircrafts.

N. B. As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.

246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[625] LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

10 October 1945.

N. D. No. 123.

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Re: N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945.

Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

1. Additional operational orders:

(a) Units of the attacking forces assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu-jima), by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situation, as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General Headquarters.

N. B.—Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement [626] of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the Navy, the only ones who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and [627] a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

K. NAKAMURA,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

[628] LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

11 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 130.

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and [629] aircraft, shall advance into

Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan".

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".

3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete refuelling".

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.

(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the [630] United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

K. NAKAMURA

Rear Admiral, IJN,

Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

[631]

QUESTIONNAIRE

17 October 45.

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral _____, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)

2. When?

(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922—any time such a proposal *first* was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion.)

3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U. S.?

4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.

(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)

5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.

(Give dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September [632] 1941, Spring of 1941.)

6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, or some combination of persons or agencies.)

7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.


8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision?

(e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I.?: Destroy U. S. main Pacific base?: Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? or what? (Incl #4)

9. Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed?

(e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note: When I say Plan, I differentiate between *plans* or staff studies and the actual *orders* issued to put the plan in effect.

10. When did this work begin?
11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?
12. When was the plan finally approved?
13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan?
(e. g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the General Staff, [633] the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to _____ The Ambassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc.) Note: Names of individuals and agencies are both desired—for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also, state persons who had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.
14. What sources furnished information on what the plan was based? Give names, rank and positions.
(e. g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).
15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed sources?
16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps carried by your aviators obtained?
(e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).
17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?
- [634] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in the harbor?
20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).
21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed.
Discuss:
 - a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
 - b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
 - c. How were the commanders and particular units to (Both fleet units and air units) selected?
 - d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
 - e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
 - f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
 - g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were employed?
 - h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?
22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?
23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?
24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).
25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?
26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack.
Include:
 - [635] Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?
 - Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?
 - Time each group was to strike its target.
 - Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?
27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.
(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any back, any other details, conclusions as to usefulness of this weapon).
- [636] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give details: (e. g. If the U. S. had made some concessions was it to be abandoned or changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have been made?)
29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:
 - a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.
 - b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
 - c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.
 Note: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)
30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?
31. Where did it assemble?
32. When did it move out on its mission?
33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.



Scale 1 : 27,500,000
or 434 miles to the inch
at the Equator

STATUTE MILES



MERCATOR PROJECTION

34. Did everything go as planned?
35. If not, what changes or mishaps occurred and why?
36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?
- [637] 37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?
38. If so, what was done about them?
39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?
40. List your losses.
41. List estimated U. S. Losses.
42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?
43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack.
(e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)
44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case.
(e. g. "All copies of order burned on surrender", "ads. ----- who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).").
45. Did you have any submarines operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?
47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in Hawaiian area?
48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?

[639] Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Mr. Chairman, in connection with the story of the Jap attack I have been awaiting an opportunity to take a few minutes to read into the record certain of these so-called diplomatic intercepts that were picked up and decoded.

The Congressman from California has already referred to some, I think, which are pertinent but he only gave extracts from the Judge Advocate General's report.

Mr. GEARHART. It was the Judge Advocate General's summary, not mine.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. And I think there are many obscure statements in these diplomatic decoded messages which you cannot understand except by paralleling them with the movements of the Japanese attacking force, and with the permission of the committee—I have just a few pages—I would like to put into the record at this point these portions so as to connect them up with the story.

The first one is on page 96 of our exhibit 1, which contains all of these messages. It is from Tokyo to Washington. That means their ambassador at Washington. It is their number 727. It is dated November 4, 1941 [reading]:

Proposal "B":

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:

Then I will omit certain portions which are not pertinent right at this moment and it follows [reading]:

The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return—this is part of his proposal to the United States—

mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.

Turning over on page 98, if the committee wants to follow me on this, of Exhibit 1, we have another message, No. 731, Tokyo to Washington, November 4, 1941 [reading]:

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

[641] Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.

Then follows another message from Tokyo to Washington on the same page, dated November 5, 1941 [reading]:

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, we feel that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.

We have been led to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. Will you please ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point?

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the [642] message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolute essential factor.

Then on page 99, a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 5, 1941. The first two paragraphs I will not read at present. The third [reading]:

If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B. Please, therefore, ascertain the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

[643] On page 100, from Tokyo to Washington, a message of November 5, 1941. That is numbered 736. [Reading]:

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

On page 116 of Exhibit 1, Tokyo to Washington, November 11, 1941 [reading]:

Judging from the progress of the——

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "from Tokyo to Washington," do you mean from the Japanese Government to their Ambassador in Washington?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. [Reading]:

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736—that is on the 25th—

is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential [644] that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

Page 122 of Exhibit 1. I only have two or three of these. This is from Washington, from Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, under date of November 12, 1941. [Reading]:

Departmental secret.

Continuing he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force—not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that [645] the United States will have any objection to our proposal."

Page 137 of Exhibit 1. This is from Tokyo to Washington, November 16, 1941. [Reading]:

For your Honor's own information.

I have read your #1090 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to realize what that means.

That is the one fixing the 25th as the dead line.

In your opinion, we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the dead line for the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, [646] and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

Page 165 of Exhibit 1—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire? I understand counsel is now reading for the purpose of the record, certainly, these code cablegrams, these decoded cablegrams that are printed at length in an exhibit already in evidence.

Mr. MITCHELL. They are already in evidence, but my point about them was that you cannot understand the hidden suggestions in here, particularly the ones I am about to read, unless you parallel it with the story of the Japanese movements and planning for the Japanese

attack. That is the reason I am putting them in now, sir, in order to make the comparison for the committee, so they can form their own judgment about it.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 165, from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 22, 1941. [Reading]:

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out [647] for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanges; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

Now, there is just one more. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 24, for both Ambassadors.

The time limit set in my message of 812—

that is the one I have just read—

is Tokyo time 29th.

Now, Mr. Chairman, will you call Admiral Richardson?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. You have read to us decoded messages, continuously referring to Japanese No. 736. Now, I presume that that 736, of course, is in that exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. I read that. It is a message from Tokyo to Washington dated November 5, stating that because of various circumstances it is absolutely essential and necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed [648] by the 25th.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Well, now, I was going to follow that up with whether or not the agreement that they discuss in these messages is now a part of the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the terms that they proposed to our Government.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I mean.

Mr. MITCHELL. There never was any yielding to them.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, I was wrong in using the word "agreement." I meant to inquire whether or not the terms proposed by the Japanese Government, upon which they based these messages, are a part of the record and even so I think it would be apropos at this time to include them at the end of the messages that counsel read.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will say this. The terms that they transmitted to their ambassadors to be submitted to our Government, about doing away with the freezing and furnishing them oil and things of that kind are in other intercepted messages in this very same exhibit 1, but there will be evidence introduced, after Admiral Richardson, from the State Department, giving the full story of the negotiations and just what proposals they made.

Senator LUCAS. All right. My only thought was that if it would come in at this particular point it would clarify the record.

[649] The CHAIRMAN. We can hold that up until later.

Senator LUCAS. Very well, then, I withdrew the request.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was just referring to some vague happenings and things that would happen and the reason for the deadline.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General, call the next witness.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, please state your full name.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral James Otto Richardson.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson, how long did you serve in the United States Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I entered the Naval Academy in September 1898; graduated in 1902.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is your present rank?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral, United States Navy, retired.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were giving us—

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, would you like for me to give you —

Mr. MITCHELL. No. During your Navy service have you spent [650] some of your duty time in Asiatic areas and Pacific areas? Would you give us a brief review of your Asiatic experience?

Admiral RICHARDSON. If it meets the wishes of the counsel to the committee, I will give a brief summary of my service record using my own judgment to select those items which might be of interest to the matter under investigation.

In 1902, in accordance with my request, I was ordered to the Asiatic station where I remained until 1905. During that time I served 1 year in the southern Philippines. The remainder of the time I was on the China coast and in Japan.

It so happened that I arrived in Yokohama in time to see the Russian Minister depart immediately preceding the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. I was in Yokohama when that war was initiated by the surprise attack of the Japanese on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur and the Russian ship at Chemulpo.

I remained in Japan for approximately 3 months. I returned to Japan again in time to be in Tokyo when the Japanese Government received the first news on the battle of Tsushima which in effect closed the Russo-Japanese War.

I went to the China station again in 1922, where I remained until 1924. During that time I served on the China coast and the last year I was in command of the south China patrol. I was in Amoy when the first news of the earthquake [651] on the 1st of September 1923 occurred.

From 1924 until 1931 I performed various duties in Washington, at the Naval Academy, and on the Atlantic coast. In 1931 I placed the U. S. S. *Augusta* in commission and she served as flagship for the scouting force then in the Atlantic and proceeded to the Pacific when practically all of our combatant ships were concentrated in the Pacific.

I was detached in 1933 and was a student at the Naval War College for 1 year.

From 1934 to 1935 I was budget officer of the Navy Department. From 1935 to 1936 I served for a short period in command of Cruiser Division 6 and then chief of staff to the commander in chief, United States Fleet.

From 1936 to 1937 I commanded the destroyers of the scouting force. From 1937 to 1938 I was the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, during which period the China incident started and during which period the attack on the *Panay* occurred.

From 1938 to 1939 I was the Chief of what was then called the Bureau of Navigation, now known as the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

From 1939, the summer, until 1940 I was commander of the battle force. From 1940 to 1941 I was commander in chief of the United States Fleet. At that time the United States [652] Fleet comprised all combatant ships in commission that were not assigned to the Asiatic Fleet or not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

I reported for duty as commander of battle force on June 24, 1939. On January 6, 1940, I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch as commander in chief of United States Fleet. On the 5th of January 1941 I received a secret dispatch in a code held only by the Chief of Naval Operations and myself informing me that I would be detached on the 1st of February.

On February 1, 1941, I was relieved by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. At that time the fleet was reorganized, and Admiral Kimmel became commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and another officer became commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

I departed from Honolulu on February 14, 1941, and on March 25, 1941, I reported for duty as a member of the General Board.

Mr. MITCHELL. At that time when you were commander of the United States Fleet was there a separate command known as the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. There was not.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who was Chief of Naval Operations while you were chief in command of the United States Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Harold R. Stark, who was my [653] immediate superior.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you were at that time commander of the United States Fleet at what Pacific city or was it on the Pacific side or the Atlantic side that you went to?

Admiral RICHARDSON. When I assumed command of the United States Fleet there was a portion of the fleet serving in the Atlantic. There was a detachment of the United States Fleet serving in the Hawaiian area, known as the Hawaiian detachment, which was composed of heavy cruisers and destroyers, and, if my memory serves me correctly, one aircraft carrier. The Hawaiian detachment was under the command of Vice Adm. Adolphus Andrews, who was also commander of the scouting force.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, were you located on the Pacific coast?

Admiral RICHARDSON. All the fleet in the Pacific assigned to the United States Fleet, that did not form a part of the Hawaiian detachment, was based at San Diego and San Pedro, Long Beach.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is where you made your headquarters then?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I actually assumed command of the fleet in the harbor of San Pedro, Long Beach, and I remained there until approximately the 1st of April, when the fleet departed for their annual fleet exercises.

[654] Mr. MITCHELL. What was your flagship at that time?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*.

Mr. MITCHELL. You say the Pacific Fleet that you were in command of out there that was not included in these other detachments, that was based on the Pacific coast, was ordered out to maneuvers in the spring of 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It had been the custom for many years to have annual fleet exercises, including fleet problems and other exercises under simulated war conditions, where all available ships and aircraft were employed in training.

Mr. MITCHELL. What were the base ports of the Pacific Fleet at that time other than the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic vessels you spoke of?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, each ship had a home port.

Mr. MITCHELL. Generally speaking, I mean what were the principal points?

Admiral RICHARDSON. They were based practically all the time at San Pedro and Long Beach but the ships periodically proceeded to Bremerton and to San Francisco for overhaul, and normal operations in training and gunnery exercises were off the coast of southern California.

Mr. MITCHELL. When the fleet vessels under your command made that movement in the spring of 1940, to what area did they proceed?

[655] Admiral RICHARDSON. They proceeded to sea divided into two task forces representing opposing fleets and conducted a war game and various exercises and then united with the Hawaiian detachment and proceeded to the Hawaiian area, arriving there on the—I actually arrived at Lahaina Roads at 1500 on April 10.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you had been ordered to move out into Hawaiian waters after these exercises, or had you—

Admiral RICHARDSON. Each year the fleet exercises were held in a different part of the world, a different part of the ocean, to familiarize the officers with the weather conditions and the terrain and everything else that it was necessary to know and before I became commander in chief the plans for this exercise had already been drawn up and approved and I carried out exercises which were planned by my predecessor.

When I arrived in Pearl Harbor according to the published plan the fleet, with the exception of the Hawaiian detachment, was to depart from the Hawaiian area on the 9th of May—no, the 9th of April. Wait a minute, let me see. No, the 9th of May.

Mr. MITCHELL. This is 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940.

Mr. GEARHART. What was the date?

[656] Admiral RICHARDSON. The 9th of May 1940.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you say, do you—

Admiral RICHARDSON. From the Hawaiian area the return would normally have been to the Pacific coast.

Mr. MITCHELL. The point is that when you went to Hawaiian waters at that time you expected that that would be a temporary arrangement and that you would shortly return to the Pacific coast?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That was an arrangement the schedule for which had been prepared and approved and was known to all the officers and men in the fleet.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you understood it was temporary?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Now, we have a file of correspondence that includes some letters between you and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, running from January 1940 to January 1941. You have examined that file and have a copy of it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. You have supplied me with a copy of that file.

Mr. MITCHELL. At this point I would like to offer in evidence as Exhibit 9 the file of correspondence that I have just referred to, of which each member of the committee has a copy.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 9.")

[657] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, just so that I will be able to follow the questioner, is there any way of telling how many parts there are in particular in Exhibit 9? I have seen several groups of papers.

Mr. GESELL. I think, Congressman, that there are really basically two parts; the letters called Stark to Admiral Richardson are mimeographed and the letters of Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark are the ones you have there in your hand; they are photostatic copies.

Senator BREWSTER. Does this purport to be a complete record of their correspondence in that period?

Mr. GESELL. No, it does not.

Senator BREWSTER. How were the eliminations made?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there are a great many personal letters. I think these letters were chosen because they relate to the reasons for the fleet going out there and the objections that Admiral Richardson later developed as to their staying there. That was, really, what I think they are mostly pertinent to.

Senator BREWSTER. Has your staff been over the complete file to select those which they consider pertinent?

Mr. MITCHELL. These letters were furnished us both by Admiral Stark and his counsel and by Admiral Richardson. I won't say that I have seen every letter that passed between them [658] during that period.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, has counsel or have any of the counsel staff seen all of the letters?

Mr. GESELL. We have seen all the letters that we have been able to read.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean that you have been able to read?

Mr. GESELL. Just exactly that, Senator, the ones we have been able to find. This correspondence is personal correspondence and we asked counsel for Admiral Stark to submit to us all of the letters that he had exchanged with Admiral Richardson and counsel submitted us a file which they stated was the complete file of correspondence which they had.

We have also had searches made in the Navy Department for any correspondence between these two officers.

Admiral Stark and his counsel have reviewed the selection of the letters made here and we have also shown the file to Admiral Richardson and he has double checked the selections, so that we have taken such precautions as we can to assure that the correspondence is representative of the topics that the documents were selected for and have done everything we can to make sure that we have obtained any letters that we can find.

[659] Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, on page 14-c there seems to be no beginning to that letter. Can that be explained?

Mr. GESELL. That is a last sheet which came in there by error and connects to another letter which is not offered in evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. You have the other letter?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have, for submission to the committee, the other letters?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How many letters will that be?

Mr. GESELL. A small number. I have not counted them. You are welcome to see them. Many of them are personal letters that do not seem to us to be germane.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I make one suggestion?

As these exhibits go into this record it seems to me, in order for anyone to clearly understand the letters and the answers thereto, the letters should go in, and then they should be followed by the answers.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have mine arranged that way.

Senator LUCAS. The exhibits that were given to us were not arranged that way.

[660] Mr. MITCHELL. I know it, so I tore mine down and put them in chronological order.

The letters I have here are letters that seem to me to be pertinent to the inquiry that I was going to make of Admiral Richardson here. If there are any more of those letters that you want to see I will get them for you.

Admiral RICHARDSON. May I make a statement, Mr. Chairman, in regard to this correspondence?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral RICHARDSON. When I relieved Admiral Bloch as commander in chief of the United States Fleet I found that quite a little official business had been conducted in personal correspondence, so that when I relieved Admiral Bloch it was necessary for me to write to Admiral Stark for information which I needed. I did not want that to occur when I was relieved, so before I was relieved I gave my file of personal letters to my relief.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom?

Admiral RICHARDSON. To the officer who relieved me.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. GESELL. Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Kimmel, with the request that he and his prospective chief of staff look over the file of letters and indicate those that they felt would be useful [661] in the conduct of the

affairs of the fleet, and I would retain them and deliver them to Admiral Kimmel. The majority of the other letters were destroyed by me because I was unwilling to take away and have in my custody letters that referred to fleet business, so that I could not supply counsel with my file of letters. I have been able to secure some copies from the Department and from various sources, so that my supply of letters, which will be essential to refresh my memory on many of these points, would not have been made available to me except through the counsel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman.

I understood you to say, Admiral, those letters that were not being desirable by your relief you destroyed.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. A few found their way into my papers when my effects were packed up, so I did have a few, but by no means a complete file.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, Admiral, I have here a letter dated March 15, 1940.

Admiral RICHARDSON. March what?

Mr. MITCHELL. March 15, 1940, addressed to "Dear J. O." and signed "Betty". Who is "J. O."?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am J. O.

Mr. MITCHELL. Who is "Betty"?

[662] Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral H. R. Stark.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the way you usually addressed each other in this personal correspondence?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice in the letter of March 15, 1940 on page 2 there is a paragraph that reads as follows:

I still think that the decision to send the detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy.

What did the word "orange" stand for in naval parlance? Was it Japan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Japan.

Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

The State Department is strong for the present set-up and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

That is a letter from Admiral Stark to you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, and that was in reply to my letter to him asking about why the Hawaiian detachment was there, and I would like to invite your attention to the second paragraph in that letter of March 15, 1940.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you went there you expected to come back soon and then you found you were not ordered back; that is right, isn't it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then you wanted to know why you were kept out there?

[663] Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

Mr. MITCHELL. And this correspondence started, and you asked Admiral Stark why you were there, and this reference I just made is to that discussion, is it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; I think not. It is March 15, is it not?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I was not out there. This 15th of March letter relates to the presence in the Hawaiian area of the Hawaiian detachment—

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Which had proceeded to the Hawaiian area in the fall preceding.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right. Then we pass on to the letter of May 7, 1940, by Admiral Stark to you, and I find that contains this statement:

When the fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaiian waters. This will present somewhat of a [664] problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board, because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement, and unless you hear to the contrary, you may assume it is O. K.

That is on May 7, 1940, and up to that time you expected to come back in the course of 2 weeks?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No—oh, yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I thought it was possible.

[665] Mr. MITCHELL. We have here a letter of May 22 that is written by you to Admiral Stark, May 22, 1940, in which you write him:

As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule, and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know now about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on.

For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

(a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, airfields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered.

(b) Are we here as a stepping-off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our [666] time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking, and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion.

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, airfields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a fleet. If only peacetime training is involved, should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?

Now, with that statement before you, will you state to the committee just what your situation had been up to that time, and how you happened to write that letter?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, a fleet composed of a large number of ships and men and planes must secure careful planning, in order that time not be wasted and that something be accomplished. When the fleet went to the Hawaiian area as a part of the fleet exercises, we had

a definite schedule of gunnery exercises, steaming competitions, full power [667] drives, inspections, and everything else that is required to keep a fleet busy, and keep them under training.

When the fleet went to the Hawaiian area we did not take with us tugs, targets, target rafts, target planes, towing planes, repair ships; so that if the fleet was to remain in the Hawaiian area, in order that it could be usefully employed, it was essential that I know that we remain there long enough to bring out all of the gear that was necessary for training the ship, for fear that I would start all this material to Hawaii and then, after it once started and got halfway there I would return, and then have to wait for several weeks for it to get back to the normal bases on the west coast, so I could continue training.

So that, from my point of view, my effectiveness in the fleet and continued training in the fleet demanded an early decision, so that plans could be made.

Mr. MITCHELL. When did you first learn, and how, that the decision had been made here in Washington to base your fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of on the Pacific coast?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The first notice that I received was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, United States Fleet, May 4, which reads—

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the date of it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. May 4.

[668] Mr. GEARHART. 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. May 4, 1940.

It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain Hawaiian waters for short time after May 9. Will expect to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday next.

The 4th of May was Saturday. On the 7th of May I received from the Chief of Naval Operations, addressed to CINCUS—CINCUS was the abbreviation for commander in chief United States Fleet—

CINCUS make immediate press release instructions as follows:

"I request permission to remain in Hawaiian waters to accomplish some things I wanted to do while here. The Department has approved this request."

Delay Fleet departure Hawaiian area is for about two weeks prior to the end of which time you will be further advised regarding future movements. Carry out regular scheduled overhauls of individual units, movements of base force units at your discretion.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you issue the press release?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had not requested or asked to be left out there, had you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I had not.

Mr. KEEFE. I am having difficulty, Mr. Mitchell. I have [669] the answer but I did not get your full question.

Mr. MITCHELL. I probably did not have my nose in the microphone again. My question was whether he had given the press release, and he said he did, and I asked him if he had asked to be kept out there at Hawaii, and he said "No."

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you.

Mr. MITCHELL. I refer now to a letter of May 27, 1940, which was written by Admiral Stark to you in response to the letter of May 22 that I just read from, and in which you wanted to know about what you were supposed to do, and he said, among other things:

Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph.

First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action.

[670] We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned, she, Japan has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Then later in the letter:

Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know, and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thought contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing, and that is even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do, and so long as they don't know, they may hesitate or be deterred. These facts I have kept very secret here.

The above, I think will answer the question "why you are there." It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get [671] this information I will rush it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned, you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important, and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically, if you want to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices, or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status—go ahead. Just keep us informed.

Later on, he says:

You ask whether you are there as a stepping-off place for belligerent activity?

Answer: Obviously it might become so under certain conditions, but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return, it might nullify [672] the reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

He says later:

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base, but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, airfields, service, recreation conditions, for so large a fleet:

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies.

Now, that brings to our minds the question of your attitude about the basing of the fleet, and I call your attention to a letter you wrote to Admiral Stark—before we get to that, I have a letter here of June 22, Stark to Richardson.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that contained in this file?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am not so sure. It is a loose sheet.

Mr. GESELL. It was sent to you subsequently, Congressman Keefe. There were additional letters discovered after the [673] first mimeographing, and they were sent to the members of the committee, and they did not come in the same attachment as the others.

The CHAIRMAN. They were put in a folder marked "Additional Letters Between Stark and Richardson."

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am sorry we did not have them all together at the start.

This letter is from Stark to Richardson, June 22:

Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to the movement of the Fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively, decision has been made for the Fleet to remain for the present where it is.

Is that about the first—

Admiral RICHARDSON. What letter is that?

Mr. MITCHELL. June 22, 1940. Maybe the Admiral hasn't got a copy of it.

Mr. GESELL. I will get him one.

[674] Admiral RICHARDSON. I have my letter.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir. There is one from you dated June 22, but this is one from Admiral Stark to you dated June 22, which was supplied to us later from the original file.

I am sorry, I thought you had seen it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. All right; I have that letter.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you received any information more definite than that as to the permanency of your station at Pearl Harbor prior to that letter? It says:

Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time.

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, I had received no prior information.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you had developed by that time very definite ideas in your own mind in opposition to the advisability of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, had you not? Will you please state in your own way just what the situation was and what your objections were grounded upon?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation, inadequate airfields.

[675] A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields.

There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time.

Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when

there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is essential to successful training.

For those reasons, and because I believe that the fleet could be better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to return to the west coast.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is also a letter from you—or rather a memorandum from the Secretary, it is called, dated September 12, 1940, Will you please turn to that?

[676] Admiral RICHARDSON. I have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. September 12, 1940.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Was that prepared while you were out in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was. At that time I had shifted my flag and was then flying it from the U. S. S. *Enterprise*, an aircraft carrier.

The Secretary of the Navy visited the Hawaiian area from September 6 until September 15. During that time I had him off Lahaina for dinner aboard the *Enterprise* with all the flag officers present. He was aboard the *Enterprise* for awhile. Then he was shifted to other types of ships, battleships, destroyers, cruisers.

I did that in order that he might see the operations conducted by various types of ships and in order that he might meet other flag officers in the fleet. I was particularly careful to see that he had an opportunity to talk with Admiral Kimmel, Vice Admiral Andrews, Admiral Snyder, and a destroyer captain named Binford.

I knew that he would hear the news of many officers and I was anxious that he remember the things that I had said to him; and in order that he might not confuse what I had said to him with the things that had been said to him by others, I [667] prepared a memorandum setting forth a brief outline of the points that I had covered in very extensive conversations and I filed a copy of that memorandum with the Chief of Naval Operations, because I endeavored at all times to let the Chief of Naval Operations know what I was doing, or what it was my intention to do.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you please turn to that memorandum of the 12th of September 1940. At the bottom of page 2, under "4 (A)" is the title "Retention of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area."

Was that statement intended to sum up your views about the retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you mind reading that, Admiral?

Admiral RICHARDSON (reading).

Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

(a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:

- (1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
- (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
- (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due [678] to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.

- (4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.
- (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing.
- (6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.
- (7) In case of war, necessary for fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

Shall I continue?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, I think those are pertinent.

Admiral RICHARDSON (reading):

If the disposition of the fleet were determined solely by naval considerations the major portion of the fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.

If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the fleet. In other words, is it more important [679] to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the fleet in the Hawaiian area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?

In case our relations with another Pacific nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 2,000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases?

Mr. MITCHELL. Shortly after that you made a visit to Washington, did you not, Admiral?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember when you reached here and when you left, approximately? You were here on October 8, were you not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. At 07:07, on October 7. I talked with Stark, Nimitz, Knox. That was my second visit to Washington. I came at that time because the Secretary said he wanted to talk to me. I arrived. I found that they were considering increasing the strength of the Asiatic Fleet, which was under the command of Admiral Hart. And while here I lunched with the President. Had a long talk with him. I saw Dr. Stanley [680] Hornbeck of the Department of State, who was at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, the advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs.

Mr. MITCHELL. In your interviews with the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Stark, did you take up this question with them of your objections, the objections that you just stated, as to the basing of the fleet in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think not, because I had given a memorandum to the Secretary and fully stated my views to him. I had sent a copy of it to Admiral Stark, who was thoroughly familiar with my views. And I had sent a copy of part of it to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck of the State Department who knew what I thought. So, if I remember correctly, I did not talk about that with Admiral Stark. I talked primarily about detaching ships from the main fleet to strengthen the Asiatic Fleet.

And the first day I arrived I was suddenly confronted with the fact that 5,000 sailors had landed on the west coast to be turned over to me and I had to find some means of getting them out to Hawaii. So I had to take a carrier—I think it was the *Saratoga*—and use her to

transport the men that I was unable to accommodate in ships that had come to the coast with me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the White House records show that on October 8, 1940, you had lunch with the President and with Governor Leahy at 1 p. m. Do you remember that?

[681] Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Governor Leahy or Admiral Leahy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral William E. Leahy.

Mr. MITCHELL. He was then Governor of Puerto Rico.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. We did not go to the White House office in company. I was invited by the President through the Chief of Naval Operations to lunch at 1 o'clock. When I arrived there I found Admiral Leahy there.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state in your own way, Admiral, just what occurred at that meeting and what was said about any of these matters we have been referring to?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The President talked to Admiral Leahy about Puerto Rican affairs, and as I was not interested, I remember little of what was said; but I have a vague recollection that one subject under discussion was the question of housing.

The President asked Admiral Leahy his opinion about strengthening the Asiatic Fleet and my recollection is that Admiral Leahy said that whatever you sent out will be lost, therefore I would send the least valuable combatant ships we have, the 7,500 ton cruisers, but I recommended, I personally recommended that none be sent. A decision to send none was reached.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Leahy had been Chief of Naval Operations previously?

[682] Admiral RICHARDSON. He had been Chief of Naval Operations. He was Chief of Naval Operations when I was the assistant.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then proceed, Admiral, with your statement of what occurred there.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The following statement, because of its importance, I have written out. I wrote it out several weeks ago when it appeared certain, in my mind, that I would, unfortunately, be called before this committee. And with the permission of the Chairman I would like to read this statement—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Which I prepared in the quiet of my home, where I could think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral, to do that.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I took up the question of returning to the Pacific coast all of the fleet except the Hawaiian detachment.

The President stated that the fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.

I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no train of [683] auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action.

I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations.

The President said in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan."

I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it, and I know that our fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for or initiating war operations."

The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast we are not stepping backward."

This is embarrassing.

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not [684] enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that complete your statement of the conversation?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is about all of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want to adjourn?

The CHAIRMAN. Four o'clock having arrived, the Chair thinks we might recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, November 20, 1945.)

[685]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[686] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Mitchell, you were examining the witness when we adjourned. You may proceed.

Before you proceed, Mr. Mitchell—this is not necessarily on the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson, in the correspondence which you have there appears to be a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations dated October 9, 1940, made by you. That was the day following this visit with the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if counsel will permit me to interpose.

Last week I requested from Admiral Inglis a chart which he said he would have ready for me yesterday showing the disposition of the ships in the Pacific from May 1941 to December 7, 1941. I would like to have that at this moment, if I could.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am informed that they have been working on it; they ought to have it any time; they haven't sent it yet.

Mr. GEARHART. I am most anxious to have it before I am permitted to examine the witness now on the stand. I want to ask him questions concerning those figures. So if a chart can be supplied me, I will appreciate it very, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I am satisfied that Admiral Inglis and the Navy Department will make the chart available as soon as possible, and as soon as it is available it will be presented here.¹

¹ Exhibit No. 86.

Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. You made that memorandum of October 9, 1940, following your visit the day before with the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. In order that the Chief of Naval Operations might be informed as to the decisions of the President and as to his views as expressed to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. The first item on that memorandum is: "Go ahead with assembly of train."

What does that mean?

Admiral RICHARDSON. There had been some discussion as to assembling auxiliary vessels, transports, repair ships, supply ships. I had urged that it be done as one evidence of our intention to be prepared. The President stated that [688] we would go ahead with the assembly of a train.

Mr. MITCHELL. Item 2 is: "Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four old light cruisers?"

Is that a question the President asked, or one you wanted to know about?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The President asked me. I knew we did not have it. So I wanted the Chief of Naval Operations informed that he might find it necessary or advisable to have a supply of fuel oil in Samoa.

Mr. MITCHELL. Item 3:

Give me a chart showing British and French bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines, or airplanes in islands in the Pacific east of the international date line.

Was that another request from the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. That was a request by me, as I remember it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then, in paragraph 4, you stated:

The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley—

That is Admiral Ghormley, is it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It is Admiral R. L. Ghormley.

Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

—was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the [698] British Admiralty felt that they should have offices prepared for staff conferences.

Were you reporting a thing that the President had said to you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I was.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. 5:

The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain overland through Africa.

Under that, in brackets, "F. D. R."

What does that mean?

Admiral RICHARDSON. "F. D. R." belongs to the next paragraph. The first is a bit of information. The next, the sixth paragraph is intended to read:

I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, can be convinced of the desirability because that is what the President stated to me.

[670] Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

I can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American peo-

ple, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.

That was informing the Chief of Naval Operations what the President had said?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true. I was at that time, just before going to Washington, on board a flagship on the west coast with approximately one-third of the battleships. We had returned to the west coast for replenishment and for recreation and for overhaul and, if my memory serves me correctly, I was at that time flying my flag on the *New Mexico*.

Mr. MITCHELL. Item 7, the last on the memo, is this [reading]:

The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.

That was just passing on to the Chief of Naval Operations an item of information?

[691] Admiral RICHARDSON. It was.

Mr. MITCHELL. Going back now, Admiral, to July 1940, prior to this visit in October 1940, you made a visit to Washington in July 1940, did you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. At my suggestion, before I left the west coast for the Hawaiian area, I was ordered to proceed by air to Washington for a conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President.

I actually started and France capitulated and my trip was delayed. I later came by air, arriving in Washington on July 8 and departing from Washington for Honolulu on July 11.

Mr. MITCHELL. The appointment book at the White House states that on July 8 you had a luncheon engagement with the President at 1 p. m.; on July 11 another appointment with the President at 12 noon. What is your memory about that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. As to the appointment on July 8, I had lunch with the President and talked with him for 2 or 3 hours and my mission at that time was primarily to find the thought back of our retention in Hawaii, to explore and endeavor to ascertain, if possible, the duration of our stay and, from my point of view, stress the necessity of increasing the number of men in the Navy because we were at that time building a very large Navy; we had on board ship [692] approximately 85 percent of the number of men required to man the ships.

In normal times, in normal peacetimes, you can build a destroyer quicker than you can train the men to man them. Therefore, I was very strongly of the opinion that all the ships in active commission in the fleet should have on board them all the men that they could carry in order that the ships themselves might be prepared and that nucleus crews should be trained for the new ships, because they would be required whether we had peace or had war. I was also desirous of securing the retention of officers in the fleet without the normal change of duty.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were those the subjects that you discussed with the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. They were.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want to state in your own way, as near as you can recollect, what the general tenor of the conversation was?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the President was rather loath to increase the number of men because he felt, as expressed to me, that men of mechanical trades in civil life could be quickly inducted and made adequate sailormen if their services were suddenly required.

Mr. MITCHELL. What about the second appointment at [693] 12 noon on July 11 with the President? Do you remember about that and what was said?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I believe that that—well, I know that that meeting lasted only a few minutes and I went by to tell the President good-bye and no subjects of any moment were discussed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have any appointment with Mr. Hull or Mr. Welles, or both of them, during July 1940? Their record shows an appointment on July 9.

Admiral RICHARDSON. During that visit I saw Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles and talked to both of them at the same time, or, rather, I talked to Secretary Hull in the presence of Under Secretary Welles for an hour or so.

I saw Senator Byrnes on the 10th of July. I had lunch with General Marshall on the 10th of July. I saw Dr. Stanley Hornbeck on the 11th of July and outside of naval personnel I think those were the only officials that I saw. I wanted to see the then Congressman Scrugham, who was chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House that handled naval appropriations, but he was not in town.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember the subject of your discussion with Mr. Hull on that meeting of the 9th of July, what the general tenor of it was?

[694] **Admiral RICHARDSON.** I saw Mr. Hull to fully explore and learn all that I could as to why the fleet was retained in Hawaii, how long they would probably stay there and what the future intentions were, because I had been directed to retain the fleet in Hawaii and announced that it was retained there at my request and naturally, since I had made no such request, I wanted to know what was back of the whole thing.

I also felt so strongly the need for men that I wanted to impress on both the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State that I felt that they should assist insofar as possibly they could in seeing that the fleet was fully manned.

Mr. MITCHELL. In this correspondence file is a letter from you to Admiral Stark dated June 22, 1940, dated at Lahaina Roads, is it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Lahaina Roads.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you please look at that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I cannot find that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will hand it to you, my copy.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have it. My letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. Your letter.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes; I have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your letter refers to the fact that General Herron, then commanding the Hawaiian department, had [695] received an alert from the War Department. Do you remember that incident?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Vividly.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was any alert ordered from Washington for the Navy at the same time? Just go on in your own way and tell us about it, Admiral.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Lieutenant General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian department, received from the War Department a dispatch on July 17, 1940, which read:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific trade to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

At that time I was at sea. Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron visited Admiral Claude C. Bloch on June 17, informed him of the receipt of these orders and requested the Navy establish a distance reconnaissance. This is hearsay and gained from official correspondence.

Admiral Bloch, in company with General Herron, either had Vice Admiral Andrews come in or visited him and requested him to establish the long range reconnaissance be- [696] cause the patrol planes were under Vice Admiral Andrews. Vice Admiral Andrews was the senior officer afloat in Pearl Harbor.

I was informed of what had been done by both Admiral Andrews and I believe Admiral Bloch, so I sent to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, the following message:

Would like to know whether request of Commanding General Hawaiian Department for additional air patrol is a part of Army exercises or is it based upon information from the War Department?

I received at 0945 local time on June 19, 1940 the following reply:

Request of Commanding General was based upon a directive from the War Department. He has no information as to whether or not it is an exercise.

I had received no information from the Navy Department. Therefore, despite what anybody else believed, I knew that it could not be other than a drill.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Other than a what?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Other than an exercise, because I firmly believed that no important information would be available to General Marshall that was not available to Admiral Stark and if the information was of such a character as to [697] necessitate alerting the Army, the Navy would be equally alerted; but in order to be certain I—

Mr. MITCHELL. Are you looking for your letter of the 22d?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. On June 21 I had a plane come out from Pearl Harbor, pick me up at 0745, take me into Pearl Harbor, where I had a conference with Admiral Bloch and General Herron. I read the order. I asked General Herron whether it was a real alert or a drill. He said he did not know. I assured him that it could not be anything but an exercise.

I sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations requesting information. No reply was ever received.

In compliance with General Herron's request to establish a patrol Vice Admiral Andrews modified the patrol that was then in effect. I had established a plane patrol centered on Lahaina, which covered the arc from 220 to 335 degrees to a distance of 180 miles. Admiral Andrews changed this patrol to cover the arc from south, through west to north to a distance of 300 miles. He also established a dawn and dusk patrol, reported his action to me in a letter dated June 18

and requested that I confirm this action. I sent to Vice Admiral Andrews the following dispatch:

Affirm patrol.

Do you want me to go on?

[698] Mr. MITCHELL. That report from Admiral Andrews is the document in the correspondence file dated June 18, 1940, "Memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet." You have it before you, have you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I forwarded that with a letter from Admiral Bloch to me, with the dispatch exchange between me and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in my letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in order that he might be fully informed as to the whole incident.

Mr. MITCHELL. The report of Admiral Andrews states that the sector you spoke of from south through west to north to a distance of 300 miles would be searched.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. With what types of planes was that reconnaissance conducted?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the patrol planes, a type then known as VP, which is a seaplane, unarmed, used later in this war, primarily as a rescue plane.

Mr. MITCHELL. How long did you keep that plane reconnaissance operation on that scale?

Admiral RICHARDSON. In order that the committee may be fully informed with respect to long-range reconnaissance which prevailed for a number of months, it will be necessary for me to cover some correspondence and make a comprehensive [699] statement. Shall I proceed?

Mr. MITCHELL. If you are ready to.

Admiral RICHARDSON. In connection with the annual fleet exercises, it had always been the custom to simulate war conditions, and therefore, when the fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area, about April 10, and all of the heavy ships anchored off Lahaina Roads, I established, as a part of the exercises, a dawn and dusk inner patrol of planes, which extended to a distance of about 30 miles. I established an antisubmarine patrol of destroyers at all the entrances to Lahaina Roads, and I established a long range reconnaissance of approximately 180 miles.

This reconnaissance was established solely as an exercise. It was not adequate either as to the density of the planes or as to the distance searched to provide warning of any impending attack from a prospective enemy. Because of the frequent warnings which I had received from the Chief of Naval Operations in personal letters, because of my orders to remain in the Hawaiian area with the fleet for reasons unknown to me, I continued this patrol and gradually the purpose for which it was maintained was somewhat modified.

It was continued for three purposes: First, for training; next, because of my knowledge of the Japanese, and the *Panay* incident. Although I felt there was absolute- [700] ly no danger at that time of an attack by the Japanese fleet, I feared that there was, at any time, a possibility that some fanatical, ill-advised officer in command of a submarine or a ship might attack.

Also I felt—and this may have been wrong, but I felt that Admiral Stark might not have all the information that there was available, or he might not fully understand the implications of all the information that he had, and that partly as a personal defensive device, he was warning me to be on the alert against a possible attack, and being an officer of long experience, I wanted the same protection, and therefore I flew this patrol so it could not be said of me after the thing happened that I was warned and did nothing about it.

It was in effect from that point of view a token reconnaissance.

That was continued until, in November 28, 1940, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I said, in part—that is my letter of the 28th of November—

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this [701] up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii.

The third paragraph states:

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern—

Mr. MITCHELL (interposing). You might read that fully, that second paragraph.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That relates to another item, but I will do that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON (reading):

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern, and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i. e., (a) that [702] we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that wartime measures of security must be carried out.

Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training, and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on fleet units.

Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters, and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

Now, Admiral Stark replied to that letter in a letter dated December 23, the third paragraph of which says—have you got it?

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, I have, but I was wondering if you would not get the thread of this a little better if you went back to Admiral Stark's letter to you of November 22, [703] the reply to which you just read? You refer to that in the reply. That is November 22, 1940.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Counsel, there are two points, there are two lines of thought. There are two chains of action, and I am pursuing one.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right. Go ahead. You may go back to that, if necessary.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Go back?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. What I am now discussing is long range reconnaissance. In Admiral Stark's letter of December 23, he stated, in paragraph 3:

First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy—

Murphy was at that time Commander Vincent R. Murphy, my war plans officer, whom I had left in Washington to discuss matters with the War Plans Division of Naval Operations. [Reading:]

[704] I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent security measures should be prosecuted, namely, that while the extent of security measures required his increasing, it has not yet reached the demands of full wartime security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on equipment, and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures should be given due weight.

Upon receipt of that letter of December 30, 1940, in a letter addressed to the fleet, the number of the letter being "U. S. Fleet Confidential Letter No. 8CL 1-40; Subject: Security of fleet units operating in the Hawaiian area", which is the finished product, the tentative draft of which I sent to Admiral Stark—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that, please?

Admiral RICHARDSON. December 30, 1940. I doubt whether the committee has a copy of this letter, because I myself received it just yesterday, and I secured this letter because the counsel indicated to me his intention to interrogate me with respect to long range reconnaissance. Undoubtedly the counsel will supply the members of the committee with a copy of this letter, if he has not already done so.

[705] Mr. GESELL. It has not been supplied as yet.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, you are not referring to the report of December 30, 1940, from the commandant?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Mr. MITCHELL. They are different documents?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Counsel, there are two chains of circumstances and letters originating at about the same time. I am pursuing one of them.

Mr. MITCHELL. This letter you refer to is from you to Admiral Stark, is it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. When Admiral Stark informed me that he felt it was no longer necessary to do other than sweep operating areas and do what his letter of December 23, said to do, then I had no concern over doing other than what I thought was necessary. I discontinued then long range reconnaissance of any kind except the sweeping of operating areas.

I present this letter primarily to show that I discontinued patrol plane reconnaissance. I also issued this directive:

Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

Now if counsel so desires, I will pursue the other [706] chain of circumstances.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was the precise date that Admiral Kimmel assumed command there?

Admiral RICHARDSON. After issuing this directive, 8CL-40 of December 30, 1940, I felt that this letter was not sufficiently comprehensive to provide for the security of the fleet, so I immediately started the preparation of a revision of that document. I was engaged—at least my staff was—in revising that when I received information of my prospective detachment. So I amplified that very much. But inasmuch as I was to be relieved in the near future, I asked that my staff confer with the prospective staff of the prospective commander in chiefs to ascertain their views. So the document that was later issued under the title of "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, date of February 15, 1941" was signed by Admiral H. E. Kimmel, who was the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet having relieved me on February 1, 1941.

Had I remained in command of the U. S. Fleet this order would have borne my signature and it would have been substantially the same order.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, let us go back for a moment to Admiral Stark's letter to you of November 22, 1940, which I have before me. He says:

While you were here early in October we sent a dispatch [707] to Comfourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being afforded to the vital element of the naval establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian Department.

Admiral Bloch's answers to this dispatch and to a second dispatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did not provide bases for further action by the Department.

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander in Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

[708] For instance, is it desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comment and those of Comfourteen on this question.

Anti-aircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet, actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries, and possibly by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Anti-Aircraft Units now available in the Pearl Harbor area, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.

And so on.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you responded to that letter on the 28th of November and you said:

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii.

Now you did take it up with Admiral Bloch?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just tell us what you did about that.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The letter of Admiral Stark to me dated November 22, 1940, is one of a series of letters and incidents about which at least three witnesses in addition to me will testify, and in order that that matter may be initially understood I think it advisable to cover the whole series.

When I was in Washington the 7th, or the 11th of October [709] I discussed with Admiral Stark the position of the fleet when in Pearl Harbor, the inadequate provision that had been made both by the Army and Navy to protect the fleet, and before I returned to Pearl Harbor Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Bloch, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, a dispatch requesting certain information, as indicated in his first paragraph of the letter of November 22.

I remained on the *New Mexico* on the west coast and did not arrive in Pearl Harbor until the 6th of December. Admiral Bloch was the commandant of the district, and he was exceedingly busy with work under construction. I felt that it was essential that I personally know what we had, and what the Army had, therefore I arranged with Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron to inspect everything that the Army had to defend the Army and Navy installations in Hawaii from all forms of overseas attack.

I asked General Herron to have the officers who were subordinate to him, who were directly responsible for any part of the defense, prepared to show me what they had, to give me a list of what they had, give me a list of what the plans called for them to have, and the best estimate they could make of when they would receive what they required.

The flagship was going to sea on individual exercises which did not require my presence. Therefore, on December 19, [710] in company with General Herron, I reviewed the Army equipment and received the data requested. I delivered this data to Admiral Bloch and told him that inasmuch as he represented the fleet in relations with the Army in Hawaii, because I might be away at any time, that I wanted him to use this data and prepare a letter to the Navy Department setting forth his views and forward the letter through me, which Admiral Bloch did in a letter dated December 30, 1940. The subject: "Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks."

[711] That letter was forwarded by me to the Chief of Naval Operations with the first endorsement dated January 4, 1941. I have been informed, and I believe that rear admiral, now Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, then on duty in the War Plans Division of Naval Operations, prepared, for the signature of the Secretary of the Navy, a letter dated January 24, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War.

Reference to this letter appears on page 5, section 7 of the report of the Roberts Commission.

Mr. MITCHELL. This letter, Admiral, of December 30, 1940, signed by Admiral Bloch and addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, is in evidence here. Have you it before you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you mind reading paragraphs 1 and 2 of that letter, or shall I read it for you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I will read it:

In view of the inquiries contained in references (a)—which is Stark's dispatch of October 1940—(b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

Aircraft Raids:

[712] Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack.

First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with antiaircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate any enemy carriers, and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area 59 B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is 6 years old and the planes themselves are 5 years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched, will require both fighting planes and antiaircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area, 36 pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are 6 years old, and some of them are 4 years old. [713] In numbers and models there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base by antiaircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 100 .50-calibre out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50-calibre machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the number of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of antiaircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the antiaircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of antiaircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of antiaircraft barrages [714] abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area.

This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 calibre machine guns.

[715] In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of 8 radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and 55 are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

May I also read the last paragraph?

Mr. MITCHELL. Any part of it that you think is material, Admiral.

Admiral RICHARDSON. This is paragraph 11:

It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then on January 7, 1941, you placed an endorsement on that communication of Bloch's?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think that is January 4, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, yes. It is blotted up. January 4.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is Saturday, and I wanted this away as quickly as I could and I know I would not hold it.

Mr. MITCHELL. That expresses directly your individual [716] views about the situation, did it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It did. I think that Admiral Bloch and I were in complete agreement, because we fully discussed the matter.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you care to read the portions of that that you think are especially useful? The first paragraph probably covers the ground really, and the second—I will read it if you like.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think, if I may be permitted to suggest it, that the first and third paragraphs ought to be read, because the third paragraph contains the matter that has been mentioned several times. Paragraph 1:

Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant 14th Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant 14th Naval District in the opinion that the Army Pursuit Squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not [717] considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

[718] **Mr. MITCHELL.** I will read "2" for you, to relieve your voice, Admiral.

Admiral RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries, nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of the Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in the event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for cooperation with the local defense forces are being made. At present, the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Paragraph 3:

There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the Harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor, particularly the movement of large ships and the landing and takeoff of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the [719] only operating base available to the Fleet in this area, any pressure defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided.

Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered it is necessary to lay such nets.

That paragraph was, in part, based on information from the Navy Department; insofar as was known torpedos launched from aircraft would not operate in water of the depth of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. You spoke, Admiral, of the fact that following that report of Admiral Bloch of December 30, forwarded with the endorsement you have just read, there resulted the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, to the Secretary of War, which you stated was prepared for him by Admiral Turner.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Turner so informed me.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have that letter here and it hasn't been offered in evidence yet. Probably I had better read it if the committee is ready.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Will you identify that?

[720] Mr. MITCHELL. These are letters which we will mark Exhibit 10.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 10.")

Mr. MITCHELL. It follows right along logically after this Bloch report. It is a letter from Secretary Knox, dated January 24, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of it?

Mr. MITCHELL. January 24, 1941.

[721] MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.

[722] (5) Mining.

- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

(2) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire.

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case [723] of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one of the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90-mm., [724] and one hundred twenty 37-mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special services for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

[725] (5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Then attached to that is the reply of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, dated February 7, 1941:

[726]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, Feb. 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This

will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-P pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks [727] and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified [728] opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

Signed by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

[729] Attached to that is a letter of transmittal from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

"Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and copy of Secretary Knox's letter, and one of Secretary Stimson's letters; transmitted under date of February 11, 1941.

And another, addressed to the the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed by General Dick, Adjutant General, dated February 7, 1941, inviting attention to the correspondence I have just read between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War.

And attached then is a document dated February 13, 1941, signed by Carl Grosse, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, acknowledging receipt of the Adjutant General's letter of February 7, together with the two enclosures noted.

They are all part of the same exhibit (No. 10).

[730] Now, Admiral Richardson, had you left Hawaii before February 11 and 13 when this Knox-Stimson matter was up?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I was relieved of command of the fleet on the 1st of February 1941. Thereafter I knew nothing about fleet matters, although I did not actually leave the islands until the 14th of February.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, this correspondence between the Navy and the War Department that I have just read, that reached there February 11 and 13, would not have come to your hands?

Admiral RICHARDSON. This is the first time it has come to my notice.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, going back to your visits with Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox, which was your first trip here in 1940, along in

July, you said you went to Mr. Hull and others to find out what the situation was, why you were being kept at Pearl Harbor. I neglected to ask you what Mr. Hull said, if he gave the reason for it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Hull in a very complete and comprehensive manner presented to me his views of the relationships, relations between the United States and Japan. He felt that we should take a very strong position with respect to Japan and that the retention of the fleet in Hawaii was a reflection of that strong attitude.

[731] I did not receive this impression from Secretary Hull, and I cannot state with certainty how I received it, but I left here with the distinct impression that there was an opinion in Washington that Japan could be bluffed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, when you were here during that trip you visited with Admiral Stark, I suppose?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. I stayed with Admiral Stark at the Admiral's house.

Mr. MITCHELL. In your contact with him did you gather any different impression about his attitude toward basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of on our west coast than he expressed in these letters?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It is my belief that had Admiral Stark been uninfluenced by other considerations he would have wholeheartedly agreed with me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, just what did he say about it in your meetings with him, if you remember.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, his letters, I think, in many places show that he hoped that the fleet would return to the west coast, and after the fleet had been in Hawaii for some time he authorized me to return approximately one-third of the fleet to the coast at a time for recreation and replenishment and the securing of additional men, and when he informed me that I might do that he said that he informed me with great [732] pleasure. And I believe that I came with either the first or the second one of those task forces that visited the coast.

Mr. MITCHELL. During 1940, when you were in command of the fleet, did you have fleet war games out in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral RICHARDSON. We had, while I was in command of the fleet, only one big fleet exercise which involved two fleet proper. They took place between the first of April and the 9th of May.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did any of those exercises involve a simulated air attack by an enemy carrier force?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Those exercises did not. The exercises were planned by my predecessor. They did not include a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. And joint exercises with the Army were discussed by Admiral Stark with me in letters, and it was too late to modify the plans, and in those exercises the only exercises in which the Army participated was, I believe, on the 8th or 9th of April. I sent some heavy cruisers in to simulate an attempted raid in order to exercise the forces stationed in Hawaii, the Navy patrol planes, in locating the force and the Army bombers in bombing it, and the submarine stations normally in Pearl Harbor in attacking the force, which was simulating an attack, so that there was not a large scale joint exercise between [733] the Army and the Navy in which a carrier raid on installations in Hawaii occurred, although in previous years, when I was in a

position other than commander in chief, I had been present in the fleet when such attacks were made.

[734] Mr. MITCHELL. I think we are ready for the committee to inquire of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, who was your immediate predecessor as commander of the United States Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the technical relationship between the commander in chief of the fleet, such as that which you were commander of, and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District is a subordinate of the commander in chief. He is also under the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to other than fleet matters.

The CHAIRMAN. When the fleet is at sea does the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have complete authority within that district or is he still subject to orders of the commander in chief of the fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He is always subject to the orders of the commander in chief. Because the commander in chief may not be present in Pearl Harbor he is the representative of the commander in chief in dealings with the commanding general.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, up to the time when you were detached, the force of which you were commander in chief was [735] known as the United States Fleet, is that true?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct, because at that time the commander in chief of the United States Fleet had command of all the ships in the Atlantic that were in commission and not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as a ship would be were she undergoing shake-down preparatory to joining the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. So that during the time when you were commander in chief of the United States Fleet that meant that you were the commander in chief of the entire fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. No matter where it was located?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there was a reorganization that was somewhat coincident with your detachment?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely coincident.

The CHAIRMAN. And they divided the fleet into the Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. No?

Admiral RICHARDSON. There had always been a small force known as the Asiatic Fleet that was not under the command of the commander in chief of the United States Fleet but passed under his command in case the United States Fleet moved [736] to the western Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, on the 1st of February, then, 1941 approximately, the Pacific Fleet as such came into existence?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It did. The title and the position of commander in chief United States Fleet disappeared and in lieu thereof there was established the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, which commanded all the ships in the Pacific Ocean that were not part of the Asiatic Fleet and were not operating directly under the

Chief of Naval Operations. There was a commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, who commanded all the combatant ships in commission in the Atlantic Fleet except those that were operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you become commander in chief of the United States Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. On January 6, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you were in command of the fleet approximately 13 months?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Admiral Kimmel associated with the fleet under your command in the Pacific?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He was. He was in the fleet under the command of, or the immediate senior under Admiral Stark before I became commander in chief and before Admiral Stark [737] became Chief of Naval Operations. In fact, he relieved Admiral Stark as commander of the cruisers and from that position he relieved me.

The CHAIRMAN. What relationship did he occupy in authority with respect to you as commander in chief of the fleet? Was he senior officer under you or how far down the line did he go?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Kimmel?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, he was very far down. He was a rear admiral and under me came first the commander of the battle force, who was an admiral. Then commander of the scouting force and commander of battleships, who were both vice admirals. Then Admiral Kimmel commanded the cruisers and as such he was on the same level as the commander of the battleships, the commander of the destroyers and the commander of the aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. And he was commander of all the cruisers then in the force?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, what we call a type commander.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, in this correspondence between Admiral Stark and you, you continuously emphasized your belief that the fleet should be based on the Pacific coast rather than in the Hawaiian Islands or Oahu?

[738] Admiral RICHARDSON. I did that.

The CHAIRMAN. And there were, as I gather from the correspondence, many reasons for that opinion on your part, one among them being that you had larger areas for training of the aircraft force and the other activities of training the men and also that you believed that the morale of the men would be improved by being closer to their homes?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I presented solely the naval point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. There are other considerations that at times determined the disposition of the fleet or the units thereof.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations and in your conversations with him in Washington and with the Secretary of State and with the President you were impressed with their belief that in addition to naval reasons that there

was probably a diplomatic or other, maybe psychological, reason for keeping the fleet in that area as a deterrent against activities on the part of Japan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely.

[739] The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you were in Washington you emphasized the fact that you needed more men and that the Navy was being vastly expanded and that men were not coming in as fast as ships were being built?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That you needed more men?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did it in and out of port, everywhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Then you referred to 5,000 men that were allotted to you on one of your trips here, or while you were here on one of your trips and that you sent them out to the Hawaiian area on a carrier, did you say?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Those that I was unable to accommodate in the ships that came with me to the west coast I sent out to Pearl Harbor in a carrier.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Following your detachment from the fleet you became a member of the General Board of the Navy here in Washington?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all I want to ask at this time. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. I don't care to ask any questions at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

[740] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't think I have any questions now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the admiral two or three questions.

In your memorandum of September 12, 1940, to the Secretary of the Navy you submitted a number of pertinent points to be considered, among which were the operations of the fleet and in that part of the memorandum you discussed the problems involved if the fleet was to be retained in Hawaiian waters.

As I understand it, those points of disadvantage that you stressed in that memorandum were purely problems from a naval standpoint and nothing else?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, absolutely.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, you set forth seven points, seven disadvantages to basing the fleet in that area. Those points have been gone over by counsel and yourself and I was anxious to determine from you as to whether or not at that time you considered the question of the possibility of a hostile air attack from some aggressor nation, in connection with not basing the fleet in the Hawaiian waters?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I had not considered that it was likely that the fleet would be attacked by a carrier raid [741] and I so stated repeatedly in security orders issued to the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the admiral desist for a moment? The Chair announced at the beginning of these hearings that the photographers would not be permitted in this area way. It interferes with the wit-

nesses, with the counsel, and with the committee, and I hope that my friend will observe that rule hereafter. You may proceed, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. This memorandum was in June 1940, and if I understand you correctly, Admiral, the possibility of a hostile air attack on the fleet was not considered in making up the recommendations which the authorities here in Washington should study?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. And the question of a submarine attack was not considered either in connection with those plans?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have difficulty in hearing the Senator.

Senator LUCAS. I say the question of a submarine attack by a hostile force was not considered in 1940 either?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. I think my view is clearly presented in a document before the committee which says:

The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions: [742]

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,

(2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,

(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

So that, actually, before I left the fleet we were sweeping the channel against magnetic mines.

Senator LUCAS. How long was it after you gave your seven points of disadvantage to keeping the fleet in Hawaii that the order of Admiral Andrews was issued to start the patrol which you discussed?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Andrews' order did not start a patrol.

Senator LUCAS. What was that order?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It modified the patrol that I had in existence.

Senator LUCAS. I see, all right. And when did that patrol go into existence that you had, Admiral?

[743] Admiral RICHARDSON. It started the day that the fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area on the 10th of April.

Senator LUCAS. 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940, purely as a part of the fleet exercise for training purposes.

Senator LUCAS. For training purposes only?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. And how long did that continue?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It continued until, I think, the 30th of December 1940.

Senator LUCAS. Well, how did the admiral's order augment that? I had just forgotten your statement a moment ago.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Initially the long-range patrol, so-called, but it was not a long-range patrol, it was to 180 miles centered on Lahaina between the arc of 220 and 235, as I remember, but I can verify that—220 to 335 to 180 miles.

Now, when the Army received an alert Admiral Andrews shifted the center from Lahaina to Pearl Harbor and increased the distance to 300 miles and changed the arc from 180 through west to north. Later on I modified that patrol.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Now, before you leave the patrol, how long did that continue?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The patrol established by Admiral Andrews?

[744] Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am not certain, but I think it continued as long as the Army maintained their alert which was, as I remember, almost a month.

Senator LUCAS. Now, how many planes were being used on that patrol?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I haven't the faintest idea.

Senator LUCAS. That is an Army question?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I haven't any idea.

Senator LUCAS. Did the Navy use any planes?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, the Army used no planes.

Senator LUCAS. But you don't know how many planes the Navy used on that patrol?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator LUCAS. Well, who would know that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I doubt if anybody would know—

Senator LUCAS. Well, weren't you—

Admiral RICHARDSON—Because you cannot remember, at least, the commander in chief cannot remember, details of activities after 5 years.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did you make any record of the daily patrols that were made by these planes from the ships?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. You established it in an order and forgot it, assuming that it would be carried out.

[745] Senator LUCAS. You do not recall? You wouldn't want to make a guess as to how many planes daily went out on this patrol to cover this arc that was established by the admiral?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; I would not hazard a guess and the only possible source of information of any reliability would be in the files of the commander in chief and the files—

Senator LUCAS. Of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral RICHARDSON (continuing). Become very voluminous and are normally retained active only about 2 or 3 years.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand that at that particular time the planes that were on the sea on the *Enterprise*, that were making daily flights in training, that there was no record of the number of planes that went out and when they came back?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, every ship keeps in her log a record of everything that it does.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is what I thought.

Admiral RICHARDSON. And in the patrol squadrons there would undoubtedly be maintained a record of when the planes left and when they returned.

Senator LUCAS. Now, who would have the record of the patrol, of the men who were making the determination of the number of planes that were going out on this patrol in line [746] with the order that was augmented by Admiral Andrews?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, Admiral Andrews' order to the officer in command of the patrol wing would tell him how many planes to

use, when to start out, how far they would go, when they would return.

Senator LUCAS. Well, was that Admiral Andrews' responsibility then?

Admiral RICHARDSON. What?

Senator LUCAS. Would that be Admiral Andrews' responsibility for issuing the order and for the keeping of the record of the planes?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; he would not keep a record. In consultation with the commander of the patrol wing, which I think was Patrol Wing 2, he would issue the order in general terms. The commander of Patrol Wing 2 would implement it and record his compliance.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Later on, Admiral, you modified this order?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Senator LUCAS. Just how did you do it, now?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Because of the number of planes that were available and because of the need for training men, I modified the patrol to cover periodically an arc between 170°, which is 10° to the east of south and [747] 350°, and I covered daily an arc, a sector of that arc and in order that it might not be evident to Japanese residents of Oahu that I was searching the same sector every day, I rotated that sector.

Senator LUCAS. All right. Now, one further question and then I will be through.

With respect to the letter that you wrote to Admiral Stark after General Herron, as I understood you to say, had been notified that an alert was on in the Hawaiian Islands, you did not receive any information at that time from anyone in Washington, D. C., about that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Not at that time.

Senator LUCAS. You later said that you wrote to Admiral Stark about the type of alert that was on and that you had never received any answer from him.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, I telegraphed him, I mean I sent him a radio and asked him what it was all about.

Senator LUCAS. And you never received any reply to that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Never.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark after that as to why he did not reply to that important message of yours?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I talked to both Admiral Stark and [748] General Marshall.

Senator LUCAS. What did Admiral Stark say as to the reason he did not reply after this type of alert went out to the islands?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He said it was an exercise, an Army exercise.

Senator LUCAS. That is what Admiral Stark said?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. And he did not think it was sufficiently important, even though he had received a message from you, he did not think it was important enough to make reply to you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, he knew that I had enough confidence in him to know that if it were the real thing he would have told me.

Senator LUCAS. But you did send him a wire?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Senator LUCAS. And asked him about it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Senator LUCAS. You wanted to find out for yourself?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I wanted an answer, too.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. One other question, if I may. Over in one of these letters in reading this correspondence I note this, Admiral. In your letter of May 13, [749] 1940, addressed to Admiral Stark—at that time you were then still discussing the reasons pro and con as to why the fleet should or should not be based in Hawaiian waters—in this letter you state this:

It seems that under present world conditions the paramount thing for us is the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything, anything, certainly, in the Far East, our own or other interests. South America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed.

Who did you expect to grab South America in that letter?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, Senator, I haven't a copy of that letter.

Senator LUCAS. It would be interesting to know because——

Admiral RICHARDSON. May what?

Senator LUCAS. This is May 13, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Admiral is in a position to answer that question he may do so. We have gone past our adjourning hour.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, I have that.

Senator LUCAS. I am sure you and I agree on the same thing, probably, as to who we thought might grab South America, but it was just interesting to get your further reactions.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I didn't want anybody to grab [750] South America.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[751]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

When we recessed Senator Lucas was examining Admiral Richardson. You may resume.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Richardson, in one of your statements made before the committee this morning you stated that you were certain that the Navy could have been alerted as well as the Army had it been any other thing than a drill.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Correct.

Senator LUCAS. Later on you told the committee, and told me on examination, that you wired, you radioed, I think you said, Admiral Stark, asking him directly in this radiogram what the alert meant, and you received no reply.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Later on you had a talk with Admiral Stark here in Washington and in that conversation with the Admiral he advised you that it was merely a drill?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You also said that while you were here you had a conversation with General Marshall on that same question.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Will you give to the committee what General Marshall said about the alert?

[752] Admiral RICHARDSON. I told General Marshall that the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department had received an alert, that I was certain that it was a drill, but a situation had been created where there was some uncertainty and some uneasiness, and that I would like to know what was the purpose of the alert dispatch sent by him.

He said:

Oh, that was simply an exercise and I thought if I did not state that it was an exercise the exercise would be carried out more completely.

Senator LUCAS. That is about the end of the conversation, I take it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you stated previously—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that Congressman Clark would be the next in order but he is not here at the moment.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, you stated in your examination that you and Admiral Stark were close personal friends?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Had been. Admiral Stark entered the Naval Academy 1 year after I did.

Mr. MURPHY. When in Washington you stayed at his home?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. He served with me when we [753] were both ensigns.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the attitude of Admiral Stark in regard to the location of the fleet at Hawaii?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, from all that he said to me, and from all that he wrote to me, I gathered that he was fully in sympathy with me. Of course, he was more closely in touch with diplomatic considerations than I was.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you receive a message from Admiral Stark dated March 15, 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. A letter?

Mr. MURPHY. I understand that on March 15, 1940, Admiral Stark sent you a message in which he declared, despite your many doubts, that the policy of keeping the fleet units in Hawaiian waters was sound, and that the State Department was very strong for it. Did you receive such a communication?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That communication did not refer to the retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian waters, for the reason that the fleet had not arrived in the Hawaiian waters at that date. That referred to the Hawaiian detachment which was sent to the Hawaiian area the fall preceding, I think, September or October 1939.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know of any written memorandum, by letter or otherwise, where at any time Admiral Stark stated his position as to whether or not the fleet should be assigned [754] to Hawaii?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He stated repeatedly that he hoped we would return and that our delay in Hawaiian waters would not be unduly prolonged.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you state—give me a reference to any communication that you know where Admiral Stark made his position clear in writing?

Senator BREWSTER. May I be permitted to speak?

Mr. MURPHY. Do you want to help me?

Admiral RICHARDSON. On the 7th of May in a letter to me he says:

Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian waters for a couple of weeks.

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) * * *

He said:

Of course, you know the thought behind the above * * *

Mr. MURPHY. Are you following the letter?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, I am skipping.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you stopped at "but I cannot tell" in the second line in the second paragraph, did you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you go from there to where?

[755] Admiral RICHARDSON. The fourth paragraph?

Of course, you know the thoughts behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then — ???? nobody can answer the riddle just now.

Mr. MURPHY. Where is Admiral Stark's position in that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is all I know.

[756] Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral RICHARDSON. It is manifest that he trusted that the fleet would not remain there long.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, where is his position, I mean as to whether it should or not? Can you refer to anything in writing at any time, anywhere, where Admiral Stark states his position to you that he is in agreement with you, or that he disagrees with the proposition of having the fleet there?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, whatever he said I firmly believe that he wholeheartedly agreed with me.

Mr. MURPHY. But can you give us a reference to anything in writing anywhere? If so, state it.

Senator BREWSTER. I refer you, Admiral, to the letter of May 22 to you, the first paragraph of which is [reading]:

Replying to your letter of May 13th—

in which I think Admiral Stark made his position very clear.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Unfortunately, I have not a copy of that letter.

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest to the Chairman that inadvertently the Chair has overlooked that this would be the turn of Senator Brewster, the Senator from Maine, to examine the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chairman exercised his right [757] at the beginning and I examined following the examination of counsel and did examine the Admiral but not upon this point.

Mr. MURPHY. I beg your pardon, you misunderstood me. I meant that after Mr. Clark it would then have been the turn of Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I have placed no objection to your examining the Admiral.

Mr. MURPHY. And then I would follow.

Senator BREWSTER. That is quite all right, Congressman Murphy, and I hope you will accept my suggestion which is simply in the interest of saving time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is subject to correction. In the absence of Mr. Clark the next in order by the alternation would have been the Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I am quite willing to let Mr. Murphy proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize to the Senator from Maine for that omission.

Senator BREWSTER. I know that my rights are being saved, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, do you have the letter of May 22 suggested by the gentleman, the Senator from Maine?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I doubt if I can find anywhere a specific statement saying:

I am opposed to retaining the [758] fleet in the Hawaiian area.

Mr. MURPHY. Can you find a specific statement saying that he agrees with you categorically?

Admiral RICHARDSON. This is what he says on the 22d of May. [Reading:]

When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy—
that means the dispatch to return—

it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the only written memorandum to which you can refer?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I—

Mr. MURPHY. I mean is that the only one?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Congressman Murphy, since the receipt of this correspondence I have been almost constantly in attendance here. If I had time to search through all of the papers carefully I have no doubt that I would find sufficient [759] evidence of his concurrence with me as to convince anyone.

Mr. MURPHY. If you find it will you produce it, please?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I will, or I shall.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you had a meeting with the President about which you prepared a memorandum in October of 1940. Did you prepare any memoranda after the previous meetings?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. Pursuing further the question which the Congressman has been asking, I think it should be clear what was the representation in your letter to which Admiral Stark expressed his view on. It was, as I understand it, your letter of May 13, in which you used the following language [reading]:

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although

important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital.

If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be [760] docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.

Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I want you to know that if the situation becomes such that higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.

That is the end of the quotation from your letter, to which I understand Admiral Stark in his letter of May 22 replied. [Reading:]

I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself.

Would that lead you to believe, or would that leave you in any doubt, Admiral Richardson, as to the position of Admiral Stark in this matter?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I was never in any doubt about his position.

Senator BREWSTER. And what was the situation, Admiral, of the fleet? With the fleet which you had at Pearl Harbor—was it what would be considered in naval parlance as a fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it was a combatant fleet but it did not have in company with it the auxiliaries that would be essential to active operations.

Senator BREWSTER. So that if there were hostilities [761] that should develop, what would have been the mission of the fleet under any plans that were in existence?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Under the existing plans it would have been necessary for the fleet to return to the west coast to mobilize, assemble a train, fill the ships with the regulation number of personnel, provisions, supplies, stores, fuel, strip the ships of needless articles which necessarily appear on a ship during a long period of peace and prepare them for offensive operation.

Senator BREWSTER. State whether or not the fleet on December 7 was in such a condition as would have required its return similarly?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It had been more completely prepared for war action because before I returned to Pearl Harbor with a portion of the fleet, arriving thereon the 6th of December, we had placed in storage a lot of inflammable material that we carried in time of peace. The ships had been degaussed.

The CHAIRMAN. Had been what?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Degaussed.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't get that word.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it is a French word which means running a coil of wire around them which energized will probably prevent the magnetic field of the ship from exploding a magnetic mine.

[762] Senator BREWSTER. Under the plans existing prior to December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it contemplated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period of any hostilities with a Western Pacific power?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the plans then in existence were called the "Orange" plan or the "O-1" plan and it was, in my opinion, a fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then existing "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. That was in 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940.

Senator BREWSTER. And did that contemplate some manner of offensive action by the fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that absolutely could not be realized.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to quote to you, because I think we all are going to be vitally concerned with this matter of naval defense. You were Assistant Chief of Naval [763] Operations during 1937 and 1938 under Admiral Leahy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. One year.

Senator BREWSTER. I am quoting from Admiral Leahy's statement before the Naval Affairs Committee on the function of the Navy, as I think it will contribute to this matter, and I want to know whether you would agree with this concept. I quote Admiral Leahy on the first page of his testimony at the 1938 hearings. [Reading:]

In defending our territory in war, we cannot assume an attitude of passive defense and simply beat off an attack at one place and later at another. In such a case we would see our coasts blockaded, our outlying possessions seized, our commerce, both coastwise and foreign, driven off the seas, and we would undergo the costly experience of finding the war lasting just as long as the enemy willed it; that is, until he had attained every objective and everything he wanted. The only way that war, once begun, can be brought to a successful conclusion is by making the enemy want to stop fighting—by injuring him before he reaches our shores so badly that he will be anxious to make peace. Prompt and effective injury to an enemy, at a distance from our shores, is the only correct strategy to be employed.

[764] We have outlying possessions in Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Samoa, Panama, Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Philippine Islands are still United States territory and will remain so until complete independence is attained. All of these outlying island possessions are more or less vulnerable, and their defense depends upon two factors. One is a local defense by mobile forces and fortifications. The other, and the dominant factor, is sea power. A superior Navy can prevent powerful attacks being made on all those island possessions that lie closer to our home territory than they do to those of an enemy or enemies. A sufficient Navy can keep open the lines of supply to the defenders of such possessions, and, if they are secure in their own local defenses against minor attacks, the Navy can use them as bases from which to operate against the enemy or enemies. Defense of those possessions—Guam, the Philippines and Alaska—which lie nearer to the home territory of another power or powers than they do to the continental United States, is dependent solely upon sea power and the ability of sea power to support forces in those areas.

[765] I presume you would be in full agreement with that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Complete accord.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now, I have here an exhibit which has been furnished us, which is extracts from the joint Army and Navy war plan, Rainbow No. 1. That is a part of the extracts from joint Army and Navy war plan, Orange 1938.

I assume that was in the process of development year by year, but this does not contain any of the tasks that were assigned under section 6 and others. In section 6, the presentation apparently confines itself to the defense plans of the Hawaiian area without including therein anything regarding the tasks which I assume were the function of the Navy to carry out, the task forces, or tasks.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true. What is the date of that?

Senator BREWSTER. This one is dated 1938, the Orange plan. I think that was Orange No. 1. This was approved, it says, by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy August 14, 1939, verbally by the President October 14, 1939, by the Joint Board April 10, 1940. That is April 10, 1940, brought down current. That was finally Rainbow No. 1.

You have that before you, do you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have it.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, whether or not—

[766] Admiral RICHARDSON. But, Senator Brewster, these are copies of extracts from plans that were modified from time to time. They are not complete; some of them were made after I left the fleet; some of them were in process of being made, so any questions that I answer with respect to this is certainly to be most confusing because here is one that is dated March 28, 1941. I know nothing about it.

Senator BREWSTER. I think my question won't involve, perhaps, any confusion. The point which I wish to inquire about is whether or not the appointment of the tasks as they are called, which I assume were the functions of the Navy, the affirmative tasks, would be essential to an appraisal of the responsibility of the commanders in that area?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I think it would be but it would not be anything other than confusing to consider any other plans than the plans that were in existence on the 7th of December 1941, about which I know nothing.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I don't intend to enter into that field. My point is in attempting to appraise the responsibility of those who were in authority at Pearl Harbor, as to whether or not their responsibility in taking aggressive action with the fleet under their charge must not necessarily be known in order to determine as to the wisdom of their course at any given time?

[767] Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, of course, no plans ever made by the Army or the Navy of the United States visualized their being put in effect without either a declaration of war or an attack upon us, so if you take the joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, that was the basic plan on which the Navy drew its war plan and on which the Army drew its war plan.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, reading these excerpts, these extracts I have given you, which are apparently exclusively of a defensive character, one might draw the impression that the Navy had no function than to be there at Pearl Harbor and assist in its defense. That, of course, would not be a warranted conclusion, would it, Admiral? The Navy had another job to do under all plans, did it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, absolutely, and the Navy's job was to be aggressive.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Now, the pages of this refer specifically to the joint responsibilities of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area and it does not refer, as I can find here, to anything about what the fleet is going to do.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, over on page—I should say it is No. 2. For instance, on that first page we have section 1. We then have section 2 on the first page. There is no [768] section 3 apparently. It becomes section 4, then section 5, section 6. Then we

come to extracts of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans, Rainbow No. 1, section 6. [Reading:]

Tasks * * * Joint Tasks * * *

Now, I take it those refer to omissions as to the naval tasks which they were supposed to undertake.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. It is a part of the function of both the Navy and the Army to keep in constant preparation for possible war plans under any eventualities, is it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. If you will turn to page 3, under paragraph 35, "Naval tasks";

(F) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island areas.

Now, all war plans that I am familiar with for the Navy contained a task along those lines.

[769] Senator BREWSTER. What you were reading answers my question, I guess. It is a function of the Army and Navy to keep in constant operation war plans in the event of any eventualities?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

Senator BREWSTER. When this came up, orders were immediately issued, were they not, to execute war plan 46 against Japan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have no idea.

Senator BREWSTER. On that date?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have no idea.

Senator BREWSTER. I heard you mention when the order came through. That was what impressed me. I do not know what it meant. I assumed it was the plan which had been prepared.

Admiral RICHARDSON. In every war plan there is a provision for putting it into effect, and it is defined and known how the plan will be put into effect, and when that order is received it goes into effect and everybody knows it is in effect, but during the latter part of 1940 and the early part of 1941, due to changing world conditions, the Navy war plans were in a constant state of flux, in an effort to have a plan that was in accordance with the existing situation.

As a matter of fact, there is in this correspondence a [770] letter from me with respect to the plan that was being developed, in which it is stated that the plan and that letter was prepared with the knowledge and approval of my successor. We worked on it jointly during the week or 10 days before I was relieved.

The numbers of the plans are so numerous and the provision of every plan is so different, the assumptions are so different, that it would be impossible for me to recall now the assumptions in Rainbow 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.

Senator BREWSTER. But you would be—had you finished?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. In fact, there was a plan which was known, I think, as "plan dog" for a while. "Dog" being the Navy name of the "D".

The CHAIRMAN. "Dog"?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Dog, d-o-g.

The CHAIRMAN. Common cur.

Senator BREWSTER. But all of these plans contemplated aggressive action by the Navy as contrary to merely defensive action in fixed positions?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Navy had always believed that the only way you could defend the country was by aggressive action.

Senator BREWSTER. The basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor then would, of necessity, mean a return to the west coast, in time of war, and did inevitably affect the time element very seriously, the time involved in the return?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, there is a difference of opinion on that point. I thought it did.

Senator BREWSTER. What would be the approximate time for the return to the west coast and making the preparations under the condition when you were there?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it is about a little over 2,000 miles, and the fleet would only make about 15 knots, and that is 360 knots a day, or about a week to get back.

Senator BREWSTER. In the matter of the patrol reconnaissance, the difficulty, so far as the air reconnaissance was concerned, was with the shortage of planes, was it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with the naval expansion bill of 1838, which provided for 3,000 naval aircraft?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I am familiar with it to a very limited extent.

Senator BREWSTER. Was that during your period as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, but the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in those days concerned himself primarily with administrative matters. Relations with the committees of Congress, with the other executive departments, and with the President were handled by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator BREWSTER. It was becoming evident, more evident each year, was it not, as to the part which airplanes would play in naval as well as land war?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No doubt about that.

Senator BREWSTER. That was a constantly expanding activity?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. You spoke about getting the impression while you were in Washington, but not from Cordell Hull, that Japan could be bluffed. Do you recall where you gained that impression? Could I recall to you, did you confer with Stanley Hornbeck while you were here?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Senator BREWSTER. Whether or not you gained any impression of that through your conferences with him?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, whether I was correct or not, I was distinctly of the impression that Dr. Hornbeck was exercising a greater influence over the disposition of the fleet than I was.

Senator BREWSTER. Could you develop that at all?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The only way in which I can develop that is this:

I saw Dr. Hornbeck on July 11. I talked to him from 10:30 to noon. [773]

According to my notebook I said he is the strong man on the Far East and the cause of our staying in Hawaii where he will hold us as long as he can. And that was an impression that I wrote in my notebook when it happened.

[774] On October 9 I saw Hornbeck, who was unwilling to accept the responsibility for retaining the fleet in Hawaii. Now I may have been entirely wrong, but that was the impression I gained.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you express to him, Admiral, in your conversations, the same opinion that you had expressed to the President as to the psychology of the Japanese military authorities on the situation?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, inasmuch as Dr. Hornbeck was the advisor of the State Department on far eastern affairs and had written many books on the subject, some of which I had read, I doubt whether I told him that he was completely wrong, but I expressed my view fully.

Senator BREWSTER. He was at that time the one in charge of what they called the far eastern desk in the State Department?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. I had known Dr. Hornbeck for some time.

Senator BREWSTER. His first name is Stanley?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, and I think he had been relieved as head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and had been superseded by Mr. Max Hamilton, if I remember correctly, whom I had also known for many years. Dr. Hornbeck was the advisor of the State Department on far [775] eastern affairs.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection, Admiral, with your service in Hawaii, was there a local influence in leaving Hawaii?

Admiral RICHARDSON. If there was it was unknown to me.

Senator BREWSTER. You did not have any situation of that kind locally?

Admiral RICHARDSON. None at all.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark, when your name was reached you were temporarily absent. Do you have any questions of the Admiral?

Mr. CLARK. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Am I next in order, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think in order to balance between the two sides, inasmuch as the Chairman has assumed to do the first interrogating on the Senate side, that you would come next.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, pursuing the questions that have been asked just a moment ago by the Senator from Maine, I think you testified that the fleet, as you commanded it in 1940, was undermanned, undertrained, understaffed, under provisioned and underammunitioned.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, no American force was ever [776] underprovisioned. We eat better than anybody in the world.

Mr. GEARHART. But did you have a sufficient supply of edibles to keep you going for a long time, for instance, through a war engagement, a war responsibility?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, normally we carried dry provisions for about 60 days, if I remember correctly. Insofar as I remember, there was no question of provisions. The ships did not carry the full wartime allowance of ammunition because of the needless expenditure of fuel in pushing that much weight through the water. There was a deficiency in certain types of ammunition.

For example, we had little, if any bombardment ammunition which would be necessary in effecting a landing.

As to enough men, never within my knowledge, except in war, has the Navy had on board enough men to fight the ship. We have been lucky if we could secure sufficient appropriations to maintain 85 percent of complement. Men of experience were being removed from the ships in order to train new men.

Mr. GEARHART. Now to place it on a percentage basis, what would be the percentage of fighting efficiency of the Navy as you commanded it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, that would be a highly theoretical question. No answer would be of any value.

Mr. GEARHART. You consider you were 85 percent manned?

[777] Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, we had 85 percent enough men to man the battery and steam at full power for more than a very short time, and as an instrument of war their value was prospective. They could be fully realized in a short space of time by the addition of men, because men in war learn far more rapidly than they do in time of peace.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, the Navy under your command was not in a condition of readiness to commence the war with Japan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely not.

Mr. GEARHART. And if it were the policy of the United States to commence a war with Japan the ships would have to return first to the west coast, spending a week in travel and a week in coming back—and how many weeks being put in shape for striking?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, in my letter, one of my letters, I stated that in the event active war operations were undertaken it would either be necessary to return to the coast for mobilization or preparation or accept the handicaps of preparing in Pearl Harbor. I could not hazard a guess as to how soon they would be ready from Pearl Harbor, returning to the coast and being ready to start again, because I do not know how quickly you could have assembled the ships, the tankers, and done the training. Actually it was a year or so, was it not?

[778] Mr. GEARHART. You say a year or so?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, before we really got going well in this war it was not a matter of weeks.

Mr. GEARHART. Then in order to prepare the fleet to strike, say, Japan originally, it would have to travel from Hawaii to the United States, spending a week, then uncertain weeks in the United States being equipped for war, and then travel back a week, and that would mean really by leaving it in Hawaii it was 4,500 miles further away from the enemy than it would be if it had been in the United States?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, but I think when you consider the many, many other things that had to be done before active war operations could be undertaken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the west coast would have little effect on the over-all time, because you had to assemble, train, you might have to build some, you might have to have drydocks, you might have to have repair facilities, you had to have a terrific amount of stores and all kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields, and everything else, none of which was ready.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. So that the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the west coast, when actual war started it was a matter of no moment, in my opinion, because [779] other things controlled the time of getting ready.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, considering the other situation, the one which actually happened, by having our fleet in Hawaiian waters we had our fleet 2,500 miles closer to the enemy for their sneak attack?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Do you want an opinion on that?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, unless it is a question of geography, unless it is a matter of going over water, or something else.

Admiral RICHARDSON. In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a Japanese fleet that could cross most of the Pacific ocean and deliver an undiscovered attack on Pearl Harbor would quite likely have been able to deliver the same attack on Puget Sound.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that is amazing.

Admiral RICHARDSON. But the whole question is the amount of oil they have got in the ships.

Mr. GEARHART. Now you have outlined the deficiencies in our Navy's strength at that time. Were those deficiencies known to the Japanese? Have you any way of knowing whether they were or not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I never had any doubt that the Japanese knew everything they wanted to know about our fleet, and the Secretary of the Navy told me himself that they knew more about it than I did.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then in the light of what you have [780] just said, do you think that the President was correct when he said he thought the presence of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters had a restraining effect on the Japanese?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did not think so when I was talking to him, and I have not changed my mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Now while you were in command of the ship—or of the fleet in 1940, and during the months of 1941 when you were in charge of the fleet, were any of your battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers or service vessels transferred to the Atlantic?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, my memory is not active, and certainly with changes made during my incumbency as to the ships in the Atlantic and ships in the Pacific, because new ships were being built, and joining the fleet, and some ships were being transferred from that part of the United States Fleet in the Pacific to that part of it in the Atlantic, so I have here something that has just been prepared for me, expecting that this question might be asked me, from the records of the Navy Department the transfers that were made.

Before I can answer that I would need about 5 minutes to look over the data which has been compiled at my request.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you take a minute or two and see if there were any considerable or important transfers made one [781] way or the other?

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, it might be well to have it incorporated in the record.

Mr. GESELL. We were hoping to get the final answer on that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, in lieu of presenting at this time a hurriedly prepared presentation of this kind, may I request that the counsel secure that information from the Department and present it to the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands that the counsel is in process of doing that and it is to go in, as it no doubt should. It ought to be accurate to the last item. Therefore the Chair, as far as he is concerned, and I am sure the committee, will be glad to accede to the Admiral's request.

Mr. GEARHART. That will be entirely satisfactory.

Senator LUCAS. What does that include?

Mr. GEARHART. With the understanding it will be incorporated in the record as soon as it can be made available.

The CHAIRMAN. That compilation will include the date at the beginning of any transfer and the end, the final date covering the transfer period.

Admiral RICHARDSON. What I propose is that they give me a list of the transfer of vessels to and from the Atlantic, [782] the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets between May 1, 1940, and February 1, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. They might have been numerous, but within my recollection they were not substantial, except possibly some cruisers and destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Will that record show the class of ship?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All classes of ships?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, even show the name of them and the class.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, can you bring that down to December 7, 1941?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman would suggest, from other sources and under the testimony of other witnesses, it ought to be brought down to the 7th of December.

Mr. GEARHART. I have already requested that, Mr. Chairman. That was promised me yesterday. I presume it will be coming along pretty soon.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I assume the reason the admiral requested the material on February 1 is because that was the time of the change of his command.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Exactly, Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As the Chairman suggests, of course [783] for our purposes we will probably want it to come on down to the date of this happening at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That has previously been requested.

The CHAIRMAN. You can only speak for the time in which you were in command.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That will undoubtedly be furnished.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you, during your command, have occasion to protest to the Chief of Naval Operations against the detachment from

¹ See footnote 1, p. 125, supra.

your command of ships and their transfer to the Atlantic or any other place for duty?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Not to my present recollection.

Mr. GEARHART. Can you tell us, as a naval expert, as to whether or not your fleet, the one you commanded, was numerically inferior to the Japanese in the Pacific, or superior?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, our knowledge of the Japanese Fleet and its composition was not complete and, therefore, any answer I give might later be proved inaccurate, in the light of better information. But to the best of my knowledge and belief, the Japanese Fleet was either equal to or superior to that part of the fleet that I had with me in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Then calling for an opinion answer too, this being addressed to you as a naval expert, which you undoubtedly are, what effect would the detachment of three [784] battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers in May 1941 have upon that numerical comparison of strength?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It would have made the Pacific Fleet relatively weaker than the Japanese Fleet.

Mr. GEARHART. And wasn't it that transfer which caused the change in the name of the fleet that you have been the commander of, it having been known as the United States Fleet and because of these detachments it was actually known thereafter as the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think that had no bearing on it, insofar as I know.

Mr. GEARHART. When did the change occur, Admiral?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The change in the name?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The 1st day of February 1941. In my opinion it was occasioned by the increasing importance of naval activity in the Atlantic.

Mr. GEARHART. Then really you were the last commander in chief of the United States Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Until Admiral King was made one, and a bigger one.

Mr. GEARHART. Is there a United States Fleet now?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral King is commander in chief of [785] the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations—at least he was during practically all the war.

Mr. GEARHART. That is, he is commander of every naval ship afloat, is that correct?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He was and is today.

Mr. GEARHART. You, as commander of the United States Fleet, were commander of all ships afloat except those that composed the Asiatic detachment?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, Mr. Gearhart. I will answer that question this way: As commander in chief of the United States Fleet I was in command of every combatant ship in commission in any ocean that did not belong to the Asiatic Fleet or was not serving directly under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations. Many ships serve directly under the Chief of Naval Operations, because when a new ship is built, until she has had some cruising, some target practice, some training, some tests of new equipment, she is not considered

worthy of joining a fleet, and she may be in an ocean, but she does not belong to the fleet in that ocean.

Mr GEARHART. I see. Thank you very much, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson, can you tell us when [786] the fleet went from the west coast to Hawaii in the spring of 1940, if there was a definite date for its return, or whether there was not a definite date for its return?

Admiral RICHARDSON. There was a definite published schedule available to all officers in the fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. And what was that date?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Based upon dates that occur in this correspondence, it is my opinion that it was on May 9.

Senator FERGUSON. The 9th of May 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The 9th of May 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would fix that date? Would you fix that date, or would it be fixed here in Washington?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Actually it had been fixed either by me or possibly by my predecessor and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. So it would be really an order of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral RICHARDSON. A fleet schedule is prepared well in advance that shows all the exercises planned, all the fleet activities well in advance. The over-all plan is prepared in the fleet and is approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and then it is carried out without any further orders. In accordance with that approved plan all of the ships participate in the annual fleet exercises and leave the west coast, and the [787] Hawaiian detachment left Hawaii to join the fleet in the exercises of the fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any delay, Admiral, in leaving the west coast at that time to go to Hawaii or did you go on the scheduled day?

Admiral RICHARDSON. We went on the scheduled day.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get word that you might not return in May of 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received it in the dispatch which I put in the record yesterday, on the 4th.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the dispatch that you were to make a press release?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. This is the dispatch from OPNAV to CINCUS:

It looks probable but not final that Fleet will remain Hawaiian waters for short time after May 9. Will expect to apprise you further Monday or Tuesday next.

Senator FERGUSON. When you received that were you out in the Hawaiian waters?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, I had finished the fleet exercises and we were all, except the big ships, big carriers, in Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Because at the end of a fleet exercise [788] all of the senior officers are assembled.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give us the date of that order?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Which order?

Senator FERGUSON. The one you just read. I haven't seen it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. May 4.

Senator FERGUSON. The 4th of May?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of the memo that you were to release a press release?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received that on May 7.

Senator FERGUSON. The 7th of May?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever discussed that with Admiral Stark or anyone here in Washington?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Before the event?

Senator FERGUSON. No, after the event. After you had that paper asking you to make a press release, did you ever discuss that with Admiral Stark or anyone else?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, sir. No, I never discussed it with anyone.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever discussed your testimony here with anyone other than the counsel? You have never written [789] any books about it, or magazine articles, or anything of that kind, have you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, I have never talked to anybody about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now when did you first receive definite information that the fleet would be kept at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral RICHARDSON. We never received any definite information as to the duration of our stay in Hawaii. We just gradually drifted into staying.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time were you receiving any diplomatic information between our country and Japan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, while you were commander in chief, receive any diplomatic information?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you came here to Washington to receive your instructions as far as any diplomatic relations were concerned.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I came here to find out the background of our stay, the purposes back of it, and, if possible, how long we would stay.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you get the background from the State Department or anyone?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I acquired the information that [790] we would stay there as long as it was considered essential for us to support diplomatic representations by being there.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were you told what the diplomatic representations were that you were supporting? Were you taken in on those?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, but I can read it in the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you state what your opinion was as to what were the diplomatic relations that were going on at that time?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the United States has always believed in a strong China, a China that could stand alone, and we were doing all that we could, without going to war, to induce Japan to cease what we considered was aggressive action in China. We also were opposed to the extension of Japanese activities and Japanese influences further south in Asia.

[791] Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss with anyone the question of a patrol line from Hawaii to the Asiatic coast?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us whom you discussed such a matter with?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, may I read a memorandum on that subject which I prepared several weeks ago, thinking that I might be asked that question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The committee will be very glad to have it, Admiral.

May the Chair ask what sort of a line that was you were inquired about?

Admiral RICHARDSON. A patrol line.

In presenting this, I would like to state that my war plans officer accompanied me to Washington, and I discussed with him most of the things that were talked about. He was a man whose judgment I held in very high esteem, and when I prepared this he went over it so that I discussed with him what I might present here as part of my testimony, and I did it in the interest of accuracy.

On October 10, the day that I had reservations to return to the west coast by plane—

The CHAIRMAN. That is 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940; October 10, 1940.

[792] About 5 p. m. Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, sent for me and Admiral Stark to come to his office. I was accompanied by Commander Vincent R. Murphy. Admiral Stark was accompanied by Admiral Ingersoll, and Capt. C. M. Cook, who is now, I think, perhaps a vice admiral.

The Secretary stated that he had important information bearing on the employment of the fleet. He stated that he had just talked to the President, and that the President was concerned as to the Japanese reaction to the British on the reopening of the Burma Road scheduled for October 17. In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the President, was considering shutting off all trade between Japan and the Americas, and to this end was considering establishing a patrol of light ships in two lines extending from Hawaii westward to the Philippines, and from Samoa toward the Dutch East Indies.

The question was raised—I do not recall by whom—as to whether this included stopping Japanese ships as well as others, and the view was expressed that this would be an act of war, and I asked whether the President was considering a declaration of war.

The Secretary stated that the President hadn't said, and that all he, Knox, knew was what he was told.

I was amazed at the proposal and stated that the fleet [793] was not prepared to put such a plan into effect, nor for the war which would certainly result from such a course of action, and that we would certainly lose many of the ships.

Parenthetically, I had seen that thing tried in the war plans, and it didn't work.

There was some further discussion that a line of light ships as proposed would entail such dispersal as to expose the ships to destruction in detail, and that the best way to accomplish the President's purpose was to control the source of the trade by patrol of the relatively few ports involved.

The Secretary appeared displeased at the general reaction and mine in particular, and said:

I am not a strategist; if you don't like the President's plan, draw up one of your own to accomplish the purpose.

The conference closed with the understanding that Stark and I, with our war plans officers, would draw up a statement of assumptions, proposed decisions, and tentative plan of operation in connection with the reopening of the Burma Road.

An outline plan was drawn up. It envisaged the transfer to the Pacific of additional patrol planes, an aircraft carrier, some destroyers, and possibly a cruiser or two.

Admiral Stark was not prepared to approve these transfers, [794] and stated that he would talk the matter over with the President and let me know later what decisions were arrived at.

When the plan was completed, the Secretary and the President were away from Washington, and I returned to the west coast on the 11th.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through, Admiral, with that answer?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am ready for another question, sir.

[795] Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear any more about the plan after you left Washington? You say that the Secretary and President—you mean the Secretary of the Navy and the President—were not in Washington when the plans were completed, and you left Washington.

Now, did you hear anything further about the plan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received, after my return to the *New Mexico* at Long Beach, a dispatch from Admiral Stark directing me to send to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet a copy of the assumptions and the tentative United States Fleet disposition, and operations to meet the situation, which I did in a letter dated 16 October 1940, and my recollection is that I sent this to Admiral Hart, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Asiatic?

Commander RICHARDSON. Asiatic Fleet. By the commanding officer of the *Houston*, which was bound out from Long Beach.

I sent this letter out by Captain Jesse B. Olendorf, now either a rear admiral or vice admiral, and this [indicating] is the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, do you know what paper the admiral is referring to? Have we a copy of it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. What?

Senator FERGUSON. I asked counsel if we had a copy, if [796] they knew what memorandum you were referring to, and if we had a copy of it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The date is 16 October, 1940, and the subject is "International Situation Re Enforcement of the Asiatic Fleet."

You had this duplicated.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me see it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The light paper doesn't belong with it. I would like to have that.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right, sir. I will tear the light paper off.

(A document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Mr. MITCHELL. The admiral is right. We do have a copy of it.

This is it, isn't it, Admiral? [Indicating.]

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we ready to proceed?

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't had time to read this, but I will come back later to it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. If I may add, this plan was never carried out.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give a reason why it was not carried out?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it served as a base, I mean [797] it influenced in some way the development of succeeding plans, but I never heard any more about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at that time we did not have an embargo on, did we, in October of 1940? That did not come until July 25, was it not, in 1941?

I notice the "B" item here is:

Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.

C. Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and America.

At that time we did not have an embargo on, did we?

Admiral RICHARDSON. As far as I know, we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any embargo prior to sometime in July of 1941?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I do not remember when the embargoes, any embargoes were placed, but there was either a limitation on the shipment of aviation gasoline under consideration or in effect before I relinquished command of the fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did I understand you to say that you said something to the Secretary of the Navy about—that this would mean war or would not mean war, if you put this into effect that he had suggested?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I thought it would mean war, and I so stated to the Secretary.

[798] Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us his reply to that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, he said that he didn't know whether the President meant war or not. And I further stated that the fleet was not ready for any such plan—was not ready for war.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you told the Secretary of the Navy that you were not in position to put this plan that he was putting up to you into effect?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; I never stated that I couldn't put it into effect. I could have tried it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the substance of what you said to him?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That in my opinion it would mean war; in my opinion we would lose the ships; and in my opinion we couldn't stop trade between South America and Japan without being in trouble with both of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything else you can add to what you have said that took place at that time in relation to this embargo or patrol of the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; except as I stated before that the Secretary stated, if you are unwilling, deem it inadvisable, highly inadvis-

able to establish this line of ships to shut off trade between Japan and America, draw up a plan by which you would shut off such trade, if ordered to do so.

[799] Senator FERGUSON. That is the plan?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is the plan.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read this over and come back to it.

Will you refer to your long-hand letter of January 26, 1940, please? It is the part where you are talking of Admiral Leahy as "Bill Leahy." Do you have your letter, Admiral?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where you say:

I use to say to Bill Leahy "be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to be drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they cannot leave us in the lurch."

There is a possibility that this constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

Now, do you remember that part? Whom were you talking about—"the boss"?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The President of the United States, who is also known as the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy by the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is a paragraph in that same letter, on the first page:

When this understanding was reached it had some value, [800] but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about two and one-half continents.

What were you talking about there?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well that might be some slight exaggeration.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you exaggerating about?

Admiral RICHARDSON. About the 2½ continents. But my recollection of that is this, that Rear Admiral Royal R. Ingersoll—I think that is his initial—Royal Ingersoll anyway, then a rear admiral, had made a trip to London to have some exploratory conferences with the British Admiralty, because if there appears a possibility of nations being associated, it is always customary, in my opinion for the military or the naval staffs to discuss with each other what might happen if such association becomes a reality, so they would not be taken by surprise.

So I was expressing my understanding of the meaning of exploratory discussions between the Navy Department and the British Admiralty, as what might be considered by them as reasonable steps to be taken if the United States and Great Britain should become associated in an effort.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time Admiral Ingersoll held what position in the United States Navy?

[801] Admiral RICHARDSON. I am not certain, but I believe at least there is a possibility, that he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time? It was Admiral Stark, was it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Admiral Stark; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you had been saying to Bill Leahy, as you describe him—Admiral Leahy—what position did he hold in the Navy when you were telling him to "impress the boss"?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, when the China incident started, Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations and I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what base were you speaking about in that letter?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My recollection is that it was Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, we were to have the use of the base at Singapore?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And what were we to do for that use? You expressed it as "protect two and a half continents," which you now say was a slight exaggeration. But what were we to do?

[802] Admiral RICHARDSON. What I meant was this, that when this understanding of what might take place in the event of closer association between the United States and Great Britain that we would have the use, in case we were drawn into the war, would have the use of Singapore, and we would have the assistance of the British in the Western Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Assistance to do what?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, this was all—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). I understand.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Drawn on the assumption.

Senator FERGUSON. In your letter here you stated that we were to, in case the agreement went through, we were to have Singapore as a base for at least part of our Fleet; is that correct?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was our part in that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it was all based on the assumption that we would be drawn into the war as an associate of Great Britain, and she would be occupied, and we would have the rest of the bag to hold.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you explain what you mean by "the rest of the bag"? What would we be holding?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, we would be protecting North America, South America, and Australia.

[803] Senator FERGUSON. This was in January 1940, was it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. 1940.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that Admiral Ingersoll did go to London; is that correct?

[804] Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what month or what time he went to London?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I don't remember. I have forgotten.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the war games of 1932 that were discussed in the Reader's Digest, I believe, in an article?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I was in it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether or not he put on a war game wherein we took airplane carriers north of the Hawaiian Islands and made an attack from those carriers?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the opinion of the judges?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1932? I was in command of the U. S. S. *Augusta* at that time and I played such a minor part in that that my memory is not vivid and whatever I might try to say would be wholly memory, and while I think I have a good memory, it isn't that good.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, when you were commander-in-chief of the Fleet did you have any enemies—they were not an enemy at that time—but any submarines that were near Pearl Harbor that did not belong to the United States?

[805] Admiral RICHARDSON. That is, in my opinion, largely a matter of opinion. I had several reports from destroyer patrols of the presence of foreign submarines in that area, their opinion being derived from underwater or sound of supersonic listening devices and at one time, particularly on the 16th of December, the presence of a submarine in the prohibited area right off the entrance to Pearl Harbor was reported to me. This report was believed by several officers, including the commander of the destroyer, the sound officer, the commander of destroyers, about three-fourths of my staff, but it was not believed by me and two other officers on my staff and we later proved to everybody else that all the manifestations of the existence of a submarine at that time could be attributed to something else.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was that reported to Washington, do you know, or after you decided that you thought it was a false alarm did you just forget the incident?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I do not remember whether that was reported or not but at that time I issued an order for the destroyers to drop depth charges on any such contacts they made and then after further consideration, without being influenced by any superior authority, I rescinded that order; but in looking over this correspondence I do find in one letter somewhere that Admiral Stark said to me that he regretted [806] the destroyer had not followed the contact for a longer period and I think that referred to another reported contact with a submerged submarine, the contact having been lost after several hours.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume, then, that you never had occasion to use the depth bombs on any subs and that you revoked the order. Now, was a copy of that order sent to Washington?

Admiral RICHARDSON. So far as I know, no; it was not. Well, I am certain it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. When you gave yesterday the conversation that you had at the White House with the President and Admiral Leahy did you finish reading your entire statement?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall anything more that took place at that conversation?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No. In a conversation of the length of 2 hours, some of it about Puerto Rico, some of it about the fleet, some of it about a selection system, some of it about retiring officers, it is impossible to remember more than what impressed one at the time as being of grave import.

Senator FERGUSON. You had some very definite opinions on the subject that you were discussing with the President, did you not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

[807] Senator FERGUSON. And he had some very definite opinions on the subject that he was discussing with you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you tell us—or, first, you told us, as near as you can state it, what the President had said. Will you state, as near as you can, what you said to the President? Did you make a written memo based on that? I thought that you—

Admiral RICHARDSON. I read that for you yesterday. Shall I read it again?

Senator FERGUSON. What you said to the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you anything to add to that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, did you hear from the President on that subject again?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I never heard from the President again and never saw him again.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when was that conversation at the White House in relation to your conversation with the Secretary of the Navy about the convoys—or not convoys—patrols? Was the White House conversation prior to the one that you had with the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary Knox? This exhibit that you passed to me is dated October 16, 1940. [808] What was the date you were at the White House?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I was at the White House on the 8th of October. The conversation with the Secretary of the Navy with respect to the opening of the Burma Road and the line of patrol ships was on the 11th. I left Washington—no, it was on the 10th.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at the time you were at the White House and talked with Admiral Leahy and the President you did not know anything about this patrol that the Secretary of the Navy discussed with you on the 10th or the 11th?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely not.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. And I was amazed with the presentation of facts made by the Secretary, but everything is influenced by after-knowledge. I assume now that the question of fuel oil at Samoa might have had some relation to the intention to establish this patrol, or the prospective consideration.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now that some part of your discussion with the President brought up this subject of the patrol?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I feel fairly certain that nothing that I said or did had anything to do with creating the idea that the establishment of this patrol should be undertaken.

[809] Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss this patrol question with anyone in the Secretary of the Navy—or no, pardon me, the Secretary of State's office?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with Dr. Hornbeck?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; although I saw him after that.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not discuss it with him?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, insofar as I know, I did not discuss it with him, but at about that time, and I think—well, I know—on the 10th of October 1940 I had sent Dr. Stanley Hornbeck a part of my memorandum of September 12, 1940 which I had given to the Secretary of the Navy and it is possible and highly probable that I discussed with him some of the contents of this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire now from counsel whether or not we have any data or memorandums or any information of Dr. Hornbeck upon this question, any memo that he may have written after he talked with Admiral Richardson? As I understand it, it is the custom of the State Department after they have a conversation they record that conversation in a memorandum.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have asked for all their material on that, and nothing of that kind has come forward as yet. We have not received all that we have asked for.

[810] Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you inquire specifically for that? I would like to defer that question for the time being.

Were you ready for a question, Admiral?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I am humiliated to be compelled to request that I be permitted to change a statement which I have made here. I made it honestly but it is a mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral RICHARDSON. After a further search of the records of the dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark I find that I did receive a reply to my inquiry about the alert of the Hawaiian Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. And this is my dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us the date?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes. The dispatch from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations dated 22 June 1940 read as follows [reading:]

Commanding General Hawaiian Department received orders War Department placing forces on alert against hostile trans-Pacific raid and since no information received Navy Department have assumed this exercise. Navy patrol planes are participating.

[811] In testimony that I gave somewhere I stated that I had received no reply, but it appears that I did receive a reply which reads [reading:]

War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue cooperation.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, Admiral, that it was not a war game or practice alert, would it? What would you say about that reply?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I will say that I was completely wrong, because this is the first time—

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking now. I realize that and we are glad to have you correct your testimony, but would this order that you read indicate that it was not a war game that was going on but it was something that was considered both by the War Department and the Secretary of State's office?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It indicates that to my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. That being true, how do you account for the Army being alerted and the Navy not? What is the date of that last instrument that you read?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The dispatches that I have read apparently are contained in a report of Admiral Hewitt's investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, Admiral, whether you were [812] a witness before Admiral Hewitt? His investigation took place after May of 1945.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I know that I was not a witness.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not a witness?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; and this is the first that I have seen of any part of his report.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you just make the record clear now? What refreshed your memory? One of your officers gave you this information, did he?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He just handed it to me now.

Senator FERGUSON. He just handed it to you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, reading that, can you account for the fact that the Navy was not alerted and the Army was alerted?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That passes my comprehension.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked, Admiral, the date of those two communications.

Admiral RICHARDSON. They are both dated 22 June.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I see that the hour of recess has come and I have considerably more. Do you want to adjourn at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[813] (Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Tuesday, November 20, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, November 21, 1945.)

[814]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (Room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[815] TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson, you were in the process of examining Admiral Richardson. You may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson—

Admiral RICHARDSON. Could I make an opening statement with respect to the testimony of yesterday?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have not had an opportunity to verify whatever evidence there is in official records with respect to dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark regarding the Army alert, and, therefore, I request that the members of the committee hold in abeyance their judgment on that subject until I have had an opportunity to search the original records.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be glad to grant you that privilege, Admiral Richardson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson, I want to speak to you about this instrument that you handed to me yesterday which I did not have time to read yesterday, dated October the 16th, 1940.

I ask counsel when he received a copy of that, when the committee received a copy of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Senator, the Admiral tells me [816] that he handed me not the one you have but this document here, which is a copy of it, 2 or 3 days ago. I had it in my files. I had not studied it myself or felt that it was pertinent to what I was inquiring of him about so I did not pursue it further.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there is no question about that. I just wanted to know when you had received it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't think the committee has had it at all yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, counsel has had it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, yes; in the way I state.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the Admiral may use the one copy and I will use the other, so that we will know that we are talking about the same thing.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a copy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume, Admiral Richardson, that that exhibit—and might we have it marked exhibit—what is the last exhibit number, General?

Mr. MITCHELL. This will be Exhibit 11.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 11.

Mr. MITCHELL. A communication dated October 16, 1940, directed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet by [817] the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson, the first three pages, if you will refer to it, were written by you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was.

Senator FERGUSON. And written about the time of October the 16th, 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Approximately on that date.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you know whether it was written on the flagship *New Mexico*?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this is the instrument that you indicated as being delivered to Admiral Hart, Thomas C. Hart, Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And what is the last page on this Exhibit 11 dated? The same day, October the 11th? The photostat does not give the initialing or writing at the top—at least on mine it does not. Does it on yours?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It says:

Secret, October the 11th, 1940:

U. S. Fleet Dispositions and Operations to Meet Special Situation in Western Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read it?

[818] Admiral RICHARDSON (reading:)

Assumptions: The gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.

(2) The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an unfriendly act to Japan.

(3) The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.

(4) Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.

(5) The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.

(6) The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations with the Western Hemisphere.

(7) The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific—in Australia and Singapore—and Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea—Celebes Sea area.

(8) The United States is prepared to accept war [819] if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.

(9) Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis powers.

(10) The situation and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October 1940.

[820] Senator FERGUSON. Let us speak about the last, No. 10, that "The situation and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940."

As I understand it, you wrote this memo that you just read.

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did write it? Where did you get it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. May I explain?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I want you to explain.

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Secretary of the Navy directed me and Stark to draw up a plan of action should decision be reached to stop trade between Japan and the Western Hemisphere.

In order to draw any war plan, you must start with some assumptions as to bases for the plan. This whole document which I have read is nothing but the assumptions that the officers who drew up this plan set up as the basis for their plan. It was drawn up by the officers in the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations in collaboration with me and Admiral Stark and my war plans officer, Commander Vincent R. Murphy, now rear admiral.

So that these assumptions, when I left Washington, had not been seen by the Secretary of the Navy or by the President of the United States, neither one of whom was in Washington [821] that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this the substance of what you had received from the Secretary of the Navy a few days previous?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was our joint conception of what the Secretary informed us the day before, on October 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and you made a memo of what he informed you, and this is the memo?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I made no memorandum. I did not write one word of this. It was drawn up by the War Plans officers of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in collaboration with the War Plans officer of the United States Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he get the information to put in this document?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He was present—all of them were present when the discussion was had with the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say then that this represented a fair statement of what the Secretary of the Navy said to you at a previous date?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir; this is a more formally stated, comprehensive presentation of the assumptions arising from what he did state to us.

[822] Senator FERGUSON. Getting to the date of the 17th of October, can you explain that any more?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The 17th of October?

Senator FERGUSON. It is on the last line, the No. 10 item.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That was the day that Great Britain was to reopen the Burma Road, and it was thought that the Japs, or the Japanese, might take some aggressive action in connection with the reopening of the Burma Road.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know about when Admiral Hart received this instrument?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Of my own knowledge, I do not know, but I think it entirely possible that I may have somewhere among my papers a letter from Admiral Hart written in December, informing me that he had received this document.

Senator FERGUSON. Now when the document went to Admiral Hart, it had the sheet on it which you read; is that correct?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Had what?

Senator FERGUSON. It had the sheet on that you read? The last sheet was on it when you sent it to Admiral Hart?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, absolutely. It is Enclosure A in this letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Will you now read your letter which you wrote on the flagship *New Mexico*, October 16, 1940.

[823] Admiral RICHARDSON. May I have your copy? That is my own copy and it is clearer than this photostatic copy.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask you what these things are on the margin.

Admiral RICHARDSON. You can see them better on that copy.

Senator FERGUSON. I will use this one. Before you read it, on the last page where your signature appears, at the top is 01 in the margin and a line drawn. Do you know what that means?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The numbers in the right-hand margin of the last page of the letter indicate numbers of my staff. 01 is the chief of staff. The initial which is rather indistinct is "T" for Taffender, who is rear admiral, who was my chief of staff. 11 is the operations officer. "B" stands for Beery, Rear Adm. Bernard H. Beery, then captain. 16 is the war plans officer. VRM stands for Vincent R. Murphy.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would those lines crossed through those numbers indicate that those respective officers had seen this instrument prior to sending it, or signing it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Those marks are the initials of the officers, and the initials I recognize as their own.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it indicate, when the line is [824] drawn through their number, that they have seen the instrument?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My memory is not definite on that, but the line, I think, means that they are to see it, and an initial indicates that they have seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you read that instrument?

Admiral RICHARDSON. This is "CinC File No. A16/01687."

Long Beach, California. October 16, 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

Subject: International Situation—Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of Assumptions. (B) Copy of Tentative Operations.

1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road the following:

[825] (a) Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peacetime move.

(b) Declaring a complete embargo in shipments to and from Japan.

(c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line

roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations' office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.

2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in regard to the memorandum referred to above, [826] but received a dispatch today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to you via the *Houston*. It is believed that further study in the Department and in the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions might have a deterring effect on ORANGE full scale operations in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by the dispatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations in the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department, that no Army forces would be available and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

[827] 6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or decision is not reached to dispatch the Advance Detachment before that time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transports in West Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise, utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is done, the reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place coincidentally with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests. I presume you will be further informed of this eventuality as plans are more fully developed.

7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and preparation of the tentative detachment slated for reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to you by clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON with this letter.

8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything under your name? I [828] see some marks here which are illegible.

Admiral RICHARDSON. "Copy to OPNAV via air mail. This copy to be acknowledged by dispatch"—no, "This copy acknowledged by dispatch 132,000 of October" something blank "1940". It is very vague.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence now Exhibit 11, two parts of which have been read, so that the other part will be in. It is the Enclosure (B). Let it all be contained in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be inserted at this point as Exhibit No. 11.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 11".)

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson, do you have any comment to make on this document Exhibit 11 that I may not have covered, anything that you may want to put in the record to clarify it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no comment on it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. During your tenure as Commander in Chief did we have any convoys in the Pacific?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Only on one occasion was a single ship convoyed by a ship under my command from Pearl Harbor to [829] Guam, from Guam to Cavite, by a ship under the command of Admiral Hart, and the ship on her return voyage was convoyed in like manner from Cavite to Guam and from Guam to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall the name of that ship? Do you recall that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My memory is not certain, but I believe it was the *Chaumont*.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the occasions were for convoying that ship?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received orders to escort her to Guam, to have the escort await for her return, that she would be escorted from Guam to Cavite by a ship from the Asiatic Fleet and likewise escorted from Cavite to Guam by a ship from the Asiatic Fleet, and escorted from Guam to Honolulu by the escort which accompanied her outward bound. I have no information or knowledge—or I had no information or knowledge at the time as to why she was escorted, what she was guarded against, or what her cargo was.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you received an order?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations directing me to—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). From the CNO?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The CNO.

[830] Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel, do we have a copy of that dispatch?

Mr. MITCHELL. I doubt it because I have never seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson, do you know where we could locate a copy of the dispatch to you to convoy that ship, and could you give us about the date of it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have frequently endeavored to recall when this incident occurred, and I have, unfortunately, no record in any of my papers as to the time. Any statement I made would be a pure guess, but I should say around—

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). After the instrument of October 11 that we just read?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My guess would be that it was in December of that year, because I received a dispatch to escort her when I was in the Hawaiian area. I did not return to the Hawaiian area until the 6th of December 1940, so my guess is that it would be within the month of December 1940.

[831] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not you wrote any letters about it? Is it mentioned in any of this correspondence that we have?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I wrote no letters about it. I sent a dispatch, however, to the Chief of Naval Operations and inquired as to whether the escorting of this ship indicated an intention to escort all U. S. Government vessels, or an intention later to escort all United States flag vessels. That is, ships flying the American flag.

I promptly received a reply from the Chief of Naval Operations saying, "Negative to your inquiry."

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only knowledge you have about that convoy that you have given us, that you recall?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have an impression; I cannot state as an absolute certainty, that after I was relieved and after I returned to Washington, purely as a matter of curiosity I asked the then Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, as to why I was ordered to escort this vessel, and he stated that it was rumored that there were German raiders operating in the mid-Pacific area within the Marshall Islands or north thereof and that I was directed to escort this vessel to protect her against possible attack by German raiders.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything else you wish to add to that?

[832] Admiral RICHARDSON. No. That is as complete an answer as I can give.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that you stated you left the position as commander in chief of the fleet February 1, 1941.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you at that time were succeeded by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you also stated that he was a commanding officer under you in charge of cruisers?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He was a type commander, not commanding officer, because with us commanding officers command a single ship.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. Now, do you know how Admiral Kimmel came to succeed you; have you any information on that you could give the committee?

Admiral RICHARDSON. When I was in Washington in October 1940, in conversation with Admiral Stark and Admiral Nimitz, who was then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Bureau of Naval Personnel, I stated that in my opinion they should have in mind the names of officers whom they would consider favorably as the relief of all of the important officers in the fleet, as any officer of the age of most of the flag officers of senior rank might break down in health or might be detached [833] for other reasons, and that in order that they might not be taken unawares I thought they should have a tentative slate of prospective reliefs, and they agreed with me and asked me to suggest the names of possible reliefs.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any suggestions?

Admiral RICHARDSON. After some consideration I submitted a list of names and in that list was the name of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us who else was in the list?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I do not remember with certainty, and I hoped I would not be required to answer that question, because I have very many friends in the Navy and I would hate for them, any of them, to feel that their name was not on that list.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no desire to press for an answer.

About how many were in the list, so that they may feel that they were included?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think probably five or six.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what was your suggestion——

Admiral RICHARDSON. Just a minute.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Much to my surprise, and as evidence [834] of how uncertain some testimony may be after 5 years, I thought that in that letter I stated that I had not included Admiral King's name, because he was already afloat in the Pacific—I mean in the Atlantic—but in looking over some old papers I was surprised to find this entry, 29 October, letter from Nimitz agreeing to King's shift up if I had to be taken out.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have in mind when you made that suggestion about replacement of officers that you might be replaced in the very near future?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Not by one of the names that you mentioned.

Admiral RICHARDSON. When I left Washington in October, Admiral Stark and Admiral Nimitz informed me that it was their belief that I would remain in command until I completed 2 years' service as commander in chief, and I had no reason for suggesting this excepting that when a man is over 60, in a strenuous job, he might not hold out.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the normal tour of duty —— is that how you express it in the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is how we express it, but there is no such thing, because there have been officers remain Commander in Chief one year; there have been officers remain two years. My predecessor remained, I think, 2 years.

[835] Senator FERGUSON. The normal, you would say, then, is 2 years—average?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it was not normal for a number of years, and I believe that a feeling grew up in the Navy that a 1-year tenure of office was too short, and there was a tendency, as exemplified by actual practice, to extend the cruise of a commander in chief to 2 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Was 13 months an average tour of duty?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I know of one or two flag officers who were detached as commander in chief after 1 year.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say the commander in chief, that would be in the same position as you were?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Same way.

Senator FERGUSON. Was seniority recognized in the Navy, for instance as it is recognized in the Senate, that the next in line would take your position?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Seniority is recognized in the Navy in the assignment of officers to duty up to and including that of captain, but in the selection of officers for flag assignments an effort is made to base assignments on an estimate of the officer's ability rather than upon his lineal position on the list.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how long of a notice did you have that you were going to be removed, when you were commander in chief of the fleet? [836]

Admiral RICHARDSON. I received a dispatch on 5 January, about 11:30 in the morning Honolulu time, Sunday.

Senator FERGUSON. And from whom did you receive that dispatch?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am not positive. I think it came from the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, who was Admiral Nimitz, and was charged with the preparation of all orders, but it came to me in a secret code that was held by no one in the fleet except me, and the reason it was in a secret code was that the same message involved many other changes of flag officers, and I was directed in the message to inform all of the officers concerned but to inform no one else in a public release of the impending changes made.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the first public release that you were retired from that position as commander in chief of the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My recollection is that it was on the 6th of January or possibly the 7th, Tuesday.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who made that release?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it come from Hawaii or did it come from Washington?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I read it in the newspapers in [837] Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever discuss your retirement from that particular position with anyone in the service, I mean in the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. May I correct the word. It was not a retirement.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was relief or detachment.

Senator FERGUSON. Detachment. Did you ever discuss that detachment with anyone?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did not—yes. I discussed it with one official in the Navy Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us who that official was?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us your discussion with him about your detachment?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I said to the Secretary upon reporting here—

Senator FERGUSON. First, will you give us about the date, if you can, Admiral.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, my orders directed me, my orders detaching me from command of the United States Fleet directed me to report to the Secretary of the Navy for duty. I reported, as nearly as I can remember, on the 24th day of [838] March, 1941. I can verify that date.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is near enough.

Admiral RICHARDSON. By the Secretary of the Navy I was ordered on 25 March 1941 to report to duty with the General Board. When I went in to report to the Secretary of the Navy I said, in effect, in my experience in the Navy I have never known of a flag officer being detached from command of the United States Fleet in the same manner that I was, and I feel that I owe it to myself to inquire why I was detached, and he stated that the President would send for me and talk the matter over with me.

[839] Senator FERGUSON. Did the President ever send for you and talk the matter over with you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever seek to go to the President on the matter after being told that he would send for you?

Admiral RICHARDSON. By no means.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any other discussion with the Secretary of the Navy—the Secretary at that time was Mr. Knox, was it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any other discussion about your detachment? Will you give us the full story?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, I had no more discussion about my detachment. I had some discussion about my duty, to which I was to be assigned.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us something about the duties? Was it a promotion that you were going to; was this general board a promotion?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, no.

In accordance with the law, upon detachment from the position of commander in chief of the United States Fleet, I reverted from the rank of admiral to that of rear admiral, and from being senior to many people to whom I had been [840] senior only temporarily I reverted to my normal position on the Navy list.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the duty of this general board?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it was a board that has been held in high esteem by many people for many years. It is a board of senior officers of the Navy that consider matters referred to it by the Secretary of the Navy and advise him on any subject that is referred to them. The primary duty in time of peace was the consideration and recommendation as to the building program, and the type and characteristics of the ships to be built.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation with the Secretary of the Navy that would indicate that he knew why you were detached?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He said to me, "The last time you were here you hurt the President's feelings."

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say what the occasion was that you had hurt the President's feelings?

Admiral RICHARDSON. He did not say.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him.

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know on what occasion you could have hurt the President's feelings?

[841] Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it would hurt my feelings if a senior subordinate under me disagreed with me and I couldn't make him change his mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you feel that probably the conversation that you had then on the—was it the 8th of October at a luncheon with Admiral Leahy and the President—was the occasion that you may have hurt his feelings?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the occasion that you told us that you were rather definite in your opinions?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Unfortunately, I am definite in most of my opinions.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any other conversation with the Secretary of the Navy as to why you were removed—Pardon me—detached. I want to use that word instead of “removed.” Detached.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, may I say something off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record).

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement made by the Admiral, it is apparent that he doesn't think that is material and pertinent and I seriously doubt whether [842] we should go fishing in every direction here in view of the Admiral's last statement.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have no humility about making this statement. I am perfectly willing to make it, if it is useful. It is a trivial thing.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks probably the Admiral had better finish.

Admiral RICHARDSON. There is a requirement in the Navy that on every annual fitness—I mean on every fitness report submitted, an officer indicates his preference for duty, and inasmuch as I had been informed that I would remain at sea longer if that were carried out, I would have only a short time remaining on the active list when I was detached, and therefore I did not want to move my household effects from Washington to some naval station. I did not want to be assigned to a responsible position in the Department for only a short time, and really, as a joke, I entered on my last fitness report that I preferred duty on the Naval Examining Board.

In all my experience in the Navy—and I have had 4 years in the Bureau of Navigation, charged with assigning officers to duty, I never heard of anyone looking at a fitness report of a flag officer to see where they would assign him to duty. So before I reported to the Secretary, I read [843] in the paper, or heard a rumor, that I was to be assigned to the Naval Examining Board in accordance with my request, and when I reported to the Secretary, I said, “Mr. Secretary, I have reported for duty. I am willing to do any duty that can in any way contribute to the preparation of the Navy for war, but having heard or read a rumor that I was going to the examining board at my request I want to tell you that if I am ordered to the examining board, I am going there gladly, willingly, rather. I will do the job to the limit of my ability, but if a press release is made that I was assigned to the examining board at my request, I will inform the press that it is a lie.”

He said, “Well, Admiral, you, of course, won't go to the examining board. Where do you want to go?”

And I said, “Any other place you send me.”

So I went to the general board.

The CHAIRMAN. That completes that statement? That is all there is to that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, had you put on a long-distance reconnaissance at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I had, Senator Ferguson, and I think in the previous testimony I have covered it as com- [844] prehensively as I can.

Senator FERGUSON. You have given us all of the data on that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have anything to do with the reconnaissance orders or directives as of 1941, that is what I was getting at. Were you consulted in relation to that after you left?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I discontinued prior to my detachment long-range reconnaissance of the type that I established upon arrival in the Hawaiian area, and in lieu thereof I established a search of the operating areas and a search off the entrance of Pearl Harbor before ships left the harbor. That was incorporated in a security order which was in process of revision when I was detached.

The first order, that revision, that was issued after I was detached, was issued over the signature of Admiral Kimmel on 15 February, and I knew what was in that order, and I previously stated that had I remained there, while I had not read this order thoroughly, it is my belief, based on the fact that the officer who prepared it on my staff remained with Admiral Kimmel until after that order was issued, it is my belief that had I remained there the order would have been substantially as it is now, and would have [845] been over my signature.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the places that you could anchor the fleet? What places were there to anchor this fleet at the Hawaiian Islands?

Admiral RICHARDSON. The main anchorages were within Pearl Harbor, in Lahaina Roads off the Island of Molokai, and for carriers, off Oahu, between the entrance to Pearl Harbor and Diamond Head, and small vessels used Hilo and Kahoolawe.

Senator FERGUSON. Was all anchorage considered open anchorage except Pearl Harbor?

Admiral RICHARDSON. All were open anchorages, except that it was possible for small ships to enter the harbor of Hilo and enter Kahoolawe.

Senator FERGUSON. The antiaircraft protection was placed to cover what anchorage? Lahaina Roads or Pearl Harbor?

Admiral RICHARDSON. There was no antiaircraft protection any place except Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time that you left did you consider the antiaircraft protection sufficient to protect the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral RICHARDSON. By no means. I so indicated in my endorsement on the letter that was prepared by Admiral [846] Bloch under date of 30 December 1940, my endorsement being dated 4 January 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. When we were given maps here, we were shown that the fleet was—that the battleships were moored in pairs. Do you know why that would be? Is that the way you kept them?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is the only way you could get them in the Harbor. There wasn't room for putting the ships at individual berths.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was so congested that it was necessary to put them in pairs?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That was habitual practice.

Senator FERGUSON. Could they have been placed in any other position, all the fleet as we have seen it on these plats?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No, there were not separate berths adequate to berth each big ship separately.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you start, during the period that you had the fleet at Pearl Harbor, to place it in shape for active duty, war duty?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did everything within my power to make the officers and men of the fleet become war-minded, and one great deterrent of my effective accomplishment of that aim was the fact that many officers who were long-time friends [847] would say, in effect, "Joe, we cannot be on the verge of war, otherwise they would give us enough men to man the ships."

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me who told you that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. One specifically will be a witness before this committee, I think, possibly. His name is John Henry Newton. I think his rank is vice admiral.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you say that the fleet was a liability or an asset in the defense of Pearl Harbor, being in the Harbor, was it a liability or an asset?

Admiral RICHARDSON. You are not on very safe ground in expressing an opinion 5 years or 4 years after the occurrence of an event in hopes that your mind will not be conditioned by after-knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you wouldn't want to give an opinion on that question at the present time.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I prefer not to.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

You have had considerable experience in the Far East in your previous years in service, you stated?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. After you were retired as Commander in Chief, was that experience utilized in any way?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Not to my knowledge.

[848] Senator FERGUSON. You were not consulted on any matters in the Far East?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. After the 5th of January when you received your first notice of detachment, did you confer with anyone in the State Department?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Between that time and the time of my detachment?

Senator FERGUSON. No; after your detachment, did you confer on any questions with anyone in the State Department officially?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, no; I had no official standing that would entitle me to confer with anybody in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not consulted by anyone in the State Department?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Not on official business; no.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral, I have just one question that I think hasn't been pursued fully.

You were asked yesterday by Senator Ferguson as to Naval games or maneuvers early in 1932 or 1936.

Admiral RICHARDSON. In 1932, I think, only.

[849] Mr. KEEFE. 1932?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think only 1932.

Mr. KEEFE. Only 1932.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. In which simulated attacks by air power were made upon Pearl Harbor.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. But the matter was not pursued so that I have any very definite ideas as to just what the conclusion of those Naval games was.

Now, there would be a record maintained, would there not, of the character of the simulated attack upon Pearl Harbor at that time?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Undoubtedly. I cannot recall the part that I played in fleet exercises of 1932, but I know that at that time I was the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Augusta*, which was the flagship of the scouting force, and that ship participated in whatever exercises we had.

I do not remember what those exercises were in the Hawaiian area, but I believe there must have been a simulated air raid. I know that on return to the United States, the task force to which the *Augusta* was assigned, did conduct a simulated air raid on the west coast of California, somewhat north of Santa Barbara. However, I know that many carrier [850] raids against Pearl Harbor have been simulated previous to the 1941 fleet exercises.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Admiral, the purpose of conducting those maneuvers and those exercises and simulated attacks is for the benefit of the fleet in considering the defense of Pearl Harbor, in connection with the Army?

Admiral RICHARDSON. No; the purpose was primarily to exercise the Army in Hawaii and the local Naval defense forces which was composed of submarines, long-range patrol planes, and in the War Plans—

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me, Admiral. What I am getting at is this. Judges were appointed to judge the effectiveness of the attack in those cases, were they not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My impression is that we did not have umpires to determine the success or the failure of the attack, but at the conclusion of every fleet exercise, there was what is called a critique attended by all senior officers and at which those who played an important part in exercises present their views as to what took place and what lessons were learned and the commander in chief himself sums up his conception of how well the job was done and how much was learned and what mistakes were made.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, is a record kept and filed with anybody for future study?

[851] Admiral RICHARDSON. The whole thing is printed.

Mr. KEEFE. Printed by whom?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Printed in a document and sent to the Naval War College or the Chief of Naval Operations, or should be.

Mr. KEEFE. If there were maneuvers in 1932 and subsequent to that time when simulated attacks by air were made upon Oahu and Pearl Harbor within Oahu there would be some place in the Navy Department a printed report showing the actual character of those attacks and the summaries?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is my belief.

[852] Mr. KEEFE. Have we such reports, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, there was laid on my desk this morning at 10 minutes to 10 from the Navy Department a document which I think is the report or material on the 1932 war game.

Mr. KEEFE. Is it a voluminous report?

Mr. MITCHELL. I haven't had time to examine it. I came in only about 5 minutes before I came to the committee room this morning. I understand that the Army's report of this game, of some of the 1932 games, is already in the hands of Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I will be very glad to have it sent from my office. I just received it recently. I haven't had the time to study it.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask counsel whether or not there are any records or files in the hands of the committee showing the results of any war maneuvers or simulated attacks on Pearl Harbor subsequent to 1932 and prior to 1941?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think not. We have asked for them but we have not received them. I asked the Admiral about the war games of 1940 when I examined him and his information was not as definite as we wanted. We have asked for the report of 1940 in so far as, I think, they relate to attacks on Pearl Harbor.

[853] Mr. KEEFE. Will that report be made available to the individual members of the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. As soon as we get it we will let you have it.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, could the Admiral make a statement?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I know that in the annual fleet exercise He apparently has one in mind.

while I was commander in chief there was no simulated carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. I also know that many such attacks have been simulated in preceding years. Some times they have one of these simulated attacks and some years they do not have them, so that I could not state which years they had them.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, one other question, Admiral. Prior to the time that you took the fleet from the West coast to conduct manoeuvres in 1940, I believe in January—

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think the 1st of April.

Mr. KEEFE. The 1st of April?

Admiral RICHARDSON. When I took them out.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Prior to that time the base of the fleet had always been at San Diego and San Pedro, do I so understand your testimony, except the Hawaiian detachment and the Asiatic Fleet, perhaps?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, "always" is a long time. [854] Within my memory we had practically no ships in the Pacific. I never served in the Pacific except on the Asiatic station, until I went out there in the *Augusta* about 1932, so that in 30 years service I was never on duty in the Pacific Ocean except when I was on the Asiatic station.

From 1932 until 1940 the normal bases of the fleet were in the San Pedro, Long Beach, and San Diego areas.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I want to ask you a question or two prompted by other questions.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In this October 10th or 11th memorandum in which you set out a number of assumptions from which war plans were based, those were all theoretical assumptions?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Wholly.

The CHAIRMAN. And did any of this materialize while you were in command?

Admiral RICHARDSON. My recollection is that that never materialized. They opened the Burma Road and the Japanese never did disturb us or the British very much, so that the plan was never implemented.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, let me ask you this question: While you were in command had the practice arisen of having the fleet go into Pearl Harbor periodically for recreation [855] or for any other reasons?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, yes. In fact, it is probable that there were more ships in Pearl Harbor in December 1940 than there were in December 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. So that this was a recognized practice of the fleet to assemble in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral RICHARDSON. A ship cannot remain at sea or anchored out in the open roadstead all the time. They must go in now and then for replenishment of provisions, for recreation, for upkeep, disabling engines if necessary and for the material maintenance of the ships and it was my custom for ships to go in periodically, all of them, not at the same time but for every ship to have a turn in Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. In the correspondence between Admiral Stark and you, all through it is emphasized the caution in regard to practices or exercises or maneuvers to do nothing that would create the impression of any offensive step being taken with reference to Orange, which I understand is Japan.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And in your conferences here in Washington with the Secretary of the Navy and with Admiral Stark and with the President was any further emphasis placed upon that precaution in connection with your exercises and maneuvers?

[856] Admiral RICHARDSON. No; because I had been so thoroughly indoctrinated with that idea over a great many years that I needed no further instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That is, of course, I presume, always a precaution that the Navy takes and always takes regardless of circumstances under which it exercises and maneuvers, that it is not to be understood as an offensive action against any country?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, in your statement about the meeting at the White House October 8, 1940, you quoted the President or said in effect, and I am reading from the record at page 684 [reading]:

That if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war.

You are quite clear that the President said that about the Philippines?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is according to my firm conviction, my best opinion and belief.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, at the time that you were at the White House we did have ships based at Manila, did we not?

[857] Admiral RICHARDSON. They were on an Asiatic station. They might or might not have been at Manila, but they were in the western Pacific area. They might have been in the southern Philippines, they might have been in Manila and some of them might have been on the China coast.

Mr. MURPHY. But what I mean is, Manila was the base of the fleet. That was its home port, wasn't it, of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Quite right.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I notice in the letter of December 23, 1940, a letter from Admiral Stark, apparently, to Admiral Hart, the following on page 2 [reading]:

In regard to your next paragraph I am completely with you and have sought at every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might say, in this connection, that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should go in maintaining our position in the Philippines seems to be changing upward. While such a change is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final on questions that arise.

Apparently the view was changing as to the Philippines.

Do you have any other thing on that subsequent to October the 8th, 1940, as to our attitude as to what would have happened if the Philippines were attacked?

[858] Admiral RICHARDSON. I have not. I have nothing further to add.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions by members of the committee

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask one or two questions.

Admiral, the question was asked you by one of the members of the committee as to whether or not in January 1940 the Pacific Fleet, of which you were in charge, was ready for war duty and you unqualifiedly answered "No, it was not."

Now, even though this may be somewhat repetitious I would like to ask you, Admiral, how many men were in the Navy under your command at that time, in January 1940, if you know?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I do not know how many men were there at that specific time but I would like to further amplify my statement regarding lack of readiness of the fleet by stating that it was as ready at that time as it had been ready in many years preceding.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. All right. Now, you stated, as I recall, the percentage of men that were attached to the battleships?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

[859] Senator LUCAS. And, as I recall, you said it was about 85 percent of its actual strength.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That had been the long custom in the Navy, to maintain about 85 percent of the required complement on board

ships because the Navy was faced with two alternatives: Based on the number of men allowed by Congress they must either limit the number of ships in commission to those that they could fully man, thereby curtailing the opportunity for officers to acquire experience in command, or they had to maintain in commission ships that could not be fully manned for war operations.

Senator LUCAS. That is correct. Now, one further question: With respect to the auxiliary equipment that would have been necessary to have placed the fleet of which you were in command upon a wartime basis, will you give to the committee just as near as you can what you believed in 1940, at that time, would have been necessary in the way of auxiliary cruisers or whatever ships were necessary and whatever implements were necessary to have had it on a war footing basis in 1940 when you were in command?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I would be unwilling to hazard without a thorough study a curbstone opinion as to the number of ships, auxiliary ships, that would have been required [860] to accompany the fleet and service it in war operations.

Senator LUCAS. Well, whatever would have been necessary in January 1940 in order to put this fleet upon a wartime basis as has been suggested here by you, that was a matter that was wholly in the hands of the Congress of the United States as to the supplying of the men and the supplying of equipment and the tools to put it on a wartime basis?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Absolutely.

Senator LUCAS. Now, one other statement that I want to read into the record here from a letter that is already in the record as one of the exhibits, and it is a letter that you wrote, Admiral, to Admiral Stark dated September the 18, 1940. The fourth paragraph of that letter says this [reading]:

During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet, and I have frequently heard officers say, "I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election."

That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

[861] Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Richardson, during the early part of your testimony you testified while you were making one of your visits to the United States during the days you were commander in chief that you picked up at San Francisco 5,000 men to take back to your fleet. Is that correct?

Admiral RICHARDSON. If I made such a statement it was erroneous. I did not pick them up at San Francisco. There were 5,000 men made available to me on the West coast ports. I think the majority of them were made available to me in the San Pedro, Long Beach, and San Diego area, although some of the 5,000 might have reported to ships that had proceeded to Mare Island and those that had proceeded to Puget Sound for repairs. The point I make is that they were not made available to me at San Francisco but on West coast ports.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. Wait a minute.

I did not want to insist on the San Francisco and I was not making any point on that. The point that I want to start from in this examination, you did obtain 5,000 additional men on the West coast?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

Mr. GEARHART. And they were taken to your fleet in the [862] Pacific?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

Mr. GEARHART. That suggests to me a question. I would like to know how many men you had with your fleet before you obtained these additional 5,000?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think it would be impossible for anyone to answer that question at this time.

Mr. GEARHART. Without endeavoring to be accurate, can you give me round figures as to what the complement and manpower would be of a fleet such as you were commanding at that time?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Congressman Gearhart, the commander in chief of a fleet, with constant changes in the number of men, with changes now and then in the number of ships, could not discharge his responsible position if he burdened his mind with such details.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you testified that your fleet was about 85 percent of what it should have been in manpower?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

Mr. GEARHART. What I am trying to find out is, how did it affect that percentage that you have fixed at 85 percent by the addition of 5,000 additional men? That is the point that I am leading up to.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, if the committee is willing [863] to accept a wild stab.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I don't think that anything you say in the way of opinion is wild. I have that much respect for your opinion.

Admiral RICHARDSON. It would be a wild stab.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, make a stab.

Admiral RICHARDSON. It would be somewhere between 1 and 7 percent.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then the 5,000 improved the situation considerably?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Five men would have improved the situation.

Mr. GEARHART. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Richardson, you were asked by a member of the committee as to whether or not it was not Congress whose duty it was to furnish men for the Navy and I think your answer was that it was.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I would like to —

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would elaborate on that.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I would like to change it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you elaborate on it or change [864] it?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It was not Congress' duty. Congress alone had the power to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, Admiral, what requests were made to Congress at or about that time for men and matériel for the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, of course, I have no knowledge but having served as director of the office of personnel, Bureau of Navigation, for almost 3 years and having been budget officer of the Navy Department for 1 year, having been assistant chief of naval operations for 1 year, having been chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel for 1 year, I know that we always asked for more men than we had any hopes of getting.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, were you acquainted with the fact that the Navy would make a request and then the Budget Director and his force would pass on it and then it would come to Congress as an estimate of the Budget Director? Are you familiar with that?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether the period that you were talking about, that it was Congress', at least, power to give more men; do you know what the Navy had requested and how much it had been reduced or increased by the [865] Budget Director?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have no knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't those figures?

Admiral RICHARDSON. But I am perfectly willing to volunteer the statement that I believe that the President had it within his power by an act of Congress to increase the number of men in the fleet faster than he did do it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you stated something that you had a conversation with someone relative to the fact that if we needed men in the Navy we could take machinists or mechanically inclined people and use them in the Navy.

Will you tell me more about that? Where did you get that idea and whom did you discuss it with?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Everything that you stated, Senator Ferguson, is in accordance with my statement except that you did not add the name of the President of the United States, which I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that you got that idea from the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you at that time discussing with the President the amount of men that you felt that you needed?

[866] Admiral RICHARDSON. I was. I discussed it with everybody. Everybody thought I was a nut on it.

Senator FERGUSON. And what month was it that you had that discussion with the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. On both occasions.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be when you had luncheon with Admiral Leahy and the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. If my memory serves me correctly, I think that I would never forego the opportunity to urge that additional men be added to the fleet. Therefore, I think I discussed the matter with the President at my meeting with him in July and also in October.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of the Navy when you received the information that is now at least partly contained in Exhibit 11 in relation to the embargo or the patrol, whichever you want to call it, in the Pacific?

[867] Admiral RICHARDSON. No; at that time, in my discussion with the Secretary of the Navy, I cannot state that I said any-

thing with respect to the inadequacies of personnel, but I did state that the fleet was not ready for action that might involve us in war, and the Secretary said, "Richardson, we have never been ready, but we have always won."

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you on that point, the only way to get men in the Navy at that time was by voluntary enlistment, is that true?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And during that period was it true that the Navy, through posters and recruiting stations and by methods that the Navy usually adopts, was seeking to urge enlistment in the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I cannot answer specifically.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral—

Admiral RICHARDSON. Do you want me to finish?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, yes. I do not want you to answer unless you feel free to do so.

Admiral RICHARDSON. When I became chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel we had on the waiting list thoroughly acceptable qualified young men that wanted to enlist in the Navy as apprentice seamen. We had 8,000 of them. Some of them had been on [868] that list for 4 or 5 months.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they later taken on the ships?

Admiral RICHARDSON. They were taken on under a quota system in accordance with their position on the waiting list as funds appropriated by the Congress made it possible for them to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel wish to ask any further questions?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Insofar as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned, what, in your opinion, would have been the difference in the attack, or the result of the attack if there had been a full complement of men on each of the ships involved?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I am not now aware of the state of personnel in the fleet 11 months after my detachment.

Mr. CLARK. Assuming it was only 85 percent of the full complement, what difference would it have made if it were a full complement?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That being the only change?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I think the difference would have been infinitesimal.

[869] Mr. CLARK. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator want to ask any more questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not quite clear, Admiral, on two of your statements to reconcile. I understood one of your answers indicated that the amount of men in the Navy was limited by the money appropriated by Congress, and in another statement you indicated that the President could have put more men on.

Now I am not undertaking to quote your testimony, but just to refresh your memory probably as to what you did say on those two items. How can we reconcile those two? The reporter may be able to read that to you.

Admiral RICHARDSON. There is no need for him to read me that, because normally Congress does not, in its annual appropriation, limit the number of men. It provides so much money.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. But there is a general limitation on the number of men. Now it is my belief, which I am certain I can verify, or it can be verified, that under legislation [870] the Congress, the President, had the authority to increase the number of men allowed in the Navy, and I believe that there were substantial appropriations made available to the President which he could allocate for purposes that were not specifically stipulated by Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. So he could have used it for increasing the Navy?

Admiral RICHARDSON. So I think he could have used it had he seen so fit.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Now if you wish—and I think it has no bearing—but if you wish I can go into this further.

Senator FERGUSON. That reconciles it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of the Admiral to the fact that subsequent to the short question which I asked him with relation to the 1932 maneuvers there has been placed before me what purports to be the report, and the preliminary reports incident to those maneuvers, consisting of a bundle of perhaps 1,000 or more pages, of the preliminary work done preparing for the maneuvers. One is a report, Copy No. 1, entitled "Confidential Report of the Chief Umpire Joint Army and Navy Exercises, Grand Joint Exercise No. 4."

[871] There is another large report entitled, "Confidential Black Report (Army) on Grand Joint Exercise No. 4, February 6-12, 1932."

Then a bound volume containing many pages which appears also to be a report, confidential, of Army participation in the grand exercise No. 4.

Now from these reports that had been furnished a few moments ago it appears quite clear that in initiating these exercises umpires were appointed by both the Army and the Navy to observe the results of those exercises and maneuvers, and to make a full and complete report, confidential in character.

Now, as commander in chief of the fleet, when you assumed command, did you have the benefit of the examination of these reports?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Not those specific ones, but later ones.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you are sure now, Admiral, that so far as the record now appears, those exercises were meticulously conducted apparently, according to a long preparation by both the Army and Navy, and that reports were filed by the umpires appointed?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I feel sure, I feel sure that I was on perfectly safe ground when I said that I thought you could find evidence of the holding of those exercises.

[872] The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, at some time or other in the course of these proceedings it would be interesting if some of us had time to read these reports. I do not know when anybody will get time, when they are presented on such short notice, but I think that question should be explored, and I assume counsel will explore it, to bring it to us in concise form so we can understand what the report of the umpires was on those maneuvers.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was going to ask if that is the 1932 maneuvers?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am frank to say I have not gone back to 1932 for maneuver reports. I supposed we were more directly interested in war games along a year or two before the Pearl Harbor attack, which would deal with simulated air attacks, and on that is where our inquiry was directed.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether these reports contain the report of a simulated air attack upon Pearl Harbor? Are they part of those maneuvers?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not know. They were brought in at the request of one member of the committee who asked for the 1932 maneuver report. If I thought that were directly involved here I would have had them long ago, I think.

[873] Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, Admiral, if I understand your testimony in response to questions by Senator Ferguson, you at one time served as Budget Officer of the Navy Department.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had experience in coming before subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have.

Mr. KEEFE. To present the Navy's budget estimate.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I have.

Mr. KEEFE. I think in your testimony yesterday you stated that you made an effort to see the chairman of that subcommittee upon one of your visits here.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. I saw one and made an effort to see the other.

Mr. KEEFE. The former Senator from Nevada, I believe.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I saw the then chairman of the Senate subcommittee, the present Secretary of State. I endeavored to see Governor Scrugham, who was at that time a Congressman and chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact, Admiral, when the Navy prepares its request in the first instance for each fiscal year it makes up the request which is submitted to the President's Bureau of the Budget first, isn't that true?

[874] Admiral RICHARDSON. The preliminary estimate made by the Navy bureaus and officers of the Navy Department are submitted to the budget officer of the Navy Department.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand that. That is the first step.

Admiral RICHARDSON. And he himself, with the approval of the Secretary, frequently reduces the estimates, in the hope that his action will preclude more drastic action by the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. KEEFE. In any event, following that the procedure is that the request from the Navy goes then to the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And you make a presentation to the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. On the Navy's request.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. After the individual departments of the Navy have submitted their request to the budget officer of the Navy he finally prepares the presentation for the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Then when the Bureau of the Budget finally acts, that budget is then submitted by the President to the [875] Congress?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. In his annual budget message. That is true, is it not?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

[876] Mr. KEEFE. And during the course of the year there may be supplementary estimates submitted?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. By the Bureau of the Budget to the Congress?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you come before the Congressional committee to present the request, do you have instructions to defend and present the budget as submitted by the President?

Admiral RICHARDSON. If my memory serves me correctly, an act of Congress provides that, as a representative of the Navy Department, I would be subject to imprisonment if I asked for funds in excess of those set up in the budget.

Mr. KEEFE. So that, as a matter of law, and as a matter of practice, the executive officers coming before a Congressional committee to present a budget support the President's Budget as submitted to the Congress?

Admiral RICHARDSON. In accordance with an act of Congress.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, have you ever examined the complete submission of estimates by the Navy Department to the Bureau of the Budget?

Admiral RICHARDSON. For what year?

Mr. KEEFE. In the fiscal years, say, 1934-41.

[877] Admiral RICHARDSON. I certainly did, in 1934-35, because I was the budget officer of the Navy, but that is the only time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might suggest that those budget estimates are matters of record which could be obtained from the Department and from the budget messages of the President and the Appropriations Committee. The Chair doubts whether the admiral could remember all of them.

Admiral RICHARDSON. I could not.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have before me, Mr. Chairman, and may I say, Admiral, figures submitted to me by the Navy Department showing in each fiscal year the appropriations requested by the Navy Department, the budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress and the amounts in each fiscal year made available by the Congress.

Now, I assume, of course, that you have no familiarity with those figures except perhaps the estimates which you examined when you were budget officer for the Navy.

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Congressman?

Mr. KEEFE. That is all at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel wish to ask further questions?

Mr. MITCHELL. I have one question of the admiral.

Admiral, you testified that following the letter from [878] Admiral Stark to you of November 22, suggesting you examine into the question of security of the fleet in port against a possible air raid, and your reply of November 28, when you got back to Pearl Harbor, you made that inquiry?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the one you described?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Which led up to the Bloch report and the Knox-Stimson letter. Had you made any study of the proposition before?

Admiral RICHARDSON. I had not.

Mr. MITCHELL. In your memorandum of September 12 to Secretary Knox in which you listed the objections that you had to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor there was no reference there or statement about peril to the fleet in part, was there?

Admiral RICHARDSON. That consideration had not arisen in my mind.

Mr. MITCHELL. So it was in your representations about basing, or your objections about basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor which you had in that document and which you presented to other officials of the Government, including the President, you had not included any point of that kind in there?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Not air raids; not protection against air raids.

[879] Mr. MITCHELL. That is the only question I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions by the committee?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a request of the admiral?

Mr. GEARHART. A request of the counsel. I would like to have the log of the U. S. S. *Wright*, the war vessel that I think was a part of Admiral Halsey's task force, the log from the 25th of November on to the fatal day of December 7.

Mr. MITCHELL. If we can get it, it will be made available.¹

Mr. GEARHART. Likewise if there is a log available of the cruiser *Helena*, which I understand was in the harbor and went through the attack.²

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask the admiral one concluding question, and that is, if he has anything now that he wants to volunteer to the committee, rather than a direct question, relative to this issue that he believes to be relevant.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was about to ask the admiral about the same thing. If the members of the committee are through with their questions, and I assume that they are, Admiral, if you have any further statement that you wish to make, the committee will be glad to receive it.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to state that I never bore any resentment toward [880]

¹ Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 125.

² Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 168.

President Roosevelt because of my detachment from command of the United States Fleet.

He was the constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. I was one of his senior subordinates; there was a difference of opinion; each of us frankly expressed his views; neither could induce the other to change his opinion; I was relieved of command of the Fleet. Had I been constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I would have taken the same action.

Because of this conviction, on January 28, 1941, 4 days before I was relieved of command of the Fleet with orders to proceed to Washington for duty, I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations by an officer, the following oral message:

The day I was made commander in chief I realized then and thereafter that the same power which made me commander in chief could unmake me at any time. When I arrive in Washington I shall keep my lips sealed and my eyes in the boat and put my weight on the oar in any duty assigned.

Living up to this resolution has resulted in the circulation of many rumors which bear little relation to fact.

I hope my testimony given here has clarified the situation to some extent.

The CHAIRMAN. On behalf of the committee, Admiral, the Chair wishes to thank you for your frank and forthright [881] testimony and to say that the Chair feels sure that every member of the committee has undoubted respect for your ability, your opinion, and your patriotism, in the diligence with which you have sought to follow your duty before the committee, as well as while you have been in the Navy of the United States.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now counsel may proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Leahy has been waiting quite a while. His engagement has been quite severe. I wonder if you could not call him right now? The committee can sit a few minutes longer.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is agreeable to the committee, Admiral Leahy has been waiting here a couple of days, and counsel desires to call Admiral Leahy now.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I do not know, of course, the scope of Admiral Leahy's testimony, but I think, in view of the position which he held as Chief of Naval Operations during the period covered today by something contained in Admiral Richardson's testimony, and in view of the importance and magnitude of the issues, any suggestion of disposing of him in any brief fashion is unjust to his position, his prestige, and the importance of the issues with which he was necessarily concerned. I am sure his testimony is worth at least an afternoon's session.

[882] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is not advised as to what particular point counsel wishes to call Admiral Leahy on now. Admiral Leahy is on the list of witnesses, I imagine, to testify in a comprehensive way. The Chair does not know whether counsel wishes to interrogate him with respect to this luncheon about which Admiral Richardson testified.

Mr. MITCHELL. Under the circumstances, I think it would be useless to try to finish his examination before lunch.

Admiral Leahy, I believe, retired from the Navy in 1939. He was Governor of Puerto Rico in 1940, and he went to Vichy in the fall of 1940, and he was not serving in the Navy in 1940 and 1941. When I arranged to call him, I did not suppose he had contacted the Navy during those 2 years, and it would make his testimony on other matters particularly wanting, although as an expert witness he might testify to anything.

I had proposed to ask him as to his attendance at that luncheon at the White House. I felt if any witness is called to testify to a conversation with the deceased President, every other person who was present in the room should properly be called too. That was the reason I called Admiral Leahy, and his description in that regard would be very short.

[883] It is up to the committee to say how much they want to go into expert matters with him. If they say that they will, then let us call Admiral Leahy back at 2 o'clock.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it is evident from the scope of Admiral Richardson's examination that the preparedness of the Navy and of the United States defense forces during the decade preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the relevant matters about which, of course, Governor Leahy speaks with considerable authority as Chief of Naval Operations for 4 years. How far that may be gone into I do not know, but I do think it deserves some time.

The CHAIRMAN. It is obvious to the Chair that we cannot conclude with Admiral Leahy, and therefore this committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[884]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Counsel, will you call the next witness?

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Leahy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Leahy, will you come around and be sworn?

(The witness was sworn by the Chairman.)

TESTIMONY OF FLEET ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, UNITED STATES NAVY

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated there, Admiral. You may proceed, counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, your rank is that of admiral of the fleet?

Admiral LEAHY. Fleet admiral.

Mr. MITCHELL. Fleet admiral?

Admiral LEAHY. Fleet admiral, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you talk into that microphone? The acoustics in this building are not excellent and we have to do that in order to be heard.

Mr. MITCHELL. How long have you served in the Navy?

Admiral LEAHY. I entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1893 and I have served continuously since except for approximately 2 years, from 1939 to 1942, during which time I was part time Governor of Puerto Rico and the rest of the time Ambassador to France.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were Governor of Puerto Rico during [885] all of the year 1940 up to December?

Admiral LEAHY. I went to Puerto Rico as Governor in the fall of 1939 and left there in November, about the end of November 1940.

Mr. MITCHELL. And then you went to Vichy and how long were you there as our Ambassador?

Admiral LEAHY. I went to France as ambassador, arriving in France on January 2, 1941, and I left about the end of April 1942.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were Chief of Naval Operations at one time, Admiral. What was that period?

Admiral LEAHY. I was Chief of Naval Operations from January 2, 1937, until August 1, 1939.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is your present duty? What duties are you now performing as Fleet admiral?

Admiral LEAHY. I am at present assigned to duty as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were you in Washington in October 1940?

Admiral LEAHY. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were you present at the White House at a luncheon on or about October 8 of that year at which Admiral Richardson was present?

Admiral LEAHY. I did have luncheon with the President [886] on October 8, 1940, and Admiral Richardson was also present at the luncheon.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state in your own way just what occurred at that luncheon?

Admiral LEAHY. I was at that time in Washington on duty connected with the Government of Puerto Rico and the President asked me to have luncheon with him on October 8. I found after I arrived that Admiral Richardson was also to be at lunch.

Many matters were discussed at the luncheon, some in connection with my affairs in Puerto Rico and some with Admiral Richardson in regard to the condition of the fleet.

Perhaps it would be best for this inquiry for me to state as well as I can remember the discussion that took place between Admiral Richardson and the President in regard to the condition of the fleet. My memory in that matter is good, principally because I was exceedingly surprised to learn that the commander in chief of the fleet did not consider the fleet prepared for war and at that time I was apprehensive in regard to an early war situation in the Pacific, although I was very far from sources of information and I had no late information in regard to that matter.

I do not remember how the subject was brought up but Admiral Richardson told the President that the fleet in [887] Honolulu was not ready for war for numerous reasons.

He said the ships did not have their war complements; that the facilities in Pearl Harbor were not sufficient to keep the ships in a top condition at all times; that he had not a sufficient number of fuel ships to make it possible for him to operate the fleet at any distance from the Hawaiian Islands; that the personnel of the fleet, the officers and the crews, did not know why they were in the Hawaiian Islands; that apparently nobody expected to be called upon for war duty; that the families of the men and officers were in the continental United States

and they wanted to get home and see their families; that the recreation facilities and the means for taking care of his men when they were on shore in Honolulu were almost nonexistent, at least they were entirely insufficient and that he felt that if there was a prospect of calling upon the fleet for war service it could be done much more advantageously in a port on the Pacific Coast of the United States where he could clear his ships for action, get the additional things that would be needed and reinforce his peacetime crews.

I think that covers very well all of the conversation that went on between the President and Admiral Richardson at this luncheon which I attended with them in the President's office.

[888] Mr. MITCHELL. Did the President himself say anything about basing the fleet there that you heard?

Admiral LEAHY. I do not remember that the President made any comment whatever as to why the fleet was in Pearl Harbor or as to whether or not it might be required to remain there. He may have made a remark of that kind but I have no recollection of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you leave the White House with Admiral Richardson?

Admiral LEAHY. We left the White House together and we rode to where we were going, he to the Navy Department and I to the Interior Department, either in a car which I had or in his car.

During this short ride I expressed to Admiral Richardson my surprise to find that the fleet was in the condition which he had stated to the President and I said that I hoped he would manage to correct as many of the deficiencies as possible without any delay because I had been telling the Congress and the people of this country for some time that the Navy was ready for war and I was distressed to find that it was not.

Mr. MITCHELL. At the meeting at the White House did you participate with Admiral Richardson in discussing the condition of the fleet? Did you take part in that conversa- [889] tion or were you a listener?

Admiral LEAHY. Well, I was very generally a listener. I do not remember having said anything about it although I may have interjected a remark from time to time. I do not remember anything that I may have said in regard thereto at the White House.

Mr. MITCHELL. The committee may examine.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman has no questions at this time. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No questions now, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George?

Senator GEORGE. No; I have no questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark is not present. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, there was some statement made by Admiral Richardson to the effect that the President said something relative to what we would do in the event that there was an attack on the Philippines. Do you have any recollection of any such conversation?

Admiral LEAHY. I have not.

Mr. MURPHY. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

[890] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you hear all of Admiral Richardson's testimony?

Admiral LEAHY. I did not, Senator. I only heard very small parts during the time I was here waiting to be called as a witness.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you read in the papers the full account of his statement as to his conversation with the President?

Admiral LEAHY. I did not, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. He referred not only to the incident which has been cited as to the Philippines, but also as to the reasons which seemed to the President sufficient for a fleet to be stationed in Pearl Harbor, and the effect that it might have on the Japanese. Do you recall any conversation along that line?

Admiral LEAHY. I have no recollection of any conversation in the White House that might have a bearing on that question, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Richardson said he expressed himself rather strongly to the President as to what he felt about the effect on a military-minded government, such as the Japanese, of the location of an inadequately prepared fleet in Pearl Harbor. Do you have any recollection of anything [891] of that kind?

Admiral LEAHY. No; I do not remember, Senator, anything that was said about that in this conversation at the luncheon.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you recall as to whether Admiral Richardson queried at all as to the reasons why the fleet was laying at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral LEAHY. As I remember he stated none of the officers or men knew why they were in Pearl Harbor, and that he personally felt that they could accomplish preparations for war service to much better advantage in a port on the Pacific coast. That is all I remember.

Senator BREWSTER. You do not recall that the President made any rejoinder or any remark as to the reasons why he felt the fleet should be there?

Admiral LEAHY. No; I do not, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you make any memorandum of the conversation at that time?

Admiral LEAHY. I did not. I am speaking entirely from memory. The only thing that impressed me was the fact that the commander in chief, in whom I had great confidence, and have always had, reported officially to the President that the fleet was not prepared for war, and I thought at that time that a war was a very likely contingency.

Senator BREWSTER. You referred to the commander in chief.

[892] Admiral LEAHY. I mean the President—the commander in chief of the fleet.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral LEAHY. Admiral Richardson.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral Richardson had served under you as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for a period?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct, and I, of course, have served with him in other places in the fleet at various times.

Senator BREWSTER. You would have considerable confidence in his recollection of events?

Admiral LEAHY. Well, I would have complete confidence in Admiral Richardson, but whether or not he remembers the conversation, I could not say.

[893] Senator BREWSTER. He apparently was rather positive and rather careful in his statement as to the matters to which he had given considerable thought, and he had written out the purpose of his conversation, so his testimony was affirmative, that "I do recall this as the conversation." Your evidence is apparently of a negative character, as to not recalling certain items of this testimony, is that correct?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct, sir. I cannot say the conversations did not take place, but I do not remember them.

Senator BREWSTER. You would not have any question if Admiral Richardson said he recalled it that he did recall it?

Admiral LEAHY. I have no doubt whatever he would be correct. He may have made notes following the conversation or he may not.

Senator BREWSTER. In any event it was true that the particular matter in discussion was one with which he was very vitally concerned, was it not?

Admiral LEAHY. He was very serious in his statement to the President, so much so as to definitely make an impression on me so that I have not forgotten what he said about the fleet.

Senator BREWSTER. He had come there and he rather definitely indicated that he wanted to find out what the reasons were, or at any rate, he posed questions which were calculated [894] to elicit that information?

Admiral LEAHY. That I do not know, Senator, but I presume so.

Senator BREWSTER. From his statement that he and the officers of his fleet did not know the reason why they were there you apparently implied that he was in Washington to find out if he could?

Admiral LEAHY. Well, he made that statement. What his purpose was, of course, I could not say.

Senator BREWSTER. As far as you were concerned, it was not a matter with which you were at that time officially concerned?

Admiral LEAHY. No; I had nothing whatever to do with it at that time, Senator, because I had separated myself from the Navy Department and I had very little information. Perhaps that accounts for my surprise.

Senator BREWSTER. Your presence was in that respect that of a casual bystander, as far as official relations were concerned?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct. I think I just happened to be invited to luncheon at the same time that Admiral Richardson was. I usually lunched with the President once or twice when I came to Washington.

Senator BREWSTER. And there were some Puerto Rican matters [895] discussed at the luncheon, and he apparently was killing two birds with one stone?

Admiral LEAHY. We discussed some of the problems before the Puerto Rican Government at that luncheon.

Senator BREWSTER. You naturally were interested in the naval aspects of the matter, as one who had been so long actively associated with the service?

Admiral LEAHY. I was very much interested in it, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. And you had been for 4 years Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral LEAHY. No; about 2½ years, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. What period did that cover?

Admiral LEAHY. It was from January 2, 1937, to August 1, 1939.

Senator BREWSTER. And during that period you were the naval officer primarily responsible for the preparation of our naval defense?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And the development of the fleet?

Admiral LEAHY. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And were associated with the presentation of the expansion program of the fleet in the 1938 expansion bill?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct.

[896] Senator BREWSTER. Which you submitted before the Naval Affairs Committee as of that time?

Admiral LEAHY. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And also the preparation of the budget for the Navy during that period?

Admiral LEAHY. Yes; I was charged with the preparation, with the supervision of the preparation of the budget in the Navy Department at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. May I have that time exactly?

Admiral LEAHY. From January 2, 1937, to August 1, 1939.

Senator BREWSTER. And you heard this morning the outline of the procedure in the preparation of naval budgets in the discussions between Congressman Keefe and Admiral Richardson?

Admiral LEAHY. I heard that this morning, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was an accurate presentation of the procedure in the preparation of the budget and submission to the Congress?

Admiral LEAHY. I think, from what I heard, it is an accurate presentation of the procedure.

Senator BREWSTER. The only thing I was not clear about—and perhaps you may have answered this—was the manner of the Congressional presentation of the question of increased items in the Navy. I always understood that was a matter of [897] Executive order, that the officials in the Navy Department could not testify in support of items in excess of the Executive budget, and I think Admiral Richardson spoke of it as a Congressional provision.

Are you familiar with that?

Admiral LEAHY. I am unable to answer that, Senator.

I know we were not permitted to introduce items that were in excess of those that were transmitted to Congress by the Budget Bureau with the President's approval. Whether it is a statutory provision, or whether it is an Executive order, I am unable to say, but it is a fact we were not permitted to do it.

Senator BREWSTER. I am familiar with that fact. I was simply surprised at that statement. I wanted to clarify it. It was the usual experience for the Budget Bureau to reduce somewhat your estimate?

Admiral LEAHY. Well, during the time I had the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, they always reduced our estimates after we had cut them as much as we thought we could with safety. They did it carefully, always, with consultation always, to find out from the Navy, from me, what damage would be done if they did cut an amount from the budget, and we always told them, and they said, "We have only a certain amount of money which can be obtained, and we must

[898] divide it among the different departments, so you will have to take so much of a cut."

Sometimes they would say, "Where do you want it?"

Then, if they were kind enough to give us a choice of the lesser of the evils, we would choose the place where the cut should be made, if it must be made.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you recall, admiral, the episode in connection with the Naval Expansion Program of 1938, the question of the limitations proposed on naval aircraft to not exceed 3,000?

Admiral LEAHY. I would be unable to answer that without looking at the records, Senator. I remember there was such a limitation, but beyond that I would not like to make a statement, and probably it might not be correct.

Senator BREWSTER. If there were a limitation of 3,000 at that time, then the later events have demonstrated the wisdom of a very great increase in naval aircraft that has since occurred?

Admiral LEAHY. That is quite correct, Senator. The Navy Department was quite desirous of a large increase in naval aircraft at that time. I know at the time I was associated with it, we were extremely anxious to build up the air arm as much as we could. There was a limitation in the number of carriers that were available.

[899] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral LEAHY. It would not have been worth while to get more planes than could have been taken on the carriers. Perhaps you remember well that we were advocating more carriers all the time.

Senator BREWSTER. Prior to that time, the limitation on naval aircraft had been whatever was commensurate with a treaty navy, isn't that correct? That is, there had never been an actual limit at that time. Is that not correct?

Admiral LEAHY. I do not remember, Senator, that the treaty limitation limited the number of aircraft that we were permitted to have.

Senator BREWSTER. No; it did not. It simply set forth a number commensurate with the treaty navy, which might have been any number that the development of the naval art might have made advisable.

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct, sir, and also what we could carry with the vessels that were permitted to us by the treaty navy.

Senator BREWSTER. It was after that time that you began to develop land-based aircraft in the Navy?

Admiral LEAHY. No; we had developed land-based aircraft long before that time, Senator, but in a very limited number. There was a question as to whether the Navy should have any [900] land-based aircraft. Finally it was adjudicated with the understanding that the Navy would have a limited number of land-based aircraft for the purpose of patrolling about their bases.

Senator BREWSTER. That was a matter of agreement with the War Department?

Admiral LEAHY. An agreement between the War Department and a predecessor of mine, as Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator BREWSTER. Was the custom developed at that time of carrying two or three or four times the number of planes required for the complement of a carrier?

Admiral LEAHY. I do not remember that we had such a policy at that time, Senator. I doubt it very much. We were having difficulty

getting the planes that we really wanted without getting a multiple of three in capacity.

Senator BREWSTER. To refresh your recollection, I have before me the act of 1938 as presented by you to the committee, which provided for the authorization of the construction of additional naval airplanes, the number not exceeding 3,000. That was the increase proposed at that time. They at the same time imposed a limit. I do not know whether you recall the circumstances, but on the floor that was amended by striking out the words so it read "not less than 3,000."

[901] Admiral LEAHY. I remember that, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. You remember that episode?

Admiral LEAHY. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. So after that you did have the authority for any number of planes in excess of 3,000, providing you could get the appropriations?

Admiral LEAHY. I would hazard the guess that the reason for the limit of 3,000 was a budgetary limit which had been imposed upon us, but I am not certain. We wanted more than that, I am quite sure, and we had some friends in the House who arranged it for us.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Leahy, according to your testimony, when you left the White House with Admiral Richardson, you expressed your surprise over what Admiral Richardson had said to the President about the fleet not being ready. You further testified that you were distressed as you regarded war as "a very likely contingency."

Was anything said by the President at the White House which caused you to accept that thesis that a war was a very likely contingency?

Admiral LEAHY. I have no recollection of the President saying anything in regard to that matter, but I had thought [902] that war was a likely contingency for several years, and I was practically certain in my own mind that it was going to come at some time in the reasonably near future.

Mr. GEARHART. Was anything said at that luncheon by Admiral Richardson which added to your conviction that war was a very likely contingency?

Admiral LEAHY. On the contrary, the fact of Richardson saying that his fleet was not ready for war should have led me to believe that many people did not agree with me that war was a contingency—a likely contingency.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, among all Navy and Army experts, war with Japan had been regarded for many years, perhaps as long as 30 years, as inevitable, is that not correct?

Admiral LEAHY. Well, I would not like to use the word "inevitable." It was considered a reasonable probability at some time in the future.

Mr. GEARHART. Army and Navy experts have to keep themselves informed with respect to the manifested plans of other countries in respect to expansion, do they not?

Admiral LEAHY. They make every possible effort to get all of the information that can be obtained in regard to those very questions.

Mr. GEARHART. It was quite apparent to you, and I [903] presume, to others in a similar position, that Japan's expansion pro-

gram was bound, in time, to bring her into clash with the interests of the United States?

Admiral LEAHY. Well it seemed inevitable to me.

[904] Mr. GEARHART. Then, not being afraid of that word "inevitable," it really was inevitable to anybody that understood, even people beyond the exact range of the Army and Navy, that we were in for trouble with Japan?

Admiral LEAHY. Of course it is impossible for me to say what other people thought. I know what I thought myself, and I would think your statement would be correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral LEAHY. But of course what they thought I could not say.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, you had no reason for believing that you alone entertained that opinion, but it was a general opinion?

Admiral LEAHY. I am quite sure a great many other people entertained that opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. At the time you were at the White House and attended this luncheon the inevitability of war was becoming more and more a question of imminency of war in the estimation of people who were closely watching the events in the Pacific, is that not correct?

Admiral LEAHY. I think that is exactly correct, but again I must say that I cannot tell you what was in the minds of other people, but the development in Asia indicated that the difficulty with Japan was approaching much more rapidly [905] than it had been in the past.

Mr. GEARHART. Now as you got along into 1941 and had become the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, you became informed from day to day, did you not, of the intercepted messages that were being exchanged between the Japanese diplomatic and military and naval authorities?

Admiral LEAHY. In 1942 I assumed my present office, and subsequent to that time I probably received all of the information that was available to the State, War, and Navy Departments, I probably did.

[906] Mr. GEARHART. Yes. That is, the question is based upon the assumption that you were there in 1941. What were you doing there in the year of 1941?

Admiral LEAHY. I was Ambassador in France.

Mr. GEARHART. While you were in France did you receive any information in respect to the plans of the Japanese which you transmitted to the White House?

Admiral LEAHY. I received from time to time rumors from my acquaintances, and so forth, from other countries, as to what their information was in regard to Japanese activities and I reported them at once, of course, to the Department of State, under which I was serving.

I had much information of sharp interest at the time that the Japanese moved into Indochina because they were dealing with the Government of France at that time and the Government of France kept me fully informed as to their demands and what they proposed to do.

That, of course, was immediately, instantly reported to our Department of State.

Mr. GEARHART. It was reported in the public prints that the Japanese went into Indochina with the permission of the Vichy Government; is that true?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct; under pressure from the German friends of the Japanese.

[907] Mr. GEARHART. Did you ever see any written assurances from the Japanese Government to the Vichy Government that they, the Japanese, would withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their objectives in other spots in the Orient?

Admiral LEAHY. I did not. I was told by Marshall Petain the details of the agreement with the Japanese. I saw no written communication.

I thought of telling a story but I better not.

Mr. GEARHART. I would be very interested in hearing it, Admiral.

Admiral LEAHY. There are too many of my friends in the news business here.

Mr. GEARHART. The next time I see you at the Army and Navy Club I will get that story in private.

Admiral LEAHY. All right.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask this concluding question, Admiral.

Did anything occur, or was anything brought to your attention while you were in Vichy representing the United States to the Vichy Government, that caused you to feel that a war with Japan had become any less a very likely contingent?

Admiral LEAHY. At the time that the Japanese moved into Indochina with the permission of the Government of France I told the Chief of the Government that that convinced me that we would be at war with Japan over the Philippines in the near [908] future.

Mr. GEARHART. And did you advise Washington of that information which had come to you leading you to that conviction?

Admiral LEAHY. I did.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you, while you were in France, receive any information which would lead you to believe that there was a danger of Hawaii coming under attack by the Japanese?

Admiral LEAHY. I did not.

Mr. GEARHART. I believe that is all. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Leahy, you were speaking about the French Vichy Government's agreement with the Japs in their occupation of Indochina. Do you recall whether Marshal Petain, then acting as head of the Vichy Government, informed you as to what the agreement provided for in the number of men that the Japs could put in there under that forced agreement?

Admiral LEAHY. He did give me such information, Senator, but I cannot remember the number. It was a small number of Japanese that were by agreement to remain in a small part of Indochina. The French were to be permitted to continue the government of Indochina and the Japanese were to withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their purpose, which was to facilitate their movement to the south. That was related to me [909] by the Marshal.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral LEAHY. I have no doubt it was true.

Senator FERGUSON. Then later did they violate the agreement as to the number of men they were to send in under the alleged agreement?

Admiral LEAHY. They later sent in more men than they had agreed to send in and they took more widespread action in seizing control of the Government than was stated in the original agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, as Ambassador for the United States, make protest to the Vichy Government that they were doing this, did you protest that?

Admiral LEAHY. No, I did not, because I got my information from the French Government. It was the only way we could get that information and they told me about it and expressed their regrets and I transmitted that to our Government.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am getting at. They seemed to be claiming, at least, that they were unable to stop this flow of Jap troops into Indochina.

Admiral LEAHY. They were unable to stop it. It was unnecessary for them to tell me that because I knew that quite well.

Senator FERGUSON. And you notified the State Department [910] here?

Admiral LEAHY. That was transmitted to the Department of State as it came to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make more than one protest during 1941, up until Pearl Harbor date?

Admiral LEAHY. As I remember it—you are speaking of Indochina now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral LEAHY. As I remember, the only protest—

Senator FERGUSON. Let me straighten out about the protest. You notified your own Government, our Government, that they were violating the agreement and what the French had told you about it; is that correct?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you get any information back from the State Department to take up with the French Government?

Admiral LEAHY. I do not think so, Senator, because I had already taken it up with the French Government immediately when I got the information from them.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you take up, what was the tenor of your conversation with them? Did you tell them you thought this increase would mean war or not?

Admiral LEAHY. No; it was not that, Senator. The tenor of my conversation with the French Government in regard to [911] Indochina was always the same, that they should refuse officially and diplomatically to agree to these things.

Now, I doubt very much if they ever agreed to the increase in the number of troops that went to Indochina, Japanese troops, but they knew it, and there wasn't any purpose in disagreeing with it, there was nothing they could do about it; it was done by force of arms.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was a violation of the original agreement as to the number?

Admiral LEAHY. There is no doubt about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, I wanted to be a little more specific than the others have been on what happened at the White House on the 8th, when you had lunch with the President and Admiral Richardson.

I am going to use the direct quotes from the official record. Admiral Richardson said:

which I prepared in the quiet of my home, where I could think and refresh my memory to a maximum extent possible.

The Chairman said:

You may proceed, Admiral, to do that.

Admiral RICHARDSON.

apparently reading, and was reading, from a memorandum.

I took up the question of returning to the Pacific Coast all of the Fleet except the Hawaiian detachment.

[912] Do you know whether or not that was discussed?

Admiral LEAHY. I do not remember that it was discussed in that way. I have already stated, Senator, that Admiral Richardson said in my hearing that he considered it wise to bring the Fleet back to the Pacific Coast in order that it could be prepared for war if that was the purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. And that, of course, would include all except the Hawaiian detachment?

Admiral LEAHY. I would say that Admiral Richardson, having made these notes on the same day of the conversation, is probably much more accurate than I am.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Leahy, he does not purport to have made that memorandum on that day. He made the notes recently.

Admiral LEAHY. Oh, recently.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral LEAHY. Well, stated another way, this was a matter in which Admiral Richardson was interested in detail. To me it was only a matter of general interest. And his recollection should be more accurate than mine.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, he says that he remembers very little of what you and the President talked about about Puerto Rico, because that was your problem, about some housing, and you remember that, do you?

[913] Admiral LEAHY. I remember that very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; because you were directly interested in that part of the conversation.

Admiral LEAHY. But there would be a difference, Senator. I was also very much interested in the Navy, and perhaps Admiral Richardson never heard of Puerto Rico, for all I know.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, I am reading from the official record Admiral Richardson's language:

The President stated that the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan.

Are you prepared to say now that that did not take place?

Admiral LEAHY. I cannot say that it did not take place, Senator. I can only say, as I said before, that I do not remember it, but it is quite likely that that statement was made, because a great many people, before I left the Navy Department, had exactly that idea, that if we would send small forces to various places it would be a deterrent on the Japanese.

I was in complete disagreement with them always.

[914] Senator FERGUSON. You did not agree then with the fact,

the idea, that the fleet being in Hawaii, in the Hawaiian area, would be a restraining influence on the action of Japan?

Admiral LEAHY. Not if it was unready for battle, Senator, but I assumed that it had been made ready, and then it would have been a deterrent and a very useful one.

Senator FERGUSON. But you received your first information on that particular day from Admiral Richardson that it was not ready for action?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, reading on, and giving you a direct quote again from Admiral Richardson's—

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman cite the page?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Page 682, Witness Richardson, questions by General Mitchell:

I stated that in my opinion the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the Fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no train of auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action.

[915] Are you prepared to say that that was not said at that meeting?

Admiral LEAHY. I am not prepared to say that it was not said. I do not remember a statement of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall anything about the Japanese being a military government rather than, as it is expressed here, a civilian political government?

Admiral LEAHY. No, sir, Senator; I do not remember that but that is the kind of thing I would not remember because I knew that so thoroughly, so somebody's saying it would make no impression on me.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in your mind as an exact fact, that it was a military government rather than a civilian political government?

Admiral LEAHY. That is an exact statement of fact according to my opinion at that time, and up until the other day when it ceased being a government.

Senator FERGUSON. And that kind of a government, a military government, is much harder to negotiate with along diplomatic lines than a civilian political government, isn't it?

Admiral LEAHY. I should think so, unless you have something with which to negotiate.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by that that unless you have [916] a military force that you can really use.

Admiral LEAHY. Exactly what I mean.

Senator FERGUSON. That is exactly what you mean. Now, quoting Admiral Richardson further from the record, page 683, he further stated:

I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the Fleet returned to the Pacific Coast, the complements filled, the ships docked and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel and then stripped for war operations.

Now, are you prepared to say that that didn't take place at the meeting?

Admiral LEAHY. I am not prepared to say that it did not. I doubt very much if it went that far into detail without its impressing itself

on my memory to some extent, but I should like to say that I am in complete agreement with the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, quoting further Admiral Richardson, and I have very little more:

The President said, in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the Fleet in the Hawaiian area has had and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan."

[917] Do you recall that, or are you prepared to say that that did not take place?

Admiral LEAHY. I am not prepared to say that it did not take place, and I do not recall that statement. I would not be surprised to learn that it was made, because there was a general impression in this country that the presence of ships in Honolulu was exercising a restraining influence on the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. But from a military viewpoint you differed with that opinion, knowing, after, at least, after Admiral Richardson, that it was not prepared?

Admiral LEAHY. I would not say that I was in disagreement with that line, Senator. I would be in disagreement with the effectiveness of it, but I would not say it did not exercise a restraining influence. As a matter of fact, I am inclined to think it did. But it would have a much more effective restraining influence if it had been prepared for war.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Admiral, do I understand that you would have anticipated that, if war was coming, that they might attack the fleet in the harbor at Pearl Harbor if war was coming?

Admiral LEAHY. I would have been afraid of that, Senator, because it was possible—it was a difficult operation for [918] the Japanese, but it was a possible one, and I would have been afraid of it, and as a matter of fact, I was always fearful that such a thing might happen to us, and many other officers were as well.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you knew the conditions at Pearl Harbor, the size of Pearl Harbor, and, as the admiral said this morning, the necessity of docking the ships in pairs, and that that did create a hazard as far as the fleet was concerned?

Admiral LEAHY. I was thoroughly familiar with the situation in Pearl Harbor. I have been there in the fleet myself and I know exactly what it looks like and how easy it is to hit from the air.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, quoting again from page 683, Admiral Richardson:

I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it and I know that our Fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for our initiating war operations."

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place?

Admiral LEAHY. I am quite prepared to say that I remember that Admiral Richardson told the President that Honolulu was not a suitable place to prepare the fleet for war service, which is approximately the same.

Senator FERGUSON. Approximately this statement.

[919] Admiral LEAHY. I am only speaking from memory of 3 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand. That is why I am giving the correct quotes of the admiral.

On page 683, again reading :

The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast, we are not stepping backwards."

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at that meeting?

Admiral LEAHY. I am not prepared to say that it did not take place, but I do not remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember any conversation about stepping backward or taking the fleet out of the Hawaiian area would be a step backwards?

Admiral LEAHY. I have——

Senator FERGUSON. Or a surrender of something?

Admiral LEAHY. I have some kind of recollection, which I cannot locate at that luncheon, that there was a fear expressed that moving our ships away from the Hawaiian Islands might be interpreted by Japan as a withdrawal from our advance into the [920] Pacific, but I do not remember where that was, it might have been in the Navy Department. I do not know whether it was at the talk with the President.

Senator FERGUSON. But it could have been at the President's luncheon?

Admiral LEAHY. It could have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Because that was a fact as far as you know; that is, someone had related it, or stood for that proposition?

Admiral LEAHY. There were people in America who had that attitude at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading again from page 683:

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.

The sentence before that is:

"This is embarrassing." I didn't quite see how that was in there.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Richardson made the statement.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what the admiral said. I heard him.

Senator FERGUSON. It is part of his answer then.

This is embarrassing.

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place, [921] those two sentences, Admiral?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman has asked the witness about the two sentences. Certainly you are not asking about "This is embarrassing."

Senator FERGUSON. No; but I had to read that because it is in the record. This is the sentence I wanted an answer on:

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war.

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at the luncheon?

Admiral LEAHY. Well, I am inclined to think that that question was asked but whether it was made in those words or not, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the substance of what was said?

Admiral LEAHY. I am inclined to think that was made by Admiral Richardson.

Senator FERGUSON. What did the President reply?

Admiral LEAHY. I do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will give you the answer Admiral Richardson gave, quoting from page 683:

He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or [922] the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.

Are you prepared to say that that did not take place at the meeting?

Admiral LEAHY. I am very much surprised to hear that the President made a statement that he would or would not enter the war under any conditions, because, of course, I talked the war situation over with the President many times and at length during the time I was Chief of Operations, and the President never indicated to me that he could declare war. That would be a function of other branches of the Government. He might have said that he would recommend that we go to war. I am surprised also to hear Richardson's recollection that the President said he would not go to war if they, if the Japanese, invaded the Philippines.

From my knowledge of the President and my relations with him in the matter of war for the preceding years I feel quite sure that if the Japanese had invaded the Philippines, which was then under our Government, the President would have recommended a declaration of war.

[923] Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you had conversations with the President that brings you now to this answer that if the Japs had invaded the Philippines he would have recommended to Congress that we go to war?

Admiral LEAHY. That is my thought from a very intimate knowledge of what the President was thinking about and doing.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral LEAHY. I cannot believe that he would not have recommended war if the Japanese had invaded our territory.

Mr. MITCHELL. May I interrupt for a minute?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the witness misunderstood the quotation. Admiral Richardson said the President said we will not go to war over the Kra Peninsula or Thailand. I think the Admiral here today understood you to say "he" would not go to war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will read it again.

Admiral LEAHY. That is quite all right, then. I have no disagreement. He meant the United States.

Mr. MURPHY. So there is no mistake, Mr. Chairman, would it be permissible to have the stenographer read back the exact words of the Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. Does General Mitchell think that I said "he"?

[924] Mr. MITCHELL. No. I say the Admiral here misunderstood.

Admiral LEAHY. I misunderstood. I thought you said "he", the President.

Senator FERGUSON. No. I will read the language again.

Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East

Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.

Now, do you understand the quotation?

Admiral LEAHY. I understand it now.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you prepared to say that that did not take place?

Admiral LEAHY. I cannot say that it did not take place or that it did. I think it is not in discord with the President's ideas, as I understood them, at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be in accord with what the President had been thinking as far as he had expressed himself on other occasions to you, at least?

Admiral LEAHY. It would not have been in disaccord, Senator. I should think it would have been in accord with his [925] thoughts.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let the Chair go down the line first.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Leahy, in view of the cross-examination of Senator Brewster, I think it is perhaps proper to place in the record at this time specific facts with respect to the budget estimates for appropriations, the amounts requested by the Navy Department and the appropriations actually made by the Congress.

Now, I have before me, secured as a result of my request of the Navy Department, a statement prepared by the Navy Department, signed by E. G. Allen, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Director of Budget and Reports, which is dated November 14, 1945. It appears that these reports cover the period covering the fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive.

The annual appropriation act of the fiscal year 1932, Admiral, shows that appropriations were requested by the Navy Department in the sum of \$354,809,746.

That request was submitted to the Congress by the President in his annual budget in the sum of \$347,794,248.

The Congress appropriated in that year \$358,262,123, plus [926] contract authority of \$7,700,000.

Now, Admiral, do you understand that contract authority is a vehicle adopted by the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House which authorizes the Department to which contract authority is granted the authority to go ahead and carry out plans requested even though the money is not then made immediately available; do you so understand that?

Admiral LEAHY. That is my understanding of it, Mr. Keefe. Of course, that was a matter for legislative, legal decision, but that is my understanding.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think, if I may state, as a member of the Appropriations Committee of the House, that that has been my understanding of it, while the money itself is not made immediately available contract authority is granted to the agency so that expenditures may,

or contracts for expenditures may, be incurred and the appropriation subsequently made to cover it.

Admiral LEAHY. It is practically a promise for a future appropriation to cover that authority.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right, generally speaking. I understood Admiral Richardson to say that, in the preparation of the Navy budgets, they always anticipated that there would be some cuts by the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, perhaps. Did you so understand that when you were in charge?

[927] Admiral LEAHY. I have often heard that statement made, Mr. Keefe. When I was charged with supervision of the budget preparations I endeavored to cut our requests for money to the lowest point that was consistent with the preparations of the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, for the fiscal year 1933, the annual appropriation act, the Navy Department requested of the Bureau of the Budget \$399,139,886.

In that same year they had supplemental and deficiency appropriation requests amounting to \$10,000,000; or a total in the fiscal year 1933 of \$409,139,886.

For similar items for the regular annual appropriation plus the supplemental, the budget submitted to the Congress by the President called for an appropriation in the fiscal year 1933 of \$351,677,450.

The Congress actually appropriated for that fiscal year \$327,583,591, plus \$5,715,000 contract authority.

In the annual appropriation for the fiscal year 1934 you requested—rather, the Navy Department requested \$352,717,786.

The President's budget submitted to the Congress requested \$308,669,562.

Congress gave to the Navy in response to the President's budgetary request \$308,669,562, plus \$8,100,000 of contract authority.

[928] In the annual appropriation act of 1935 the Navy requested during the fiscal year 1945, \$335,410,918.

The President's Budget cut that amount to \$303,407,649.

The Congress gave in response to the President's Budget estimate \$301,734,056, plus \$2,800,000 of contract authority.

In 1936 the Navy requested in its annual appropriation act and in supplemental and deficiency acts during the fiscal year 1936 a total of \$526,787,542.

The President's Budget submitted to the Congress was \$509,375,572.

The Congress appropriated \$482,600,230, plus \$6,590,000 of contract authority.

In 1937 the annual appropriation requested plus supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts for that fiscal year, was \$586,932,284.

The President's Budget cut that amount to \$551,512,599.

The Congress appropriated \$528,467,832, plus \$13,000,000 of contract authority.

In 1938 the annual appropriation act, plus the supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts, for the fiscal year 1938, amounted to \$599,035,223.

The President's Budget reduced that amount to \$567,191,709.

Congress appropriated \$519,139,808, plus \$15,000,000 of contract authority.

[929] In the fiscal year 1939 the annual appropriation requested by the Navy plus the supplemental and deficiency request amounted to \$719,380,009.

The President's Budget cut that request to \$650,246,411.

The Congress appropriated \$623,526,194, plus \$15,000,000 of contract authority.

In 1940 the annual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency appropriations requested by the Navy amounted to \$1,077,377,889.

The President's Budget cut that budget request of the Navy to \$976,430,769.

Congress appropriated \$943,375,249, plus \$22,450,000 contract authority.

[930] In 1941, the fiscal year 1941, the requests of the Navy, annual appropriation and supplemental and deficiency appropriation requests amounted to \$5,236,629,902. The President's Budget cut those requests as submitted to the Congress to \$3,561,405,919. The Congress appropriated for the fiscal year 1941 \$3,549,383,345, plus \$946,098,112 of contract authority.

Now, I have totaled, Admiral, the figures beginning with the fiscal year 1934 from this statement prepared by the Navy Department and the total asked by the Navy Department for the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, amounts to \$9,434,271,533. The amounts submitted to the Congress in response to those requests by the President in his annual Budget and supplemental Budget estimates was \$7,428,240,190. The Congress appropriated in the same period \$7,256,896,276 plus \$1,029,038,112, or a total of \$8,285,934,388.

The estimates indicate that in the period from the fiscal year 1934 to 1941 inclusive, the Budget cut the Navy's requests for appropriations \$2,006,031,343 and the Congress exceeded the Budget estimates in making appropriations and contract authorizations in the same period \$857,694,198.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEEFE. I yield.

[931] Mr. MURPHY. I am just wondering if the gentleman is going to have the witness swear to the testimony. It seems to me if it is relevant, and I believe it is, that there ought to be some way to bring it out so that it might be thoroughly examined. Certainly, we do not want to examine the gentleman from Wisconsin. If it is relevant and important I am wondering if this is the way to approach it.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have the figures right here and they have been submitted to counsel also, may I say, and I think counsel has the figures and the figures which I am quoting are accurately those which have been submitted by the Navy Department. Is that not true?

Mr. MITCHELL. I assume you have got a document directed from the Navy as to the Navy budget.

Mr. KEEFE. I have no objection to submitting the letter from the Navy Department and other figures which I have before me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not raise any question as to the accuracy of the figures. The regular way in which it should be presented, however, would be to present an official copy of the naval budget and the President's budget and the appropriation acts of Congress for these various years, which would be official documents.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I say that that can be [932] done. That would require a tremendous amount of work because of the tremendous number of supplemental estimates that were submitted during many of these years. I have before me not only the estimates submitted by the Navy Department but I also have those from the Bureau of the Budget itself.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask the Congressman this question: In your total tabulation of the amount asked by the Navy for the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, that includes only appropriations. Does that include any authority or any contract authority, or is that the dollars-and-cents figure?

Mr. KEEFE. That includes the actual money appropriations, plus contract authority, and I so designated it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think the Congressman understood my question. In the Budget estimate requests of the Navy, do they request an appropriation in money or do they add to that, from your tabulation also the amount they wish in contract authority?

Mr. KEEFE. If I understand you correctly—

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, does the recommendation of the Navy include only appropriations asked for in money, or does it include also contract authority?

Mr. KEEFE. The figures which have been submitted to me by the Navy Department do not include any submission of [933] contract authority or any requests for contract authority.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the contract authority, then, is a figure that was put into the appropriation bills by the Congress itself?

Mr. KEEFE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And is not included in the Navy estimate, and not included in the President's Budget; is that true?

Mr. KEEFE. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your last figure there which shows that the Congress for the total period exceeded the requests of the Budget by some \$800,000,000 includes contract authorizations put in the bill by Congress, which in your last year were more than a billion dollars; is that correct?

Mr. KEEFE. No; that is not true. The contract authorizations in the last year, in the fiscal year 1941, was 797 million in round figures.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the total amount of comparative appropriations for those years—

Mr. KEEFE. I gave those figures.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). If you eliminated the contract authority which increased in 1941 and 1940 as the situation developed?

[934] Mr. KEEFE. Well, the situation is perfectly clear, Mr. Chairman, and you are as familiar with that situation as I am and I am quite well aware of the fact, as a member of the Appropriations Committee of the House, that very frequently any department such as the Navy or the Army may ask for a direct appropriation of money and the House or the Senate, as the case may be, might take the position, "You cannot spend that money in this fiscal year as money. We will give you so much money, but we will give you authority to go ahead and carry on your program and buy the material or the ships or whatever you want and we will appropriate the money for you when you need it;" and that is the vehicle that has been adopted by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. When they give contract

authority it is as good as an appropriation because it is an authority to the agency to whom it is extending the power to go ahead and expend the money.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is making no question about that policy but the point that the Chair wanted to clarify was that the excess to which you referred is made up in part of contract authority as well as appropriations.

Mr. KEEFE. There isn't any question about that at all. The actual appropriations of money that were made during that period by the Congress were \$7,256,896,276 and the [935] contract authority extended to them in that same period was \$1,029,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. And that contract authority, if carried out to the full, would be included in a subsequent year's appropriation, in a subsequent fiscal year's appropriation?

Mr. KEEFE. It might be.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if contracts were entered into according to the authority given, naturally the cost of those contracts would be presented and paid for in the subsequent fiscal year's appropriations.

Mr. KEEFE. May I say this, Mr. Chairman. The question is the Navy comes in and says, "We want so many ships, we want so many airplanes, we want so much ammunition, we want so many guns," and so on and so forth, "and we have requested an appropriation for that amount."

Now, when they come before the House or Senate committees that committee may find that it is all right for them to have the ships that they asked for or the guns or what not, or the ammunition, but they won't be able to spend the money in that fiscal year, so they give them contract authority to go ahead, which is just as good as money, with the assurances that it will be provided. That is the fact of the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is sure that all members of the [936] committee are familiar with the practice and there is nothing in it that is subject to criticism. It is a practice that Congress indulges in by giving authority to the Navy and the Army and other departments, if they see fit, to make contracts for things to be supplied in the future.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But the actual payment for those things comes in a later period.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right, but the Congress has committed itself, Mr. Chairman. When it gives contract authority it has committed itself to so much money toward that.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about that.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I am rather surprised the Chairman would raise that question.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was trying to differentiate between the net amount of appropriations and the amount of contract authority, that is all the Chair was seeking to do.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether the gentleman has finished.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, if the committee has finished with the Admiral I would like to have him excused. I have kept him here on a false alarm twice and he is a busy man.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any more questions?

[937] Mr. KEEFE. I would like to ask in view of this colloquy that has taken place, Admiral Leahy, you have heard the statement that I have made with respect to the manner in which these appropriations have been made in the past at the request of the Navy and these contract authorizations. You have heard my statement, have you not?

Admiral LEAHY. I have heard it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you consider that it is substantially correct?

Admiral LEAHY. Of course, with regard to the figures I have no knowledge. In regard to the procedure, it is quite correct. When I was in charge of the business of getting money for the Navy we found it impracticable to spend in a fiscal year all of the money that was asked for and the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee would give contract authorization for so much of the business as they felt should not be financed within that fiscal year.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that contract authority would permit you to let the contract—

Admiral LEAHY. That is quite correct.

Mr. KEEFE (continuing). For the construction of the ships and what not and go on with your program, as it were?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. The program that you asked for, isn't that [938] true?

Admiral LEAHY. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. Although the actual money that you asked to pay for that work might not be needed until the next fiscal year?

Admiral LEAHY. It could not be obtained until the next fiscal year except by deficiency appropriation.

Mr. KEEFE. So that when the authority was given you to enter into these contracts you were in effect assured that you could go ahead with your program to that extent?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me in order that there not be any question, that I would like to ask if the counsel, or I will offer in evidence this document, if there is any question about it, the report from the Navy at this point as to these appropriations, so that it may appear in the record. I have read it in the record, if there is any question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understood counsel had some document, too, on that subject. If you are mistaken about it he can clarify it.

Mr. MITCHELL. This comparison between department requests, budget allowances and appropriations was requested from the War and Navy Departments at the suggestion of Mr. [939] Keefe and I assume it is in just the form he wanted it and the document itself is undoubtedly sufficiently authenticated to be offered here as an exhibit.

The only question I have about the figures— I don't suppose it is any of my business—is whether or not there may not be a duplication, because where there is a contract authority and in the very next year the appropriation, the same figures to pay the bills come in and if you use the authority in one year and the appropriation in another you might have a duplication.

Now, suppose we check it and you can offer the exhibit that way and we will find out whether you need any more figures.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I haven't any objection to doing that. I personally understand what you are talking about, but as to the comparison between what the Navy asks and what the budget gives and what the Congress gives, that is carried forward year from year, year after year.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have the document. I will offer it as Exhibit 12, as a report from the Navy. Have you the Army figures, too?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have those, too. Those little notes on the bottom of the page are my notes.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. If the counsel have the [940] same document or similar documents from the War Department it might be well to put them in together.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't know that I have it for the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if there is any occasion to check it and see whether there is any duplication, it can be done and the figures corrected later.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I find that the Army and Navy have not yet sent us a copy of these documents. This is dated November 14th and I have not received it, but let us offer it and we can check it later.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, here is the one from the War Department right here. You can see there is the letter and here is the enclosure, except that penciled memoranda of mine on there, Mr. Mitchell. I did not know you were going to offer these. I thought you would offer yours.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, we haven't any.

Mr. KEEFE. But you may have my copy. Let me have my letters back. Do you want those? Those are simply the letters of transmittal.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they go in with the exhibit.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; you can put the letters of transmittal right in with them.

[941] The CHAIRMAN. Minus the personal notations.

Mr. MITCHELL. In pencil.

The CHAIRMAN. In pencil, all right.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will offer in evidence as Exhibit 12 the letters from the Navy Department to Congressman Keefe dated November 14, 1945, together with the enclosure which is a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941, inclusive, and a similar letter from the War Department to Mr. Keefe dated November 7, 1945, and an enclosure detailing the appropriations for the War Department Military Establishments for the fiscal years 1932 through 1941, inclusive.

Mr. KEEFE. Except the penciled memoranda at the bottom.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is understood that the penciled notations on these exhibits are not offered.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Are they marked as Exhibit No. 12?

Mr. MITCHELL. 12.

The CHAIRMAN. Both as Exhibit 12?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is one exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That goes into the record.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand that the figures which are on the exhibit which has been offered will be copied in the record?

[942] The CHAIRMAN. That is my understanding.

Mr. KEEFE. Do we so understand it?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be printed as a part of the hearing at this point.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right. The reporter will put the schedules right in his daily transcript, if you like.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. All right.

(The documents referred to, without Mr. Keefe's penciled notation, were marked "Exhibit No. 12" and follow herewith.)

Address Reply to
Executive Office of the Secretary

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 14 November 1945.

And Refer to
EXO S: OBR/G-Tn

Hon. FRANK B. KEEFE,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. KEEFE: I am enclosing a revised statement on naval estimates and appropriations for the years 1932 to 1941 inclusive to be substituted for the one enclosed with the Secretary of the Navy's letter sent you on yesterday.

This revised statement was prepared after collaboration between this office and the Bureau of the Budget in studying [943] the records of the years in question, and the figures appearing thereon will agree with those furnished you by the Bureau of the Budget. While the records concerning the regular Naval Appropriation Bills for each year were complete, information concerning deficiency and supplemental estimates requested by the Navy Department was lacking in many cases and required extended search through the files for the years in question.

Sincerely yours,

E. G. ALLEN,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Budget and Reports.

(Enclosure.)

[944] *Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive*

Fiscal year	Appropriations requested by the Navy Department	Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract authority
1932				
Annual appropriation act.....	\$354, 809, 746	\$347, 794, 248	\$358, 262, 123	\$7, 700, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	354, 809, 746	347, 794, 248	358, 262, 123	7, 700, 000
1933				
Annual appropriation act.....	399, 139, 886	341, 677, 450	317, 583, 591	5, 715, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	10, 000, 000	10, 000, 000	10, 000, 000	0
Total.....	409, 139, 886	351, 677, 450	327, 583, 591	5, 715, 000
1934				
Annual appropriation act.....	352, 717, 786	308, 669, 562	308, 669, 562	8, 100, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	0	0	0	0
Total.....	352, 717, 786	308, 669, 562	308, 669, 562	8, 100, 000

Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 1941, inclusive—Continued

Fiscal year	Appropriations requested by the Navy Department	Budget estimate of appropriations submitted to the Congress	Amounts made available by the Congress	
			Appropriations	Contract authority
1935				
Annual appropriation act	\$318,324,414	\$286,332,392	\$284,658,799	\$2,800,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	17,086,504	17,075,257	17,075,257	0
Total	335,410,918	303,407,649	301,734,056	2,800,000
1936				
Annual appropriation act	502,855,817	485,443,847	458,684,379	6,590,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	23,931,725	23,931,725	23,915,851	0
Total	526,787,542	509,375,572	482,600,230	6,590,000
[945] 1937				
Annual appropriation act	585,010,984	549,591,209	526,546,532	13,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	1,921,300	1,921,300	1,921,300	0
Total	586,932,284	551,512,599	528,467,832	13,000,000
1938				
Annual appropriation act	594,269,223	562,425,709	516,258,808	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	4,766,000	4,766,000	2,881,000	0
Total	599,035,223	567,191,709	519,139,808	15,000,000
1939				
Annual appropriation act	629,665,104	564,406,461	546,866,494	15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	89,714,905	85,839,950	76,659,700	0
Total	719,380,009	650,246,411	623,526,194	15,000,000
1940				
Annual appropriation act	788,775,549	790,342,453	773,049,151	20,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	288,602,340	186,088,316	170,326,098	2,450,000
Total	1,077,377,889	976,430,769	943,375,249	22,450,000
1941				
Annual appropriation act	1,384,442,202	1,337,311,577	1,274,171,138	148,741,612
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts	3,852,187,700	2,224,094,342	2,275,212,207	797,356,500
Total	5,236,629,902	3,561,405,919	3,549,383,345	946,098,112

[946]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 7, 1945.

HONORABLE FRANK B. KEEFE,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. KEEFE: Attached is a statement which contains for the War Department Military Establishment, data on amounts requested of the Bureau of the Budget, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and funds and contract authorizations made available to the War Department for the fiscal years 1932 through 1941. These data were requested by you on October 19th for use as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating committee.

Insofar as can be determined, there is no copy in the files of the War Department, of a speech delivered by the President of the Philippine Islands, Mr. Quezon, in Manila some time in November 1941.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Secretary of War.

Incl. Stmt.

[947] *Appropriations, War Department Military Establishment, fiscal years 1932 through 1941*

Fiscal year	Requested by War Department		Requested by the Bureau of the Budget		Appropriated by the Congress	
	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations	Appropriations	Contract authorizations
1932						
Annual appropriation act.....	\$247,856,137	\$3,000,000	\$339,725,859	\$3,000,000	\$235,475,955	\$3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	3,448,157	0	3,444,951	0	4,291,679	0
Total.....	351,304,294	3,000,000	343,170,810	3,000,000	339,767,644	3,000,000
1933						
Annual appropriation act.....	316,079,255	0	301,030,642	0	289,500,024	0
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	15,164,468	0	15,164,468	0	15,461,468	0
Total.....	331,243,723	0	316,195,110	0	304,961,492	0
1934						
Annual appropriation act.....	320,884,513	0	277,730,841	3,000,000	277,050,381	3,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	16,000	0	16,000	0	16,000	0
Total.....	320,900,513	0	277,746,841	3,000,000	277,066,381	3,000,000
1935						
Annual appropriation act.....	279,913,374	0	260,624,208	3,000,000	255,526,147	3,000,000
Second and deficiency appropriation acts.....	26,357,947	0	25,335,947	0	25,335,947	0
Total.....	305,271,321	0	285,960,155	3,000,000	280,862,094	3,000,000
1936						
Annual appropriation act.....	346,723,362	0	317,459,277	0	341,348,204	7,686,753
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	14,627,792	0	14,340,000	0	14,190,000	0
Total.....	361,351,154	0	331,799,277	0	355,538,204	7,686,753
1937						
Annual appropriation act.....	458,193,897	0	375,025,510	8,000,000	383,104,859	10,669,786
Supplemental and deficiency appropriation acts.....	8,829,018	0	8,040,000	0	5,140,000	3,000,000
Total.....	467,022,915	0	383,065,510	8,000,000	388,244,859	13,669,786

[948] The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions of Admiral Leahy?

Admiral, the Charman would like to ask you just one question. When you were testifying about the agreement between the Vichy French Government and the Japanese Government, with respect to certain troops going into Indochina, did I understand you to say that that was done under pressure of the Government against the Vichy French Government?

Admiral LEAHY. At the time that was brought up to the French Government Marshal Petain sent for me and told me about it and told me that the pressure from the German invaders of France in behalf of the Japanese was so heavy that he could not refuse to allow the Japanese into Indochina in the small number that they asked for and under an agreement that they would withdraw when they had accomplished their purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether under the same pressure later they were unable to prevent other numbers from going in in violation of the agreement?

Admiral LEAHY. I do not see how they could have prevented other numbers going in, Senator, because they had very few troops in Indochina and they were outnumbered by the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time, the Vichy Government was [949] pretty generally understood to be under pressure constantly from the German Government?

Admiral LEAHY. I am sure it was constantly under pressure for whatever the Germans thought they needed to help them with the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the committee thanks you, Admiral, for your testimony and for your cooperation, and regrets that you were held so long before you could go on the stand.

Admiral LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator. I am very pleased indeed to contribute any little thing I had to this very difficult investigation you have, and my short detention here was no trouble whatever, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further now, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. I have some documents that ought to go into the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, we will receive them.

Mr. MITCHELL. First, I would like to read into the record extracts from a letter dated January 25, 1941, dated at Pearl Harbor, from the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet—that was Admiral Richardson—to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. It follows along this investigation about the air conditions—the air defense con- [950] ditions at Pearl Harbor (reading:)

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander in Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander in Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be [951] created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline, as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

(b) War with Japan is imminent.

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.

(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.

(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.

(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.

(g) Local sabotage is possible.

[952] 5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

WAITING ATTITUDE

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment, both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reenforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.

(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.

(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.

(d) Augment Army A.A. defenses with A.A. batteries [953] of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) I will omit. They relate to operations away from Pearl Harbor.

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the *Lexington* class should be selected, due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defense of Oahu and in the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose [954] a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as an opportunity for maintenance and

upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material cannot but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore [955] patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be dispatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Copy to: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel.

[956] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that is a letter from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right, dated January 25, 1941. It is already in the volume that the committee has. We are occasionally pulling out the documents and putting them in the record, so it connects up the story.

Mr. Chairman, I have next, if you want to sit and listen to it tonight, the defense plans having to do with Pearl Harbor. They cover a wide field beyond that, and we had prepared extracts from that volume which has reference particularly to the air defense. It is true, as one of the members said the other day, this book of extracts of defense plans does not cover a great many operations that go far afield from Pearl Harbor. We think it ought to be brought into the record at this point, and I will preface that statement by calling the attention of the committee to the fact that, as the result of Admiral Stark's letter of November 22, to Richardson asking him to look into the air defense system, Richardson went back to Honolulu and did that work in December.

It resulted in the report which has been read in already. That inspired the letter from Secretary Knox to Stimson which started in motion the set of revisions of plans, field [957] orders, and so forth, that dealt with air defense at Pearl Harbor.

We have two purposes in bringing that in:

One is to show the extent to which the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor was in the year 1941, in the minds of people here in

Washington, and people at Honolulu, and the other purpose is to show, in as brief form as we can, the respective functions that have been assigned to the Army and Navy forces in Pearl Harbor in connection with air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. This document you have here in your hand, the document you have referred to, is the one which you want to place in the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not want to place it all in. The committee has it, but there are certain paragraphs of it that I would like to read into the record.

I would say the original plans are here that cover everything. General Gerow was War Plans Officer of the General Staff at that time, and I found out he is the most appropriate witness to explain the plans to the committee as you may require. With the understanding he will be here shortly to authenticate these plans and explain them further, and on the assumption he is going to do so, I propose next to place in the record at this stage certain extracts that I think bring out the air-defense plans there as they were [958] worked out locally and in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is agreeable to the committee, we might hear that now.

Mr. MITCHELL. It will take you more than 10 minutes, I am sorry to say.

The CHAIRMAN. We might sit a little longer than that.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that, I think it might be very well to have the extract of which he speaks, but I think, also, there should be available, as exhibits, the complete plans. While the extracts that he presents to the committee relate to the defense of Pearl Harbor, the functions of the Navy went very much afield. I think for an accurate appraisal of the relative responsibilities of the Navy and Army, it may be very relevant to know what the Navy was supposed to do in the event of a war, which might have a very definite bearing on the appraisal of the whole situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator, here is the original material from which these extracts were obtained. Now, would you like to have these duplicated in the same way, or do you just want to examine them?

Senator BREWSTER. Are those the only copies which you have?

Mr. MITCHELL. They have not been asked to reproduce [959] them. It might be possible we could get one or two other copies.

Senator BREWSTER. I think one copy is all that is necessary as an exhibit in the case.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have them here for that purpose, and I was planning to have General Gerow offer them generally and tell you what they are. We have not gone to the trouble and expense of copying this mass of stuff.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you find out if they will allow us to keep it?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am keeping it now so you will have access to it, if you want to borrow it. I planned, as I say, to have the general authenticate them.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go ahead with the reading of these extracts.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will do the best I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be feasible, gentlemen, to have these extracts printed in the record without reading them?

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not see why not. If the committee does not want to hear me read them, I will hand these to the reporter, and ask him to transcribe into the daily transcript the sections I have marked in pencil, that have particular relation to our air defenses.

The CHAIRMAN. Each member of the committee has the [960] document itself?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Each member of the committee has the transcript daily.

If it is agreeable to the committee to have these extracts printed in the daily transcript of the record, it would be available to us tomorrow, as well as the documents from which the extracts were taken.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am glad to be relieved.

Senator LUCAS. That will give the committee an opportunity to study these over tomorrow, if they desire, and if they want to explore further any extract that you have here, it may go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, that will be done.

(The extracts referred to follow:)

[961] EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE

(1938)

* * * * *

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—ORANGE shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans—ORANGE, All Navy Plans—ORANGE, all Joint Plans—ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

* * * * *

This plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicated, but in general it may be assumed that:—

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.

2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.

3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES FLEET to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

* * * * *

[962] 2. COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.

* * * * *

b. HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier.

(1) Boundaries.

The HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

* * * * *

(3) Missions.

(a) Joint Mission.

To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(b) Mission for the Army.

To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

(c) Mission for the Navy.

To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Armed forces.

* * * * *

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 1¹

HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL AND PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.

Joint Decisions:

a. Boundaries:

[963] The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.

b. Category of Defense:

Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."

c. Army Task:

To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

d. Navy Task:

To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army Forces.

f. Joint Plan to be Prepared: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5²

The Pacific Area

33. Army Tasks.

[964] *d.* In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

35. Navy Tasks.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

Hawaiian Coastal Frontier-----Category D

e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 *b.*

36A. Hawaiian Coastal frontier.

a. Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.

b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

[965] *Navy.*—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned Naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategic employment, in cooperation with the Army.

¹ Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, 14 August 1939, verbally by the President, 14 October 1939; revised by the Joint Board, 10 April 1940.

² Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1941, and by the Secretary of War, 2 June 1941.

EXTRACTS FROM WAR DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS PLAN RAINBOW No. 5¹

30. HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.

. Extent.

a. OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of OAHU.

b. Category of Defense: D (as defined Section III, Chapter V, J. A. A. & N., 1935).

c. Missions.

(1) *Joint*—Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) *Army*—Hold OAHU against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

[966] (3) *Navy*.—Patrol the Coastal Zone: control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

EXTRACTS FROM HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECT, REVISION 1040

BRIEF ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. *a. Missions.*

(1) *Joint Mission*: To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

(2) *Mission for the Army*: To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the naval forces.

(3) *Mission for the Navy*: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces (Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange).

b. *Category off Coastal Frontier Defense*: Category "D" defense, prescribed by the War Department for this department, assumes the possibility, but not the probability, of a major attack. Defense measures specified envision the employment of seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a general reserve (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935)

d. *Forms of hostile attacks*: The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department Assignment of Category [967] "D" to this Department.

(1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.

(a) Sabotage.

(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.

(d) Air raids, carrier based.

(e) Surface ship raids.

(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.

5. *a. Basis for Planning.*(1) *Missions and Conditions.*

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions: The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par. 1 b). The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange (see par. 1a).

(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

(2) That the most probable form of attack is [968] a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

¹ Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.

d. Conclusion.

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined to the next paragraph.

e. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as follows:

(a) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:*

The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6.)

The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet external and internal attacks.

[969] (b) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade:*

The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6.)

(c) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:*

In carrying out the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

[970] HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN—HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Section 1.—DIRECTIVES

1. **Responsibility.**—This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. **Basis.**—This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, pages 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.

3. **Method of Coordination.**—The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this [971] method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b.

4. **Planning Representatives.**—The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40 a, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935).

5. **Joint Planning Committee.**—A Local Joint Planning Committee is established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI,

page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate such standing or special subcommittees as from time to time may be necessary.

[972] 13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation, Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.

14. TASKS.

a. Joint Task.—To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. Army Task.—To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. Navy Task.—To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

15. FORCES.

a. Army Forces.—The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

b. Naval Forces.—Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.

c. Overseas Reinforcements.

[973] (1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.

* * * * *

17. ARMY.—The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval [974] Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. *a.*), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. *e.*

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."

j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

[975] * * * * *

18. NAVY.—The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

- a. An inshore patrol.
- b. An offshore patrol.
- c. An escort force.
- d. An attack force.

- * * * * *
- i. Distant reconnaissance.
- j. Attacking enemy naval forces.
- * * * * *

k. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

* * * * *

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

* * * * *

(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.

* * * * *

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain [976] effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BLOCH,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, Commanding
Hawaiian Department.

[977] HEADQUARTERS
14th NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

1939

28 MARCH 1941.

Annex No. VII

JOINT AGREEMENTS

Section VI—JOINT AGREEMENTS

JOINT SECURITY, PROTECTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE.

I. GENERAL.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39 (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their

renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

[978] II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be [979] the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

III. JOINT COMMUNICATIONS

* * * * *

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade. [980]

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed [981] equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.

IV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES.

8. *Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft.*—During joint exercises, alert periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be modified except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.

11. *Aircraft Warning Service.*—The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.

Approved: 2 April 1941.

[982]

(Signed) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding,
Hawaiian Department.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. BLOCH,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.

[983]

MARCH 31, 1941.

Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force,
Commander Patron Wing TWO,
Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might [984] arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armoured and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any [985] information as to range and armament

of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material [986] readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present plans are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, [987] can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible enemy action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

[988] (e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities [989] have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks would be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us.

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more [990] than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its dispatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

[991] 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions.

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. *Subsidiary decisions.*—In order to be in all [993] prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. *Search and Attack Group* (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO)).

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility Squadrons.

2. *Air Combat Group* (Commander Hawaiian Air Force).

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier [994] VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft.)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

[994a] 1. *Search and Attack Group*.—Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

2. *Air Combat Group*.—Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

[994b] (d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

MATERIAL READINESS

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

[995] C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

DEGREE OF READINESS

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

[996] (e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: CONDITION A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

* * * * *

(Signed) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)

[997]

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

5 NOVEMBER 1941.

Section I—GENERAL

10. *Antiaircraft Defense.*—a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and matériel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

Section II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15f (8) below.

14. *Alert No. 1.*—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

[998] b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

15. *Alert No. 2.*—a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

[999] c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

f. THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE WILL:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A." The bomber [1000] commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

* * * * *

(1) The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(j) The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

* * * * *

[1001] 16. *Alert No. 3-a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

* * * * *

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

* * * * *

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

* * * * *

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of [1002] Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

[1003] Section III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs *a* and *b* below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

a. MATERIAL READINESS.

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

[1004] 2. All types: 30 minutes.

3. All types: One hour.

4. All types: Two hours.

5. All types: Four hours.

* * * * *

[1005]

OPERATIONS ORDERS—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

PART VI—FIELD ORDER NUMBER 1 NS (NAVAL SECURITY)

FIELD ORDERS }
No.— Ins— }

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafer, T. H.

* * * * *

(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to the destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such a raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile sympathizers.

b. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing normal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which include:

(1) By the Pacific Fleet:

(a) Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are operating.

(b) The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.

(c) The organization of a destroyer attack unit [1006] to locate and destroy hostile submarines.

(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.

(2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval District and attached units):

(a) Establishment of an inshore patrol consisting of a destroyer patrol at the entrance to the Pearl Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and daily mine sweeping operations.

(b) The organization of an air striking force consisting of Patrol Wing TWO, attached Fleet aircraft, and attached aircraft from the 18th Bombardment Wing to search for and attack hostile surface ships.

* * * * *

2. The Hawaiian Department, supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend OAHU from attacks by hostile aircraft and hostile naval vessels, will take precautionary measures to prevent acts of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support naval forces conducting aerial attacks on hostile naval vessels.

* * * * *

c. The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with fleet aircraft, will defend OAHU against attacks by aircraft, [1007] will attack hostile Naval vessels, and in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows:

(1) *Offensive Action*.—Conduct air operations against hostile naval vessels. Bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft participating in joint air operations will be placed under the tactical control of the Navy.

* * * * *

(3) *Reconnaissance*.—Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efficiency of the Air Force and to supplement, where practicable, that of naval air forces in securing information of hostile fleet movements.

* * * * *

(5) *Conditions of Readiness*.—Aircraft and crews thereof will be maintained in the condition of readiness directed by this headquarters.

(6) *Hostile Air Attack*.—Air operations directed above will be instituted without further orders from this headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condition of readiness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack upon OAHU or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters. All other aircraft and crews thereof will be alerted and this headquarters advised of action taken.

* * * * *

(2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be taken under fire except under the following conditions:

[1008] (a) After hostile offensive action, such as the use of bombs, torpedoes, mines and other ammunition, has been observed.

(b) After receipt of a verified report of a hostile attack.

(c) Upon orders from this headquarters.

* * * * *

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHORT:

(S) Phillip Hayes,
PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

[1009] Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3 QL/(13)
Serial 01646

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 14, 1941.

* * * * *

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,

(3) a combination of these two.

* * * * *

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

* * * * *

(G) DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK:

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both [1010] inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

[1011] (a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

* * * * *

Condition I.—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II.—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III.—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns

required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

* * * * *
[1012] Mr. MITCHELL. We have a study dated August 20, 1941, five months before this attack made by General Martin of the Air Corps and Admiral Bellinger of the Naval Corps, which is a most voluminous document.

I think the committee have had copies of it, and have had it for some time. I would like to offer that as Exhibit 13.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to have the body of that report transcribed into the record, except the diagrams. It is only a few pages.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done. The general counsel will mark the part to be copied so the reporter will understand.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 13" and follows herewith:)

[1013]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER (T-3),
Hickam Field, T. H., 20 August 1941.

In reply refer to:

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th [1014] Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan.)

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support on the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines [1015] which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required.

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian

Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C & D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the difference above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber [1016] squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

Barking Sands-----	2
Morse Field-----	2
Hilo-----	1
Lanai-----	1
Parker Ranch-----	1

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. [1017] This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:

- Incl #1—Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu. (In triplicate.)
- Incl #2—Personnel Requirements Recapitulation. (In triplicate.)
- Incl #3—Air Force Housing Facilities. (In triplicate.)

[1018] PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF BOMBARDMENT AVIATION IN THE
DEFENSE OF OAHU

I. GENERAL

1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search and thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for an attack.

2. The most difficult problem presents itself when it is necessary to search through 360°. This might occur daily and it is the only one considered in this study. It is possible, of course, that intelligence obtained from advanced naval bases and ships at sea might implement this plan and reduce the search area

to 270°, 180° or even 90°. In this case, the striking force would be augmented by those planes not required for search.

8. All computations in connection with air operations under this plan are based on the B-17D airplane. This type of airplane is considered available for either a search mission or an attack mission and consequently no reference is made to reconnaissance or bombardment aviation as such but to the search or the attack forces. The combat crew training of both will be identical and search and attack missions will [1019] be rotated for the purpose of resting crews and maintaining aircraft.

II. THE PROBLEM

1. To analyze the mission of heavy bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu with a view to promulgating a plan in accordance therewith.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE

1. Facts:

a. The Army mission is: "To defend the Naval Base of Oahu."

b. The bombardment mission is:

(1) When Navy reconnaissance is adequate:

To attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action.

(2) When Navy is absent or not present with equipment in *Numbers of Quality*:

To search for, attack and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action.

[1020] c. Capabilities¹ of B-17D type airplanes are:

	Gal Fuel used	Miles flown
(1) Search at 45% Power at 5,000' Altitude (No bombs—2500 gallons fuel):		
One hour full throttle operations	432	214
Two hour fuel reserve	272	
Climb	30	10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr	1766	1910
	2500	2134
Radius of Action in nautical miles		1067
(2) Search—Attack at 45% at 5,000' (4-600# bombs—2100 gallons fuel):		
One hour full throttle operation	432	214
Two hours fuel reserve	272	
Climb	30	10
Cruise at 143 knots at 136 gal/hr	1366	1485
	2100	1709
Radius of Action in nautical miles		864
[1020] (3) Attack at 65% Power—Return at 45% Power at 15,000' (4-600# bombs—2100 gallons fuel):		
One hour full throttle operation	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power	272	
Climb	90	27
65% Power—193 knots at 208 gal/hr	687	643
45% Power—150 knots at 136 gal/hr	612	643
	2093	1549
Radius of Action in nautical miles		775
(4) Attack at 65% Power—Return at 45% Power at 15,000' (8-600# bombs—1700 gallons fuel):		
One hour full throttle operation	432	236
Two hours fuel reserve at 45% power	272	
Climb	90	27
65% Power—193 knots at 208 gal/hr	485	450
45% Power—150 knots at 136 gal/hr	408	450
	1687	1163
Radius of Action in nautical miles	1700	581

¹ NOTE.—The capabilities were taken from [1021] curves in the B-17D handbook and checked by tests.

d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base.

e. If the solution to a problem is designed to meet the most adverse conditions, any less adverse condition will facilitate the solution.

f. Army Air Force units at present are not charged with the reconnaissance mission for the defense of Oahu.

g. The combatant force having the longer range weapon has a basic advantage, other factors being equal.

h. The bombardment airplane is the longest range weapon which the Department Commander has at his disposal.

2. Assumptions:

a. The following are the assumed or known *maximum* capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) Some of his carriers can steam at 30 knots for at least 24 hours. (Best available intelligence indicates ORANGE has three carriers with this performance.)

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (based on performance data of the U. S. Navy carrier planes [1023] and no allowance is made for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

b. The following are the assumed *probable* capabilities of enemy equipment:

(1) His carriers steam at 27 knots for 24 hours. (28 knots is the mean top speed of his carriers; 1 knot reduction is made for foul bottoms.)

(2) His carrier bombing planes have 400 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots (reduction in range from 600 to 400 nautical miles is made to allow for take-off, rally after attack, full throttle operation and landing).

NOTE—In the discussion that follows it is assumed that hostile carriers operating under conditions *a* and *b* above once committed to action will steam straight in to their launching radius. Any maneuvering by the enemy when within our search area will simplify our problem for it will give the search force more time in which to locate the enemy.

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or an attack on Oahu.

[1024] *d.* An enemy will not venture an attack against the Hawaiian Islands until control of sea lanes of communication is obtained. Then as the enemy fleet approaches those islands, raids by surface vessels, submarines and carrier-based aircraft, may be expected.

e. Our most likely enemy, ORANGE, can probably employ a maximum of 6 carriers against Oahu.

f. A 25-mile visibility is assumed. This assumption is based on standard U. S. Navy search and patrol methods employed in this area.

g. For the purpose of this problem the day is divided into 13 hours of daylight and 11 hours of darkness. These assumptions are based on the following computations:

(1) June 22, 20° N. Lat.:

Sunrise.....	0521
Sunset.....	1842
Hours of daylight.....	1321
Add:	
Morning twilight.....	25
Evening twilight.....	24
Total hours of daylight.....	14:10

[1025] (2) December 21, 20° N. Lat.:

Sunrise.....	0630
Sunset.....	1750
Hours of daylight.....	1120
Add:	
Morning twilight.....	24
Evening twilight.....	24
Total hours daylight.....	12:08
Average (1) and (2).....	13:09

[1026]

IV. DISCUSSION

Part 1: The Search.

1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100 percent coverage through 360°. A method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius of 833 nautical miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes is indicated in Chart No. 1. It will be noted that the outside lines of visibility for the diverging tracks cross at the 600 nautical mile circle, the overlap area inside of that distance becoming a noncovered area beyond that distance. The width of the noncovered area increases as the distance increases beyond 600 nautical miles with the corollary that the probability of finding the target decreases as the search continues out. However, as can be seen on the chart, each search plane on the search back covers the area not covered between any two planes on the search out and, in addition, covers the area previously searched by the plane on its left on the search out but uncovered on the search back, 100 percent coverage of the area is, therefore, obtained on the search out and back.

[1027] 2. In order to have available for ready reference a means of determining coverage and noncoverage of areas on the *search out* using 3°, 4° and 5° sectors, there is attached Chart No. 2. The method of constructing the curves thereon is indicated on the chart. It will be observed that, with the assumed visibility of 25 miles, 100 percent coverage on the search out is obtained to a radius of:

- a. 600 nautical miles with airplanes in 5° sectors.
- b. 750 nautical miles with airplanes in 4° sectors.
- c. 1,000 nautical miles with airplanes in 3° sectors.

3. Under any given set of operating data for the search planes and enemy carrier, the radius of action of the search force is determined by:

- a. Rate of closure of the carrier and search planes.
- b. Minimum distance the carrier can be offshore and allow the search force to make interception and relay the information to the attack force.
- c. Minimum time required for the attack force to make interception beyond the radius of action of the carrier planes.

4. In developing this plan, all search aircraft take off at daylight. They might take off during darkness in order to be at a certain location at dawn if definite information as to the movements of enemy surface vessels is reported from some source such as our search of a previous day, friendly surface vessels or Navy patrol.

[1028] *Part 2:* This part of the discussions deals with the maximum capabilities of enemy equipment namely his carriers steam at 30 knots and his bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots. See Chart No. 3.

1. *Section No. 1:*

a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illustrates four possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. In each case the distance out for dusk and dawn is computed from the *most distant* aircraft launching circle, or 350 nautical miles. This figure is based on the fact that after launching, the carrier planes will be in the air 3:20 and during that time the carrier steams in 100 nautical miles to recover its planes.

b. 1A shows a carrier launching its aircraft at midnight, attacking and recovering during darkness; 1B shows the launching at dusk with the attack and recovery during darkness; 1C shows the launching at noon with the attack and recovery during daylight; and 1D shows the launching at dawn with the attack and recovery during daylight.

c. It will be noted that each time schedule has a daylight period within the radius of action of the attack force but that 1D permits the least time interval for our forces to operate against an enemy and requires it to attack [1029] at the longest range. *The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.*

d. It is the opinion of some individuals that a late afternoon attack is highly probable since it permits an enemy carrier to *escape* under cover of darkness. This presupposes that search operations are impracticable. This headquarters cannot subscribe to this opinion for the following reasons:

(1) A minor surprise raid such as a single carrier is not a logical method of attack to reduce the defenses of Oahu.

(2) It permits us to operate against him for a long period on D Day at close range.

(3) The enemy will be more concerned with delivering a successful attack than he will be with escaping after the attack. He will have carefully considered the cost of the enterprise, will probably make a determined attack with maximum force and will willingly accept his losses if his attack is successful.

2. *Section No. 2:*

a. This section illustrates a routine daily search by the search force which will be made in order to prevent an [1030] enemy from making an undetected approach on Oahu.

b. Specifically, with the carrier approaching at 30 knots and the search force taking off at dawn, interception must be made no closer to Oahu than 435 nautical miles and no later than 3:03 after dawn on D Day. This permits 40 minutes to send a radio message to the home base and get the attack force in the air and 2:10 for it to intercept and deliver its attack before the carrier can launch its planes. The attack force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 5:34 D Day, 359 nautical miles out.

c. On a time distance basis, dawn D Day for a carrier is 526 nautical miles from Oahu; dusk D Day—1 is 856 nautical miles out and dawn D day—1 is 1,246 nautical miles from Oahu. Solving the rate of closure problem for the two forces 1,246 nautical miles apart, it is found that contact will be made at 1,030 nautical miles from Oahu at carrier's dawn plus 7:12 on D Day—1.

d. It must be pointed out that this solution is the maximum radius of action for the search force, yet not necessarily the most difficult problem presented to our attack force. While a carrier arriving at the 1,030 nautical mile circle at dawn plus 7:12 on D Day—1 cannot be attacked that day, it can be attacked the following day as shown in b [1031] above when it must come within easy range of the attack force if it is to attempt to steam to within its launching radius.

3. *Section No. 3:*

a. This section illustrates the most difficult problem which the attack force has to solve. It is the same problem that is illustrated in Section No. 1D. The critical point here is the carrier's position at his launching radius at dawn. Under these circumstances he is able to launch his aircraft before we intercept him and deliver an attack against him on D Day. Therefore, we must hit him D Day—1, or the day before he arrives at this position.

b. Specifically, if his dawn position D Day is 350 nautical miles from Oahu, his dusk position D Day—1 must be 680 nautical miles out and his dawn position D Day—1 must be 1,070 nautical miles out. If he makes good this schedule, interception by the search force will be made at 884 nautical miles out at his dawn plus 6:11 on D Day—1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit a message and to get the attack force in the air, the attacking force will strike the carrier at its dawn plus 10:43 D Day—1 at a distance of 748 nautical miles from Oahu and can operate against it during the remaining 2:16 before dusk. *Under the most favorable conditions for the enemy the enemy carrier can be subjected to attack by our attacking force during a period of 2:16 on D Day—1.*

[1032] 4. *Section No. 4:* This section shows the radius of action of the B-17D type airplane with full load of bombs and 1700 gallons of fuel.

5. *Effect of Visibility (See Chart No. 2):*

a. To cover the required search area under the above conditions 120 airplanes, each covering a 3° sector, would be needed to operate to a distance of 1030 nautical miles. This number of planes would permit 100% coverage of the entire 360° off the search out.

b. Obviously any decrease in the number of planes employed will increase the sector to be searched by each plane and therefore reduces the probability of finding the target. Any uncovered area would, however, with a lesser number of search planes be covered on the search back, and depending upon the location of the carrier and the hour of the day, might permit an attack to be made on D Day—1 or D Day.

Part 3: This part of the discussion deals with the assumed *probable* capabilities of enemy equipment (see Chart No. 4). It is believed that his *maximum* capabilities will be reduced from those assumed for Sections 1 to 4, inclusive, (Chart No. 3) by the following factors:

1. His average carrier top speed will be 27 knots. This statement is predicated upon the fact that the average top [1033] speed of ORANGE carriers is 28 knots, and the belief that on his run across the Pacific, foul bottoms will probably further reduce his speed.

2. The cruising range of his carrier aircraft will be 400 nautical miles. No allowance is made in previous computations for full throttle operation, for fuel reserve, or for time required to take off from, and land aboard, the carrier.

3. He will not have unlimited avenues of approach for his attack.

a. He must avoid the shipping lanes to negate detection.

[1034] b. Any approach to Oahu which is made from east of the 158th meridian materially increases his cruising distance and the probability of detection by friendly surface vessels. It seems that his most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0° counter-clockwise to 180° around Oahu; the next most probable, the quadrant 180° counter-clockwise to 90°; the least probable, 90° to 0°.

c. The tactical search enunciated above is not the only source of information as to his movements. Office Naval Intelligence, surface scouting forces, commercial ships at sea, radio intercept and proposed advance naval line patrol, will tend to disclose his general location and might, therefore, reduce the search area for our forces.

d. He will want to take the shortest distance to his objective, although this will be of minor consideration if his range is sufficient to permit him the long approach.

4. Section No. 5:

a. This section has been drawn to show one possible plan of attack of the enemy under his assumed *probable* capabilities. Here consideration has been given to the factors enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 immediately above, with the result that his performance characteristics have been reduced to 27 knots speed for his carrier and to 400 nautical miles range for his [1035] airplanes. Under these conditions it will be necessary for the carrier to approach within 233 nautical miles of Oahu before it can launch its aircraft; recovery would be made at 167 nautical miles. Accordingly, the radius of search can be reduced to 833 nautical miles and still permit the search force to locate the carrier and the attack force makes its attack before the carrier-based aircraft can be launched. These assumed characteristics can reduce the required search radius to 833 nautical miles and still permit the carrier being attacked before it reaches the position from which aircraft can be launched.

b. If on D Day—1 the carrier force is at a distance of 991 nautical miles steaming in at 27 knots and the search force takes off at dawn, interception will occur at the carrier's dawn plus 5:49, 833 nautical miles away, the maximum radius of search under these conditions. Allowing 40 minutes to order the attack force out and 3:42 for the flight, the carrier can be attacked at its dawn plus 10:11 D Day—1, 715 nautical miles out and can operate against it during the remaining 2:49 before dusk.

c. Further, should the carrier be missed on D Day—1 there still remains an opportunity to attack it on D Day. Interception must be made by the search force not nearer than carrier's dawn plus 2:02, 288 nautical miles out on D Day in order to make an attack prior to launching. This attack would occur at dawn [1036] plus 3:56, 237 nautical miles out.

5. Section No. 6: The problem here is the same as that shown in paragraph 3, Part 2, above, i. e., the most favorable plan of action open to an enemy. With the carrier making good its time schedule to arrive at its airplane launching position at daylight, interception by the search force will be made at dawn plus 5:11 of carrier's D Day—1. Allowing 40 minutes to transmit the message to the home base and for the attack force to take off, the attack force can reach the carrier at dawn plus 9:08 of carrier's D Day—1 and can operate against the carrier during the remaining 3:42 before dusk. *Under the most profitable plan of action of an enemy carrier, a B-17D attacking force can operate against the carrier for 3:42 of the day prior to his attack on Oahu.*

6. Effect of Visibility:

a. In Section No. 5, a 5° search spread should give adequate coverage. The search time schedule is such that if interception is not made on the search out it can be made on the search back in time to transmit the information and to deliver an attack by the striking force before dusk on D Day—1. There is 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles on the search out, but on the search out and back there is 100% coverage. 72 airplanes would be used for the search.

[1037] b. In Section No. 6, with 5° search sectors, the probability of finding the target at 740 nautical miles is 85% for the search out and as stated in a above, 100% for the search out and back. 72 airplanes would be sufficient for complete coverage in this case, for if interception is not made on the way out, it can be made on the search back in time to transmit information and deliver an attack.

V. CONCLUSION

1. Action by enemy carrier-based bombing planes against Oahu should be figured on the basis of their having 400 nautical miles range and a speed of 180 knots.

2. *a.* The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should *base our plans* of operation, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before the attack.

(2) Cross circle 530 nautical miles from Oahu at dusk of the day before the attack.

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.

(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical miles from Oahu 2:30 after dawn the day of the attack.

[1038] *b.* Any variation from the above time schedule permits our attack force to strike the enemy during daylight of the day before his attack over a greater time interval and at a shorter range; or, permits our attack force to strike him during daylight of the day he attacks but before he is within his radius of action of Oahu. If an enemy carrier succeeded in slipping in undetected by our search force and launched an attack, we could and would, of course, attack as soon as possible in order to destroy or disable the carrier prior to, or during, the recovery of its planes.

3. The area between the circles with radii 530 nautical miles and 833 nautical miles from Oahu is the operating area for the solution of this problem under its most adverse condition.

4. *a.* With the Army Air Force responsible for its own reconnaissance, 72 B-17D airplanes will be required to search daily the area within the circle of 833 nautical miles radius from Oahu, each plane covering a 5° sector.

b. Based upon the assumption of visibility used in this study, 72 airplanes employed to search a 360° sector should result in 100% coverage with some overlap to 600 nautical miles, 85% coverage at 700 nautical miles and 75% coverage at 800 nautical miles in the *search out*. In every case, the search out and in would permit 100% coverage within the time interval which would [1039] allow the launching of the bombing attack prior to dusk on D Day—1.

5. If a similar search could be conducted from Dutch Harbor, Midway, Johnston or Palmyra the possibility of enemy surface ships approaching Hawaii and the west coast of the United States undetected would be practically non-existent.

[1040] 6. *Search* must be conducted during daylight hours because of the extreme difficulty of locating what will be an unlighted objective proceeding under cover of darkness. The B-17D airplane is capable of searching for, and attacking, an enemy force the day prior to its arrival within its striking distance of Oahu.

7. With this plan in actual operation the defenses of these islands can be assured without assistance from the Navy. This will permit complete freedom of action of the Pacific Fleet.

8. The B-17D airplane is capable of operating beyond the combat range of any known enemy carrier-based aviation.

9. *Attack* must be conducted during daylight hours because it is considered impracticable to locate and bomb a maneuvering precision target during darkness.

10. Based on the worst situation that could arise, i. e., the employment of 6 enemy carriers against Oahu simultaneously each approaching on a different course, an attack force of 36 B-17D's would be required to disable or destroy the carriers. It is expected that 6 B-17D's with bomb loads of seven 600# bombs would be sufficient to accomplish the desired result (see Study No. 1). It is contemplated that this attack force will be augmented by 36 additional B-17D's of the maintenance [1041] and reserve force if in commission.

11. This attack force should be further augmented by a minimum of 36 long-range planes of the B-26 or similar type, capable of carrying torpedoes to be used as the striking force under conditions of low ceiling and visibility when high altitude level bombing technique is not practicable. (See Study No. 2).

12. A reserve of 72 planes will be needed to provide for maintenance, replacement and reserve for both the search and attack forces. As was stated in paragraph 10 above, 36 of this number may be employed as part of the attack force if in commission.

13. In order to operate the above number of B-17D's, a *minimum* of 216 combat crews will be needed as indicated in Chart No. 5.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the War Department give immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 833 nautical miles and center is [1042] Oahu, as follows:

72 for daily search missions.

36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs, for a mission).

72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the attack force.

180 total B-17D's.

36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.

2. While this number of bombardment airplanes could not be accommodated at Hickam Field and there are no other suitable bases available on Oahu, it should be only a matter of time until projects submitted to the War Department for the construction of airdromes on outlying islands of the Hawaiian group are completed which, with Hickam Field, will be adequate for operations of the above number of planes. Existing plans for the dispersion of the 18th Bombardment Wing (H) provide for units of one and two squadrons to operate from dispersed airdromes. Modification of the plan to apply to operations therefrom are anticipated and will be made.

3. It is further recommended that in making future allotments of officers and enlisted men to the Hawaiian Air [1043] Force consideration be given to providing a *minimum* of 216 B-17D combat crews and 36 medium bomber-torpedo combat crews. In this connection, see paragraph 8, basic letter.

4. Our leading tacticians and strategists here concur in the opinion that this plan will solve the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and that to their knowledge it is the best and only means that can be devised to locate enemy carriers and make attacks thereon before said carriers can come within launching distance of Oahu. The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. The best defense is an aggressive and well-organized offense. The basis of this plan is offensive action. We have had clearly demonstrated to us in Europe the fallacy of depending upon passive measures of defense. We must not base our plans of action on the "Defense of Hawaii", but rather upon a vigorous offensive. We must ferret out the enemy and destroy him before he can take action to destroy us.

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unprepared-[1044] ness for offensive action.

In order to initiate offensive action, the Hawaiian Air Force must have at its *immediate* command well-organized, equipped and trained combat crews. It should be remembered that while reinforcements from the Mainland can be made available on short notice their expeditious presence here *will not solve* the problem. Upon their arrival they must be given an opportunity to undergo a certain amount of indispensable indoctrination and training in the plane of action of the Hawaiian Air Force. If this plan is to be effective the force recommended above must be made a reality and maintained in existence in Hawaii for combat at any time. With the United States living and working under a condition of unlimited National Emergency, Japan making its southward movement and the world in general in a complete state of turmoil we must be prepared for D Day at any time. Reinforcements, therefore, must be considered from the standpoint of *replacements for losses only*. Any delay in placing this plan in operation, such as would be necessary for the above reasons, would mitigate against its success.

It is believed that a force of 180 four-motored aircraft with 36 long-range torpedo airplanes is a small force when compared with the importance of this outpost. This force can be provided at less cost to the Government than the cost [1045] of one modern battleship. It is further believed that this force should be made available as soon as possible even at the expense of other units on the Mainland.

STUDY OF THE BOMBS REQUIRED TO DISABLE AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER

1. It is assumed that two direct hits by 500-pound or 600-pound demolition bombs will be sufficient to disable an aircraft carrier.

2. From the tables of probability of direct hits by bombing, results obtained by units of the Hawaiian Air Force in bombing sleds towed by Navy surface craft and from previous experiences by bombardiers who have made attacks of this nature, it is determined that about 90 percent probability of two direct hits may be expected from 6 B-17D's or similar type airplanes attacking a maneuvering carrier from 15,000 feet, each dropping seven 600-pound bombs in train. Bombardiers are assumed to be capable of at least a 20 mil accuracy.

3. In arriving at the number of bombs and airplanes required, several methods of attack are considered:

a. Attack by individual airplanes from different directions, attacking in close succession.

b. Formation attacks by three plane elements from different directions and in close succession.

c. Formation attack on a six-plane flight.

[1046] In all cases bombs are assumed to have been dropped in train by each airplane with a spacing of 80 feet between bombs. The number of bombs (42) and airplanes (6) required to give a 90 percent probability of two effective hits was determined to be nearly the same for each type of attack.

[1047] NEED FOR TORPEDO PLANES IN THE HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE

1. a. Any or all of the following factors could be expected to partially or wholly prevent the successful accomplishment of the bombardment mission:

- (1) Inability to find enemy force (navigation).
- (2) Lack of bombing accuracy.
- (3) Enemy fighter action.
- (4) Hostile antiaircraft artillery fire.
- (5) Weather obscuring objectives.

b. Consideration of these factors;

(1 and 2) Navigational and bombing accuracy are primarily matters of training and practice. Efficient standards can be and are being attained by the training of combat crews in the Hawaiian Air Force.

(3) The critical altitude, high speed and defensive armament of the present heavy bombardment aircraft is such as to provide excellent defense against enemy fighters. It is not believed that carrier based fighters will be very effective against the B-17D's at high altitude.

(4) Reports from abroad indicate that antiaircraft fire will be only partially effective and will not prevent the accomplishment of the [1048] mission.

(5) The weather of the Hawaiian Islands is probably the best in the world from a standpoint of flying conditions and yet a very definite percentage of bombing missions fail because of overcast conditions which obscure the objective. Heavy bombardment as such is useless against surface craft when low ceilings (200-1,000 feet) prevail, and it is doubtful if it could be used below 5,000 feet without prohibitive losses from antiaircraft fire before reaching the bomb release line. Enemy surface craft may be expected to take full advantage of all cloudiness conditions and even to wait until such conditions occur before launching an attack. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has *no weapon* to effectively combat surface craft under such conditions.

2. The following is submitted as a solution to this problem:

a. The most effective action against surface craft under poor weather conditions is believed to be a torpedo attack from low-flying aircraft. This is substantiated by results from abroad, i. e., Bismarck sinking, Taranto attack, etc. A torpedo plane flying just off the water can operate [1049] under a very low ceiling and with guaranteed accuracy against all surface craft. The torpedo plane should be land-based, of long range, fast and capable of being accurately navigated. It should operate *in conjunction with* heavy bombardment.

3. a. The only type airplane that could be adapted to this purpose at present in the Hawaiian Department is the A-20A. It is believed that this adaptation can be made and the problem is under consideration and test at present.

b. It is believed that the medium bombardment airplane of the B-26 type will be even more satisfactory because of its longer range.

c. It is recommended that adaptation of some such airplane be made, preferably in such a manner as not to interfere with the normal bombardment mission.

[1050] **Mr. MITCHELL.** Before I forget it, I want as the next exhibit, No. 14, to introduce a letter from Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, dated 14 April 1941. Subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor," addressed to the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., and signed for the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department by Carl Grosse, assistant adjutant general. It has a notation on it, "Copy to Commandant 14th Naval District."

I will not read that letter. It contains reference to several of these air defense plans.

The **CHAIRMAN.** You want that printed in the daily transcript?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, I want to put that in.

(The letter referred to was marked Exhibit No. 14 and follows herewith:)

[1051]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 14 April 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 381/67a JDP.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to secret letter from The Adjutant General to Headquarters Hawaiian Department, above subject, dated 7 February 1941, file AG 381 (1-24-41) M. There are enclosed herewith for your information copies of the principle directives, orders, and estimates which have been issued, in cooperation with the local naval authorities, to provide for the joint defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters against surprise raids or air attacks.

2. Inclosure 1, joint letter HHD-14th ND, dated 14 February 1941, initiated the study by joint committees of Army and Navy officers of the joint problems of the defense which were mentioned in the correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy, inclosed in the letter referred to in paragraph 1 above, and also included study of additional problems which were raised by Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

[1052] 3. Inclosure 2, Annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (HCF-39) is a new joint agreement with the local naval authorities which pertains to joint security measures. Attention is particularly invited to Section II of this document which relates to joint air operations. This joint agreement covers the major points which were studied by the joint committees organized in inclosure 1. Inclosure A to this Annex No. VII has not yet been completed, however tests are now being conducted to determine the most effective means of positive identification of friendly aircraft and insure its protection from anti-aircraft artillery fire.

4. Inclosure 3, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force and Patrol Wing TWO (Naval Base Defense Air Force) is self explanatory and will serve as the basis of joint air operations orders to be issued in the near future. These joint orders are required since it will be noted that, in the conduct of air operations, aircraft of one service passes to the tactical control of the other service.

5. Inclosure 4, Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security) is a new operations order for this Department covering the measures which will be taken during an alert period and initially upon a sudden raid or air attack. This order has been coordinated with comparable security orders of [1053] the Pacific Fleet and the Naval Base Defense Force. This order is in addition to and does not replace the existing Field Orders No. 1 and No. 1 W which are contained in OHD-38.

For the Commanding General:

CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Copy to Commandant 14th Naval District.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Is counsel in a position to advise the committee as to who will be called next?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Hull is our first witness on Friday morning.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. In the interrogation of Admiral Richardson there were some facts that he did not know which I would like to have the Navy liaison officer attempt to discover for me. Here are the questions I am going to ask:

How many naval planes were attached to the fleet when Admiral Richardson took it over?

[1054] How many naval planes were attached to the fleet when Admiral Richardson was relieved of his command?

How many planes were capable of doing reconnaissance duty during that time?

How many planes were actually on reconnaissance work every day after the reconnaissance orders issued by Admiral Richardson were augmented by Admiral Andrews which directed reconnaissance on dawn and day patrol 300 miles covering a western semicircle of 180°?

That is the information I would like to have.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. May I ask a question of counsel?

In the event Mr. Hull is not able to appear, or for some reason does not appear, would you be able to give me who the witness will be to substitute for him?

Mr. MITCHELL. There are a group there: Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Grew, and Mr. Hamilton. Our idea is if Mr. Hull gets tired and has to retire in order to return later, we will bring on some of these other witnesses and keep going on with the State Department story as rapidly as we can. We had to assure Mr. Hull and his family that the committee will not detain him for questioning more than 45 minutes at a time. He tires very rapidly. That upsets our schedule a little.

[1055] The CHAIRMAN. In connection with that, copies of the written statement of Mr. Hull have been furnished to all members of the committee.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume it will be read by the committee before Mr. Hull comes on.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

We have given you copies of it in advance so you can study it beforehand.

The CHAIRMAN. As to whether the other statement should be read by somebody in the meeting, they do concern matters on which the committee may want to take action after it has been examined.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to inquire of General Mitchell whether or not the committee has received all of the exhibits, or all of the written information in relation to the State Department witnesses?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Gesell will answer that.

Mr. GESELL. We have received from the State Department all of the documents which we intended to introduce in connection with the testimony of the State Department witnesses, with the exception of one or two documents which are being [1056] cleared with other governments, and we expect that the clearance will be obtained

before we go ahead Friday morning. All of the documents which we have obtained have been distributed to each of the members of the committee. I think the bulk of them went to the committee about a week ago, and we have from time to time, I think, including this morning, handed additional documents on the subject to the members of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. So then, at the present moment, we have all of the documents that the committee counsel desire to use, except those that you must receive clearance on? As I understand it, you are being delayed from getting certain information from the State Department because other governments will not clear the committee getting those documents.

Mr. GESELL. There has been no refusal to clear, Senator, by any Government.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the situation?

Mr. GESELL. The situation is this: There is an understanding, I am informed, which has prevailed between the United States and other governments with which we are in friendly relations that they will not give publication to notes and documents they received from our officials, and we will not give publication to similar material we received from the officials for a period of 15 years, unless specific authorization [1057] is obtained.

Now, we have not received any refusal from any government to release the documents which we wish to present to the committee.

There are one or two situations where we have not yet heard either way, and we expect to hear in those situations before Friday morning.

[1058] Senator FERGUSON. Then if you get the approval we will receive those copies of those papers prior to the hearing?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be difficult to examine witnesses on documents, as I said before, unless we get them sometime before the witnesses are put on the witness stand.

Mr. GESELL. You are quite right. I can assure the Senator in this instance the volume of documents to which I refer is extremely small. We hope it may be even possible to get them to you tomorrow, if the clearance comes through. We will do the best we can on that, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. As one of the members of the committee, I think I have quite a few questions on the documents that I have not received. They are included, I take it, among those that the other governments must clear.

Mr. GESELL. I do not know about that.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will have to check the rest to be sure it is what you have in mind. They come in pretty fast. We have a system set up of taking them and trying to keep up with them.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is nothing further, the committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock Friday morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, November 23, 1945.)

Part 2—November 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30, and December 3 and 4, 1945—follows.

2-9

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 2

NOVEMBER 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, AND 30, AND
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Printed for the use of the
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

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HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan	
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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Allen, Brooke E., Maj.	203-209		3105-3120					
Allen, Riley H.								
Anderson, Edward B., Maj.						64		
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Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm.			4022-4027					
Anstey, Alice			148-186					
Arnold, H. H., Gen.								
Asher, N. F., Ens.	1127-1138							
Ball, N. F., Ens.	1033-1038							
Ballard, Emma Jane			2567-2580					
Barber, Bruce G.			3972-3988					
Bartlett, George Francis			2492-2515					
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr.	1719-1721							5269-5291
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm.	1219-1224							
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm.		115-134	1575-1643	660-688			471-510	3814-3826 3450-3519
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm.	886-951 1382-1399							
Benny, Chris J.			3720-3749					
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[1059]¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson; and representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[1060] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

Before Secretary Hull is called, the counsel has some documents, I understand, to present for the record.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct, Senator. We are starting today with a series of witnesses from the State Department. I thought at the outset we should place in the record certain document material which can be used in the examination of certain witnesses. Additional documents will be provided from time to time, but this is the basis of the initial set.

We have placed comparable sets to those being introduced before each member of the committee.

These are all documents that were put in the hands of the members of the committee sometime earlier. We simply arranged them and regrouped them in exhibit form, to facilitate the committee's reading the exhibits, but the material contained in these exhibits has been in the hands of the members of the committee.

The first, to be marked as exhibit 15, is a series of three documents from Mr. Grew to the Department of State, dated January 27, November 3, and November 17, 1941, respectively.

The first is the dispatch in which Mr. Grew referred to the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and I want to call the committee's attention to the mimeographed [1061] sheet in that exhibit which shows the transmission of that document to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet from the Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to offer that as Exhibit 15.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that included in the transcript of the hearings?

Mr. GESELL. No, these are merely exhibits, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it may be marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 15.")

Mr. GESELL. As Exhibit 16, we would like to offer a series of documents relating to the joint memorandum of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt under date of November 5, 1941. The memorandum itself, and certain material explaining the

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

origin of the memorandum and the circumstances have been under discussion here and are all included in this exhibit.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 16.")

Mr. GESELL. As Exhibit 17, a joint memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Memorandum for the President." Subject: "Far Eastern Situation."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 17.")

[1062] Mr. GESELL. As Exhibit 18 a series of approximately 20 or more documents relating to the so-called *modus vivendi*. This series of documents entitled "Draft Suggestions (November 11, 1941) to the Secretary of State" includes various drafts of the *modus vivendi*, the note of November 26, as well as communications between the United States Government and Government of other countries and memoranda prepared by Mr. Hull and others of his conference with representatives of foreign governments.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 18.")

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 19 is a single document which was a proposed message to the Congress. This document, as is indicated, was discussed with the President by the Secretary of State and no further action was taken. The memorandum for the President is dated November 29, 1941.

I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that at the end of this memorandum there is a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan dated November 29, 1941.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 19.")

Mr. GESELL. As Exhibit 20 we wish to offer additional communications concerning the proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan. This includes the draft of October 17 [1063] and the message as actually sent by President Roosevelt dated December 6, 1941.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 20.")

Mr. GESELL. Finally, as exhibit 21, a series of several communications, most of which were received in the very last few days before the attack, from Ambassador Winant in England, and other sources, giving information as to the possible movement of Japanese forces.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 21.")

Mr. GESELL. We will have occasion to refer to these exhibits during the testimony of the witnesses who are about to come, and of course we will have other exhibits to offer.

I also want to refer briefly to the official publications of the Department of State which have been made available in three volumes to all of the members of the committee. These include a substantial number of memoranda covering conversations held with the Japanese Government during the period with which we are concerned.

While the committee is no doubt familiar with the volumes, I want to call attention to page 806 of volume II, Foreign Relations of the United States—Japan, 1931–41. There is set forth on that page, as part of the index, and subsequent pages, a very detailed chronological presentation of the various [1064] economic measures and freezing orders which were entered from time to time beginning as early as the moral embargoes in 1938 and 1939, and continuing down to the Executive order freezing the Japanese and Chinese assets in the United States on July 26, 1941.

All those basic orders and other material relating to them are contained in these official documents. I think the members of this com-

mittee will find the chronological presentation helpful in finding the specific dates and other information that may be pertinent.

Mr. MURPHY. What page is that?

Mr. GESELL. Page 806. It starts in the index of volume II, Congressman Murphy.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. GESELL. Those have all been received, have they, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, these exhibits to which you referred will be marked as you have indicated, and will be available, and have already been available to the Chairman and members of the committee.

Mr. GESELL. We would now like to call Mr. Hull as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, will you be sworn?

[1065] **TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE¹**

The CHAIRMAN. The counsel and the committee have discussed, Mr. Secretary, if you will permit me to make a brief observation here, the question of whether your statement, which has been submitted to the committee and which all members are presumed to have read, and have also been given to the press two or three days ago, should be read now, or whether it should be printed as a part of the hearing, and based upon it the committee then proceed to examine you with reference to its contents, or any other matter that they might wish to inquire of you about.

The committee cannot expect you to read this document itself because of its length and the condition of your health. I think it is a matter for the committee to decide, whether they wish it read by someone or whether they prefer that it be printed at this point as a part of the hearing, and then the committee inquire with reference to it.

Does counsel have any suggestion in regard to this matter?

Mr. GESELL. Our suggestion, Mr. Chairman, would be that the statement be inserted in the transcript as if read, and that we proceed, in the time we have, with an examination of Mr. Hull. We discussed that with Mr. Hull, and I think that was the procedure we had all anticipated would be followed.

[1066] The statement was made available to the members of the committee and they have had it in advance more than is usually the practice to be certain that everybody had an opportunity to study it thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I might first ask you what your wishes are, if you have any preference in regard to it.

Mr. HULL. Naturally I will defer to the desire of the committee. I had wondered whether, in view of the early release of the statement both to the committee and the press, whether the committee would decide to have it read at this time, assuming that the committee has read it. Naturally, if the members of the committee have been too busy to read it we could read it now. I defer to the wishes of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

I will just go down the line and ask the committee what its wishes are about it.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I think the statement ought to be inserted in the record as if read. I see no reason why it should be again read, unless the members of the committee have not had an

¹ See p. 5308, *infra*, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Hull.

opportunity to read it. We have had it a sufficient length of time. I have read the statement in its entirety and reread a great part of it a second time yesterday. So far as I am concerned I think it would be wise to put it into the record. And the Secretary will, of course, refer to [1067] it, and perhaps read portions of it in answer to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I concur in the views expressed by Senator George and the request made by counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I concur in the statement made by the able Senator from Georgia.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I concur in Senator George's statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I have had the statement and I have read it. I have been deeply impressed. I feel that in deference to the Secretary, Mr. Hull, this carefully considered statement of his, which, as I understand, has been prepared under his direction and represents a very careful and well considered presentation of the events leading up to this affair, certainly it deserves the consideration which it would receive by being read.

It is quite true that the members of the committee have had the statement. I have read it two or three times. I am perfectly ready to go ahead, but I think the committee as well as everybody else can profit by having it read.

While perhaps it may seem that this is an extra judicial observation, and we are not primarily concerned with the audience [1068] immediately gathered here, we are speaking to an audience of 120 million Americans that are concerned, and I think we realize very well, under modern conditions, that if we proceed immediately with whatever examination is to follow, that that will immediately preempt the statement, to the exclusion of Mr. Hull's statement, and I therefore believe that Mr. Hull's statement, which I assume would take the better part of the morning to read, should be read here at this time.

It is so important that it certainly deserves that amount of consideration by this committee. We could permit Mr. Hull to return at 2 o'clock and then take up whatever questions may be directed to him. And perhaps have it read by Mr. Gesell, who is very competent, certainly, in this field.

I feel quite strongly that the public interest would be served by having it read.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have given a great deal of time and consideration to this statement. As far as I am concerned I am prepared to proceed without having it read. I concur in the statement of the gentleman from Georgia.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, while I have spent a considerable time upon the statement I was compelled to do so at intervals and not to read it all at one time. I think that [1069] it would be well for the committee to hear the entire statement, as a whole, read before the committee, but I have no desire whatever that the Secretary remain here during that reading. I feel that he should not unless he so desires.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Of course, Mr. Chairman, I would not insist upon the Secretary himself reading the document, but, as it appears to me, Secretary Hull was one of the great actors in one of the greatest periods of our American history, and to take his carefully prepared statement and merely insert it in the record doesn't strike me as giving proper consideration to the statement of one who played so important a part in the development of the world situation.

I think it ought to be read in order that those of us who have already read his statement may have the essential points properly emphasized in our memory in this important day's proceeding. I would like to have it read.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I agree with my colleague Mr. Gearhart.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair has not expressed his view but in order that there be no partisan division in the committee the Chair will vote with the minority that the document be read at this time, and if agreeable, Mr. Gesell, who is competent in such matters, will proceed to read it.

[1070] Mr. Secretary, if you do not wish to remain here while the document is being read you may retire and come back at 2 o'clock; just as you wish.

Mr. HULL. Well, I would be disposed to retire unless my absence should be construed as a lack of interest by any of my friends who want it read.

Senator BREWSTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will assure the Secretary that, in view of his health, that his retirement while this document is being read, and about which no questions would be asked of the Secretary if he were sitting here while it was being read, his retirement at this time will not be interpreted as any lack of interest in the document on which he has spent, no doubt, weeks in preparation.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. HULL. Then I will be expected to be here at 2 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think if it would simply appear that the Secretary has incorporated in the record that this is his considered statement, very carefully prepared, of the background of all these events, that it does represent his considered conclusions and contribution, so that we will not understand that it is an incidental or minor document, [1071] it would be well.

Mr. HULL. I think everyone understands that we took the unusual step immediately or soon after Pearl Harbor to publish, first in one volume and then in two, containing some 1,800 to 2,000 pages, virtually every conversation and its record that took place between the Japanese and myself and the President. When this hearing was projected I undertook to prepare a statement, with the cooperation of the experts who understood the nature and location of all relevant documents, undertook to prepare a statement, which is now before you.

So far as I have observed, I consider it accurate and I would not under any circumstances want anyone to have any doubt about my standing for that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is sufficient to identify it as a statement which you would yourself present in person except for the condition

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask the unanimous consent then that Mr. Hull have the permission and consent of the committee to retire during the reading of the statement and to return for an appearance before the committee at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that consent is given by the committee.

Secretary Hull, you may sit here as long as you wish and [1072] retire when you wish. We will expect you back at 2 o'clock.

Mr. HULL. I may return shortly or I may not.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. GESELL. I will commence the reading of this statement and if I find that my voice gets tired I would appreciate permission of the committee to ask one or two of the men from the State Department here to spell me a bit on the reading.

The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable. The Chair will help you out if necessary.

Those who desire to retire will do so as rapidly and in as good order as possible.

The committee will come to order. You may proceed.

Mr. GESELL. I will not commence reading with the table of contents but start at page 2.

(The table of contents referred to follows:)

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[1074] Annex A Record of the Secretary of State's Conference, Consultations and Telephone Conversations (as entered in engagement books) with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941

Annex B Record of the Secretary of State's Conversations in the State Department with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, October, 1940-December 7, 1941

Annex C Arrangements for Contacts Between the Department of State and War and Navy Departments in 1940 and 1941

Mr. GESELL. (reading):

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was preceded by months of conversations between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan. The initiative in this matter came from Japan which, by the beginning of 1941, after nearly a decade of relentless pursuit of a policy of aggression and conquest, had apparently reached a stage in the development of that policy at which she felt the need for a showdown with the United States.

A comprehensive documentary history of these conversations, as well as of the whole course of our relations with Japan during the fateful decade from 1931 to 1941, which began and ended with acts of aggression committed by Japan, was prepared and published by

It comprises well over 2,000 pages and is contained in the volume entitled *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, and much more fully in the two volumes entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*. It is, I believe, the most complete account of a diplomatic record every published so soon after the events to which it relates.

I commend these volumes to the attention of the committee. In the present statement I shall attempt to supplement this documentary history with such additional [1076] material as might be of interest to the committee and with a personal analysis and interpretation of the events which led up to the treacherous attack launched by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. While the story I am about to tell relates primarily to the year 1941, it is necessary also to deal, to some extent, with the developments of the preceding decades in order to lay bare the roots of the events which immediately anteceded the Pearl Harbor attack.

I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. JAPAN'S RECORD OF AGGRESSION

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern [1077] state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandizement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest

tain for her [1078] self an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo." By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. [1079] On April 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934, Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion of China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937 Italy adhered. While the fact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations—the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis."

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread [1080] fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. *Panay* in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "The New Order in Greater East Asia" and "The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke

In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance extorted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indo-china.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone.

On October 4, 1940, Premier Konoe was quoted by the press in a statement on the Tripartite Pact as having said in part:

[1081] If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime.

B. JAPAN'S RECORD OF DUPLICITY

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an interallied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any 1 power, [1082] were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said: "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for 4 years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

[1083] On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy * * *." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.

On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development * * * that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies." Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances: To illustrate:

On July 30, 1941, Japanese planes bombed the U. S. S. *Tutuila* at Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy there.

On July 31, 1941, Japan assured our Government that Japan would discontinue bombing the city area of Chungking. [1084] On August 11, only 11 days later, the American Embassy at Chungking reported that during the preceding 4 days Chungking had received unusually heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

C. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN JAPANESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES

The President and I had very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression and expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between forces of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. [1085] Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1932, and in a further communication of February 25, 1933, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

On January 17, 1933, the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows:

I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest.

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Thus in 1931-33, when Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity [1086] of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934, I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

On June 12, 1936, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program.

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the [1087] Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes.

In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues in that situation of concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities.

On October 6, 1937, the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In November 1937 the United States participated with 18 other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese [1088] Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

In the fall of 1937 our Government was confronted with the decision whether to apply the Neutrality Act to the hostilities between China and Japan. It was clear that the arms embargo authorized by the act would hurt China and help Japan, since China needed to import arms and Japan manufactured a large supply. The President used the discretion provided by law and refrained from putting the act into operation.

On July 26, 1939, our Government notified the Japanese Government of its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911. It was felt that this treaty was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. The treaty therefore terminated on January 26, 1940, and the legal obstacle to our placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was thus removed.

Beginning in 1938 our Government placed in effect so-called "moral embargoes" which were adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. Following the passage of the [1089] Act of July 2, 1940, restrictions were imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing list of exports of strategic materials. These measures were intended also as deterrents and expressions of our opposition to Japan's course of aggression.

On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world.

Throughout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation of American rights. Loans and credits aggregating some 200 million dollars were extended in order to bolster China's [1090] economic structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against Japan.

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind—and I was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact—that it was apparent that

the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects. The people of China were living on a very low standard. Japan, if it should conquer China, would keep China bled white and would not have the [1091] capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social welfare. It meant everything for the development of that half of the world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United States and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop internal improvements and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profitable relations.

During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had always felt that if a government makes a threat it ought to be ready to back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as possible.

I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by previously modifying our Neutrality Act, been in a position to send military aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm, and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to arm more than we did in the face of the world situation.

With reference to charges which at times were made that the Government did not reveal everything to the public, I [1092] pointed out that a Government could not come out every morning before breakfast and give a blueprint of its plans and purposes in times of extreme crisis. If we should announce one day that we were not particularly assertive of any rights or interest in other parts of the world, almost overnight we would see the aggressor nations move into those parts. I said that for a while after I went to the State Department I thought that when I was talking to representatives of the aggressor nations they were gazing up in the air, but I soon discovered that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our defensive preparations—that was all that meant anything to rulers bent on violence.

The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941, in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today." The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling num-

ber of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small. The President defined our national policy as follows:

We were committed to an all-inclusive national defense. We were committed to full support of resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting aggression and were thereby keeping war away from our hemisphere.

[1093] We were committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security would "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors."

On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, I said:

It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region.

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere."

D. SITUATION IN EUROPE

The President and I had to consider also the effect which would be produced on the European war situation if by any [1094] chance we should be successful in stabilizing the situation in the Pacific area. We knew that as the forces of aggression gathered strength in Europe and overran one unprepared victim after another, Japan's appetite to add to her empire by seizing rich territories increased.

The record in Europe was an awful one.

In 1933 Hitler had come into power in Germany. From that time the menace to peace from Japan in the Pacific and from Germany in Europe had developed concurrently.

On October 14, 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and also gave notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations.

On October 3, 1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia.

In March 1936 Hitler in flagrant violation of the Locarno Pact proceeded to occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland.

In July 1936 peace in Europe was dislocated further by the outbreak of civil war in Spain.

On March 11, 1938, Hitler sent his armed forces into Austria, and on March 13 proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria.

In September 1938, at Munich, Hitler and Mussolini forced a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland.

On March 14, 1939, Hitler, in violation of pledges given in the Munich settlement, invaded and occupied [1095] Czechoslovakia.

In September 1939 war broke out in Europe. Continued Axis aggression which had been proceeding step by step for several years thus sent the European continent into conflagration.

This weakened the military position of all countries, including the United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in the Pacific.

In the early summer of 1940 France's effective resistance collapsed. Britain was virtually under siege. Germany's vast and powerful military machine remained intact.

Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses.

It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension would aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe.

E. SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Finally the President and I, in considering the suggestion regarding negotiations with Japan, had to take into account the situation in the United States, especially as it affected foreign policy. A review of this situation is [1096] presented not in a spirit of criticism, but merely to remind ourselves of the inner turmoil through which the whole Nation was then passing.

In the years following 1931 the United States, like most of the world, was in the throes of a severe economic crisis. Many of our people had a profound sense of disillusionment over our participation in World War I. The Nation was much more intent on internal affairs than on potential threats thousands of miles away.

In the spring of 1933 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations rejected a proposal, supported by the administration, which would have authorized cooperation by the United States in an arms embargo against an aggressor nation.

In January 1935 the President sent a message to the Senate, requesting the advice and consent of the Senate to United States membership in the World Court. He pointed out that Republican and Democratic administrations alike had advocated a court of justice to which nations might voluntarily bring their disputes for judicial decision. The President declared that the United States had an opportunity "once more to throw its weight into the scale in favor of peace" at a time when "every act is of moment to the future of world peace." The measure, nevertheless, failed of passage.

[1097] In August 1935 in the shadow of a new European war, Congress passed a joint resolution known as the Neutrality Act providing that upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between or among two or more foreign states "the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war" from the United States to any belligerent country. In signing the joint resolution the President said he had done so "because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war." But the President said, with emphasis, that the "inflexible" arms-embargo provisions "might drag us into war instead of keeping us out." A few months later I urged, in reference to the application of the Neutrality Act, the wisdom of leaving discretion to the Executive.

In January 1936 a "neutrality" bill containing a provision for restricting the export to belligerents of abnormal quantities of war materials was introduced in Congress at my request. Although extended hearings were held in which I and others urged the adoption of the measure, isolationist sentiment was so strong that it failed of passage.

During this period our Nation still showed signs of deep suspicion of and hostility toward any line of policy which appeared to extend our commitments abroad.

These signs were interpreted by the aggressor nations as [1098] meaning that the United States would not oppose effectively their policies of conquest.

A few examples of this public state of mind may be cited.

Early in 1938 a relatively modest naval expansion program received a great deal of criticism and suspicion as to the use to which the program would be put. So strong was this feeling that I made a public reply on February 10, 1938, to a letter from a member of Congress in which I gave reassurances that the proposed program did not contemplate the use of any of the units in cooperation with any other nation in any part of the world. I also stated that it was the desire of our Government that the United States not be drawn into or forced into war. I warned, however, that if every peaceful nation insisted on a policy of aloofness, the result would be to encourage nations inclined to play lawless roles.

It was during this same period that the movement for a popular referendum as a prerequisite for a declaration of war was at its height. Such a proposal was rejected by the House of Representatives by a very narrow vote (January 10, 1938, by a vote of 209-188).

Fortune published in April 1938 a poll which showed that 54 percent of those polled thought that we should withdraw entirely from China, and only 30 percent thought we should take steps to make the Japanese respect our rights.

[1099] In the summer of 1939 an effort led by the President and myself to secure a revision of the neutrality legislation, which would have strengthened the hands of the western democracies against Hitler, was violently opposed and blocked on the wholly mistaken theory that no war was likely to occur and, if it did occur, no attack against us was likely.

Following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 our Nation began gradually to awaken to the awful peril of two aggressors on the rampage, one on our left hand, and the other on our right.

Congress speedily enacted revision of the Neutrality Act.

When the Nazis crushed France in June 1940 and Japan began to show strong interest in French, Dutch, and other territories in the Far East, we accelerated our rearmament program and adopted the Selective Service Act.

But most of those measures were attended by strenuous public debate and dissension. Many well-meaning people of all political faiths were confused as to what our course should be in a world apparently falling apart. A considerable number of our people were still clinging to the fundamental belief that no serious danger from foreign wars did or could threaten this country, and that about all the Nation had to do to keep out of war was to stay at home and mind its own business.

During this period of internal debate, while the Nation [1100] was gradually moving toward awareness of the menace from abroad, there was forced into the Selective Service Act inclusion of a provision that our new citizen army could not be used outside the Western Hemisphere except in our own possessions. In August 1941, only by the narrow margin of a House vote of 203 to 202, did Congress extend the service of men inducted under the act, after the measure had been urged in the strongest terms by the President, myself and other members of the Administration.

Throughout these years the President and I repeatedly called attention in public addresses to the darkening clouds of war in the east and west and to their menace to ourselves. We attempted to explain the basic problems confronting us, and at the same time we tried to avoid playing into the hands of the aggressors or causing irritations that would slam the door. The text of the more important public statements made by the President and by me is given in *Peace and War*.

F. DECISION TO ENTER INTO CONVERSATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE

The constantly growing danger in the Far East, the acuteness of the situation in Europe, the vast expanse of territory to be defended, the necessity of building up our own armaments, the necessity of supplying materials for defense of this hemisphere, of the British Isles, of the Near East and of the Far East, the generally divided attitude of the American [1101] public toward the world situation, and growing realization of the far-reaching consequences to the whole world which would follow the extension of the European war and of the hostilities in China to the entire Pacific area and of the importance of averting if possible such a development—all these constituted significant and inescapable factors which the President and I reviewed in considering the Japanese suggestion.

In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the wide divergences between the policies which the United States and Japan had been pursuing in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement. Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.

We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful, fair, and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military [1102] authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line with our need to rearm for self-defense.

The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's course of aggression. We realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries.

[1103] II. CONVERSATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO JULY 1941

On February 14, 1941, the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations.

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious [1104] concern and suspicion.

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;

(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;

(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;

(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with those principles.

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United

States should request Chiang Kai-shek to [1105] negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to his government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources—such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel—in the south-west Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guaranty of independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted.

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control [1106] of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia.

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood.

On May 14, Mr. Matsuoka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Konoe and he were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means, "unless," he added significantly, [1107] "circumstances render this impossible."

In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the Minister's reply was that those measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radio address on the same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious.

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords.

[1108] On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any ne-

gotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese government the general subject matter involved in the proposals.

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points—the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by [1109] self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles.

III. JAPAN'S WARLORDS DISCLOSE THEIR INTENTION OF FURTHER AGGRESSION

On June 22, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and this action started a chain of developments in Japan.

Following an Imperial conference at Tokyo on July 2, in which, according to an official announcement, "the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided," Japan proceeded with military preparation on a vast scale. One to two million reservists and conscripts were called up. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled. Restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan. Strict consorship of mails and communications was carried out.

During this period the Japanese press stressed the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure from many [1110] countries. It charged the United States with an intention to establish military bases in Kamchatka and with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." It warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis.

In July our Government began receiving reports that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. This Japanese movement into southern Indochina threatened the Philippine Islands, the Netherlands East Indies, and British Malaya. It

also threatened vital trade routes. We immediately brought these reports to the attention of the Japanese representatives, pointed out the inconsistency between such a military movement and the discussions which were then proceeding, and requested information as to the facts.

On July 23, the Japanese Ambassador stated in explanation of the Japanese advance in Indochina that Japan needed to secure an uninterrupted source of supplies and to ensure against encirclement of Japan militarily. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, replied that the agreement which was being discussed between the American and Japanese representatives would give Japan far greater economic security that she could gain by occupying Indochina. He pointed out [1111] that the United States policy was the opposite of an encirclement policy. He said that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Under instructions from me, he told the Ambassador that in these circumstances I could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador.

Thereafter, no conversations were held on the subject of a general agreement with Japan until in August the Japanese Government took a new initiative.

On July 24 President Roosevelt made a proposal to the Japanese Government that Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country. That proposal envisaged Japan's being given the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which—according to Japanese accounts—Japan was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the President's proposal.

It is pertinent to allude briefly to the estimate which we made of the situation at this juncture.

The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for 4 years. During those years the United States had continued to follow in its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done this notwithstanding [1112] constant violation by Japanese authorities or agents of American rights and legitimate interests in China, in neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and notwithstanding acts and statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of widespread conquest by force and even threatening the United States.

The American Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and while yielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amicable relations with Japan. It had been desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of their own accord from their program of conquest toward peaceful policies.

The President and I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a feasible alternative to Japan's indicated program of conquest. We had made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with Japan in a program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeatedly indicated that if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, and if thereafter any countries or areas within the Pacific were men-

aced, our Government would expect to cooperate with other governments in extending assistance to the region threatened.

While these discussions were going on in Washington, [1113] many responsible Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan's determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies. Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs had declared that the Three Power Pact stood and that Japanese policy was based upon that pact. Large-scale preparation by Japan for extension of her military activities was in progress, especially since early July. Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress upon the Japanese Government our Government's concern and our objection to movement by Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina, occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there for further southward movements.

The Japanese move into southern Indochina was an aggravated, overt act. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. It was essential that the United States make a definite and clear move in self-defense.

[1114] Accordingly, on July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States. That order brought under the control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Chinese or Japanese interests were involved. The effect of this was to bring about very soon virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

On August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which he said was intended to be responsive to the President's proposal regarding neutralization of Indochina. In essence, the Japanese proposal was that:

1. The Japanese Government should undertake to refrain from stationing troops in regions of the southwest Pacific, to withdraw from French Indochina after "settlement of the China incident," to guarantee Philippine neutrality, and to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in east Asia essential to the United States; and

2. The United States should undertake to "suspend its military measures in the southwestern Pacific areas" and to recommend similar action to the Governments of the Netherlands and Great Britain, to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in the Southwestern Pacific [1115] essential to Japan, to take measures to restore normal commerce between the United States and Japan, to extend its good offices toward bringing about direct negotiations between Japan and the Chungking Government, and to recognize Japan's special position in Indochina even after withdrawal of Japanese troops.

The proposals advanced by the Japanese Government completely ignored the President's proposal, and on August 8 I so indicated to the Japanese Ambassador.

The movement of Japanese forces into Indochina continued unabated after the President's proposal was made known to the Japanese Government. Also since then Japanese forces bombed Chungking more intensely than ever before, Japanese troops were massing on the Thailand frontier, Japan was making demands on Thailand, and Japanese troops were massing on the Siberian frontier of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, on August 8 and again on August 15, an official Japanese spokesman declared that encirclement of Japan by the ABCD powers—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands—was an actual fact. The Japanese press, while affirming its approval of efforts by the Japanese Government to improve relations with the United States, stressed that the basis for any negotiations must be predicated upon there being under no circumstances [1116] any change in Japan's policies, namely, the "settlement of the China Incident, the firm establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Axis Alliance."

IV. JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR ROOSEVELT-KONOYE MEETING

In the conversation which I had with the Japanese Ambassador on August 8, the Ambassador inquired whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views. After reviewing briefly the steps which had led to a discontinuance of the informal conversations, I said that it remained to the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines which would make possible an adjustment of views.

At the Atlantic Conference in August, Mr. Churchill had informed President Roosevelt that the British Government needed more time to prepare for resistance against a possible Japanese attack in the Far East. This was true also of our defense preparations. Furthermore, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had agreed that the American and British Governments should take parallel action in informing Japan that, in the event the Japanese Government should take further steps of aggression against neighboring countries, each of them would be compelled to take all necessary measures to [1117] safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of its country and nationals and to insure its country's safety and security. The President and Mr. Churchill were also of the view that the American Government should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means to offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which Japan was engaged.

Accordingly, President Roosevelt on August 17, the day of his return to Washington, informed the Japanese Ambassador that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries our Government would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United States. At the same time President Roosevelt informed the Japanese Ambassador, in reply to the Ambassador's requests of previous weeks, that we were prepared to resume the conversations.

At this meeting on August 17 the President also informed the Japanese Ambassador that before proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the American and Japanese Governments, as suggested by the Japanese Government, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present attitude [1118] and plans.

On August 28 the President was given a message from the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, urging that the meeting of the heads of the two governments be arranged to discuss all important problems by Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area. Accompanying that message was a statement containing assurances, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful intent.

The President in his reply given on September 3 expressed a desire to collaborate with the Japanese Prime Minister to see whether there could be made effective in practice a program such as that referred to by the Japanese Government and whether there could be reached a meeting of minds on fundamentals which would afford prospect of success for such a meeting. It was suggested that to this end there take place immediately in advance of the proposed meeting preliminary discussions on fundamental and essential questions on which agreement was sought and on the manner in which the agreement would be applied. We felt that only in this way could a situation be brought about which would make such a meeting beneficial.

On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to [1119] the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in that draft that "the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted *so long as pursued on an equitable basis*" [italic added] clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan.

On September 6 Prime Minister Konoe in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo indicated that the Japanese Government fully and definitely subscribed to the four principles which this Government had previously set forth as a basis for the reconstruction of relations with [1120] Japan. However, a month later the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to the American Ambassador that while these four points had been accepted "in principle," certain adjustments would be necessary in applying these principles to actual conditions.

A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe would have been a significant step. Decision whether it should be undertaken by our Government involved several important considerations.

We knew that Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous. We asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and again the civilian leaders gave assurances; time and again the military took aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's past and contemporary record was replete with instances of military aggression and expansion by force. Since 1931 and especially since 1937 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's national policy.

Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite Alliance was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce Japan's commitments [1121] in the alliance. They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking this country if it became involved through self-defense in the European war. They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in the alliance.

Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a practice of offering general formulas and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. This suggested that when military leaders became aware of the generalized formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which watered down the general assurances.

A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would have had important psychological results.

It would have had a critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese.

If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon them.

If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japanese military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.

[1122] The Japanese had already refused to agree on any preliminary steps toward reversion to peaceful courses as for example adopting the President's proposal of July 24, regarding the neutralization of Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina.

It was clear to us that unless the meeting produced concrete and clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken greatly this country's moral position and to facilitate their aggressive course.

The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be overlooked.

He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its principal cities and industrial regions.

He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S. *Panay* on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.

He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious outrages in Nanking in 1937.

He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon which the Japanese Government, even through- [1123] out the 1941 conversations, stated that it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those principles in application included stationing large bodies of Japanese troops in north China. They would have enabled Japan to retain a permanent strangle hold on China.

He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in 1940 with the Chinese quisling regime at Nanking a "treaty" embodying the strangle hold principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minister when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940.

As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their course of conquest, we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with Konoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all, unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a purpose to move in a peaceful direction. I was opposed to the first Munich and still more opposed to a second Munich.

Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the realities in the situation.

Although the President would, as he said, "have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt that in view of the factors mentioned [1124] the President could go to such a meeting only if there were first obtained tentative commitments offering some assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoye nor any of Japan's spokesmen provided anything tangible.

At various times during September discussions were held with the Japanese. On September 27 the Japanese Ambassador presented a complete new redraft of the Japanese proposals. He urged an early reply.

On October 2, I gave the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum of an "oral statement" reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining our Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which our Government did not consider consistent with the principles to which this country was committed. Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to Japan's intentions regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan's relationship to the Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese suggestion of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles so as to reach a meeting of the minds on essential questions. It was stated in [1125] conclusion that the subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought had engaged the close and active interest of the President and that it was

the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that such a meeting could be held.

During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of Japanese leaders.

For example, Capt. Hideo Hiraide, director of the naval intelligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on October 16 as having declared in a public speech:

America, feeling her insecurity . . . is carrying out naval expansion on a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry out naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously.

The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all necessary preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching [1126] for action, when needed.

In spite of strenuous efforts by the Government, the situation is now approaching a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends upon how we act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our Navy should set about on its primary mission.

[1127] V. TOJO CABINET AND CONTINUATION OF CONVERSATIONS

On October 16, 1941 the Konoe Cabinet fell. On the following day it was replaced by a new cabinet, headed by General Tojo.

The new cabinet informed our Government that it desired to continue the exploratory conversations looking to peace in the Pacific and to an agreement with the United States. But it showed no willingness to effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position. Instead, Japanese bellicose utterances continued.

On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by Major General Kiyofuku Oamoto:

Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese-American question, our national policy for solution of the China affair and establishment of a common co-prosperity sphere in East Asia remains unaltered.

For fulfillment of this national policy, this country has sought to reach an agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means. There is, however, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may end in a break with the worst possible situation following. The people must therefore be resolved to cope with such a situation.

Clearly, the Japanese warlords expected to clinch their [1128] policy of aggrandizement and have the United States make all the concessions.

On October 30 the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversations be concluded successfully without delay and he said that "in order to make progress, the United States should face certain realities and facts," and he thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese armed forces.

The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here on for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Department of State to the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and

thus to prevent a breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a subsequent general agreement. The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles.

[1129] In the last part of October and early November messages came to this Government from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent. The Generalissimo requested that the United States send air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a similar request of the British Government. He also asked that the United States issue a warning to Japan.

At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4 years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this, even though a Chinese request might contain points with which we could not comply, we dealt with any such request in a spirit of utmost consideration befitting the gravity of the situation confronting our hard-pressed Chinese friends.

I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President giving an estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations recommended:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for [1130] intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy considerations were involved that material aid to China should be accelerated as much as feasible, and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally, I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been striving for months to avoid a showdown with Japan, and to explore every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.

On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in line with the estimate and recommendations contained in the memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The [1131] Generalissimo was told that from our information it did not appear that a Japanese land campaign against Kunming was immediately imminent. It was indi-

cated that American air units could not be sent and that the United States would not issue a warning but there were outlined ways, mentioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist China.

On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an [1132] address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific"; and the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense.

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were breaking high both in the East and in the West", he said, and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."

Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the conversations.

On November 7 the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document containing draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China. Japanese forces in Indochina, and the [1133] principle of non-discrimination. That proposal contained nothing fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government.

In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Ambassador in Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks which might make inevitable war with the United States.

In the first half of November there were several indeterminate conversations with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. On November 15 I gave the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. I pointed out that this represented but one part of the general settlement we had in mind. This draft declaration of economic policy envisaged that Japan could join with the United States in leading the way toward a general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of what her leaders professed to desire.

On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambassador Grew and through their Ambassador here, urged that the conversations be brought to a settlement at the earliest possible time. In view of the pressing insistence of the Japanese for a definitive reply to their outstanding [1134] proposals, I was impelled to comment to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15 that the American Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums.

On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 17 he and the Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the same day on the President.

In those conversations Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, seemed optimistic in regard to adjusting the question of applying the principle of nondiscrimination and the question of Japan's relation to the Tripartite Alliance, but he indicated that it would be difficult to withdraw Japanese troops from China. Mr. Kurusu offered no new suggestions on those two points. This was further evidence that Japan was bent on exercising a position of military, political, and economic control and dominance of China. The President made clear the desire of this country to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis in the Pacific area.

On November 18 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called on me. In that conversation the question of Japan's relation to the Tripartite Pact was discussed at length. I asked the Japanese Ambassador if he did not think that something could be worked out on this vital question. The [1135] Ambassador made no helpful comment in regard to the continued stationing of Japanese troops in China.

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility of a temporary arrangement or a *modus vivendi*. The Ambassador brought up the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese entry into southern French Indochina, the United States put freezing measures into effect.

I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had mentioned, we would not know whether the troops to be withdrawn from French Indochina would be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. I said that it would be difficult for our Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless we believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. I said that I would consult with the representatives of other countries on this suggestion. On the same day I informed the British Minister of my talk with the Japanese about the suggestion of a temporary limited arrangement.

On November 19 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu again called on me at their request. During that conversation the Ambassador made it clear that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and felt bound to carry out its obligations.

[1136] VI. JAPANESE ULTIMATUM OF NOVEMBER 20 AND OUR REPLY

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as

did other high officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final Japanese proposition—an ultimatum.

The proposal read as follows:

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indochina where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied [1137] in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either the restoration [1138] of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina—for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provisions pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to revert to peaceful courses.

On November 21 Mr. Kurusu called alone upon me and gave me a draft of a formula relating to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. That formula did not offer anything new or helpful. I asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more to offer on the subject of a peaceful settlement as a whole. Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not.

On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese

messages that the Japanese Government had decided that the negotiations must [1139] be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We knew from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with Kurusu's statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their "absolutely final proposal."

The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world. By mid-summer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being—at least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made without fighting.

There was never any question of this country's forcing [1140] Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation.

The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a showdown.

There the situation stood—the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.

The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws.

Three possible choices presented themselves.

Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese [1141] warlords could then have told their people that the American Government not only would make no reply but would also not offer any alternative.

Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In that event the Japanese warlords would be afforded a pretext, although wholly false, for military attack.

Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal.

The last course was the one chosen.

In considering the content of a counter-proposal consideration was given to the inclusion therein of a possible *modus vivendi*. Such a project would have the advantages of showing our interest in peace to the last and of exposing the Japanese somewhat in case they should not accept. It would, if it had served to prolong the conversations, have gained time for the Army and Navy to prepare. The project of a *modus vivendi* was discussed and given intensive consideration from November 22 to November 26 within the Department of State, by the President, and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy. A first draft was completed on November 22 and revised drafts on November 24 and 25. It was also discussed with the British, Australian, Dutch, and Chinese Governments.

The projected *modus vivendi* provided for mutual pledges by the United States and Japan that their national policies [1142] would be directed toward lasting peace; for mutual undertakings against advances by military force or threat of force in the Pacific area; for withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from southern Indochina; for a modification by the United States of its freezing and export restrictions to permit resumption of certain categories of trade, within certain specified limits, between the United States and Japan; for the corresponding modification by Japan of its freezing and export restrictions; and for an approach by the United States to the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to their taking similar measures. There was also an affirmation by the United States of its fundamental interest that any settlement between the Japanese and Chinese Governments be based upon the principles of peace, law, order, and justice. There was provision that the *modus vivendi* would remain in force for three months and would be subject to further extension.

It was proposed as a vital part of the *modus vivendi* at the same time to give to the Japanese for their consideration an outline of a peace settlement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. On November 11 there had been prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs for possible consideration a draft of a proposal along broad lines. [1143] This draft like others was drawn up with a view to keeping the conversations going (and thus gaining time) and to leading, if accepted, to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a nature compatible with American principles. This draft proposal contained statements of general principles, including the four principles which I had presented to the Japanese on April 16, and a statement of principles in regard to economic policy. Under this draft the United States would suggest to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they enter into peace negotiations, and the Japanese Government would offer the Chinese Government an armistice during the period of the peace negotiations. The armistice idea was dropped because it would have operated unfairly in Japan's favor.

A further proposal to which I gave attention was a revision in tentative form made by the Department on November 19 of a draft of a proposed comprehensive settlement received from the Treasury Department on the previous day. This tentative proposal was discussed with the War and Navy Departments. In subsequent revisions points to which objections were raised by them were dropped. A third proposal which I had under consideration was that of the *modus vivendi*.

What I considered presenting to the Japanese from about [1144] November 22 to November 26 consisted of our *modus vivendi* draft and an outline of a peace statement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. This second and more comprehensive part followed some of the lines set forth in the November 11 draft and in the November 19 draft.

While the *modus vivendi* proposal was still under consideration, I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of a clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

[1145] In a message of November 24 to Mr. Churchill, telegraphed through the Department, President Roosevelt added to an explanation of our proposed *modus vivendi* the words, "I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon."

On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the *modus vivendi* aspect.

As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of November 24 and of November 25 contained two things: (1) the possible *modus vivendi*; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested example of how those principles could be applied—that which has since been commonly described as the 10-point proposal.

I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding—and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for—acceptance by our Government of their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20.

It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote.

So far as the *modus vivendi* aspect would have appeared [1146] to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.

It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the *modus vivendi* aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally

were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.

The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view [1147] of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I recommended to the President—and he approved—my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon of that day.

The document handed the Japanese representatives on November 26 was divided into two parts:

The first part of the document handed the Japanese was marked "Oral." In it was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of reaching if possible a settlement of questions relating to the [1148] entire Pacific area on the basis of the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. It was stated that it was believed that some progress had been made in reference to general principles. Note was taken of a recent statement by the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired to continue the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement.

In connection with the Japanese proposals of November 20 for a modus vivendi, it was stated that the American Government most earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gage program of peace throughout the Pacific area. Our Government stated that in its opinion some features of the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted with the fundamental principles which formed a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government had declared that it was committed.

Our Government suggested that further effort be made to resolve the divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. Our Government

stated that with this object in view it offered "for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations."

The second part of the document embodied the plan itself which was in two sections.

In section I there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. These principles were stated as follows:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

This statement of policy and of principle closely followed [1150] the line of what had been presented to the Japanese on several previous occasions beginning in April.

In section I there was also a provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles. These principles were enumerated. They were based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

This suggested provision for mutual pledges with respect to economic relations closely followed the line of what had previously been presented to the Japanese.

In section II there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two governments. One unilateral commitment was suggested, an undertaking by Japan that she would withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina. Mutual commitments were suggested along the following lines:

(a) To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area;

(b) To endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein;

[1151] (c) Not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking;

(d) To relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights;

(e) To negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment;

(f) To remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other;

(g) To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate with Japan and the United States each furnishing half of the fund;

(h) To agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and

(i) To use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the situation in the Far East, [1152] as embodied in the ten points contained in the document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the informal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis for further conversations.

A vital part of our program of standing firm for our principles was to offer other countries worthwhile plans which would be highly profitable to them as well as to ourselves. We stood firmly for these principles in the face of the Japanese demand that we abandon them. For this course there are no apologies.

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter how slight. [1153] It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was given to the Japanese Government.

When handing the document of November 26 to the Japanese representatives, I said that the proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, had not been referred to in the outline for fear that they might give rise to misunderstanding. I added also that I had earlier informed the Ambassador of my ambition of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented me from realizing that ambition.

It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give a false meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an "ultimatum". This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people and gain their support for militaristic depredations and aggrandizement.

VII. THE LAST PHASE

After November 26 the Japanese representatives at their request saw the President and me on several occasions. Nothing new developed on the subject of a peaceful agreement.

On November 26 following delivery of our Government's proposal to the Japanese Ambassador, correspondents were [1154] informed by an official of the Department of State that the Japanese representatives had been handed a document for their consideration. This document, they were informed, was the culmination of conferences during recent weeks and rested on certain basic principles with which the correspondents would be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

On November 27 I had a special and lengthy press conference at which I told the correspondents they were free to use the information given them as their own or as having come from authoritative sources.

I said that from the beginning I had been keeping in mind, and I suggested that the correspondents keep in mind, that the groups in Japan led by the military leaders had a plan of conquest by force of about one-half of the earth with one-half of its population. They had a plan to impose on this one-half of the earth a military control of political affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, and moral affairs of each population very much as Hitler was doing in Europe.

I said that this movement in the Far East started in earnest in 1937. It carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of justice or fair play.

From the beginning, we, as one of the leading free countries, had sought to keep alive the basic philosophy and [1155] principles governing the opposing viewpoint in international relations, that is, government by law, government by orderly processes, based on justice and morals and principles that would preserve absolutely the freedom of each country; principles of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries; the preservation inviolate of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries; the peaceful settlement of disputes; equality of commercial opportunities and relations. These and other principles that go along with them have been, I pointed out, the touchstone of all of our activities in the conduct of our foreign policy. We had striven to impress them on other countries, to keep them alive as the world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy. We had striven to preserve their integrity. That was no easy undertaking.

I said that in the spring of 1941 there had come up the question of conferences with the Japanese on the subject of peace. The purpose was to ascertain whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area was possible.

I mentioned that for a considerable time there had been two opposing groups in Japan. One was the military group, sometimes led by military extremists. They had seemed to be in the saddle when the China undertaking in 1937 was decided upon. As the Chinese undertaking went on, there was an [1156] opposing group in Japan, representing honest lovers of peace and law and order. Another portion of this group comprised those who personally favored the policy of force and conquest but considered that the time was not propitious, for different reasons, to undertake it. Some of this group were inclined to oppose Japan's policy because of the unsatisfactory experience of Japan in China and of what they regarded as Japan's unsatisfactory relations with Germany under the Tripartite Pact.

I said that our conference with the Japanese during the preceding several months had been purely exploratory.

During that time I kept other countries who had interest in that area informed in a general way.

I pointed out that for the previous 10 days or so we had explored all phases of the basic questions presented and of suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States as close together as possible, on the theory that that might have been the beginning of

some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations of the Pacific, including our own.

During the conversations, I said we had to keep in mind many angles. We had to keep in mind phases not only of the political situation but of the Army and Navy situation. As an illustration, I cited the fact that we had known for [1157] some days from the facts and circumstances which revealed themselves steadily that the Japanese were pouring men and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indochina. One qualified observer reported the number of Japanese forces in southern Indochina as 128,000. That may have been too high as yet. But a large military movement was taking place. There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make attacks somewhere there around Siam, any time within a few days.

I told the correspondents that we were straining Heaven and Earth to work out understandings that might mitigate the situation before it got out of hand, in charge, as it was to a substantial degree, of Japanese military extremists.

Referring to Indochina, I said that if the Japanese established themselves there in adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they not only had a base for operations against China but they would be a distinct menace to the whole South Sea area. When we saw what this signified in extra danger, naturally we explored every kind of way to avoid that sort of menace and threat.

I said that we had had the benefit of every kind of view. Some charged us with appeasement, others with having let other countries down. All the time we had been working at just the opposite. All these various views were made in good faith and no fault attached to the proponents thereof. [1158] This was just a condition which was not without its benefits.

We had exhausted all of our efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese. Our efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general agreement. We wanted to facilitate the conversations and keep them from breaking down but at all times keeping thoroughly alive the basic principles that we had been proclaiming and practicing during all those years.

On November 26, I continued, I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine [1159] everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace.

To a correspondent's question whether I expected the Japanese to come back and talk further on the basis of what I gave them on No-

vember 26, I said that I did not know but, as I had indicated, the Japanese might not do that. I referred to the military movements which they were making and said I thought the correspondents would want to see whether the Japanese had any idea of renewing the conversations.

In reply to a further question whether in order to conform to the basic principles of our Government's policy it would be necessary for the Japanese to withdraw the troops they were sending to the southward, I said, "Yes." In reply to another question as to whether it would not mean withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina, I said that of course our program announced in 1937 covered all that. The question of getting the troops out of China had been a bone of contention.

In reply to a question whether the assumption was correct that there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept our principles and go far enough to afford a basis for continuing the conversations, I said that there was always a possibility but that I would not say how much [1160] probability there might be.

In reply to a question whether the Japanese had proved adamant on the question of withdrawing from the Axis, I replied that they were still in it.

In reply to a question whether the situation took action rather than words from the Japanese, I said this was unquestionably so, but it took words first to reach some kind of an understanding that would lead to action.

In reply to a question how the Japanese explained these military movements to the south, I replied that they did not explain.

On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of [1161] coordination.

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the British Ambassador.

I said the same things all during those days to many of my contacts.

On November 25 the American Consul at Hanoi, Indochina, had communicated to the Department a report that the Japanese intended to launch an attack on the Kra Peninsula about December 1, and he reported also further landings of troops and military equipment in Indochina in addition to landings he had previously reported from time to time. On November 26 the American consul at Saigon had reported the arrival of heavy Japanese reinforcements in Southern Indochina, supplementing arrivals he had reported earlier that month. On November 29 the Department of State instructed its posts in southeast Asia to telegraph information of military or naval movements directly to Manila for the Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet.

On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus.

In a message from Premier Tojo to a public rally on [1162] November 30 under the sponsorship of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the "Great Japan East Asia League" he stated among other things that—

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting (pitting?) the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance.

[1163] On that day, Sunday, November 30, after conferring with our military regarding the Japanese Prime Minister's bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far Eastern situation, I telephoned the President at Warm Springs and advised him to advance the date of his return to Washington. Accordingly, the President returned to Washington on December 1.

On December 2 the President directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for continued Japanese troop movements into Indochina.

On December 3 I reviewed in press conference certain of the points covered by me on November 27. I said that we had not reached any more advanced stage of determining questions either in a preliminary or other way than we had in November.

On December 5 the Japanese Ambassador called and presented a reply to the President's inquiry of December 2, containing the specious statement that Japanese reinforcements had been sent to Indochina as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory.

On December 6 our Government received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers, and 20 destroyers from Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. This was confirmation that the [1164] long-threatened Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south was under way. The critical character of this development, which placed the United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an important subject of my conference with representatives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.

On December 6, President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor of Japan that the "tragic possibilities" in the situation be averted.

On December 7, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

Throughout the critical years culminating in Pearl Harbor and especially during the last months, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of our armed services kept in constant touch with each other. There was the freest interchange of information and views. It was customary for us to pick up the telephone and for the caller to ask one of the others whether he had anything new of significance on the situation and to

communicate whatever the caller may have had that was new. These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations.

[1165] As illustrative of the contacts which I had with officers of the War and Navy Departments during the especially critical period from November 20, to December 7, 1941, I attach a record of the occasions when I talked with such representatives as compiled from the daily engagement books kept by my office (Annex A). That record may, of course, not be complete.

In addition, I attach a statement of the record of the occasions on which I talked with representatives of the War and Navy Departments from October 1940 to December 7, 1941 (Annex B).

I attach also a statement in regard to the arrangements for contacts during the years 1940 and 1941 between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments (Annex C).

In the foregoing I have endeavored to give a simple narrative and analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan, especially as they bear upon the inquiry of this Joint Committee. If I can throw light on any aspect of our relations not covered in this statement, I shall be glad to do so.

ANNEX A

[1166]

Record of the Secretary of State's Conferences, Consultations and Telephone conversations (as entered in engagement books) with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941

November 21. 9:55 a. m., Admiral Stark, General Gerow.

November 24: 12:15 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

12:50 p. m., Captain Schuirmann.

3:30 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Knox.

3:30 p. m., General Marshall, Admiral Stark.

November 25: 9:30 a. m., Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox.

12:00 noon, Meeting at White House with President, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark.

4:30 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

[1167] November 26:

9:20 a. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

9:50 a. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

1:20 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

November 27:

11:05 a. m., Telephone call to Secretary Stimson.

4:00 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

5:10 p. m., Telephone call to Captain Schuirmann.

November 28:

12:00 noon, Meeting at White House with President, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark.

3:20 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

4:40 p. m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark.

November 30:

10:30 a. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

12:08 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

[1168] December 1:

12:00 noon, Admiral Stark at White House.

December 3:

4:45 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

December 6:

10:45 a. m., Telephone call from Secretary Knox.
 11:50 a. m. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
 1:00 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
 1:15 p. m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark.
 1:50 p. m., Captain Schuirmann.
 5:15 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
 8:45 p. m., Telephone call to Secretary Knox.

December 7:

10:30 a. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
 10:30 a. m., Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox.
 2:10 p. m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark.

[1169] Witness HULL

ANNEX B

Record of the Secretary of State's Conversations in the State Department with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments. October 1940-December 7, 1941.

With Secretaries Stimson and Knox:

October 18, 1940.
 October 23, 1940.
 October 30, 1940.
 November 12, 1940.
 November 29, 1940.
 December 3, 1940.
 December 13, 1940: Attended also by Admiral Stark, Captain Deyo, General Marshall.
 December 23, 1940: Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Senator Byrnes, Admiral Spear, Colonel Maxwell, Mr. Philip Young, Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Major Timberlake.
 January 7, 1941.
 January 14, 1941: Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Foley.
 January 23, 1941.
 January 28, 1941.

[1170] February 11, 1941.

February 14, 1941.
 March 31, 1941.
 April 8, 1941.
 April 10, 1941: Attended also by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Secretary Morgenthau and Admiral Stark.
 April 22, 1941.
 April 29, 1941.
 May 5, 1941.
 May 13, 1941.
 May 20, 1941.
 May 27, 1941.
 June 3, 1941.
 August 12, 1941.
 August 19, 1941.
 August 29, 1941.
 September 30, 1941: Attended also by General Marshall, Admiral Stark.
 November 25, 1941.
 December 7, 1941.

[1171] **With Secretary Stimson:**

October 14, 1940.
 November 1, 1940.
 December 3, 1940: Lunch.
 March 4, 1941: Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Foley, Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Harold Smith.
 May 9, 1941.
 August 8, 1941.
 October 6, 1941.
 October 28, 1941.
 December 10, 1941.

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With Secretary Knox:

November 4, 1941.
November 10, 1941.

With other Army and Navy Officials:

November 5, 1940: Admiral Stark, Admiral Greenslade, Captain Schuirmann.
November 6, 1940: Admiral Stark.
November 9, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
November 25, 1940: Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Colonel Turner, Captain Schuirmann.
November 27, 1940: Admiral Stark.
December 2, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
[1172] December 4, 1940: Admiral Stark.
December 5, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
December 31, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
January 2, 1941: Captain Kirk.
January 3, 1941: General Marshall, Admiral Stark.
January 9, 1941: Colonel Bratton, Admiral Anderson, General Miles and Commander Cramer.
March 4, 1941: General Marshall.
April 11, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 12, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 16, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 17, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 17, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
April 18, 1941: Colonel Mason.
April 20, 1941: Colonel Betts.
May 1, 1941: Admiral Stark.
May 2, 1941: General Arnold.
May 7, 1941: General Marshall.
May 9, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
May 13, 1941: General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
May 15, 1941: Admiral Stark.
May 21, 1941: Commander Peal (Naval Attaché Berlin).
[1173] June 3, 1941: Colonel Betts.
August 9, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
August 21, 1941: General Miles, Major Hansen, Captain Schuirmann.
August 23, 1941: Colonel Bratton.
September 4, 1941: Admiral Stark.
October 4, 1941: General Embick.
October 14, 1941: Admiral Turner.
October 17, 1941: Colonel Bratton and Major Smett.
October 27, 1941: General Miles, Captain Schuirmann.
October 30, 1941: Admiral Stark.
November 1, 1941: Captain Schuirmann and Commander McCollum.
November 4, 1941: General Marshall, Admiral Ingersoll.
November 8, 1941: General Miles.
November 19, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
November 19, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
November 21, 1941: Admiral Stark, General Gerow.
November 24, 1941: General Marshall, Admiral Stark.
November 24, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
December 6, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
December 12, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.

[1174]

ANNEX C

Arrangements for Contacts Between the Department of State and War and Navy Departments in 1940 and 1941.

During the years 1940 and 1941 there were maintained arrangements for contacts between the Department of State and the War and Navy Departments as follows:

(a) The regularly constituted Liaison Committee which began to function in April, 1938, and which consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations. That Committee customarily met at

weekly intervals. The meetings of the Liaison Committee were for the purpose of taking up matters of mutual interest to the three Departments and for the interchange of views and information.

(b) The Liaison Office which was established in the Department of State in 1939 and which was responsible under the Under Secretary of State for the regular channelling and expeditious transmission of pertinent information to the War and Navy Departments. The information thus transmitted, in addition to that having an obviously military and naval character, included basic related political and economic information needed for use in the preparation of estimates of the military and naval situation.

[1175] (c) Arrangements which the political and functional divisions of the Department had for direct communication with representatives of the War and Navy Departments under which information of pertinent interest received by the Department of State from its representatives abroad was made available to the War and Navy Departments. Conversely, the War and Navy Departments kept the Department of State informed of data of interest.

(d) Other conferences and conversations at frequent intervals between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as well as other representatives of the War and Navy Departments, including the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. These conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including—of course—developments in the Pacific area. At those conferences the Secretary of State was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and the Secretary in turn took up the political factors in the world situation of which he had special knowledge. These conferences became increasingly frequent, as the world situation became more critical, especially during the final stages of the conversations [1176] with the Japanese representatives.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will adjourn at this time and reconvene at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:37 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[1177]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, your statement was completed before the recess, including the exhibits which were attached to it, so that you are now free to be examined by members of the committee in any way they see fit.

Mr. GESSELL. Counsel first.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, counsel first; I beg the counsel's pardon. The counsel will proceed.

Mr. GESSELL. Mr. Hull, can you, as best you now recall it, fix the approximate time when you concluded that the possibility of solving the Japanese matter through diplomatic negotiations was most improbable and that it was likely Japan, with or without a declaration of war, would strike at the United States, or its possessions in the Pacific?

Mr. HULL. I might say by way of preface that we had been in conversation, through the late spring and summer and early fall, with the Japanese—that we maintain the basic principles that we started out with and the Japanese maintain the basic policies they started out with.

There was some camouflage by them at times of some of [1178] their policies, but it was manifest, after long months of close-in con-

versation with the Japanese Ambassador, and taken in connection with information we were receiving from, among other sources, including our own Ambassador, Consuls, interceptions, and so forth. It was reasonably clear to me that they had no idea of yielding their policies, which were policies of conquest and aggression by force, and enslavement of the conquered peoples wherever they went.

It was manifest that they were not going to depart from that and, we knew that we were not going to depart from our basic policies, which were the policies prevalent among civilized and peaceful nations.

I will refer to that later, perhaps, and I am not sure that I should do it at this moment, except to refer to them as the policies of peace and law and order, and justice, and equality, and peaceful settlement of controversies.

Mr. GESELL. Well, was it clear—

Mr. HULL. Now, during those early days in October, it looked more and more like they were prepared to, and were intending to, adhere to their policies. I take it you do not want me to cite any instances indicative of that attitude. But the situation floated along until Tojo's government came into power, about the 16th, I think, of October, the 15th [1179] or 16th, and the Kono government fell.

While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not go on without something serious happening.

We were moving in those days on with the so-called temporary proposal of the Japanese, on November 20.

Mr. GESELL. So that by November 20, the gradual process that you just outlined, it had become apparent to you and those with whom you were conferring in Government that the Japanese really had no bona fide intention of settling the matters under discussion in a peaceful, diplomatic manner?

Mr. HULL. The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that during those months they tried to prevail on this Government by persuasion and threats and other methods, to yield its basic principles, so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her continued course of aggression and conquest.

Mr. GESELL. Well, did you tell the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the President, as these negotiations proceeded, your conclusions as to whether or [1180] not there was any chance of their being successful?

Mr. HULL. It seemed to me that we were all very much like a family. We were seeing, talking among and with each other, making things known to each other in one way or another most of the time, and we made it a point to make known to each other whatever the other person might think of things that would be desirable to communicate.

So at all times, I think it is accurate to say that each of us in the State House have always tried to impart to the other, and with reasonable diligence, anything new that we learned that would be of interest.

Mr. GESELL. I not only refer to anything new you might learn, but also the conclusions that you might have reached from the diplomatic side.

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. As to the status of the negotiations, and the likelihood of their success?

Mr. HULL. Well, after Mr. Kurusu—I might say when he reached here about the 15th or 16th of November, I had different talks with him in conjunction with the Ambassador and he had nothing new to talk about. He had no new ideas, no new information. He was simply pleading that we must agree on the diplomatic side of this, or something awful would happen. About the first words he said to me were that [1181] the Pacific Ocean was like a powder keg. Then, he went on and pretty soon made the statement that Japan had reached the explosive stage, so we were given the benefit of all such views.

On the 20th, they came in and handed me a proposal that they well knew was an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 5 years' explorations of each other's situations, and attitudes.

The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that, and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything more to offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, "No."

So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal, and what their interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter.

Mr. GESELL. That was the proposal that you knew that, in the light of the principles which the United States Government had announced, would not be accepted, was it not?

Mr. HULL. It was utterly incompatible with them.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, during this period—you have referred to the various sources of information you had—am I correct in the belief that the most reliable source of information, or the one upon which you placed the greatest [1182] foundation, was the Japanese intercepted messages?

Mr. HULL. I looked on them as I would a witness who is giving evidence against his own side of the case.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, you were in a position during this time, in effect, through these intercepts, to know what they were saying between themselves, were you not?

[1183] Mr. HULL. We knew something of that. It confirmed our course and our questions and our arguments about the situation, the true situation.

Mr. GESELL. I gather from what you say that you saw the intercepts regularly as they were translated?

Mr. HULL. I understood that they were to come to my office, among other places, from the Navy and War Departments. I had, in particular, one secretary who was exceedingly well-informed on all these things, and he would receive interceptions of messages, from the War or Navy Department, and if they contained anything of importance he brought them in to me at once. I looked at it and handed it right back to him because we were following the policy of the War and

Navy Department to the effect that it was all-important that information about the interceptions should not get back to the Japanese.

Mr. GESELL. You had no reason during his time, did you, to feel that the Japanese knew we were intercepting the messages?

Mr. HULL. None whatever.

Mr. GESELL. Now, is it your understanding, Mr. Hull, that you saw all the messages, or only those that had a diplomatic significance?

Mr. HULL. Mainly, so far as I know, it was messages within my sphere of duties, and others, that were not important [1184] to me, or to what I was dealing with, were passed on to the Far Eastern Division.

Mr. GESELL. But the State Department, one way or another, saw all of them, is your understanding, that were distributed?

Mr. HULL. I wouldn't say that we saw all of them. I couldn't say that. Sometimes it would require a little time to decode them and get them to us. We would be late, sometimes, in getting them. But apparently that was unavoidable. There may be, and I am satisfied that there was, a number scattered through this entire list that we didn't see at all.

Mr. GESELL. Do you remember at this time whether or not you saw intercepted messages that were really of a nondiplomatic nature, concerned with the ship movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, and the military installations at Pearl Harbor, reconnaissance being conducted, and other matters of what we might call a military espionage nature?

Mr. HULL. My impression now is that I was aware of the circulation, but I myself didn't give them any attention, any real attention, so far as I recall.

Mr. GESELL. These all came to you from the Army and Navy, did they not?

Mr. HULL. They would have come from there.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, during this period, in fact, at any time during this period, did you ever receive any informa- [1185] tion or any reports or any rumors to the effect that Japan was contemplating a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. HULL. I never heard Pearl Harbor mentioned during the later months by anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. May I suggest to the Secretary, that if you move the microphone a little closer, you can be more easily heard with less exertion.

Mr. HULL. Pardon me.

Mr. GESELL. Do you remember Mr. Grew's dispatch of January concerning the rumor that there was to be an attack on Pearl Harbor which was transmitted by the State Department to the Navy Department?

Mr. HULL. I remember his telegrams in the fore part of January and later telegrams. I overlooked whatever there was in reference to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GESELL. During the latter period that you have referred to, I understood you to say that you had no information.

Mr. HULL. That was January of 1941?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. HULL. Oh, yes. I was familiar with that. I misunderstood. I had November on my mind for some strange reason. I was entirely familiar with the one in January.

Mr. GESELL. Now, other than that do you recall any [1186] information that came to you in writing or orally from people in our own Government or from representatives of foreign governments or from the President or any source that was to the effect that the Japanese were planning or considering or were likely to make an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. HULL. I saw nothing that came in during that period, the correspondence which I later saw, or knew of, between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, which took place in January 1941, that is all I know of, that and the Grew telegram.

Mr. GESELL. You mean the letters of Secretary Knox and Stimson concerning preparations against an attack?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Well now, you have stated in your statement that was read today that beginning around the latter part of November you were remarking to all your contacts that it was quite likely that the Japanese would strike and strike with boldness and daring in any direction, and we introduced here this morning a memorandum of your conference with Mr. Halifax in which you referred to that subject.

I take it then from what you say that while you were considering and had in mind the possibility of some sort of a surprise action, you at no time had in your mind the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

[1187] Mr. HULL. You may, or may not, recall that for some time we were receiving messages, constantly, almost, about the Japanese movements of men and ships and fleets bound to the lower end of Indochina. We knew that was the jumping-off place for an attack on the south—well, toward Singapore, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, and other areas, and we were watching that pretty closely, very closely as the days passed by.

So I just, myself, I didn't think anything either way about other places in the Pacific that might be attacked, including Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GESELL. Well now, do you recall—

Mr. HULL. Pardon me. Of course, I was in the diplomatic branch of the service.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall, Mr. Hull, that on November 27 a warning message was sent to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, at San Francisco and at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, and to other points, signed by General Marshall, which was apparently sent for the purpose of putting the armed forces at those points on notice of the possibility of some hostilities, do you recall that such messages were sent?

Mr. HULL. I think I do.

Mr. GESELL. Secretary Stimson testified before the Army Board that in connection with that message, which he partici- [1188] pated in drafting, he had some conversations with you at the time. Do you recall any conversation with him?

Mr. HULL. I never sat in on the drafting of Army and Navy instructions to their field forces. Sometimes they would call me over the telephone about some particular thing.

Mr. GESELL. Secretary Stimson states just that.

Mr. HULL. He probably called me; if he says he did I am sure he did.

Mr. GESELL. The phrases in the message reading as follows, which he discussed with you on the telephone, I wonder if you recall. The message at the outset reads:

Negotiations with Japan appear to have terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Mr. HULL. That first sentence, first line or two there is about the language I was using in talking to high officials during those last days about the situation.

Mr. GESELL. Was the question of sending a warning message to the various theaters in the Pacific, to your recollection, ever discussed at any of the meetings with the President at the White House?

Mr. HULL. I don't recall it. As I say, I didn't [1189] participate in the purely military phases, except as sort of an outsider, and more or less as a layman. That was given attention by the Army and the Navy heads and the President.

For that reason I didn't sit in on the drafting of their orders, which would have contemplated, perhaps, previous conferences. I don't recall having any conferences on those particular orders.

We did always, at these meetings, report to each other everything we knew in our respective lines of activities and sometimes we discussed numbers of questions that were presented.

Mr. GESELL. Well now, at about this time Secretary Stimson reports that there was a meeting at the White House, on the 25th of November, at which you and Secretary Knox and himself were present, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

He says there:

The President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, as soon as, perhaps, next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

Do you remember any conferences at that time or at about that time with the War Council as to what should be done about the general problem?

Mr. HULL. The main point I was making during those and [1190] subsequent days was the very great improbability that Japan would seriously continue to participate in any conversations. We had learned through the interceptions not only that they had determined on their ultimatum but that they had ordered that conversations cease on the 25th, and then finally they worried me almost sick after the 20th about getting a quick reply.

I couldn't get them, couldn't prevail on them to give me the reason that was rushing them off their feet. I finally said, "Well, I can't make any reply before"—I think it was—"the 26th"—I am not sure but it went beyond the time they wanted me to make it, and I said, "If you can't get on with that situation that confronts me, why, you will have to do the best you can."

I don't recall except they acquiesced in that.

Then, as I say, I felt that first we should keep up these conversations to the last split second, going on and ignoring their ultimatums, ignoring anything that went on, so long as we kept a consistent record, showing an earnest desire for peace and an earnest desire to

prevail on Japan finally, by some remote speculative possibility, to change her mind, and also automatically, as well as very desirable, to secure some more time.

For some time, really during much of the summer, whenever [1191] I met any of our head military men or high British or Australian or Dutch officials, they would refer to this very great need, each of them had, for more time to prepare for defense.

We proceeded then in an atmosphere of practically grabbing at straws, putting up a development, propositions that we would hope to put up to Japan, and force her to expose her duplicity, that we had overtaken so often.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now—

Mr. HULL. If you will pardon me, I left this out a while ago.

So we hoped, I hoped that we could, by constant pressure, that if by any hook or crook it should prove possible for the Japanese to decide that they would be willing to wait a month or two it would be a fine thing for us, and I earnestly hoped we could get through with these different arrangements, but when we reached this War College meeting that you talk about, on the 25th, there wasn't much discussion, except the various phases, including my statement that it would be a mistake to assume that this thing is going on. I said, "The Japanese are heavily armed; they have been on this movement for a number of years, this movement of conquest, yoked hard and fast with Hitler most of the time."

And then I said—if I can recall what I wanted to say, [1192] what I wanted to get in here—at any rate I said it will not do to trust any phase of that situation because they are in control of this whole movement; we are not in control of it. We can only effect that movement of the Japanese armies of invasion by surrendering to them the principles for which peace-loving nations, including ourselves, stand.

[1193] Mr. GESELL. Well, now, was there anyone at that meeting who advocated a withdrawal from the principles which we had been taking in the negotiations?

Mr. HULL. That never was done, so far as I know, by any high American official in the State, War, Navy, or the White House.

Mr. GESELL. When you say it was not done you mean it was not urged upon you by anyone?

Mr. HULL. It was not.

Mr. GESELL. Do you remember the President making a statement which I quoted from Mr. Stimson's diary, to the effect that at that meeting on the 25th he mentioned that there was a likelihood that we might be attacked as soon as next Monday?

Mr. HULL. I do not recall definitely except that there was nothing new, really, if he said that because I was talking along those lines during those strenuous days after we got their ultimatum and other information about their purposes.

Mr. GESELL. Yes. Would it be fair to say that that view was the prevailing view among the Cabinet officers and military officers who attended the meetings at the White House of this war council group at this time?

Mr. HULL. Well, only the Army and the Navy Cabinet [1194] heads attended it.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. HULL. So far as those Cabinet heads were concerned, I do not know really the precise state of mind they were in but I received the definite impression that they felt that the outlook was critical and called for the closest attention.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, you have reviewed in your statement some of the meetings at this time and I do not want to go over it except I wanted to ask you about one specific meeting before taking up the note on the 26th with you in some detail, and that was a Cabinet meeting which the records of the White House indicate was held on December 5th, at which you lunched with the President prior to the Cabinet meeting.

Do you recall any discussion that took place at that meeting or with the President at that luncheon concerning the problems we are concerned with here?

Mr. HULL. I might refresh my recollection in some way, somehow, but I do not remember just at the moment.

You will understand that in justice to the Army and Navy, I informed them when I felt that diplomatic efforts to deal with the situation had ended, that the security and safety of the country was then in the hands of the Army and [1195] the Navy, so I did not have so awfully much to talk about, in fact, concerning the difficulties that the Army and Navy were then dealing with, but I was frank to express any comment that I thought would be helpful.

Mr. GESELL. Now, in that connection, do you recall discussing with representatives of the Army and Navy the question of whether or not you should abandon consideration of the proposed modus vivendi before it was done?

Mr. HULL. As happened now and then in the State Department, when we would run into some terrific problem that called for affirmative action at once we would prepare different trial drafts on the subject by different persons who had jurisdiction down in the Department and we would thresh out those questions in the most vehement manner sometimes.

We did that in connection with our plan to the effect that we would keep up the conversations. We would not refuse to answer their ultimatum of November 20th; we would not take any action that would deviate from our fixed policy of driving along, hit or miss, in the hope that somewhere even then that something might develop suddenly and out of the sky. So we went along in that fashion. And your question now relates to——

Mr. GESELL. My question is whether before it was definitely decided that you would not attempt the modus vivendi [1196] you discussed that specific decision with the Army and Navy?

Mr. HULL. Yes. Pardon me, I was trying to bring out another thread or two of this thing.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. HULL. We discussed, I think elaborately, with the heads of the Army and the Navy up to and ending on the 25th. We had not decided that it would not be feasible to present it to the Japanese until perhaps the afternoon of the 25th, as I remember it, refreshing my mind as best I can from documents and other things. So we knew that the Army and Navy people were fairly familiar with it.

They should have been because we sought to talk with them at any and all times that they might be interested in talking and to keep them informed.

Mr. GESELL. I think it is clear from the documents and from what you have said that the Army and Navy knew what you were considering.

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. And you consulted them.

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I wondered, however, whether you recall specifically taking up with them the question of whether or not as a governmental matter it would be advantageous or disadvantageous to deliver the modus vivendi to the Japanese?

[1197] Mr. HULL. As I say, we talked about the different phases of it right along and near the last we ran into so many terrific difficulties that those of us who were striving most actively to put this up to the Japanese and let them turn it down, as we thought the chances largely were that they would, it would clear the atmosphere and clarify to the public both here and in Japan some of the confusion that had arisen.

I do not recall that we had conferences with the Army and Navy after we discussed that, I and my associates in the State Department and whoever we talked to, I do not recall that we had any further conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the effect that it was possible to know.

One reason, perhaps, was that Secretary Stimson, I think, expressed himself readily to the effect that the Japanese would not accept this because it was too drastic.

Mr. GESELL. That I gather was generally the view as to the modus vivendi at that time.

Mr. HULL. Yes. Now, as to Admiral Stark, at that last stage I do not recall what he was thinking or saying.

Mr. GESELL. We introduced in evidence the memorandum from you to President Roosevelt recommending that the ten-point note be handed to the Japanese and that the modus [1198] vivendi not be handed to the Japanese.

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I was wondering whether you had any discussions with him on that subject or whether he acted on your memorandum without a conference. Do you recall on that point?

Mr. HULL. I was talking with him almost constantly on different phases of this highly acute situation and I do not remember whether I talked in any detail with him on this phase but the nature of my memorandum would indicate that I had talked with him.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, one other question with reference to this policy. You refer to the delay, the need for delay that you felt in talking to our officials and to the officials of other governments so that steps could be taken for military preparations. Do you remember whether during this period you had any particular time limit in mind for which you were seeking to stretch the negotiations out to?

Mr. HULL. We were just trying our best, as we had been for weeks and really months. I felt that the Japs, as I say, were over here for the single purpose of inducing us to surrender our policies and principles and let her policy of war and conquest and so on continue intact,

I still think [1199] that that was their business over here. At the moment I am not sure whether I understood fully your question.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, I would like to ask you one other question which relates to a somewhat different subject.

Mr. HULL. Maybe I did not answer all of this question. If I did not, I wish you would repeat it.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I wanted to know whether there was any time limit—

Mr. HULL. Oh, yes. Pardon me.

Mr. GESELL (continuing). For which you had been seeking to extend the negotiations to?

Mr. HULL. No. We were doing our best to keep this going for at least three reasons. One was our interest in peace. Another was to save time for our Army and Navy—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to suggest to counsel and to the Secretary that under our arrangement we agreed not to question the Secretary more than 45 minutes at a time, but that is subject to the Secretary's desire if he is not growing tired.

Mr. GESELL. I think I can probably in about 10 minutes cover the principal points that remain, if you feel that it is all right, Secretary Hull.

Mr. HULL. It is perfectly all right, Mr. Chairman, to [1200] run on for another 15 minutes, as far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, we will go ahead.

Mr. HULL. So the Army was speaking about certain preparations that it hoped to complete by the 5th or 8th of December. The Navy had some other date still further. In the memorandum by the President the word "6 months" was written up at the top of it in longhand. He probably felt that if by any hook or crook the Japs should decide, on account of conditions in which they were interested, to keep this matter running along a few days or a few weeks, he would like to put in 6 months. Now, that is not a fact that I am undertaking to state.

Mr. GESELL. We have that memorandum.

Mr. HULL. Yes. It is all in there.

Mr. GESELL. We have that memorandum with the "6 months" note handwritten on the top.

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Now, there are only one or two other subjects, Mr. Hull. They are not related to the *modus vivendi* discussions.

The first question is this: Do you know of any arrangement or agreement or understanding made by President Roosevelt or any other official of the United States Government prior to December 7 to the effect that in the event Great [1201] Britain or the Dutch or any other of the ABCD powers was attacked in the Pacific by the Japanese this country would go to war against the Japanese without its being attacked?

Mr. HULL. I never heard of anything except, as the danger became more imminent, there was a conference among the staff people, first I think over at Singapore and then more or less discussion among the heads of the Army and the Navy.

As to what the President said to them I do not know but, at any rate, I understood what took place to be that with Japan on the tip

end, with all of its armies and navy and air forces marshalled for a general movement in Indo-China, that this was the jumping off place and they were poised just like a diver on the end of a plank before the plunge. There they were, and we received and were receiving messages at all hours.

Finally, the latest message we received was that they were actually moving, sailing, a bunch of, I think, about 8 cruisers, 20 destroyers, and 35 transports, sailing from Indochina straight across the Bay of Siam toward the—what is that “K” Peninsula?

Mr. GESELL. Kra Peninsula.

Mr. HULL. Kra is the specific pronunciation.

At any rate, those were the things that greeter us and I think it was about that time that our Army and Navy officials [1202] got up these statements, especially the one on the 27th of November.

Mr. GESELL. Yes. Now, that one has been introduced and we are going to, of course, go into the events concerning the Singapore conferences, but I was really directing my questions to events before that time, at the Atlantic Charter conference meeting or any other meeting before that time, whether you got any intimation or any statement from the President or Mr. Welles or anyone else to the effect that we had made such a commitment with Great Britain or any other nation?

Mr. HULL. No, I did not. I only knew what was contained in the order of November 5 by Admiral Stark and the other of November 27.

Mr. GESELL. Both of which we introduced this morning.

Mr. HULL. That we might render some military course by this Government in case the danger reached that stage, that they would be derelict to their duty unless they had some plan to recommend to their government and that is as far as it got so far as I know.

Mr. GESELL. With respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Richardson has testified to conversations that he had with you and has indicated that he felt the State Department was exercising some influence over the disposition of the fleet and I wanted to ask whether you had any [1203] information you could give us on that question.

Mr. HULL. May I introduce that with what I said almost in my statement, in my written statement? I said soon after I came to the State Department, when I would be talking with the representatives of these thugs at the head of governments abroad, a government of aggression, that they would look at me in the face but I soon discovered that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our Army and that our diplomatic strength in dealing with governments that were not very honest, that were more or less dangerous, that have ulterior purposes, the first thing they throw their ayes on is not you or me or any other official—it is on our Army and Navy.

Now, diplomatic strength goes up or down with their estimate of what that amounts to. It does not mean that they expect to rush in to fight, perhaps, but it is like a desperado who goes around in a suspicious place and he sees somebody who is armed and he is just a little bit more cautious in exploring his plans to explode a safe or commit some other crime than he would be if there was no remote possibility of danger.

That was the feeling that I absorbed during my 10 or 12 years over there as we moved through the awful conditions that finally led into the war.

Now, I do not think our people have time and perhaps the opportunity in this of terrifically critical periods to [1204] grasp the full facts and factors that are involved. They did not stop to think.

Some person said, "Why, we were trying to bluff the Japanese." Well, if he was going into that why didn't he say we were trying to bluff Hitler and Tojo, because they were hooked together by links of steel in their plans. Why leave them out if you are going to take up that sort of a thing?

Now, the truth is, I have always said from my experience with them that a bandit government headed by such unmentionable persons as Hitler and Tojo, that such a government recognizes nothing, nobody, unless there is something translated into force, something it is able to rest its attention on. So I said the world is in a state of anarchy.

Here are two great nations in the East and the West, leading millions of people on armed to the teeth and using them to alter the peace. They are killing and massacring and robbing and conquering with all the methods of a savage. So just to illustrate, if I may, I happen to think of this:

When the Tripartite agreement was entered into between the Japanese and the Germans in September 1940 the average citizen in this country or any ordinary person with a grasp of intelligence could not begin to know all of the ramifications and the factor and the facts that were related to this transaction. He just thought that they had agreed to fight [1205] off each other. He did not know what they agreed to by any means. So I notice here a statement, a communication by the Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and if you will pardon me, it is two or three lines.

Mr. GESELL. Would you like me to read it for you from the exhibits?

Mr. HULL. All right. It is section 2 there.

Mr. GESELL. All right. This is from Exhibit 1, section 2, message to Washington from Tokyo dated October 8, 1941, translated October 8, 1941, on page 57 of the exhibit (reading):

When we conclude the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude the China trouble.

Mr. HULL. That is two points.

Mr. GESELL (reading):

To win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp.

Mr. HULL. Three.

Mr. GESELL (reading):

To have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (STAHLER)——

Mr. HULL. Four.

[1206] Mr. GESELL (reading):

(STAHLER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with the Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet).

Mr. HULL. Five.

Mr. GESELL (reading):

To guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then—

Mr. HULL. Six.

Mr. GESELL (reading):

But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.

Mr. HULL. I just intruded to bring that out, to show the interminable factors that are and were in the international situation.

Mr. GESELL. Well, Mr. Hull, we very much appreciate your coming.

Mr. HULL. May I add one sentence?

Mr. GESELL. Certainly.

[1207] Mr. HULL. I felt myself that any country that showed too much weakness in the face of these desperadoes and their armies would be much more likely to get into trouble and get all of us into trouble than if we maintained in our case a firm, a reasonably firm policy. I do not think I ever used the word "strong" policy unless I did it unintentionally. I always stood for what I called a firm policy and I do not know whether you asked me—no, you did not ask me about Hornbeck.

Mr. GESELL. No. I thought perhaps I would do so at some other time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thanks the Secretary. He has now been on the stand for an hour and the Chair would like to inquire when it would be convenient for the Secretary to come back?

Mr. GESELL. We will arrange that.

The CHAIRMAN. You will arrange that?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You arrange then with counsel, Mr. Secretary, when you should reappear.

Mr. HULL. Oh, I shall be glad to come here in the morning, attend the morning session.

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

[1208] The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable with the committee.

Mr. GESELL. We might see how our schedule runs and get in touch with Mr. Hull at the close of today's session or possibly get in touch with Mr. Hull Saturday and maybe work it out for Monday.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be other witnesses that will go on in the interim between now and the time you are to reappear and counsel will get in touch with you, Mr. Hull, and I want to say we appreciate the generosity you have displayed in your giving us the time you have given us today. We do not want to tax your strength and we do not want you to tax it yourself.

Mr. HULL. I appreciate the courtesy of the committee in excusing me during the reading of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You will be advised, Mr. Secretary, by counsel when you will be expected to return. Thank you very much.

Who is the next witness?

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Sumner Welles is the next witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sumner Welles. Please be sworn, Mr. Welles.

[1209] **TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE**

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Welles, the Chair will suggest that you keep your microphone as close as possible on account of the acoustics in this room, which you are probably familiar with already.

Mr. WELLES. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GESELL. I would like now to offer for the record as Exhibit No. 22 a document entitled, "Draft of Parallel Communications To The Japanese Government," on the stationery of Mr. Churchill, dated August 10, 1941; two telegrams and a draft of a proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to the Department by Mr. Welles following the conference between the President and Mr. Winston Churchill.

That number will be No. 22 and copies of this are before the various members of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Mr. FERGUSON. May I inquire at this time whether or not we have had clearance from the other governments on the communications?

Mr. GESELL. We have had clearance on practically all the documents. There remain perhaps two on which we have not heard anything as yet one way or the other and as soon . [1210] as they are available I will, of course, distribute them to the committee and if they seem to necessitate any examination of any of these witnesses on those points they, of course, will be available and be recalled before the committee on those documents. We have done our very best to get clearance.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this a special clearance on this particular exhibit that you now offer? We received it here at noon and I wondered.

Mr. GESELL. Well, you received part of it this noon and part of it had been in your hands before, I believe, Senator. The draft of the proposed communication that Mr. Welles brought back has been in your hands, I believe, for some time. The top document is being distributed now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Exhibit No. 22?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Consisting of this single sheet?

Mr. GESELL. No, there are three documents that make a part of it; it is all in one.

The CHAIRMAN. All of this is 22?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That which is mimeographed and that which is photostated?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

[1211] The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 22".)

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Welles, as a starting point could you briefly indicate your position in the Department of State during the years 1940 and 1941?

Mr. WELLES. During those years my time and attention were primarily given to relations between the United States and the other American republics and, to a considerable extent, to our relations with

European governments. I had no participation in the diplomatic discussions which went on between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Government representatives and only at certain times, when the Secretary was away on a much needed vacation or was not in the Department and I had to act as Acting Secretary of State did I take any active part.

Mr. GESELL. You were present, were you not, during the meeting in the Atlantic between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill?

Mr. WELLES. I was.

Mr. GESELL. Did you at that time participate in any discussions between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning Japan or developments in the Far East?

Mr. WELLES. No. During the meeting at Argentia the President delegated to me the work which had to do with the [1212] drafting of the Atlantic Charter. My conversations were almost entirely taken up with talks with the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, and those conversations related solely to the drafting of the Atlantic Charter text and to one of the diplomatic negotiations, none of which had to do with Japan.

Mr. GESELL. Did you receive any information at that meeting as to any agreement or arrangement or understanding that had been arrived at, if there was any, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning joint action of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific?

Mr. WELLES. When I left the President, since he was due to return to Washington before myself, he told me that he had had a conversation, or several conversations, with Mr. Churchill with regard to the Japanese situation and the increasing dangers in the Far East; that Mr. Churchill had suggested to him that the two governments, as a means which might be of some effect, should take parallel action in issuing a warning to the government of Japan.

As I recall it, the President stated that what Mr. Churchill had suggested was that the Government of the United States should state to the Government of Japan that if Japan persisted in her policy of conquest and aggression the United States, in the protection of its legitimate interests and [1213] in order to provide for its own security would have to take such acts as were necessary in its own judgment.

The President also asked me to tell Secretary Hull that he wished to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately upon his return and that warning which had been suggested as a parallel action by Mr. Churchill was communicated to the Japanese Ambassador by the President on August 17th of that year.

Mr. GESELL. Were you present at the meeting?

Mr. WELLES. I was not. You mean the meeting between the President and the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. No.

Mr. GESELL. Now, the Exhibit 22 which has just been introduced includes as the first document a document dated August 10, 1941, reading as follows:

DRAFT OF PARALLEL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

DECLARATION BY U. S. GOVERNMENT THAT:

1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.

[1214] 2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

DECLARATION BY H. M. G.

Same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading: "... their support of them, H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such Power."

DECLARATION BY DUTCH GOVERNMENT.

Same as that by H. M. G.

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

Do you recall ever having seen this document?

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember having seen that document. I remember seeing the draft, however, which I took from Argentina to Washington and which is one of the exhibits itself in this collection.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, did you prepare that draft or do you know who prepared it?

Mr. WELLES. As I recall it that was prepared after discussions between the President and myself the last day of the Argentina meeting.

[1215] Mr. GESELL. The last paragraph of that draft reads:

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government undertakes any further steps in pursuance of the policy of military domination through force or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it has apparently embarked, the United States Government will be forced to take immediately any and all steps of whatsoever character it deems necessary in its own security notwithstanding the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in conflict between the two countries.

Was that, in essence, your understanding of the agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning the notice or threat which should be given to the Japanese?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Now, referring to Volume 2, Foreign Relations of the United States with Japan 1931-1941, where the conversations between President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941 is reported.

At page 556 I find in the paragraph beginning at said page what appears to be a somewhat different statement. This is the oral statement handed by the President to the [1216] Japanese Ambassador. It reads:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

That statement that I have just read is a somewhat watered down version of the one you brought back, is it not, Mr. Welles?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct.

[1217] Mr. GESELL. Is it your opinion that the statement that I have just read from volume II is, in fact, the statement which was made at this meeting rather than the statement that you brought back?

Mr. WELLES. The statement was handed by the President, I understood, to the Japanese Ambassador in writing, as an aide-mémoire, and that is the statement to which you refer.

Mr. GESELL. Have you any information as to what accounted for the watering down process?

Mr. WELLES. I am not informed on that point, beyond the fact that the papers I brought back were given to Secretary Hull and he discussed them with the President before the President handed them to the Ambassador.

Mr. GESELL. Now, we have had reference already, in some other documents in this testimony, to the ABCD bloc. Can you tell us what the ABCD bloc is? Is that an association of powers based upon treaties and other understandings, or what is it?

Mr. WELLES. Those are the countries that were primarily concerned with the increasing march of aggression of the part of Japan.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know of any arrangements existing between them as to joint military action in the Pacific [1218] which any of them might take prior to December 7, 1941?

Mr. WELLES. None whatever.

Mr. GESELL. Have you any information concerning the staff conferences held at Singapore, to which Mr. Hull referred in his testimony?

Mr. WELLES. I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. GESELL. The documents indicate, in somewhat the same connection, Mr. Welles, that at the time of November 5, 1941, when there was under consideration, the request of the Chinese Government that the United States send assistance to meet the Japs who were proposing an attack on Kunming, and the Burma Road, that you participated in some of the conferences at that time.

You may recall that there was a joint memorandum submitted to the President at that time by Admiral Stark and General Marshall. Do you recall those conferences?

Mr. WELLES. I am afraid, unless you give me some details as to who participated in the conferences and precise dates, I could not.

I should make it clear at this point, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that I have not kept a diary and that, except for some copies of conversations which I have had, I have had no means of refreshing my memory on these points.

Mr. GESELL. Well, the joint memorandum was dated [1219] November 5, and there were minutes attached to it of the meeting of November 3, 1941, attended by various Army officials, at which you were not present, and there is reference of an earlier meeting at which you attended.

Mr. WELLES. I suppose the meeting of the Liaison Committee would be the one.

Mr. GESELL. It possibly is. This is a conference at the State Department on the morning of November 1, and present were yourself, Secretary Hull, Mr. Hornbeck, and other State Department

officials, and Captain Schuirmann of the United States Navy, at which the problem was discussed.

[1220] Mr. WELLES. Of course during that period there were many continuing conferences in the office of the Secretary of State in regard to the situation in the Pacific region. I was not generally present at those conferences on account of the burden of work I had in other parts of the world which took up the major part of my time, and I am unable for that reason to give you offhand an answer to your question.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted at all in connection with the 10-point note of November 26 which Mr. Hull delivered to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. WELLES. The note of November 26?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. No; I was not.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted concerning the *modus vivendi* which was under discussion prior to that time?

Mr. WELLES. No. I was kept informed by Secretary Hull of what was going on, but I had no part in the formulating of policy with regard to that.

Mr. GESELL. Now in looking over the various records we have of meetings which were held in the days immediately preceding the attack, I find three meetings which you apparently attended. I think I will mention them all and then ask you if you can tell us your recollection of the discussions at any of those meetings, as far as they are pertinent here.

[1221] One was a meeting of November 24, attended by yourself, Mr. Hull, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark.

Another, a meeting on December 2, which was attended by President Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and yourself—possibly a Cabinet meeting on that same date; the meeting of December 6, attended by yourself and Secretary Hull, Admiral Schuirmann, Mr. Hornbeck, and Mr. Hamilton.

Do you recall any of those meetings and the discussions held?

Mr. WELLES. I think I have very little to add to what Secretary Hull has already testified this afternoon with regard to the trend of those conferences and conversations. It was uppermost in the minds of all of us, I think, that the situation was becoming more and more serious as the hours passed. The entire purpose of the State Department, under the orders of the President, was to find every means possible to prevent a break in the negotiations which had been continued for so long a time.

A very large part of those meetings, as I recall it, was taken up with the consideration of intelligence information which had come to us. Since no minutes were kept of which I am aware, I am afraid, after a period of 4 years, I cannot give you any details.

Mr. GESELL. Now can you recall whether at that time, with [1222-3] reference to the intelligence information, you have any information, or any information was discussed at any of these meetings, which in any way pointed or indicated or suggested the possibility that the Japanese would strike at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WELLES. I do not. During the preceding 7 or 8 weeks, after I think it had been perfectly apparent to all of us that the situation,

since the Japanese had moved into Indochina, meant in all human probability that the Japanese intended to extend further the operations upon which they had already engaged.

I do not recall at any time that anybody in high position in the Government indicated to me that Pearl Harbor or Hawaii was a probable objective.

Mr. GESELL. Did you hear Pearl Harbor even mentioned in those conversations, Mr. Welles?

Mr. WELLES. I did not, except—let me interrupt there—except as one of the strategic points in the Pacific in which we were vitally concerned.

Mr. GESELL. Do you remember any discussions concerning Pearl Harbor in that connection, as to the question of its defenses, the question of it being alerted or not alerted, or any things of that sort?

Mr. WELLES. No. I should make it perfectly clear that at that time there was no reason why that should be discussed [1224] with me by any high military or naval officer.

Mr. GESELL. I take it you say it was not?

Mr. WELLES. It was not.

Mr. GESELL. Admiral Richardson has testified here to a conversation he had with Secretary Hull concerning the question of the fleet being based at Pearl Harbor, or on the west coast, and I think, as he put it, you sat in on that conversation. Do you recall it?

Mr. WELLES. I remember the conversation with Admiral Richardson very well.

Mr. GESELL. What is your recollection of it?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that the admiral expressed very grave concern at the situation resulting from the fact that the fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor. I remember that I discussed it afterwards with Mr. Hull. I think the feeling of myself was quite as strong as that of Mr. Hull, that if any change in the arrangement which then existed were undertaken the impression would inevitably be given to the Government of China that the United States was withdrawing from the protection of its own vitally important defenses in the Pacific, and that short of some overwhelmingly imperative reason for such a change the whole situation in the Pacific by such a step would be so vitally affected as to make it in the highest degree prejudicial to our own interests.

[1225] I am not attempting to vouch for what conversations Mr. Hull may have had with the President with regard thereto, but that is the conversation, as I remember it.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any conversation with the President concerning it?

Mr. WELLES. No; because Mr. Hull was handling the question of the Far East with the President whenever he was in the Department.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall whether Admiral Richardson said anything at this meeting with Mr. Hull which indicated or suggested that the fleet was insecure in Pearl Harbor and subject to disaster through attack?

Mr. WELLES. I do not recall such exact expressions of opinion on the part of Admiral Richardson, but the very clear construction that I drew from what Admiral Richardson said in that meeting was that he believed the fleet was insecure if it remained stationed in Hawaii.

Mr. GESELL. Was he discussing the question of security or was he discussing the question of the readiness of the fleet for combat?

Mr. WELLES. To the average layman like myself I think there probably would be very little difference between the two expressions. I do not think the admiral went into any technical phases of the situation in that sense.

[1226] Mr. GESELL. He discussed, did he, the questions of better training on the west coast, the need of assembling a train, and matters of that sort?

Mr. WELLES. No; not so far as I recall it.

Mr. GESELL. Now, one other topic that has to do with the Japanese intercepted diplomatic messages. Were you among those who saw those messages as they were intercepted?

Mr. WELLES. The custom in the Department at that time was that the diplomatic intercepts went first to the office of the Secretary of State and from his office they came to me. Occasionally, intercepts of a military character would also come to me, but whether all of them came to me or not, I could not undertake to say. I am quite confident to say, however, that all of the diplomatic intercepts did come to me.

Mr. GESELL. Those came to Mr. Hull and to you from the Army and Navy, did they not?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall seeing messages of an espionage or military nature concerning fleet movements in Pearl Harbor reconnaissance?

Mr. WELLES. No.

Mr. GESELL. And matters of that sort?

[1227] Mr. WELLES. No.

Mr. GESELL. Do you have any record or do you know of any record which indicates what intercepts were in fact distributed in the Department of State and which ones were not?

Mr. WELLES. That record would undoubtedly be available in the office of the Secretary of State, if it were kept.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know whether any was kept?

Mr. WELLES. I could not answer that question.

Mr. GESELL. I take it you, like Mr. Hull, returned the intercepts after you read them, for security reasons?

Mr. WELLES. They were taken back, as soon as I got through with them, to his office.

Mr. GESELL. I think that is all, if the committee please.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you one question.

Were your conferences on the far-eastern situation growing out of the fact that you were directly in charge of inter-American relations and European affairs, rather incidental, due to the absence of the Secretary?

Mr. WELLES. They were entirely incidental, Mr. Chairman. The matter was handled in this way, that since occasionally I had to act as Acting Secretary of State it was necessary for me to be kept in touch with what the Secretary of State and the President were doing in the far-eastern picture, and [1228] occasionally during any absence of Mr. Hull I had to act as the mouthpiece of the President in order to communicate certain messages to the Japanese representa-

tives, or in order to act in accordance with the request of Mr. Hull, if he were not available.

I think it is fair to say it was only in that connection that I was drawn into the picture.

The CHAIRMAN. During that period who was the Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs, or was it the head of the Division?

Mr. WELLES. There was no Assistant Secretary of State at that time, Mr. Chairman, who acted as being in charge of far-eastern affairs. Secretary Hull, probably from the time that he commenced his negotiations with the Japanese Ambassador in March 1941, was in entire charge and took entire charge of those negotiations himself. The principal advisers whom Mr. Hull had in the Department at that time were Dr. Hornbeck, who was the political adviser for far-eastern Affairs, and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine of the Far Eastern Division.

The CHAIRMAN. During your conferences, or during your presence at any conference with the Secretary, or with the President, or with the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, or any of the high ranking military and naval officers of the Government, did the question of the use of the Navy [1229] and its placement in the region of Hawaii for diplomatic reasons arise?

Mr. WELLES. Perhaps before I answer your question specifically, Mr. Chairman, it might be helpful for me to say that in the year 1939 a so-called liaison committee had been created, with Mr. Hull's approval and the President's authorization, between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments, of which at the outset General Marshall, Admiral Stark and myself formed part, together with various assistants. That liaison committee was established primarily for the purpose of bringing the three Departments into closer touch, so that it could act as a clearinghouse for information among the three Departments more familiar with the policies which each one was pursuing.

As the year 1941 came in Mr. Hull undertook himself to have weekly conferences, prolonged conferences, directly with the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War. In view of that, the meetings of the liaison committee, composed of General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and myself, dealt almost entirely with questions which affected the Western Hemisphere, questions of such vital importance, as to assistance which we might give to some of the Latin-American Republics who desperately needed some means of defense, or questions which arose occasionally with regard to the bases which the United [1230] States was acquiring in the Caribbean, and so on.

As to matters which affected the far eastern picture, those very rarely came under the cognizance of that liaison committee. For that reason matters of the kind which you mentioned were being handled by Mr. Hull with Colonel Stimson and Colonel Knox, and I do not recall that the question which you bring up, namely, whether the fleet should be used for diplomatic purposes or not, was ever discussed by me with members of the War and Navy Departments.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire of counsel for probably a little clearer understanding with respect to the exhibit, exhibit 22.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As a part of it I find about seven pages of the photostatic copy, and on the note, the first page, it states, "This draft was not given to the Japanese Ambassador. See communications given by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941."

Now then, the following photostatic pages, are they a copy of the document that was given to the Japanese Ambassador or the one that was not given?

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Welles has testified that it was not [1231] given to the Japanese Ambassador. We have called attention to the text of the note which was given, which appears on page 556 of volume II of the reported conversations.

I think I might say in that connection, with respect to the whole subject, that the first sheet, the draft of paralleling communications to the Japanese Government, comes from the files of the White House, as it is the text of the two telegrams sent by President Roosevelt to Mr. Hull arranging for a meeting with the Japanese Ambassador. The photostatic document which you refer to comes from the files of the State Department and the note on there, as you have pointed out, indicates that it was not handed to the Ambassador.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was my understanding of it, but I wanted to be clear on that point.

Mr. GESELL. That is a correct statement.

Mr. WELLES. That is my understanding as being perfectly correct, Mr. Congressman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the document that was read from the book is the one that was delivered by the President to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. What is published in that book as having been delivered by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 16, 1941, is the document delivered.

[1232] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you, Mr. Welles, to say you participated in the drafting of one of these documents. Did you participate in the drafting of the one that was delivered to the Japanese Ambassador or the one that was not?

Mr. WELLES. The one that was not delivered, Mr. Congressman. That was merely a suggestion that was hastily drafted before I left Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I believe I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I want to pass for just a moment while I am looking through some testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Welles, as I understood your conversation with Admiral Richardson, you stated that he had informed you and Mr.

Hull that at Pearl Harbor the fleet was insecure, and then, as I understood you further, you said it would not be moved out of Hawaiian waters unless there was some matter of extreme importance. That is not the exact language used, but something of that implication. I was wondering if there was credence placed by Mr. Hull and yourself in the statement [1233] of the commander in chief of the fleet that the fleet was insecure in its position; I wonder if that was not a matter of extreme importance, or would the fact that you did not want to back up and return it to the west coast overcome the statement of the admiral as to the security of the fleet.

Mr. WELLES. I am afraid I must have expressed myself badly, Congressman Murphy, if that is what you understood I said.

Mr. MURPHY. I so understood it. I would like to have it cleared up so there will not be any misunderstanding.

Mr. WELLES. I will be very glad to. My understanding was that the admiral stated that in his belief and opinion the fleet was insecure in Hawaii, and that it was my feeling in consequence that in view of the fact of moving the fleet from Hawaii, leaving Hawaii defenseless, would have a highly important and prejudicial effect upon the willingness of the Chinese Government to consider resistance, and also in the sense that it would persuade the Japanese Government immediately to continue with its policy of aggression since it would have interpreted it as an indication that the United States was withdrawing and giving a wide-open road to Japan to dominate the entire Pacific region.

That is what I intended by saying "as of utmost importance" it seemed to me if the fleet was withdrawn at that time.

[1234] Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, to pursue that a little further, in the event that the Fleet was insecure—I mean, what would you understand the Admiral to mean by that—that it was subject to and likely to be attacked?

Mr. WELLES. My understanding was, Mr. Congressman, that the Admiral believed that from the Navy standpoint, there was not sufficient security for the fleet at that point.

Mr. MURPHY. And you felt that even though there was—I don't want to misquote you—did you think at that time that there was any any likelihood that the fleet might be attacked at Pearl Harbor because of the admiral saying that it was not secure there?

Mr. WELLES. In my judgment there was no immediate danger at that time, in the autumn of 1940. Having the greatest respect for the Admiral's opinion, it was an opinion as being necessarily deserving of every possible consideration, but I want to emphasize the fact that I believed that was a matter for the Navy Department, primarily, and for the President and the armed forces of the country to determine.

From the diplomatic standpoint, the effect would be disastrous, I thought, if it were withdrawn.

Mr. MURPHY. So that the President would be confronted with the opinion of the commander in chief of the fleet from a purely naval standpoint and at the same time with the [1235] opinion of the Secretary and yourself from the diplomatic standpoint?

Mr. WELLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And it would be up to him, as the President, under constitutional authority to make a decision based on all of the information presented to him?

Mr. WELLES. From that standpoint, that would be his responsibility.

Mr. MURPHY. There have been rumors throughout the country, in several of the papers, to the effect that at the Atlantic Conference, there was a promise by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of England, Mr. Churchill, that we would stall the Japanese for a period—that is a free translation—stall the Japanese for a period of about 4 months.

Mr. GEARHART. Baby them.

Mr. MURPHY. I am using the word "stall." My colleague suggests "baby them" along. At any rate, was there any promise, so far as you know, on the part of the President of the United States, or any commitment by him, to the Prime Minister of England, that we would stall, baby them along, or anything of that nature, for a period of 4 months?

Mr. WELLES. The only promise made by the President, [1236] Mr. Congressman, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is that I have already stated, namely that the United States would take parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government that we could not regard with indifference their continued expansion.

Mr. MURPHY. And nothing else?

Mr. WELLES. It was also the President's agreement, if it can be called that, an understanding was reached that the United States would again undertake the negotiations which, you remember, had been broken off when the Japanese moved into Indochina, would again undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government in an effort to avoid war.

Mr. MURPHY. One other question.

Admiral Richardson said that having talked to you and having talked to Mr. Hornbeck, or Dr. Hornbeck, and having talked to Mr. Hull, that he gained the impression at the State Department and he said not from Mr. Hull, that we were trying to bluff the Japanese. Did you say anything to Admiral Richardson that would justify such an inference on his part, that we were trying to bluff the Japanese?

Mr. WELLES. I never stated to Admiral Richardson in any conversation that I had with him that we were engaged in bluffing. Such would not have been the facts.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

[1237] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Welles, I should like to direct your attention to the testimony of Admiral Richardson with respect to the statement you made on your impression as to the content of conversations you had with him about the security of the fleet and in order to make the record complete at this point, I am going to read what Admiral Richardson said in a memorandum submitted to the Secretary of the Navy as to why the fleet should be withdrawn. He said:

Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian area:

(a) From a purely naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:

- (1) Difficulty, delay, and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
- (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
- (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing, and departure of large ships.
- (4) Congested and restricted operating areas in the air and on the surface.

(5) Inadequate facilities for Fleet services, training, [1238] and housing.

(6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.

(7) In case of war necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

On cross-examination, I think both counsel and myself asked the admiral if he had in mind, when he gave these reasons for withdrawing the fleet, an attack upon Pearl Harbor or a submarine attack, and he stated unqualifiedly "no." This was in 1940, at a time when we were pretty much at peace, when he gave this memorandum to the Secretary.

In his testimony he did not take into consideration the question of the security of the fleet as was described to you, and I wanted to call your attention to that.

Mr. WELLES. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Welles, whatever word is used, it was your understanding, was it not, that the fleet at Pearl Harbor at that time was not prepared for war, or for an offensive action?

Mr. WELLES. I couldn't say, Senator Brewster, that it [1239] was my impression that the fleet was not prepared for war.

Senator BREWSTER. After what Senator Lucas has read of the testimony of Admiral Richardson, is your recollection affected?

Mr. WELLES. I can only remember that in the conversation that I had with Admiral Richardson in 1940, I gained the impression that the admiral felt, in a general sense, that the fleet station at Hawaii was not secure, and that it would be in a better condition if it were removed from Hawaii to some other position.

Senator BREWSTER. Did he indicate it was his idea that it should be based on the west coast?

Mr. WELLES. Not to me.

Senator BREWSTER. He didn't indicate that he thought it ought to move toward the Philippines, I gather?

Mr. WELLES. There was no specific indication that I can recall that he gave me at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. But your impression is that it was quite clear it was a matter of security rather than a readiness for war?

Mr. WELLES. I should say insecurity in the most general sense, Senator Brewster. I do not remember that the admiral went into any detail as to why he thought so in his [1240] conversation with me at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. If you were to come to the conclusion that the fleet was not ready for war, as a result of Admiral Richardson's testimony, then the keeping of the fleet at Hawaii, in a condition not ready for war, would have some aspects of having your diplomatic position exceed your military power, would it not?

Mr. WELLES. It seems to me almost impossible, Senator Brewster, to divorce in a critical condition as existed at that time, the diplomatic from the military, because the military is a very essential part of the diplomatic picture.

Senator BREWSTER. Isn't it a fundamental principle that you should not take a position that you cannot support?

Mr. WELLES. I think that is an admirable principle, but under conditions which then existed, I was hardly in a position to state or to judge for myself, as I know you will agree, whether the fleet was prepared or not prepared.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, let's take a hypothetical question. If you were satisfied the fleet was not prepared for offensive action at Pearl Harbor, and you still kept it there as a diplomatic measure, your diplomatic position would be exceeding your military might, would it not?

Mr. WELLES. I will have to say again, Senator Brewster, that in my judgment, I don't think you can divorce the two [1241] things. I think the whole picture had to be taken into account. I still feel, as I did 5 years ago, that if the fleet had been moved, it would have been regarded by the Japanese as an invitation to move in and to expand to the south, or in our direction.

Senator BREWSTER. Would your view on that have been affected prior to the moving of the fleet to Pearl Harbor, assuming the fleet were based on the west coast, whether or not it should be based at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WELLES. I think the Japanese have always regarded Hawaii as essential to the protection of the west coast. That has always been my understanding, and an indication that we would abandon the defense of Hawaii would be regarded as open weakness on our part by them.

Senator BREWSTER. You regarded the Navy as one of the elements in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WELLES. I did.

Senator BREWSTER. Rather than Pearl Harbor as being the base from which the fleet would carry out offensive action?

Mr. WELLES. I would regard it as a combination of the two.

Senator BREWSTER. With reference to the question by the Congressman as to deferring action by the Japanese [1242] through the fall of 1941, do you accept the rather general understood story as to the use of the words "babying along"?

Mr. WELLES. I think the President's desire, if he used that phrase, and I do not remember that he used it to me, was to indicate that he desired to put off the possibility of war to the last possible moment.

Senator BREWSTER. You do make that reference in your book; you apparently accept it as established as having been used.

Mr. WELLES. It has become almost classic, perhaps.

Senator BREWSTER. You did consider that it was, in the light of the advice of our naval and military advisers to gain time, that tactics of that sort were very essential?

Mr. WELLES. Through most of the autumn of 1941, Senator Brewster, I never failed in my understanding that both the Army and Navy were doing their utmost to persuade the President and the State Department that any break should be avoided, if possible; that negotiations should be continued for as long as possible.

Senator BREWSTER. In order to build a proper picture, will you give your impressions of Nomura?

Mr. WELLES. Did you ask me to give my impressions of Nomura?

[1243] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. My impressions of Nomura, from the time I first met him in the winter of 1941, were that the Ambassador was actually desirous of trying to avert war with the United States.

In the late autumn—and, of course, hindsight is always better than foresight—in the late autumn, I think it is incredible that he did not know in full detail what his Government intended; but I think he came, primarily, at least, I always believe he came primarily to Washington to try to avoid war, rather than to try to prepare for war.

Senator BREWSTER. And you had a somewhat different impression of Mr. Kurusu?

Mr. WELLES. A very different impression.

Senator BREWSTER. What was that?

Mr. WELLES. Mr. Kurusu came here primarily under orders from General Tojo to stall until they were ready for the attack which later came.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, did you have a conversation with the Consul of the Japanese Embassy on August 4, 1941?

Mr. WELLES. I did, Senator Brewster. I had three conversations with Mr. Wakasuge.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you give the substance of those?

Mr. WELLES. They are rather long and involved, Senator [1244] Brewster. Do you want me to read from them? I have them here at hand.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that would probably be the best way.

Mr. GESELL. They are reported in volume II.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those conversations reported in this bound volume?

Mr. WELLES. I think they are all reported in full, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they quoted in the same language you have them there?

Mr. WELLES. I think identical, Mr. Chairman. I see here there is one on July 21.

Senator BREWSTER. I don't think it is necessary to read them then. If they are identical we can insert them in the record later.

Mr. WELLES. They are all in the record. They are all published.

Senator BREWSTER. I mean in our record here.

Mr. GESELL. Senator, when we had in front of us the problem of whether or not we should introduce as a formal exhibit these memoranda prepared at the time of the various conversations we felt it would burden the record to introduce them as an exhibit and have gone on the assumption that, so far [1245] as the actual reported conversations are concerned, that that material is available in the official Government publication to the members of the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. How much space would it occupy? I had the August 4 in mind.

Mr. GESELL. Of course, there are many others.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. They represent at least several hundred pages of conversations.

Senator BREWSTER. I was addressing myself to Mr. Welles—

Mr. GESELL. I am sorry.

Senator BREWSTER (continuing). And his conversations of August 4. That was not very extensive?

Mr. WELLES. There were three conversations, Senator Brewster, one on July 21, one on August 4, and one on October 13. In addition to those conversations, Mr. Hull and I jointly saw Mr. Wakasuge on another occasion and those conversations in which Mr. Hull participated are also published in this book.

Would you care to have me read this?

Senator BREWSTER. No; not if they are available. We can decide subsequently as to what portions shall be incorporated in our record.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

[1246] Mr. MURPHY. You will find the August 2, 1941, conversation at page 320. You will find the—

The CHAIRMAN. August 4 is the one he referred to.

Mr. MURPHY. There was a press release on August 2, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Welles has not referred to a conversation on August 2. He referred to a conversation on July 21, August 4, and August 13.

Mr. WELLES. October 13.

The CHAIRMAN. October 13.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all I have. We can decide later with counsel as to whether any portion of that shall go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart, we only have 5 minutes until adjourning time.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all I will need.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, we will give it to you.

Mr. GEARHART. Referring again, Mr. Welles, to your conversation with Admiral Richardson, did he or any other person give expression to the idea that, because of the condition of unreadiness for war of the fleet, its presence in the Hawaiian waters could not operate as a restraining influence over the Japanese for the reason that Japan had a military government, the leaders of which thoroughly understood the lack of fighting [1247] capacity of the Navy at that time?

Mr. WELLES. That statement was not made to me, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GEARHART. Was anything to that effect or along those lines said?

Mr. WELLES. Not that I recall.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. It is about 3 minutes to adjourning time. Does the Senator want me to start?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been suggested that we might, by running a few minutes overtime, conclude with Secretary Welles.

Senator FERGUSON. It will take me considerable time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that being true, I suppose we may as well take a recess.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Welles could return at 11 o'clock in the morning. Secretary Hull will take, perhaps, an hour.

Mr. GESELL. We would like to inquire whether Secretary Hull will be available to come tomorrow morning before we make a definite arrangement with Mr. Welles.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I suggest that counsel notify Mr. Welles and Secretary Hull both.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

[1248] The CHAIRMAN. Obviously, if Secretary Hull will be here at 10 o'clock there will be no need for Secretary Welles to be here. But you should be available, of course.

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, November 24, 1945.)

[1249]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[1250] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Welles, I believe, is to continue now.

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps a word or two about the schedule would be helpful at this time.

Mr. Grew is scheduled to follow Mr. Welles. He has engagements that he hopes very much to keep on Monday and Tuesday of next week, and so we thought we would put him on right after Mr. Welles to see if there was any opportunity of finishing with him today.

Mr. Hull will come again Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

Now, there has been placed before each member of the committee two documents which I would like to introduce into the record at this time. These are two documents which have been awaiting clearance by the British Government and were released last night.

The first is a message dated November 26, 1941, to the Secretary of State, signed by "Winant," who was Ambassador to Great Britain. "Triple Priority" captioned "Most secret for the President from the former naval person." The "former naval person" is Mr. Churchill. The committee will recall that Mr. Churchill in his early career was active in the British Admiralty, and that phrase "the former naval person" was used to designate him in these communications.

[1251] If the committee will recall, in exhibit 18, introduced yesterday, we placed in evidence President Roosevelt's message to Mr. Churchill concerning the *modus vivendi* which was sent on the basis of a draft prepared by Mr. Hull to which Mr. Roosevelt added the remarks concerning being prepared for real trouble soon, and this message, which I would like to introduce, and have designated as Exhibit 23, is the reply of Mr. Churchill to President Roosevelt forwarded through State Department channels.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Read it into the record.

Mr. GESELL. The message reads as follows:

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

As I indicated, this was in reply to the President's [1252] message concerning the modus vivendi to Prime Minister Churchill and, of course, relates to that subject.

The next and other document before the committee is another message forwarded in the same fashion to the President from "the former naval person," Prime Minister Churchill, dated November 30, 1941. This message we introduce because of its relation to the question of a commitment, which was discussed yesterday when Mr. Welles was on the stand, at which time you will recall we introduced an exhibit which included a draft of a proposed joint position to be taken by the United States and Great Britain with respect to Japanese developments. This is somewhat later, dated November 30, 1941. The other document was dated in August, at the time of the Atlantic Charter. This appears to have some reference to the same general matter.

The text of this message is as follows; this is the message of Prime Minister Churchill:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her [1235] fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right, which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress" or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war.

I ask that those two documents be received in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be printed as part of the hearing at this time.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 23 and 24," respectively.)

Mr. GESELL. Now I think it is appropriate for Mr. Welles to return to the stand.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Gesell, will you indicate what the name "Winant" at the bottom of each of those exhibits indicates?

Mr. GESELL. It is my understanding that Mr. Winant was Ambassador and he was simply transmitting the messages.

[1254] Senator LUCAS. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, I believe, was on the verge of examining Mr. Welles when we recessed yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Secretary, when did you first receive information that you were to go to the Atlantic Conference?

Mr. WELLES. About 3 days before the time for my departure, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you state the day that you departed for the Conference?

Mr. WELLES. I believe that I left on the, left Washington on the evening of August 8, leaving Boston the morning of August 9.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did you arrive at the Conference?

Mr. WELLES. I think I arrived the night of the 9th.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you travel with the President?

Mr. WELLES. I did not. The President went by sea and I went by airplane from Boston.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what day the President arrived at the Conference?

Mr. WELLES. The President, I think, had arrived the morning of the day on which I arrived there, which was either the 9th or the 10th of August.

[1255] Senator FERGUSON. You say he either arrived the 9th or the 10th?

Mr. WELLES. I can't remember at the moment which date it was, but I think it was the 9th of August.

Senator FERGUSON. This conference was held on a battleship?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the name of the ship?

Mr. WELLES. The President was on the *Augusta*, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. But the actual conference between the President and the Prime Minister?

Mr. WELLES. I think all of the conferences took place on the *Augusta*. I think the President only visited the *Prince of Wales*, the warship upon which Mr. Churchill had come, on one occasion. That was to go to Sunday services.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a conference with the President prior to going to the Conference?

Mr. WELLES. I had a conference with the President as soon as I arrived there.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you state whether or not the Far Eastern question was discussed with the President?

Mr. WELLES. You mean when?

Senator FERGUSON. When you arrived.

Mr. WELLES. No; there was no discussion of it whatever.

[1256] Senator FERGUSON. Was there an agenda?

Mr. WELLES. May I repeat, Senator Ferguson, what I attempted to make clear yesterday.

The only part of the conference in which I took part was in preparation of drafts for the Atlantic Charter and in discussions which took place on three or four occasions between Mr. Churchill and

the President with regard to the Atlantic Charter. I was present at no conferences that had to do with military or naval subjects.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you consider that in the Atlantic Charter the far eastern question is involved?

Mr. WELLES. In my judgment, Senator Ferguson, the text of the Atlantic Charter is applicable to all the world and not to any particular part of the world.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it involve parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. You are now referring to the Atlantic Charter?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. I do not consider that it had any connection with the parallel declarations.

Senator FERGUSON. That took place afterward?

Mr. WELLES. Yes. The Atlantic Charter was, in my judgment, a joint statement of the two Governments of general policy with regard to the objectives which they hoped could be achieved when the war was over.

[1257] Senator FERGUSON. After the war was over?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you are familiar with the exhibit that was handed to us yesterday, headed "10 Downing Street, Whitehall." Do you have it before you?

Mr. WELLES. I have not got it before me, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, would you see that he gets a copy of it?

Mr. WELLES. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. That is dated August 10, 1941, and "10 Downing Street" is in London, England; that would be correct, would it not?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct, but my assumption was that the Prime Minister was using his official stationery which was available on his warship.

[1258] Senator FERGUSON. Did you consider that this was written on the 10th on the warship?

Mr. WELLES. I should assume that it had been prepared by the Prime Minister after his arrival or while he was on the way over.

Senator FERGUSON. You landed there the evening of the 9th?

Mr. WELLES. That is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the 10th did you hear anything about this subject?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection, Senator, is that Mr. Churchill did not arrive until the evening of the 10th, 24 hours after my arrival.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not arrive until after you had arrived, and that was the evening of the 10th?

Mr. WELLES. That is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. So, on the whole date of the 10th you had never heard of this subject?

Mr. WELLES. I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not been consulted about it?

Mr. WELLES. I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for this being written on the 10th and Mr. Churchill not landing there until the evening of the 10th?

Mr. WELLES. I have taken it for granted that Mr. Churchill [1259] was preparing various papers which he wished to discuss with the President, while he was on the way over.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with Mr. Hull's conference with Mr. Halifax, the Ambassador of Britain here, on the 9th?

Mr. WELLES. I could not have been familiar with that, Senator Ferguson, since I was on my way up North at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there had been—at the time did you know there was a conference between Mr. Halifax and Mr. Hull?

Mr. WELLES. Not so far as I can remember.

Senator FERGUSON. That could relate to this same question, as to the number of ships that we could use in the Pacific?

Mr. WELLES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first see this exhibit, draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government?

Mr. WELLES. I don't rememeber having seen this document at that time. My recollection is that the President spoke to me about this question the last day of my stay in Argentina, told me of his conversations with the Prime Minister on this question and suggested that the matter be taken up as soon as I returned to Washington; and the draft which I brought back with me was prepared on that last day.

[1260] Senator FERGUSON. The draft that you prepared, then, was prepared on what date?

Mr. WELLES. On the last day of my stay in Argentina, which, I think, was the 13th.

Senator FERGUSON. On the day of the 13th.

Mr. WELLES. I think so, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you prepare the instrument that was handed to us as your notes. Do you have a copy of those? I do not have the exhibit number. It is dated August the 15th.

Mr. WELLES. This is dated August 15th.

Mr. GESELL. Number 22, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. It is Exhibit 22. August the 15th is the date.

Mr. WELLES. This must have been prepared after my return to the Department of State from a draft on notes which I had drafted before we left Argentina.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you know where the original notes would be?

Mr. WELLES. Unless they are in the Department of State they probably were destroyed after the clean draft was prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. This is not the instrument that you prepared at Argentina?

[1261] Mr. WELLES. I should think not. It is dated August 15th and I think this is undoubtedly a clean draft which was prepared after my return to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the instrument of August 10, 1941, from 10 Downing Street, Whitehall—would you say that that was the British idea as to what happened there? Does this fairly represent that? Is that your understanding?

Mr. WELLES. My understanding is that this was a suggestion drafted by Mr. Churchill for presentation to the President and for discussion with him and that this draft which is headed "10 Downing Street" had been drafted by Mr. Churchill before his arrival at Argentina.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there is in existence the actual agreement between the President and Mr. Churchill on this question?

Mr. WELLES. So far as the President is concerned, the text of that agreement was presented to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17th by the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask counsel where this paper came from, August 10, 1941? Where did he get it?

Mr. GESELL. As I stated when it was introduced, this is from the files of President Roosevelt and it is in the files relating to the Atlantic Charter trip, so that is how we [1262] relate it to that event. There will be testimony about that later.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this reads: "Declaration by United States Government That"—this is the draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government. [Reading]:

Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.

2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

Now, let us take the first declaration. There is nothing said in there about the President coming to Congress is there? That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct, Senator, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if Japan made any encroachments in the Southwest Pacific it would produce a situation in which the United States would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan?

[1263] Mr. WELLES. It would assume, in my judgment, however, in view of the fact that it states that it is a declaration by the United States Government, that the British Prime Minister foresaw the need for the President to act in accordance with the United States Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. But how do you account for the Prime Minister mentioning, however, that it would come to Congress in case a third power became the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of the counter measures, or their support, and not in the first situation where we would consider any further encroachment such conduct as we would go to war for?

Mr. WELLES. You will, of course, understand, Senator that this is purely assumption and interpretation on my part.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking to you as a member of the State Department at that time.

Mr. WELLES. My understanding would be that what is foreseen in article 2 is the possibility that the President in such circumstances would consider it desirable to enter into some kind of temporary relationship with that third power which would envisage the treaty-making powers of the Senate in addition to the war-making powers of the Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. But that would not be involved in the first item, that we would go to war—be compelled to [1264] take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan in case of any encroachment by the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. Is that the way you read that?

Mr. WELLES. I think that the declaration by the United States Government constitutes, of course, a covering of the constitutional requirements laid upon the President also. I can conceive of it being entirely possible that the counter measures envisaged in article 1 might involve measures of security which would possibly lead to a clash between the United States Government and the Japanese Government forces while the United States Government was attempting to take care of the security of our interests.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next is the proposal of the British Prime Minister, the last phrase reading:

"... their support of them. H.M.G."—meaning His Majesty's Government—"would give all possible aid to such Power",—that might become involved in resisting, is that correct?

Mr. WELLES. My interpretation is that the British Government, not being under the same constitutional provisions as the United States Executive, would make a flat declaration that it would give such aid to such Power.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not necessary that Mr. Churchill [1265] ask anyone for that consent?

Mr. WELLES. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was saying so by this instrument?

Mr. WELLES. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the declaration by the Dutch Government. The Dutch Government agreed and this would indicate it had already agreed, the same as the British Government, is that correct?

Mr. WELLES. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. And then the last item was:

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

Now, when you drafted this instrument of August 15th—and, Mr. Gesell, I would like for you to inquire of the State Department whether or not there are any notes in existence that Mr. Welles made in relation to his conference with the President on this subject?

Mr. GESELL. We have seen none. We will inquire some more, however. We have been through the papers pretty thoroughly.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Now, taking the instrument—have you the instrument before you of August 15, 1941?

[1266] Mr. WELLES. I have it before me, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You will notice that, in the beginning, on the first page, you use the words, "Joint Declaration." It reads:

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netherlands and of China that they concur in a joint declaration.

Now, that is, however, distinguished from a parallel declaration, is it not?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference in diplomatic language?

Mr. WELLES. A joint declaration means that by prior agreement the governments concerned would make an identical declaration. A par-

¹ Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 22-A.

allel declaration, in my interpretation, means that two governments would agree that they would take action simultaneously but not necessarily in the same terms.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you know who the President did consult on this question of the parallel action? He did not consult you prior to entering into it?

Mr. WELLES. The President upon his return undoubtedly [1267] consulted fully with Mr. Hull in regard to these terms.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whom he may have consulted prior to that time?

Mr. WELLES. Prior to August 10th?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or at the conference do you know whom he may have consulted with? Would you name who was with the President at the conference?

Mr. WELLES. When I arrived the President had with him only some of the highest ranking military and naval officers of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us their names?

Mr. WELLES. My only difficulty is remembering whether they came with the President or whether they arrived after the President arrived, but by the time that August 10th had come, Senator, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral King, and General Arnold were all there.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anyone with you when you had the conference with the President? Was there any other person at this conference when he gave you these ideas that you made a memo of, or were you personally with him?

Mr. WELLES. I think I was alone with the President in his sitting room on the *Augusta*, the Admiral's cabin.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the last page—page 6 of this instrument—and I think that is the part that relates [1268] to the joint—or not the joint action—the parallel action. (Reading):

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government undertakes any further steps in pursuance of the policy of military domination through force or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it has apparently embarked, the United States Government will be forced to take immediately any and all steps of whatsoever character it deems necessary in its own security notwithstanding the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in conflict between the two countries.

Now, that is diplomatic language?

Mr. WELLES. That is diplomatic language; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And what is a fair interpretation of that? What does that mean?

Mr. WELLES. That means that the United States Government would take such steps as it might judge necessary to protect its legitimate interests and its safety, notwithstanding the possibility—and that word "possibility" should be underlined—that those steps taken in its legitimate interest and for its safety might eventually result in hostilities.

[1269] Senator FERGUSON. How does that differ from No. 1? (Reading):

Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.

Mr. WELLES. In the first place, article 1 and the suggestion made by the British Prime Minister limits the field of encroachment by Japan to the Southwest Pacific. The last part of this draft is broader in its structure. It says, "In the Pacific region."

Senator FERGUSON. How inclusive would the Pacific regions be?

Mr. WELLES. I should think it would be all-inclusive in the broadest sense of the word.

Senator FERGUSON. So it means the same, would you say, practically the same, except that the region is enlarged in what you drafted?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct, and I also stress the need to underline the word "possibility."

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you stress the word "possibility"?

Mr. WELLES. Because it was still conceivable in August [1270] 1941 that Japan might turn from her then course and that steps which were legitimate on the part of the United States to safeguard its interests and to provide for its security would not lead to hostility or conflict between the two countries.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Japan could have lived within this and there would have been no conflict?

Mr. WELLES. I think that is an entirely correct statement, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is why you used the word "possibility" here?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. It lay within Japan's power——

Mr. WELLES. That is entirely correct.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). To avoid the use of this rather than to have it exercised?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But a fair statement of this instrument would be that if Japan did not intend to live within it, then this would become operative even to the point of war?

Mr. WELLES. What it implies—I think you are entirely accurate—what it implies is that the United States would have to take such measures as might be necessary for the safety of this country and for the preservation of this [1271] country's legitimate interests no matter what the consequences might be.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be the same as the first item of Mr. Churchill's instrument, according to your interpretation?

Mr. WELLES. I have endeavored to point out the differences, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the President returned to the United States on the morning of August 17, is that correct?

Mr. WELLES. That is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. The two telegrams indicate, that we have received in evidence, that the President desired to communicate with the Jap Ambassador.

Mr. WELLES. In addition to those telegrams the President requested me to make all arrangements necessary so that he could see the Ambassador the moment after his return.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when you drafted this instrument which I have read from, which says, "This draft was not given to the

Japanese Ambassador," did you help to draft the instrument that actually went to the Ambassador?

Mr. WELLES. The draft which is dated August 15 was handed by me to Mr. Hull as an indication of what the President had in mind to say to the Ambassador. It was then re- [1272] drafted in the Department of State under Mr. Hull's supervision after consulting with various other officials of the Department and the draft of August 17 represented the joint views of the officials of the Department of State together with those of Mr. Hull as to the proper communication.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get back to Washington?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is that I got back on the 14th. It may not have been until the morning of the 15th.

Senator FERGUSON. And you drafted this on that day that you returned?

Mr. WELLES. It was drafted immediately after my return, as I remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anyone in Washington that knew what this agreement was with the Prime Minister and with the Dutch other than you and the President?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. WELLES. May I remind you, Senator Ferguson, that this was not in the nature of an agreement. It was a statement on the part of the President, which you can call a promise on the part of the President to the Prime Minister that this Government would make a parallel warning with the British Government to the Japanese but until—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know—

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness finish his answer.

[1273] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Were you through?

Mr. WELLES. Not quite through, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you continue.

Mr. WELLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To answer your question more fully, Senator Ferguson, until my return to Washington there was no one in Washington who was aware of the conversations which the President had had with Mr. Churchill.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I was getting at. So that until the President returned on the morning of the 17th, as far as you knew, no one knew of the understanding or promise or whatever we call it, other than you? You were the only man in Washington that you knew of that knew anything about it?

Mr. WELLES. No. Only on the day when I returned I naturally informed the Secretary of State fully on everything that had taken place at Argentina of which I was informed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he get any knowledge, did he seem to have any knowledge other than what you were giving him on this subject?

Mr. WELLES. There would not have been any means for him to have knowledge of it, Senator Ferguson, unless the President had telegraphed him directly about it.

[1274] Senator FERGUSON. He did not appear to have such knowledge?

Mr. WELLES. I am quite confident that he did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why the language was used that was given to the ambassador?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is that it was thought wiser at that time, in view of the fact that this Government was going again to

undertake to negotiate with the Japanese Government after the break in negotiations, to omit the phrase, "the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in conflict between the two countries."

The language in the memorandum of August 17 omits that phraseology.

[1275] Senator FERGUSON. How does that alter the instrument?

Mr. WELLES. I do not think it alters the purport of the instrument, Senator. I think it leaves out a concrete phrase.

Senator FERGUSON. The instrument amounts to the same thing?

Mr. WELLES. To all intents and purposes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know when the President, or when our Government, first made public this promise to the Prime Minister—I think those were your words, while I had used the word "agreement"—in relation to this parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. When the public was informed?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; when it first came to the attention of the public.

Mr. WELLES. I am not able to answer your question, Senator Ferguson, without going over the documentation to make sure.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you if you know when the white papers "Peace and War" were published.

Mr. WELLES. They were published as soon as possible, I understand, after the Pearl Harbor incident.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. They were not published until 1942 or 1943, were they?

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember the exact date.

[1276] Mr. GESELL. January 2, 1943, I believe is the release date, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. January 2, 1943. Now, do you know whether or not the President sent a message to Congress on August 21 or 22, 1941, in relation to the Atlantic Charter, the Conference?

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember the exact date.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a copy of "Peace and War"?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 717, Instrument No. 229, it is listed as "Message of President Roosevelt to Congress, August 21, 1941, embodying text of the Atlantic Charter."

Will you glance over that message and see whether or not there is anything in it at all about the parallel action and promise to the Prime Minister of Britain?

Mr. WELLES. It had been my recollection, which is now refreshed, that there was no specific reference to it in that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any reference to it?

Mr. WELLES. None that I see.

Senator FERGUSON. None that you see. Did you ever discuss with the Secretary of State, or with the President, why that action was omitted from the message to Congress?

Mr. WELLES. It had been my understanding from the very beginning that was the moment when we were endeavoring to start negotiations again with the Japanese, in order to find some peaceful solution, in order to prevent war, if at all possible, that the publication of a warning of the character which had been given by the President to the Japanese Government would not be conducive to successful results in attempting to find a peaceful solution. Public

opinion in Japan would have been exceedingly inflamed and would have made it far less likely for any peaceful solution to have been found.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Japan did—well, they got the message on the seventeenth, so they knew it.

Mr. WELLES. The Japanese Government certainly had it, but I have no recollection whatever that the Japanese Government permitted it to be made public in Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it was indicated in Mr. Churchill's statement that he desired the President would have the intention to seek authority of Congress to give aid to such powers.

Mr. WELLES. That, my understanding is, implied that in the event that Japan continued upon its path of aggression and conquest, and such action had been necessary, that only in that event would the President come to the Congress for the necessary declarations on the part of the Congress, if the Congress saw fit, but it was not the intention of Mr. Churchill [1278] that the President immediately announce to the public that this was his intention.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a fair statement, then, that this was not made public either to Congress or to the people prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WELLES. For the reasons which I have indicated.

Senator FERGUSON. You discussed that with the President?

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember discussing that specific question with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with Mr. Hull?

Mr. WELLES. Again I am sorry to say I cannot remember whether I did or not, but I imagine that every aspect of this question was discussed in full.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Admiral Stark ever knew of this promise and this parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. I think the Navy Department and War Department undoubtedly were fully informed.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Admiral Kimmel or General Short ever had any information about this parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. I have no means of having such information, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Britain ever gave parallel action?

[1279] Mr. WELLES. I take it for granted that the British Government took parallel action at the same time and that the records of the Department of State will probably show that.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean our Department of State records?

Mr. WELLES. I would assume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why we do not have those records?

Mr. WELLES. I did not know we did not have them, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that Britain did take the parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. I find it very difficult to answer that question specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel if we have any record on that question, that Britain did take parallel action.

Mr. GESELL. We have no evidence that they did. We have not seen any documents on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you endeavor to find out whether or not there is any evidence?

Mr. GESELL. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to hand you, Mr. Welles, a photostatic copy of the New York Times for August 13, 1941. Will you just glance at that article? I would like to have you read it.

Mr. WELLES. The U. S. and Britain Tell Tokyo To Keep Hands Off Thailand? Is that the article? [1280]

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES (perusing article). I have had a hasty reading of it, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Take the first part. Would you read that into the record? Then I will ask you some questions on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind giving the date line?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; August 13, 1941.

[1281] The CHAIRMAN. From what point did this article originate?

Senator FERGUSON. Give the date line.

Mr. WELLES. This is an article sent by wireless to the New York Times, dated Tokyo, Wednesday, August 13, by Otto D. Tolischus.

The American and British stand in the Far Eastern crisis, as expressed in recent statements by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, was formally conveyed to the Japanese Government by both United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and British Ambassador Sir Robert L. Craigie in recent interviews with Vice Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, Japanese Foreign Minister, it was understood in political circles here today.

As a result of these steps as well as direct discussions between Mr. Hull and Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, the Japanese Government was officially informed that any action that would threaten the independence of Thailand would be a matter of immediate concern to Britain and the United States and that the United States and Britain were prepared to meet any step Japan might take, move for move.

Do you wish me to continue?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[1282] Mr. WELLES (reading):

And inasmuch as Mr. Eden has warned that any threat to Thailand's independence threatens the security of Singapore, on which hinges the whole position both of Britain and the United States in the Far East, there is little doubt in Japanese minds today what the next step would be.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be sufficient.

Now, Mr. Secretary, that indicates parallel action, does it not, along the same line?

Mr. WELLES. This relates, as I understand it, specifically to the question of the independence of Thailand.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; of Thailand, and the instrument, the Churchill document goes to the Southwest Pacific, and our document on the 17th, handed to him on the 17th, goes to the entire Pacific. That is the distinction.

Now I would like—

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness answer that question.

Mr. WELLES. May I examine the book?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; examine the document in the book. I think he is referring to the August 17 note handed to the Japanese Ambassador by the President. That is on page 556. That is a different book, is it?

Mr. WELLES. I have a different book, Mr. Chairman.

The final paragraph in the document of August 17 reads:

[1283] Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interest of the United States and American Nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

That, which is the actual document handed by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, states specifically to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries——

[1284] Senator FERGUSON. Now can you account for the fact that our Ambassador to Japan and the British Ambassador were taking parallel action on Thailand as early as the 12th or the 13th—that is, the 13th Tokio time and 12th Washington time, is it not?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for that?

Mr. WELLES. Well, in regard to this specific event of August 13, I was not in Washington, not in the Department of State at that time, and naturally I had no participation in the instructions which may have been sent to Ambassador Grew.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you——

Mr. WELLES. May I just conclude?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. It had been for some time the policy of this Government, whenever it saw fit, to take parallel action with regard to events that were happening in the Pacific which threatened not only the interest of the United States but the interest of the other countries that were also resisting—leave out the “also”—that were resisting action at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be a fair statement to say that after you talked to the President, and from what you know of the instrument, on the parallel action, that from then [1285] on this country was to do the negotiating?

Mr. WELLES. To do the negotiating with the Japanese Government?

Senator FERGUSON. With the Japanese.

Mr. WELLES. I know of no such commitment. I know only that it was told to Mr. Churchill by the President that negotiations would be resumed after the President's return.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that you know that from talking with the President.

Mr. WELLES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no conversation with Mr. Churchill on this parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, are you familiar with anything in the foreign relations papers, or the white papers, any messages to Mr. Grew in relation to that parallel action taken with Mr. Craigie?

Mr. WELLES. I could not answer that offhand, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like, after you leave the stand, to have you make a search. I have tried to find them, but I have not been

able to. I would like to ask you to look them up, and I will then ask you that further question.¹

Are you familiar with Mr. Churchill's remarks in, I believe [1286] this would be the House of Commons, on the 27th of January? In Churchill's address in the House of Commons on the 27th of January 1942, as printed in the New York Times on the 28th of January 1942, he said:

On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectations had not been falsified by the events.

Did you discuss anything with the President that would confirm that statement by Mr. Churchill?

Mr. WELLES. I at no time had any discussion with the President which would throw any light on this statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that that statement is in conformity with the instrument drafted by you as a memo to the President on the 15th?

Mr. WELLES. It would seem not in conformity.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that it was in conformity with the instrument dated at Downing Street on the 10th?

Mr. WELLES. I again would say that it was not in conformity.

Senator FERGUSON. With that instrument?

[1287] Mr. WELLES. With that instrument.

Senator FERGUSON. You were somewhat familiar with the Far East, or the Far East situation, at the time you were at the Atlantic Conference?

Mr. WELLES. With the general situation?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. Yes, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. In view of the fact that there have been so many requests made for original documents, I would like to see the original speech made by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons, if you can get it.

Mr. GESELL. I think I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce it, Counsel, to see if there is any variation from the language I read? I read it from the New York Times.

Mr. GESELL. The speech is referred to in "The Beginning of the End," by Winston Churchill. Of course, it is not the manuscript which he read in the House of Commons, if he had one, or he may have just been talking ad lib, but here is the text of it, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Would counsel read that into the record so we will have it?

[1288] Mr. GESELL. Read the whole speech, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No, just that part that I referred to.

Mr. GESELL. I was afraid you would have me in for another reading.

Senator FERGUSON. You need not do it right now.

Senator LUCAS. I am still asking for the original document. I am very concerned about the original documents which these statements

¹ See Exhibit No. 72. See also pp. 627-629, *infra*.

come from. I am not going to take the book, I want the original, Mr. Counsel.

Senator BREWSTER. I assume that refers to what correspondence is in our Congressional Library. What is that?

Mr. WELLES. That is Hansard, isn't it, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. I assume that is in the Congressional Library.

Mr. WELLES. I imagine so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will endeavor to secure the original document?

Mr. GESSELL. I will.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Welles, were you familiar with the fact that Mr. Eden on August 6, then Foreign Secretary, made the statement to the effect that the threat to the independence of Thailand would constitute a menace to Singapore and Indochina and would not be tolerated by the British Government?

[1289] Mr. WELLES. I remember, in general terms——

Senator FERGUSON. That statement was made in the House of Commons.

Mr. WELLES. I am not familiar with that specific statement. I remember in general terms that that was the position taken by the British Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not you knew that the Australian Government had taken the same position?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that there was the general position taken by the Australian Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand did not, on August 26, take the same position?

Mr. WELLES. That I do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the conversation between Lord Halifax and Mr. Hull when Lord Halifax asked Mr. Hull what aid the United States would give should Singapore or the Dutch East Indies be attacked, and Mr. Hull answered that the American discouragement of or resistance to the Japanese move would be affected by the number of American naval vessels the British would be requiring at that time in the Atlantic. That took place on the 9th of August 1941.

Mr. WELLES. I was away from the Department of State on that date, Senator Ferguson.

[1290] Senator FERGUSON. Did you become acquainted with that after you returned?

Mr. WELLES. I undoubtedly read the memorandum on that conversation after my return.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the Roberts Commission, the Army Board, or the Navy Board went into the question of this parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. I am unable to give you any information on that, Senator. I had no conversations with Justice Roberts or the other members of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with their report?

Mr. WELLES. I, of course, have read their report.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall now whether there was anything in that report?

Mr. WELLES. I do not recall it.

¹ Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 92.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say was the fair appraisal of the note of August 17? What does it mean? What is it?

Mr. WELLES. I think in essence it means, Senator Ferguson, that the United States had felt for some time past that the course which was being pursued by Japan threatened the legitimate interests of this country and the safety and future security of the United States, and that in its own self-defense should Japan persist in that course, the United States would inevitably and eventually be called upon to try and stop it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, Mr. Wells, where you were on the 6th of December 1941?

Mr. WELLES. I was in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in Washington?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in the State Department at that time, on the 6th?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the memorandum of November 30 on a conference between the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, to this effect:

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me the accompanying memorandum, which is self-explanatory. He was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus. I said that the President was returning tomorrow morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador with respect to his inquiry. Previously the Ambassador had sent me a [1292] telegram (copy attached) received from his Foreign Office on the same matter.

The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time for his Government to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He assured me that his Government would be in harmony with any steps we might pursue to this end.

This is dated November 30, 1941. Were you familiar with that?

Mr. WELLES. I have seen that document, yes, but may I stress again the fact, Senator Ferguson, that I had no direct participation in any of the conversations that went on in regard to the far eastern situation at that time, except during the days when Mr. Hull was ill and not in his office.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever know whether or not the President, when he returned in the morning, did take this matter up, and what the result was?

Mr. WELLES. I could not attempt to give you an answer to that, but I am sure Mr. Hull could.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to ask you one question about the note attached to that. The note attached to that is marked "Most Secret," and I will read this from it—

Mr. WELLES. What is the date of it, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. That is attached to the November 30 [1293] instrument that I just read.

R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc or 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three days commencing November 29 and our Commander in Chief, Far East, has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.

Were you familiar with that?

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember this memorandum at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you familiar with the fact that there was an agreement between the countries known, as brought out yesterday, as the ABCD Bloc?

Mr. WELLES. I am not familiar with any aspects of any such understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it not be necessary, if we were going to carry on diplomatic relations with a country, that we synchronize or at least collaborate between the Army, Navy, that is, our military powers, and the State Department?

Mr. WELLES. Decidedly so.

Senator FERGUSON. We could not hope to carry on negotiations without each understanding the other's acts?

Mr. WELLES. I quite agree.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore it would be necessary for our military authorities to know what took place on this [1294] parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. I agree.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I am coming to the ABCD bloc and I am reading from page 203 of transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Monday, October 2, 1944: "I will repeat that"—

Mr. GESELL. Who is talking?

Senator FERGUSON. This is General Marshall, I take it, who is speaking. Have you got a copy of it there?

Mr. WELLES. I have not got the copy, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Here it is. It is General Marshall's testimony:

I will repeat that I must have known on the 26th of November that the negotiations were nearing an impasse, because Admiral Stark and I evidently directed the preparations of a draft of the 27th of November warning on that day, the 26th—

the following is quoted from that statement—

after consultation with each other, United States, Britain, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacked or directly threatened the territory, the mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, [1295] or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° east of or south of 10° north Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, off the Loyalty Islands.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Are not you reading substantially the same as is in evidence in this case in exhibit No. 17, paragraph 2?

Senator FERGUSON. Substantially the same, but I wanted to read the actual record.

Mr. GESELL. The actual record, Senator, was a memorandum handed to the President, Exhibit 17, from which the language you have read from General Marshall's testimony is quoted.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know, Mr. Welles, whether or not you were familiar with this agreement between the military authorities?

Mr. WELLES. I was not familiar with it, Senator, and the reason for that, as I have said before, is the fact that I had no direct participation in these negotiations. Those were handled by Mr. Hull, by the President, and by the top military and naval authorities.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you be able to carry on at intervals if you were not familiar with it?

[1296] Mr. WELLES. Because under those circumstances, while generally familiar with the trend of events and with the discussions that were going on, I was acting merely as a mouthpiece, to communicate messages from the President, or from the Secretary of State. Undoubtedly if I had been in a position where I was obliged, on account of the absence of Mr. Hull, to undertake any part of the negotiations, I would have had to familiarize myself with all of this material to which you are now referring.

[1297] Senator FERGUSON. For you to properly carry on, you should have been informed about this military matter, should you not?

Mr. WELLES. I think that in the event that I had any participation in the discussions, in the events that were then participating, I certainly would have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I ask you about a telegram sent by Mr. Winant, our Ambassador to London, dated December 2, 1941, received 10:40 a. m. This was sent to the Secretary of State, personal and secret to the Secretary and the President.

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

WINANT.

Do you know why the British Admiralty would be notifying our State Department and the President about these ships if we did not have some agreement in relation to their movement?

Mr. WELLES. Because the information given in this telegram, which I remember now very well, was a clear indication that the Japanese were already moving further, proceeding [1298] further on their course of domination of the Southwest Pacific region.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what effect would that have on our notice, or on our memorandum given to the Japs on the 17th of August 1941, which was given in conformity with the parallel agreement or promise?

Mr. WELLES. I should regard it as information which gave a clear indication that the Japanese were disregarding what we had asserted to be our legitimate rights and our security.

Senator FERGUSON. And would bring that into action?

Mr. GESELL. Bring what into action?

Senator FERGUSON. The notice that we had given.

Mr. WELLES. Well, the notice that we had given was that we would then, in our own judgment, take such steps as we might regard as necessary for our safety.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Now, on December 6 there was another telegram, and I will read the whole matter, because I want to bring out your part in it. This is dated December 6 and is marked "Personal and secret for the Secretary." It refers to the last telegram that I read, and it states:

My Number 5918 December 6, 4 p. m.

Again from Cadogan. He was in the British Admiralty, was he not?

[1299] Mr. WELLES. Cadogan was the permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra or Bangkok. Latter would not be reached before Monday.

Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our naval dispatch, latter stating 3 a. m., Greenwich time, my dispatch as given me 3 a. m., London time. Believe former correct.

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand, fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax.

Then I will read the rest so we will have it all in the record.

Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him your Number 5682, December 5, although I had previously pressed on him each of the points you outlined prior to reception your message with the [1300] exception of paragraph 7 which I agree is not clear and which I will clear up with him this evening. I want you to know that I had nothing to do with the insertion of the reference to I. L. O.

I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place in the country and will be constantly in contact with the Embassy over private wires in case you wish to communicate with me.

WINANT.

Now, going back to the part that you did, "to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax," will you explain that?

I will ask counsel if we have those messages.

Mr. GESELL. We have asked for that message.

Senator FERGUSON. You have made a request for it?

Mr. GESELL. We have asked for it, some time ago. No written record of such message can be found in the Department, so the assumption may be that it was an oral statement.¹

Senator FERGUSON. All right, Mr. Welles, will you give us your memory on it?

Mr. WELLES. I feel that I have here available, Senator Ferguson, the only conversations with Lord Halifax which I had at that time. They are dated November 27 and November 28.

Senator FERGUSON. May I see those, Mr. Welles?

[1301] Mr. WELLES. I think they are published, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. They are published?

Mr. WELLES. I will ask counsel: Are these published?

Mr. GESELL. I do not believe so. What date are those, Mr. Welles?

Mr. WELLES. November 27 and November 28.

[1302] Mr. GESELL. They are not published, so far as I know. I don't believe they are published, Mr. Welles, since volume 2 has only the conversations with the Japanese, not the conversations with representatives of other governments.

Mr. WELLES. I see.

Shall I read these, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose so.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask the question. I will ask you to read them.

¹ See p. 508, *infra*; see also Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1697-1700.

Mr. WELLES. They relate in a sense to—

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify them?

Mr. WELLES. They relate in a sense to the *modus vivendi* discussions and—I am not certain—to the telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I give you the telegram?

Mr. WELLES. I have a copy here. Counsel has given me a copy.

I am not certain whether they are illuminating on this subject. The first is November 27 and it is as follows:

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request. The Ambassador said that—

May I say in parenthesis that Secretary Hull was laid up with a cold during these 2 days and that is the reason I saw the Ambassador.

[1303] Mr. GESELL. This one you are reading has been introduced in evidence as part of Exhibit 18. The full text of that is three pages, is it not?

Mr. WELLES. Three pages; yes.

Mr. GESELL. That one is already in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless the committee insists upon it, it won't be necessary to read it.

Senator FERGUSON. No; there is no need of reading it, then.

Now, the other instrument.

Mr. WELLES. The other is November 28. Has that been introduced?

Mr. GESELL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read the one of the 28th, please?

Mr. WELLES (reading):

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning.

The Ambassador began the conversation by saying that he had expected to spend the week end in Philadelphia, but, since he had heard from his Embassy here that his government was "greatly excited," he had returned to Washington. He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval officials in London [1304] had been informed by the Navy Department that the negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently precautionary measures must at once be undertaken. The Ambassador inquired whether this was in fact the case. I replied that the situation so far as I knew was exactly as it was last night, namely, that the Japanese Ambassadors had submitted a statement of the position of this Government, handed to them by the Secretary of State, to their government and that no reply from the Government of Japan had as yet been submitted to this Government through them. I said that consequently I could not say technically that the negotiations had been broken off, although it was, of course, the assumption on the part of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government would not accept the basis proposed by the Government of the United States. I told the Ambassador of the various reports which had reached the Department of State regarding the situation in the Far East today.

The next paragraph, the final paragraph, is as follows:

The Ambassador then said that his government was annoyed with him because he had not reported the conversation which had taken place yesterday between the two [1305] Japanese Ambassadors and the President and the Secretary of State. He asked me if I could give him a report on that subject. I informed the Ambassador consequently of the substance of the memorandum by the Secretary of State of the conversation which had taken place at the White House.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask you to state the date of that memorandum again, please?

Mr. WELLES. November 28, Mr. Congressman.

I will immediately see if in my records I have any copy of later conversations with the British Ambassador which have any light to throw upon the telegram which Senator Ferguson has read.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the one that you did not read, does it have anything that relates specifically to the language of the telegram that I read you?

Mr. WELLES. No. It has to do with the *modus vivendi* and the information given to the British Ambassador with regard to that matter.

Senator FERGUSON. The first paragraph reads:

The Ambassador said that Secretary Hull had called him on the telephone last night to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys. The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear [1306] in his own mind as to the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Government with a document other than the *modus vivendi* document which had so recently been under discussion.

This is dated November 27, 1941.

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that conversation?

Mr. WELLES. I have that before me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that conversation?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that all that was said about that? Did you try to explain why we gave the note of the 26th rather than the *modus vivendi* note?

Mr. WELLES. I think the rest of the memorandum goes into that.

Senator FERGUSON. Goes into that?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with why we gave the note of the 26th and not the *modus vivendi*?

Mr. WELLES. I was familiar with the discussions which had taken place with regard to it, although I did not participate in the decisions reached. I wish to say, however, that I was wholly in accord with the decision which was reached.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how the Japanese treated [1307] it—whether they treated the note on the 26th as an ultimatum?

Mr. WELLES. My own understanding is that their note of November 20 was in the nature of an ultimatum to us.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't any doubt about it that there note of the 20th was an ultimatum?

Mr. WELLES. It seemed so to me, and any reply which we made short of complete acquiescence in the domination by the Japanese of the entire Pacific and eastern Asia would not have been regarded by them as complete.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you decide that war was inevitable, in your own mind, considering the note of the 20th?

Mr. WELLES. It had seemed to me from the middle of September, more or less, that there wasn't the remotest possible chances of reaching a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the difficulties which had arisen and that consequently hostilities would probably be inevitable.

Senator FERGUSON. And did it become more so after the Japanese note of the 20th of November?

Mr. WELLES. The Japanese note of November 20 seemed to me an ultimatum which this Government couldn't possibly accept in its own self-defense and protection.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the modus vivendi proposal have been an acceptance of that note?

Mr. WELLES. Certainly not.

[1308] Senator FERGUSON. It would not?

Mr. WELLES. Certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. It would have extended the matter, in your opinion?

Mr. WELLES. That is, of course, a question I can't answer. I doubt if anybody can. I should say every probability existed that it would not have been regarded as satisfactory by the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the intercepted messages; for instance, the one saying the 20th of November was the last day?

Mr. WELLES. Senator, I want to answer your question as clearly and as precisely as possible, but when you ask me if I had seen certain specific intercepted messages, I can only say that I saw, in my belief, all of the intercepted diplomatic messages received by us, but only a part of the intercepted naval or military messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that one about the 20th being the last day?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that messages—

Senator FERGUSON. That is rather important.

Mr. WELLES. I remember messages which I saw which indicated that a time limit was set for the Japanese to receive acquiescence in their demand from us at that time. Later, it [1309] had been extended for a couple of days.

Senator FERGUSON. Up until the 29th.

Mr. WELLES. That is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. And then we did not compromise, I mean we didn't do anything to change those dates, we didn't attempt to, because it was against our principles?

Mr. WELLES. My understanding is that, no matter what reply had been made after the receipt of the note from the Japanese dated November 20—the only reply that they would have regarded as satisfactory was a complete acquiescence in the demands made in that note.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would go to the note of the 28th, the memorandum that you read. I haven't seen it. It had something in it about the breaking off of relations. I wish you would read that paragraph again.

Mr. WELLES. Certainly. [Reading]:

He—

that is the Ambassador—

He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval officials in London had been informed by the Navy Department the negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently precautionary measures must at once be undertaken.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he could be speaking [1310] about the language of Mr. Hull to Secretary Stimson as related in his diary?

Mr. WELLES. I couldn't possibly undertake to answer that question, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. I will try to find the one I want.

Page 119 of the Army Board Report:

On the morning of the 27th of November, 1941—

Mr. Stimson's diary reads—

the first thing in the morning I called up Mr. Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese, whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago, or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me how he had broken the whole matter off, as he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and the Navy."

Could the message from our Navy to the people in London have been that information?

Mr. WELLES. I am not in position to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the instrument of the 26th?

Mr. WELLES. I am.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that language that I read a fair [1311] interpretation of that instrument?

Mr. WELLES. Namely, that it was a breaking off?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. I think it is fair in the sense that any reply handed to the Japanese representatives at that time which was not a full acquiescence in their demands would probably have been regarded as necessary to be rejected by them.

Senator FERGUSON. So that would be a fair interpretation of the note of the 26th, that it was a breaking off?

Mr. WELLES. I shouldn't say that was a fair interpretation unless relations actually had been broken.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say to Mr. Halifax in relation to that particular paragraph that you read; did you know anything about the situation?

Mr. WELLES. I knew, of course, that the note of the 26th of November had been handed to the Japanese representatives. I was familiar with some of the intercepts which had to do with the Japanese constructions that were being said. And on page 2 of my memorandum which I have already read—may I quote it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, please do.

Mr. WELLES. In reply to the Ambassador, I said:

* * * that consequently I could not say technically that negotiations had been broken off, although it was, [1312] of course, the assumption on the part of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government would not accept the bases proposed by the Government of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, our Government assumed that they would not accept and therefore it would be breaking the relations off?

Mr. WELLES. I can only repeat, Senator, the statement which I happened to have made to the British Ambassador. I said, "consequently I could not say technically that negotiations had been broken off * * *"

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by that?

Mr. WELLES. So long as conversations continued, so long as diplomatic negotiations still are in existence, diplomatic relations are not broken off. One can assume that they will be broken off, but that doesn't mean that they already are.

Senator FERGUSON. Asking you as an expert in the State Department, when does the State Department turn the matter over to the Army and the Navy?

Mr. WELLES. I think it is very difficult, if not impossible, to give a precise answer to a very general question like that. It would depend on the individual circumstances in every case.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you agree that we did turn [1313] it over to the Army and the Navy on the 27th as indicated by Colonel Stimson's note or language?

Mr. WELLES. I think that that is a question which only Mr. Hull himself could answer.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say was meant by a de facto rupture of diplomatic relations, as indicated by our interception of a message from Tokyo to Washington, November 28, 1941? Have you got the printed copy before you?

Mr. WELLES. I have not.

[1314] Mr. GESELL. Here is one. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 195.

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair ask the photographers to finish their work. While the witnesses are testifying we thought that we would try to keep this space clear. We would appreciate it very much.

Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. It starts:

Therefore, with the report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal, which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

Do you find that language?

Mr. WELLES. I have just found it, Senator, yes.

What is the question?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know what is meant by this language.

Mr. WELLES. "De facto ruptured"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. As a question of fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that be a breaking off of relations?

Mr. WELLES. That would be an actual breaking off, as a question of fact.

[1315] Senator FERGUSON. You used the word "technically" ruptured. The Japs, in their language, which we intercepted and knew, that language was that it was a de facto rupture, that is, as a matter of fact it was a breaking off of relations; is that correct?

Mr. WELLES. That is their statement.

Senator FERGUSON. That is their statement.

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then here we have their statement as to how they are going to consider this.

Mr. WELLES. That is their statement.

Senator FERGUSON. The last sentence of your memorandum dated November 27, 1941 was, "The gravity of the situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated." Will you explain that?

Mr. WELLES. You ask me to explain my intention in making that statement?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; what you meant by it.

Mr. WELLES. My intention in making that statement was that in view of my belief that the Japanese would not accept the reply which had been given to their note of November 25, that there was no other way to accomplish any satisfactory result of the diplomatic negotiations, that they had ended in a blind alley; consequently there was no hope of reaching a specific solution.

[1316] Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation with any of our military men on that point?

Mr. WELLES. On this particular point?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that you thought that was true?

Mr. WELLES. I was present, as I remember, at several conversations in Secretary Hull's office in which intelligence was brought in with regard to increasingly alarming movements of Japanese troops and of Japanese naval vessels, all of which confirmed my belief, as expressed in the sentence which you have quoted from my memorandum of my conversation with the British Ambassador.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to your message of December 6, and after the questions I have asked you, is your memory refreshed as to what you could have been referring to on the bottom of the message about wanting to carry out the President's wishes in the message transmitted by Welles to Halifax?

Mr. WELLES. I shall have to see if there is any document I have. I have not got it available.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you make a search and produce it, if you can, so that we may talk about that when you return?

Mr. WELLES. I shall be glad to.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Were you present at the Cabinet meeting related yesterday by Secretary Hull that it was decided that some speeches would be made to the American public? I notice [1317] that afterward you made an address and Secretary Knox made one.

Mr. WELLES. I was never present at any Cabinet meetings when Secretary Hull was present. I only attended when he was not available.

Senator FERGUSON. How did the fact reach you that there was a desire that certain State Department or public officials make some utterances to the public?

Mr. WELLES. To the best of my recollection the expression of that desire did not reach me.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that your utterance was not made in compliance with that suggestion?

Mr. WELLES. To the best of my recollection the suggestion was not made to me. The address to which Mr. Hull referred in his statement of yesterday was an address made at the tomb of Woodrow Wilson on Armistice Day and it was my desire to make as clear as possible the gravity of the situation that the American people were then facing.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were speaking as a member of the State Department and not speaking in relation to that, having in mind that Cabinet meeting at all?

Mr. WELLES. I am frank to say, Senator Ferguson, that I do not remember any suggestion having been made to me.

¹ See p. 508, *infra*; see also Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1697-1700.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go over Secretary Knox's speech before he gave it?

[1318] Mr. WELLES. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not familiar with that?

Mr. WELLES. I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you in any way contribute to the Davis-Lindley book on How War Came? They seem to write with some authority.

Mr. WELLES. I did not contribute to it in any way. Both Mr. Lindley and Mr. Forrest Davis had many conversations in the Department of State with officials, including myself, with regard to the events that had taken place.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I didn't mean in contribution, that you directly contributed.

Mr. WELLES. I see.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give them any of the information they printed in the book?

Mr. WELLES. I talked with them upon several occasions and I have no doubt that some of the information published in their book was written in the light of the conversations that were had.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not they used the note of August 17? That is the parallel action note?

Mr. WELLES. I haven't read the book for well over a year, Senator Ferguson. I couldn't attempt to remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what intermediaries our [1319] State Department may have used in their negotiations with Japan?

Mr. WELLES. To be accurate would be difficult—

Senator FERGUSON. You may not describe them as intermediaries.

Mr. WELLES. To be accurate it would be difficult for me to be sure I was giving a correct answer since I individually had nothing whatever to do with any conversations that such persons may have had. I think there again Mr. Hull can give you the full information since in my case it would be merely hearsay.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known who was negotiating?

Mr. WELLES. I had understood, again I repeat, only by hearsay, not through direct participation—

Senator FERGUSON. From whom did your information come?

Mr. WELLES. My information came both from Secretary Hull and other individuals.

Senator FERGUSON. I wouldn't consider that in the same category as ordinary hearsay. Who did Mr. Hull tell you was negotiating?

Mr. WELLES. I remember Frank Walker, then Postmaster General.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you finish?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Frank Walker, Postmaster General.

[1320] Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whom he was negotiating with?

Mr. WELLES. I think that he had conversations both with Admiral Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Walker confer with you on these questions?

Mr. WELLES. Not at any time. That is the reason I did not attempt to answer with any assurance of accuracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of anyone else?

Mr. WELLES. I couldn't be precise on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear the name of Jones?

Mr. WELLES. Rev. E. Stanley Jones?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. I have never understood that he took any such part.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the note to the Emperor, due to any work on that at all, on the 6th? It was sent the night of the 6th.

Mr. WELLES. I think that the President drafted that himself. I had nothing to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. You had nothing to do with it?

Mr. WELLES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn it was gone?

[1321] Mr. WELLES. I think the following morning, if I remember correctly. I may have known it that night but certainly not until after it had been prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. I note in your book *The Time for Decision*, you say that you were many times with the President in conference immediately following the attack. Now I ask you if you were in conference with him on Saturday or Sunday before the attack?

[1322] Mr. WELLES. Not so far as I can remember. The President had been away December 6 as I remember it and I do not think that I saw him immediately before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the President returned about December 1 from Warm Springs?

Mr. WELLES. I did not remember the exact date.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall any conferences, then, or any telephone messages between you and the President on the 6th or the 7th, up to the time of the attack?

Mr. WELLES. Undoubtedly I saw the President and was in communication with him but I cannot remember specifically now without a diary. As I told you, I have no diary. It is very difficult to be accurate on precise dates.

Senator FERGUSON. I am speaking about the day of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, prior to the attack. Do you recall any conversations you may have had in relation to any diplomatic negotiations or military operations?

Mr. WELLES. I can be perfectly specific on one point and that is that I had no communication with the President on the morning of the 7th. I had no communication with the President until he telephoned me to tell me of the attack; it was first from him that I knew of it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn, when was the first knowledge that you had of the Winant note that I read [1323] you this morning, the wire relating to the ships?

Mr. WELLES. The telegram you are speaking of, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. The telegram of December 6?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. The telegram was undoubtedly put on my desk as soon as the Department of State had decoded it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is possible that you had it on the 6th of December; is that correct?

Mr. WELLES. I will have to check on the precise time of that telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. It came in, I think, 10:40 a. m.

Mr. WELLES. Received 10:40 a. m., on December 6. I undoubtedly saw it shortly afterwards.

Senator FERGUSON. What did it mean to you in relation to your negotiations?

Mr. WELLES. As I think I said before when you first read it, Senator Ferguson, it was an indication that the Japanese were moving, moving fast in large force and, furthermore, that it confirmed the fact that they were having no further regard for the warning which had been given to them.

Senator FERGUSON. And the warning was particularly the [1324] one on the 17th of August 1941?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did it mean war?

Mr. WELLES. As well as many other representations which were made to them after that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it mean war?

Mr. WELLES. Well—

Mr. MURPHY. Between whom?

Mr. WELLES. I should say that the chances had diminished from one in a thousand to one in a million that war could then be avoided.

Senator FERGUSON. And war between whom?

Mr. WELLES. War between the United States and Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. And Japan. Now, did you take that telegram up, that message, with the Army and Navy, with the military authorities? You say that it was reduced from one in a thousand to one in a million. Did you take it up with the Army and the Navy?

Mr. WELLES. May I repeat again, Senator, that these matters were being handled by the Secretary of State, by the President, and by the highest military and naval officials.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you confer with Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State, about that telegram?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that on the morning of December 6 Mr. Hull received when I was with him, and probably during the rest of the day, considerable intelligence which came to us from our own officials, both of the War and Navy Departments, with regard to the Japanese movements, all of which were of the most serious and alarming character.

Senator FERGUSON. Did all of the messages on the day of the 6th lead you to the conclusion that you changed your average there from one in a thousand to one in a million, or did this telegram?

Mr. WELLES. I think this telegram was a factor in changing my belief.

Senator FERGUSON. It was the one that really changed your belief?

Mr. WELLES. That was one factor—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you—

Mr. WELLES. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. Go ahead.

Mr. WELLES. That was one factor among many.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what were the other factors that brought you to change the one in a thousand to one in a million?

Mr. WELLES. All of the other intelligence messages which were coming in and to which I have already referred.

[1326] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any discussion that you had with Mr. Hull in relation to this particular situation, on the change that was taking place as it would relate to the military?

Mr. WELLES. Every bit of information, Senator, including this telegram, made it more and more clear that the Japanese movements were such that both our naval and military officials would have to take charge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know when they did take charge?

Mr. WELLES. No; I could not attempt to answer that question with any precision.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot give us any idea as to the time.

Now, going back into 1940, did you know that the Secretary of the Navy had communications with Admiral Richardson, then commander of the fleet, in relation to the blockade?

Mr. WELLES. I had no knowledge of the conversations which Secretary Knox had with Admiral Richardson.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, could you let me have the instrument that Admiral Richardson brought in?

Mr. MITCHELL. He brought a good many.

Mr. GESELL. What instrument?

[1327] Senator FERGUSON. The one in relation to the blockade.

Mr. GESELL. The proposed escorting, is that what you are referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, it was more than an escort. It was a line.

I show you the letter from the commander in chief of the United States Fleet to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet. You were not here, as I understand it, when Admiral Richardson testified.

Mr. WELLES. I was not present, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just read that and read the last page?

Mr. WELLES. The final page?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Read the first few pages and then the final page.

Mr. WELLES [reading]:

Long Beach, Calif., October 6—

Senator FERGUSON. No; read it just to yourself.

Mr. WELLES. I beg your pardon.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you some questions about it. It is already in the record.

Mr. WELLES. Yes, Senator; I have looked over that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever have any knowledge of that?

[1328] Mr. WELLES. I had no knowledge whatever of the conversations which Admiral Richardson had with the President or Secretary Knox.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any knowledge in relation to the so-called blockade, or call it whatever name you desire?

Mr. WELLES. The President discussed with me or, rather, told me of a plan which he had been formulating in his mind but always as a plan, to undertake a patrol of certain regions of the Pacific in order to limit the sphere of activity of Japan but I wish to emphasize the fact that he always discussed that with me as being in the nature of a project and not in the nature of any decision.

Senator FERGUSON. How early did he discuss it with you?

Mr. WELLES. I should assume about the middle of the autumn of 1940, some time in the latter part of 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be about the time that this letter is dated, October 11?

Mr. WELLES. About that time; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And would, in your opinion, that have meant war between the United States and Japan?

Mr. WELLES. I think it would have led to incidents which undoubtedly would have made more likely the outbreak of [1329] war between the two countries.

Senator FERGUSON. What incidents did you have in mind?

Mr. WELLES. If as a part of the patrolling operations the United States naval vessels undertook to prohibit the passage of Japanese vessels with the Japanese flag from one part of the Pacific to the other, the Japanese Government undoubtedly would have regarded that as being in the nature of a hostile act.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Japanese had notified Mr. Grew to that effect?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that there was some information which was available to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment. I want to find something.

On May the 11th, 1941, reading from Foreign Relations of the United States, volume 2, page 145, down near the bottom of the page, speaking about the Minister of Foreign Affairs down in the last part, "He said that by way of example"—do you have it, Mr. Welles?

Mr. WELLES. I have it before me, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read what he said?

Mr. WELLES. Beginning with the second paragraph, I assume.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to begin there where, "He [1330] said"—well, you can start back one sentence. "He said he knew that Hitler."

Mr. WELLES (reading):

The Minister's subsequent remarks, which he said he was addressing to me as "an American friend and not as the American Ambassador" were bellicose both in tone and substance. He said that he was exceedingly worried lest the United States should proceed to convoy its ships to Great Britain, which would almost certainly lead to war with Germany. He said that to declare a neutral zone in the Atlantic or any other ocean was contrary to international law and that in the face of our supplying Great Britain with war materials he thought that Hitler had shown great "patience and generosity" in not declaring war on the United States. He said he knew that Hitler desired to avoid such a war but that it was doubtful whether his patience and restraint could continue indefinitely. He said by way of example that if the United States were to convoy its ships in bringing aid to Chiang Kai-shek they would be torpedoed by the Japanese Navy just as he would expect the American Navy to act similarly in a reverse situation. He said that if, in spite of previous forbearance, Hitler should now sink our ships in the Atlantic and if we Americans should then attack the German submarines he would regard this as an act of American aggression which would call for deliberation as to the applicability of article III of the Triple Alliance Treaty of September 27, 1940, and he thought there was no doubt that such deliberation would lead to war between Japan and the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Mr. Welles—

Mr. WELLES. But may I inject, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. That this message is dated May 14, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. WELLES. More than 6 months after the time you were asking me about.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that you and I were talking about.

Now, did we consider that this was bluffing because he was saying it to the Ambassador not as Ambassador but as a friend? Were you familiar with that note?

Mr. WELLES. I saw the note when it came in from Mr. Grew.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you consider it?

Mr. WELLES. I considered it as confirmation of my belief which had been going on for some time and which is now [1332] borne out by proven facts, that the Germans were instigating the Japanese to provoke trouble with the United States and were in large measure responsible for the attitude which the Japanese Government was taking.

This message from Mr. Grew relating his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister related almost entirely to Germany and to the action which Germany might take against the United States and referred to the extraordinary forbearance and patience which Hitler had shown.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not place any significance then on that particular incident?

Mr. WELLES. I placed a great deal of significance on it. I placed the significance on it that the relations between Japan and Germany were becoming even closer than before and that Japan very often was moving as the Germans were indicating.

Senator FERGUSON. They would be the mouthpiece of Hitler, then, in effect?

Mr. WELLES. That was certainly the impression that I drew from that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going back to October 8, had you any idea that if Admiral Richardson had carried out that memo that it may have meant war?

Mr. WELLES. Well, may I say again, Senator Ferguson, [1333] that the President's conversations with me were always, with regard to this project, were always limited to it as an idea which he was thinking of, which he was considering; that no decision had been reached by the President in that regard. If it had been carried out, I think unquestionably incidents would have taken place, as I said before, which would have led to hostilities.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any knowledge at the time the fleet was moved from the west coast to Hawaii, did you know it at the time it was moved?

Mr. WELLES. I probably had.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted prior to that in relation to the effect it might have upon your diplomatic relations with Japan, with our diplomatic relations with Japan?

Mr. WELLES. I am sorry to have to say the same thing so often, Senator, but I know you will understand the spirit in which I say it. I was not consulted because I was not taking part in making policy concerning the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. I may have used the word "consulted" because you were in the Department; you were Under Secretary.

Mr. WELLES. I knew of it. It was being talked of.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew of the fact, you knew about it?

[1334] Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that it was being sent out to Hawaii in May of 1940 as an arm of the diplomatic negotiations?

Mr. WELLES. I could not possibly say "Yes" to that question. I think the action taken, as I—

Senator FERGUSON. It went out, I think, in March. It went out in March on maneuvers, but then there was a telegram sent that there was to be a release from Hawaii that it was going to be detained there for some time.

Mr. WELLES. May I finish my earlier answer, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I want you to finish it.

Mr. WELLES. My judgment was that it was done only as an integral part of over-all policy.

In answer to a question of Senator Brewster yesterday, I said that I thought that under conditions such as those which existed in the prewar years you could not divorce what was done in the military field from what was done in the diplomatic field, or vice versa—that it was a part of the whole policy. In other words, that the military was not being made subservient to the diplomatic nor the diplomatic subservient to the military; that the policy was being worked out along parallel roads.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

[1335] Mr. WELLES. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then do I understand that as part of the diplomatic negotiations and in cooperation with them it was decided by someone that the fleet would be transferred from the west coast to Hawaii?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is that it was felt that in view of the situation which was existing the continued refusal on the part of the United States to take measures which it regarded as necessary for the protection of its legitimate interests would be regarded as a sign of weakness and of acquiescence by the Japanese military leaders in their policies.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was the opinion of someone in our own Department, in our State Department, someone in our Government, that we would strengthen our position in the diplomatic field if we had the fleet stationed at Hawaii rather than on the west coast?

Mr. WELLES. Those decisions with regard to the over-all policy covering both the diplomatic and the military and naval field were made, of course, by the President himself after consulting with the Secretary of State and his other advisers who were dealing with that question.

Senator FERGUSON. So that would be the decision of the President of the United States?

[1336] Mr. WELLES. It would have to be so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did you understand, when you were talking about the fleet back in those days, that the fleet was to protect and defend Pearl Harbor, the Islands? Was that your understanding?

Mr. WELLES. That the fleet was to defend Pearl Harbor?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. My understanding was that it was part of a general strategy which was looked upon by the Navy Department for the protection of our interests throughout the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know why the Army had its installations at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WELLES. In the same sense, as a means of protection of our—
 Senator FERGUSON. Was it to protect the fleet?

Mr. WELLES. As a means of protection of our interests throughout the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 12 having arrived, the committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[1337]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Welles, you may resume the witness chair.

Senator Ferguson, you were inquiring.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Secretary, were you able to find any of the messages I spoke to you about this morning?

Mr. WELLES. I think, Senator Ferguson, I have the information which you requested.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it, please?

Mr. WELLES. May I give you the information in full in my own way?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. You will remember that there has already been read the memorandum of my conversation of December 2 with the Japanese Ambassador and with Mr. Kurusu in which I communicated to them a message from the President. That is a part of the record, as I understand it.

I found in my personal file, after the conclusion of the hearing this morning, a copy of a letter which I sent on the same date to the British Ambassador. I sent it by messenger. May I read the text of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may.

[1338] Mr. WELLES. December 2d.

Personal and strictly confidential.

My dear Ambassador—

Senator FERGUSON. It is 1941?

Mr. WELLES. December 2, 1941.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: In accordance with our telephone conversation I am enclosing herewith for your personal and confidential information copies of the two documents handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador November 26th last.

Mr. Hull asks that I request you to see that every possible precaution is taken to prevent any publicity.

I am likewise enclosing a copy of the document which I handed the Japanese Ambassador this morning and which, as you will recall, is a copy of a memorandum sent to me by the President.

Believe me, yours very sincerely.

My understanding is that the message from the President which I communicated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent a copy to the British Ambassador on December 2 is the message referred to in the telegram which was read this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Are those messages in the white papers
 [1339] or in the Foreign Relations papers?

Mr. WELLES. The message from the President which I communicated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent a copy on December 2 to Lord Halifax is published as Document No. 262 in "Peace and War."

Senator FERGUSON. That is commonly known as the white papers?

Mr. WELLES. I imagine so.

Mr. MURPHY. What page?

Mr. WELLES. Page 262, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GESELL. I might say the letters appear in volume II which many of the committee members have been using, the Foreign Relations of the United States, at page 778.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the reasons I have asked you quite a number of questions, Mr. Welles, is that you had written a book, "The Time for Decision," and I noticed on the cover it had "Only a handful of men in the world have had access to the information on which this is based." Naturally I assumed that I had one of the men on the witness stand, or before me today, from whom I might get this information.

So I was trying to get as near the source as I could. I realize that it would be a great task for Mr. Hull to ask him the questions. So if you will just bear with me a little while I ask you questions—

[1340] Mr. WELLES. I am entirely at the disposal of the committee and yourself, Senator Ferguson.

If you will permit me to make an observation with regard to my own feeling of modesty, an author is not always responsible for the blurbs on the covers of his publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though he may benefit from that.

I notice that on page 288 of your book you say:

The wisdom of any foreign policy can generally be determined only by its results. Any impartial estimate of our policy during these crucial years from 1936 to 1941 must, therefore, be appraised in that light. Our objectives, essentially, were those laid down for the Government by its chief military and naval advisers and in my own judgment our policy did delay the Japanese attack for at least a brief period.

Now, were you familiar with the note—call it a note—it is a memorandum—of November 5, of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, in relation to "no ultimatum." That was used in that note, as I remember it. I just use that to refresh your memory.

Mr. WELLES. I have not got the text of that before me, but I do recollect it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you show Mr. Welles that, Counsel?

Mr. GESELL. Here is the memorandum on the top and the [1341] related documents. [Handing.]

Mr. WELLES. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed, Mr. Welles.

Mr. WELLES. I remember having seen this document, Senator. I couldn't at this moment say the precise date, however, upon which I first saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. We might assume that you saw it near its delivery?

Mr. WELLES. Approximately that time.

Senator FERGUSON. And that indicates it was delivered on November 5?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was another document delivered on the 27th, that either the Army or the Navy board refers to, one or the other?

Will you show him the one of the 27th?

Mr. GESSELL. This is Exhibit 17 in this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 17.

Do you know how it happens that that was delivered following the day of the note by Mr. Hull on the 26th, why it was not obtained before?

Mr. WELLES. I could not answer that question. I am afraid that is a question that only Mr. Hull could answer.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any knowledge on that?

[1342] Mr. WELLES. I have no knowledge on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. I think I asked you this morning whether or not it wasn't true, to your knowledge, that we carried on the negotiations subsequent to the Atlantic Conference, the Atlantic Charter meeting, that we carried it on?

Mr. WELLES. That we——

Senator FERGUSON. The United States Government.

Mr. WELLES. The United States Government.

Senator FERGUSON. The United States Government rather than the other governments.

Mr. WELLES. Yes. That, of course, Senator, was a resumption of the negotiations which had been commenced in the preceding month of March by Mr. Hull. In other words, there is nothing new about it. It is the result of negotiations which had been interrupted.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see the instruments in exhibit 18, please.

Mr. GESSELL. I think you have that.

Senator FERGUSON. I may have it.

I have; if you will show Mr. Welles, the memorandum of November 24, 1941, I have a copy now. It is "Proposed Modus Vivendi for Submission to Japanese Ambassador."

Participants: Secretary of State Hull; the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax; the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih; the Australian Minister, Richard G. Casey; and the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon.

If you will turn to page 3, I read:

They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than in this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

[1344] Are you familiar with that?

Mr. WELLES. I am familiar with the memorandum; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is initialed by Mr. Hull.

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with that fact at that time?

Mr. WELLES. I was not present at this conference, if that is what you have in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. No. How soon after this conference was had, did you become familiar with this memorandum or the information in the memorandum?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that Mr. Hull spoke with me after the conference which he had had, and that he also saw the copy of this memorandum shortly after it had been dictated.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall reading that?

Mr. WELLES. I recall reading it but my mind was more concentrated, perhaps, on the general conversation I had with him than on the precise phraseology of this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what was meant by:

I remarked that each of their governments were more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country and at the same time they expected this country—

I assume he means the other governments—

[1345] in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

What is meant by that?

Mr. WELLES. I think it would be perhaps more desirable, Senator, for you to get Mr. Hull to explain the language which he himself dictated, because this represents his own thinking at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your understanding as to his meaning?

Mr. WELLES. My understanding is that what he had said here arose from the warning given to the Japanese Government by the President on August 17. If the Japanese Government undertook to continue its policy of conquest and expansion, the United States would be obliged, in its defense and safety, to take such steps as it considered necessary, and, obviously, those steps envisaged the possibility of military action.

[1346] Senator FERGUSON. In other words, did you understand that the note of—the parallel note that I referred to this morning of August 17 committed us to the action that he is now mentioning in this note and at the same time they expected this country in case of a Japanese outbreak to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area?

Mr. WELLES. What I interpreted that note as meaning was that it envisaged the possibility that if Japan continued a policy of conquest and expansion in conflict with the legitimate interests of the United States the steps that this Government would then have to take to preserve its own security might lead to some form of conflict with Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, so that there won't remain any misunderstanding about this in the record I will read the rest of the instrument. [Reading:]

And yet I said their governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his [1347] government and that it would support the *modus vivendi* proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record.

And this is dated the 24th day of November 1941, a note or a memorandum of the conversation by Mr. Hull.

Could you give us the sequence of events which led to our position of being the negotiator with Japan in relation to this language used here?

Mr. WELLES. As the statement presented to the committee by Mr. Hull on yesterday shows, the effort was commenced in the month of March of 1941 to find through direct negotiations between the United States Government and the Japanese Government some pacific solution of the crisis which was developing.

Those negotiations were interrupted when Japan moved into Indochina and occupied it and were later resumed shortly after August 17.

The United States Government was, therefore, in a position of already being a negotiator with Japan for a solution [1348] which, had it proved successful, would have solved all of the controversy arising in the Pacific area as an outgrowth of the militaristic policy of expansion and aggression upon which Japan had embarked.

The other countries involved, because of their vital interests in that region would under such circumstances, had the negotiations proved successful, found a solution of their difficulties as well. It, therefore, seems to me entirely logical that the United States should have been negotiating rather than other governments which were already participating in a major war.

Senator FERGUSON. From then on would you say that we were receiving all of the information that the other governments, the ABCD part, all the military information in relation to the Pacific was coming to us from those governments because we were doing the negotiating?

Mr. WELLES. I should say that we were receiving the bulk of the intelligence and other information from our own naval and military authorities; that very frequently information of value as to the developments was gained also from the British and Dutch and others of the governments primarily concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not any of the other governments were breaking the Japanese diplomatic code?

[1349] Mr. WELLES. My recollection is that the British Government was intercepting the messages just as we were.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the British Government had all the information from the intercepted messages that we would have?

Mr. WELLES. That is my clear recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you know whether any of the other governments, the Dutch Government, was breaking the code? I mean by "breaking the code" intercepting the messages and translating them.

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is not clear on that point but my assumption would be that such information as was being obtained was made available to the Dutch Government by the British Government.

Senator FERGUSON. The British Government, then, would be keeping the Dutch Government informed?

Mr. WELLES. That is my assumption.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you have any knowledge on the Chinese Government?

Mr. WELLES. I am not informed on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of the "winds" message, so described?

Mr. WELLES. I could not say that at that time I had any knowledge of it that I now recollect. As I said this [1350] morning, Senator, it is very difficult after 4 years——

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Mr. WELLES (continuing). To recollect with any accuracy, particularly when you have been reading the newspapers, as I have, with regard to the hearings and with regard to the matters that are coming up for discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. The word "winds" message or "wind execute" message, then, does not get a response?

Mr. WELLES. I could not at this time say that I had ever seen it until I saw it in the press more recently.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you know what I am talking about when I speak of it?

Mr. WELLES. Yes and——

Mr. GESELL. May I interpose, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I do not suppose Mr. Welles could have seen the execute in the papers. The only discussion, or the only message released has been the code itself. The question of execute is something we are still——

Senator FERGUSON. Working on.

Mr. GESELL (continuing). Working on, right.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Mr. Welles, did you ever know that there had been an execute? In other words, if there had been a carrying out of the original message that they [1351] would indicate the break in diplomatic relations by using the direction of the wind.

Mr. WELLES. To the best of my recollection, Senator, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear from any source that the Japanese Ambassadors in various places, for instance, here in Washington and in London, were destroying codes, or did you ever hear of it?

Mr. WELLES. I recollect that shortly before December 7th an intercept gave an indication that the Japanese Embassy here was instructed to destroy its papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall when that was?

Mr. WELLES. Without referring to a record I could not give you the precise day or time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it prior to the 7th?

Mr. WELLES. Prior to the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that signify to you as a diplomat and Under Secretary of State?

Mr. WELLES. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not catch that.

Mr. WELLES. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say it indicated war?

[1352] Mr. WELLES. A rupture of diplomatic relations at the very least and under the circumstances then existing the probability of war.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that help you to form your opinion on the percentage that you gave me this morning on the 7th?

Mr. WELLES. That was decidedly one of the contributing factors.

Senator FERGUSON. I am reading now from a memo that was given to us this morning. That is the telegram dated November the 30th, 1941, received at 1:28 p. m., sent by our Ambassador, Mr. Winant. Do you have a copy of that? That was given to us this morning.

Mr. WELLES. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the text, this being the sentence, the last part of the sentence that I want to inquire about [reading]:

We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours.

[1353] Now, it is the part, "And in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours." What was he referring to?

Mr. WELLES. The situation by November 30 had already reached such a point that it was very clear that the possibility of hostilities was imminent and in that event I would assume that the only construction that could be given to the sentence which you have read, Senator, would be that those arrangements to be synchronized with ours referred to naval and military operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of that synchronizing of our military operations as being known as the ABCD bloc?

Mr. WELLES. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you this morning if you recalled who were present at the Atlantic Conference. I have a copy of the New York Times here and it lists the names and I wonder whether you would check it to see whether it refreshes your memory.

Mr. WELLES. Certainly.

Mr. MURPHY. May we have the date for the record, please?

Mr. WELLES. The date is Sunday, August 17, Mr. Congressman. Yes, Senator.

[1354] Senator FERGUSON. Will you give the names of those listed as being present to see whether it refreshes your memory?

Mr. WELLES. General Marshall, General Arnold, General Burns, Colonel Bundy, Admiral Stark, Admiral King, Admiral Turner, Captain Sherman, Mr. Hopkins, Averell Harriman, General Watson, Captain Beardall, and Dr. McIntire.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Beardall was naval aide to the President, was he not?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct. Mr. Harriman had flown up with me at the time that I went.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position at the time, Mr. Harriman?

Mr. WELLES. He was stationed, as I recall it, in London at that time in connection with lend-lease operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Hopkins' position? That was Harry Hopkins.

Mr. WELLES. Harry Hopkins arrived some time after the Atlantic Charter Conference had started. I think that he flew over with Lord Beaverbrook, who had come down to see Mr. Churchill. My recollection is that they arrived 1 day or perhaps 2 days before the meeting broke up.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation with [1355] Mr. Hopkins about this parallel promise?

Mr. WELLES. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he present when you discussed it with the President?

Mr. WELLES. As I said this morning, Senator, my recollection is that I was alone with the President at the time that our conversation on this point took place.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is one other item in that book on the 24th that I have marked, and I would like to have you read that item from the New York Times of the 25th. I have marked the paragraph there.

Mr. MURPHY. The page?

Senator FERGUSON. Would you identify the paper that you are reading from?

Mr. WELLES. Yes. It is the New York Times, Monday, August 25th. The article is headed: "Text of Prime Minister Churchill's address on meeting with President." The marked paragraph is as follows:

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed, [1356] but this I must say, that if these hopes—

there is a typographical error; I think the word must be "fail"—that if these hopes should fall we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

That is the marked paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you say that that would be, in effect, carrying out this parallel arrangement?

Mr. WELLES. I should not, Senator. I should say that at that time that was a unilateral declaration on the part of the British Prime Minister.

Senator FERGUSON. And had nothing to do, in your opinion, with the parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. I think the parallel action should be regarded as separate from this. In my judgment this is a unilateral declaration, a unilateral declaration which, of course, arose from the fact that the two governments had agreed on a parallel course of action.

Senator FERGUSON. This was a radio broadcast to the world, was it not, this particular language?

Mr. WELLES. The heading of it as I read it, as I remember it, says, "Text of Prime Minister's Address."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember whether it was or not.

[1357] Senator FERGUSON. You would not say, then, that that was the carrying out of the British side of the parallel action?

Mr. WELLES. I should not. I should interpret the British side of the parallel action as being a warning delivered to the Japanese Government by the British Government of the same character as the warning delivered by the President to the Japanese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would be an exchange of diplomatic notes rather than a radio address?

Mr. WELLES. Most decidedly, in my judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at Peace and War—United States Foreign Policy—and see whether or not there are any notes between the date of the delivery of the note of August the 17th and their reply of the 28th?

Mr. WELLES. I want to get your question clear, please, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know what diplomatic relations we had, as far as notes were concerned, between the 17th, Sunday, when the President returned, on August 1941, and the date of the reply of Japan to that note on August the 28th, if I am correct on my date of the reply, the 28th.

Mr. WELLES. There is nothing published here between August 17th and August 28th, except for the message of the President to the Congress.

[1358] Senator FERGUSON. That is the message of August what?

Mr. WELLES. August 21, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. 21st?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, at this place I would like to insert where I referred this morning, or we can do it right here, I would like to insert in the record the message of the President to Congress on the 21st, being the only paper in this book between those dates.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want it inserted as a part of the transcript?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; as part of the transcript. It is a short message; it is only several pages.

Mr. GESELL. May I interpose, Senator. While Mr. Welles has been looking at one book I have been looking at the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I want to get your help.

Mr. GESELL. And I see in volume 2, Japan, Foreign Relations with the United States, refers to several conversations which were held with the Japanese Ambassador on various subjects, particularly a rather lengthy one I haven't read, "Memorandum by the Secretary of State on August 23rd of his talk with the Japanese Ambassador."

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want to get in the record.

[1359] Mr. WELLES. My volume, Senator, is entitled "Documents." There probably is a distinction made in the publication between conversations and documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I have the message from the President inserted?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be inserted at this point in the transcript here.

(The message referred to follows:)

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO THE CONGRESS, AUGUST 21, 1941, EMBODYING
TEXT OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

Over a week ago I held several important conferences at sea with the British Prime Minister. Because of the factor of safety to British, Canadian, and American ships, and their personnel, no prior announcement of these meetings could properly be made.

At the close, a public statement by the Prime Minister and the President was made. I quote it for the information of the Congress and for the record:

"The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea.

"They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including high-ranking officers of their military, naval, and air services.

[1360] "The whole problem of the supply or munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States, and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression, has been further examined.

"Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union.

"The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.

"They have agreed upon the following joint declaration:

"Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, [1361] being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

"Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

"Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

[1362] "Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

"Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

"Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

"WINSTON S. CHURCHILL."

[1365] Senator FERGUSON. Now, will counsel put in at least a memo on what the documents are between those dates?

Mr. GESELL. These are memos of conversations; they are not documents.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not documents.

Mr. Welles, there were no exchanges of documents between those dates?

Mr. WELLES. According to publications I have, there were no exchanges of documents between those dates.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask counsel to see whether or not we intercepted any messages during that period.

Mr. GESELL. You mean translated, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, there were a number of messages translated in that period.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they relate in any way to this document?

Mr. GESELL. Senator, I haven't had an opportunity to read them. They begin with the message on page 15 of exhibit 1, and they run through to—let me see, what date I was going to; the 28th, is it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, up to the 28th.

The Congress and the President having heretofore determined, through the Lend-Lease Act, on the national policy of [1363] American aid to the democracies which East and West are waging war against dictatorships, the military and naval conversations at these meetings made clear gains in furthering the effectiveness of this aid.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister and I are arranging for conferences with the Soviet Union to aid it in its defense against the attack made by the principal aggressor of the modern world—Germany.

Finally, the declaration of principles at this time presents a goal which is worth-while for our type of civilization to seek. It is so clear-cut that it is difficult to oppose in any major particular without automatically admitting a willingness to accept compromise with Nazism; or to agree to a world peace which would give to Nazism domination over large numbers of conquered nations. Inevitably such a peace would be a gift to Nazism to the take breath—armed breath—for a second war to extend the control over Europe and Asia, to the American Hemisphere itself.

It is perhaps unnecessary for me to call attention once more to the utter lack of validity of the spoken or written word of the Nazi government.

It is also unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration of principles includes, of necessity, the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of information. No [1364] society of the world organized under the announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive.

Mr. GESELL. Well, with one or two that do not seem to be on that point, they run to page 21. I have not read them [1366] all. Then there are several in volume 2 that relate to espionage activities in that same period.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice in the one instance on page 17, Mr. Welles, it is from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, August 16, 1941, which would be before this message was given, and part of it says: "That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree."

Now, that was sent prior to the 17th. Had you ever heard whether or not Japan was intercepting our messages?

Mr. WELLES. I had no reason to think so at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the State Department, to your knowledge, know that Japan knew we were intercepting their diplomatic messages?

Mr. WELLES. The Department had no reason to think so. We were doing everything on earth, of course, to prevent such knowledge being obtained by them.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as you knew, they did not know that?

Mr. WELLES. So far as I knew, there was no chance that they did.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you recall any messages intercepted between the delivery of that note and the reply?

Mr. WELLES. I do not offhand recall, Senator. I would [1367] have to refresh my memory by reading these messages here.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I would like to go to the 6th of December 1941. You were in your office on that particular day, as you told me this morning, is that correct?

Mr. WELLES. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And on that day, will you relate from memory, unless you have some book or record, what occurred? I notice you

stated once that you had a private file, that you obtained a paper from a private file. Did I understand you correctly?

Mr. WELLES. When I left the Department of State, Senator, all of my documents that related to official business became part of the archives of the Department of State, and I retained only copies of memoranda or conversations, and a small amount of personal correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. But the originals of those copies of memoranda or conversations should be in the State Department?

Mr. WELLES. They are all on file in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. So we would be able to find in the State Department anything that you have and there would be no need of going over your file?

Mr. WELLES. Absolutely. The originals of everything I had were left in the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you anything relating to the 6th?

[1368] Mr. WELLES. I have no diaries, as I said before, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean any memo of conversations.

Mr. WELLES. I am afraid the files of the Department will have to be searched to find memorandums of conversations which I had on that day. I remember that the day was unusually rushed. At that particular moment I was exceedingly concerned with regard to the situation in the Western Hemisphere, and a good deal of my thought, time, and attention was given to that phase of the world problem. At the same time, as I said this morning, I think I had received information which was brought to the Secretary of State, in his office, when I was present, with regard to the Japanese troop movement, with regard to Japanese naval movement, all of which added to the gravity and burden of the day.

Senator FERGUSON. So that was a very important day in the history of the United States, as far as the State Department was concerned?

Mr. WELLES. In every sense of the word.

Senator FERGUSON. You had received the message from Ambassador Winant at 11:40. I will ask you when you first knew that Japan was replying to the note of the 26th. What time on the 6th did you know that they were replying to Mr. Hull's note of the 26th?

Mr. WELLES. I could not attempt to give you the precise [1369] hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give it near the hour?

Mr. WELLES. What you have in mind, I assume from your question, is when I had knowledge of intercepts which showed that the Japanese were replying.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct. When did you first know or get information that the Japanese were replying?

Mr. WELLES. My present recollection is that I had no knowledge of it until the Sunday, not on the Saturday.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though the Army or Navy, or both, were getting parts of the message during the day, you do not recall now any information on that?

Mr. WELLES. The best of my recollection, Senator, is that I knew nothing of that until the following morning. But it is not very surprising that I should not have received any such message. Mr. Hull himself, as I said before, was in charge of that particular ques-

tion. It was occupying practically all of his time and attention, and I, since the Department of State had to continue operating notwithstanding, was doing the best I could to handle any important or difficult urgent problems which were coming up, and consequently my own feeling is that it was very natural that information of that important character should have been communicated directly to Mr. Hull and to the President and not to myself.

[1370] Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you state to us the important matters that you were handling on that day?

Mr. WELLES. I should have to go to the records of the Department in order to give you an accurate answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you do that?

Mr. WELLES. I think undoubtedly the records of the Department will show it.

Senator FERGUSON. They were at least relating to the Far East, that is, the Pacific area there, were they not?

Mr. WELLES. The matters that I was handling, Senator, at that particular time, as I have attempted to indicate, had to do primarily with the very grave situation which we were confronting in the Western Hemisphere, a grave situation in view of the fact that in the world situation as it then was it was to the highest degree necessary and desirable that the closest kind of cooperation and understanding be maintained between the United States and the other American Republics. That, in my judgment, was one of the foundations of our own security.

Senator FERGUSON. And if war came, you felt it was necessary that we get the cooperation of the South American and Central American Republics at once?

Mr. WELLES. I regarded them as of the most vitally important to the security of this country.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be true because of the [1371] Panama Canal, if for no other reason?

Mr. WELLES. If the United States was faced with the possibility of war on both oceans, which had been overshadowing all of our minds for weeks, it certainly was of the highest importance that we should not be faced with the possibility of any Axis machinations in the New World.

Senator FERGUSON. But the record shows, and parts of the testimony indicate, that parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 would be in Washington. I am talking now about the reply on the 26th, at 11:49 Washington time. That was a. m. But you do not recall now any information about that particular message until Sunday?

Mr. WELLES. I do not recall any specific information in regard to it until Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would think that that kind of message, that kind of information that we were receiving their reply, would go directly to Mr. Hull and to the President?

Mr. WELLES. That is my understanding. It seems to me the logical thing under those conditions.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on Sunday, do you know what hour of the day you had heard that we had intercepted their message or their reply?

Mr. WELLES. I remember that I was informed in the early morning on Sunday when I reached my office that an appointment [1372]

had been requested by the Japanese Ambassadors with the Secretary of State, at approximately the same time, my understanding was, that they were going to deliver the reply which was coming through. I did not see Mr. Hull that morning, I did not see him until after he got through, to the best of my recollection, with his interview with the Japanese Ambassadors. The first knowledge, as I think I said this morning, which I had of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, came through a telephone conversation which the President had with me when he gave me the information.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you to give us what the President of the United States said to you in that telephone conversation.

Mr. WELLES. It would be very hazardous for me to attempt to give you anything that approached a textual version of what the President said to me on the telephone, and I would not attempt it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us the substance of what the President said?

[1373] Mr. WELLES. The gist of what he told me was the fact that the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place, and that he wished me to come over to the White House at some time which he fixed that afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a very short conversation?

Mr. WELLES. It was a very short conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to the White House?

Mr. WELLES. I went to the White House at the time that the President fixed. I should say it was about 3 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether or not the President had conferred with anyone Sunday morning?

Mr. WELLES. I could not undertake to answer that question, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. From what he had said——

Mr. WELLES. The President did not tell me with whom he had spoken on the telephone.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you then talk about the attack on Pearl Harbor, Sunday afternoon at 3 o'clock?

Mr. WELLES. In the first conversation which I had with him at that time he gave me certain reports which were reaching him. I remember that some of the reports gave the impression that the Japanese were attempting to undertake landings on the islands, reports which were later disproved. At that time, as I remember it, he had no detailed or full information [1374] whatever as to the extent of the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anyone present other than you and the President?

Mr. WELLES. He was sitting alone in his office on the second floor of the White House. There was nobody with him.

Senator FERGUSON. He was receiving messages on the attack?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was solely on the attack that you were discussing, the Pearl Harbor incident?

Mr. WELLES. I remember, even in the first conversation—I think I had three with him that day—he discussed the need for him at the earliest possible moment either to appear before the Congress or to send a message to the Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help him to prepare the message to Congress?

Mr. WELLES. He asked me to undertake to help him take care of that message; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help him prepare that message.

Mr. WELLES. I helped to prepare the original draft; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was delivered on Monday morning, was it?

Mr. WELLES. I would have to have my memory refreshed [1375] on that.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the 8th?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Monday noon.

Mr. WELLES. Monday noon.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when Congress recessed the time before; that is, before the 8th? Do you know whether they recessed on the 4th? I think my able colleague, the Senator from Illinois, moved that it recess until Monday morning, or until Monday noon. Did you know that it had recessed?

Mr. WELLES. On what day?

Senator FERGUSON. On the 4th.

Mr. WELLES. On December 4?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. I undoubtedly knew at the time. I cannot at the moment say just when I knew it, or more about it, other than the fact that I did know it at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you worked on the message that is now in your file, that has been offered in evidence, but never delivered to Congress?

Would you show it to him, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. WELLES. I do not know exactly what message you have in mind, Senator.

Mr. GESELL. That is exhibit 19, Senator.

[1376] Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 19. Will you just review exhibit 19 and see whether you had any part in it?

Mr. WELLES. I had no part in the drafting of that message whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not, or did you know, that the President had in mind the delivery of a message such as we have here now in evidence?

Mr. WELLES. The draft which is dated November 29, 1941, is that the one you have in mind?

Senator FERGUSON. Or any message prior to the 7th, to the day of the attack, on the Japanese far eastern question.

Mr. WELLES. I have no knowledge whatever of the preparation of this draft which you have just asked me to refer to.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted on any draft prior to Pearl Harbor in relation to our far eastern question?

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember that I was consulted with regard to any other draft.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted with relation to the draft of the message to Congress on August 21, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter message?

Mr. WELLES. I had no part in the preparation of that draft, as I recall it. I remember that the President told me that he intended to deliver such a message to the Congress at the first opportunity, but I

nothing whatever to do [1377] with the preparation of the

Senator FERGUSON. Was the Atlantic Charter in writing and signed by the President and by Mr. Churchill, as indicated in the message?

Mr. WELLES. The Atlantic Charter, Senator, was a joint communiqué issued by the heads of two governments. As is very often the case, it was not a signed agreement, simply an agreement on a public basis by the chiefs of the two governments in order to indicate what their respective policies were and what the objectives were which they sought for a better and more decent world at the end of the war.

Senator FERGUSON. It was what you would call, then, in the nature of a press or public release?

Mr. WELLES. I should say it was, technically, if you will permit the use of the word "technical," it was technically a joint communiqué, which is a joint release to the public opinion of the world.

Senator FERGUSON. And that may account for the fact that in the statement now published in the address to Congress it indicates that it was signed by the authors of the communiqué?

Mr. WELLES. They both agreed upon it. I remember, just before Mr. Churchill left, since he left before the President did, a final text was gone over, one or two slight changes were made, and it was then approved by the President to be retyped in order that it could be transmitted by radio to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. And was so transmitted, in your opinion?

Mr. WELLES. It was so transmitted to the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. No press release or communiqué was given in connection with the parallel action that we have discussed earlier?

Mr. WELLES. No press communiqué was given in regard to that, Senator. In my judgment, the President's feeling must have been that it was impossible to conceive of any successful negotiation with the Japanese if it was publicly stated that we were delivering a warning to the Japanese.

[379] Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss that with the President?

Mr. WELLES. I do not remember discussing that phase of it.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is your conclusion at the present time?

Mr. WELLES. That is my conclusion, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. As to why no release would be given?

Mr. WELLES. That is merely my conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, just in connection with the Senator's statement in the record of one paragraph of the New York Times on the speech of Mr. Churchill, the first sentence that the Senator had said was, "It is certain that this has got to stop." I think, in order to show what was being referred to in the previous paragraph, certainly it ought to be incorporated, because Mr. Churchill talked about the menace to the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. I will be glad to have that paragraph in the record.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Why not let the whole speech go in?

Mr. MURPHY. It should go in.

(An excerpt from the New York Times, August 25, 1941, containing the text of Prime Minister Churchill's address, follows:)

[1380] TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL'S ADDRESS ON MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

[The New York Times, August 25, 1941]

(Following is the text of Prime Minister Winston Churchill's address yesterday as recorded by the New York Times:)

I thought you would like me to tell you something about the voyage which I made across the ocean to meet our great friend, the President of the United States.

Exactly where we met is a secret, but I don't think I shall be indiscreet if I go so far as to say that it was somewhere in the Atlantic. In a spacious, land-locked bay which reminded me of the west coast of Scotland, powerful American warships; protected by strong flotillas and far-ranging aircraft, awaited our arrival and, as it were, stretched out a hand to help us in.

Our party arrived in the newest, or almost the newest British battleship, the *Prince of Wales*, with a modest escort of British and Canadian destroyers. And there for 3 days I spent my time in company, and I think I may say in comradeship, with Mr. Roosevelt, while all the time the chiefs of the staff and naval and military commanders, both of the British Empire and of the United States, sat together in continual council.

President Roosevelt is the thrice-chosen head of the most powerful state and community in the world. I am the servant of King and Parliament, at present charged with the principal direction of our affairs in these fateful times. And it is my [1381] duty also to make sure, as I have made sure, that anything I say or do in the exercise of my office is approved and sustained by the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. Therefore this meeting was bound to be important because of the enormous forces, at present only a partially mobilized, but steadily mobilizing, which are at the disposal of these two major groupings of the human family, the British Empire and the United States, who, fortunately for the progress of mankind, happened to speak the same language and very largely think the same thoughts, or anyhow think a lot of the same thoughts.

MEETING WAS SYMBOLIC

The meeting was, therefore, symbolic. That is its prime importance. It symbolizes in a form and manner which every one can understand in every land and in every clime, the deep underlying unities which stir and, at decisive moments, rule the English-speaking peoples throughout the world.

Would it be presumptuous for me to say that it symbolizes something even more majestic, namely, the marshaling of the good forces of the world against the evil forces which are now so formidable and triumphant and which have cast their cruel spell over the whole of Europe and a large part of Asia.

This was a meeting which marks forever in the pages of history the taking up by the English-speaking nations, amid all this peril, tumult and confusion, of the guidance of the [1382] fortunes of the broad toiling masses in all the continents, and our loyal effort, without any clog of selfish interest to lead them forward out of the miseries into which they have been plunged, back to the broad high road of freedom and justice. This is the highest honor and the most glorious opportunity which could ever have come to any branch of the human race.

When one beholds how many currents of extraordinary and terrible events have flowed together to make this harmony, even the most skeptical person must have the feeling that we all have the chance to play our part and do our duty in some great design, the end of which no mortal can foresee. Awful and horrible things I have seen in these days.

BARBARISM PLUS SCIENCE

The whole of Europe has been wrecked and trampled down by the mechanical weapons and barbaric fury of the Nazis. The most deadly instruments of war science have joined to the extreme refinements of treachery and the most brutal exhibitions of ruthlessness and thus have formed a combine of aggression, the

like of which has never been known, before which the rights, the traditions, the characteristics and the structure of many ancient, honored states and peoples have been laid prostrate and are now ground down under the heel and terror of a monster.

The Austrians, the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Danes, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Greeks, the Croats and the [1383] Serbs, above all the great French nation, have been stunned and pinioned. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, have bought a shameful respite by becoming the jackals of the tiger. But their situation is very little different and will presently be indistinguishable from that of his victims. Sweden, Spain, and Turkey stand appalled, wondering which will be struck down next. Here then is the vast pit into which all the most famous States and races of Europe have been flung and from which, unaided, they can never climb.

But all this did not satiate Adolph Hitler. He made a treaty of non-aggression with Soviet Russia, just as he made one with Turkey, in order to keep them quiet until he was ready to attack them.

And then, 9 weeks ago today, without a vestige of provocation, he hurled millions of soldiers with all their apparatus upon the neighbor he had called his friend, with the avowed object of destroying Russia and tearing her in pieces.

This frightful business is now unfolding day by day before our eyes. Here is a devil who, in a mere spasm of his pride and lust for domination, can condemn two or three millions, perhaps it may be many more, of human beings to speedy and violent death. Let Russia be blotted out. Let Russia be destroyed. Order the armies to advance. Such were his decrees. Accordingly, from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, six or seven millions of soldiers are locked in mortal struggle.

[1384]

RUSSIA NOT SO EASY

Ah, but this time it was not so easy. This time it was not all one way. The Russian armies and all the peoples of the Russian Republic have rallied to the defense of their hearths and homes. For the first time Nazi blood has flowed in a fearful flood. Certainly a million and a half, perhaps two millions of Nazi cannon-fodder, have bit the dust of the endless plains of Russia. The tremendous battle rages along nearly 2,000 miles of front. The Russians fight with magnificent devotion. Not only that, our generals who have visited the Russian front line report with admiration the efficiency of their military organization and the excellence of their equipment.

The aggressor is surprised, startled, staggered. For the first time in his experience mass murder has become unprofitable. He retaliates by the most frightful cruelties. As his armies advance, whole districts are being exterminated. Scores of thousands, literally scores of thousands of executions in cold blood are being perpetrated by the German police troops upon the Russian patriots who defend their native soil. Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in the sixteenth century there has never been methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale or approaching such a scale. And, this is but the beginning. Famine and pestilence have yet to follow in the bloody ruts of Hitler's tanks.

We are in the presence of a crime without a name.

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and [1385] devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about the vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now, they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indochina from the wretched Vichy French. The menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands, under the protection of the United States.

JAPAN MUST BE HALTED

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

And thus we come back to the quiet bay, somewhere in the Atlantic, where the misty sunshine plays on great ships which carry the White Ensign or the Stars and Stripes.

We had the idea when we met there, the President and I, [1938] without attempting to draw final and formal peace aims, or war aims, necessary to give all peoples, and especially the oppressed and conquered, a simple, rough-and-ready wartime statement of the goal toward which the British Commonwealth and the United States mean to make their way. We make a way for others to march with them on a road which will be painful and may be long.

There are, however, two distinct and marked differences in this joint declaration from the attitude adopted by the Allies during the latter part of the war and no one should overlook them.

The United States and Great Britain do not now assume that there will be any more war again. On the contrary, we intend to take ample precautions to prevent its renewal in any period we can foresee by effectively disarming guilty nations while remaining suitably protected ourselves.

The second difference is this: That instead of trying to ruin Germany by all kinds of additional trade barriers and hindrances, as was the mood of the Allies, we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the interests of the world and of our two countries that any large nation should be unprosperous. We want Germany out from the means of making a decent living for itself and its people by industry and enterprise.

FAR-REACHING CHANGES

These are far-reaching changes of principle upon which all [1937] nations should ponder.

Above all, it was necessary to give hope and the assurance of final freedom to those many scores of millions of men and women who are battling for freedom or who are already bent down under the Nazi yoke.

Hitler and his confederates have for some time past been adjuring and urging the populations whom they have wronged and injured to bow to them and to resign themselves to their servitude and, for the sake of some reward and indulgences, to collaborate—that is the word—in what is called the new order in Europe.

What is this new order which they seek to fasten first upon Europe and then upon the globe?—for their ambitions are boundless—upon all the continents of the globe? It is the rule of the Herrenvolk—the master race—who are to end to democracy, to parliaments, to the fundamental freedoms and liberties of ordinary men and women, to the historic rights of nations, and give in exchange the iron rule of Prussia, the universal goose step and the strict discipline, enforced upon the working classes by the political police, the German concentration camps and firing parties, now so busy in a dozen countries always handy in the background. There is the new order.

Napoleon in his glory and genius spread his empire far and wide. It was a time when only the snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover were the guardian fleets stood between [1938] him and dominion of the world. Napoleon's armies had a theme. They carried with them the surge of the French Revolution—"Liberty, equality, and fraternity." That was the theme. There was a sweeping away of outworn, medieval systems and aristocratic privilege. There was the land for the people—a new code of law. Now Napoleon's empire vanished like a dream.

But Hitler—Hitler has no theme—naught but mania, appetite, and ambition. He has, however, weapons and machinery for grinding down and holding down conquered countries which are the product—the sadly defective product—of modern science.

HOPE FOR THE CONQUERED

The ordeals, therefore, of the conquered peoples will be hard. We must give them hope. We must give them the conviction that their sufferings and their resistances will not be in vain. The tunnel may be dark and long, but at the end there is light. That is the symbolism and that is the message of the meeting.

Do not despair, brave Norwegians, your land shall be cleansed, not only of the invader but from the filthy quislings who are his tools.

Be strong in your souls, Czechs, your independence shall be restored.

Poles, the heroism of your people, standing up to cruel oppressors, the courage of your soldiers, sailors, and airmen shall not be forgotten. Your country shall live again and resume its [1389] rightful part in the new organization of Europe.

Lift up your heads, gallant Frenchmen. Not all the infamies of Darlan and Laval shall stand between you and the restoration of your birthright.

Stout-hearted Dutch, Belgians, Luxemburgers, tormented, mishandled, shamefully cast away peoples of Yugoslavia, glorious Greece, now subjected to the crowning insult of the rule of the Italian jackanapes, yield not an inch. Keep your souls clean from all contact with the Nazis. Make them feel even in their fleeting hour of brutish triumph that they are the moral outcasts of mankind. Help is coming. Mighty forces are arming in your behalf. Have faith, have hope, deliverance is sure.

There is the signal which we have flashed across the waters and if it reaches the hearts of those to whom it is sent they will endure with fortitude and tenacity their present misfortune in the sure faith that they, too, are still serving the common cause and that our efforts will not be in vain.

You will, perhaps, have noticed that the President of the United States and the British representative in what is aptly called the Atlantic Charter have jointly pledged their countries to the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny. That is a solemn and grave undertaking. It must be made good. It will be made good, and, of course, many practical arrangements to fulfill that purpose have been and are being organized and set in motion.

HOW NEAR IS UNITED STATES TO WAR?

[1390] The question has been asked: "How near is the United States to war?" There is certainly one man who knows the answer to that question. If Hitler has not yet declared war upon the United States it is surely not out of his love for American institutions. It is certainly not because he could not find a pretext. He has murdered half a dozen countries for far less. Fear, fear of immediately redoubling the tremendous energies now being employed against him is no doubt the restraining influence. But the real reason is, I am sure, to be found in the method to which he has so faithfully adhered and by which he has gained so much.

What is that method? It is a very simple method. One by one—that is his plan. That is his guiding rule. That is the trick by which he has enslaved so large a portion of the world.

Three and a half years ago I appealed to my fellow countrymen to take the lead in weaving together a strong defensive union within the principles of the League of Nations, a union of all the countries who felt themselves in ever-growing danger. But none would listen. All stood idle while Germany rearmed.

ONE BY ONE

Czechoslovakia was subjugated. A French Government deserted their faithful ally and broke a plighted word in that ally's hour of need. Russia was deceived and deceived into a kind of neutrality or partnership while the French Army was being annihilated. The Low Countries and the Scandinavian countries, acting with France and Great Britain in good time even after the war had [1391] begun, might have altered its course and would have had at any rate a fighting chance. The Balkan states had only to stand together to save themselves from the ruin by which they are now engulfed. But one by one they were undermined and overwhelmed. Never was the career of crime made more smooth.

Now Hitler is striking at Russia with all his might, well knowing the difficulties of geography which stand between Russia and the aid which the western democracies are trying to bring. We shall strive our utmost to overcome all difficulties and to bring this aid. We have arranged for a conference in Moscow between the United States, British, and Russian authorities to settle the whole plan. No barrier must stand in the way. But why is Hitler striking at Russia and inflicting this suffering on himself, or rather making his soldiers suffer this frightful slaughter?

It is with the declared object of turning his whole force upon the British Islands and, if he can succeed in beating the life and strength out of us, which is

not so easy, then is the moment when he will settle his account, and it is already a long one, with the people of the United States and generally with the Western Hemisphere.

One by one—there is the process. There is the simple dismal plan which has served Hitler so well. It needs but one final successful application to make him the master of the world.

I am devoutly thankful that some eyes at least are fully [1392] opened to it while time remains. I rejoice to find that the President saw in their true light and proportion the extreme dangers by which the American people, as well as the British people, are now beset.

IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES FLEET

It was indeed by the mercy of God that he began 8 years ago that revival of the strength of the American Navy without which the New World today would have to take its orders from the European dictators, but with which the United States still retains the power to marshal her gigantic strength and, in saving herself, render an incomparable service to mankind.

We had a church parade on Sunday in our Atlantic bay. The President came onto the quarter-deck of the *Prince of Wales* where there were mingled together many hundreds of American and British sailors and marines.

The sun shone bright and warm while we all sang the old hymns which are our common inheritance and which we learned as children in our homes. We sang the hymn founded on the psalm which John Hampden's soldiers sang when they bore his body to the grave and in which the brief precarious span of human life is contrasted with the immutability of Him to whom a thousand ages are but as yesterday and as a watch that is passed in the night.

We sang the sailors' hymn "For those in Peril," and there are very many in peril on the sea. We sang "Onward, Christian [1393] Soldiers," and indeed I felt that this was no vain presumption, but that we had the right to feel that we were serving a cause for the sake of which a trumpet has sounded from on high.

When I looked upon that densely packed congregation of the fighting men of the same language, of the same faith, of the same fundamental laws, of the same ideals and to a large extent, of the same interests and certainly in different degrees facing the same dangers, it swept across me that here was the only hope but also the sure hope of saving the world from merciless degradation.

And so we came back across the ocean waves uplifted in spirit, fortified in resolve. Some American destroyers, which were carrying mails to the United States marines in Iceland, happened to be going the same way, too, so we made a goodly company at sea together.

And when we were right out in midpassage one afternoon a noble sight broke on the view. We overtook one of the convoys which carry the munitions and supplies of the New World to sustain the champions of freedom in the Old. The whole horizon—the whole broad horizon—seemed filled with ships. Seventy or eighty ships of all kinds, sizes, arrayed in 14 lines, each of which could have been drawn with a ruler, hardly a wisp of smoke, not a straggler, but all bristling with cannon and other precautions on which I will not dwell, and all surrounded by [1394] their British escorting vessels, while overhead the far-ranging Catalina airboats soared, vigilant, protecting "eagles" in the sky.

And then I felt that hard and terrible and long drawn out as this struggle may be, we shall not be denied the strength to do our duty to the end.

[1395] Senator FERGUSON. I would like to put to Mr. Welles one more question.

Do you have anything that you want now to state in the record, that have been suggested or not suggested by any of my questions?

Do you want to make any explanation whatever on the record so that we will have all of the facts?

Mr. WELLES. I thank you for that opportunity, Senator. I do not at this moment think of anything that I wish to add to what I have said this morning and this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Welles, I want to get clear in my mind the facts with reference to the so-called Atlantic Charter. As I understand

testimony, and will you correct me if I misstate it, you assisted in drafting the memorandum which is known as the Atlantic Charter.

r. WELLES. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

r. KEEFE. This memorandum resulted from the conversations at sea between the President and Mr. Churchill?

r. WELLES. That is correct, but may I interject and amplify in parentheses there?

r. KEEFE. Yes.

r. WELLES. The President had been considering such a statement of policy for some time before and had been seeking [1396] for an opportunity to make such a statement of policy. When we arrived in Argentina we found Mr. Churchill had some specific suggestions in regard to the statement of policy, and the Atlantic Charter contained both the President's original ideas as well as some of the original ideas which Mr. Churchill had brought with him. I make this statement in amplification of my reply.

r. KEEFE. The result was there was a clean typed document prepared, as you have indicated?

r. WELLES. There was a final clean copy made, Mr. Congressman, that clean copy was then rushed to the radio operator so that the document could be sent immediately to the White House for further release or future release.

r. KEEFE. But that actual document, in whatever form it was, in clean typed form that you indicated, as finally agreed upon, was signed by either the President or by Mr. Churchill?

r. WELLES. The revised text had been approved in detail by each of them and it was after that that the clean copy was made and then it was radioed to Washington and to London.

r. KEEFE. Of course there never was any signature of either of the parties to that document.

r. WELLES. There was no signature in that sense. There was full approval, of course, given by both of them to the [1397] final

r. KEEFE. So that the interpolation of the signatures in the message of the President to the Congress, which appears on page 717 of the volume "Peace and War," that I have before me, results from what you said that got into the document?

r. WELLES. As an indication that both of them had given their consent their official approval as representing the respective policies which they desired to pursue and achieve.

r. KEEFE. So that there is actually not in existence a historic document known as the Atlantic Charter bearing the signatures of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt?

r. WELLES. Not in the sense that it is an agreement between the two governments signed and sealed, but I may say to you, Mr. Congressman, as you undoubtedly know, very often heads of governments in a joint communiqué, after a meeting, announce their agreement on certain policies which their respective governments are going to attempt to carry out. If you will permit this addition, I do not regard the Atlantic Charter as any less valid because it did not have actual signatures or any official seals put upon it. It had been approved in every syllable by both Mr. Churchill and the President and was released upon their instruction as containing the policies of the two governments.

Mr. KEEFE. And that which appears in the President's [1398] speech to the Congress under date of August 21, 1941, is that identical agreement?

Mr. WELLES. That is the text as agreed upon at Argentina.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have any part in the drafting of the October 17 proposed message to the Emperor of Japan?¹

Mr. WELLES. May I refer to the text of that before I answer you, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. GESSELL. That is Exhibit 20, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GESSELL. I just said that so we would keep the record straight.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; Exhibit 20.

Mr. WELLES. I remember the draft very well now that I have had a chance to look at it again. I do not think I actually had any part in the preparation of it, either.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you consulted by Mr. Hull or anyone else in the State Department?

Mr. WELLES. I think I must undoubtedly have sat in on the conference in Mr. Hull's office in which this was under consideration.

Mr. KEEFE. In the memorandum to the President under date of October 17, which is part of the same exhibit, there appears this language:

There is attached a redraft of your proposed [1399] message to the Emperor of Japan.

I call your attention to the word "redraft."

In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself, and so forth.

Now, this letter of transmittal indicates that there was a prior draft of the proposed message. Do you recall that?

Mr. WELLES. I recall the fact that there had been several, at least one other if not more, drafts prepared. Whether the redraft was undertaken because the President desired it changed, or whether it had been undertaken because Mr. Hull had decided to undertake a redraft, I could not at this moment say.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did the suggestion of the dispatching of the message direct to the Emperor result from this so-called 2-hour conversation held on the evening of October 16?

Mr. WELLES. That 2-hour conversation, Mr. Congressman, as I think I indicated in my testimony of yesterday evening, was one of a series of conversations which I had with the Minister Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasubi, which was the only direct participation, as I said yesterday, in the Japanese negotiations, and this conversation took place in Mr. Hull's office. As this memorandum to the President shows, the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory [1400] conversations, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister, at his request, is coming to call again "this afternoon for a further extended discussion and various other considerations," Mr. Hull told the President that he was inclined to the view it was premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor, pending further clarification of the situation in Japan, and probably the attitude of the new government.

¹ See Exhibit No. 73, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1700-1702.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask you on that point, had there been discussions between the State Department and the President prior to the 17th of October 1941 as to the possibility of making some direct address to the Emperor of Japan?

Mr. WELLES. If there were any conversations on that point, Mr. Hull would be the individual who had those conversations with the President.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have any knowledge of any such discussions yourself prior to the 17th of October 1941?

Mr. WELLES. I find it very difficult to say "Yes" or "No" categorically. I can only take it for granted, in view of the fact I was having these conversations with Mr. Wakasubi, that I must have been familiar with the general purport of the Secretary of State's conversation with the President.

Mr. KEEFE. I am now addressing you as a very experienced man in diplomatic field, as an expert, and I would like to have your opinion on this. Was it ordinary or customary in [1401] crises such as were developing at this time in October, for the head of a government, such as the President of the United States, to address the message directly to the Emperor of Japan, or was that a departure from established diplomatic relations?

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman said "October." Do you mean December?

Mr. KEEFE. I mean October 1941.

Mr. WELLES. There was nothing unusual, Mr. Congressman, about a head of a state sending a personal message to another chief of state. I will recall that after the so-called *Panay* incident the President sent a message directly to the Emperor of Japan.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what was there in the situation that suggested the sending of a message such as the one that had been suggested here, directly to the Emperor?

Mr. WELLES. What was in the situation, Mr. Congressman, was the fact that both the President and Mr. Hull were determined to leave no stone unturned to try to find some means of obtaining a pacification of the difficulties, to try to persuade the civilian elements particularly in Japan of the possibility of a pacific solution, and, and everything else, to avoid war, and if that proved impossible, to put off war to the last possible moment. That was the reason undoubtedly for the decision to consider any form of communication in [1402] any form of individual in the Japanese Government which might possibly be useful for those purposes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, this message was not in fact sent. You are aware of that, are you not?

Mr. WELLES. Yes; it was not sent.

Mr. KEEFE. And matters drifted along until finally the exhibit indicates that another message was prepared, which bears the date December 6, 1941, a message from the President to the Emperor of Japan.

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have any part in the drafting of that message?

Mr. WELLES. I had no part in the actual drafting of it, that I remember. I remember, however, knowing that it was to be sent.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was it drafted in the State Department?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is it was drafted under the supervision of the Secretary of State himself, but it may be possible that the President made the original draft himself, in view of his deep interest in the matter, and that that original draft of the President was later revised in the State Department. I could not attempt now to say, but I am quite sure Mr. Hull will be able to tell you.

Mr. KEEFE. Would there be any record in the State [1403] Department that would indicate at what time on the 6th day of December 1941, this second appeal or message to the Emperor was prepared?

Mr. WELLES. Was prepared or sent, Mr. Congressman?

[1404] Mr. KEEFE. Was prepared.

Mr. WELLES. I do not believe that there would be any indication as to what hour the draft was completed, no.

Mr. KEEFE. The record indicates that a dispatch was sent from the State Department to Tokyo to the American Embassy at 8 p. m., indicating that "an important telegram is now being encoded to you containing for communication by you at earliest possible moment text of message from the President to the Emperor." That bears the time imprint of 8 p. m. The State Department papers indicate that the message was sent at 9 p. m. on the 6th.

Mr. WELLES. That is not necessarily responsive to your question, Mr. Congressman. A draft might have been completed earlier in the afternoon.

Mr. KEEFE. What I am getting at is that indicates at least it was reaching the point so that the message went to the Embassy in Tokyo, that the message was being encoded at 8 p. m.

Mr. WELLES. That is undoubtedly true.

Mr. KEEFE. And later at 9 when it was dispatched.

Mr. WELLES. That is undoubtedly correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Would there be any record in the State Department to show when that message was actually completed?

Mr. WELLES. I think it is possible that Mr. Hull's [1405] records would show that he had an appointment with the President that afternoon, at what time that appointment was had, and also that he would remember whether or not, if such appointment was had by him with the President, the final draft of this proposed message to the Emperor was approved by the President.

Mr. KEEFE. As far as you are concerned, you were not called into the conference, as I understand, by either the President or Mr. Hull on the final drafting of this message which was actually sent.

Mr. WELLES. Not with regard to that message, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. But you believe Mr. Hull could, from records in the State Department, furnish that information?

Mr. WELLES. I should think it is very likely.

Mr. KEEFE. When a message such as the one of October 17, 1941, or the message that was finally sent on the 6th of December, is being drafted and under consideration, is it the custom of the State Department to call in the responsible heads of the Army and Navy to go over the matter before final action is taken?

Mr. WELLES. Mr. Hull at that time, Mr. Congressman, was having conversations with the Secretaries of War and Navy. He was also in constant communication with them, and I should [1406] think it in the highest degree probable that he would tell you, if you ask

on the question, that he had consulted with them in regard to these messages to which you refer.

Mr. KEEFE. Would there be any records in the State Department showing whether or not such consultations were had, aside from Mr. Hull's own memory?

Mr. WELLES. I think that he might have records showing the matters that he discussed with the Secretaries of War and Navy, but of that I am not certain. He would have to tell you that.

[1407] Mr. GESELL. Congressman Keefe, may I interpose for a moment?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. To call attention to appendix A to Mr. Hull's statement showing telephone calls made by him with representatives of the Army and Navy on the 6th. That perhaps is in part of the record that you are looking for.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I am aware of that, but I am aware also that Mr. Hull further stated that he was not at all sure that this was all inclusive of the telephone conversations or appointments which he had.

Mr. GESELL. Right.

Mr. KEEFE. I note in this exhibit that we have been referring to, Mr. Welles, a written memorandum on White House stationery reading:

Dear Cordell:

Shoot this to Grew. I think can go in gray code. Saves time. I don't mind it gets picked up. F. D. R.

That would indicate, would it not, that the final drafting and final word on the matter came from the President himself to Mr. Hull?

Mr. WELLES. I think that is entirely clear from this file which I have before me.

[1408] Mr. KEEFE. Now, unfortunately that bears the stamp of the Secretary of State, December 6, 1941, with the word printed "noted," but there is no time stamped on it to show when it was noted or when it was received. Is that customary in the State Department?

Mr. WELLES. This question of stamping, Mr. Congressman, I think arises in many of the offices of the Department. I think it is an indication that the Secretary of State's office received this from the White House and that it was immediately given to the Secretary of State. There is no kind of stamping in either his office or mine, so far as I know, certainly not in mine, which indicated the precise hour when a document from the White House would have been received.

Mr. KEEFE. I notice another part of this exhibit is a letter from the Department of State under date of December 6, 1941, which says, "Memorandum for the President."

It says further:

There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page 3 of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on the telephone. If you approve the draft as it now stands we shall see that it gets off to Grew at once.

Initials "C. H."

Then on the bottom of this letter, in the handwriting of [1409]

President, appears "O. K., send the amended page 3 to the British Ambassador and send copy to me. F. D. R."

That would indicate that the final draft of this message was prepared in the State Department as a result of telephone conversations between Mr. Hull and the President, would it not?

Mr. WELLES. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you participate in or were you consulted in any manner in connection with the drafting of this final message to the Emperor?

Mr. WELLES. As I think I have stated, I had no part in the drafting of it, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that it was going on in the Department?

Mr. WELLES. I knew such message was under contemplation and under preparation but, as I have said before, it was not always for me, in view of the volume of work which I myself was handling and the urgency of this work, to sit in every conference which had to do with the situation in the Pacific. I doubt if I was able to attend more than a very few of them, a very small proportion of them.

Mr. KEEFE. I have been trying to fix in my own mind, for my own purposes, the time when the message was actually finally completed as a result of the conversations between the [1410] President and Mr. Hull. Is there any record that you know of or could refer to me in the State Department that would fix that time?

Mr. WELLES. I wish it were possible for me personally to give you the information you want, Mr. Congressman, but if Mr. Hull's recollection or records don't give you this information I should think it possible that some of the officials of the Far Eastern Division, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine, would be able to give you the information that you want, since they undoubtedly sat in in all of the conferences which had to do with the preparation, the drafting and redrafting of this message.

Mr. KEEFE. When was the notice, official notice from the State Department, given to American Nationals advising them to leave the Orient, issued?¹

Mr. WELLES. I again in that case would have to refer to the records of the Department to give you that information, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall there was an official notice issued by the State Department warning all American Nationals to leave the Orient?

Mr. WELLES. As the situation became more and more dangerous it was a matter of very necessary precaution on the part of the Department of State to safeguard the lives of our nationals who were still in those areas, and instructions were sent progressively during the autumn months from one point to another to our consuls instructing them to advise our nationals to leave, but I could not give you the full list without referring to the records of the Department of those instructions issued to our consuls or the dates when the instructions were sent.

Mr. KEEFE. I have the press releases as of October 9 of 1940 as early as October 1940, all during that period, the first press release emanating October 9, 1940, and into the fall of 1941.

Were those formal releases issued through our consuls and consular representatives in various parts of the Orient which were published in the newspapers advising the nationals to leave?

Mr. WELLES. In certain cases the consuls, as I recall it, were instructed to see the nationals and explain the situation to them and give them the advice required.

¹ See Exhibit No. 74, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1703-1705.

other instances I think the consuls were instructed to take all measures necessary in their judgment to insure that our nationals would be warned of the situation and of the need in our judgment for them to remove themselves.

Mr. KEEFE. The reason, Mr. Welles, that I have been endeavoring to locate some information through your testimony this afternoon is from the statement that Mr. Hull himself [1412] made when he was a witness when he said this:

It seemed to me that we were all very much like a family. We were seeing, living among and with each other, making things known to each other in any way or another most of the time, and we made it a point to make known to each other whatever the other person might think of things that would be desirable to communicate. So at all times I think it is accurate to say that each of us in the State House have always tried to impart to the other with reasonable care anything new that we learned that would be of interest.

He made that general statement, and you were the Under Secretary of State, and it now appears from your testimony that there were many things transpiring in relation to the far eastern situation that you were not personally involved in.

Mr. WELLES. I think that is a perfectly easy thing to explain, Mr. Congressman.

During the autumn of 1941 the world situation was such that the interests of the United States were affected in every quarter of the globe. It was utterly impossible for Mr. Hull to take personal charge of the supervision of the negotiations with the Japanese Government and the general situation in the Pacific which required all of his strength, all of his time and all of his abilities, and at the same time attempt to handle [1413] questions relating to what, in my judgment, was of the utmost moment to this country, and that is inter-American affairs, the maintenance and preservation of inter-American solidarity, and the assurance that the United States would be safeguarded on account of its completely friendly and loyal relations with other American Republics, and at the same time attempt to handle the innumerable questions coming up in regard to the countries of Europe, and it was necessary for some high official, consequently, to undertake that other part of the heavy burdens involved.

I fell upon my shoulders to attempt to handle that other part of the work. For that reason it was physically impossible for me to be receiving a great number of Ambassadors and Ministers and other foreign representatives and representatives of our own Government, representatives of other Government departments, all day long, morning, noon and very often the afternoon and evening, and at the same time sit in on conferences in the office of the Secretary of State or in the White House which had to do solely with Far Eastern matters.

It made it a practice and a point of familiarizing myself through the exchange of conversations of the talks which the Secretary of State was having with regard to the far eastern situation, and Mr. Welles very frequently would talk to me about the developments in that field.

[1414] The reason why I am not able to give more precise information to you with regard to these detailed questions that you ask me, Mr. Congressman, is on account of the circumstances I have just endeavored to indicate.

Mr. KEEFE. I can well appreciate that, Mr. Welles.

Mr. WELLES. Thank you, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall, Mr. Welles, where you were on the evening of December 6?

Mr. WELLES. I think when I left the Department of State I went straight home to my own house, was there all night, and came in early the following morning to my office in the Department.

Mr. KEEFE. What time did you leave the Department of State that evening, if you now recall?

Mr. WELLES. I could not give you the exact time, but I should think undoubtedly it was fairly late in the afternoon.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you receive any telephone calls at your home that night with respect to the receipt of the reply by the Japanese?

Mr. WELLES. I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. At what time did you get to the State Department the next morning, Sunday morning?

Mr. WELLES. I should think probably a little before 10 o'clock.

[1415] Mr. KEEFE. Was there a conference in progress there that Sunday morning?

Mr. WELLES. To the best of my recollection—and on this I may be wrong because my memory is not clear on this point—to the best of my recollection I did not see Mr. Hull that morning before he saw the Japanese envoys, but I want to emphasize that I am not clear on that.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have any conferences with anybody that morning?

Mr. WELLES. I had several conferences with the officials of the Department, all of them, I think, relating, however, to inter-American or European affairs. I remember that I went out to lunch with Dr. Berle, then Assistant Secretary of State, and it was upon my return to the State Department, my office at the State Department, that the President telephoned me, as I have already explained to Senator Ferguson.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you knew nothing about the intercept of the Japanese reply that morning?

Mr. WELLES. To the best of my belief I knew nothing of the Japanese intercept until Sunday. What exact time on Sunday I learned of it I could not say. It may have been at the time when I knew that the Japanese had requested an audience, an interview, with the Secretary of State. It may have been subsequent.

[1416] Mr. KEEFE. Do you know from whom you got any information at all with respect to the Japanese intercept that morning?

Mr. WELLES. I could not at this time endeavor to tell you. I think the officials in the Far Eastern Division were undoubtedly busy in Secretary Hull's office and I know that I had that morning some very urgent matters which had to do with the Western Hemisphere and I could not say now precisely when I learned of it nor from whom.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you advise, for the purpose of the record, how the Atlantic Conference originated?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield before he proceeds to that phase?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to suggest that the gentleman had asked about the Japanese intercept on Sunday and there will be evidence of several

intercepts on Sunday and it is not clear which he was referring to or about which the gentleman was answering.

Mr. KEEFE. I think the record will show what I was referring to. The Japanese intercept which was a reply to the message of the 26th.

You so understood, Mr. Welles?

Mr. WELLES. That was my understanding.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[1417] Mr. KEEFE. Since the witness and counsel understand, why, it is unfortunate that one member of the committee does not.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you proceed in answer to my last question?

Mr. WELLES. Will you restate your question, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. KEEFE. How did the Atlantic Conference originate?

Mr. WELLES. I am unable to give you the precise background. The first I knew of it was when the President sent for me approximately a week or several days before the time of the meeting and told me that he had arranged to meet with Mr. Churchill, that Mr. Churchill was not taking Mr. Eden with him, but was taking the permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British Foreign Office with him, and that consequently the President desired me to accompany him, since I was the corresponding member in our Government to the Under Secretary from the British Government.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you advised that the military and naval staffs were going to be in attendance at this meeting?

Mr. WELLES. The President gave me no information when he told me of his plans and his desire that I go with him as to what the precise nature of the conversations were to be; nor, so far as I was concerned, were there any agenda. If there were any they did not come to my cognizance. He did [1418] tell me General Marshall and Admiral Stark and General Arnold were going to be at the meeting.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, as I understand your answer then, there was no agenda prepared prior to your going to the meeting?

Mr. WELLES. So far as I was concerned. What I wanted to make clear is the fact that if there was any agenda with regard to other matters taken up at the Atlantic Charter meeting other than the drafting of the Atlantic Charter, itself, I was not aware of it nor did I see it.

Mr. KEEFE. So far as you know, as the Under Secretary of State, and the one designated to accompany the President, you had no prior notice that such a meeting was to be held until you were advised by the President of his desire to have you accompany him?

Mr. WELLES. None until the President called me to his office to tell me of it.

Mr. KEEFE. Did the President prior to your leaving advise you as to what the meeting was called for or what it was proposed to discuss?

Mr. WELLES. The President had during preceding weeks told me of his thought that in view of the increasingly serious world situation, in view of the spread of the war in Europe, that nothing would be more valuable from the standpoint of keeping alive in a very quickly darkening world some principles [1419] of international law, some principles of moral and human decency, than for him to make some kind of a public statement of the objectives in international relations in which the Government of the United States believed.

He discussed that with me upon several occasions and when he told me of his plan to meet Mr. Churchill at Argentia, he informed me that he thought it would be an extremely desirable thing for such a statement to be made upon his return from that meeting. He did not at that time indicate to me that he had in mind a joint statement, but what he did say, and my memory is very clear, is that he felt the time would be very appropriate upon his return for him to make such a statement.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. KEEFE. It does.

Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the message to Emperor Hirohito which was dispatched at 9 o'clock, according to the memorandum of the State Department, by the President, was released at that time to the press?¹

Mr. WELLES. The records of the Department will show when it was released, but my very clear understanding would be that such a message would not be released until we had been informed by our Ambassador in Tokyo that the message had been received by the Emperor.

[1420] Mr. KEEFE. The telegram to our Ambassador indicated that the press was being informed that the President was dispatching a message to the Emperor. Do you know as to what information was given to the press, if any?

Mr. WELLES. The records of the Department will unquestionably show that in complete detail. I think probably the intention was to show that the President was doing everything in his power by communicating directly with the Emperor to prevent any deterioration of the situation, but just how much was said to the press I, of course, do not now remember.

Mr. KEEFE. You were not at the White House at any time December 6th?

Mr. WELLES. To the best of my recollection I was not.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have any further questions?

Mr. GESELL. One or two short questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Welles, what did the President ask you to do when he mentioned at the conference the preparation of a note to be handed to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. WELLES. What did the President ask me to do?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. You are speaking of the meeting at Argentia?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

[1421] Mr. WELLES. He asked me to see to it that the Secretary of State was immediately given his ideas with regard to the communications to be made to the Japanese Ambassador and asked me, myself, to see to it that the Ambassador should be called to the White House to meet with the President as soon as possible after his return.

Mr. GESELL. Did you understand that the text that you were to prepare was to be final or that the text was to be worked out in collaboration with other Government officials?

Mr. WELLES. My very definite recollection is that the text was to be regarded in no sense as final but simply as a basis for discussion.

Mr. GESELL. What was your understanding of the parallel action to be taken which was agreed upon at this conference?

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1702.

Mr. WELLES. My understanding of the parallel action was that a warning would be issued by the President to the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington in more or less the terms in which the warning was finally conveyed, and that at the same time, acting in a parallel way, the British Government through similar methods would give a similar warning to the Japanese Government.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, each Government would give some warning but the exact text of the warning was to be worked out by this Government and the British Government, to use your phrase, unilaterally?

[1422] Mr. WELLES. That is entirely my understanding.

Mr. GESELL. One further question.

With respect to this draft on the stationery of the Prime Minister concerning which we have had discussion today, do I understand your testimony to be that you do not know whether or not this specific draft or parallel communications as proposed here was agreed upon by the President and the Prime Minister?

Mr. WELLES. Your question is not very clear to me.

Mr. GESELL. I am afraid it is not.

Do you know whether this specific suggestion as drafted by the Prime Minister was sent in those precise terms by the President?

Mr. WELLES. I have no reason whatever to think so. On the contrary, my understanding is that the President gave me the very clear impression when he talked with me about it that he would give a warning to the Japanese Government, that no agreement had been reached as to the phraseology of such warning, but that the promise which he had made to Mr. Churchill was limited to the fact that a warning would be given.

Mr. GESELL. That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Welles, the press disclosed that late [1423] in November 1941 the President left Washington and went to Warm Springs for a rest. It also appeared in the press on or about November 29, while the President was attending a belated Thanksgiving dinner with the patients at that institution, that Mr. Hull called him on the long distance phone and conveyed to him a very urgent message, a message which the President received and returned to the table and announced that he was immediately leaving for Washington, arriving here by December 1, if I remember correctly.

I was wondering if you had any consultation with Mr. Hull prior to the placing of this emergency call?

Mr. WELLES. I recollect no prior conversation with Mr. Hull with regard to his telephoning the President. My recollection, of course, however, is clear that the situation was becoming more and more serious, from all of the information coming to us, and that Mr. Hull very naturally telephoned the President, on account of that, that he had better return to Washington.

Mr. GEARHART. But you don't remember having overheard or participated in any conversations with Mr. Hull and other officials of the State Department in which the necessity of recalling the President to Washington was discussed?

[1424] Mr. WELLES. My recollection is that it had to do with the information with regard to the increasing number of Japanese troops that were being sent to Indochina and that the President's memorandum to me of December 2, instructing me to communicate that message to the two Japanese Ambassadors, was one of the reasons why the situation was regarded as so urgent.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. GEARHART. No.

Now, wasn't there a message intercepted between the Japanese on November 28, translated on the same day, which indicated that the Japanese were considering military action?

Mr. WELLES. The date of that, Congressman Gearhart, is November 28?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. I have it now before me. That undoubtedly is another one of the factors which gave the impression, if not the assurance, that the situation was in the highest degree grave.

Mr. GESELL. That is the message on 195 of exhibit 1? Is that the one you are referring to, Mr. Welles?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. You saw the President immediately upon his return, did you not?

[1425] Mr. WELLES. I do not remember exactly when I saw the President after his return. I was trying to remember that this morning when Senator Ferguson was asking me, and I cannot now remember.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, when you did see the President, did you discuss with him as to why he had returned so unexpectedly, so precipitously?

Mr. WELLES. The instructions given me by the President to communicate the memorandum he had sent me to the two Japanese Ambassadors was one of the reasons, in my judgment at that time, as it is now, which required the President's return in order that he himself could take charge of the communication.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it not the prevailing opinion among all the leaders of the State Department at that time that war was just a matter of days, or perhaps hours?

Mr. WELLES. I think, Mr. Congressman, I really answered that in my replies to Senator Ferguson this morning. I said that as the time passed toward the beginning of December the one in a thousand chance which I had thought still obtained for maintaining peace had become about one chance in a million.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

[1426] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. I desire to ask just a few questions.

Mr. Secretary, were you in the room yesterday when Secretary Hull testified?

Mr. WELLES. I was here a part of the time, Senator Lucas, not all of it.

Senator LUCAS. Have you had an opportunity to read his narrative and analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan?

Mr. WELLES. I have read the full statement which was presented in testimony yesterday morning.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with the table of contents contained on the second page and the annexes, A, B, C, and D?

Mr. WELLES. I think so, Senator Lucas; yes.

Senator LUCAS. Do you agree with Secretary Hull in this statement that he made to the committee?

Mr. WELLES. I agree with Mr. Hull completely in the statement which he has made to the committee.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you, Mr. Welles, how long have you been connected with the Government of the United States?

[1427] Mr. WELLES. I entered the foreign service in the year 1915, Senator Lucas. I retired from the service in 1925. I came back when the President appointed me in 1933, and resigned in the late summer or early autumn of 1943.

Senator LUCAS. Now, during that time it is obvious that you drafted and saw many diplomatic messages over that period of years, and I desire to call or direct your attention again to exhibit 22, which is the so-called draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government by Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of England, and specially call your attention to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this exhibit which has been referred to as the agreement, promise, discussion, suggestion.

At the risk of repetition—I think you fairly and thoroughly explained it—but at the risk of repetition I wish you would again at this point state for the record just what you understand this to be.

Mr. WELLES. I understand that this document was a suggestion made to the President by the British Prime Minister as to parallel action to be taken by the British and United States Governments, and possibly by the Dutch Government, and possibly by the Soviet Union.

Senator LUCAS. Well, there was no agreement at the time between the President of the United States and Winston Churchill upon this question?

[1428] Mr. WELLES. The only agreement reached at Argentina with regard to this question, so far as I know, was that the President made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the President on August 17.

Senator LUCAS. Exactly so, and that is what he did?

Mr. WELLES. That is what he did.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I should like also to direct your attention to the paragraph 1 of that exhibit, which says:

Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwest Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.

Much has been said about that paragraph. What do you understand, again for the record, that Churchill was talking about when he was referring to the "United States Government"?

Mr. WELLES. That the Government of the United States would issue a warning to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese persisted in the policy of conquest and military expansion the Government of the United States would find itself compelled to take such steps as

in its own judgment were necessary to protect the legitimate of the [1429] American people and the safety of the States.

Senator LUCAS. Now, one further question that I want to about relates to Exhibit 24, which is the memorandum that to our Ambassador by Winston Churchill on November 30, 194 states as follows:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in ave between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan immediately to the gravest consequences.

Now, did that come after the declaration was issued to Japan Government with respect to Mr. Hull's 10 points?

Mr. WELLES. This came 4 days after the note of November which you referred had been delivered by Mr. Hull to the Ambassadors.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what was this Government doing at insofar as continuing of negotiations were concerned with the Government?

Mr. WELLES. This Government at that time was waiting for reply from the Japanese Government to its communication.

Senator LUCAS. Did that reply come? If so, when?

[1430] Mr. WELLES. That reply came, as we all of us recall on December 7, at the time that Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Senator LUCAS. You were interrogated about the conversation took place between Admiral Richardson and Secretary Knox with respect to the patrol that was discussed from Hawaii Philippines to Singapore, as I recall. You stated very clearly you had discussed this with the President and that the President considered that only as a plan or a project at that particular time. I presume it goes without saying that such a plan or project line with what you have been testifying to here all along; it was such a plan or project that was definitely in the interest of safety and the security of this Nation?

Mr. WELLES. That unquestionably was the President's intention when he was considering that plan.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. And the plan did not, of course, materialize after he had talked to the Secretaries of Navy and of Admiral Richardson?

Mr. WELLES. It did not materialize.

Senator LUCAS. When you spoke about the Atlantic Chart adopted and that it might be applied to all the world after the war, obviously you were referring at that time to the European war?

[1431] Mr. WELLES. After the termination of the European war.

Senator LUCAS. One other question: Do you know from the what time the message that was sent by the President on the December 6 was received by the Emperor of Japan?

Mr. WELLES. Ambassador Grew, Senator Lucas, would be able to give you that reply with complete precision.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir. That is all.

[1432] Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I want to address one or two questions which I think may be within the purview of this inquiry but that have not been covered heretofore. They might possibly not be thought to be within the scope of the resolution but in my judgment they may be. While the chairman introduced it with respect to Pearl Harbor, I take it while it has the aspect of a post mortem in determining what transpired, we are finally and fundamentally concerned with the future and with this as a prologue to avoid difficulties and I have been impressed with your experience in the State Department for something like 20 years and your qualifications, therefore, as an expert.

It struck me in your testimony that your opposite number to the Under Secretary was a permanent Under Secretary of State in Britain, indicating the difference in the conduct of our affairs.

Would you express an opinion as to whether the development of a permanent secretariat in our State Department hierarchy than has heretofore existed might be a constructive step?

Mr. WELLES. I believe that it would, Senator Brewster, although I think it is fair to say that it is inconceivable that any President or any Secretary of State would be able to [1433] operate with success if permanent officials of that character were not in accord with the policies which they wished to follow.

Senator BREWSTER. How do the British overcome such a possible conflict?

Mr. WELLES. Well, as you remember, Senator Brewster, the British Foreign Office has two under secretaries. One is the parliamentary under secretary, who changes with the government and who appears on the floor of the House of Commons to answer questions if the Foreign Minister is not available, with regard to foreign policy. The other is the permanent under secretary who is a member of the British civil service and who does not change.

If you will permit me to express my opinion, I have often wished, as I say now, that there were some method by which either the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State could appear on the floor of the Senate or on the floor of the House in order to afford the Members of the Congress a far greater continuing measure of information than has previously been available to them.

Senator BREWSTER. That brings me to my next question.

In the past few years a special subcommittee of the Senate composed of eight members of a bipartisan character, four on a side, were actively associated with the develop- [1434] ment of the United Nations charter, in almost constant consultation, we have understood, with the State Department and apparently working out very fruitfully. This was to constitute, we understand from recent reports, a more or less continuing arrangement.

To what extent do you feel a liaison of that character with representative members of the committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that have constitutional responsibilities may in some measure accomplish the integration of the executive and legislative branches of the Government which sometimes seems to be required?

Mr. WELLES. I think, Senator Brewster, that it would contribute tremendously to the objectives which I have in mind. I think that

any continuing commission of that kind can do a great deal of work but it does not cover the entire field, of course, to the extent which a representative of the State Department appearing on the floor either of the Senate or of the House and subjected to questions from the Members of the Congress would achieve.

Senator BREWSTER. To what extent, now coming nearer to the event, would it have been at all feasible during this very critical period in the last 3 or 4 months of the Japanese situation if such a committee had been kept in any degree constantly informed as to the situation? Would it [1435] have been feasible, do you feel, as a diplomatic matter?

Mr. WELLES. I think it would have been both feasible and in the highest degree useful.

Senator BREWSTER. Would it not be possible if eight members of the Senate were informed continuously in detail from week to week and told that they could furnish all pertinent and appropriate information that might be desired by the Senate and thus by the country, answering in substantial measure the purposes which would bear properly upon it?

Mr. WELLES. I think it would certainly accomplish a very great deal in that direction.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask a question or two if the other members are through.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few but I am perfectly willing to follow the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; the Chair will wait.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time that these negotiations were going on during 1941 was there any liaison officer between the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Department of State such as Senator Brewster mentioned?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is that Secretary Hull himself endeavored to keep in touch with the Foreign Relations [1436] Committee and to inform the members of the committee of the developments in the situation, but that matter was in his hands and not in mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar on November 24 with a statement by Senator Pepper in Boston that the United States had fixed—this was in 1941—the United States had fixed a line in the Pacific and if the Japs crossed that line the American Navy would start shooting without paying attention to the technicality of a declaration of war?

Mr. WELLES. I do not at the present moment recollection that statement of the Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you check it and see whether or not the Department of State show such a statement and would you look, Mr. Welles, for counsel whether or not there was any such information in the State Department? ¹

Mr. WELLES. This was a statement, Senator Ferguson, which you tell me Senator Pepper made in Boston, which appeared in the—
Senator FERGUSON. Yes; on November 24, 1941.

Mr. WELLES. Which appeared in the press?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705.

Mr. WELLES. Unquestionably then it was seen in the State Department.

[1437] Senator FERGUSON. And do you know whether there was any foundation in the State Department for that statement?

Mr. WELLES. I endeavored during my testimony this morning and this afternoon as well, Senator Ferguson, to make it clear that I know of no such arrangements as those indicated by Senator Pepper.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the instrument or the parallel action, taking the document and the oral statement of the President to the Japanese Government on the 17th of August 1941 be such a statement?

Mr. WELLES. In my judgment, decidedly not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Senator Lucas asked you in relation to Exhibit 24 and he read to you:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences.

Do you know of anything in the State Department, any record indicating that any such message was given, either secret or public? ¹

Mr. WELLES. I know of no such message having been given.

[1438] Senator FERGUSON. You would not consider the message from the President of the United States to the Emperor on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th, whatever the facts will show later as to when Mr. Grew gave it, would be such a message as I have indicated?

Mr. WELLES. In my interpretations, no. I think the message from the President to the Emperor was in every sense of the word an attempt to avert war and not to bring it on.

Senator FERGUSON. But at that particular time the ships were on the way to the Kra Peninsula, were they not, to our knowledge?

Mr. WELLES. We had that information, of course, on December 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WELLES. My strong impression is that the President regarded his message to the Emperor as the last possible appeal which could be made and I think I have attempted to bring that out in the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that the message to the Emperor was a change in the nature of the 26th by Mr. Hull?

Mr. WELLES. I should not.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't the nature of the sixth one relate to the withdrawal from Indochina and the message of [1439] Mr. Hull goes much further? Would you just refer to the language of the sixth? I am talking about the note to the Emperor.

Mr. WELLES. This message from the President in its final form says:

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't that the only requirement that the President mentions in the instrument?

Mr. WELLES. That is the only specific requirement.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is not as broad as the language on the 26th?

Mr. WELLES. On the other hand, Senator Ferguson, in my judgment the President's message can only be interpreted as a most urgent appeal to the Government of Japan to cease [1440] in its policy of aggression and while the specific request was limited to the withdrawing of Japanese troops from Indochina, the whole spirit of the message, I think, can only be interpreted correctly as meaning a cessation of a policy of aggression.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read in the State Department records there where Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, and the Secretary of State had counseled with the President about sending such a message to the Emperor?

Mr. WELLES. I have read it. I have not, however, got it at hand.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the fact that there had been such a conference?

Mr. WELLES. I do not now recall the fact that I was familiar at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that the State Department took note of the fact that Senator Pepper made a speech in Boston on the 24th?

Mr. WELLES. I did not attempt to say, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department took note. I said that a press report of that character would unquestionably have been brought to the attention of the Secretary of State.

[1441] The CHAIRMAN. You do not mean thereby to intimate that the State Department had any advance information in regard to such a speech?

Mr. WELLES. Certainly not. I am very glad that you made it clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would such a speech made by Senator Pepper or any other Senator in Boston or anywhere else have had any binding effect upon the President or the State Department or upon Congress?

Mr. WELLES. In my judgment, it would not.

The CHAIRMAN. With reference to the message, the personal appeal of the President to the Emperor and the suggestion that it was an unusual course for the head of one state to pursue with reference to the head of another state, do you know whether it is true that President Roosevelt appealed in the same way to Hitler prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 to avert war and bloodshed that might involve large areas of the world?

Mr. WELLES. That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he also make the same sort of an appeal to Mussolini?

Mr. WELLES. Upon several occasions to both of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that the President sent you as a Special Ambassador to Europe to undertake to avert war prior to its outbreak in 1939?

[1442] Mr. WELLES. That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman. I was sent for the purpose of reporting to the President, after interviews in the four capitals, whether there existed any chances whatever for the negotiation of a just and decent peace.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time of the suggested parallel messages which, as I understand it, were to be sent separately in the individual capacity of each government in 1941, Congress had some time therefore passed a Lend-Lease Act under which the President was authorized to give aid to any nation whose survival in his opinion was essential to the security of the United States?

Mr. WELLES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the President was executing that law not only in the Far East but in European regions?

Mr. WELLES. He was, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday in reply to the Senator from Maine you suggested that—I will quote your answer. Probably I should quote the question. [Reading:]

Senator BREWSTER. If you were to come to the conclusion that the Fleet were not ready for war, as a result of Admiral Richardson's testimony, then the keeping of the Fleet at Hawaii, in a condition not ready for war, would have some aspects of having your diplomatic position exceed your military power, would it not?

Mr. WELLES. It seems to me almost impossible, Senator Brewster, to divorce a critical condition as existed at that time, the diplomatic from the military, because the military is a very essential part of the diplomatic picture.

In his testimony Admiral Richardson stated that in his conversation with the President on the 8th day of October 1940 the President indicated not only that he felt that the Fleet in the Hawaiian area could act as a deterrent against Japan, but, according to Admiral Richardson, he used the expression, "I know that it has already exercised a deterrent influence upon Japan."

Did you have any conferences or conversations with the President about that time in relation to that phase of keeping the Fleet in the Pacific?

Mr. WELLES. Mr. Chairman, when I saw the published text of Admiral Richardson's testimony my attention was drawn to that specific remark of Admiral Richardson with regard to the fact that the President had told him that the stationing of the Fleet at Hawaii had had a deterrent effect, and I could not at the moment, and I do not now, remember the exact facts that the President had in mind when he made that statement to the Admiral, but I am quite confident that members of [1444] the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State or Ambassador Grew or Mr. Hull could give you the information that you ask for.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in view of the fact that the President did feel at that time that the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii had had a deterrent effect upon Japan, in view of the fact that Japan did not actually attack until 14 months thereafter, in December of 1941, would you be willing or feel able to express any opinion as to whether the Fleet did exercise a deterrent influence in October 1940 that it continued to exercise such an influence during the remaining 14 months prior to the actual attack?

Mr. WELLES. I can only emphasize, Mr. Chairman, what I have said before in the course of my testimony and that is my very definite

belief that if the Fleet had been withdrawn from Hawaii the Japanese military lords would have unquestionably interpreted that withdrawal as an indication that the United States was acquiescing in the spreading domination of the entire Pacific and Asiatic region by Japan and would have begun an increasing encroachment upon the legitimate rights of this country.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your view is that whether up to October 1940 it exercised by its presence a deterrent effect, or whether it during the following 14 months [1445] exercised any such deterrent effect, its withdrawal at that time, in your judgment, would have exercised a very dangerous effect upon the safety and security of the United States because of the interpretation of such withdrawal placed upon it by Japan?

Mr. WELLES. That is precisely my feeling, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, Mr. Secretary, under what circumstances the Fleet first went to Hawaii? Do you know that it went there first as a maneuver?

Mr. WELLES. I could not at this time, Senator Ferguson, tell you with any accuracy as to my memory with regard to the manner in which the Fleet first went to Hawaii. As you made that statement I seemed to remember that I did recall it but if you had not made the statement I could not have answered your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I have one more question that was brought up by Senator Lucas, that the President had promised to give this note of the 17th of August.

Did the President tell you that Mr. Churchill or his government so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement, but when he

[1446] Mr. WELLES. The President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement, but when he told me that he had promised Mr. Churchill that the United States Government would make a parallel warning I took it for granted that Mr. Churchill must have made that statement to him.

Senator FERGUSON. The same promise to the President?

Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Secretary, in connection with keeping the fleet at Hawaii, I think the record is clear that the fleet went out to maneuver in March or April and that on May 3, 1940, a report was issued by Mr. Knox' office to the effect that Admiral Richardson had requested that the fleet remain in Hawaii and that the request is approved.

Do you recall any conversations in the State Department at or about that time concerning that decision to keep the fleet at Hawaii and what considerations entered into it?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is, Senator Brewster, that conversations did take place between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State and the President in regard to the fleet at Hawaii. I did not myself take part in any conversations concerning that question, so far as I remember, except in the

conversation which I had with Admiral Richardson, to which I have already referred.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

[1447] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the committee thanks you for your presence and for the patience with which you have responded to questions, which have, I am sure, helped to clarify the situation so far as it came within your knowledge.

Mr. WELLES. Mr. Chairman, may I to you and through you to the members of the committee express my very real gratitude for the consideration shown me by the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all now. Does counsel have any suggestions to make now?

Mr. GESELL. We are ready to keep right on plowing just so long as the committee wants to go ahead.

There is one other matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understood that earlier in the day it was suggested that Mr. Grew had engagements on Monday and Tuesday, I am informed, that might interfere with his appearance. Is that correct?

Mr. GESELL. That has been changed.

Mr. MITCHELL. He has decided to forego them in the interests of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee appreciates that, Mr. Grew, and the plan now is that Secretary Hull will resume at 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

[1448] Mr. GESELL. And then, following him, Mr. Grew will make the stand.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with that understanding then, we will—

Mr. GESELL. I have one small matter, Mr. Chairman.

Reference was made in exhibit 18 to a memorandum of a conversation between Dr. Hornbeck and Sir Ronald Campbell, dated November 28, 1941, in which Sir Ronald Campbell refers to the fact that the British Army authorities have received a message from our Army authorities stating that, inasmuch as the United States-Japanese negotiations have broken down, and so forth.

That reference, we believe, will appear—and I want to point this out to the committee now for purposes of clarity—is based upon the message of November 27, 1941, sent by the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, to the commanders in the Pacific and to London for information, the so-called war warning message which the committee has copies of, the text of that indicating that the London naval authorities of our Government are to inform the British of the war warning message sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could counsel tell us if we have a copy of the message to London?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; that is before all of the members of the committee in the Navy folder and communications under date of November 27, 1941.

[1449] Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:17 p. m., November 24, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m. Monday, November 26, 1945.)

[1450]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[1451] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Secretary Hull, are you ready to resume?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel were still examining Secretary Hull when his testimony was recessed the other day.

The Chair would like to state, in view of the request originally made that we not examine Secretary Hull more than 45 minutes at a time, that I hope the committee will keep that in mind notwithstanding that that time was extended the other day at the suggestion of the Secretary himself.

Mr. HULL. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I would like to undertake to run for an hour and to come here just as often and just as long as any member of the committee may desire. I may not be able to come both in the afternoon and the forenoon. I will do the best I can about that.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your generosity in regard to time.

Mr. HULL. It is my throat that gives me this trouble about testifying.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

[1452] Mr. GESELL. Mr. Hull, I inquired of you when you were last here as to what the Department of State's position was with respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and I do not believe you had an opportunity to complete your answer on that subject. We are anxious to know what position the Department of State took on that subject.

Mr. HULL. We unhesitatingly felt that it would be to a more or less extent useful, especially after the Navy was based at Pearl Harbor, that it remain there during the critical state of relations between us

and certain other countries, including Japan especially, on the policy that I stated the other day to the effect that we were dealing with one of the worst international desperadoes within the memory of man and that he was at large and on the rampage, dangerous, treacherous, undependable in every way.

We felt at the State Department—I think we all felt that way—that it would be a little more wholesome in our many matters of discussion and our many relations with that Japanese area for our Navy to be standing there and I think from all of the tangible and intangible reactions I had we were thoroughly justified in that view.

Mr. GESELL. Did Admiral Richardson in discussing this matter with you state anything to you which to your mind indicated that the fleet was insecure or unsafe at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. HULL. My memory could be at fault but I do not think at any time that any person suggested the idea that the [1453] Fleet could not protect itself, that it would have to be moved somewhere where it could protect itself. I do not think anyone suggested that view.

Mr. GESELL. Now, turning to another subject. We have in evidence here Exhibit 19, a draft of a proposed message to the Congress which you transmitted to President Roosevelt under date of November 29.

I would like to ask if you would tell the committee what the facts and circumstances were which led to the decision not to deliver that message to the Congress prior to December 7?

Mr. HULL. In brief the Japanese were completely in charge of the war lords, as they were called, headed by Tojo. In this country the President and I, with other supporters in Congress and out of Congress, had a few weeks before dealt with the matter of the extension of the Conscription Act.

We found that public opinion in the country was split wide open on the question of nationalism, as some people call it, and a broader international viewpoint. I think the best that Congress could do, held down and held back as it was by public opinion, was to enact this law reenacted by one vote and to do that they had to continue as one of its provisions a prohibition against service by American soldiers beyond [1454] this hemisphere and beyond our territories.

I felt, and I did not have much doubt about it from my knowledge of the situation here and in Japan that to send a message to Congress stating that we were just in the act of getting into a fight with Japan, she assuming completely the offensive, that we were threatened with danger there that was very imminent.

Knowing as we did that Japan was liable to break out on any day, it was apparent that we could do but little more by exploiting this situation at that time than to play into the hands of the Japanese military.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, you felt that this message if sent out might be seized upon in Japan and used as a provocation towards some action on their part?

Mr. HULL. I got the impression that they did that precise thing when we passed the Conscription Act a year before. They saw our wide division here of opinion; we had just seen on any matter pertaining to foreign affairs we were extremely nationalistic in our ideas here to the extent of an immense portion of the public and of officials wherever one went. They were all equally patriotic and possessed

of equally high purposes but that was an honest difference of view and that was the situation.

We would have gotten nowhere with any kind of affirmative legislation, in the first place, and we would have had no time to have gotten anywhere in the second place.

Mr. GESELL. Now, about this time, and indeed earlier, our records here in evidence indicate that messages to the Emperor of Japan were under consideration. We have drafts as early as October 17, 1941, and, as Congressman Keefe pointed out the other day, somewhere there is an indication that there were even earlier drafts.

Now, I wanted to ask if you could tell us a bit about the discussions between you and President Roosevelt concerning the advisability of sending a message to the Emperor and why, specifically why, a message was not sent sooner than it was.

Mr. HULL. Specifically, it was not sent for this primary reason, that the military element in Japan was in supreme, arbitrary control of the Government at this time and the little Emperor, so far as we could ascertain, was going along with them and under their domination.

We felt that, in the first place, this whole military situation was being ruled with an iron rod by the military group, not by the Emperor, that he was going along with them and we remembered that some time along there they were so powerful, the military group, that they touched the Emperor on the shoulder and said, "You sign up in blank a declaration [1456] of war." With what we knew was the fact, that the military group had him in control to all intents and purposes it was, we felt satisfied, that if they saw the President going over their heads to the little Emperor, as he was at that time, it would only react against the whole situation and the military group would merely tighten up—by reason of our action tighten up—their military situation, all the while keeping the Emperor under their domination. That was the main reason.

We analyzed every phase and every available detail of conditions both in Japan and in this country in our efforts not to overlook any fact or factor that might shed any light on what would be the correct decision in the matter.

[1457] Mr. GESELL. Now, if the committee please, we have no further questions from Mr. Hull. He is available for questioning by the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I gather from your statement which was read last week that during these days prior to the transmission of your message of October 26 you had also considered the question of the *modus vivendi*, and of course that meant a sort of temporary patching up method by which you would keep the negotiations alive for a short period of 3 months, as I gather, with the possibility of its extension, if it was entered into, and you decided against that because, among other reasons, it would have been regarded by China as an appeasement movement, and by most of the nations with which we were conferring and with which we were concerned about that Far Eastern situation, and therefore it was not wise to sign that.

Is that practically the situation?

Mr. HULL. Yes. The fact was that Japan had come in with what seemed to be the most extreme demands and proposals that she had made during the 6 or 7 months of conversations with us. That was on the 20th. We could not, under our view, say "No" and stop right

there; although Japan, as I have said here, Japan, after 6 or 7 of intimate conversations with us, knew what our attitude was that we could not think of accepting her proposal, not even could we think of doing so, and, on the other hand, she knew how far we would go.

When we look back there and see that for 6 or 7 months at the closest possible grips with this American-Japanese situation—our conversations—I think I must have had 35 or 40 conversations in my Department with the Japanese, all in the most earnest effort to find some approach that would solve this threatened and dangerous situation without it getting out of hand—so we knew it was months—and if we did not we ought to have been taken out of the picture—we knew by some very remote possibility, some likelihood, we knew where each other stood. But our policy was to say “No” to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. I knew we were to remain silent even, it was to grab at every straw in sight in an effort to keep up the conversations and to give time to our army and navies here, and among our future Allies, to make further preparations, and also to show our continuing interest in peace.

So this modus vivendi was given every possible consideration and attention. On November 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 we made a great effort to get something worked out that might stay the hands of the Japanese armies and navies for a few days, or a few weeks, or even a month, by some possibility. I am sure [1459] I was making every possible effort to get some delay.

I am sorry I have to depart to some rather pointed remarks to the Chinese and to the British and the others because of their appointment at their course and attitude with respect to the situation but with all of my efforts, and those who were cooperating, we were clear by the end of the 25th or the 26th that this was not going to work. The Chinese, as I said some days ago, the Chinese made an attack on the situation. Secretary Stimson agreed with us that he was satisfied the Japanese would not accept it, but he was not to be tried as another grabbing-at-a-straw proposition.

Then you notice this last release of a dispatch from Mr. Stimson to the President where he went the whole distance in expressing his fear of a collapse generally of the Chinese situation.

Now, this modus vivendi was tied in with our basic policy. We were to go right along discussing our plan, not the Japanese plan which negatived their whole proposition of force and conquest. We were to go right along with them while we gave them what we could. That was just a little chicken feed compared to the vast amount they had demanded in their ultimatum of November 20 and they knew they would need it if they were going forward with their plan of conquest, as they evidently were.

[1460] So we had every reason to feel, under even the best of chances, the chances were overwhelming, not quite unanimously so, but overwhelming that they would not accept it, but this was their attitude and let the public here and elsewhere see that we were offering something in the way of an inducement, even though it was a day-to-day concern, such as the consignment of oil, \$600,000 worth of money, which was nominal compared to what they had been getting before oil was cut off.

Now, it was in those circumstances, as I say, that I upbraided the other future Allied Governments for not taking more interest in this thing.

As I strove, with my associates, to get this thing over, the opposition, the difficulties, and virtually impossibilities from our standpoint got worse, so there was no other recourse except that that be laid aside.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you stated in your original written statement the other day, and you state now, that you regarded, and the State Department regarded, their note of the 20th of November as an ultimatum and your note of the 26th, which is described as the ten-point note, was a reply to that ultimatum?

[1461] Mr. HULL. Yes, that was the third alternative we had, either to refuse to accept the ultimatum; which was confirmed by their interceptions, as I recall, plus further interceptions directing the Ambassador to discontinue conversations, first on the 25th and, later, on the 29th I believe it was, and so we took the third alternative, which was to keep alive the negotiations. The fact that they had put up an ultimatum to us did not prevent us from offering a proposal for them to consider, if by any speculative possibility they should decide to consider, at anytime. That was the first proposition. The second, in Japan they had lashed the public to the highest possible war pitch. They had ignored our set of policies and principles that we had talked about to them. They had put forth one or two false issues that they were being choked by the British in the Far East, by the Dutch and by ourselves, and they were being denied the creation of what they called the coprosperity sphere. That was a spurious and false disguise of what they were really after in the Pacific area. In this country we were divided, unfortunately, among ourselves, with the result that our statement of principles had been confused in the public mind. They had almost been lost track of, and there was serious need to bring them back together, bring them up to date, especially as the Japanese were in the act of moving in the stage of events—they were going out.

[1462] Furthermore, the ten-point note contained at least five points that the Japanese would have found to their benefit had they accepted them. There has been more misinformation and more ignorant misrepresentation—unintentionally, no doubt—of really what we were faced with there, the many angles, many factors, and what the significance of this last proposal was. The Japanese knew any hour what they could get out of us after 6 months of conversation. It did not take a soothsayer or some fortuneteller to make that clear to somebody who did not seem to know anything about it, but the fact was that there was nothing in there that any peaceful nation pursuing a peaceful course would not have been delighted to accept. It was a broad, constructive, progressive, up-to-date proposal for the most desirable and mutually profitable relations between nations. The only trouble with this was that the Japanese were bent—if I did not see ladies present, I would say were hell-bent—on carrying forward their military policy. They could not any more have abandoned that military policy at that stage, when they had their guns drawn, when their fleets were afloat, as we know since, for Pearl Harbor waters, when the conversations had been abandoned—there is nothing more clear

that they would hunt excuses about the so-called ten-point n whole truth is that whenever we have peaceful nations pursuif
ful policies in their relations to each other, they will
[1463] and would have welcomed, this formula that we :

Furthermore, as I say, the Japanese could, at anytime, h
“Let us see if we cannot narrow this somewhat. We w
whether we cannot consider it further.” They knew exactl
could resume the conversations, leaving off a few of these t
extremely essential but retaining those that were absolut
They knew they could get back at anytime to the same bas
versations, if there was any difference in fact after we h
our 6 months of discussions.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one other question, and that is with
to the Fleet. You are familiar with the evidence, I pres
the Fleet had been sent out to Hawaiian waters in the
1940.

Mr. HULL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss that matter with the I
[1464] Mr. HULL. I don't undertake to recall everyt
was said. I just know that I was favorably disposed tow
self, and the President naturally was. He was accustomed
an oral question now and then about what I thought of the p
cal effect of sending the Fleet, for instance, to Pearl Harbor,
consideration that might occur to him—orally. But we ha
ord anywhere, so far as I can find in the State Departmen
subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Richardson testified that on t
October, 1940, he discussed the matter with the President
there was a disagreement between them. That is, the
wanted to get the Navy back to the Pacific coast. The Pre
that it ought to remain out in Hawaiian waters. Admiral
son says the President stated to him on that day in that co
that he felt that the Navy's presence there, the Fleet's pre
a deterrent against Japan and that he knew it had been i
time. Were you in a position to concur in that position of
dent at that time?

Mr. HULL. That was my judgment. I think we overloo
the broader aspects of this situation. Japan, even before
partite Pact in September 1940 was working along under th
Anticommitern Pact with Germany, working along in t
of relations with Germany, and we did not know, dealing w
unreliable and treacherous persons as we were, we did not k
express relations might then exist between [1465]
Germany. Any evidence that we were preserving a fairly f
would find an echo even in Berlin at that time.

It was a world situation, that was knit together incre
every imaginable agreement between these international d
who were waging world conquest and nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in view of the fact that the actual
curred in December 1941, which was 1 month after the co
related by Admiral Richardson, would you be in position
any opinion as to whether during that period the prese
fleet in Hawaiian waters continued to exert any deterrent
over Japan?

Mr. HULL. Well, as I said, there were a vast number of facts and circumstances accumulating with respect to the Japanese mind on this subject. They were not available to us, except to a very limited and occasional extent. I got the impression somewhat back there that the Japs wanted not only to tell us where to keep our fleet in the Pacific to move it out into the Atlantic, keep it over there. I may have been wrong in that impression, but I think it is worth checking on if you are interested in running down every minute phase of this matter.

Now, someone suggested that the Government was trying to bluff the Japanese. The whole truth is that we were in our own waters, in our territory, on our own side of the Pacific, and that we were pursuing a perfectly peaceful and defensible course. In all our talks with the Japanese and all of our [1466] representations, we were pleading with them for peaceful relations and their continuance. If we happened to have a double-barreled shotgun sitting back in the corner somewhere in the house when we are talking to a desperado, it does no harm, to say the least. I always feel a little better and I think he would feel a little worse if he could see the outlines of that gun back there. It is a psychological thing that nobody can escape.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.

Mr. Secretary, I want to invite attention to a few points made in your written statement presented to the committee, and as a convenience to you, I will quote the points that I want to ask you about.

On page 9, you include this statement:

Throughout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China.

Mr. HULL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It had been the historic policy of the United States for a long time to favor a policy of a strong China, had it not? [1467]

Mr. HULL. That raises a bunch of questions.

Back during the period of our difficulties extending through the 30's and on up to Pearl Harbor in dealing with Japan and Germany, I recall only too vividly our terrific distress when some American citizen would get shot or their women and children outrageously injured, or their property seized or their merchant shipping, like *Panay*, recklessly bombed and shot. When we protested to Japan, there were a few in our own country who would cry out and demand that we get out of there. "What are you doing over there on that side of the world, trying to start a war?" I think one of them lectured all over the country and his slogan was "Get the hell out of China; come back home where you belong; mind your own business and keep out of trouble."

That sounded to all of us people who were reared in a primitive section of this country very possible at first blush, but there were some points of opposition to that possible theory.

In the first place, we were under solemn obligation in writing in the Nine-Power Treaty to cooperate to preserve the integrity of Chinese territory and the sovereignty of China and the equality of ingress and egress to all nations alike in trading, in commerce, finance.

In the second place, we had always been the friend of China, and there were four hundred-odd million of people to deal with in the

future, and we felt that we could not act in a course of bad faith and in almost a cowardly way in the light of our [1468] obligations.

In the third place, Japan and we were under solemn obligation under the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In the fourth place, we, ourselves, stood for a policy of international cooperation for the peaceful settlement of any controversies that might come up between nations in the future.

In the fifth place, we had discovered and proclaimed it as early as 1936 in this hemisphere that a war of a course of aggression in one country was a matter of concern to all the countries of the world.

On top of that we had discovered by this time that Germany and Japan were linked together, operating together as any two highway-men operate and as closely as any two could operate. We found this movement for each one to conquer his respective half of the world and to enslave the people just as they did enslave them later in both Europe and in parts of Asia.

That whole thing was developed, all those considerations were developed, right in front of us. We couldn't have retired and have come away. I would hate to look you gentlemen in the face and describe what I think would be our condition today had we done that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You think undoubtedly that subsequent events have clearly demonstrated that the policy we had with China was sound?

[1469] Mr. HULL. It was sound and it has been testified to by the leading Japanese statesmen in power in loud, vociferous speeches which they made, not only from year to year but from month to month and from week to week. So, we didn't have to go outside of that range of testimony to convince ourselves about their plans and purposes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, Mr. Secretary, on page 33 or your written statement there appear two brief paragraphs that I would like to read:

There was never any question of this country's forcing Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation.

Mr. HULL. At that time—it is well to keep in mind a little of the background. At that time we could not tell just what would be the outcome of the German invasion of Russia. It was extremely critical. We did not know whether Japan intended [1470] to carry her reported desire to invade Russia in Siberia. The whole situation seemed to be very critical and very doubtful, and it was in those circumstances that Japan came back to us with her final offer and that, as I have said, was probably more extreme—substantially more extreme—than any she had made.

In the first place, she did not agree to abandon her policy of military conquest and aggression except in certain local areas and for 90 days.

In the second place, I think I must have observed dozens of times the Japanese close military alliance with Germany aimed at the United States primarily and paramountly.

[1471] If a person could flinch before one could get through speaking to him, the Japanese Ambassador would flinch before I could conclude my question about the Japanese hanging on to the Germans by this hard and fast pact aimed at the United States. They never came within sight of any acceptance of a proposal that they get out of that close military partnership with Hitler who, it seems now, was ordering not only the Jews but all the Poles, men, women, and children, killed.

This bunch of Japanese in extreme control, knowing what kind of a savage they were in partnership with, and Tojo and the others being savages themselves when they were at war or getting into war, they hung on to the Germans with this pact. They wouldn't talk about either stopping their military policy, their aggression policy, nor would they talk about getting out of this pact, but asked us to go into what they would call an honest and honorable agreement with them, while all the fruits of that agreement would go to Hitler as well as to themselves.

To the extent that it was possible, they wanted us to furnish them all the oil that they would need to fight us as well as others. They were on their way then to an attack and they said you must give us all the oil we need now or we might have trouble in attacking—and for some reason we declined to do it. There were a number of impossible things [1472] like that in that ultimatum of November 20.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you did regard the Japanese proposal of November 20 as nothing but an ultimatum?

Mr. HULL. Well, they said so both in writing and orally, and we could only regard it as that from its very nature.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, was your reply of November 26 in any sense an ultimatum?

Mr. HULL. Well, the truth is we were most anxious, as we have said here at different times, to go forward with the conversations, and we had every motive to desire to go forward with them, and we offered this, as I say, as an ordinary, normal plan for international relations, on these lines, and I think everybody in the State Department, the President and others, were in agreement; and, as I say, the Japanese would have found a way at once, all they had to do was to announce that they were through with conquest and aggression and automatically they would have become the beneficiaries of these proposals.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any information that the Japanese regarded your message of November 26 as an ultimatum?

Mr. HULL. Not until sometime afterward. They then had their fleet on its way, as I say, to Hawaiian waters. They themselves had ordered the discontinuance of conversations. We were satisfied, of course, that they would attack at any [1473] time. We didn't know what time. They had that solely within their own power. But it wasn't until they proceeded to manufacture a falsehood in order to dodge the effect of their own ultimatum, the old fraudulent cry, "Stop thief," they thought if they could pretend to their own people, they knew that that wouldn't travel far in this country, except at the hands of people who might be a little prejudiced or a little extreme in their views, but they felt that they could put over the idea in their own

country just as Hitler put over one falsehood after another to shield and disguise his own plans and his own course to his armies of invasion.

The Japanese alibi was taken up and adopted by a few people in other parts of the world but not to any very great extent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a few other questions but I observe that the Secretary has been before us about an hour. So I suggest we might suspend at this point with his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. We will excuse you now, Mr. Hull, for the time being, and you may consult counsel as to when you will return. If you wish to come tomorrow morning it will be entirely agreeable to the committee.

Mr. HULL. I apologize to the committee. My throat is not quite as strong as it should be. It is improving so long [1474] as I give it a chance to improve. I don't want to give it a set-back. That is why I am taking these precautions that I am.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thoroughly understands that, Mr. Hull, and you do not need to apologize. You may be excused now until you return.

Mr. HULL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grew.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN¹

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Grew, will you state your full name for the record, please.

Mr. GREW. Joseph Grew.

Mr. GESELL. During what period of time were your our Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. GREW. I arrived in Japan on June 6, 1932; left on June 25, 1942.

Mr. GESELL. And you were there more or less continuously during that period, particularly during 1941, were you not?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, if the committee please, before proceeding with Mr. Grew I want to direct specific attention to exhibit 15 in evidence, a series of three dispatches from Mr. Grew to the Department of State dated January 27, November 3, [1475] and November 17, 1941, respectively. I would like to read portions of these into the record.

The dispatch of January 27, 1941, states:

My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their various facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic, the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information.

The second, the dispatch of November 3, is a lengthy one, and I simply want to call attention to the very last portion thereof, which reads as follows:

It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitably may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

¹ See p. 2480; *infra*, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Grew.

The third dispatch, dated November 17, reads as follows:

In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at [1476] present involved in the China conflict, I am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative and surprise. It is important, however, that our Government not place upon us, including the military and naval attachés, major responsibility for giving prior warning. The control in Japan over military information, both primary and secondary is extremely effective, and we have no expectation that any advance information would be obtained either through the press or from personal contacts with Japanese; the few Americans left in Japan are mostly concentrated in Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe, and are in no position to observe military movements and the absence of American and other foreign vessels in adjacent waters almost assures to the Japanese the ability to dispatch troop transports in various directions without foreign observation. Recent reports from our Consuls at Taihoku and at Harbin point to Japanese troop concentrations in both Taiwan and Manchuria, and all other available indications are that since the general mobilization of July last, troop dispositions have been made to enable new operations to be carried out on the shortest [1477] possible notice in either Siberia or the southwest Pacific or in both.

We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations which might be forthcoming against such areas, and we are taking every precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field of military and naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning.

Now, with those dispatches in mind, Mr. Grew, I want to ask you whether, with the exception of the dispatch of January 27 which I have read referring to the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, you had any information of any nature which indicated the possibility of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I had no specific information or information of any character.

Mr. GESELL. I notice in your book, which I am sure will be referred to from time to time here, your note of that day, for January 27, 1941, in which you say:

[1478] There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese in case of a break with the United States are planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Of course, I informed our Government.

Your reference to "a lot of talk around town" suggests that at that time you had heard the same rumor from sources other than the Peruvian Ambassador; is that correct?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Could you indicate to what extent there was talk around town at that time?

Mr. GREW. I wouldn't say that talk was widespread, but it came from various sources. I could not now recollect from what sources, because they were not important, but this telegram which I sent on January 27 was based practically entirely on the report which had been brought to me by my Peruvian colleague.

Mr. GESELL. Did that talk persist of a general rumor category or did it prevail only at or about the time of your dispatch?

Mr. GREW. I would say only about the time of my dispatch.

Mr. GESELL. You don't remember any talk about town subsequent to that time concerning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I do not.

[1479] Mr. GESELL. Was there any talk or gossip or discussion of the possibility of an attack against the United States at any other point other than Pearl Harbor during this period from January on?

Mr. GREW. Well, do you refer to talk by Japanese, from Japanese sources?

Mr. GESELL. Well, I think my question was intended to be as broad as possible, but let's take the Japanese sources first.

Mr. GREW. Well, we were very largely during that last year cut off from our Japanese contacts. The Japanese did not dare to be seen with us and did not dare come to the American Embassy, and most of my contacts had just slipped away, so it was very difficult to keep in touch with what people were thinking. You see, the secret police were constantly watching every Japanese who had contact with any foreigner, and in many cases I am quite sure Japanese—in fact, I know—were arrested and kept in prison for some time as a result of having seen too much of foreigners. So it was very difficult to pick up what the people were thinking at that time apart from what was published in the press.

[1480] Mr. GESELL. I suppose you received rumors second-hand, so to speak, through your other diplomatic colleagues who themselves may have been in touch with Japanese; is that correct?

Mr. GREW. Yes, of course I received reports of what was going on from diplomatic colleagues constantly during all that year.

Mr. GESELL. Did you get from any of your diplomatic colleagues any information indicating that Japan was to attack the United States at any point subsequent to January 27, which was of a specific military nature?

Mr. GREW. I couldn't put my finger on any one conversation which would confirm that, but all the evidence which we accumulated during those years intensified as time went on, made it abundantly clear that they were likely to attack.

Mr. GESELL. And, of course, my questions have had to do more with specific military objectives rather than the broad question of likelihood of an attack.

Now we have had here, Mr. Grew, the statement from a Navy officer concerning the Japanese plans for an attack, based upon captured documents and prisoner interviews, and I want to ask you two or three questions based on that.

The reports indicate that the Japanese task force left from Etorofu Jima sometime around the 26th of November, Jap time.

Did you have any information which indicated in any way that there was a Japanese task force at that Island at about that time?

[1481] Mr. GREW. None whatever.

Mr. GESELL. The report also indicates that in August 1941 Admiral Yamamota ordered the fleet commanders and key staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminary to the final formulation of operation plans for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and that war conferences were thereafter continuously held at the Naval War College in Tokyo from the 2d of September to the 13th of September.

Did you have any information concerning those war plans or those conferences that were being held which indicated in any way the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack or an attack on the United States anywhere else?

Mr. GREW. Those conferences were generally of a routine nature. They took place from time to time. We knew, of course, that they were going on, but what they were talking about we did not know.

I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even know that they existed.

Mr. GESELL. I want to ask you about that in a moment, but now let me ask you this.

This report that I have been discussing indicates that on December 1 the cabinet council met and approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States.

[1482] Were you aware that there was a cabinet meeting in December, around December 1 or 2?

Mr. GREW. I recollect we were informed at that time of such a meeting.

Mr. GESELL. Was any announcement made or any information made available to you in any way indicating that one of the matters considered at the cabinet meeting was the commencement of hostilities against the United States by an attack at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. That was all guess work.

Mr. GESELL. Did you guess that that had been considered at that time?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you report that you had so guessed, to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. Well, I think that my reports were complete in themselves. I think that the warnings that I had issued covered the field. I very likely did report that meeting but I cannot tell you without consulting our files.

Mr. GESELL. You don't recall, do you, any specific report that you made at that time to the effect that you thought the cabinet was considering an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. I don't recollect any specific report to that effect. I would have to consult the records on that.

[1483] Mr. GESELL. I think we have your dispatch concerning the cabinet meeting. I will bring it forward in a moment.

Now, I would like to ask you a general question.

First I have this dispatch, your dispatch of December 1 to the Department of State, and with reference to the cabinet meeting the information that you appear to have given at that time was to this effect:

Tonight's newspapers report that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations.

[1484] Mr. GESELL. Does that refresh your recollection that you did not at that time have any information that you reported indicating that one of the matters discussed was the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. GREW. I doubt if I reported that precise point at that time.

Mr. GESELL. Now I would like to ask you a general question by way of leading up to several others.

During this period what was your general information as to the state of the Japanese preparations and readiness for war, the strength

of their military and their general mobilization activities :
ported them to the Department of State?

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask what period that is? May I ask what is embraced in your question, Counsel?

Mr. GESELL. I would like to have him cover in a general period there, perhaps, progressively to show what steps he has been taking.

Mr. KEEFE. The whole 10 years?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, if I may read a few passages written at that time as contemporary comments I think would be the best way to answer this question. May I do so?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[1485] Mr. GREW. Shortly after my arrival in Japan in the spring of 1932 I wrote a series of letters to Mr. Stimson who was then Secretary of State, after sizing up the situation as we saw it at that time.

On August 13th, in a letter to Mr. Stimson, I said I was surprised.

Senator BREWSTER. Would you give the year in each case? The record will be clear?

Mr. GESELL. The year, Mr. Grew.

Senator BREWSTER. The year.

Mr. GREW. 1932, Senator. I told Mr. Stimson how the Japanese were working up an antforeign and an anti-American psychology in the country, as a matter of fact against all countries but especially against the United States, and I said to Mr. Stimson [reading

This situation reminds me strongly of the efforts of the German Government in calumniating foreign nations, to build up a public war psychology and effort being repeated whenever some new venture, such as the introduction of submarine warfare, was about to be launched. Here in Japan the building up of public animosity against foreign nations in general and against the United States in particular has doubtless a similar purpose—to strengthen the military [1486] in its Manchurian venture in the face of especially American opposition.

I believe that on the part of the Japanese it is a sign of weakness. * * *

Such a national temper is always dangerous. The German military was supported by a carefully nurtured public war psychology, took the bit and overrode all restraining influences in 1914. The Japanese military is not dissimilar. It has been built for war, feels prepared for war, welcomes war. It has never yet been beaten and possesses unlimited confidence. I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes on all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would render it close them.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may we have the page in the book the witness is reading from?

Mr. GREW. The page of that in my book is page 64.

Then 2 years later I have some pages from a long report I wrote as Secretary of State which I think are probably pertinent to the [reading]:

Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime importance.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask what is the date of that?

[1487] Mr. GREW. The date of this, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GREW. December 27, 1934, page 145 in my book. This dispatch is on record in the Department of State. [Reading:]

Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime importance, namely national support, demonstrated and reinforced by national preparedness. I believe that a fundamental element of that preparedness should be the maintenance of the present naval ratios in principle and the eventual achievement and maintenance of those ratios, so far as they apply to Japan, in fact. With such a background, and only with such a background, can we pursue our diplomacy with any confidence that our representations will be listened to or that they will lead to favorable results. General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, was recently reported in the press as saying: "Armies and navies, in being efficient, give weight to the peaceful words of statesmen, but a feverish effort to create them when once a crisis is imminent simply provokes attack." We need thorough preparedness not in the interests of war but of peace.

It is difficult for those who do not live in [1488] Japan to appraise the present temper of the country. An American Senator is reported to have recommended recently that we should accord parity to Japan in order to avoid future war. Wherever the Senator's views may be concerning the general policy that we should follow in the Far East, he probably does not realize what harm that sort of public statement does in strengthening the Japanese stand and in reinforcing the aggressive ambitions of the expansionists. The Japanese press of course picks out such statements by prominent Americans and publishes them far and wide, thus confirming the general belief in Japan that the pacifist element in the United States is preponderantly strong and in the last analysis will control the policy and action of our Government. Under such circumstances there is a general tendency to characterize our diplomatic representations as bluff and to believe that they can safely be disregarded without fear of implementation.

It would be helpful if those who share the Senator's views could hear and read some of the things that are constantly being said and written in Japan, to the effect that Japan's destiny is to subjugate and rule the world (sic), and could realize the expansionist ambitions which lie not far from the surface in the [1489] minds of certain elements in the Army and Navy, the patriotic societies, and the intense nationalists throughout the country. Their aim is to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlement, Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force. With such dreams of empire cherished by many, and with an army and navy capable of taking the bit in their own teeth and running away with it regardless of the restraining influence of the saner heads of the Government in Tokyo (a risk which unquestionably exists and of which we have already had ample evidence in the Manchurian affair), we would be reprehensibly somnolent if we were to trust the security of treaty restraints or international comity to safeguard our own interests or, indeed, our own property. * * *

When Japanese speak of Japan's being the "stabilizing factor" and the "guardian of peace" of East Asia, what they have in mind is a Pax Japonica with eventual complete commercial control, and, in the minds [1490] of some, eventual complete political control of East Asia. While Ambassador Salto may have been misquoted in a recent issue of the Philadelphia Bulletin as saying that Japan will be prepared to fight to maintain that conception of peace, nevertheless that is precisely what is in the minds of many Japanese today. There is a swash-buckling temper in the country, largely developed by military propaganda, which can lead Japan during the next few years, or in the next few generations, to any extremes unless the saner minds in the Government prove able to cope with it and to restrain the country from national suicide. * * *

I wish that more Americans would come out here and live here and gradually come to sense the real potential risks and dangers of the situation instead of speaking and writing academically on a subject which they know nothing whatever about, thereby contributing ammunition to the Japanese military and extremists who are stronger than they have been for many a day. The idea

that a great body of liberal though lying just beneath the surface since 1931 would be sufficiently strong to emerge and assume control with a little foreign encouragement is thoroughly mistaken. The liberal thought is there, but it is inarticulate and largely impotent, and in all probability will remain so for some time to come. * * *

In view of all these considerations, I have little hesitation in reiterating and emphasizing the potential dangers of the situation and the prime importance of American national preparedness to meet it. As a nation we have taken the lead in international efforts toward the restriction and reduction of armaments. We have had hopes that the movement would be progressive, but the conditions of world affairs as they have developed during the past twelve years since the Washington Conference have not afforded fruitful ground for such progress. Unless we are prepared to subscribe to a Pax Japonica in the Far East, with all that this movement, as conceived and interpreted by Japan, is bound to entail, we should rapidly build up our Navy to treaty strength, and if and when the Washington Naval Treaty expires we should continue to maintain the present ratio with Japan regardless of cost, a peacetime insurance both to cover and to reduce the risk of war. In the meantime every proper step should be taken to avoid or to offset the belligerent utterances of jingoes no less than the defeatist statements of pacifists in the United States, many of which find their way into the Japanese [1492] press, because the utterances of the former tend to inflame public sentiment against our country, while the statements of the latter convey an impression of American weakness, irresolution, and bluff.

Mr. GESELL. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Grew, that those views which you expressed in those early dispatches were repeated and strengthened by you from time to time as we come nearer to December 7?

Mr. GREW. Yes; definitely.

Mr. GESELL. And that they represent your judgment that Japan was mobilizing both psychologically and militarily for gradual steps of aggression?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; definitely.

Mr. GESELL. Now, when did you reach the conclusion in your own mind that war with the United States was inevitable?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, I think my position on that is perhaps somewhat similar to the position of a candidate for political office who knows that he is going to be defeated but he does not admit it until it is all over.

Our foreign service is our first line of national defense and our duty is to hold that line if we can do it. For any diplomatic officer in the foreign service or for any foreign-service officer to go abroad and throw up his hands and say "War is inevitable" might as well go home because he [1493] would be a discredit to the service in which we are members.

I cannot tell you of any moment at which I really felt that war was inevitable.

Mr. GESELL. You recognized, I think, for a long period that it was a strong possibility?

Mr. GREW. Definitely.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any views or opinions as to whether Japan was likely to strike without a declaration of war?

Mr. GREW. When a criminal commits a crime I find that the FBI or Scotland Yard look up the technique of that crime and go back and look at previous crimes committed with the same technique and thereby spot the criminal. If we had remembered our history we would have recollected that the Japanese did precisely the same thing at Port Arthur in 1905. It struck at Russia without a declaration of war, so that their attack on Pearl Harbor was exactly the same pattern.

Mr. GESELL. Would it be safe to say that in making references in your dispatches to the strong possibility of a surprise attack by Japan that you had in mind just those considerations of that part of history?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, in reaching your conclusion and in considering the developments I understood you to say that you [1494] did not know or have access to any information resulting from the intercept of the Japanese diplomatic messages.

Mr. GREW. That is a fact.

Mr. GESELL. No copies of intercepted messages were sent to you and you did not even know they were being intercepted?

Mr. GREW. I did not.

Mr. GESELL. Have you any information which would indicate whether or not the Japanese knew we were intercepting their messages?

Mr. GREW. I have no evidence to that effect, no.

Mr. GESELL. The question has come up here, Mr. Grew, concerning the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Did any information come to your attention which indicated that the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor had any effect one way or the other on Japanese opinion?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, definitely. The Japanese press from time to time and, as I remember, in public speeches took the position that relations between Japan and the United States could never improve until we removed our fleet completely from the Pacific to the Atlantic because it was always a source of suspicion to the Japanese.

I do not think that that preposterous suggestion was ever advanced officially but it certainly was heard from time to time.

[1495] Mr. GESELL. Of course, my question was directed to a more limited movement of the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the west coast. Was there any discussion of whether such a movement would have any effect or whether the movement in the opposite direction was having some effect?

Mr. GREW. I think the statement which I just mentioned had in mind the removal of the fleet completely from the Pacific, not merely to the west coast.

Mr. GESELL. You do not remember, I take it then, any reaction to the movement of the fleet from the west coast to Pearl Harbor in 1940, I believe it was?

Mr. GREW. I cannot recollect at present any specific reaction.

Mr. GESELL. Now, there has been considerable said here in the testimony so far concerning the relationship between the civil and military government of Japan, and Mr. Hull and other witnesses have expressed opinions that the military branch of the government was in a position to considerably dominate the civil branch of the government.

Have you any comments or information to give us on that subject?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. I think in order to shed light on that subject we ought to go back very briefly a little in history, to the middle of the last century we will say, [1496] around the time of the restoration of the Emperor in 1868.

The Japanese had watched what they considered the alleged encroachments of Western powers in the Far East. They remembered the opium war, the second Chinese war, and they were afraid that the same thing might happen to them. Therefore, they put the re-

sponsibility for the defense of the country entirely in the hands of the army and navy.

As I remember it, in the constitution of 1889 it was provided that the army and navy should determine their own organization. In that case, after many years went by and things quieted down in Japan began to gather confidence and believed she was not under military control gradually passed from the military to the civilian and in the twenties, I have been told—I was not there myself but have been told—that the prestige of the Japanese military was such that officers when they went off duty did not wear a uniform in the streets.

In any case, the days of the so-called Shidehara diplomacy arose. Shidehara, who is now Prime Minister of Japan, was Foreign Minister, and he and his associates did everything possible to bring about good relations with the United States, Great Britain, China, and the other countries.

I have always thought, and I think it is a fair premise, that one of the principal reasons why the Japanese Army moved into Manchuria in 1931 was in order to put itself on the map again and up their prestige.

In any case, that is then what happened. The Japanese moved into Manchuria and it was a question of time. Of course, the Japanese were in a position of control.

Now, during that period a development came about which I think is provided for in any law, that the Navy and War in Japan could have their own access to the Emperor over the head of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; so, of course, that tremendous power.

They also had it in their hands to make it impossible for the Emperor to form any Cabinet of which they did not approve. In other words, if they did not like a Prime Minister they would dismiss him and appoint a War or Navy Minister and the Cabinet could then be formed.

An illustration of that was in 1937, I think, where the Emperor asked General Ugaki to come forward and form a Cabinet. Ugaki was a very fine military officer, but he was of a moderate type. He was not one of the extremists; he did not commend the army as a whole and after working for 5 days he finally went to the Emperor and confessed himself defeated, so that he did not form a cabinet, and he communicated to the press at that time [1498] that he never again would wear a Japanese military uniform. That was the way those things worked out during that period.

Now, to come down to the question of the relative control between the civilians and military, I would put it more relative control between the moderates and the extremists.

You sometimes had a civilian Prime Minister, such as the Prime Ministers of Prince Konoye, in which the worst acts of international banditry in all history probably were carried out and on the other hand, you had the cabinet of Admiral Yonai, who was a military and naval officer. His regime was one of the most moderate that had been in Japan for a great many years.

Mr. GESELL. Well, during the period from July 1941, to December of 1941 were the extremists or the moderates in control of the government?

Mr. GREW. At the time of the Konoye cabinet, that was the third Konoye cabinet, up to during the summer of 1941, he, I believe, was doing his best to bring about an improvement of relations with the United States, but from the moment of his fall, when Tojo came in, it was quite clear that the extremists' policy prevailed.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Japanese give any publicity to their note of November 20? Did they at that time indicate what position they had taken to their own people, that you recall?

[1499] Mr. GREW. I do not recall that that note was published. It could have been. I will have to look up the records on that.¹

Mr. GESELL. You do not recall any substantial publicity being given to their November 20 note?

Mr. GREW. I do not recall it now.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Japanese give any publicity to our note of November 26?

Mr. GREW. They did not until after Pearl Harbor and then when it was published in a newspaper that newspaper was promptly confiscated. The Japanese did not want that note to become known and certain prominent Japanese at that time said to me that they had been informed that the note was in the nature of an ultimatum but they were unable to confirm that and in the light of the contents of the note which I passed on to my Japanese friends they said if that were a fact, if the note was couched along those lines, the Japanese people would be definitely opposed to an intransigent attitude on the part of the Japanese Government in dealing with it. That is on record.

[1500] Mr. GESELL. Did the Japanese attempt to characterize the note without revealing its contents at that time?

Mr. GREW. They definitely did.

Mr. GESELL. In what manner did they characterize it?

Mr. GREW. They characterized it as in the nature of an ultimatum.

Mr. GESELL. What did they say about it?

Mr. GREW. I do not know what more they said about it, because I have no access to the records. I suppose you are speaking of the Japanese press now?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. GREW. I cannot recollect exactly how that was put forward, but that was the impression created among the Japanese public.

Mr. GESELL. Did you ask for any authority to release the text of the note of November 26?

Mr. GREW. I do not recollect having asked that. It would not have done any good if I had.

Mr. GESELL. Now, coming to a subsequent message, the message to the Emperor, which was transmitted by President Roosevelt to the Emperor on or about December 6, could you state to the committee the circumstances under which you received that note, when you first learned of it, and what steps you took to deliver it to the Emperor?

[1501] Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. That was the evening of December 7, Japanese time. I was listening to the radio broadcasts from San Francisco on that evening and heard that the President had sent, or was sending a message to the Emperor. I promptly telephoned to Mr. Dooman, the counselor for the Embassy to stand by. Not long thereafter I received a very brief, urgent message from Mr. Hull saying an important message for the Emperor was being then encoded and I should be ready to receive it. A long telegram containing the message

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705.

was received in the Embassy at 10:30 p. m. The record on the telegram showed it had been received in the Japanese post office at 12 noon. It was, I understand, sent from Washington 9 p. m. It would have meant 11 a. m. Tokyo time, 14 hours difference. In other words, the telegram appears to have been delivered to the Japanese post office, which handled telegrams 1 hour after it was received, and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until 10 p. m.

Finally, at 10:30 p. m., it came. I had already arranged for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to stand by. I said I would be able to see him about midnight, which I did. When the telegram was finally decoded, I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs at a quarter past twelve, about 15 minutes after midnight. I showed him the communication and I said that I wished to ask for an audience with the Emperor to [1502] present it personally. I had no doubt as to getting it in his hands. The Minister discussed the matter with me, and I said, "I am making a definite reservation for an audience with the Emperor," which is the right thing to say. The Ambassador, and Mr. Togo—not Tojo, the Prime Minister, but the Minister finally said, "I will present your request to the Throne."

I left the Foreign Office at about half-past 12 a. m., about midnight. I got to bed rather late. At 7 o'clock the next morning, the 8th of December, my telephone beside my bed rang, and the private secretary to the Minister, said he had been trying to reach me ever since 5 a. m. I said, "That is surprising, because the telephone is right beside my bed and it has not rung." He said, "Please come over as soon as possible to see the Minister."

I got to the Minister's official residence about 7:30 a. m. I went into his room dressed in formal clothes. Apparently he had been with the Emperor, and he had a document in his hand, he was sitting at the table, and he said, "This is the Emperor's reply to your request." I said, "I have asked for an audience in order to present a memorandum, that message, to the Emperor personally." He merely said—I remember his words—"I have no wish to stand between you and the Throne," but nothing more was said about it. [1053] I read it, and he asked me to notice especially the first paragraph. He said, "In view of the fact the conversations in London had made no progress it had been decided to call them off. It did not strike me as very serious. They had been called before the Japanese first went into Indochina and they had been rescheduled for a later date. So I said, 'Well, I am very sorry. I hope we can start them started again.'" The Minister made a little pleasant remark, thanking me for my cooperation for peace, and came and saw me off at the door. He said not one single word about the attack on Pearl Harbor, and yet that was at 7:30 o'clock the next morning and the attack had occurred at about 3:30 a. m. Japanese time. At any rate it had occurred several hours previous. I never understood why he did not tell me, whether he did not have the courage to do so, or whether he thought it was not diplomatic protocol—I have no idea.

I went back to the Embassy and a few minutes later we heard the boys calling out "Gogi" in the street. "Gogi" is a special word on the paper, it is a single sheet containing an important piece of news. I sent one of my secretaries out to get it and he brought it in. It is the way I learned about the attack on Pearl Harbor, was

news sheet was brought in and put on my desk. An hour later, the police came in and locked us up in the Embassy, and that is the story.

[1504] Mr. GESELL. We have no further questions of Mr. Grew.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 10 minutes to 12. You became a diplomatic prisoner from then on until you were exchanged?

Mr. GREW. Yes, Mr. Chairman, from then on until we were exchanged the following June.

The CHAIRMAN. So that getting back to the morning on which you were told by the Foreign Minister practically that you would not be permitted to see the Emperor, the attack had already taken place some 4 hours before that. When did you receive from the State Department here, or did you after that receive any dispatch from the State Department that was delivered to you in Tokyo?

Mr. GREW. After the attack upon Pearl Harbor?

The CHAIRMAN. After the interview with Togo.

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I think we did not receive any telegrams after that. I was able to establish a telephone connection with Mr. Hamilton of the State Department and we merely spoke for a minute about the attack and he said he hoped we were all well in the Embassy and a few personal remarks of that kind, but I recollect nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your record show whether, after the Japanese Government took over the embassy and locked you up, any messages were sent to you that were not delivered by the Japanese Government, and I presume they would have been delivered [1505] by the Japanese Government if you had got them?

Mr. GREW. I recollect no messages received. I sent two or three messages to Washington and I did not know whether they got through. As a matter of fact, they did get through.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony here shows that the Japanese Fleet, the task force, left the Kurile Islands headed toward Pearl Harbor on the 25th, United States time, which would have been the 26th, Japanese time, and that Secretary Hull dispatched or gave to the Ambassador of Japan here on the 26th his reply to the Japanese message of the 20th. When did you receive information, if you did receive information, that that message to the Japanese Government had been delivered on the 26th?¹

Mr. GREW. I presumably received that in a telegram from the Department of State, which kept me informed of the exchange of documents and conversations going on in Washington. Without consulting records, Mr. Chairman, I could not tell you just what moment I received them.

The CHAIRMAN. Your recollection is you did receive notification through the State Department that such message had been delivered?

Mr. GREW. In all probability, I think I did.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think I want to ask any other questions now.

Mr. Cooper.

[1506] The VICE CHAIRMAN. I do not have any questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Nothing now, at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I want to ask you if you inquired from your diplomatic colleague the source of his information in regard to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

¹ Exhibit No. 75

Mr. GREW. I do not think I did, Mr. Congressman. Sometimes when an official, diplomatic official, receives information that kind or even a rumor report of that kind, it may put rather difficult position to ask him to reveal the source. I do I did ask that question.

Mr. CLARK. You did not ask him where he learned that it likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. What is that?

Mr. CLARK. You did not ask him where he learned that it likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. I do not recollect having asked that question.

Mr. CLARK. Well, now, I do not mean to insist upon this considered it important enough to make it the subject of dispatch to your Government, did you not?

Mr. GREW. Definitely.

Mr. CLARK. You say now you made no effort to find out from which he obtained that information?

[1507] Mr. GREW. To have gone to my Peruvian colleague said, "I would like to know the source from which you received information," would have put him in a very difficult position. Most of those pieces of information were received from friends who would have been endangered by the knowledge had passed that information on. I think in all probability asked my colleague for the source he probably would have felt could not give it to me. In any case, it is a rather difficult thing to ask for such a thing as that.

Mr. CLARK. Did you know him pretty well?

Mr. GREW. I knew him pretty well. He was a man I trusted his word and I trusted his judgment.

Mr. CLARK. You made some reference in your testimony warlike activity by Japan, I think, in 1905 without a declaration of war. Was that against Russia?

Mr. GREW. That was against Russia; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. There is just a hazy recollection in my mind that there was some activity by our fleet about that time. Probably headed entirely around the world as a kind of demonstration against Japan. Do you recollect about that?

Mr. GREW. I recollect the sending of the fleet around South America and into the Pacific. I do not recollect the date.

Mr. CLARK. Well, did it have any connection with the activity of Japan against Russia?

[1508] Mr. GREW. I would have to refresh my memory.

Mr. CLARK. It is not material anyway.

Mr. GREW. I am sorry; that is a long time ago. It is a long history. I would not like to answer that question without looking it up.

Mr. CLARK. I was trying to refresh my own memory through you.

Mr. GREW. I am afraid my memory is bad on that.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one question I omitted to ask, if you will answer it now.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In regard to this rumor brought to your attention by the Peruvian Minister or Ambassador.

Mr. GREW. Minister.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony here shows that in January 1941, Admiral Yamamoto, I believe it is, the Japanese Admiral, had formulated some plan by which to attack Pearl Harbor at some indefinite date in the future. Would you be able to know whether the formulation of such plan by the Japanese Admiral might have had any connection with the rumors that the Peruvian Minister passed on to you?

Mr. GREW. I think that is very doubtful, Mr. Chairman. The Japanese were pretty effective in their secrecy. I think it is very unlikely that that information would have been allowed to leak out anywhere. It would have been probably retained in a very small group of the highest military and naval officers, so that I would doubt very much if the rumor which I telegraphed the Secretary of State on January 27 had any connection whatever with the elaboration of the plan.

The CHAIRMAN. The telegram—the dispatch—which you sent to Secretary Stimson in 1932 was sent to him as Secretary of State?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, by the time you sent your dispatch of 1934, Secretary Hull had become Secretary of State?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was at that time in the office of the State Department?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make one request of counsel before you adjourn?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice in the New York Times they have an article which is dated "Nuremberg, Germany, November 23":

The following excerpts from the official German report on discussions between Adolf Hitler and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4, [1510] 1941, were introduced in the Nuremberg war criminals trial today.

It shows the discussion of the plan of a war between Japan and the United States. I think that is pertinent in this inquiry in view of the interpretation that has been put by some people on the note of November 26, 1941. I request that we obtain an authenticated copy of it.

Mr. GESELL. We will try to do that.¹ Is that mentioned in today's New York Times?

Mr. MURPHY. Saturday's New York Times.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, the committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[1511]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. The Chair thinks Mr. Clark had concluded his examination of Mr. Grew and Senator Lucas will now come to bat.

Mr. GESELL. If the committee please, before Senator Lucas commences, my attention was called during the recess to the fact that I

¹ Exhibit No. 76.

had neglected to introduce the dispatch from Mr. Grew un-
of December 1 referring to the meeting of the Cabinet, fro
I have read during his examination, and I think, to make th
complete, I should offer that document in the record now as Ex

The CHAIRMAN. That will be received as Exhibit 25.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 25.")

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Ambassador, do you have an opini
whether or not the message or memorandum that was issue
President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan on
ning of December 6 was ever delivered to the Emperor?

Mr. GREW. No, Senator; I have no evidence to indicate th
delivered to the Emperor.

Senator LUCAS. Who was the Minister at that time of Ja
whom you conferred?

Mr. GREW. I conferred that night with the Foreign Mini
Togo, and I asked for an audience with the Emperor to pr
document and he said that he would present my request to the
and then I saw him the next morning at 7:30 and he said, "T
Emperor's reply."

Senator LUCAS. Did he give you that reply in writing—

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). Or was it oral?

Mr. GREW. In writing.

Senator LUCAS. Was it signed by the Emperor?

Mr. GREW. No, no, it was not signed by the Emperor.

Senator LUCAS. And you do not know, other than what he
whether the Emperor ever saw this last message?

Mr. GREW. I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. I should like to direct your attention to a s
which was made by Mr. Hull in his treatise on this subject o
in which he said the following [reading]:

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General
1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China unde
manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal a

[1513] I should like to ask you whether or not you are
with the memorial presented to the Emperor of Japan on
1927, by Premier Tanaka outlining the positive policy of J
the conquest of the world?

Mr. GREW. That is the so-called Tanaka memorial?

Senator LUCAS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GREW. Of course, I have seen it in times past but I ha
known whether it was authentic or not.

Senator LUCAS. That is the question that I desired to ask
read it in a magazine entitled "China at War" which was p
in this country in March 1942 and I was wondering whethe
you had ever read the article, or in your experience in Japan
you had reached the conclusion that this memorial was an a
document?

Mr. GREW. I never reached that conclusion, Senator. I
recollect whether I read that precise article or not, but, o
that was discussed at considerable length in the old days and

that I ever saw was ever able to adduce any concrete evidence to prove its authenticity.

[1514] Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

Now, I want to direct your attention, Mr. Ambassador, to the report made by the Army Board, including George Grunert, lieutenant general; Henry D. Russell, major general; and Walter H. Frank, major General, United States Army, who investigated, as I recall, at the request of Secretary Stimson the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in that report—and this is on page 51 of the September issue of the United States News, which purports to have a full text of the official report concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor—the following information was found. Starting at the top of the page in the right-hand column it reads in this way:

Apparently on the 26th, in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposal shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the three months' cruise. Evidently the action to kick the whole thing over was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the ten points which they took as an ultimatum. It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed.

Now, as I understand it, Mr. Ambassador, you were a witness before that General Board, and I should like to have you elaborate or comment, if you care to do so, upon this conclusion that was reached by the Army board making this independent investigation.

[1515] Mr. GREW. Senator, may I read briefly the record of my actual testimony before that committee on that subject?

Senator LUCAS. I want the testimony read, sir.

Mr. GREW. I was asked what was the reaction of the Japanese people, both private and official, to that document, if you remember. That is Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26, 1941. I replied [reading]:

The reaction of the Japanese military people and also of probably the majority of the civil government officials, who took their cue from the military at that time, was that they characterized that memorandum as an ultimatum.

Senator LUCAS. What page are you reading from, if I may ask?

Mr. GREW. I am reading now my actual testimony before that Army Board.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir.

Mr. GREW [reading]:

If I may do so, I should like in that connection—

I am still reading my testimony—

I should like, in that connection, to express the personal opinion that that attitude of the Japanese officials to the memorandum as an ultimatum was totally unsound and wrongly based.

Then I was asked:

It is your considered opinion, therefore, that they [1516] used it as a pretext for the accomplishment of what they desired?

My reply:

Yes, sir. It was in no respect an ultimatum, either in tone or in substance.

I continued—

Senator LUCAS. What page is that on in the report?

Mr. GREW. That is on page 4208.

Senator LUCAS. That is correct.

Mr. GREW. I go on to 4215, where the point came up again was my testimony. [Reading:]

Now, to go back and coming to your question, we will go back to the people, the Army and the Navy. At what point did they decide defend the Harbor? Naturally, they had all their plans made for years beforehand. In case of war with America they were very far-sighted in those respects; had their plans drawn up probably—

Although I had no means of knowing that, of course—

probably right down to the last detail, but as for the moment at which they were pushed I do not myself know exactly how long it would have taken the carriers to get from where they were to the point at which they attacked the Harbor, but it has always been my belief that it was about the time of the case of Mr. Hull's memorandum [1517] of November 26th that they were pushed. I cannot prove that; I have no evidence. It is just my feeling.

Now, in that connection, Senator, I think that my testimony has given a wrong impression has been given to my testimony because it appears from the official report that I had said that Mr. Hull's memorandum actually touched the button that started the war.

I never said that. I said it was my belief that the thing happened started at about that time; that is all.

Then, if I may, as throwing light on this general subject, I like to read the brief comment that I wrote in connection with Mr. Hull's memorandum. Shall I do that, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREW. This is on page 482 of my book, "Ten Years in Japan." Senator LUCAS. 482?

Mr. GREW. Page 482 in my book, "Ten Years in Japan."

Mr. MURPHY. At the bottom of the page.

Mr. GREW. That is not in Foreign Relations.

Senator LUCAS. Proceed, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. GREW (reading):

[1518]

NOVEMBER 29

Our Government has handed to the Japanese—

mind you, this was written on the spot at the time in Tokyo

Our Government has handed to the Japanese a ten-point draft proposal justifying the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge, object statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically everything that she ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply stop her aggressive policy. If she adopts such a program she would be offered free access to needed raw materials, free trade and commerce, financial co-operation and support, withdrawal of the freezing orders, and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty of commerce with us. If she wants a political and economic stranglehold on the continent of East Asia (euphemistically called the New Order in East Asia and the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)—which most of her extremists do want—she must pursue her southward advance by force, she will soon be at war with the ABCD powers and will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to the status of a third-rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she can obtain peace without further fighting all of the desiderata for which she allegedly started fighting—strategic, economic, financial, and social security.

[1519] Then I said further:

I have had conversations with friends and after examining their testimony I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge of the

contents of the American document of November 26, that Washington has delivered an ultimatum—

now, wait a moment. I beg your pardon, sir, I am wrong. I was quoting a statement made to me by a prominent Japanese. I will withdraw that and begin again, just that last passage, if I may. This is written on December 5, 1941. (Reading:)

Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a letter from a prominent Japanese who is closely in touch with Government circles here. This letter reads in part as follows: "The situation is very regrettable. You know how I feel and I may understand your feelings. Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now in my mind. I have had conversations with friends and after examining their feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual contents of the American document of November 26, that Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is the regrettable psychology of our people."

Now, that document as I think I said this morning was [1520] not published in Japan until after Pearl Harbor and when it was published the paper publishing it was immediately confiscated. In other words, the authorities did not want the Japanese people to know what was in that document.

Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you if you are acquainted with any of the members of the General Board that made this investigation and so made the report that I have read to you heretofore?

Mr. GREW. I beg pardon, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Are you acquainted with any of the members of the Army Board that made this report which was described to you in the statement "it was the document that touched the button that started the war as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it"?

Mr. GREW. Are you asking me the names?

Senator LUCAS. I am asking you if you personally know any of the generals that made that report.

Mr. GREW. Let me see. I do not recollect now. I may have met them. I did not know any of them well, certainly. Generally Russell, it appears, was the officer who questioned me on this particular point. I did not know him well.

Senator LUCAS. Do you have any knowledge why the Army Board reached such a strained construction of your language and placed it in this report?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I never understood that. I think my evidence is clear.

Senator LUCAS. I certainly agree with you, from what you have read. I examined the transcript and it is rather difficult [1522] for me to understand why the Army Board used that statement of yours in the way it did.

Another thing, while I am on that subject, it is difficult for me to understand why it was that the Army Board said practically nothing about the ultimatum that was issued by Japan, which has been testified to here over and over again by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Welles, and that they used the Ten-Point Program of Mr. Hull so far as their report on the question of ultimatum was concerned.

One other question and then I am through. During your stay, Mr. Ambassador, in Japan, did you have any opportunity to discover what

the Japanese naval forces or military forces were doing in the building up their military or naval machines?

Mr. GREW. We had very little opportunity to get really inside information on that. As I say, the Japanese were past masters at it and their secret police were constantly watching all foreigners; Japanese who were regarded as possibly pro-American or in any way pro-foreign, watching them continually, and if they felt there was a chance of them having imparted information they would gearrest them immediately.

So it was very difficult to find out exactly what was being done; those things dripped through from various [1523] channels from time to time.

We had a pretty good idea in the Embassy, apart from the information published in the press, that they were steadily strengthening both their army and navy. While, of course, there were various announcements made from time to time of the building up of their forces.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any military or naval attachés or Intelligence Department attached to your Embassy?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How many did you have at that time?

Mr. GREW. I think a military and a naval attaché and several called language officers, young officers in the Army and Navy were there to study the Japanese language.

Senator LUCAS. Was that the only intelligence service that you had at that time in Japan that was connected with your department?

Mr. GREW. That was the only intelligence service we had, insofar as we were able to receive information from various sources from our Consuls in the different places, and in some cases friendly foreigners, and in other cases I might say also friendly Japanese.

Senator LUCAS. The reason for these questions takes me back to April 1940, when Admiral Stark appeared before the Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, of which I was a member at that time, and he gave the committee the information that it was practically impossible to learn just what Japan was doing at that time in the way of strengthening her military and naval forces.

They knew from past treaties and past information as to the number of battleships, the number of cruisers, and so forth, but after the termination of the treaty in 1936 he advised us it was very difficult to obtain any information at that time as to what the Japanese were doing either in the way of building battleships or other ships.

Incidentally, he thought they were building at that time two battleships, but he was not certain about it. I just call that to your attention, because it seems to me their secrecy must have been of the highest order if our intelligence service was not able to ascertain whether or not they were building a couple of battleships.

Mr. GREW. Admiral Stark was quite right about that. The Japanese took the utmost precautions to see that information of that kind could not get into the hands of no foreigner. I know, for instance, on the railway from Tokyo down to Shimonoseki at the foot of Honshu Island, close to one of the Japanese navy yards where they were building ships, they had a big stockade erected around the yard and whenever a train passed they [1525] always pulled down the curtains.

Of course, the police were watching all the time to prevent any foreigner from coming into that area. That is just one little instance, but that was the whole system throughout Japan, and it was exceedingly difficult to get accurate information about what they were doing.

Senator LUCAS. Did I understand you to say in your direct examination that the ten-point program that was promulgated by Mr. Hull was published in one newspaper in Japan and that newspaper was immediately confiscated? Is that correct?

Mr. GREW. That is correct, sir, yes sir.

Senator LUCAS. That was after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. That was after Pearl Harbor. That, as far as I was concerned, was of course hearsay, because I was locked up in the Embassy and had no contacts with the outside.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have an opportunity while you were locked up in the Embassy to read the daily Japanese newspapers?

Mr. GREW. After about two or three weeks of our interment, I have forgotten how long it was, they finally did allow the Japanese newspapers to come in to us. The first few weeks they did not.

[1526] Senator LUCAS. The first few weeks you were totally ignorant of what was going on?

Mr. GREW. Yes. I would not like to set a date on it. I would have to consult my record.

Senator LUCAS. Anyhow, they had no free press in Japan, as far as the publication of any document was concerned?

Mr. GREW. Absolutely not. It was completely controlled.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Ambassador, you have already been asked about the Army Pearl Harbor Report at page 51. So that the record will be clear, I would also like to ask you about the part at page 27, which reads as follows:

This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to prepare, but it was too late as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State in handing the Ten-points counter-proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, and it was, as the Secretary of State remarked, washing his hands of the matter.

Then, again, on page 56, and I quote:

The Secretary of State—the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the Secretary of State in delivering the [1527] counter-proposals of November 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the War and Navy departments to gain time for preparation for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government.

I would like to state for the record that the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have the benefit of the testimony of Admiral Inglis, apparently.

I am wondering if counsel is familiar with the report, whether the Army had the benefit of the testimony, to the effect that the Jap Fleet was advancing on November 25 in the direction of American waters? Are you familiar with that, counsel, whether there was such knowledge in the Army Board, or such evidence?

Mr. GESELL. I believe at the time of the Army Board hearing at least a good portion of it was missing. There was even doubt where the Jap transport started from.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, at any rate, this evidence which has been produced would throw a new light on the advance of the Japs from December 25, and you, Mr. Ambassador, would be right in saying it was the time of the note of the 26th, but not [1528] that the time of the 26th was the cause of the act; is that right?

Mr. GREW. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you answer?

Mr. GREW. I said I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, I direct your attention to page 359 of your book—or first to page 358 of the book in which you stated that—and I am reading now from the second to the third paragraph:

it may become open to question whether we can afford to await a British attack and whether we should allow Japan to dig in throughout the area where it visualizes far-flung control. That question, I think, will depend upon the time of the Japanese advance. In the meantime let us keep our powder dry and ready—for anything.

Those were your sentiments, I take it? That is on page 358.

Mr. GREW. Page 358?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Those were your sentiments as of January 1941; is that right? That is the second to the last paragraph at the bottom of the page.

Mr. GREW. Yes; I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you hear my question?

[1529] Mr. GREW. I would like to have it again.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read the question, Mr. Stenographer? (The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. MURPHY. I say, those were your sentiments as on the first of the year 1941?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will you turn to page 365?

At page 365 you make a statement to the effect that the Germans were opposing the sending of Ambassador Nomura to Washington, that they were trying to break diplomatic relations with the United States. Was that your considered judgment as of January 3, 1941?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I direct your attention to page 366 of your editorial in the Kokumin. You refer there to a Japanese editorial warning of war with America. Is that the kind of editorial that was running in the papers in Japan on January 7, 1941?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Congressman, yes, that is the sort of editorial that was appearing at that time, but all sorts of editorials were appearing in the Japanese press, I would say, was totally irresponsible in its editorial statements and often in its actual reports.

[1530] Mr. MURPHY. Then, I direct your attention to page 367 of your editorial at the luncheon at which you were present and at which Matsuoka threatened the United States with war, on January 18, 1941. Did that occur?

Mr. GREW. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. That is the first line of the second paragraph of your note of January 18.

The CHAIRMAN. He asked if that occurred.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; that did occur at that luncheon. I think it is rather important for the record that this whole passage should be read, that is, after I have looked into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Read it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read the pertinent part that you think should go in the record?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

JANUARY 18, 1941.

At the Farewell Luncheon given by Matsuoka for Admiral Nomura today I was talking with them both and was expressing the hope that the Admiral would be able to exert his influence—I didn't say where the influence was to be exerted—to improve American-Japanese relations. Matsuoka remarked: "They certainly couldn't be worse," and turned away.

At the luncheon also practically threatened the United States with war, and I immediately replied to the [1531] following effect: "The Minister too has lived long enough in the United States to know that the American people are fundamentally peace-minded and furthermore that they stand for justice and equity. He also knows that the American people are firmly determined on certain matters among which, on the one hand, are their obligations and, on the other hand, their rights. Their profoundest wish is to see peace, prosperity, security, stability, and happiness assured to all nations. In the present state of world affairs we must inevitably realize that what counts in international relationships today is the concrete evidence of facts and actions, regardless of the persuasive garb in which such facts and actions may be dressed. Let us say of nations as of men: 'by their fruits ye shall know them'."

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, you were asked about the Fleet being in the Pacific, and you stated certain Japanese felt the Fleet should be taken entirely out of the Pacific. I direct your attention to page 368 of your book, to an editorial, or rather an item in the Korean-Japanese language daily newspapers in which the following occurs:

Should Japan make a proposal it would be for instant withdrawal of the American Fleet from the Pacific.

[1532] Were editorials of that nature, or statements of that nature made in other papers in Japan?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. That thought appeared from time to time in the Japanese press.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention to page 378 of your book and I note that you record the fact, under your entry of April 10, 1941, that "Matsuoka went to Europe." Is that right?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

[1533] Mr. MURPHY. That, Mr. Chairman, is the reason for my asking for the exhibit from the Nuremburg trials, to follow up with the trip of Mr. Matsuoka at that time.

I direct your attention to page 390 of your book. There was some testimony given to the committee by Admiral Richardson to the effect that his impression was that the United States was bluffing. In connection with the word "bluffing" and the idea of "bluffing" I direct your attention to page 390 of your book where you make reference to the fact that the Japanese had tried to intimidate you.

Will you expand on that a little bit, please? I direct your attention to the middle of the page.

Mr. GREW. This statement, Congressman, as I remember it, was based on a long talk I had with Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, at his own private house, walking up and down his garden, and just chatting about the things, and I say:

The Minister thereupon makes perfectly clear his interpretation of the Tripartite Pact to the effect that if the United States should convoy its ships to England and if Germany should sink such ships, and if war with Germany should result, he, Mr. Matsuoka, would regard the United States as an enemy in the sense of Article III of the Pact, and it is his belief that war would then ensue between Japan and the United States. [1534] He says that this is only his own opinion and that there would have to be a deliberation only among his colleagues in the Japanese Government but with Japan's participation, which deliberation Japan would have but one out of three votes. (In this connection it is interesting to note that when Germany attacked Greece this year, Mr. Matsuoka, according to the Greek Minister here, informed Mr. Polaris that Japan herself would determine her obligation under the Tripartite Pact and her decision would be guided by common sense, and that Mr. Matsuoka believed that it was quite clear what the decision would be. Nothing was then said of Japan having but one out of three votes.)

I expressed my surprise at that statement.

I also noted in that entry on that particular day:

Soon after Mr. Matsuoka took office he indicated that his platform was that the United States could and should be intimidated into adopting a policy of complete isolation with regard to both the Far East and Europe. This platform was implemented by the Three Power Alliance, which action failed to have the desired effect but was one of the major factors in stilling the trend of American opinion away from isolationism. It would seem that despite the egregious [1535] failure of that attempt, Mr. Matsuoka prefers to persist in a course fraught with the gravest dangers than to take a new course which would constitute admission on his part that he had misread the character and temper of the American people, and which inevitably make his position as Foreign Minister untenable.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate you did state in your entry on that date that:

He at once expresses his astonishment that Mr. Hull had sent for Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, and had told him that Matsuoka had sought to "intimidate" me in our conversation on the

Mr. GREW. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Finally, I direct your attention to page 415 of your book. You were asked whether or not you knew of these Japanese intercepts. You were also asked the question, at least the questions which have been raised here, whether the Japanese knew of our messages. You make a statement on page 415 which would seem to indicate that the Japanese knew of some of our messages, except "one confidential source" is that correct?

Mr. GREW. That is true. I can tell you how that came about. One of the high officials of the Japanese Government [1536] asked me to send a secret message to our Government which they did not want the Japanese military to see and in passing this message I asked me to please put it in our most secret code. I said of course I would do so. Then after a little hemming-and-hawing this official said to me, "We understand that you have one code which is unbreakable."

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Ambassador, in connection with the stationing of the Fleet at Hawaii, stationing it there, when did you first have knowledge of that?

Mr. GREW. I beg your pardon, I didn't understand.

Senator BREWSTER. When did you first have knowledge of the ship being retained at Honolulu?

Mr. GREW. Retained at Honolulu?

Senator BREWSTER. Retained; yes.

Mr. GREW. Well, I can't remember the precise date.

Senator BREWSTER. I inquire with particular relation to whether or not you were advised in advance or whether you learned of it after the event; that is what I am concerned with.

Mr. GREW. Frankly, Senator, I couldn't answer that question without consulting the record. I have no recollection of having been specifically advised of it.

Senator BREWSTER. Could you say whether or not you were [1537] asked for an opinion or whether you were consulted in advance, before that action was taken?

Mr. GREW. I have no recollection of that, Senator. I would have to look at the record.

Senator BREWSTER. You have no recollection that you were, but if you find that you were you will advise us? ¹

Mr. GREW. Right.

Senator BREWSTER. So that if we have no further record we will understand that you were not consulted before the event.

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. You understand that the Fleet went out to Pearl Harbor for maneuvers in March or April 1940 and subsequently on May 7 I believe the decision was notified to Pearl Harbor that the Fleet would be retained there and so far as the evidence now shows it remained there from then on, based at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. You have just spoken about the code. Did you ever have any reason to think that the Japs had knowledge of our codes or were getting any of our messages?

Mr. GREW. Well, I think that, from that which the official mentioned, to the effect that he understood that we had one code that was unbreakable, I think that implied that they were able to break our other codes, but I have no concrete evidence on that, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you ever have reason to think that they knew we were breaking some or all of their codes?

Mr. GREW. I have no [1538] evidence to that effect, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Nothing ever came to your attention which would indicate that they even had a suspicion of that?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; it did not.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you receive copies of any of these intercepts at any time, of the diplomatic communications?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I received no copies of such intercepts.

Senator BREWSTER. Were you ever apprised of the information which they contained?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. So you proceeded all through this period without whatever benefit there may have been to that knowledge in appraising the situation?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. As one of, perhaps, more experience than any other single person in our country with the Japanese, their preparations and their psychology, would you give us your opinion as to whether there was any possibility that if the modus vivendi, which

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.

we have heard discussed, which was under consideration in the part of November, had been submitted to the Japanese instead of a message that was submitted, that it would have any difference in the action of the Japanese at that time?

Mr. GREW. My impression is that it would have made no difference.

Senator BREWSTER. That they were determined on that count that they, irrespective of our replies, short of a complete surrender of their message, would have continued on?

Mr. GREW. I feel that.

Senator BREWSTER. Was that because of their situation at that time in a military sense or did it rest on other factors?

Mr. GREW. It was based mainly on the fact that throughout many years the military had been developing the program, gradually exerting control over all of east Asia, which they called the periphery sphere, first economic control, to be followed by gradual military control, and every step taken by the Japanese military was a way of implementing that program.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, there had gone on, for a considerable period, over some years, the policy of allowing Japanese to secure iron and aviation gasoline from our country before their interests in that respect finally terminated. To what extent, if you recall, did you consult in connection with the various decisions to permit oil traffic to go on?

Mr. GREW. I cannot recollect now whether that precise question was asked me or not, but I frankly expressed my own opinion from time to time in my reports.

Senator BREWSTER. What were they?

Mr. GREW. Those opinions were rather concisely stated in the Report. Would you wish to have me rehearse that statement?

Senator BREWSTER. If you would; yes.

Mr. GREW. Shall I read it?

Senator BREWSTER. Whichever way you prefer.

Mr. GREW (reading);

During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan—and embargoes are of the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as insults—I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes.

I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, relations with that country were bound to go steadily downhill and it most probably would, end in war, and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I felt it would be very shortsighted to go into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. [1541] nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, respect and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats and modify those threats.

We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Japan at the time of the Abyssinian campaign.

But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that at that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that it had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect and shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.

Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended in war but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been three years earlier.

It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanctions.

That, in general, expressed my views at that time, Senator. In other words, I didn't want to see us get into a [1542] position with the Japanese where we might be obliged to step back in our tracks until we were ready to go ahead with whatever program we put into effect.

Of course, at the same time, especially after the autumn of 1940, when we realized that there was always the risk of conflict, I felt we couldn't afford to continue to give these materials to the Japanese, that might eventually be used against us.

Senator BREWSTER. So that you were of the opinion then, and events have seemed to justify it, that that did mean a very definite breach which might well eventually lead to war?

Mr. GREW. There was always that possibility. It was something to be taken into consideration.

Senator BREWSTER. The economic impact of the embargo upon Japan would tend to force them to some move in order to maintain their present economic position?

Mr. GREW. The longer those embargoes went on, of course, the more difficult their economic position became. They had very large stocks of those commodities themselves.

Senator BREWSTER. Of this scrap iron and gasoline?

Mr. GREW. Yes; very large stocks. So there was no telling at what point they would feel they must go down and get the oil by force. We couldn't possibly foresee that.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, we were in the same position——

[1543] Mr. GREW. I would like to add, if I may, this statement.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Whether in the meantime they would be able to come to some kind of an agreement with the United States and satisfy the Netherlands Indies by which they would be able to have access to that oil without fighting.

Senator BREWSTER. The negotiations with the Dutch East Indies went on following that time in their attempt to secure access to those supplies?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. So that in both the case of the embargoes and the case of the fleet at Hawaii, they constituted action from which once taken we were compelled to follow through? That is, we couldn't take then a backward step?

Mr. GREW. It was merely my personal view that it would be a mistake to initiate that action and then have to withdraw that action.

Senator BREWSTER. Both of those actions, the embargo and the stationing of the fleet at Hawaii, constituted a show of firmness on the part of the United States in the situation, did they not?

Mr. GREW. Yes; the policy which I had recommended.

Senator BREWSTER. In the case of the embargo, the embargo was recommended by you?

[1544] Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. So far as you know, the location of the fleet was not a matter on which you recollect being consulted?

Mr. GREW. I do not.

Senator BREWSTER. Subsequent to the stationing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, did you have occasion to express an opinion regarding its consequences or effects?

Mr. GREW. Senator, that is perfectly possible, but I made, of course, a great many reports to Washington during those years, and I can't for the moment recollect whether I actually touched on that point in some of my reports or not. I probably did. It would be rather difficult to put my hands on it.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you recall whether your opinion was ever asked regarding it?

Mr. GREW. I can't recall that particular point; no.

Senator BREWSTER. Would you examine the records and find out if you were and let us know subsequently, as it may be a matter that will be of considerable concern, as to any opinion which you did express as to the effect, as you were, naturally, the one on whom we would depend for an estimate of Japanese opinion?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.¹

[1545] Senator BREWSTER. So far as you now recall, you do not recollect the expression of an opinion on that point?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. But you will let us know?

Mr. GREW. I will do my best to check it.

Senator BREWSTER. You served subsequently for a time after you returned here as Under Secretary of State, did you not?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. For how long a period was that?

Mr. GREW. When I came back from Japan I was appointed assistant to the Secretary of State and spent most of that time going around the country making a great many speeches about what we were up against in fighting Japan, and I was later appointed Director of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department. I don't recollect the precise date. I held that position for something like six months or more. And then in December 1944 I was appointed Under Secretary of State and remained in that position until I retired from the service on September 30.

Senator BREWSTER. 19—

Mr. GREW. 1945.

Senator BREWSTER. How long did you spend in the diplomatic service?

[1546] Mr. GREW. I have been in the service for 41 years. From the 19th of July 1904 to the 30th of September 1945.

Senator BREWSTER. You heard our discussion with Mr. Welles yesterday. I would like an expression of your opinion as to whether or not in the functioning of our diplomatic service the creation of a permanent Under Secretariat might be of benefit to the functioning of the service and of our foreign relations?

Mr. GREW. I feel very strongly that it would be.

Now, in our service, of course, no matter what party we may have belonged to, when we come into the service we are supposed to be absolutely nonpartisan. We are to serve the Government.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.

For instance, William Phillips and I were both twice Under Secretary of State and we both served once under a Republican Administration and once under a Democratic Administration. So it is perfectly possible to serve administrations of both parties over a period of time.

Any officer who cannot go along with the policy of the Government in control at that time naturally wouldn't be worth his salt if he felt he couldn't conscientiously carry out that policy and should retire, without any question.

Senator BREWSTER. In the instance which you mentioned, in connection with the service of both yourself and Mr. Phillips, [1547] that illustrates the attempt of the administrations under which you served to accomplish this benefit of, let us call it, nonpartisan service, but did not give us the benefit of what the British accomplish by their permanent Under Secretariat, who are recognized officials, to continue irrespective of a change of administration.

So that, as I gather, you would feel that development along those lines might well be beneficial?

Mr. GREW. In general, in principle, I feel very strongly that it would be.

There is only one reservation I would make. That is this, that unless personal relations between the Secretary of State and his Under Secretary are of the closest and most intimate nature, with complete mutual confidence, it just doesn't work. So if a situation arose where a new Secretary of State found that he could not establish those relations with the permanent Under Secretary, or vice versa, I think there would have to be a change.

Senator BREWSTER. I think Mr. Welles made the point that under the British system there were two Under Secretaries, one permanent and the other transitory.

Mr. GREW. One is a Parliamentary Under Secretary; he is a political appointee.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Would it not also be true that [1548] the personal difficulties of which you speak presumably would be eliminated as far as an individual is concerned before he had risen to the rank of a permanent Under Secretary, that he never would achieve such responsible position until he had demonstrated the capacity to serve varying points of view and varying administrations?

Mr. GREW. In all probability that is true.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Grew, there has been some discussion of what is and what is not an ultimatum. Would you define what you conceive an ultimatum to be?

Mr. GREW. I think, sir, to give a technical definition I would have to look it up in the dictionary, but I would say it was, essentially, a last word.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, Mr. Hull has defined the Japanese message which was handed to him on November 20 as an ultimatum.

That agreement would require the United States to abandon all of its time-honored principles, in the event we accepted the agreement the Japanese offered. You have so interpreted it?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. It would have required us to consent to the maintenance in China of the Japanese armies and the con- [1549] tinuance of the Japanese armies in Indochina; it would have required us to confirm their occupancy of Manchuria; it probably would have required us to abandon the principle of the open door; it would require us to acknowledge the existence of, if not to consent to, the agreement they had made with the Axis; generally speaking that is true, isn't it?

Mr. GREW. That is true, I would say.

Mr. GEARHART. Therefore, if we had accepted the Japanese agreement of November 20 we would have had to give up everything that Americans call near and dear, pretty near?

Mr. GREW. We certainly would have had to abandon principles for which we had stood.

Mr. GEARHART. And had stood for for many years?

Mr. GREW. Exactly.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, we didn't do it. We offered on the 26th a counter-agreement which, if accepted, would have required the Japanese to have withdrawn their armies from Indochina; would have required the Japanese to withdraw their armies from China; would have required the Japanese to withdraw their recognition of the Wei Government; would have required the Japanese to recognize the Chiang Kai-shek Government; would have required them to interpret the Axis agreement so as not to interfere with any of those matters.

Now, if Japan had accepted our agreement she would simply [1550] have said, "Excuse, please," and withdrawn all her armies and abandoned her campaign of aggression and have gone back to Japan.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; but that is only a part of the story.

In other words, Mr. Hull, in his proposal of November 26, offered Japan a great many assets. It offered Japan, as I said a few moments ago, eventually a relaxation of our economic measures. It offered access to raw materials, free trade and commerce, financial cooperation and support, and various other things. So that Japan would have had, I would say, not only a great deal to gain but everything to gain by accepting that proposal.

Mr. GEARHART. There is no doubt but what there were some very generous inducements offered to the Japanese, but the other issues, the ones that I have named, were absolutely inconsistent with all that Japan had been trying to accomplish during the last several years. She would have had to admit that she was mistaken and would have had to withdraw and go back to Japan, withdraw her armies and admit that she was wrong, which she would have done, but she was not prepared to do it at that time, was she?

Mr. GREW. She absolutely was not prepared to, but my feeling was, at that time, and I so stated in my diary, that Japan, since public opinion in Japan is rather easily molded [1551] in a comparatively short period, as the Government was able to bring pressure to bear on the people, my feeling was that they could persuade the people that the Japanese Government, in the face of the military, could have persuaded the people that they had achieved by peaceful measures everything that they were ostensibly fighting for.

They were ostensibly fighting for economic, political, and social security. Those things would all have flown from the implementation of Mr. Hull's proposals if they had carried it out. Not at once, but over a period of time. In my opinion, the Japanese Government, if it had really wanted to come to some kind of an agreement, could have persuaded the people that this was all in their interest.

Mr. GEARHART. But Japan would have had to abandon her ruthless campaign of aggression and conquest?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely. That was fundamental.

Mr. GEARHART. And that was what they had been doing. She had been spending millions of yen, whatever they were, she had sacrificed hundreds of thousands of lives, and if she had to give up and abandon her ruthless conquests that would have constituted an ignominious defeat for her statesmen who had led her into her awful position; isn't that true?

Mr. GREW. When you speak of Japan you must realize that there is more than one Japan. You have your military [1552] extremists.

Mr. GEARHART. They were running the show and had been ever since the so-called prosperity scheme of robbery began.

Mr. GREW. They had been in control from time to time, but there were periods of relaxation, and there is no question but what some, at least, of their more intelligent statesmen, especially those who had been in our country and knew something about our powers of production, our national spirit, and all the rest of it, realized they would probably, in the case of war with the United States, ultimately be defeated, and must have realized at that time that they were on the brink of an abyss.

If those statesmen had had the courage to take the bull by the horns they might then have shifted the whole situation. I don't say they could have done it, I don't say they would have tried to do it, but there was always that possibility.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, statesmen were not running Japan; the militarists were running it at that time, weren't they?

Mr. GREW. That is perfectly true.

Mr. GEARHART. They were the ones who led the people of Japan into this terrible mistake, and they would be the last to admit it by adopting any suggestion of the United States which would require them to withdraw their troops from China and Indochina and Manchuria.

[1553] Mr. GREW. True, and that is why the doubt was expressed that this proposal of Mr. Hull would bring satisfactory results.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Mr. Hull suggest that that statement was not an ultimatum? Do you mean to say Mr. Hull was willing to negotiate the question as to whether or not Japanese soldiers should stay in Indochina?

Mr. GREW. If you read the document——

Mr. GEARHART. I have read it.

Mr. GREW. I think you will see it is not in itself an ultimatum.

Mr. GEARHART. It is a tendered agreement.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. It is in the form of a tendered agreement.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. One of the specifications is that Japan should get her troops out of Indochina.

Mr. GREW. Correct.

Mr. GEARHART. If that wasn't an ultimatum in itself, then they should get their troops out of Indochina, then the United States would be willing to compromise on that question and discuss something else.

Mr. GREW. No. All I can say is that document contained an important quid pro quo—

Mr. GEARHART. Don't talk about a quid pro quo. [1554] The Japs thought there was a quid pro quo in the question. The other question is, were we willing to temporize on that question of her getting out of Indochina and China.

Mr. GREW. We were not willing to temporize.

Mr. GEARHART. Then that was an ultimatum on that question, wasn't it?

Mr. GREW. Can you say, Mr. Congressman, because there is in a document which definitely must be carried out that the document and all the points therein constitute an ultimatum? I don't say so. I would say that was a carefully balanced document. There is a great deal on the other side of the picture.

Mr. GEARHART. There is another stipulation in the agreement providing that Japan should get out of China and recognize the Kai-shek government. Was that a point upon which we were willing to compromise and temporize or consult?

Mr. GREW. I think in the long run if we were going to stand by our principles it was essential that Japan should give up all her aggression.

Now, I can't say that we would have demanded on the basis of that document that the Japanese get out of China in a week or in a month. They probably couldn't do it. But I think there was an opening for an arrangement by which the Japanese could get out of Indochina and China and in the light [1555] of the great benefits that they would have received as a result could have done it.

Mr. GEARHART. The question I am asking you as an expert is this: Were we willing to compromise or temporize on that point? I am asking you to discuss a change in that particular stipulation, in that contract required Japan to get out of China and recognize the national government there headed by Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. GREW. I couldn't answer that. I couldn't answer for the administration that might have done.

Mr. GEARHART. I thought we were contending for principle. We tendered that agreement to the Japanese.

Mr. GREW. You thought that we were what?

Mr. GEARHART. Wasn't it a fundamental principle in our agreement with Japan that Japan should get out of China and Indochina and recognize the nationalist government and respect the territorial integrity of all those eastern countries?

Mr. GREW. That had been a fundamental principle with us for years.

Mr. GEARHART. Therefore that was not a matter which we would compromise on, was it?

Mr. GREW. It was not a matter on which we would have compromised.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, insofar as that stipulation was concerned, the Hull tendered agreement constituted an ultimatum, didn't it?

Mr. GREW. I would not say so.

Mr. GEARHART. Then if it were not an ultimatum, it was an item upon which we, America, were willing to compromise?

Mr. GREW. I am sorry, I can't agree. In every document of that kind there are some points which are matters of principle which we do not accept. There are other points which would be open for modification. That doesn't mean that because there are two points in a document such as that, that the whole document is an ultimatum. As I say, there was a great deal on the other side of the picture.

Mr. GEARHART. We undoubtedly would have offered greater inducements if she had negotiated further. At least I think we would have, if we could have gotten those other main concessions. If we had been able to induce her to sign an agreement by which she would get out of China and Indochina and would recognize the Chiang Kai-shek government we could give a lot.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Those were the things she would not concede.

Mr. GREW. Without question.

Mr. GEARHART. Those were the things we would not concede and neither would she.

[1557] Mr. GREW. There were certain things we couldn't have conceded.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the United States raised a stone wall and Japan had a stone wall. They came to an impasse at that moment, didn't they?

Mr. GREW. I don't think that that justifies us in calling that proposal an ultimatum, Congressman.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you see what I am trying to do?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. I am trying to get you to admit that that document is what every American in his heart wanted it to be. I don't think you should dodge on this ultimatum word. That, in days to come, is going to be one of the most glorious incidents in American history. The time when we took our stand. Why, of course, we told the world that America stood for principles, for good international relationships, for good neighborliness, in that agreement. For some reason a lot of people are quibbling and saying we didn't really mean it; we were willing to discuss and talk further about Japan ending that despicable program of hers called the coprosperity sphere for East Asia.

[1558] The CHAIRMAN. Is that a question?

Mr. GREW. Is that a question?

Mr. GEARHART. Now, don't be hurrying me, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I was simply asking whether the Ambassador understood that that was a question.

Mr. GREW. No; I did not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not expect you to answer.

Mr. GREW. Was that in the form of a question, Congressman?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; I will put it in the form of a question. I would like to have your views on this subject.

Mr. GREW. In answer to that I can say that through all these years our Government stood on certain fundamental principles of international dealing; at least those were very comprehensively expressed in Mr. Hull's four points which had been put up to the Japanese Government before.

We have never, so far as I know, departed from those principles at any time. Mr. Hull said he supported those principles in every step he took, but at the same time in supporting those principles and in expecting that the Japanese, in order to abide by the principles, would have to get out of Indochina and China, he was offering them something which, as I say, would have completely justified their having accepted those points.

[1559] Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then will you go this far with me, Mr. Ambassador: Will you admit that that part of that document which would have required Japan if she had accepted it to get out of China and get out of Indochina and get out of Manchuria and quit the aggression, was that part of it an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Congressman, I do not think you can take any part of any document and use the term "ultimatum" for it. The term "ultimatum" essentially applies to a complete document. I would not say that that term would apply to any part of that document; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I have Webster here on the question of "ultimatum."

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Noah Webster, Mr. Daniel Webster, or who? Do you want to read that into the record?

Mr. MURPHY. I think it would help the record.

Mr. GEARHART. How many definitions are there?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will read them all.

Mr. MURPHY (reading):

A final proposition, concession or condition; especially, the final propositions, conditions or terms offered by either of the parties in a diplomatic negotiation; the best terms that a negotiator will offer, the rejection of which usually ends the negotiations.

[1560] Mr. GEARHART. Thank you very much.

Mr. MURPHY. Webster's new International Dictionary.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you say that the stipulation in that tendered agreement that Japan should get out of China, out of Indochina, out of Manchuria, and to recognize the nationalistic government of China was not final?

Mr. GREW. The mere fact that we insisted that those things should be a prerequisite for a building up of relations between the United States and Japan does not, in my mind, characterize that proposal, that whole proposal as an ultimatum because there was another side to it and a very important side and I think you have got to take the thing as a whole. I do not think you can take part of it and apply a definition to it.

Mr. GEARHART. But, Ambassador Grew, you are not suggesting to me that we were willing to take those things out of the agreement in order to placate Japan?

Mr. GREW. No; we were not going to take them out. They were part and parcel of the whole thing.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but I am talking about a part of the whole thing; insofar as those parts of the whole thing are concerned it was an ultimatum, wasn't it?

Mr. GREW. I would not say so.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I would like to take the other view [1561] of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That having been settled, you may go ahead now.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

This phrase which you have used and which has brought you much fame, namely, that the document which Mr. Hull handed to Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu constituted "the document which touched the button which started the war."

When did you first use that phrase?

Mr. GREW. I did not use that phrase, Congressman Gearhart. I, a moment ago, I think, read the testimony which is, I believe, before the Army Board, which I think makes perfectly clear that I did not.

Mr. GEARHART. That is very true; I heard that testimony on that a moment ago. The question I am asking you now is when did you express that sentiment first? It could not have been at those hearings because we read it in the newspapers long before you gave that testimony. I want to know when you first expressed that sentiment?

Mr. GREW. Well, I do not believe, Mr. Congressman, that I ever expressed that sentiment in those precise terms. I realized that the Japanese military people had seen fit to call that document an ultimatum and to use it, as they alleged, to touch the button which started the war, but I do not think [1562] I have ever said that did, in itself, touch the button; no.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it constituted, if nothing else, a flat rejection of the Japanese tendered agreement of November 20, did it not?

Mr. GREW. I do not think you can say, Mr. Congressman, that it constituted a flat rejection of the Japanese proposal because it added a great deal to the Japanese proposal. It added things that the Japanese proposal had not even asked, had not ever been touched upon.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, considering its form, it utterly rejected the Japanese-tendered agreement of November 20 and stated a counter-proposal, didn't it?

Mr. GREW. I do not know whether it was regarded as a counter-proposal or not. I was not here at the time and I do not know all the ins and outs of its preparation, and so forth, but I cannot alter my opinion, which is very definite, that in that document we offered the Japanese everything that they were ostensibly fighting for. I do not say that they actually were fighting for, or anything of that kind, but ostensibly what they were fighting for, what they said they were fighting for.

Mr. GEARHART. You heard the testimony of Mr. Hull the other day when he said they were forcing him and pressing [1563] him for an answer to the not of November 11 when he did not see any reason why he should answer it at all as he was tendering a counterproposal?

Mr. GREW. I am not sure that I caught that particular point, but if Mr. Hull did say that perhaps it could be regarded as a counter-proposal.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. GREW. But, as I say, I was not here at the time.

Mr. GEARHART. Since you have been back in America, have you looked over the intercepts or any part of them?

Mr. GREW. No, Mr. Congressman. I have only seen a very few of them. From the moment I came back from Tokyo I found myself

very busy immediately and I did not have much time to go into post mortems, but I have seen some of the main ones but I certainly have not seen them all. I think there are a very large number available.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you see the ones which the Judge Advocate General sums up in these words? [Reading:]

16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington.

Referring to message to change dead line of 25th November and to press negotiations with the United States.

[1564] Mr. GREW. I do not recollect having seen that particular one.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know about the one which has been digested by the Judge Advocate General in a memorandum to the Secretary of War as follows?

Mr. GESELL. What date, Congressman?

Mr. GEARHART. Wait until I get my finger on it. [Reading:]

22 November; translated 22 November.

From Tokyo to Washington.

Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute dead line. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

Have you seen that?

Mr. GREW. I think it was published, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. GEARHART. Oh, yes; both of these have been in the newspapers.

Mr. GREW. Oh, yes; I have seen it.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the point is this: The State Department knew that the 29th was the dead line, and if the Japanese did not get an agreement acceptable to them by the 29th, "things were automatically going to happen."

Now, since the State Department knew about that message they knew that when they tendered the agreement of the 26th that there was no chance of averting whatever Japan was intending to do, having failed to get the agreement she wanted, didn't they?

Mr. GREW. Congressman, I saw one report in the press—I haven't seen the actual intercept—to the effect that if the conversations between the United States and Japan should come to a successful termination the Japanese Fleet, even though it was already on its way to Pearl Harbor, would have been turned back. Am I right in that remark, Counsel?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. GREW. I think it is correct. In other words, I think that would answer that point.

Mr. GEARHART. That was much earlier, I think. The Japanese Fleet was sent, the testimony shows, I think you will all agree, it left Japan on the 25th of November and sailed to a designated rendezvous northwest of Hawaii under instructions to stand by there, and if Japan got the agreement it wanted, which would have required us to abandon all American principles for which we have contended for a generation, that they would turn back to their ports, but it all turned on Japan getting the agreement she wanted, didn't it?

Mr. GREW. I cannot answer that question.

[1566] Mr. GEARHART. And the last tender of agreement which Japan made was the one which was delivered to Mr. Hull on November 20, 1941, is that correct?

Mr. GREW. Congressman, I still have to stand on my point that that memorandum of November 26 contained a great deal on the other side of the picture besides what Japan wanted, and what we were going to be able to give to Japan and we were going to be able to give her a great deal, as expressed in that document.

Mr. GEARHART. Mind you, I am not criticizing the message of November 26. To me it was one of the grandest state papers ever delivered. I am not criticizing it. It might be a question as to timing, and on that I am reserving consideration, but it was a great document, upon which America announced its stand with clarity to the entire world, and we ought to be proud of it and not be ducking as to whether or not we really meant it as an ultimatum.

Let us pass from that now. In your testimony you remarked how the Japanese press treated the presence of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor. You had access to the press and read those statements from day to day as they appeared, did you not?

Mr. GREW. Oh, yes; certainly.

[1567] Mr. GEARHART. Now, you knew that Japan had the totalitarian form of government that was run by the war cabinet, did you not? I guess nobody knew it better than you did.

Mr. GREW. I would say that Japan had a totalitarian form of government after the Tojo cabinet came in. Prior to that time I do not know that you could call it a totalitarian form of government. Japan was made up of a great many pressure groups, a great many different elements in the country, all of which had to be, to a certain extent, pacified by the administration, by the government itself.

I do not think until the military dictatorship was actually established in October 1941, I do not think you could properly have called it a totalitarian government.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, after the Tojo government came into power and the militarists had a chance to consolidate their control of things, they first established a very rigid censorship, didn't they, over the press?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely.

Mr. GEARHART. And that which the press printed for the consumption of the general public did not necessarily represent what the heads of the government were thinking?

Mr. GREW. True.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, they used the press as a propaganda agency, isn't that correct?

Mr. GREW. Constantly.

[1568] Mr. GEARHART. So when you tell us that there were items appearing in the press from time to time expressing irritation because the American Fleet was kept in the Hawaiian waters your were speaking of a controlled press?

Mr. GREW. Yes; I was speaking of a controlled press.

Mr. GEARHART. And at that time the Japanese Government was busily engaged in promoting an anti-American feeling in Japan, were they not?

Mr. GREW. It was.

Mr. GEARHART. And it served their purposes, did it not, at that time to instill a measure of fear in Japanese hearts that the American Navy

was about to assault them, or to leave the impression that we were threatening to? Wasn't that part of their program?

Mr. GREW. To increase in the minds of the Japanese people what? I did not get that.

Mr. GEARHART. To leave the impression with the Japanese people that the American Fleet at Hawaii was a definite threat against the security of Japan?

Mr. GREW. Oh, yes; that is true.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now, the military heads of the government of Japan, being informed by their espionage system of the condition of the American Fleet, and so forth, did not necessarily feel that same way about it, did they?

[1569] Mr. GREW. That is quite possible. I cannot answer, though.

Mr. GEARHART. You heard the testimony of Admiral Richardson to the effect that the Japanese knew more about the American Fleet and battle positions in the Hawaiian Islands than the Americans did themselves, didn't you?

Mr. GREW. Was that my testimony?

Mr. GEARHART. No. You heard that testimony?

Mr. GREW. Well, I would not know, Mr. Congressman. Very probably, but I have had no evidence of being able to make a concrete statement on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, as a matter of fact, you are familiar with Oahu, aren't you, the island that appears on the map here? You know it is utterly impossible to conceal anything in Pearl Harbor from anybody that wants to go on those mountain sides with a pair of binoculars and wants to go up there and see what we have there; so if there were any Japanese spies on the islands—and it is suspected that there were possibly two or three, it is suspected by everybody that possibly there were, there may have been one or two—they knew exactly what was going on in the ships and different things in Pearl Harbor. It was not possible to conceal from a nation conducting espionage against us what was going on there, isn't that correct?

[1570] Mr. GREW. I think you are right.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And those spies—if they had spies, and we suspect they did—reported, of course, to the militarists and not to the people?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, do you thing, basing your answer upon the considerations I have just laid before you, that the military high command in charge of the Government of Japan felt any restraint upon what they were doing in behalf of their programs because of the presence of the American fleet in the Hawaiian waters?

Mr. GREW. Congressman, that is a question purely of opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. I have a very high respect for yours, Mr. Grew.

Mr. GREW. I think that the presence of the fleet in Hawaii was always, to a certain extent at least, a deterring influence on the Japanese, including the Japanese Government.

Mr. GEARHART. Would you have thought that if you had known, as the Japs undoubtedly did know, that our fleet was undermanned, understaffed, underammunitioned, and very much unready for war? Would you have believed that if you had known that, as a diplomat?

Mr. GREW. Well, that is a hypothetical question, isn't [1571] it, Congressman Gearhart? I did not know, and I do not know whether I can satisfactorily answer your question or not.

You merely wish my opinion as to whether it had a deterrent influence on the Japanese Government, who knew that it was not prepared, is that your point?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Well, if that were true——

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the answer is obvious.

Mr. GREW. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let the witness make it, though.

Mr. GEARHART. If he wants to answer it I am willing to listen.

Mr. GREW. If that were true, Congressman, if the fleet, whether fully prepared for war or not, if it had not had a deterrent influence on the Japanese administration or government or military people, why did they let their press come out from time to time and practically demand, convey the preposterous demand that we were to withdraw that fleet from the Pacific?

Having the general knowledge which they did, if they felt that it was a nonentity, and they did have to bother with it at all, I doubt if the newspapers would ever have carried that sort of material.

Mr. GEARHART. For the same reason you mentioned a moment [1572] ago, that the Japanese military people have used the press for the purpose of propaganda, to instill fear in the people and have used it for their own needs. That is the answer to that. The press means nothing. The question is what did the militarists know, and they had a spy system all over these islands and off our shores and they knew what the condition of the fleet was.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; all right, I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. In connection with the statement that the press means nothing, it has been stated that the Japan Times and Advertiser reflected the attitude of the war department. I direct your attention to the editorial attack of the Japan Times and Advertiser as set forth on page 472 of the witness' book.

Mr. GEARHART. You are reading something that happened before 1941, when the militarists took over.

Mr. MURPHY. No; it happened after 1941, when they took over.

Mr. GEARHART. Your purpose in having me yield to you was what?

Mr. MURPHY. Read my statement, please.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks that the colloquy ought to take place between the committeeman examining the witness [1573] and the witness and not go into a discussion between members of the committee over the testimony of the witness. Will you proceed?

Mr. GEARHART. I want to know what the gentleman had in mind when he throws a 400-page book at me.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a statement on page 472 as to the demands of Japan, taken from the Japan Times and Advertiser, very strong demands on America, stating the attitude of Japan toward America and it is supposed to reflect the attitude of the War Department in Japan. I want to get it in the record on the question of the press reflecting the attitude of the War Department.

Mr. GEARHART. That is precisely what the witness said before, that the totalitarians use the press for whatever purposes they want, to tell the truth or to tell falsehoods; it makes no difference.

Senator LUCAS. Let us move on.

[1574] Mr. GEARHART. If you make a few more interruptions, you will probably speed it up.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee proceed to examine the witness without further interruption by the members of the committee.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then, I ask you, who, as a diplomat, believes that the presence of our American Fleet at Hawaii did have a restraining effect upon the Japanese, I will ask you what restraining effect it had on the Japanese on December 7, 1941?

Mr. GREW. In answer to the second question, definitely it had no effect. On the other hand, during all that preliminary period we always kept the Japanese in some doubt. They could not have known, for instance, in the preceding period they were going to be able to do the damage to our fleet that they did. They could not possibly have foreseen that. That was due to nothing that they could have calculated in advance. Therefore, I think that the mere presence of our fleet there and lack of certainty as to what it was capable of was, without question, a deterring influence on them. That does not mean that they were not willing to at least make the gamble of the attack, which they did, but it was a gamble just the same.

Mr. GEARHART. You will agree that the objective was to [1575] cripple the American Fleet in order that they could gain breathing time to consolidate their victories in the South Pacific.

Mr. GREW. Definitely.

Mr. GEARHART. And if the American Fleet had been off the shore of California, they would have had to travel 2500 miles further in order to cripple it, would they not?

Mr. GREW. That is geographically true.

Mr. GEARHART. And if we, for reasons of policy or reasons of compulsion had to contemplate aggressive action against Japan in the defense of this country we would have had to travel 5,000 miles further in order to get at the Japs and we would have had to take the fleet from where they were stationed and take them to the coast for conditioning for war, isn't that correct?

Mr. GREW. That is a naval question, Congressman. I do not think I am competent to answer that.

Mr. GEARHART. You showed you were pretty good in geography just a moment ago, and it is still a geographic question. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Secretary, do you have a copy of your testimony before the Army Board?

[1576] Mr. GREW. I have here only the pages which relate to that one single point, Senator, which was brought up today.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not understand.

Mr. GREW. I have before me only the pages of my testimony before the Army which related to that one point which was brought up today.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you come to bring just two or three pages?

Mr. GREW. How?

Senator FERGUSON. How did you come to have just those pages on that particular point?

Mr. GREW. Because I happened to take occasion to acquire them because I thought that point might come up. I wanted to be prepared to read my testimony on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Had anyone suggested that they might ask you that question?

Mr. GREW. Had anybody suggested?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; had anybody suggested that they might ask you that question?

Mr. GREW. No; it was only guesswork on my part.

Senator FERGUSON. You had read the Army report then?

Mr. GREW. I had read the Army report; yes, sir.

[1577] Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to refer you to some other pages of your testimony and if counsel has a copy, I will ask him to hand it to you. Apparently some of your testimony has been taken off the record. Is that true?

Mr. GREW. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you refer to page 4209?

The CHAIRMAN. May I inquire if the Senator means it has been taken off the record or whether he means that he gave it and it was not put on the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It was taken and not put on the record. The record is clear on that.

Mr. GESELL. There is no proof on that.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to use the exhibit itself to show it. Then, I want you to refer to page 4211, and I read this language:

Now, that is for the record. I shall now speak off the record.

Mr. GREW. Yes, I see that.

Senator FERGUSON. What was taken off the record?

You may want to read back.

Mr. GREW. I would like to just get the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you start back and read it into the record so it may refresh your memory? Will you read into the record, back a few questions so you will get what you did give off the record?

[1578] Mr. GREW. Yes. This part which is on the record about Mr. Kurusu is, I think, entirely covered in my book. In fact, I could read the references, if you wished me to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give off the record what is in your book?

Mr. GREW. Apparently not. You see, this took place some time ago. It was September 27 a year ago. I frankly do not recollect what was left off the record there or why, Senator. I have no recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, go back to page 4209 and see whether that may refresh your memory why you did not answer a question and they withdrew it because you wanted to give the answer off the record.

Mr. GREW. Let me see what the question was. Do you know where that is?

Senator FERGUSON. On page 4209.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you will find it at the bottom of page 4208, being number 34, "General Russell," I take it that is the questioner. So there is no doubt about it, "Mr. Kurusu came over in the fall of 1941, late in the fall,"—do you have that?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it into the record—or I will read it.

to participate in these negotiations. There has [1579] been discussion as to the type of man he was, and his outlook on international relations and Japanese military ambitions and his friendship for the American Government. Would you care to discuss him for just a moment for us?

Now, finally, General Frank says, "Or go off the record."

General RUSSELL. Or go off the record.

General GRUNERT. I would suggest, Mr. Ambassador, that you speak to us off the record, because I do not know who is going to get these records on this investigation.

Mr. GREW. I can tell you the reason why that was off the record, and that is because this was while the war was still in progress, and anything I might have said about any Japanese individual could readily have gotten back to Japan and might have endangered that individual.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the answer now?

Mr. GREW. What is precisely the question?

Senator FERGUSON. At the bottom of page 4208 is the question.

Mr. GREW. You mean the question marked "33"?

Senator FERGUSON. No. 34.

Mr. GREW. (reading):

General RUSSELL. Mr. Kurusu came over in the fall of 1941, late in the fall, to participate in these negotiations. There has been discussion as to the type of man he was and his outlook on international relations and [1580] Japanese military ambitions and his friendship for the American Government. Would you care to discuss him for just a moment for us?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you answer that question?

Mr. GREW. I would be glad to tell you anything I can about it; yes, What happened was this: Along about, I should say, toward the end of September or early in October 1941, before the Konoye Cabinet was formed, Admiral Tojo wrote to the Foreign Minister and said the Ambassador was fatigued and he wanted to send somebody to help him. He said he was going to try to get the best English-speaking man in the Japanese diplomatic service. He said he had not yet approached him, he could not mention his name to him, but he just wanted me to know he was going to have sent somebody over for the reason he hoped I would cooperate in getting plans ready as quickly as possible. Before he could act, the Konoye Cabinet fell out and the Tojo Cabinet fell in, and in my first interview with Foreign Minister Togo, we brought up this point at once. He said he had picked Mr. Kurusu to come to Washington to help Admiral Nomura, as he had the best command of English in the Japanese service. There has been some question as to whether Admiral Nomura's report of the conversations in Washington were always completely accurate and completely comprehensive. His grasp of English was good, but it was not 100 percent. I used to [1581] check up on that. Every time a conversation took place in Washington, Mr. Hull would send me a report of it, and I would take the report and give to the Foreign Minister and he could check it up with his own report. I think he probably saw some of the reports from the Japanese Embassy here did not quite click with our report, and there was something lacking. Anyway, Togo asked if I would arrange to get Kurusu to Washington

as soon as possible on a Clipper, as it was important to carry on the conversations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. I said I would do so.

Kurusu came to see me that night. I had known him about 10 years in Japan. He spoke English almost perfectly, he had an American wife, and I negotiated with him, and I had seen him in a personal way in many respects. I always regarded him as decidedly pro-American in his outlook and sentiments, and the fact that he happened to be the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin at the time of the signing of the Axis agreement did not change my opinion of him very much, because after all an Ambassador, when he is at a post, takes the instructions of his Government and carries them out whether he approves of that particular document or not.

Kurusu came to see me that night before he left. He threw up his hands and said, "I don't know what it is all about. I don't know anything about these conversations. I spent all the [1582] afternoon studying them, and I realize that things seem to be in a very bad mess, but I will go over and do my very best to pull them out because we cannot afford not to come to an agreement." He talked to me for some time about it in a very frank outspoken way. Frankly, he was a Japanese whom I, through long experience, 10 years' experience in a fairly intimate way, both officially and personally, had come to put a good deal of trust in. Anyway, that is the reason, I think, they sent him over here, was to support and cooperate with Admiral Nomura.

As to whether Admiral Kurusu knew what was going to happen, knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor in advance, I have not seen all the secret documents, I have not seen all the intercepts, I have not seen all the statements received from Japan. Perhaps that question can be answered there. My guess is he did not know that Pearl Harbor was about to break, because I do not think the Japanese military people or naval people were taking any civilian into their confidence. The Foreign Office was always looked on askance by the Japanese military, and I doubt exceedingly if either of those men knew what was coming. They might, of course, have known pretty generally if the conversations had not come to a satisfactory conclusion that hostilities might break out, but that they knew where they would break out or how, I would find some difficulty in believing.

[1583] That is the whole story, as far as I know, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the other part was that you gave off the record on page 4211? There is a colloquy off the record there. Do you know what that was?

Mr. GREW. I do not recollect exactly what was said there that was off the record, Senator. My guess is it was something along the line I just told you about. Naturally, I did not want to say anything which would get back to Japan during the war and possibly put some Japanese into danger especially when I felt he had been friendly to our Government. I think that is probably the explanation of that "off the record."

Senator FERGUSON. Along the same line?

Mr. GREW. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it now, you have given testimony here that you did not know that the fleet had been moved from the west coast, that is, the main part of the fleet other than the

Hawaiian unit, had been moved from the west coast sometime in the spring of 1940 to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GREW. I do not think I gave that testimony, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a fact, that you did or did not know it?

Mr. GREW. I think my answer was that I could not answer that question specifically without looking up the record. I think I must have known that without any question. I could not [1584] say definitely that I received a telegram from the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to try to refresh your memory. Will you take your Foreign Relations Book on page 69, and I will ask you this question: What was Arita in the Japanese Cabinet?

You were speaking about Arita.

Mr. GREW. Yes, I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. "After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The Minister, however, replied,"——

Will you read what he said to you?

Mr. GREW. I see exactly, and, frankly there is so much material available over those 10 years of my stay in Japan——

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). I am not criticizing you.

Mr. GREW. There it is. It shows that not only in the newspapers——

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). What did the Minister say?

[1585] The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness complete his answer, please.

Mr. GREW. Not only informal suggestions were made that it would be well to withdraw our fleet from Honolulu, but official representations appear to have been made.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, will you read what the Minister said?

Mr. GREW (reading):

After I had completed the presentation of my views, Mr. Arita said, "I agree in spirit and in principle with everything you have said." He remarked, "Off the record" on the difficulties experienced by the Japanese Government in endeavoring to cope with various elements in this country which advocate a reapproachment with the totalitarian nations, and although he spoke in guarded language he conveyed beyond a doubt that the Government (mentioning especially the Prime Minister and himself) wished to see a different orientation developed. Judging by remarks which he made previously and subsequently, it was evident that this reference was to a desire on their part for closer relations between our two countries.

Senator FERGUSON. Read on then what he said after that.

Mr. GREW (reading):

After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval [1586] ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The Minister, however, replied that the continued stay of our Fleet in those waters constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas, and he desired categorically to assert

that Japan entertained no territorial ambitions. Quite to the contrary, he added, Japan is exerting her best effort to promote good relations with her neighbors, and he cited as an example that a non-aggression pact is to be signed within a few days with Thailand. The emphasis which the Minister placed upon this matter is an indication of the important effect on Japanese consciousness of the stay of our naval forces in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is sufficient.

Now, at that time, Mr. Grew, the State Department had not consulted you as to why they had the fleet out there, had they? Or had they consulted you?

Mr. GREW. That is the point. Remember when I was asked that before, Senator, I said I could not answer that point without looking up the records on whether they consulted me or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you check up the records?¹

Mr. GREW. I will check up and see.

[1587] The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 4 o'clock has arrived.

Senator FERGUSON. We will have to recess until tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend to 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m. of the following day.)

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.

[1588]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[1589] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

When we recessed yesterday, Secretary Hull, I think Mr. Cooper was questioning you. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I notice on page 44 of your written statement you said:

On December 6, our Government received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese Fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers and 20 destroyers from Indo-China toward the Kra Peninsula. This was confirmation that the long threatened Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south was under way. The critical character of this development, which placed the United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an important subject of my conferences with representatives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.

You kept the responsible officials of the War and Navy Department constantly advised of any information you received?

Mr. HULL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything the State Department had with respect to the situation in the Far East and especially as to Japan?

Mr. HULL. I did my best to comply with that function and [1590] duty of the State Department, and I am satisfied my associates did likewise. It is due, however, to the Navy to say that they were getting large amounts of information themselves directly—for example, all the interceptions came to them first. We received information about this threatened danger, I think, on the 6th from a British dispatch and from dispatches, one or more, of our consuls and other officials stationed in the Indo-French area, and that whole situation was naturally a matter for discussion, as well as the mere circulation of information among each other.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe it was on November 7 that you stated that at a Cabinet meeting you spoke at some length covering the situation fully, and it was your opinion that all of the forces of our country should be on the alert and should be expecting any development that might eventuate in the Pacific.

Mr. HULL. Yes, and that the military situation might break at any time, and I think the Cabinet agreed entirely to that view, especially when by that stage there was so much information almost daily in the press, dispatches about bitter speeches of Japanese statesmen, dispatches about their continuing their movement down the China coast to Indochina, and other phases of information which, on their face, indicated clearly what was on hand.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. One other question, if I may, Mr. Secretary. [1591]

Evidence was presented to this committee by Admiral Inglis, of our Navy, which came from Japanese sources through intercepted messages and from Japanese prisoners who had been questioned, indicating that the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, and the special envoy, Mr. Kurusu, did not know of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and as I recall the statement of Mr. Sumner Welles, he indicated that he thought Ambassador Nomura was sincerely anxious to maintain peace between Japan and the United States but he indicated that he did not have such a high opinion of Mr. Kurusu.

As I understood the testimony of Mr. Grew on yesterday, he indicated that he had a rather high opinion of Mr. Kurusu. I was wondering whether you had any information or whether you desire to give an expression of your opinion as to that situation?

Mr. HULL. I had this impression, in a general way, and that is that they both knew by that time that they were here primarily to prevail on us to abandon our doctrines and policies and yield entire control of the Pacific beyond Hawaii, to and including India, all the important trade routes coming out of the Far East, yield the political, economic, and other kinds of arbitrary domination to Japan. That was what they were primarily concerned about, to clear the way for Japan to go [1592] forward with her plans of conquest without having to fight us.

So they went considerably in a superficial way along that route. They must have known, from what they said to us so often, so constantly, "We want to hear from you at once or something awful may happen; the situation is explosive now in Japan", and urging us, beyond all the ordinary rules of conversation between two governments. I think these two gentlemen must have been morally certain, if not absolutely so, that their Government was going on with this movement, that they must clear the way by having us get out of the way, if humanly possible, and if not, they must have known that the Japanese military forces were going on anyhow.

Now as to just when and where they would attack, I would not undertake to say definitely, because I could not. As to whether they, or either of them knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, they may have known or they may not, I would hesitate to say.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The conferences with those two representatives of Japan were continued right up to the time of the attack, were they not?

Mr. HULL. Yes. The main phase of the conference with them was due to the fact that when the President returned from Warm Springs about the 30th of November he asked us to call on the Japanese Government to find why they were concentrating all [1593] these troops in Indochina, and other phases relating to that question. They did not make a reply after the first conference, and they did not make a reply, I think, until about the 5th of December. I could be in error about this date.

However, there was nothing new about our general proposition for a basis of conversations. They made some reference to it and we would not have known but what they were going on with the conversations with us with that as a basis.

That was our last proposal on the 26th. But it will be borne in mind that, according to the interceptions, Kurusu and Nomura were instructed, from about the 27th or somewhere back there, to continue talking with us as though they were in earnest, when they were not.

[1594] The VICE CHAIRMAN. As I recall the press reports about that time, I think you expressed yourself in rather strong terms to them when you found out about the attack and they had been in conference with you right up to that time.

Mr. HULL. Up somewhere—it must have been up around midday, I received a telephone message from the White House stating that there was a report that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. After a few preliminary words, I said, "Can you have that confirmed? I have an appointment with the Japanese representatives here in my office at 1 o'clock." He said it had not been confirmed but they would give that attention. The upshot was that the last I heard from that source was that, until the Japanese came in.

I discussed before they came whether I would accredit that report as the unquestioned truth of the situation and refuse to admit them or whether in view of the extremely delicate relations I would leave open the 1 chance in 10 or more that the report was not correct. I proceeded to receive and confer with them although I felt that the chances were altogether virtually certain that the report was true.

So the proposal they made was comprised of a few pages defining the Japanese attitude just the reverse of what it was. It was, "Peace, peace, peace." And then they took our attitude and defined it as just the reverse of what it was.

[1595] Well, I felt and knew of the extreme probability that the Pearl Harbor report was true. I felt like taking liberties in talking to them about their Government in what would not be diplomatic language in ordinary times.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you have any further statement you desire to make?

Mr. HULL. I don't know of much more that I can give the committee. Two volumes of publications are here. A 75-page statement was given to you at the outset. Every effort has been made to give you anything we can that is material in connection with your investigation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Secretary, I merely wish to ask one or two questions.

The statement first made in your prepared statement for the committee emphasizes the meeting of November 7 with the Cabinet preceded by a detailed statement of the continuing critical situation in the world and especially with Japan.

Now, I would like to read, just briefly, from your statement:

On November 7 I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the [1596] Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion that relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

Now, that was the first Cabinet meeting at which you had drawn special and direct attention to the critical situation developing in the world and especially in the Pacific?

Mr. HULL. That was the first recent meeting, at least, where there had been an elaborate detailed consideration of the situation.

Senator GEORGE. They previously had been general.

Mr. HULL. At all Cabinet meetings, with few exceptions, either the President or I dealt with some phases of the situation as it was developing.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

[1597] Now, Mr. Secretary, on November 25—read from your statement:

* * * I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The highlights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at anytime, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans.

Now, particularly:

I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

Is the committee to understand that you made substantially that statement last read at this meeting on November 25?

[1598] Mr. HULL. That is my recollection. I think you will find that right soon after that date, when the Roberts Commission was functioning, I gave that original statement.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Mr. HULL. Merely in justice to the Army and the Navy and to the diplomatic branch of the Government, for them to understand, which they doubtless did anyhow, that the diplomatic establishment had exhausted its efforts to every practical extent to maintain or preserve peace.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Now, again, Mr. Secretary:

On November 25, at the meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that, in my opinion, the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

Mr. HULL. That was mainly a repetition of what we had been [1599] saying among ourselves individually and sometimes in groups for a few days prior to that. In other words, I think everybody who was following this closely was obliged to have made up their minds by this time about the seriousness of the situation and the imminence of the danger. They knew that Hitler was not going to stop. They knew that the Japanese war party in supreme control in Japan was tied in hard and fast with Hitler, and we didn't know what effect that might have on the Japanese move in addition to their own initiative.

So it was a most complicated and delicate and dangerous situation with these factors that would not ordinarily exist in the case of just one country. So after all these discussions back and forth with the Japanese and among ourselves, I think everybody reasoned the danger was imminent after their ultimatum. They couldn't have been more definite in that respect. And wherever we met after that we were discussing the increasing dangers and increasing imminence.

Senator GEORGE. That is, the constantly developing world conditions which were drawing more and more serious?

Mr. HULL. Exactly.

Senator GEORGE. And on these dates that I have directed attention to in your formal statement, you had reached a conclusion that the matter was largely in the hands of the Army and the Navy; that is, the security of the country?

[1600] Mr. HULL. Yes; that was my judgment; and I think the developments as they existed during those days, soon after the 20th of November, the Japanese movements forward, plans of attack—I think that confirms fully our estimate of what was imminent at that time.

[1601] Senator GEORGE. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, I want to direct your attention to the decision not to withdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor and its preparation for action and its being exposed to attack on account of being based at Pearl Harbor, and in that connection I desire to read you briefly from the testimony of Admiral Richardson when he was being interrogated by the gentleman from California:

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes; but I think when you consider the many, many other things that had to be done before active war operations could be undertaken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West Coast would have little effect on the over-all time, because you had to assemble a train, you might have to build some, and you might have to have drydocks, you might have to have repair facilities, you had to have a terrific amount of

stores and all kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields and everything else, none of which was ready, * * *

So the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West Coast when actual war started it was a matter of no moment, in my opinion, because other things controlled the time of getting ready.

[1602] Mr. GEARHART. Well, considering the other situation, the one which actually happened, by having our fleet in Hawaiian waters we had our fleet 2,500 miles closer to the enemy for their sneak attack.

Admiral RICHARDSON. Do you want an opinion on that?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; unless it is a question of geography, unless it is a matter of going over water, or something else.

Admiral RICHARDSON. In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a Japanese Fleet that could cross most of the Pacific Ocean and deliver an undiscovered attack on Pearl Harbor would quite likely have been able to deliver the same attack on Puget Sound.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that is amazing.

Admiral RICHARDSON. But the whole question is the amount of oil they have got in the ships.

I wonder if you care to comment on whether such considerations as those may have been discussed or entered into the decision not to withdraw the fleet from Hawaiian waters under existing conditions?

Mr. HULL. I should say that, of course, none of us in the State Department would profess to have a technical knowledge of the construction side of the Navy, the matter of enlarging its equipment or its supplies, all that kind of thing are matters [1603] for Navy people primarily and not for a layman.

I knew that we had a most touchy and delicate situation extending around the world and that the opposition was interlocked and working in many devious ways. I thought I knew at the same time as a matter of psychology that the worst bandit—and they were bandits of the most savage type, the leaders of Japan and Germany—the worst bandit, as he prowls about and he looks about, has always got his eyes open to see if any pistols or any guns or any weapons are in sight. He does not like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him. None of us care for that, as a matter of fact. And it was the same way as a matter of psychology with this bunch of overlords who were running rife over the earth.

They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not, and for that reason I thought that, especially after it was out there, I thought that it should stay there.

Mr. CLARK. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

[1604] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Secretary, when did you first see the President of the United States on December 7, 1941?

Mr. HULL. We had a meeting that evening at the White House. I talked with him over the telephone during the day; I do not recall at this moment whether I was in the White House during the afternoon or not.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall whether or not you talked to him over the telephone on the morning before the attack?

Mr. HULL. He called me.

Senator LUCAS. Do you remember about what time?

Mr. HULL. Oh, it was up somewhere—it was after Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox had left my office and they remained there until—

Senator LUCAS. Was that after the—

The CHAIRMAN. He had not finished his answer.

Senator LUCAS. I am sorry. I beg your pardon.

Mr. HULL. They remained in my office until, I think it was, a little after 12 o'clock, but I am giving my best impression.

Senator LUCAS. Was that before you received word that Pearl Harbor had been attacked?

Mr. HULL. I had not received that word until the Presi- [1605]
dent called me. That is the first information I had on the subject.

Senator LUCAS. But that morning you did have a conversation with Secretary Knox?

Mr. HULL. And Stimson.

Senator LUCAS. And Stimson?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Now, what was the subject of the conversation between the three of you on that morning, as you recall?

Mr. HULL. According to my best recollection it was in line with our increasingly frequent conferences over the telephone or in person as the dangers and the threatened outbreak in Japan increased.

For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this information from our consuls and from a British dispatch that this Japanese armada had left its jumping-off point and was sailing toward the Kra Isthmus and that Prime Minister Tojo had made a speech some time about that time or a little before—yes; it was a little before this. But that, along with these actual movements, especially these movements, was the occasion, the chief occasion, I think, of our conference. Tojo's speech was some days before, but it shed further light on what was happening then.

[1606] Senator LUCAS. Well, now, did you see the President of the United States on Saturday, December 6th?

Mr. HULL. Oh, I do not recall at this moment.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall whether you had conversations with him at that time?

Mr. HULL. Oh, I was in touch in some way on each of those days, with somebody at the White House or the Navy and the Army.

Senator LUCAS. In the conversations that you had with Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of the 7th was there anything said in that conversation about the likelihood of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor?

Mr. HULL. Nothing. As you understand, the attack was then on apparently. The fleet was moving toward the Kra Peninsula, which would greatly endanger the situation.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get your last answer. Will you read it, please?

Mr. HULL. I said the attack was under way, according to the dispatches, on the sixth. This fleet was moving, not up north in the Bay of Siam or Thailand, but it was, so far as my impression extended, moving toward the Kra Isthmus, which was probably a threat all the way down toward Singapore, down the peninsula, and not far from Malaya.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Hull, I was interested in your [1607]
statement in regard to the conversations you had with the Japanese envoys.

You stated that while they apparently were looking at your eyes they were looking over your shoulder, out of the window, to determine the strength of our armed forces and that in dealing with a nation whose leaders were dangerous outlaws the only thing that they considered in these diplomatic talks was the question of how much military and how much naval power we had.

Am I correct about that?

Mr. HULL. Yes. That was based on this further view—and I never criticize anybody for their opinions. I accord to every American full patriotism and the highest motives in dealing with public affairs, but if we had—we and the British and the other peace-loving countries—had maintained when we saw Hitler moving as he did from 1933 on and when we saw the Japs moving as they did from 1933 on, if we peaceful nations had had sort of a Military Establishment all we would have had to do at that early stage would have been to turn to them and say, "We don't want you to take that course, we don't want you Japs to go into China on this sort of an outrageous expedition." The chances are overwhelming that they would not have done it but, of course, that is one of the unfortunate phases of human experience.

[1608] Senator LUCAS. Well, I assume from that answer that it is your view that any diplomatic or political relations of Japan with this country were definitely tied in with their own naval and military forces in their homeland?

Mr. HULL. Well, Tojo was the head of the whole concern. The military were in control from 1937, when they moved into China, and they controlled the Army and officials. They were in supreme control of Japan and everything Japan possessed, including the Navy and its direction.

Senator LUCAS. Well, therefore am I correct in my assumption that, as a result of having to deal with a nation of that kind who tied their diplomatic and political relations with the military and the navy, that it was also necessary for us in dealing with Japan more or less to take a like course; and that that was one of the reasons why the fleet was in the Pacific at that time?

Mr. HULL. Exactly. That is a part of the psychology. As I tried to make clear a day or two ago, when a nation is dealing with lawless nations and governments, with every kind of dishonest and dishonorable and ulterior purposes in view, that the diplomatic influence is not much stronger than the military organization behind it.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, the fleet based in Pearl Harbor was a tremendous factor in our political and in our [1609] diplomatic dealings with Japan at that time?

Mr. HULL. Oh, I think it was. We do not know—nobody knows with all of those machinations going on daily and nightly between representatives of Hitler and Tojo, planning every imaginable step—we do not know just how much influence the Navy at Pearl Harbor had in inducing a little more circumspection on their part and a little more consideration for this Nation and this Government, but I could not help but feel that it did have that restraining effect.

Senator LUCAS. Well, a nation that lives on force, the only thing that it fears is force, isn't it?

Mr. HULL. Precisely. That is the old saying at least.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in your manuscript which was prepared and presented to this committee I direct your attention to page 15, and I desire to ask one or two questions.

You state there that [reading]:

Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.

In other words, as I understand it, and I think the [1610] English is very clear on it, the agreements that we had in effect at that time were sufficient to keep the peace in the Pacific if Japan had recognized the sanctity of international treaties?

Mr. HULL. Oh, we had copper riveted agreements with the Nine Power Treaty as the central point in the framework of international relations in the Pacific.

As I said, outside of the local agreements, outside of international law, outside of the Nine Power Treaty, outside of anything moral that the League of Nations provisions might have affected the mind of a person at all disposed to be law abiding and along with that I think that covers the main structure.

Senator LUCAS. Now, on that same page you state [reading]:

We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries.

Now, the truth of the matter is that the 10-point program was based upon those fundamental American principles that you were talking about in that statement?

Mr. HULL. To be sure there is nothing new in it and nothing that any law-abiding nation would not be delighted [1611] to support and practice.

Senator LUCAS. And how long has this Nation stood upon those fundamental basic principles that you have talked about?

Mr. HULL. We have from over an indefinite period in the past stood for all of the doctrines that you see set out. Other law-abiding and peaceful nations, law abiding and civilized, have stood for the same thing.

Senator LUCAS. And that was regardless of what political party was in power, those fundamental basic American principles have been the same?

Mr. HULL. Oh, to be sure.

Senator LUCAS. I direct your attention, Mr. Secretary, to the report of the Army Board that investigated the Pearl Harbor disaster. I will ask you whether or not you were a witness before that Board?

Mr. HULL. I was not. I sent some little data to them and I informed them that I would be pleased to appear before the Board at any time on any phase of the matters about which I might make contribution, but they sent word that they would not need my presence before the Board.

Senator LUCAS. So they never called you as a witness after that?

Mr. HULL. No.

[1612] Senator LUCAS. Now, you are familiar with that report, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. HULL. Oh, I have been over it.

Senator LUCAS. Did they ask you for any data or any statement concerning the 10-point program that was handed to the Japanese by you?

Mr. HULL. No.

Senator LUCAS. In this report in chapter 4, headed "Responsibilities in Washington," I read the following:

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:

"We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall."

Now, this is the finding of the Board:

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.

They also in that same report, in the next paragraph or two, state [reading]:

[1613] Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' Truce."

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten Points" which they took as an ultimatum.

It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it.

Now, they have charged in this report by direct charges and by implication and innuendo that you issued the ultimatum that started the war. I think you have demonstrated to any fair and impartial hearer at this hearing that that just is not true, but would you care to elaborate any further upon these comments?

Mr. HULL. That is not a very pleasant topic to me. I strove to co-operate with the Army and Navy Board without success and then I was gratuitously brought into the picture, apparently on the theory that Tojo and the military element moving abreast with Hitler on a world rampage, were not doing so and were not guilty of doing so, but that this Government of peaceful people, with no preparations in the Pacific to fight, with no two-ocean Navy on hand, with only peace appeals for months to the Japs, that this Government was the cause and that it forced poor, innocent, peace-minded Tojo and that bunch of savages and outlaws into war.

If I could express myself as I would like I would want all of you religious minded people to retire. I stood under that infamous charge for months, when every reasonable minded person knew that the Japs were on the same march of invasion in the Pacific area to get supreme control over it in every way so that we could not even land a boat load of goods on the other side of the Pacific except under extortionate terms—every person knew that they were on this move because if he had not known it in any other way, the heads of their Government were telling the world every week, sometimes every 2 or 3 days, precisely what they were doing and what they were going to do; and yet, somebody who knows little and cares less, now says, "Why didn't the United States make concessions and save us from the war," when any person knows, and if you look back at the situation as it existed

during those last 10, 12, 14 days any rational person knows just what the Japs were doing.

They were off on this final attack and no one was going to stop them unless we yielded and laid down like cowards, and we would have been cowards to have lain down.

[1615] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, your hour is up and the committee appreciates the fact that you have furnished so much information here. The committee feels that probably you are entitled to a rest for 2 or 3 days before resuming and, therefore, counsel will get in touch with you as to when you shall reappear.

Mr. HULL. Well, I do not desire to inconvenience the committee in carrying out its schedule in any way. I will do my best to cooperate with you in that respect.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee appreciates that.

Mr. HULL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grew, you may resume.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW (Resumed)

Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, before the questions begin, may I clarify a point in the record in my testimony of yesterday?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Mr. GREW. The record indicates that I said, in answer to a question, that after the Cabinet meeting in Tokyo of December 1, I guessed that they had discussed the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, I cannot recollect exactly how I phrased my answer but it was far from my intention to leave that impression because I did not and could not have guessed that. What I did [1616] guess was that the Cabinet may have been discussing the opening of hostilities with the United States, but knowing the way that things work in Japan I do not believe for a moment that the military high command would ever have taken the civilian members of the Cabinet into their confidence as to their precise plans.

They had every reason to keep those plans in the utmost secrecy, so while I do think that that Cabinet meeting may well have discussed the question of opening hostilities, I do not think that they discussed the question of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, I believe, was in the process of examining Mr. Grew when we recessed yesterday.

You may proceed, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, did you correspond with the President when you were in Tokyo as the Ambassador?

Mr. GREW. As I recollect it, Senator, I had only one exchange of letters with him. Those have been published. It is possible that I wrote him personally on other occasions but I do not think so. I think that was the only exchange, the exchange published.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were they published?

Mr. GREW. They are published in my book. I think they may have been published in Foreign Relations. I am not certain. [1617] of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have someone check that to see if they are?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. I can give you the date pretty quickly.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. I will give you the date to check that up.

Senator FERGUSON. Please. I think on page 360 you have a notation of one.

Mr. GESELL. 359.

Mr. GREW. What is that?

Mr. GESELL. Page 359, on December 14. Is that the letter?

Senator FERGUSON. December 14.

Mr. GREW. December 14, 1940, was it?

Senator FERGUSON. On page number 359?

Mr. GESELL. Page 359 of the book.

Mr. GREW. Page what?

Mr. GESELL. Page 359 of the book.

Mr. GREW. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. What year?

Mr. GESELL. 1940 that is.

Mr. GREW. December 14, 1940. Let me see whether there is anything here or not.

[1618] Mr. GESELL. I am quite sure that is not in volume 2, since that reports conversations.

Mr. GREW. I do not believe it would be in volume 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, could you have Mr. Hamilton check that while we go along with some questions on it?

Mr. GREW. It does not appear to have been published in Foreign Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. It does not appear to be published?

Mr. GREW. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you furnish copies to Mr. Hull? I am wondering how it would get into Foreign Relations if it went to the President direct.

Mr. GREW. Well, I have no record of that. I assumed that I sent copies to the Department of State, probably, without any question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you refer to your letter to the President?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the foreign relations with Japan as of that time?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the substance of the relation? What was the point at issue?

Mr. GREW. The point at issue appeared to be stated as [1619] follows:

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle—that is the angle of the American Embassy in Tokyo—to be:

- (1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;
- (2) Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat;
- (3) To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.*

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you refer to page 360, where you use this language:

The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program but when.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you elaborate on that and explain what you meant there?

Mr. GREW. The Japanese had moved out all through East Asia. They were into China, Indochina and they were in a position to threaten what I considered our vital interests. [1620] They were in a position to threaten the Philippines and they were also in a position to cut off one of the lines to Great Britain for her supplies to enable her to continue the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through with your answer?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be fair to say that at that time you saw in the near future a war between the United States and Japan?

Mr. GREW. Senator, during all my period in Tokyo I was doing everything in my power to prevent a war between the United States and Japan, up to the very end. As I said yesterday, that is the only position that I think any diplomatic representative should take.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not a question of questioning your motives at all. I just wanted to know whether that sentence would indicate that at that time you saw a war between the United States and Japan and it was only a question of when the war was going to be?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I do not think that that is the whole story. It was a question of whether we were going to be able to take steps which would prevent a war between the United States and Japan, which would prevent a war between the United States and Japan.

[1621] Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will read another sentence from page 360 of your book.

We are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

It is not quite the whole sentence that I am reading.

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest you read the whole paragraph, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I will read the whole paragraph.

Mr. GREW. Which paragraph is that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Will the Ambassador read the paragraph?

Mr. GREW. On page 360?

Senator FERGUSON [reading]:

It therefore appears that sooner or later * * *

Mr. GREW. Yes. [Reading:]

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

Now, that clash need not have been a military clash. In other words, it was always my hope that the economic [1622] measures which we had taken against Japan would finally bring Japan to a position where she might come to a reasonable agreement with us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, you were warning the President that it would be necessary for America to take some definite steps along definite lines if we were to prevent a military clash with Japan?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And that Japan would have to take certain steps?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. I said that I thought that there were risks involved both in a positive policy and a laissez faire policy, but I thought that the risks of a laissez faire policy were greater than the risks of a positive policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it a question then when we should take these steps?

Mr. GREW. Well, this letter was written in December 1940.

Now, the record show that our step on freezing Japanese assets took place on July 25, 1941, but in the meantime during that period we were tightening up, as I recollect it, all along the line in our embargoes of commodities to Japan which the Japanese could use for military purposes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did we freeze aviation gas for Japan? [1623]

Mr. GREW. The date on which we put on an embargo on oil?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on aviation gasoline.

Mr. GREW. Aviation gasoline?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you know when that was?

Mr. GREW. That, I think, is contained in Foreign Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it July 31, 1940?

Mr. GREW. I could not say that, confirm that date without looking it up. "July 31, 1940, announcement of limitation by the Western Hemisphere of the exportation of aviation gasoline."

Senator FERGUSON. That was at least a limitation on the exporting to Japan of aviation gasoline?

Mr. GREW. That was what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. A limitation, at least?

Mr. GREW. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it an absolute prohibition of any gasoline?

Mr. GREW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Aviation gasoline. All right.

Now, what was the President's reply to your letter of December 1940?

Mr. GREW. The President's reply is published on page 359 of my book. [1624]

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what would you say was a fair appraisal, without reading the whole letter?

Mr. GREW. Well, the President's appraisal was that the whole problem was a global problem and that every development in any part of the world would affect other parts of the world.

In other words, he said [reading]:

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face are so vast and so inter-related that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we cannot lay down hard-and-fast plans. As each new development occurs, we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he agree or disagree with your opinion?

Mr. GREW. He says at the beginning of his letter:

I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you give us the reason why [1625] you corresponded directly with the President rather than through Mr. Hull and the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I had been in the United States on leave of absence in 1931 and when I saw the President he said, "When you have some thoughts on the situation, drop me a line." In other words, this letter was written to him at his invitation.

Senator FERGUSON. You say in 1931 that he suggested that?

Mr. GREW. No, 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. 1939.

Mr. GREW. I was here in the summer and autumn of 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. I misunderstood you.

Mr. GREW. 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. I misunderstood you. In 1939 he suggested that and then you wrote him?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time were you of the opinion that Japan would fight or were they bluffing?

Mr. GREW. I never thought that Japan was bluffing, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. From what you heard and what you saw in Japan you were of the opinion then that they were not bluffing?

[1626] Mr. GREW. I was.

Senator FERGUSON. That they would fight under certain conditions?

Mr. GREW. Under certain circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever notify the State Department or the President as to what those circumstances were that they would fight for or under?

Mr. GREW. Senator, my reports to the State Department were continuous and many. I was constantly expressing my views to the Department of State and the Secretary of State. I cannot tell you without an examination of the records whether and when that particular point was covered.

Senator FERGUSON. But would it be a fair appraisal of your communications to the State Department that you had told them that Japan was not bluffing, that they would fight under certain circumstances and you related from time to time the circumstances?

Mr. GREW. I think the record shows that completely, Senator; from my arrival in Japan in 1932 I quoted to you yesterday a statement which I made in a letter to Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of State at that time, shortly after my arrival in Japan, in which I said the Japanese Army has been built for war and it wants war and I said it would be criminally somnolent for us to close our eyes to any possible eventualities in the Far East.

[1627] Senator FERGUSON. On page 4219 of your testimony before the Army Board, I notice that you give this as part of your answer:

Frankly, I could not answer that question without looking into it, but I am sure that everything I wrote was not published by any means.

What did you have in mind by that statement? You better look at the whole answer.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair suggest you might also look at the question that you answered in order to get the context.

Mr. GREW. I would just like to read the record on that.

Senator FERGUSON. If the Chairman please, the witness has the whole instrument before him.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no desire to get an answer except as to what he had in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman simply wants him to refresh his recollection as to the question that he was answering, so he may have the whole thing in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the Chair think the witness might need his memory refreshed?

The CHAIRMAN. That is an academic question. I was merely suggesting that he look at the question that he was asked in order to refresh his recollection.

[1628] Mr. GREW. Yes. The question was: "Do the various books to which you made reference in your testimony convey all the information that you conveyed to Washington on the likelihood of war?"

And I replied, according to the record: "I could not say that, I do not believe, because I sent a great deal of material during all of that time to the State Department both by telegram and by written dispatch, and it would have been impossible, within the confines of two volumes"—I was referring to our Foreign Relations—"to have published all of that material. I think the highlights have been published, but I could not say it has all been published. Frankly, I could not answer that question without looking into it, but I am sure that everything I wrote was not published by any means. It would have been practically impossible to publish the tremendous volume of reports that I sent in during those 10 years."

Senator FERGUSON. Who would determine as to what was to be published in the books?

Mr. GREW. I think that would have been determined by the various officials. I cannot tell you, because I had nothing to do with the publishing.

Senator FERGUSON. You would have no part in it?

Mr. GREW. I would have nothing to do with the publication of Foreign Relations.

[1629] Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you to refer to foreign relations in May of 1939. It is in relation to a telegram to the Department of State containing a message from the Foreign Minister.

Mr. GREW. Will you tell me what page that is, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Mr. GREW. May 18, 1939, volume I?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is the message from the Foreign Minister.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; I have that before me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you notice that the message is published in volume II.

Mr. GREW. The first document in volume II?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, the reply of the Secretary of State to this message is on pages 6 or 8 of that same volume. Will you look at the reply?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It says:

* * * this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's [1630] message, and in giving further consideration to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as Your Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definite Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.

Now, did the Prime Minister at that time give you a more definite statement than the one that is stated there in the book?

In other words, do you know whether or not the Japanese Government ever gave you the "definite concept" requested in the Secretary of State's reply?

Mr. GREW. Well, sir, I do not believe that the Prime Minister gave me any further information on this correspondence at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask counsel to search the files to see whether or not there is any information on that?

Mr. GESELL. We will do that, Senator.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall, Mr. Grew, to refresh your memory, that there was a definite statement and that it is not printed in the book?

Mr. GREW. To which statement do you refer? The press releases?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am referring to the statement that the Prime Minister gave you in May of 1939.

Mr. GREW. Yes; as far as I am aware, that is the complete [1631] statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you access now to the Secretary of State's files?

Mr. GREW. Have I what?

Senator FERGUSON. Access to the Secretary of State's files.

Mr. GREW. No; I am out of the Department now. I have no contact with the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. So you could not help us to get that?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you referred to a green light telegram in your book. Do you recall that?

Mr. GREW. That was merely a phrase which I applied to it informally.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you turn to your book, to where you have that in your book?

Mr. GREW. That is published also, I think, in Foreign Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you said it was one of the most important telegrams that you had sent.

Mr. GREW. That was in December 1940, I think. That was sent in December.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it December or September 1940?

Mr. GREW. It is September 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at page 334 of your book?

[1632] Mr. GREW. Yes; I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is what you call the green light telegram?

Mr. GREW. It is.

[1633] Senator FERGUSON. Now will you see whether or not it is? What else do you say about it there, about it being important?

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2068.

Mr. GREW. In Foreign Relations?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you see whether it is in Foreign Relations, among the white papers?

Mr. GREW. It does not appear to be in Foreign Relations. It might possibly be in Peace and War.

Senator FERGUSON. Peace and War is there before you. Will you look and see whether it is in Peace and War?

Mr. GREW. There is a telegram in Peace and War that I sent from the Embassy in Tokyo on September 12, 1940, published on page 569. That was not the precise telegram referred to, however.

Senator FERGUSON. So it is not in Peace and War or in Foreign Relations.

Now getting back to your telegram, will you tell me something about that telegram? What is it? What does your book say about it?

Mr. GREW. It is a fairly long comment here.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you refer to it as one of your most important documents?

Mr. GREW. Yes; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that language?

[1634] Mr. GREW. What?

Senator FERGUSON. Read that language about the importance of the instrument.

Mr. GREW. In the last part of that telegram I said:

If, by a firm policy, we can maintain conditions in the Pacific in status quo until such time as Britain may be successful in the European war, Japan will be confronted with a situation which will render it impossible for the present outlook of opportunism to remain dominant. After that time it might be feasible to set about a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific to the permanent benefit both of the United States and of Japan—on a just basis. Until the time when a thorough going regeneration of outlook takes place in Japan, only a show of force, coupled with the intention to utilize it if necessary, can effectively conduce to the attainment of such an outcome, as well as to the future security of the United States.

In view therefore of actual conditions here in Japan, and the present outlook, it is my belief that the time has arrived when a continuance of the use of patience and restraint by the United States may and probably will tend to render relations between the United States and Japan increasingly uncertain. I [1635] cherish the hope that, if the Japanese Government and people can be brought to believe that they are overplaying their hand, eventually the pendulum will swing the other way, at which time it will be possible to reconstruct good relations between our country and Japan. To me the alternative appears hopeless.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read from page 334 what you said, if you will just check it:

Another important event, from my point of view, was the sending to Washington in September of what I can only call my "green light" telegram, perhaps the most significant message sent to Washington in all the 8 years of my mission to Japan.

Now will you tell us why you describe it in that way?

Mr. GREW. Because, Senator, I felt that the time had come to apply economic measures against Japan, and that is precisely what was done.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for it not being in Foreign Relations, if it is so important?

Mr. GREW. Senator, frankly, I had nothing whatsoever to do with the preparation of Foreign Relations. I was not in a position at that time to have anything to do with it, so I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the committee have a copy of your [1636] diary?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; the diary was a purely personal and private document. The important parts of my diary are published in my book, what I call the highlights.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the committee have a copy of your diary?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; the diary was a purely personal and private document. The important parts of my diary are published in my book, what I call the highlights.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, Mr. Grew, the committee does not have access—I am talking about counsel for the committee—does not have access to your diary to determine what might be important to this committee?

Mr. GREW. Senator, I would like to have the record straight on this, if you will permit me.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would make the record straight.

Mr. GREW. I will read a copy of my letter to Mr. Mitchell, the General counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. You may read it.

Mr. GREW. This is dated November 12, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I have received your letter of November 8 enclosing a copy of a letter of November 6 from Senator Brewster, as well as a copy of your reply to the Senator. Mr. Brewster requested you in his letter to secure for him a copy of the 13 volumes of my diary from which my book "Ten Years in Japan" was prepared. Your inquiry of the State Department brought the answer that there is nothing [1637] of the kind in its possession.

You may be sure that I shall do everything in my power to facilitate, support, and further the nationally important work of the Joint Committee and to be helpful in every way to Senator Brewster and the other members of the Committee. I strongly believe that all the facts bearing upon the Pearl Harbor attack should be brought out and laid before the American people, and that no pertinent material should be concealed. You yourself can depend equally on my full cooperation in eliciting these facts.

The few official documents contained in my book "Ten Years in Japan," which was published in 1944, were taken not from the diary but from two official publications already issued in 1943 by our Government: "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41" and "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41" in two volumes. All official documents that passed between the Department of State and the Embassy in Tokyo covering the period of my ambassadorship to Japan, both incoming and outgoing, are on file in the State Department and, under the President's directive as published, any and all of these documents pertinent to the investigation are presumably available to the Joint [1638] Committee.

As to the diary itself, this is in no respect an official document. It is a private work, headed "Daily Personal Notes," containing my own personal records and prepared for my own guidance in analyzing and assessing day to day developments. The diary is in the nature of a private sketch book in which the main lines of my eventual official reports to the Secretary of State were traced, and it contains many inaccurate and sometimes misleading statements, hurriedly jotted down from day to day, which had to be ironed out and, so far as possible, corrected or confirmed before taking shape in my official reports. Only the official reports should therefor govern. Private matters of interest only to my family and myself are, as in any diary, contained in it, and it includes furthermore frank comments on individuals, comments which can only be regarded as of a strictly personal and private character and which I am in honor bound not to reveal.

It is my belief that all of the material in my diary which would be helpful to the investigation of the Joint Committee has been published in my book "Ten Years in Japan." To make assurance doubly sure, however, I have carefully examined these daily personal notes [1639] covering the months

immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and I have found no comment or material, other than that already published, which would, in my opinion, be helpful to any phase of the Committee's investigation. It is my belief that all of the main facts on this subject, so far as my own observations and reports from Tokyo are concerned, have been published in the four volumes mentioned above.

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you repeat what those four volumes are?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. I just want to see whether there is something else in this letter that would be pertinent.

Senator FERGUSON. I would ask you then to read the last of your letter.

Mr. GREW. Just the last paragraph:

If there is any further phase of this subject which Senator Brewster or any other member of the Joint Committee would like to explore and will let me know, I will, with pleasure, cooperate to the best of my ability.

Those four volumes are:

1. Peace and War.
2. United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41, published in 1943.
3. Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-41, [1640] in two volumes, also published in 1943.
4. My book entitled "Ten Years in Japan."

Senator FERGUSON. Of course the last, your book 'Ten Years in Japan' is not an official publication.

Mr. GREW. No, sir; it is not an official publication.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do I understand that you submitted your diary to the State Department to determine what you might put in this book 'Ten Years in Japan'?

Mr. GREW. That is always done, Senator, especially in wartime. That, to my recollection is done in every case.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. My question was: Did you submit it to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I submitted the manuscript of my book.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they take anything out?

Mr. GREW. I do not think they made any actual demand, but they suggested that certain passages might be eliminated; some of them because they could have caused embarrassment or actual danger to individuals, sometimes, where they might have been misinterpreted by the foreign governments, and points of that kind.

Frankly, after receiving the suggestions of the Publications Committee in the Department of State I found myself in entire accord with it. There is nothing that I reluctantly withdrew.

[1641] Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation with them about the green-light telegram of September 1940?

Mr. GREW. I do not recollect any precise conversation on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. I might ask counsel. Has counsel ever seen that telegram? Do we have a copy of it?

Mr. MITCHELL. What telegram do you refer to?

Senator FERGUSON. The telegram of September 1940. I have been referring to it for quite a while.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have never seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel get us a copy from the State Department file?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will try.¹

¹ Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 26. See infra, p. 634 et seq., for text.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, what is a fair appraisal of that telegram of September 1940? What were you trying to do, and why did you try to do it?

Mr. GREW. I think the passage that I read to you covers the appraisal of the telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why did you come to write it?

Why did you send it to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. Because I was continually sending to the State Department my views about the situation and, in many cases, recommendations, steps which I thought ought to be taken. That is the duty of any Ambassador abroad.

[1642] Senator FERGUSON. Do you think your diary may have helped counsel to obtain from the files, which I understand are very voluminous, some of the important documents? For instance, this document?

Mr. GREW. I do not think so, Senator. I think, as I say, the high lights of the correspondence appear in my diary and then the running comment from day to day of what I was thinking at the time. I think the diary would not be an appropriate document in this investigation, and I would like to explain why, if I may.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would.

Mr. GREW. You will find in my book, on page 348, under date of November 1, 1940, I made the following entry in my diary:

In the light of fast-moving developments I scarcely dare read back in the diary nowadays because of its many inconsistencies which show it up for the patchwork sort of day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our thoughts and our information, some of it reliable and some of it wholly unreliable, at any given moment—the moment of writing. It shows how often we are groping and fumbling in the dark. Less and less are we able to know what is going on behind the scenes, simply because many of our reliable contacts are no longer available and [1643] also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, when you were referring there to "we," you were talking about the Embassy in Tokyo?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send that information to the State Department, the substance of it?

Mr. GREW. Oh, certainly. I reported to the State Department that our Japanese contacts, sources of information were falling away simply because they were being very carefully watched by the secret police and most of them did not dare come to the Embassy any more, they did not dare meet me outside, and even when I went to the Tokyo Club, which was sort of a neutral meeting ground for Japanese and foreigners, I found the Japanese I knew would quietly slip away into other rooms or corners. They just did not want to be seen talking to me; they did not dare. Therefore, it was extremely difficult, under those circumstances, for us to keep in touch with everything that was going on there.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that brought you to the conclusion that things were getting serious between the two countries, that matters were growing worse, and much worse, between the two countries?

Mr. GREW. Well, "worse" to the extent that the totalitarian [1644] regime was working in full force and the secret police was controlling all Japanese individuals.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did I understand that they had a totalitarian government in Japan as early as you are talking about? I understood you yesterday to say you considered it came in when Tojo came in.

Mr. GREW. I said when Tojo came in, it was a complete military dictatorship, and everything was leading in that direction for a long time, but up to that point there were pressure groups in Japan who had to be listened to, and were listened to, and I would not say that it was completely a totalitarian regime up to that moment.

Senator FERGUSON. But they had to have the secret police at that time?

Mr. GREW. They always had the secret police. It was just a question to what extent they should intensify it. They were functioning.

[1645] Senator FERGUSON. In 1941, in the spring, were you getting any information from the British as to the military activities of the Japanese?

Mr. GREW. I cannot state any definite information, Senator, but, of course, I came in close contact with my various diplomatic colleagues, and in many cases we exchanged information. That is one of the ways we were able to keep in touch. So I have no doubt that during the period you mention my British colleague occasionally passed on to me information in his possession as I did to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any information with relation to the Japanese being nearer Singapore, that you obtained from the British?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I do not recall any precise information at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall any specific information that you may have received on the Japanese military movements at or near, toward, Singapore?

Mr. GREW. No; I do not recall any precise information on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get any information in relation to any landings of troops on the Kra Peninsula?

Mr. GREW. Japanese troops?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or on the isthmus.

[1646] Mr. GREW. You mean after they had been landed?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or of their landing. I am talking about prior to December 7.

Mr. GREW. Well, no, sir. It would be utterly impossible for any foreigner in Japan to acquire information of something that the Japanese military were going to do. We might guess that they were going to do it, but certainly not know until it had been done. All those steps were shrouded in military secrecy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that you discounted anything that came in in relation to the Jap movements because you believed that no such information could get out of the war authorities, military or naval authorities?

Mr. GREW. Very little such information did come out. Of course, when information did reach me I sifted it and assessed it on the basis of my other knowledge, and in that light I was able to decide whether it was authentic or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you send only what you believed to be authentic to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I was in the habit of reporting a great deal to the State Department. Sometimes only rumors, as in the case of that telegram of January 27.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the Peruvian——

Mr. GREW. The rumor that in case of trouble they would attack [1647] Pearl Harbor. I sent many telegrams and dispatches of that kind. In many cases it was utterly impossible to confirm those rumors.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you ever get a reply to that Peruvian message?

Mr. GREW. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That was nothing unusual, that you did not get a reply?

Mr. GREW. That was not unusual.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall, though, any information in the spring of 1941 from the British about landings or to-be-landings on the Kra Peninsula or Kra Isthmus?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I do not recall any specific information in that respect.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were there rumors of troop movements at that time?

Mr. GREW. Well, we knew from a variety of sources that the Japanese had moved down, were moving out all through that area there, and, frankly, we were ready for anything, but if the Japanese were going to land in a certain place at a certain time we in all probability would not and could not know.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings me now to the note of August 17. Are you familiar with that note?

Mr. GREW. Note from whom, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. From the United States to Japan. It is the [1648] parallel action. It is the note of August 17.

Mr. GREW. August 17.

Mr. GESELL. 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. 1941.

Mr. GESELL. Page 556.

Mr. GREW. All of these papers, Senator, were as a rule cabled over to me; the records of conversations and letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with the particular document?

Mr. GREW. I shall have to read it first.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read it so that you become familiar with it?

Mr. GREW (perusing paper). Yes; I recall that document perfectly.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you refer to your message of August 18—no. I have in mind the conversation you had with Toyda on August 18.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. 1941.

Mr. GESELL. Page 560.

Mr. GREW. I have it.

[1649] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, I am fully familiar with that note; that record of conversations with the foreign ministers.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you check and see whether or not it is in the white papers?

Mr. GREW. It is in foreign relations.

Senator FERGUSON. But not in the white paper?

Mr. GREW. What do you call the white paper?

Senator FERGUSON. The Peace and War.

Mr. GREW. That was an incomplete publication but I will see.

It does not appear to be in the volume Peace and War.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you an article in the New York Times on August 13, Mr. Grew.

Will counsel pass him the article?

(The article was passed to the witness.)

The CHAIRMAN. What year is that?

Mr. MURPHY. 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. 1941.

Mr. GREW. Yes, Senator, I have seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with that article?

Mr. GREW. Well, I have heard about it recently. I haven't read the whole article, no, but I know the pith of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You know the what?

[1650] Mr. GREW. I know the principal point in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. The report that the British Ambassador and I made representations to the Japanese Foreign Minister——

Senator FERGUSON. Will you talk into the microphone, please.

Mr. GREW. Pardon me.

I believe the principal point in it is a report that the British Ambassador and I had made representations to the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Senator FERGUSON. Along what line?

Mr. GREW. It appears to be an indication that any action by Japan which would threaten the independence of Thailand would be of concern both to the American and British Governments.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is the by-line; under what name?

Mr. GREW. It is under the by-line of Otto D. Tolischus.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know him?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversations with him from which that could be written?

Mr. GREW. I often had conversations with him.

Senator FERGUSON. From which that could be written?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. I would like to point out that in this article it is stated, "It was understood in political [1651] circles here today." It was understood. In other words that is not a——

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you have any conversation with him from which that could be written?

Mr. GREW. No, sir, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say then that that was not a true statement?

Mr. GREW. I can refer to my records. I made a point of keeping a record of my calls at the Foreign Office in Japan. My calls on the Foreign Minister in August were, August 1, August 15, 18, and 22. And I have the subjects discussed at that time—just a moment.

No, sir, I find conferences with the Foreign Minister only on August 15, 18, and 22. Of course, a good many talks were going on also between members of my staff and subordinate officers in the Japanese Foreign Office. I only saw the Foreign Minister on most important matters.

Senator FERGUSON. What am I to understand, that that is a true statement or not a true statement, that you did have such a talk with the Foreign Minister or you did not?

Mr. GREW. In the light of my own records, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever taken up the question involved in that article with Japan?

Mr. GREW. I have no recollection of having done so.

[1652] Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever had any information from the State Department that that was our understanding?

Mr. GREW. That that was taken up by the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. No; that that was where they stood on the proposition, that they stood as stated in the article?

Mr. GREW. That is a matter on which I would have to consult the records.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you consult the records so that you can give us information on that?

Mr. GREW. I will. As to whether I was ever informed by the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. GREW. That they took this position?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. GREW. As to the independence of Thailand?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

As I understand it, you don't recall ever taking it up with the Japanese Government.

Now, going back to the note of the 17th of August 1941, do you know when that first came to your attention?

Mr. GREW. I couldn't tell you the date on which it came to my attention, but, as I say, most of these documents and records of conversations were telegrams to me. I am not sure that they were in every case, but generally they were. I [1653] couldn't answer that question without examining the files of the Department of State and see whether they did actually send that information to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever take that note up with the Japanese Government? You have a memorandum, you say, that you talked to them on the 18th. What did you talk about on the 18th?

Mr. GREW. I have the record here, sir.

I saw the Foreign Minister August 15 [reading]:

I told the Minister that I was supporting the representations made by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 13, with regard to recent cases of interference with American rights and interest in Japan and in Japanese occupied areas in China and I thereupon read to the Minister and left with him a copy of the Department's telegram with the exception of paragraph numbered three. I then discussed this situation at length, pointing out the fact that these cumulative interferences with American citizens and American interests were assuming a serious aspect both in Japan and in Japanese occupied areas in China and emphasizing the radical discrepancy between this treatment of American officials and citizens of their activities by the Japanese and our treatment [1654] of Japanese officials and subjects and their activities in the United States. I expressed the belief that relief from these

interferences could be obtained by the communication by the Japanese Government to Japanese authorities and Japanese sponsored authorities of categorical instructions to desist from the interferences and obstructions under complaint.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date?

Mr. GREW. That was on August 15.

Senator FERGUSON. August 18, just glance at that. Did it relate to the note of August 17?

Mr. GREW. On August 18 the Minister asked me to come to see him, and it was a very long conference which lasted 2½ hours, and the whole question of Japanese relations was therein discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss the note of the 17th?

Mr. GREW. Nothing was said about Thailand in that conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. No. Was anything said about the note of the 17th where the British and the United States Governments were to take parallel action?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; nothing whatsoever was said about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know about that at the time, on the 18th?

[1655] Mr. GREW. Did I—I don't quite understand—did I know that that action—

Senator FERGUSON. That Britain and the United States had agreed, or at least there were promises, that we were to take certain parallel action.

Mr. GREW. I would have to consult the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the last paragraph on page 556. It may refresh your memory as to what I am talking about.

Mr. GREW. Of foreign relations?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Five hundred and fifty-six?

Senator FERGUSON. Five hundred and fifty-six.

Mr. GREW. The was the statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador.

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals [1656] and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. My question is, Did you take that matter up with anyone in the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I do not know if I did so. I have no record of having done so, but if I did I certainly would have reported that step to the Department of State, and they would have it on file. I do not recollect having done so.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12 o'clock. Before recessing the Chair would like, if the committee is willing, inasmuch as paragraphs have been read from Mr. Grew's letter to the President, of December 14, and the President's reply of January 21, the Chair will ask that the full text of both those letters be printed in the transcript of the record at this point.

(The letters referred to follow:)

DEAR FRANK: * * * About Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown some day, and

the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be:

(1) Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;

[1657] (2) Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat;

(3) To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese Navies now and later.

Those are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stand for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a [1658] forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always swinging between extremist and moderate policies, but as things stand today we believe that the pendulum is more likely to swing still further toward extremes than to reverse its direction. Konoye, and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but under present circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive.

Our own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination in meeting every Japanese step with some step of our own has been eminently wise, and that policy has sunk deep into Japanese consciousness. But while important elements among the Japanese people deplore the course which their leaders are taking, those elements are nevertheless inarticulate and powerless and are likely to remain so. Meanwhile the Germans here are working overtime to push Japan into war with us. I have told Matsuoka point-blank that his country is heading for disaster. He has at least seen that his efforts to intimidate us have fallen flat and have had an effect precisely the reverse of that intended.

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including [1659] the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

A progressively firm policy on our part will entail inevitable risks—especially risks of sudden uncalculated strokes, such as the sinking of the *Panay*, which might inflame the American people—but, in my opinion those risks are less in degree than the far greater dangers which we should face if we were to follow a policy of *laissez faire*.

In other words, the risks facing us in maintaining our future security are likely to be greater than the risks of taking positive measures as the southward advance proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great majority of the American people are in a mood for vigorous action. The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program, but when.

It is important constantly to keep in mind the fact that if we take measures "short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese, who will proceed unhindered, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do so will our preliminary measures afford some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war. The old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

[1660] If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting of Japan's present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of normal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem.

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "new structure" is in an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

* * * You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and I am profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived of your clear vision, determination, and splendid courage in piloting the old ship of state.

[1661]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 21, 1941.

DEAR JOE: I have given careful consideration to your letter of December 14.

First, I want to say how helpful it is to have your over-all estimates and reflections—based as they are upon a rare combination of first-hand observation, long experience with our Japanese relations, and masterly judgment. I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions.

I also want you to know how much I appreciate your kind words of congratulation on my re-election and your expression of confidence in my conduct of our foreign affairs.

As to your very natural request for an indication of my views as to certain aspects of our future attitude toward developments in the Far East, I believe that the fundamental proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. We are engaged in the task of defending our way of life and our vital national interests wherever they are seriously endangered. Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front and takes advantage [1662] of every opportunity to contribute to our total security.

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the chances of England's winning in her struggle with Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military, and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by importing goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire.

[1663] The British need assistance along the lines of our generally established policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the Far East is certainly well within the realm of "possibility" so far as the capacity of the United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving them assistance toward ensuring our own security must envisage both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British and be added to the assets of the other side.

You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the questions whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war. As I have indicated above, the conflict is world-wide, not merely a European war. I firmly believe, as I have recently declared publicly, that the British, with our help, will be victorious in this conflict. The conflict may well be long and we must bear in mind that when England is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed to

bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the western and southern Pacific as might occur during the course of the conflict if Japan is not kept within [1664] bounds. I judge from the remarks which appear at the bottom of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of your letter that you, too, attach due importance to this aspect of the problem.

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we cannot lay down hard-and-fast plans. As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.

With warmest regards.

As ever,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock of the same day.)

[1665]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permission? I think I can clear up one question that came up during his examination.

Senator FERGUSON. There were quite a number.

Mr. GESELL. This may be helpful. The question came up with respect to the green-light dispatch. We made an inquiry over the noon recess and find that an extract and paraphrase of that green-light dispatch will be found printed as Document 182 at page 569 of Peace and War, and inasmuch as that is an extract, we have obtained from the State Department the entire text of the dispatch, and we wish to offer that in evidence, in order that the record will be complete. This would be Exhibit 26.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you explain why this instrument was not among those delivered to us before by the State Department, if it was Mr. Grew's most important instrument?

Mr. GESELL. Our inquiry into State Department documents has been confined to the year 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that the counsel had made no request for anything back of 1941?

Mr. GESELL. We have not requested any of Mr. Grew's dispatches back of 1941, Senator.

[1666] Senator FERGUSON. Had the committee requested any State Department records back of 1941?

Mr. GESELL. I think there may have been a few instances where we have gone behind 1941, but very few.

Senator FERGUSON. Will Counsel state for the record the reason for that limitation?

Mr. GESELL. Senator, the effort was to stay around the period which we thought was of major concern to the committee, the events leading up to Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that extracts have been referred to and Mr. Grew has been examined about it, don't you think, Counsel, that the instrument itself ought to go into the transcript of the hearing instead of being an exhibit?

Mr. GESELL. I think that would be a good idea, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Senator, I would like to have it read at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be read at at this time, but I think it ought to go into the transcript of the hearing and not simply filed as an exhibit. With the consent of the committee, that will be the order.

Senator FERGUSON. Would Counsel read it into the record so Mr. Grew will be familiar with it? I have not had time to read it.

Mr. GESELL. Perhaps, Mr. Grew could read it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Let Mr. Grew read it.

Mr. GREW. I have a copy of it here.

[1667] Senator FERGUSON. You have a copy?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Read it.

The CHAIRMAN. You may read it, Mr. Grew, if you wish.

Mr. GREW. Read the whole thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the whole document.

Mr. GREW. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 26.")

Mr. GREW. This is a telegram to the Secretary of State.

827 September 7, 9 p. m.

Strictly Confidential.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of that again, please?

Mr. GREW. September 12, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. Does your book give the date of it, Mr. Grew.

Mr. GREW. Does what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Does your book state the date?

Mr. GREW. No. I used the substance of the telegram in the comment in my diary on October 1, but it was only the substance, it was not the text.

Senator FERGUSON. In your book, it is under date of October 1, 1940?

Mr. GREW. That is right, yes, sir. The telegram was sent on September 12.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[1668] One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment, Mr. Grew, if I might interrupt.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There would not be any way of telling that the instrument that you speak about on page 334 was the one of September 12, 1940?

Mr. GREW. That is in my book?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I mean without your information.

Mr. GREW. No; you are quite right. I used that merely as comment in my diary. I considered in September was one of the most momentous periods in Japanese history and in American-Japanese relations. I discussed the general situation and then I referred to the material used in that telegram, although it was not the telegram itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. GREW. Shall I proceed to read?

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GREW (reading):

One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele concerning (?) in Japan conveyed in Peiping's 300, August 31, 3 p. m., recently received here by mail, have had my careful attention. In general terms I believe that Mr. Steele's observations are well founded and [1669] sound, a belief which applies equally to the important considerations advanced in the final two paragraphs of the summary of Mr. Steele's statement.

I think, in order to make this perfectly clear, that telegram would probably be helpful to the committee and could be produced undoubtedly, Mr. General Counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel get a copy of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the telegram from Mr. Steele?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; that is a telegram from our then location in Peiping, No. 300, August 31, 3 p. m. That could be found in the files and could be produced.

The CHAIRMAN. The counsel will produce it for the record.¹

Who was Mr. Steele, if I might inquire?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Steele was a prominent correspondent of the Far East. He was on one of the Chicago papers. I am not quite sure at the present time which—I think the Chicago Daily News, but I am not quite sure. He had a high reputation in the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. GREW (reading):

His thesis that "firmness is the soundest and safest American naval policy" and that "the risks involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States" is however of such far-reaching gravity as to deserve carefully studied analysis and comment. In presenting the [1670] present trend of my thoughts on this general subject I have constantly in mind the fact that the shaping of our policy vis a vis Japan must depend upon the broader viewpoint of the administration in Washington and upon many factors which may not be apparent to this Embassy.

Two. The situation and circumstances which led to the series of exploratory conversations with the former Foreign Minister Arita (my 400, June 3, noon) and to the recommendations for considering steps leading toward the negotiation of a new treaty of commerce with Japan (my 562, July 11, 9 p. m.) have now obviously passed. I earnestly hope that the time will come when I shall feel justified in renewing those recommendations, but with the fall of the Yonal cabinet and the radically altered policy and outlook of the present set up in Japan, further initiative on our part in proposing conciliatory measures at the present time would appear to be futile and unwise.

Three. Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that the army and other elements in the country see in the present world situation a "golden opportunity" to carry into effect their dreams of expansion; the German victories have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great [1671] Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (*) (end) in a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is still acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of far flung control in the Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been and is doubtful.

*The above asterisk indicates an apparent omission. [Footnote in original.]

¹ Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 77. For text see Hearings, Part 4, p. 1712 et seq.

Four. Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the outburst of exhilaration which greeted the new Government on its inception. The Japanese Government, the army and navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may not defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I have constantly emphasized to my Japanese contacts in the plainest language and now to add to that dawning realization, they see the United States and Great Britain steadily drawing closer together in measures of mutual defense with the American acquisition of naval bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They hear reports of our haste to build a two-ocean navy and of our considering the strengthening of our naval bases [1672] in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of Singapore. These developments and rumors are having their logical effect on Japanese consciousness. On the one hand they tend to emphasize the potential danger which Japan faces from eventual positive action by the United States and Great Britain acting together (the danger of combined Anglo-American measures has long been appreciated in Japan as evidenced by efforts to avoid irritating the United States and Great Britain simultaneously) or by the United States alone. On the other hand they furnish cogent arguments for those elements in Japan who seek economic and political security by obtaining markets and source of raw materials wholly within the control of Japan. As for Germany, the Japanese are beginning to question whether even a victorious Germany would not provide a new hazard to their expansionist program both in China and in the southward advance. Meanwhile the future position and attitude of Soviet Russia is always an uncertain factor in their calculations. These various considerations are beginning to give them concern.

[1673] High pressure diplomacy, especially in the Netherlands East Indies, will continue, but the fact that the Japanese Government was able even temporarily to restrain the military forces from their plans for a headlong invasion of Indo-China indicates a degree of caution which I do not doubt was at least partially influenced by the attitude of the United States. What Mr. Steele describes as the "nibbling policy" appears likely to continue until the world situation, and especially the attitude of the United States, becomes clearer.

Five. In previous communications I have expressed the opinion that sanctions by the United States would set Japanese-American relations on a downward curve. It is true that our own newly instituted program of national preparedness now justifies measures which need not fall within the realm of outright sanctions. On the other hand we must envisage the probability that drastic embargoes on the export of such important products as petroleum, of which the United States is known to possess a superabundance, would be interpreted by the Japanese Government and people as actually (?) sanctions which [1674] might and probably would lead to some form of retaliation. The risks which Mr. Steele sees as "much less than is commonly supposed in the United States" will depend less upon the careful calculations of the Japanese Government than upon the uncalculating "do or die" temper of the army and navy in case they should attribute to the United States the responsibility for the failure of their expansionist plans. Such retaliation might take the form of counter measures by the Government but there would be even greater likelihood of some sudden stroke by the army or navy without the Government's prior knowledge or authorization. These risks constitute an imponderable factor which cannot at any given moment be weighed with assurance. It would be short, however, to deny their existence or to proceed with the formulation of policy and the adoption of measures without giving these potential risks full consideration and determining the wisdom of squarely facing these risks.

Six. In the ensuing observations I am carefully considering both of the fundamental purposes of my mission, namely the protection and advancement of American interests and the maintenance of good relations between the United States and Japan. When these two [1675] desiderata conflict, the preponderant emphasis to be placed on the one or the other is a matter of high policy which does not lie within my competency. My object is merely to place before the administration in Washington the outstanding factors in the situation as we see them from the angle of this Embassy. Having carefully set forth the inevitable hazards involved in a strong policy I now respectfully turn to the hazards involved in a laissez faire policy.

Seven. In discussing the specific question of American-Japanese relations it is impossible to view that problem in its proper perspective without considering it as part and parcel of the world problem which, briefly, presents the following aspects: (A) The United States and Great Britain are the leaders of a great group of English speaking nations around the world standing for a "way of life" which is being appallingly threatened today by a group of Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia and Japan whose avowed purpose is to impose by force of arms their will upon conquered peoples. In attempting to deal with such powers the uses of diplomacy are in general bankrupt.

[1676] Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide. Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers; she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expansion is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific and is a thrust at the British Empire in the east.

(b) American security has admittedly depended in a measure upon the existence of the British fleet which in turn has been, and could only have been, supported by the British Empire.

(c) If we conceive it to be in our interest to support the British Empire in this hour of her travail, and I most emphatically do so conceive it, we must strive by every means to preserve the status quo in the Pacific at least until the European war has been won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done nor can our interests be further adequately and properly protected by merely registering disapproval and keeping a careful record thereof. It is clear that Japan has [1677] been deterred from taking greater liberties with American interests only out of respect for our potential power; it is equally (*) that she has trampled upon our rights to a degree in precise ratio to the strength of her conviction that the American people would not permit that power to be used. Once conviction is shaken it is possible that the uses of diplomacy may again become accepted.

(d) If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunist philosophy to maintain the upper hand. At a moment it might then be possible to undertake a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem on a fair, frank, and equitable basis to the lasting benefit of both the United States and of Japan. Until such time as there is a complete regeneration of thought in this country, a show of force, together with a determination to employ it if need be, can alone contribute effectively to the achievement of such an outcome and to our own future security.

[1678] Eight. Passing from the general to the specific problem that now confronts us, and with the foregoing picture in mind, I applauded the timeliness of the instruction contained in the second part of Department's 331, August 28, 6 p. m. concerning the Shanghai defense sectors. The Department will have seen from my 791, September 4, 11 p. m. paragraph No. two that the Foreign Minister's complaint as to alleged threats on our part was met with the statement that what we have in mind is "a logical reciprocal adjustment of international relations". I feel that the appropriate time has come to proceed, gradually but progressively, with that adjustment. In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States may and probably will lead to developments which will render Japanese-American relations progressively precarious. It is my hope that if the Japanese Government and people can be led to believe that their hand is being overplayed, there will eventually ensue a reverse swing of the pendulum in which a reconstruction of good relations between the [1679] United States and Japan will be possible. The alternative seems to me to be hopeless.

Nine. The foregoing analysis, which has been drafted with care over a period of several days, has the expressed complete concurrence of the Naval, Military and Commercial Attaches and all other members of the immediate staff of this Embassy.

(End of message.)

(Signed) GREW.

(The above asterisk indicates an apparent omission.)

[1680] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, that was a very well considered instrument.

You had spent considerable time on that instrument and it was well considered?

Mr. GREW. I had.

Senator FERGUSON. And will you give us the specific reason, if you had one, for sending it?

Mr. GREW. I can't say that there was any specific reason other than my duty to express to our Government from time to time my understanding of the situation in Japan and the Far East and from time to time my representations as to what policy could be followed in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted Washington to have the information that they might know how you felt.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is it true that that was a change of attitude as far as you were concerned?

If you will look at page 272 of your book, I would like to have you read into the record what your attitude was on December 5, 1938, on that same question.

I think it is expressed in "meanwhile there were buzzings * * *."

Mr. GREW (reading) :

Meanwhile there were buzzings as to possible financial help to Chiang Kai-shek from American and British sources, and discussions as to possible economic measures [1681] against Japan. As to the latter, no matter how much I might personally like to see retaliation for the things that Japan is doing to us and to our interests in the Far East, I have consistently recommended against such measures unless we are prepared to see them through to their logical conclusion, and that might mean war, for sanctions are always a potential incentive to ultimate war. The British, at least some British, believe that Anglo-American economic sanctions would bring Japan to her knees in short order. I disagree with that thesis. I know Japan and the Japanese pretty well. They are a hardy race, accustomed throughout their history to catastrophe and disaster; theirs is the "do or die" spirit, more deeply ingrained than in almost any other people. They would pull in their belts another notch and continue. They can live on rice and, if necessary, fight on rice. The deprival of oil, rubber and other necessities of war might cramp their style, once their considerable supplies had given out, but it would take a long time to bring about capitulation, I think.

Foreign support to Chiang Kai-shek is another matter altogether, and this does not need to be done officially, no matter what official blessings might accompany the unofficial act.

Thus lay the land up to the end of November.

1938.

[1682] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, can you state to the committee what there was that changed you from that statement and belief in 1938 to the statement of September 12, 1940?

Mr. GREW. Well, a great deal of water had gone over the falls, Senator, between those two messages; there was 2 years between them. The Japanese Army was steadily encroaching further into the Far East and into East Asia. They were potentially threatening our vital interests. And from that point of view the situation had very much changed indeed. That, I think, was the main reason why I sent that telegram, but one must remember that my so-called green-light telegram was not something which had developed in a question of a few hours or a few days. It meant a progressive line of thinking over a period to the crux of the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted the State Department to know of your change?

Mr. GREW. Oh, very definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will ask you to look on page 359 of your book, the letter beginning "Dear Frank," on that same page. That is to the President?

Mr. GREW. 359?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is on page 359 but the following page looks like 358; the pages seem to be misnumbered there.

[1683] Senator FERGUSON. It is all right in my copy, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GREW. That is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you to read where it begins "After eight years of effort." Read that paragraph.

Mr. GREW. This is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940.

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward [1684] in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that you felt that diplomacy had failed and that we were going from a stage of diplomacy to some other instrument to settle the differences? You say:

* * * I find that diplomacy has been defeated * * *

Mr. GREW. I said diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces at that moment. As I recollect it it was after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet with which I had been able to work fairly closely in the hope of being able to build up our relations. When this Cabinet fell and a new Cabinet came in I saw that that work had been pretty well wrecked.

Senator FERGUSON. What Cabinet came in in December of 1940?

Mr. GREW. December 1940. I think that was one of Konoye's Cabinets. I will look. I have the complete record here.

That is Konoye's. The second Konoye Cabinet came in on July 22, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the next step if diplomacy failed? You use this expression:

Only insuperable obstacles will not prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the [1685] southward advance * * *— and so forth.

What is the next instrument?

Mr. GREW. Senator, I had in mind all the time—

Senator FERGUSON. What were you trying to convey to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I was trying to convey to the State Department that the time had come to take strong measures.

[1686] Senator FERGUSON. Of course, this is to the President.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And he is the one in charge of foreign relations. So you took it right to the top.

Mr. GREW. No. I was also reporting to Mr. Hull at that time, of course, along the same lines as indicated by that so-called green-light telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I do find in the records your reports to Mr. Hull along this same line in December, and let us have that.

Mr. GREW. Well, the one in September covers that ground.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, the one in September covers that?

Mr. GREW. The so-called green-light telegram covers that ground completely.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. So the one in September covered it to the State Department and this one was to the President, on the 14th of December?

Mr. GREW. That is right; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. GREW. There were probably other telegrams to Mr. Hull along the same lines but I haven't the full records before me so I cannot tell you.

My thought was that by taking these measures we would [1687] eventually bring at least the thinking, the sane-minded statesmen in Japan to the realization that unless they stopped in their tracks they were going to have war with the United States and Great Britain and other countries.

Now, that is precisely what happened. When Prince Konoye came into power for the third time, his third Cabinet, with all his black background and record and, certainly, as Mr. Hull pointed out the other day, he had been responsible for one of the worst train of acts of international banditry in world history, he still was an intelligent man and he, in my opinion, as a result of the policy that we followed, the measures we had taken, he saw the handwriting on the wall.

He knew a good deal more about our country than the hot-headed militarists did; he had been to our country, knew something about our productive capacity, knew something about our national spirit. In my opinion, he realized that Japan, if she got into war with us and with other countries, other western powers, would probably in the end be defeated and would emerge as a third or a fifth rate power.

In other words, I think at that time some of those more intelligent statesmen in Japan realized that they were on the brink of an abyss and it was my belief at that time that they tried their best to reverse the engine. It was too late to do it but they tried to do it.

[1688] Therefore, this policy which I had recommended had led up to that position where these intelligent Japanese statesmen, quite apart from the hot-headed militarists and all the rest of them, realized that they ought to step back and it was my hope that they would step back and, as I said in this telegram, that this would lead to a complete remolding of our relations with Japan and a remolding of the entire situation in the Far East. That was always my hope.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, on the bottom of page 360, in the same letter, you say this:

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures—and this is in quotations—

“short of war” with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese, who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do so will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war—the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

So you had in mind to convey to the President that it was your opinion and the time had come for the State Department, for our foreign relations to be such that we would [1689] indicate that we were willing to go the whole way and that would be even to the point of war.

Mr. GREW. I felt at that time entirely certain about that, Senator, for the very reason that unless we were willing to build up our forces and to build up our armaments to the point where we would be ready for anything, the Japanese would know it in a hurry and we never could get away with any bluff of any kind. I wanted our forces built up as an insurance against war.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had in mind then that we should build an army and a navy that we could implement every policy that you were telling the President that we should take?

Mr. GREW. I felt that that was an essential part of the policy, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, I will ask you whether or not when the President in his letter of January 21, 1941 said [reading]:

I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusion,

And then I turn to page 362, you are talking about that we go to the point of even going to war, I will ask you to read what he said to you on page 362, beginning with, “You suggest as one of the chief factors.”

[1690] He is talking now, as I understand it, the President, about war. Will you read that?

Mr. GREW. Which paragraph is that on 362?

Senator FERGUSON. It is the first paragraph.

Mr. GREW. “You suggest”?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW (reading):

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the chances of England's winning in her struggle with Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those Isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military, and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by [1691] importing goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply

to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we could take that as meaning that notwithstanding your warning the President was conveying to you that he felt that it was necessary to go all out on this question; that he understood you, in other words.

Mr. GREW. Well, you mean that it would appear from this paragraph that the President accepted that position?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Well, I think, Senator, from the letter as a whole that would be clear.

Senator FERGUSON. That would follow.

Mr. GREW. That would be clear.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, I will ask you in the telegram that you read, the original, the "green light" telegram, whether or not there is not a clause in there about us using the Singapore base? Do you remember that?

[1692] Mr. GREW. Yes. It was, as I remember it, we might have. Let me see how that was stated about that.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you express that?

Mr. GREW. I have it right here. That is the reference, Senator, on page 3, paragraph numbered 4 of my telegram 827, September 12, 9 p. m. I had better read the whole paragraph to make the context clear.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW (reading):

Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the outburst of exhilaration which greeted the new Government on its inception. The Japanese Government, the army and navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may not defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I have constantly emphasized to my Japanese contacts in the plainest language and now to add to that dawning realization, they see the United States and Great Britain steadily drawing closer together in measures of mutual defense with the American acquisition of naval bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They hear reports of our haste to build a two-ocean navy and of our considering the strengthening of our naval bases in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of [1693] Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. There was nothing more definite than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, had you heard any rumors or information from the State Department—first, had you any rumors in relation to any agreement we might have, or some rights that we might have to use Singapore as a naval base?

Mr. GREW. So far as I recollect I received nothing of that kind from the State Department, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you heard rumors there?

Mr. GREW. Well, no, sir; I cannot say that I heard rumors.

Senator FERGUSON. Did your Navy or Army attaché there in Tokyo give you any information on that?

Mr. GREW. They passed on to me, so far as I know, all the important information that they received. I do not recollect that either of them passed on to me any information to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you give us any opinion as to where you may have received that information of rumors?

Mr. GREW. I did not receive that information, Senator. It is clear from the telegram that that was information which the Japanese had heard and were considering. I do not know where they got it from.

[1694] Senator FERGUSON. Had they advised you that they had such information?

Mr. GREW. Well, of course, going back to this telegram, after all these years I cannot tell you exactly how that came to me. It was very likely in the Japanese press; it may have been passed on to me by individuals. All I can say was, "They hear reports." I cannot be more definite than that. I could not clamp that down.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know, though, but what the Army or the Navy attaché there may have given you the information also?

Mr. GREW. I could not answer that question, Senator, without looking back in the records.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the British Ambassador ever give you that information?

Mr. GREW. I do not believe so. I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of any agreement between the United States and Great Britain as to the defense of Singapore?

Mr. GREW. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we will go to page 556 of Foreign Relations. That is the note of August the 17th, 1941.

Mr. GREW. Five hundred and what?

[1695] Senator FERGUSON. 556 of Foreign Relations.

Mr. GREW. 556; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am particularly interested in the last paragraph, the one I had you read this morning.

Mr. GREW. Yes, we had that this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, will you tell me, if you can, when you first considered that message and what did it mean to you?

Mr. GREW. Well, I cannot tell you on what date I received the message. I probably received it on the day of its delivery. You must remember there is a day difference between Tokyo and the United States, so that anything that appeared in the print—

Senator FERGUSON. It was delivered in Tokyo—

Mr. GREW. On August 18.

Senator FERGUSON. It was delivered on Sunday and you probably got it Monday?

Mr. GREW. I probably would have gotten it Monday. Monday would have been the 19th.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that message—what did that information mean to you? That was coming from Washington to you.

Mr. GREW. Yes. It meant that we were following the policy which I had constantly advocated.

[1696] Senator FERGUSON. That was the policy that you had advocated?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the State Department give you any other information on that instrument?

Mr. GREW. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did your Army or Navy attaché give you any information?

Mr. GREW. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider that an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. By no means.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to read to you on page 2 of exhibit 16 this information, and ask you whether it was conveyed to you.

This is a document to the President of the United States dated November the 5th, 1941, and signed by—this particular one is signed by W. P. Scobey, colonel, G. S. C. secretary, and it is on a message, attached to a message by the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and it is being delivered to the President. [Reading:]

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at [1697] the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Now, was that ever called to your attention, that the Army and the Navy had considered that instrument of August the 17th as an ultimatum?

[1698] . Mr. GREW. I do not think that that was ever called to my attention, Senator, but I would like to say right here that the application of the term "ultimatum" to that document could not be well taken owing to the fact that the conversations between the United States and Japan continued for a long time thereafter and if you submit an ultimatum to a country, you do not talk any more; it is finished.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the ultimatum was on this point, as I understood this morning, Mr. Grew.

Senator LUCAS. Whom is that from?

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement. * * *

He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression.

In other words, if Japan made further aggression after the 17th of August 1941 that we would act and that that was an ultimatum.

Mr. GREW. The fact remains, Senator, that the Japanese did take a great deal of action after that date and no such action was taken by us and meanwhile the conversations in [1699] Washington continued right along.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read another statement and ask you whether it was ever conveyed to you, or whether it was your under-

standing that you had ever conveyed this information to the State Department. On page 4 of the same instrument [reading]:

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped—

and that is October the 5, 1941.

Now, reading again:

by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schulmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

Now, did you ever give any information to our State Department that would lead our State Department to the notion that in case we got into war with Japan that they could be [1700] defeated in a military action in a few weeks?

Mr. GREW. I definitely did not, Senator, because I did not—

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give them the opposite, that it would be a longer war than that?

Mr. GREW. I cannot tell you whether I gave any definite estimate at that time or not; probably not. But they had plenty of reports from me as to the toughness of the Japanese Army and Navy. I can bring out passage after passage to indicate that; that they were a fanatical race, they were a do-or-die sort of people, they would probably fight to the last ditch and that they were exceedingly military. I brought that out continually right from the very beginning of my stay in Tokyo, when I wrote that the Japanese Army is built for war, prepared for war, and anxious to go to war.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did the State Department ever convey to you that that was the attitude of the State Department of the United States?

Mr. GREW. I do not remember that they ever did.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you would remember such a statement, don't you think?

Mr. GREW. I think I would.

Senator FERGUSON. It is so contrary to what your views were that it probably would have impressed you very keenly.

[1701] Mr. GREW. I think I would have come back very quickly on a statement of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I have read you from the exhibit here. Whose views, when they speak about the State Department, whose views would that be? Mr. Hull was the head, was he not?

Mr. GREW. I cannot tell you who expressed those views, Senator, because I was not here. I frankly do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Hull that question, as to whether or not that was his views of October 5 or near October 5, 1941?

Mr. GREW. I do not think that I ever have.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. GREW. I do not believe I ever did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any correspondence with Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. GREW. I had a certain amount of correspondence from time to time of an informal nature but I do not recollect—

Senator FERGUSON. Official correspondence?

Mr. GREW. I beg pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. Official correspondence?

Mr. GREW. No; it was unofficial correspondence; purely personal correspondence, and I do not recollect that that [1702] subject was ever touched upon in our correspondence. I doubt that it was.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were here in 1939 you had a conversation with the President and with Mr. Hull?

Mr. GREW. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state as to whether or not at that time you told the President your opinion about the Japanese as far as fighting is concerned, that they could not be bluffed, as you used the expression this morning, and as to how strong they were in a military sense?

Mr. GREW. I have no record of that conversation but it is my opinion that in all probability I did do just that.

Senator FERGUSON. And would you say that you had the same kind of a conversation with Mr. Hull?

Mr. GREW. I would say that I probably did but, also, I have no record of that conversation, so I cannot answer your question definitely, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, how would you account, you being in Japan and knowing the situation, for our State Department to get the idea that I have just read to you as Admiral Ingersoll felt, that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in a military action in a few weeks?

Mr. GREW. That is a question, Senator, which I frankly [1703] am not competent to answer. I was not here at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it certainly was not from anything that you gave the State Department?

Mr. GREW. It was not what?

Senator FERGUSON. From anything that you ever gave the State Department?

Mr. GREW. No; it certainly was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, getting back to Captain Schuirmann's idea of the note of August 17. That note—have you got it before you there?

Mr. GREW. The note itself?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Or Admiral Schuirmann's?

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Schuirmann. Have you got that?

Mr. GREW. Which page is that on?

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 3.

Mr. GREW. Can you find that for me, where it is?

Mr. GESELL. I think there may have been some confusion about the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is marked on the outside, "Exhibit 16."

Mr. GESELL. Yes. Only the first two or three pages are a memorandum to the President. The remaining portion is a [1704]

minute of a meeting which amplifies the memorandum to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you understand then that the memorandum attached never went to the President?

Mr. GESELL. I have no evidence that it ever did.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, have you any evidence that it did not?

Mr. GESELL. I have no evidence either way.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason is I got that as one exhibit and it is attached and the President has acted on the instrument, as I understand it, when we come—

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. The next is November 14, 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. The memorandum is dated, however, under date of November 5, 1941, and the notes of the meeting are dated November 3, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be correct.

Mr. MURPHY. And they are separate papers apparently.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but there isn't any showing here that it all did not go to the President because it is all on the same subject.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel read the whole [1705] instrument into the record so it will be clear.

Mr. MURPHY. May I just make this one statement?

The CHAIRMAN. What is it, Congressman?

Mr. MURPHY. I just wanted to say that the statement, the memorandum that went to the President would carry the signatures of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, and on the body of the statement itself there is nothing incorporated in it, there isn't any reference at all to the minutes of the meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, it is difficult—that is the difficulty we run into when the committee only gets photostatic copies. We cannot tell whether this is a signed one or what.

Mr. MURPHY. But there is no reference—

Senator FERGUSON. This is a mimeographed copy rather than a photostatic copy.

Mr. MURPHY. But there is no incorporation of the minutes in the message by reference, at least.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have read into the record at this place the instrument, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one is that? The memorandum to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. No, the whole thing; November 5, the one from the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval [1706] Operations. It is addressed to the President. It is an estimate concerning the far eastern situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Thirteen pages.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is a very lengthy document. It is not in the transcript, it has not gone into the hearings as yet?

Mr. MURPHY. It has been offered.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been offered as an exhibit, but has it been printed in the hearing?

Mr. GESELL. No; it has not, Senator. I suggest we could just arrange to have it spread upon the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If we could have it spread upon the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. That is agreeable, and it will be put into the record here at this point and made a part of the transcript.

(Exhibit No. 16 follows:)

[1707]

Secret

Serial 0130012

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attaché. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States [1708] and the British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened [1709] by withdrawing all¹ naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing² plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct offensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will

¹ Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically."

² The preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted.

make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached [1710] the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are; continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remained undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic [1711] against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

[1712] (d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kuning, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete co-ordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group [1713] be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations.

THE JOINT BOARD

WASHINGTON

SECRET

Minutes of Meeting, November 3, 1941.

At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 8:40 p. m.

Present:

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding;
General G. C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff;
Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations;
Major General William Bryden, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air;
Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau [1714] of Aeronautics;

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division;

Captain O. M. Read, U. S. N., War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, in absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and
Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. A., Secretary.

Additional Officers Present:

Major General R. C. Moore, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Colonel C. W. Bundy, U. S. A., War Plans Division, War Department General Staff;

Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations;

Commander F. P. Sherman, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; and

Lieutenant Commander A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved.

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action [1715] of the Army and the Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being Established.—Revision requested by the British.

Discussion—Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.

Discussion—Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to the Far East.

Action taken on the several subjects was as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of airplane ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1 and 723, the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23, 1941, and directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report was approved.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October 30, 1941, was accepted and [1716] the Committee of Experts' report was approved.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The Secretary announced that the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recommended certain revisions in the United States-United Kingdom initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19, 1941; and that the revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by the United States representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of October 29, 1941.

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China.—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United [1717] States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. The policy was stated in the U. S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.

c. A U. S. war in the Pacific would materially affect United States aid to England.

d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this [1718] country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions: viz, against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the [1719] augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to

the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and [1720] emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

Admiral Ingersoll gave summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make [1721] certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Following these discussions the Board adopted the following proposal submitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Marshall:

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines:

- Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.
- Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.
- Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.
- Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.
- Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.
- Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.
- Emphasize the existing limitations on [1722] shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

At this point, General Marshall presented a list of items of equipment considered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials and difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related to Great Britain, Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other countries. In the case of Russia, a large amount of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via Archangel, Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of communications, and the difficult transport situation from the ports of debarkation might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipment to its final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused

equipment at various localities, while at the same time other localities would suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's [1725] opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions incident thereto, is a strategic decision which should be made by The Joint Board. Since the matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items and is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt that Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with The Joint Board in deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral Land should be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint Planning Committee on reports involving the disposition of Lend-Lease materials. Navy members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral Land of this request.

Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral Stark felt that merchant tonnage is so short and prospective requirements are so great that an effort should be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an A-1-a priority.

At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the *Normandie* be acquired to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion; and that delivery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea [1724] trains plus the two sea trains U. S. S. *Kitty Hawk* and U. S. S. *Hammondsport*, already acquired and converted for Navy use. Copy of this report was furnished to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Alternate Route Via Canton Island for Movement of Airplanes.—Following a discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be given to the Joint Planning Committee:

It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the action to be taken to complete the establishment of an additional landplane route between Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional air-dromes and landing fields acquired.

W. P. SCOBEE,
Colonel, G. S. C., Secretary.

[1725]

NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

I. Discussion.

1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials, and Capt. Schuirmann. U. S. N. The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the Magruder radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of U. S. forces in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures were discussed, such as sending U. S. Army Air Forces to China, which might lead to immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of Chiang Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and that this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted.

2. a. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward Kunming. G-2 believes that: the movement if contemplated will not be initiated in less than two months; the movement will be very difficult over nearly 300 miles of roadless, broken country; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone.

[1726] b. G-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder statement that with the fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to Japan would be very seriously affected.

c. The G-2 estimate also covers the broader viewpoint of expected Japanese action.

3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab B) brings out the following: the most effective air aid to China can be given by units based in the Philip-

piners; there are, at present many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply which will militate against a sustained effort; logistical difficulties, aside from general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of U. S. Army Air Force units in China.

4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is shown in Tab C.

5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves in the Philippine Department is shown in Tab D. The garrison has not reached the effective strength desired by General MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch of personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating the training and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present combined air and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. The dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison to China would leave Luzon open to serious risk of capture.

[1727] 6. Informal contact with officers of the local British Staff Mission indicate that the British have incomplete air forces for the defense of Singapore, would refuse to allow units of the Royal Air Force to support Chinese troops in Yunnan, and are of the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff would strongly disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with Japan.

7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion that:

a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain sound, viz:

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.

(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.

(3) Military counter-action against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan:

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war". It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized [1728] that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator east of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

b. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision is not reached. The means to defeat Japan, (Army, Navy, and tonnage,) must be withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany. To defeat Germany will require the utmost total effort.

[1729] c. It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in China. However, from the larger viewpoints, prospective Chinese defeat would not warrant involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan.

d. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter Japanese action.

e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

f. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.

g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.

II. Recommendations.

Substitution of the words "War Department" for "War Plans Division" in paragraph 7 above and approval of that [1730] paragraph as a statement of the War Department's position on the Far East situation at this time.

L. T. GEEOW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

6 Incls.¹

- #1—Tab A—G-2 Estimate
- #2—Tab B—Air Estimate
- #3—Tab C—Lend-Lease Program for China.
- #4—Tab D—Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept.
- #5—Tab E—Ground Reinforcements, Phil. Dept.
- #6—Tab F—Rad. fr. Gen. Magruder (10-28-41).

[1731]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
Nov. 14, 1941.

The President's reply was handed to Hu Shih at 6 p. m. by Mr. Hornbeck.
M. M. H.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 11, 1941.

Memorandum for General Watson.

I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to me when he comes.

F. D. R.

Strictly Confidential

NOVEMBER 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and [1732] that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:

Draft
message.

FE: JWB: HES FE PA/H

Address Official Communications to
The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 10, 1941.

Strictly Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

(Signed), HULL.

Enclosure:

Draft message.

¹ Tab A is included in Exhibit No. 33; other tabs not included.

[1733] *Strictly Confidential*

To Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK from President ROOSEVELT:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunming from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into [1734] consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against [1735] such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion.

In the present state of world affairs, I feel—and I am confident that you will agree with me—that there rests on the United States, in connection with every move which it considers and every decision which it makes, extraordinary obligation to give intensive thought to widespread political stresses and strains, to both long-swing and short-swing potentialities, and to the weight of various possible and probable advantages in comparison with the weight of other possible or probable disadvantages. The world conflict is now being waged in many theaters and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral. [1736] Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, efforts of China and of the United States and of many other countries, will have to be continued and be sustained over a long period of time before our countries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits.

I assure you that the situation and the problems which are the subject of this correspondence will continue to have my own and my country's constant attention.

FE:JWB:HES

PA/H:SKH

11-10-41 FE.

[1737] Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield for just one observation?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 5 of the minutes, the recommendation of the Board, after hearing these references which the gentleman read, was that they opposed the issuance of an ultimatum.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that will show from the document itself.

Senator FERGUSON. That will speak for itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the President's message, on page 3, the President's message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, from President Roosevelt, on page 3 of that same document [reading]:

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, [1738] and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-China, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

Was that your understanding of the situation, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. Well, Senator, as I said, I was not here in this country at that time; I was not in a position to check up on all these steps that were reported as being taken. Frankly, I cannot give you an opinion on that.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but, Mr. Grew, had you an idea that the fact that our fleet was on the flank was deterring the Japanese from taking action?

Mr. GREW. I said that this morning. I do agree; I do think that, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that that was true?

Mr. GREW. I think that that was true. I think it had a deterrent effect. In other words, I think if——

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Mr. Grew, you think——

Mr. GREW. I would like to finish, please.

Senator FERGUSON. I beg your pardon. Go ahead.

Mr. GREW. I think it had a deterrent effect. More than [1739] that, I think to withdraw the fleet would have had a disastrous effect psychologically.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Mr. Grew, if it had an effect and there was going to be war between the United States and Japan, how do you account for us allowing that fleet to be there and being attacked as it was at Pearl Harbor?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that that is a totally unfair question.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness can take care of himself.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Grew can take care of himself, but we have been running along here with one question after another that the witness absolutely does not know anything about and I think it is a question that other authorities and other witnesses should answer directly in the time to come. I do not object to it, because the witness is undoubtedly taking care of himself. It just seems to me that we are wasting a lot of time. Maybe I am wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, I am of the opinion that you are wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. If the witness has any additional opinion as to why the fleet was there than the reasons that he has already assigned for it being there and the effect of it being there he may state.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that the Chair rules [1740] that the witness cannot answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair makes no such ruling. On the contrary, he is suggesting that the witness answer.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. GREW. I am simply stating my opinion that I believe that the fleet at that time was there and I assumed that the fleet would be in perfect condition.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by "in perfect condition" that it would be properly protected for all events?

Mr. GREW. I assumed that the fleet would fulfill its functions in case of necessity.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you understand, Mr. Grew, that the fleet was there and it would defend itself, or that the Army base was there to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor and to defend Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. Senator, I did not go into those very strategic details; naturally, I could not. You asked me merely what my opinion is about keeping the fleet in Pearl Harbor and I have expressed my opinion that the fact of the fleet being there, to me that had a deterrent influence on the Japanese and to have withdrawn the fleet from Pearl Harbor would have had just the reverse. It would have had a very disastrous influence. That was always my opinion and I haven't changed it.

[1741] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, I read to you last night from the Foreign Relations, I think it was May of 1940, where you expressed to one of the Japanese Ministers that it was not there as a threat to Japan. How do you account for that statement?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely it was not there as a threat to Japan because we had no idea of offense. Our whole policy was one of defense and nothing else. That was fundamental in our policy. What reason had we for offense? Our whole policy was based on defense pure and simple.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if our whole policy was one of defense—and was that told to Japan?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. I think that time after time our basic principles were fully explained to Japan, not only by myself in conversations with Japanese officials, not only in written documents to the Japanese Government, but by high officials of the United States Government in public speeches. That was constantly being expressed.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that the fleet was there as a defense, and as far as a defense was concerned it was a deterrent to

Japan but as an offensive weapon it was not a deterrent to Japan because we had never expressed that it was there for that purpose.

Is that a correct understanding, Mr. Grew.

[1742] Mr. GREW. Well, sir, I merely made the statement that our whole policy was one of defense because we had no reason for offense. We did not want any more territory or anything of that kind. From that point of view, as I say, our whole policy was based on defensive position.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that your answer to my question?

Mr. GREW. Well, that is my opinion of the situation. Of course, as I say, I am not competent to go into military and naval strategy. There are cases, of course, where defensive measures require taking temporary offense. I do not know the strategy, that is not my business.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am not trying to get your opinion of the Navy strategy. I am trying to get your opinion as expressed to Japan, and the reason I am questioning you in detail, it is only for one purpose, Mr. Grew, and that is to try to find out what Washington knew, what the officials—I am covering all branches—what they knew here in Washington in relation to Japan, as far as their military force was concerned, as far as our diplomatic relations were concerned, so that the committee may judge what was known by Washington and what was known by you so that you could convey back to Washington your opinion from what they knew here in Washington.

[1743] Mr. GREW. Senator, as I said in reading that letter this morning, my whole desire is to be helpful as possible to the committee and to give every bit of evidence that I am capable of giving.

Now, the story from my point of view of Japan has been, I would say, pretty thoroughly spread on the records in the four volumes which I have mentioned. Where I can piece them out I am only too glad to do so and I will do my best, but some of the questions that you are asking me I am not in a position to answer. I could not do it.

For instance, I dare say that our military or naval attachés may have made technical reports to their respective departments which I did not see; I do not know. But I have given you everything that I can give you with regard to my own position and my own observations in Tokyo during that period.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, the only way, of course, I can find out whether you can answer my questions is for me to ask them.

Mr. GREW. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. And I do not wish to convey the idea that you are not trying to answer the questions at all. I merely want to try to get answers, if we can, because you were the one man in Tokyo, in Japan, that could give to the vari- [1744] ous agencies in Washington—the Government, in other words—the information and there is only one way we can find out, as I view it, is from you, what information Washington had on the 7th, or the 7th of December, so that the committee may draw some conclusions as to what should or should not have been done; or the facts, rather, would draw the conclusions as to what should or should not be done.

Now, going to this instrument of August the 17th, do I understand that you place little significance on that instrument of August 17, 1941, which Admiral Schuirmann called an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. As I said, Senator, in my opinion it was not in the nature of an ultimatum for the very reason that we did not act on it as an ultimatum. We continued the conversations in Washington with a view to trying to reach an agreement. You do not deliver an ultimatum to a country and then continue to negotiate after that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you here, Mr. Grew, when I asked some questions of Mr. Welles about the parallel action that was to be taken by Great Britain on this instrument?

Mr. GREW. Yes, I heard that question.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I will ask you whether or not you had any opinion then that Japan—no, that Great Britain took parallel action on this meeting between the President and Mr. Churchill on the *Augusta* in the Atlantic in [1745] relation to the message that we gave notice to the Japs on the 17th of August, 1941?

Mr. GREW. I knew nothing about that whatever, Senator, and so far as I am aware no step of that kind was taken by me in Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the information that came to you, Mr. Grew, was merely this instrument, which does not indicate that parallel action was to be taken, does it?

Mr. GREW. Probably so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you look at it and see whether or not it indicates parallel action?

Mr. GREW. Which document do you refer to now?

Senator LUCAS. Of course, Mr. Chairman, there is no evidence before this committee that there was ever any agreement that parallel action should be taken. The Senator from Michigan is assuming in every one of these questions that parallel action was agreed upon.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, the record will speak for itself as to what Mr. Welles told us.

The Chairman. The Chair does not know whether it is customary when one government sends a message to another to include in that message things that another government has sent a similar message. Evidently that did not appear in this case. [1746]

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the record is clear here from what Mr. Welles said.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if it is, it will speak for itself.

Mr. GREW. I could speak only from the point of view, less frankly, of Tokyo and I recollect neither having been instructed to take, nor having taken such parallel action on this issue.

Now, what happened in Washington I, frankly, do not know. I do not even know whether I was informed at that time. I would have to check the records to find out.

[1747] Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask you, Mr. Grew, whether you had any knowledge that parallel action was to be taken?

Mr. GREW. Not so far as I recollect, Senator. But, after all these years, I find myself in a very difficult position to give a categorical answer to a question of that kind without looking at the record. Sometimes my memory may be at fault.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be a rather important matter, would it not?

Counsel, would you let me have the 10 Downing Street instrument? I do not recall the exhibit number.

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 22.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show it to you, Mr. Grew, and have you interpret it for me.

(The document was handed to Mr. Grew.)

Mr. GREW. I take it from this document these were to be declarations by these various governments.

Senator FERGUSON. What is meant by a "draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government"?

Mr. GREW. That would have meant definitely a note to the Japanese Government which might have been presented by the Secretary of State here to the Japanese Ambassador, or might have been presented by me to the Minister of Foreign [1748] Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Might we have the notes of August 17?

Mr. GESELL. They are attached to this exhibit, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you prepared to answer the question Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. May I ask what exactly was the question again?

Senator FERGUSON. I was looking through the instrument, if the Chairman please.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. At the top of the page on Exhibit 22, the seal of the Prime Minister, what would that indicate as to where that instrument was drawn up, the "Seal of Prime Minister, 10 Downing Street, Whitehall"? It would be very difficult to tell what was meant by that without seeing the original instrument, would it not?

Mr. GREW. The only thing that is clear from this is that it was apparently written on the official paper of the British Prime Minister. I do not know that there is any indication further than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now does that instrument indicate to you that it was contemplated, if it was to be carried out, that it would be carried out by parallel action of the governments mentioned?

Mr. GREW. I do not see any indication here that it would, [1749] Senator. There is no indication whatsoever of parallel action here that I can see.

Senator FERGUSON. What is meant by "draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government"?

Mr. GREW. Well, it would mean presumably that each government would send communications along these general lines in its own language.

Senator FERGUSON. It states:

Declaration by H. M. G., His Majesty's Government—same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading: * * * their support of them, H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such power.

"Mutatis mutandis" means using the proper language, does it not?

The CHAIRMAN. There might be some dispute about that. It might mean necessary changes having been made in the instrument.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the witness' opinion on the word?

Mr. GREW. Senator, I do not think, frankly, I am competent to answer the questions that you are asking about this, because I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. As a diplomat, can you answer it? I do not know that I will get a better expert on it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

[1750] The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman?

Senator FERGUSON. Does he want to be the better expert?

Mr. MURPHY. Haven't we already heard on the record from Mr. Welles, who was at the Atlantic Charter meeting, saying that another version was used and not the version that was asked the witness? Is not that already in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I already have had the instrument of the President read by Mr. Grew. He knows what went on, and I assume he received it in Tokyo.

Is that correct?

Mr. GREW. I assume I did, but as I say, I would have to consult the record.¹

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the present moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get along.

Mr. GREW. I think we have gone over all this.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, then, as I understand it, you did not know of any parallel action to be taken, as far as the instrument is concerned on page 556 of Foreign Relations?

Mr. GREW. From my recollection, I doubt it. As I say, in order to give a categorical reply to that question I would have to look up the records and see.

Senator FERGUSON. May we have this understanding, that if you do not return it is because you find nothing in the [1751] record on that question, and if you do find something you will bring it back or have it delivered to counsel?

Mr. GREW. That will be understood, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that understood?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, were you familiar with the voluntary Air Corps in China?

Mr. GREW. I know of its existence. You mean the American Corps that went out there?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Of course I knew of its existence at the time, but I know very little about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever discussed with you in the Japanese Government?

Mr. GREW. The Japanese Government from time to time would make representations to me about our aid to Chiang Kai-shek which, they said, prevented their coming to a peaceful conclusion of the so-called China incident. They never called it war but the China incident. In the course of those representations it is quite possible that they did mention our assistance in connection with the Air Corps, but I cannot recollect any specific statement to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you advised by our Government as to just what that Air Corps was?

[1752] Mr. GREW. Well, I presumably was.

Senator FERGUSON. You were advised?

Mr. GREW. I cannot tell you without going into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Again might I ask you to get the records?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

¹ See p. 710, *infra*.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume if you do not come back then you have found nothing in the records on that point.

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that we will understand that.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.¹

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get an idea that Konoye, the Prime Minister, wanted to meet with the President?

Mr. GREW. The proposal was, as broached to me in a long talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 18, 1941——

Senator FERGUSON. I did not get the date.

Mr. GREW. On August 18, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no information prior to that?

Mr. GREW. I understand that the matter had been taken up by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington. I do not think that I was informed prior to that. I think that was the first information I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as far as you are concerned, Mr. Grew, did you know of any outside intermediaries in the negotiations between Japan and the United States?

[1753] Mr. GREW. Outside intermediaries?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It has been mentioned here that Mr. Walker, the Postmaster General——

Mr. GREW (interposing). I know nothing about that.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no knowledge about that whatsoever?

Mr. GREW. None whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. Your sole point of contact was either the State Department or the President, as you have indicated?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you tell us something about this proposed meeting of Konoye, as to what significance it could have had, as you saw it? I want to know merely as you saw it and conveyed it to our State Department, to find out what knowledge they had.

Mr. GREW. Konoye himself arranged a meeting with me on September 6 in order to discuss a meeting with President Roosevelt. As I have said this afternoon, Konoye is saddled with the responsibility for some of the war acts of banditry on the part of Japan which have been recorded in international history, but, as I also said, he, I think, saw the handwriting on the wall and realized that Japan was on the brink of an abyss and wanted, if possible, to reverse the engine. That is only opinion. Anyway, on September 6 he asked me to dinner, [1754] and he was very much afraid of any possibility of the military extremists learning of that meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you meet? Under what circumstances?

Mr. GREW. I will tell you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. GREW. Ordinarily a Japanese Prime Minister does not consort with diplomats. The contact is always with the Foreign Minister. Most prime ministers stay off it completely. But in this case Konoye wanted to talk the thing over directly. So we proceeded to the house of a mutual friend, and automobile tags on diplomatic and official automobiles were changed so nobody could recognize us. We had the dinner. All the servants were sent out and the dinner was served by the daughter of the house. We talked for 3 hours.

¹ See Mr. Gesell's statement in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1715.

During that time Konoye sketched out to me what he had in mind. It is a pretty long story. It is all on record.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you point out in the Foreign Relations where it is on record?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; I will.

Senator FERGUSON. So we will have the record clear.

Mr. GREW. The report of the dinner is recorded on page 604 of Foreign Relations and my analysis of the purpose of the meeting is contained in a long telegram which I sent to the [1755] Secretary of State on September 29, 1941, on page 645 of Foreign Relations. I would like to read to the committee, if I may, the last paragraph of that message from myself to the Secretary of State:

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference—

I might say that all these telegrams were paraphrased by the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. So we might clear the record on that, all these messages in here are either substance or paraphrased?

Mr. GREW. Yes; and in some cases I regret to say I think the paraphrases are very awkward. I think sometimes the language is being obscured rather than clarified.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they always convey what you intended to convey? Would a person reading them get an idea as to what you were trying to convey?

Mr. GREW. I think so. I do not think there has been any distortion of the meaning, but I do not think they are as clear an exposition as contained in the original text.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it would be more difficult to convey what you intended to say?

Mr. GREW. I think my meaning is clear, in any case. These paraphrases were essential because we had to protect our code. The last paragraph reads:

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the [1756] Ambassador does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan.

I preface everything I said in the position I took on this matter with that premise. In the first place, as I have told you already, I did not have access to any of the telegraphic intercepts, I did not even know that they existed, and I had no access to any of the secret documents which have appeared since, so my analysis of the situation was based entirely on my observation from the standpoint of our Embassy in Tokyo, what I could see at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, you say that the meeting was held as an absolutely secret meeting and you described how you changed the plates on the automobiles. Was it your understanding that this was to be a good faith meeting?

Mr. GREW. It was my understanding, and also after the meeting had taken place that was my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. There was not anything that happened at the meeting that would indicate to you that it was not a good-faith meeting, was there?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; there was not anything happened at the meeting that would indicate there was any lack of faith.

[1757] Senator FERGUSON. And did you, in your opinion, properly report that to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. Well, sir, my report is all contained in that telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. A fair appraisal of that telegram would be that you did express that it was a good faith meeting, is that correct?

Mr. GREW. Yes, very definitely; and that was developed still further in my telegram of September 29.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you get any opinions from Konoye, from what he said, that if he could get such a meeting his Cabinet may fall?

Mr. GREW. Yes, very definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advise the State Department to that effect?

Mr. GREW. That is contained in that telegram of September 29, Senator. I think I better stick to the record here.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I wish you would.

Mr. GREW. This is a very long telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to boil it down.

Mr. GREW. I think that the story as I saw it is pretty fully brought forward in this telegram, but there is no particular passage that I can pick out.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you sum it up?

[1758] Mr. GREW. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know now about the Cabinet falling, if that is your opinion from what he said, that his Cabinet would fall if he could not get the meeting.

Mr. GREW. I, in my telegram, said this:

The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were of the opinion, and conveyed it to the State Department, that if the meeting did not take place that would mean a military dictatorship in Japan?

Mr. GREW. That was my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you convey to the United States, or the State Department, what that would mean or could mean?

Mr. GREW. I do not think anything much could have been added to this statement here, Senator, "formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States."

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "colliding head-on with the United States," is that another way of saying "war"?

Mr. GREW. I think that would be.

[1759] Senator FERGUSON. That is a fair interpretation?

Mr. GREW. A fair deduction.

Senator FERGUSON. A fair deduction. Then you were of the opinion, and conveyed it to the State Department, that if the meeting did not take place and the Cabinet fell, and you were of the opinion it would fall, it meant war with the United States?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I did not go as far as that. No, indeed.

Senator FERGUSON. How far did you go?

Mr. GREW. I said that risk would be present, but I think the fact that, as far as I was concerned in Tokyo, I was working for peace up to the last minute, and conversations were going on in Washington. I do not think at any time it could be said any particular step or lack of step definitely meant war. No; I would not subscribe to that.

Senator FERGUSON. How far did you go in that note as a warning to the State Department in Washington?

Mr. GREW. That is clear in the telegram.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask the Senator, has that note been made a part of the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like now to have the whole note read in.

The CHAIRMAN. It speaks for itself, and should be made [1760] part of the record.

Mr. GREW. It speaks for itself.

The CHAIRMAN. When it is made a part of the record it speaks for itself, in its own terms.

Mr. GREW. I should think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore it will now be made a part of the record, part of the transcript. It is a lengthy document.

Mr. GREW. That is telegram 1529, Tokyo, September 29, 1941, noon. That is on page 645 of Foreign Relations.

(The telegram referred to follows:)

(1) In regard to the preliminary conversations taking place at Washington and Tokyo, the Ambassador points out that a review of telegraphic correspondence on this subject since last spring reveals the Japanese Government's efforts, increasing steadily and intensified lately, to arrange a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt without further delay. While admitting his role to be chiefly that of a transmitting agent in these conversations, the Ambassador naturally wishes to aid in any constructive way, particularly by endeavoring to appraise accurately for the President and the Secretary of State the Japanese factors and conditions having direct or indirect bearing on the subject and also by trying to bring the Japanese Government to adopt measures and policies such as the United States Government deems to be [1761] essential for a mutual understanding or agreement between Japan and the United States. Since the fall of Admiral Yonai's Cabinet in July of 1940, American diplomacy in Japan has been in eclipse temporarily through force of circumstances. However, when the Konoye-Toyoda regime began last July, American diplomacy obtained a very active new lease of life. The Ambassador expresses his earnest hope therefore that so propitious a period be not permitted to slip by without a new foundation having been laid with enough stability to warrant a reasonable amount of confidence that the structure to be erected gradually and progressively thereon can and will endure.

(2) The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advance to the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American [1762] interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force and by a demonstration of American willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also his statement that if Japan's leadership could be discredited eventually by such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific.

(3) The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very wisely precisely this policy which, furthered by other developments in the world, has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the present time Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation by getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The Ambassador recalls his reports to the Department to the effect [1763] that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a program can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American policy—of forbearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, followed for many years, plus a manifest determination of the United States to take positive measures when called for—plus the impact of world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States.

(4) Certain quarters have advanced the thought—and no doubt it is prominently in the mind of the United States Government—that at this juncture an agreement between Japan and the United States will serve merely as a breathing spell to Japan. During such a breathing spell, Japan, having successfully untangled itself with American aid from the China conflict, will recoup and strengthen its forces in order to resume at the next favorable opportunity its [1764] expansionist program. This thought cannot be gainsaid with certainty. The same school of thought also holds that Japan will be forced to relinquish its expansionist program because of the deterioration of Japanese domestic economy and because of the threat of financial, economic and social collapse due to a progressive intensifying of economic measures by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands against Japan. The Ambassador adds that should this thesis be accepted as reasonably sound, the position will confront the United States of choosing one of two methods to approach its objective, namely, either the method of progressive economic strangulation or the method of constructive conciliation, not so-called appeasement. The Ambassador sees the second method as the definite choice of the United States Government following the beginning of the Washington preliminary conversations and President Roosevelt's acceptance in principle of the Japanese Prime Minister's proposed meeting. Indeed, the Ambassador remarks, the United States has never departed from its readiness to negotiate on any issues with Japan (see the American note dated December 30, 1938), despite the fact that Japan already had embarked at that time on its expansion by force program. He feels that, from the viewpoint of farseeing statesmanship, the wisdom of the American choice seems to be beyond cavil. Should failure greet the con- [1765] structive, conciliatory method of approach now or later, there will always be available the other method, the application of progressive economic sanctions. In the opinion of the Ambassador, whether the trend of American relations with Japan is for better or for worse, the United States obviously will have to remain for a long time to come in a state of preparedness. The thought that eventual British victory in the world war will solve automatically many problems may, meanwhile, afford whatever degree of encouragement is justified.

(5) The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved no matter what course is pursued toward Japan, offers his carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing the Far Eastern situation from becoming worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments. The Ambassador mentions his previous expressions of opinion that the principal point at issue between the United States and Japan is not whether the former must call a halt to the expansionist program of the latter, but when. He raises the questions whether the United States is not now given the oppor-

tunity to halt Japan's program without war, [1766] or an immediate risk of war, and further whether, through failure to use the present opportunity, the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The Ambassador states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these two questions.

(6) Certain quarters hold the view that it is altogether improbable under existing circumstances that counteraction will be deliberately taken by Japan in response to any American action likely to be taken in the Pacific which would bring about war with the United States. The Ambassador states his inability to agree that war may not supervene following actions, whether irrational or deliberate, by elements either in Japan or in the United States tending so to inflame public opinion in the other country concerned as to make war unavoidable. He recalls in this regard the cases of the Maine and the Panay.

(7) The Ambassador stresses the importance of understanding Japanese psychology, fundamentally unlike that of any Western nation. Japanese reactions to any particular set of circumstances cannot be measured, nor can Japanese actions be predicted by any Western measuring rod. This fact is hardly surprising in the case of a country so recently feudalistic. The Ambassador conceives his chief duty to be an attempt to interpret accurately Japanese [1765] psychology, and he states that he has aimed to do this in his numerous reports during the last several months and years to the Department. Keeping this thought constantly before him, the Ambassador ventures at the risk of repetition to advance the considerations set forth below.

(8) Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet and its supporting elements desiring rapprochement with the United States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a situation in which it will be difficult to [1768] avoid war. The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States. There is a question that such a situation may prove to be more serious even than the failure to produce an entirely satisfactory agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned. Worded otherwise, the question remains whether it will not prove to be a less serious case for the negotiations undertaken in good faith to fail of complete success than for the United States to demonstrate its unwillingness to enter any such negotiations.

(9) The Ambassador continues by stating that he has been emphatically told on numerous occasions—and such declarations he considers must be accepted at their face value—that prior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting and formal negotiations it is impossible for the Japanese Government to define its future assurances and commitments more specifically than hitherto stated. The Ambassador explains that one reason for this Japanese position, as given him very confidentially, is that former Foreign Minister Matsuoka, after his retirement in July, recounted in complete detail to the German Ambassador in the course of the [1769] Washington conversations up to that time. Because many supporters of Matsuoka remain in the Tokyo Foreign Office, the fear has been expressed that these men will not scruple to reveal to both the Germans and the Japanese extremists any information which would render the present Cabinet's position untenable. Although certain basic principles have been accepted provisionally by the Japanese Government, the definitions and formulae of Japan's future objectives and policy, as advanced so far during the preliminary conversations, and the statements supplementary to those definitions, are so abstract or equivocal and are open to such wide interpretation that they rather create confusion than clarify commitments which the Japanese Government is ready to undertake. The Ambassador states that at the same time he has been told the Prince Konoye is in a position in direct negotiations with President Roosevelt to offer him assurance which, because of their far-reaching

character, will not fail to satisfy the United States. The truth of this statement cannot be determined by the Ambassador, who, however, points out that, in regard specifically to Japan's Axis relations, the Japanese Government, though refusing consistently to give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance membership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's alliance adherence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter [1770] formally into negotiations with the United States. The Ambassador therefore does not consider unlikely the possibility of Prince Konoye's being in a position to give President Roosevelt directly a more explicit and satisfactory engagement than has already been vouchsafed in the course of the preliminary conversations.

(10) In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above observations which he has every reason to regard as sound, American objectives will not be reached by insisting or continuing to insist during the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal convention or treaty. Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould Japan's future policy upon the basic principles they are ready to accept and then to adopt measures which gradually but loyally implement those principles, with it understood that the United States will implement its own commitments *pari passu* with the steps which Japan takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific. The sole way to discredit the [1771] Japanese military machine and army is through wholesale military defeat, and the Ambassador sees no present prospect of this. The only alternative (and the only wise one in the view of the Ambassador) is an attempt to produce a regeneration of Japanese thought and outlook through constructive conciliation, along the lines of American efforts at present. The Ambassador inquires whether the better part of wisdom and of statesmanship is not to bring such efforts to a head before the force of their initial impetus is lost, leaving it impossible to overcome an opposition which the Ambassador thinks will mount inevitably and steadily in Japan.

(11) In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan.

GREW.

[1772] Mr. GESELL. Senator, I just want to call attention again to the fact that these are official Government publications, and we have assumed that all of the conversations recorded in these publications are available to the committee and may be drawn upon in making any conclusions or anything of that sort.

We simply have not physically offered them as exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. If an interpretation is to be made of the document which is part of the record, or which has been filed as an exhibit, it seems to the Chair instead of undertaking to have a verbal interpretation of a record of that sort, it ought to be allowed to speak for itself in its own terms.

Mr. GREW. I agree with you. It is all set out here.

Mr. KEEFE. May I interrupt?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from Wisconsin?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to inquire whether or not the original document entitled "War and Peace" has been offered as an exhibit and is in evidence, the entire book, or is it considered that the committee is at liberty to consider anything in that book as a matter of reference, it being a so-called public document?

[1773] Mr. GESELL. Congressman Keefe, it is the latter. We have assumed the committee may take judicial notice of these three official publications, Peace and War, and the two volumes containing the actual notes of the conversations in Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-41.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Chairman, in order that there may not be any mistake at any time in the future in connection with these hearings, I think it would be perfectly proper to have the documents referred to offered as exhibits so we may have them.

I would like also to have offered as an exhibit the original, what I understand to be the original, short version published by the State Department in 1942, entitled "Peace and War," of which I have a copy, consisting of some 143 pages.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us clear this matter up.

Mr. MURPHY. Is not the proper legal procedure, Mr. Chairman, to incorporate that by reference, and was not that incorporated by reference? Since they are legal documents they are part of the record by reference.

The CHAIRMAN. In effect, there is not much difference between incorporating by reference and by making them exhibits which are available to the committee. The fact that they are [1774] Government publications puts upon them the stamp of authenticity, I presume. Is there any reason why they cannot be referred to as exhibits?

[1775] Mr. GESELL. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. I think we can refer to Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41, as the next exhibit, Exhibit No. 27; and I might say to Congressman Keefe that it is my understanding that includes in the front portion the document the Congressman has in his hand, the initial short summary which was originally released.

Mr. KEEFE. The reason I suggest that this initial short summary be incorporated as an exhibit is because I have found in going through these four volumes after they have been edited and reedited and changes have been made in the arrangement of the material so that it becomes difficult for me to follow a lot of this material. I find that there is a lot helpful in this short volume, which can be identified promptly and quickly, and which tells in short form this story.

Mr. GESELL. We could make the short form the next exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair suggests that it be made Exhibit No. 27 because it seems to have been published previously and that the full volume be made Exhibit No. 28.

Mr. GESELL. Very well.

As Exhibit 29, the two volumes, volumes I and II, Foreign Relations of the United States; Japan, 1931-41, which contains the actual documents of reported conversations held.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to now make [1776] Mr. Grew's book No. 30.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chairman sees no objection to making it an exhibit. I do not know whether that would increase the circulation or not, but the committee will be glad to have it made an exhibit.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 27, 28, 29, and 30", respectively.)

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you, Mr. Grew, when Mr. Dooman came to the United States? When did he come to the United States?

Mr. GREW. Mister—who?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Dooman.

Mr. GREW. Nomura?

Senator FERGUSON. Dooman.

Mr. GREW. Dooman. Well, he was the counselor of the Embassy in Tokyo. He came out there—I don't remember precisely what date.

Senator FERGUSON. My question was, when did he return to the United States before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. I would have to check. Of course, he did not return while I was away, because he had to be chargé d'affaires.

Senator FERGUSON. Does page 139 of Foreign Relations refresh your memory on that?

[1777] Mr. MURPHY. Which volume?

Senator FERGUSON. I think No. 2.

Mr. GREW. 139 of Foreign Relations, volume II?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 138.

Mr. GREW. "Memorandum by the Counsellor of Embassy in Japan."

Senator FERGUSON. He had a conversation with Ohashi.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember that conversation?

On page 139, I will ask you to read beginning down about 15 lines, "It would be absurd to suppose that the American people * * *."

Mr. GREW (reading): It would be absurd to suppose that the American people while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and the British Dominions and Colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States. There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot be concerned by the various initiatives [1778] taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences.

Senator FERGUSON. That is far enough for my purposes, unless you want to read further.

Does that refresh your memory that Dooman had been here and obtained an opinion in the United States?

Mr. GREW. I think, as I recollect, that was the opinion he received from moving around the United States, but not necessarily from official sources.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he convey this idea to you?

Mr. GREW. Well, I have no doubt of it. He returned [1779] from a leave of absence shortly before that, didn't he?

I don't know if the record shows. I think he undoubtedly told me of his general impressions.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I ask you to refer to page 137, "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State," No. 5397. I ask you to read the second paragraph.

Mr. GREW (reading): The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinary direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth with the question, "Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore there would be war with the United States?" Mr. Dooman replied, "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question." Mr. Ohashi then left that subject and adverted to the character of the reports sent to London by the British Ambassador.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what did Dooman, in your opinion, mean by that phrase?

Mr. GREW. Well, that referred definitely, when he said, "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question" that meant exactly what it says. It would come under considera- [1780] tion. It doesn't mean that it would necessarily bring about war. Inevitably raise that question. Of course, it would be raised.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, your telegram, on page 143, being No. 334, will you read that? It is in relation, I take it, to the same matter. If it isn't, I wish you would explain it.

Mr. GREW. My short telegram?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, the short one.

Mr. GREW (reading):

Yesterday, I told Matsuoka that I entirely concurred in and approved of all that Dooman had said to Ohashi on February 14. As the latter had given only an oral report of the conversation to Matsuoka I read him the whole memorandum of it. I was somewhat surprised when the Minister stated his entire agreement with what Dooman had said. Today I am sending Matsuoka for his personal use a copy of the memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever hear from the State Department on this particular matter after you sent this information to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. Not to my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. So that they were fully advised as to what you had advised the Japanese?

Mr. GREW. I advised the State Department of every step [1781] taken, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you look up and see whether or not you did get an answer?

Mr. GREW. I think I can answer that.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that you did not?

Mr. GREW. Definitely that I did not, but I will have it looked up.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Mr. Grew, did you send a telegram on November 3, 1941?

Mr. GREW. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time—will you get that telegram?

I would like to have that telegram go into the record at this place, Mr. Chairman.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1715.

Have you it before you?

Mr. GREW. I know it pretty well by heart.

Mr. GESELL. That is an exhibit, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You want it printed in the hearings?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it should be, Mr. Chairman. It is an important telegram, is it, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; it is a very important telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. Giving information to the Secretary of State?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. It was addressed "Strictly Confidential for Secretary and Under Secretary Only." [1782]

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was to go to the Secretary and the Under Secretary?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to discuss that with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to have Mr. Grew read it?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it read.

The CHAIRMAN. Read it into the record.

How long is it?

Mr. GREW. You wish me to read it?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask you questions about it.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is it?

Mr. GREW. I think I can get through it in about 6 or 7 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Inasmuch as it is an exhibit and has been made in that form a part of the record, do you insist on it being read, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No; except that I wanted to ask him some questions, and I thought we could save time by reading it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[1783] Mr. MURPHY. Before we go into the telegram, since the distinguished Senator from Michigan has had parts of the document on page 138 read, and since there are qualifying parts of it subsequently which are just to the opposite, I think that the whole thing might go in.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it all go in.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it all go in, but it will not be read here.

(Excerpt from exhibit No. 29, Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 138:)

MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY IN JAPAN (DOOMAN)

[Tokyo,] February 14, 1941.

I called this afternoon by appointment on Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. He greeted me quite politely, saying that although we had several mutual friends it was, so far as he knew, the first time we had met. I replied that I had on various occasions taken notice of statements which he had made in various capacities of the past, in Manchuria, and elsewhere, but I had, unfortunately, not been able to profit by opportunities which had presented themselves to make his acquaintance. Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just returned from leave in the United States and that he supposed I had received a number of interesting impressions in the [1784] United States. I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that day and that I could stay as long as I wished.

I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with regard to the war in Europe as they developed during the election campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion at home with regard to the question of American aid to England, which I attributed in large part first to the disclosure on the part of the British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the resources in dollar exchange, and second to the belief that the effects on Britain's capacity to produce aircraft and other munitions of German bombing raids had been more serious than the British communiques would lead one to suppose. I said that although the large majority of the American people abhorred the idea of American involvement in war, the fact was that an equally large majority of the American people believed that there was one consideration which transcends even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and that is helping England to the limit of our capacity.

I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations between the United States and Japan. I had found [1785] that American opinion is pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the United States which would make war with Japan inevitable. Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand that the American people, being an eminently practical people, are quite aware that an adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only prerequisite to a British victory: the supply to England of foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions and colonies and the maintenance of British commerce with the outside world are equally essential to a British victory. It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States. There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication. [1786] The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences. I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time: However greatly Japan's security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the United States at this time, which is to assist England to stand against German assault.

Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in Japan during the middle 20's, the lack of employment in Japan at that time was driving young Japanese to despair; communism began to spread in amazing fashion, the estimates being that there were at one time more than 50,000 Japanese communists and there was fear of decay and disintegration of the Japanese political system. There developed at the same time a growing antagonism in China [1787] toward Japan. General Chiang Kai-shek initiated a series of military campaigns which finally resulted in the downfall of the northern group of Chinese generals, including Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and others. General Chang Tso-lin made his historic trip to Nanking to consolidate himself with General Chiang Kai-shek, and upon his return to Mukden he raised the flag of Chinese nationalism and proclaimed that his action manifested the complete unification of China and at about this time, Mr. C. T. Wang, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, publicly declared in a speech at Nanking that China was now prepared to "drive Japan off the Continent of Asia". There had occurred elsewhere other events which also gave grounds for complete pessimism in Japan. Pressure by the United States on England had led to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which England discarded after it had served British purposes; the United States in 1924 excluded Japanese from emigrating to the United States,

even though the granting of a small quota of 140 would have amply served to prevent Japanese pride and honor from being injured, and when Australia followed with its White Australia Policy and other parts of the British Empire had also taken action to exclude Japanese, the Japanese had found themselves effectively prevented from expanding into areas which could use their industry and initiative. At the same time the United States and Great Britain encouraged China in every possible way to implement the policy [1788] proclaimed by Dr. C. T. Wang to drive Japan off the Asiatic Continent. He recalled travelling with Admiral Kanji Kato in 1930 from Mukden to Japan. Admiral Kato expressed himself as being extremely despondent of the future if matters were allowed to proceed as they were then proceeding, and he disclosed to Mr. Ohashi the determination of certain elements in the Japanese Army and Navy to take action toward opening up a way for Japanese expansion. This determination manifested itself finally in the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Mr. Ohashi said that the League of Nations had placed upon Japan the responsibility for seeking to alter by force the status quo in the Far East. However, it was clear that it was China and not Japan which had taken the initiative in seeking to alter the status quo, and the responsibility for the deplorable conflict now taking place between China and Japan must largely be borne by those nations which encouraged China to pursue this disastrous policy. The United States and England must also be responsible in some measure for Japan's aligning itself with Germany and Italy, for the present Sino-Japanese conflict would never have occurred if the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not been abrogated. The United States and England had further driven Japan into a position of complete isolation, and it was accordingly necessary for Japan to find friends. Japan has no special friendly feelings towards Germany and Italy and certainly has no ideological association [1789] or identity with either of those two countries. Nevertheless Germany, Italy, and Japan have a close identity of interests in revolting against attempts to keep them permanently under subjection. It would be a great mistake to suppose that Japan would not honor its commitments under the alliance if the United States "were to attack Germany".

I observed that Mr. Ohashi's presentation of Japan's case had the eloquence of one suffering under a sense of grievance. We do not deny that Japan has grievances, but we object to the methods pursued by Japan to rectify those grievances. After the war in Europe is over, there is bound to be a more rational world, and in the creation of the more intelligent world economy which we must earnestly hope will be brought into being after the war, there would be ample room for entirely satisfying Japan's legitimate needs. I then quoted Mr. Churchill's remark "If we allow the past to quarrel with the present, we shall lose the future." As difficult and important as were the problems arising in China, they had not led to a war between the United States and Japan. It was certainly not the intention of the United States to seek a war with Japan, but at the same time I wished to make it clear that it would be idle and extravagant to believe that, so long as Japan remained a partner of Germany and Italy and so long as she was unable to resolve her troubles with China on a mutually satisfactory and equitable basis, a stabilization [1790] of relations between the United States and Japan could be hoped for. I believed that it was quite possible to pass over the present critical period without war, but that one essential condition to this more or less happy issue out of our difficulties must be the realization on the part of the Japanese that they cannot substantially alter the status quo in Southeast Asia, particularly, without incurring the risk of creating a very serious situation.

Mr. Ohashi asked whether he was correct in understanding me to say that war could be averted only by Japan standing still and allowing itself to be tied hand and feet by the United States and Great Britain. I replied that it was not my intention to give him specifications as to what Japan should or should not do, but I wished to express my opinion that if Japan did not exercise the same degree of restraint and forbearance as that being exercised by the United States, it was very difficult to see how a war could be averted.

Mr. Ohashi then asked me whether we had been sending to Washington such extravagant and sensational reports as those being sent by Sir Robert Craigie to London. Without waiting for a reply he said that Mr. Eden had recently called in the Japanese Ambassador at London and had talked to Mr. Shigemitsu very harshly about recent Japanese moves in Siam and Indo-China. Mr. Eden

was apparently greatly excited by telegrams which he had received from Sir Robert Craigie. Mr. Ohashi said that he [1791] had just had a talk with Sir Robert Craigie and that he had reminded Sir Robert that he had repeatedly given the latter assurances that Japan had no intention whatever of moving toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies unless Japan was "pressed" by other nations through the imposition of embargoes by the United States or by the sending of an American fleet to Singapore. I said to Mr. Ohashi that, in my opinion, the award by Japan to Siam of the provinces of Laos and Cambodia would undoubtedly lead to the most serious disorders in Indo-China, as the French are strongly opposed to any substantial cession of territory to the Siamese. I asked Mr. Ohashi what Japan would do in the event that the disorders were beyond the French control. He replied "we shall have to suppress these disorders". I then went on to say "once having occupied Indo-China, Japan would be in a position to control Siam and to undertake operations toward Burma or the Malay States. You see how this intervention in Southeast Asia is capable of having the most widespread consequences". I asked whether he should not consider, in the light of Japanese intervention in the dispute between Indo-China and Siam, whether alarm over Japanese policies in this area is not justified. Mr. Ohashi protested that Japan's interests in Southeast Asia were predominantly economic. Was it our intention to prevent Japan from entering into more satisfactory and closer economic relations with Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies? [1792-1793] I replied that we were not concerned with arrangements calculated to be mutually profitable and which were entered into freely and not as a result of demands with menaces, open or implied. He would understand that proposals concerning trade arrangements presented under the guns of naval vessels could hardly be regarded as ordinary trade arrangements. Mr. Ohashi said that no Japanese warships were in the Indies and that the commercial negotiations now being carried on by Japan with the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China were of a normal character.

Mr. Ohashi said that he was waiting with great interest reports which Admiral Nomura would be sending in shortly of his forthcoming interviews with the President and the Secretary of State. I had then been in Mr. Ohashi's office more than an hour. I rose to go. I said that upon my return to Tokyo I asked various colleagues what sort of a man Mr. Ohashi was and that they had all replied that he was extremely frank—that some had added that he was frank to the point of unpleasantness. I went on to say that I was very glad that he had been both frank and courteous with me, and that he could count on me to maintain equal frankness and courtesy with him in our future conversations. A faint smile came to Mr. Ohashi's face and he said that he would be glad to receive me at any time.

E(UGENE) H. D(OOMAN)

[1794] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, we will discuss that telegram. I would like to have you go to No. 4 paragraph. Will you just read part of that so that you are familiar with it? You need not read it aloud.

Mr. GREW. Section 4?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, just glance at it.

Mr. GREW. Well, this is all mixed up. I have the true reading here. Possibly you have the paraphrase.

Senator FERGUSON. I have the paraphrase.

Mr. GREW. That is quite different. I hope the true reading will be made the record and not the paraphrase.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit is the true reading of the message.

Mr. GREW. Can you tell me how the passage begins that you wish to refer to?

Senator FERGUSON. It begins in the book, "If the fiber and temper of the Japanese people are kept in mind."

Mr. GREW. I will see if I can find that.

Yes, I have it here. Do you wish me to read that part?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. This is the original text.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Will you read the original text?

Mr. GREW (reading):

Having in mind the temper and fibre of the Japanese people, the view that the progressive imposition of [1795] drastic economic measures, while attended with some risk of war, would probably avert war, is a dangerously uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and measures of the United States. Our own view is that if such a course is taken would not avert war. Nevertheless both views are no more than opinion, and it is therefore our belief that it would be contrary to our national interests to postulate the correctness of either opinion and to erect thereon a definite policy. To do so would be to put the cart before the horse. The primary point for decision would appear to involve the question as to whether our national needs, policies and objectives justify war with Japan in the event that diplomacy, our first line of national defense should fail, for only on the basis of such decision could the Administration follow a course divested so far as possible of elements of opinion, speculation and uncertainty. I do not doubt that such decision, which might well prove to be irrevocable, has already been fully debated and adopted, for the sands are running fast."

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by "the sands were running fast"?

Mr. GREW. I meant that the risk of war was steadily increasing.

Senator FERGUSON. Another part of the telegram, under section 4, 1736—I have just received the original copy:

[1796] The view therefore that war in the Far East can best be averted by continuation of trade embargoes and, as proposed by some, the imposition of a blockade is not supported by what has thus far occurred.

Were you of that opinion on the 3d of November?

Mr. GREW. What part is that? Is that a separate telegram?

Senator FERGUSON. This is No. 1736. It is marked 1736, and it is November 3, 3 p. m., at the top, section 4.

Mr. GREW. Can you tell me what paragraph it is?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you show it to him, Counsel?

It is underscored with red in my copy. I will show you my original.

Mr. GREW. All right, I have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any significance to the underscoring in red?

Senator FERGUSON. Not unless the chairman wants to make something of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know who underscored it.

Mr. GREW. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what did you mean by that paragraph?

Mr. GREW (reading):

The view therefore that war in the Far East can thus be averted by continuation of trade embargoes [1797] and, as proposed by some, the imposition of blockade is not supported by what has thus far occurred.

It is obvious that by November 3 our trade embargoes had not served to restrain the Japanese Army from its expansion. They were going right ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Am I correct that in 1938 you were somewhat of the opinion that embargoes would not avert war or they might cause war and then that you changed in 1940 your opinion and advised a different course, as you did in the telegram of October 12, 1940—or was that September 12, 1940?

Mr. GREW. September 12.

Senator FERGUSON. And your letter to the President of December 14, 1940, that you changed your attitude.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And now, are you changing back on November 3?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely. You see, the policy which I had advocated in September, 1940, and which was put into effect brought up precisely the situation which I had envisaged, namely, that the Japanese intelligent leaders would realize that they were on the brink of an abyss and that they had better pull back. I think they tried to do so at that time. Unfortunately, those efforts failed and a military dictatorship [1798] cabinet came in and from that moment on the chances were very, very slim of being able to bring the thing about. So, naturally, I, under those circumstances, my views as reflected here, were of that particular moment.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted to convey that to the State Department, that your views had changed, and that is why you sent this telegram of November 3 to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State, so that it would receive their attention?

Mr. GREW. Naturally, Senator, every telegram which I sent the Secretary I wanted to have receive attention.

Senator FERGUSON. Where you designated the Secretary and the Under Secretary, did that place more importance upon it?

Mr. GREW. That places more importance upon a telegram, that is true. I did want that telegram to receive special attention, without question.

Senator FERGUSON. Because it was a change in your views?

Mr. GREW. It was a definite change, undoubtedly, because of changes of circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. From the original telegram, I would like to have you go to the last sentence.

Mr. GREW. The last sentence of the whole telegram?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is in the book as "Action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the [1799] United States"—

Mr. GREW. "It would be similarly short-sighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would indicate that it is now after 4 o'clock and unless the Senator from Michigan can conclude, we will recess.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot finish, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, we might as well recess.

The Chair is advised that Secretary Hull will return at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. So, Mr. Grew, your further punishment will be deferred for an hour or so.

Mr. GREW. I shall be glad to be here. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 4:02 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, November 28, 1945.)

[1800]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[1801] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Yesterday when the examination of Secretary Hull was suspended, the Chair announced that the committee would excuse him for 2 or 3 days, to enable him to rest a little. Before we recessed yesterday afternoon, he sent word that he wanted to return this morning, but on account of the weather it is not thought advisable to bring Secretary Hull out, and therefore the committee is glad to excuse him for today, and until such time as it is convenient for him to return.

Therefore, Mr. Grew may return to the stand.

Senator Ferguson.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, I think we were on the last sentence in the November 3 message. You had just read that the the committee. I would rather you look at the original, rather than the paraphrased version.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there a correction on the original?

Mr. GREW. I see no correction.

Oh, yes. Apparently the text must have been garbled in transcribing, Senator; so there appear to be two corrections. Shall I mention those?

[1802] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that is what I wanted to have you do. I wanted to know if you could tell us how it was when you sent it.

Mr. GREW. I think it was probably sent as it now appears corrected:

Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitable. May come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

So far as I recollect that was the way the telegram was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, you put in your book at page 470, you headed it "National hara-kiri not only possible but probable."

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, when you wrote the message on November 3, you felt—that was how you were feeling, that Japan would "do or die," as you expressed it?

Mr. GREW. I thought that that danger, that risk, very definitely existed.

Senator FERGUSON. And you end your quotation in your book, your paragraph, by saying "that important telegram is on the record for all time."

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what did you mean by that?

[1803] Mr. GREW. Well, I wanted to have my views and position perfectly clear. That is what that means.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to indicate that you had conveyed to our Government and the State Department that war may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness?

Mr. GREW. Did I what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to convey that?

Mr. GREW. Yes; very definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that you were conveying that by the message?

Mr. GREW. I felt that I was conveying that thought.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt at that particular time, when you sent the message, that war was near, did you?

Mr. GREW. I felt that there was the risk and the danger of war. As I have already said, I never gave up hope up to the last minute.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize you had the hope, but you felt the risk was great at that time.

Mr. GREW. I felt that the risk and danger of war was very great and increasing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear the statement of Mr. Welles when he changed his opinion from, I think it was, 1,000 to a million?

Mr. GREW. Well—

[1804] Senator FERGUSON. Were you increasing—

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness finish his answer.

Mr. GREW. Yes, I heard that statement of Mr. Welles. I have never tried to use percentages of risk because it was an imponderable question. I merely stated, and felt the danger of the risk of war was very great at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. In relation to the note of the 17th of August, I don't know whether I put the direct question to you, but I want to put it now; did you ever have any knowledge as to whether or not Great Britain gave any parallel notice or action similar, or along the same line as that note of August 17?¹

Mr. GREW. I have no recollection to that effect, Senator. I have asked the officers in the Department to look that up, go into the files, and they have promised to do it. I don't know whether they have yet found anything or not. I think they will find nothing.

Senator FERGUSON. The Ambassador was Mr. Craigie.

Mr. GREW. Sir Robert Craigie.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you recall any conversations with Craigie about parallel actions, or parallel notices.

¹ See Exhibit No. 71, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1695-1696.

Mr. GREW. I recall no definite conversation to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. That article in the New York Times [1805] on August 13, 1941, that you read yesterday, doesn't refresh your memory?

Mr. GREW. No. Senator, as I recollect, that article stated definitely that this statement in the New York Times—

Senator FERGUSON. Would you care to see it?

Mr. GREW (continuing). Was a report of what was being said in political circles in general. I don't think that that report was ascribed to any individual.

[1806] Senator FERGUSON. Now, in relation to the Konoye government, there is one other question I wanted to ask you. I think you said yesterday, did you not, that if there was a failure of the President and Konoye to meet, you felt that the Cabinet would fall and there would be a new dictatorship Cabinet; is that correct?

Mr. GREW. I did and I so reported.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, did you also gather from that that the Japanese, that is, the Government, would be convinced that the United States was stalling for time and that war might be counted upon at any time; was that connected with the Konoye-President meeting?

Mr. GREW. During that particular Konoye administration I did not feel that war was likely to break out at any moment; no, sir, not at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think it would take some time after the Konoye Government fell before that would crystallize?

Mr. GREW. You mean before war should break out?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, before war would crystallize.

Mr. GREW. That was a matter which we could only guess about. After the Tojo government came in, Mr. Togo, the Foreign Minister, said that they were going to continue the conversations and try to come to an agreement with the United [1807] States and the conversations did continue, but, frankly, I felt that the possibility of coming to an agreement between the United States and Japan, after the Tojo Government had come into power, had very much decreased.

[1808] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, did you know at any time that we had in mind that if Japan went across a certain line—let me get that line; exhibit 15, I think.

Mr. KEEFE. I think it is exhibit 17, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have the November 5 letter? Counsel, please get me the November 5 letter of General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Mr. GESELL. The 27th, isn't that the one you want, Senator, November 27, the joint memo of November 27?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is probably in this one. [reading]:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Mr. GREW. So far as I can recollect, Senator, I was not informed of that fact.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no knowledge along that line [1809] at all?

Mr. GREW. So far as I can recollect I had no knowledge along that line at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar, Mr. Grew, about the time or prior to the time you wrote your telegram of November 3 of the editorials that were appearing in the New York Tribune and also the New York Times? They appeared in September; that is, as to what our Government's opinion was on the Japanese question in relation to the fact that the economic pressure would have results.

Mr. GREW. No, Senator. Those leading editorials were often sent to me by our pouch, by mail. They arrived in Japan anywhere from 3 weeks to a month later. It may have been possible that on certain occasions an editorial or the substance of an editorial may have been cabled me but, frankly, I have no recollection of such messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you sent your telegram of the 3d and you considered that a very important message to our government.

Was there anything then existing as far as you were concerned that caused you to send that, "that our Government may not be thinking along the same lines", and that you did it as a warning?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. I recollect no such thought. My [1810] position was purely objective. I was trying to report the situation as I saw it from that point of view at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the significance, Mr. Grew, of your message that "the Cabinet has made up its mind and told the Emperor"?

Mr. GREW. What message is that?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is in the November 3. It is in one of your messages and I am quite sure it is in the November 3 message. Do you remember the fact that they hold told the Emperor?

Mr. GREW. I would like to refresh my memory on that passage if I may.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Can you tell me in what section of the telegram that appears?

Mr. MURPHY. It is a most indefinite question.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the part that the Cabinet had made up its mind and had told the Emperor. I may be paraphrasing the language.

Mr. GREW. I do not find that passage, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that fact, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. That I reported that the Cabinet had made a——

Senator FERGUSON. No, that the Cabinet did make up its mind and told the Emperor what it was going to do.

[1811] Mr. GREW. Well, you mean that I have reported that statement?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, in effect.

Mr. GREW. I would like to have that.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I will try and find it later for you, Mr. Grew.

Mr. GREW. I do not recollect reporting that fact.

Senator FERGUSON. I tried to keep the Foreign Relations memo after my information but I do not have it on that one.

Mr. GREW. Of course, I could not possibly have known what the Cabinet had decided, so if I stated that it must have been merely opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not you ever had that knowledge that the Cabinet had made up its mind? I am talking about the Tojo Cabinet.

Mr. GREW. Had made up its mind to go to war?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what it was going to do?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. It was practically impossible to ascertain what went on in Cabinet meetings. There were always a great many rumors in the press, a great many rumors flying around town, but to get at the actual facts of the procedure of any Cabinet meeting was practically impossible.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, I think you gave in your [1812] testimony earlier the fact that Japan might strike without a declaration of war and you had in mind what they did in 1904 at Port Arthur.

Mr. GREW. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say the last paragraph of your November message conveyed the same idea?

Mr. GREW. I think that idea is conveyed more definitely in my telegram of October 17.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, we will go to your telegram of November 17.

Mr. GREW. Of November 17, that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. November 17, and will you give the part of the telegram that you think contains that on November 17?

Mr. GREW. Will you find that for me?

Senator FERGUSON. I think you may find it on 743.

Mr. GREW. I said in that telegram:

In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict I am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative and surprise.

I think that is the passage that you have in mind.

[1813] Senator FERGUSON. So you think that that more nearly conveys the idea that they may strike without a declaration of war?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had in mind what they had done at Port Arthur?

Mr. GREW. I think that word "surprise" comprises that thought.

Senator FERGUSON. And you conveyed that to our Government on the 17th of November?

Mr. GREW. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that that strengthened your former message of November 3?

Mr. GREW. I think it supplemented it.

Senator FERGUSON. Supplemented it. You felt that you were conveying this knowledge that you had to the Government in as direct language as you could?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 485 of Foreign Relations, II, I think the statement is made that:

I said in that case I feared that everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan.

Mr. GREW. You said in "Foreign Relations." Isn't that in my book?

[1814] Senator FERGUSON. I think it is in your book, maybe.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, 485.

Senator FERGUSON. That was page 485 of your book [reading]:

I said that in that case I feared that everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan. Soon afterwards, however, the press announced that the conversations would be continued. But my friend seemed crushed.

Will you give us an explanation of that remark? That was made on December 1, 1941.

Mr. GREW. Yes. Well, if it had been true under the circumstances then obtaining that the Cabinet had decided to break off the conversations completely, I would have thought at that time that the situation was hopeless. As a matter of fact, my friend was wrong because the Cabinet decided, at least ostensibly, to carry on the conversations further.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, I notice in your book, the same page—do you have your book before you?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, I have.

Senator FERGUSON. In capital letters and quotations on the same page, at the bottom of the page, before "December 5, 1941":

"WASHINGTON HAS DELIVERED AN ULTIMATUM TO US."

[1815] Do you see that?

Mr. GREW. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. "Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us."

Mr. GREW. I think it is a little misleading, perhaps, to take that sentence out of its context. I was discussing the whole telegram here.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not taking it out of its context. I am asking if you see it. I am trying to call it to your attention.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, I have it before me.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is in capital letters?

Mr. GREW. Not in capital letters in my book.

Senator FERGUSON. The heading; I am talking about the heading. I am trying to convey to you the heading.

Mr. GREW. Oh, well, that is in quotation marks, that heading.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I said it was in quotation marks.

Mr. GREW. The headings were put in there purely arbitrarily.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GREW. They were not necessarily put in there to emphasize or to supplement the text.

[1816] Senator FERGUSON. Well I am trying to get you now to look at what I am looking at.

Mr. GREW. I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. And then I will ask you some questions.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the word "ultimatum" is used in that quotation. Will you tell us why you used the word "ultimatum" in the quotation?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from Pennsylvania?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it a fact that the gentleman who wrote the book is quoting the Japanese spokesman's feeling that it was an ultimatum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Someone who was not familiar with the message of the 26th?

Senator FERGUSON. The word "East" means the Japanese. This is the Japanese speaking. Isn't that correct, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not an American at all.

[1817] Mr. GREW. That is correct, that was a Japanese who was speaking and it was reflecting his point of view.

I think it is very important, in this connection, Senator, to have this whole passage put on the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to read the whole passage now. Will you read it?

Mr. GREW. I will do so. [reading:]

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a letter from a prominent Japanese who is closely in touch with Government circles here. This letter reads in part as follows: "The situation is very regrettable. You know how I feel and I may understand your feelings. Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now in my mind. I have had conversations with friends and after examining their feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual contents of the American document of November 26"—

and I think that that passage should be emphasized—

"that Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is the regrettable psychology of our people * * *."

That is the pertinent part of that passage, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, all right.

Now, as I understand it, without any knowledge—we [1818] are talking now about the Japanese—without any knowledge on their part they were treating the instrument, the note of November 26 of the United States to the Japanese, as an ultimatum.

Mr. GREW. Yes. I can tell you why, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I mean that is what you were conveying.

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us why, in your opinion, the Japanese in Japan were treating it as an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. The Japanese military government were clearly putting out the impression that that document was an ultimatum. It suited the military to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that at the same time that the note was delivered that the Ambassador here, the Japanese Ambassador, was treating the note to the same effect?

Mr. GREW. I assume that—

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, in Foreign Relations, 766, that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end.

Will you look at page 766?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. That is in that long conversation beginning on page 756?

[1819] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. The statement that you refer to is on some other page.

Senator FERGUSON. What page is it on?

Mr. GREW. I will have to look.

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 766. [Reading:]

Mr. KURUSU said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end and asked whether we were not interested in a *modus vivendi*.

It is on page 766, at the top. It starts, "Mr. KURUSU." It was written by Joseph W. Ballantine.

[1820] Mr. GREW. You say that is at the top of page 756?

Senator FERGUSON. No, 766.

Mr. GREW. I beg your pardon. All right.

Mr. KURUSU said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a *modus vivendi*.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were you familiar with the fact that here they were also treating, in effect, the note of the 26th as an ultimatum? I am talking about "they" as meaning the Japanese.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. In the body of the gentleman who is the witness he refers to "certain people in Japan," but the gentleman does not pretend to say who they were.

Mr. GREW. Senator, all I can say to that is the records of most of the conversations which took place in Washington between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State were telegraphed to me in Tokyo. Sometimes they were slow in coming, sometimes they were delayed for several days, and sometimes they were so garbled in transmission that I had to ask for repeats. They were very often delayed. I do not know whether this particular record was sent me or not. I will [1821] have to check up on that.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever convey to the State Department that at least some of the people in Japan were treating the note of the 26th as an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. I find, Senator, in a telegram which I sent to the Secretary of State on December 5, that I repeated the pertinent part of that conversation with that prominent Japanese which I have just mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you tell me what it is, from that telegram?

Mr. GREW. Would you like me to read the whole telegram?

Senator FERGUSON. Just that part, unless you want to read it all.

Mr. GREW. I think it would be well to read the whole thing for the record.

Secretary of State (rush)

1895, December 5, 5:00 p. m.

Strictly confidential for the Secretary and Under Secretary only.

You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal—

that refers to the memorandum of November 26—

is being represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of "fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation", and that no intimation [1822] whatever has been given out that the proposal, if im-

¹ Exhibit No. 75.

plemented, would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with that security—political as well as economic—which she affects to seek by exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said—

presumably to whom we have talked, there must be a mistake there—

The response of most Japanese to whom we have—

Mr. MITCHELL. Shown.

Mr. GREW. I think this is the meaning:

The response of those Japanese to whom we have said that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the part of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses.

It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect [1823] publication of our proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably complete evacuation of China, would be strong and indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befogged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as possible in consultation with the Japanese Government, but even without the latter's consent if that should not be forthcoming, publication to be accompanied by a statement substantially along the lines of the thought expressed in paragraph two of my 1874, December 1, 8:00 p. m.

A prominent Japanese in close touch with government circles wrote to me in handwriting yesterday inter alia:

"The situation is most deplorable. I may understand how you feel and you know how I feel. Allow me to write to you frankly what I have now in my mind. After speaking with friends and studying their frame of mind I come to conclude that they feel without having the knowledge of the true nature of your document of the [1824] 26th November as if we received an ultimatum from Washington. Under such unfortunate psychology of your people"—

I think that is "our" people. I think he is referring to his own people there and I think it is garbled—

"Under such unfortunate psychology of our people the only way left us, I think, that your Government will broadmindedly take our proposal as a base of discussion for the *modus vivendi* with a view of arriving at final settlement on the line of your proposal. From sheer desire for happy ending I have to write you." I believe—

this is my statement—

this letter to be a fair criterion of public opinion here.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Mr. Grew, do you know how many messages you sent to Washington between the 27th, which would be our 26th, and the 7th? I think the book shows two. Is that all you sent?

Mr. GREW. I think I undoubtedly sent more than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you look it up for the committee and see whether you sent any more than that, so that the committee might have all that you sent? ¹

Mr. GREW. There were certain telegrams which I sent to the Secretary of State subsequent to the commencement of war.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just talking about up to and including the 7th.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066.

[1825] Mr. GREW. I will look. I will have the files examined and see.

Senator FERGUSON. Just to try and refresh your memory as to what was going on in Japan I will ask you if they have a paper known as Asahi?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you pronounce it?

Mr. GREW. Asahi.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the December 1 date line the newspaper Asahi, in a dispatch from Washington, asserted that the closing of the Japanese consulates in the United States was imminent, and from the New York Times of December 5, 1941, I am quoting:

Tokyo, Friday, December 5.—Tokyo was struck by a bombshell, in the words of the newspaper Asahi today, with the revelation of the substance of the Japanese-American negotiation by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull.

Then—

Domei, Japanese news agency, said last night: "It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipulations of the American document."

Were you familiar with those quotes?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I never saw those messages, but I might say that everything that went out over the newspaper [1826] agency Domei was carefully controlled by the Japanese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I am assuming that in the question.

Mr. GREW. In effect the Japanese Government owns it. So anything that went out is simply what the Japanese Government wanted to have passed on to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, our State Department should have been taking that kind of a message as the Government speaking rather than the people?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely. There was not any question about that.

[1827] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, the last question in the Navy report was this:

Can you remember any information received from our State Department as to the probability of the United States coming into armed conflict with the Japanese if Japan was at war with the British in the Pacific?

Here is your answer, on page 1068 of the Navy report:

I could not answer that, sir, without exploration.

Do you recall that question and that answer?

Mr. GREW. I do not happen to recall that particular question; no, sir. That hearing took place long ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I will read the question again to you, because I would like to have it answered.

Can you remember any information—

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary was about to make a further answer.

Mr. GREW. No, sir. Thank you, I think not, Mr. Chairman. I will listen to the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Can you remember any information received from our State Department as to the probability of the United States coming into armed conflict with the Japanese if Japan was at war with the British in the Pacific?

Mr. GREW. I recollect no such statement.

[1828] Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember the answer that you gave there, "I could not answer that, sir, without exploration." What would that mean?

Mr. GREW. That would mean I would wish to examine the official files of the State Department to see whether anything had been sent to me on that subject. I do not think it was, but I do not like to give a categorical answer in a case of that kind without exploration.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you make such exploration so we will get the benefit of that?

Mr. GREW. I will, Senator. I want to be sure that the various points which you asked me to explore will be taken down.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that counsel will give you that. I do not want you to have to rely on your own memory either.

Mr. GREW. Were there any confidential or secret communications from the State Department of our policy toward Japan that were not published by the State Department? Do you know of any now?

Mr. GREW. Senator, as I said the other day, there is a very large amount of material which passed between the State Department and the Embassy at Tokyo, and vice versa, during those years. If all that material had been published [1829] it would probably take a dozen or more volumes. I know of a great deal of material which was not published, but I cannot say that that material would have been pertinent to this investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any of it that would be pertinent?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; offhand I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you think of some after you leave the witness stand, will you convey that information to the committee, so you may return with it so that we may all have the facts?

Mr. GREW. You wish me to think the matter over and see if I can remember anything which might be helpful to the committee?

Senator FERGUSON. After you leave the stand. You do not have to do it now.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, I will do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, when you destroyed—does the chairman want to put something on the record?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I do not. If I do want to put something on I will do it. I was just talking to my colleague here.

I did not mean to interrupt the Senator. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, do you remember when you [1830] destroyed the Code in the Embassy at Tokyo?

Mr. GREW. We, as I recollect it, Senator, destroyed some of our codes a few days before Pearl Harbor, but we kept certain codes for use up to the last moment, which were destroyed actually after we had learned that war had broken out.

Senator FERGUSON. What codes did the Embassy destroy prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, just a moment. Are we going to reveal the American code?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman is not able to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not understand the Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. The question is does the gentleman now want the Ambassador to go into the discussion of the codes that America was using in its diplomatic relations?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. MURPHY. Does he want him to name which ones we were using?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. GREW. I could not do it anyway.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the reporter read the question please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

[1831] Mr. MURPHY. I am wondering if the gentleman wants to press that? We have codes that we are using all over the world, and I do not suppose we have changed them. I am wondering if you want to spread on the record for the world the kind of codes we were using during the war?

Mr. GREW. I could not possibly answer that question in any case. I could not recollect. As a matter of fact I had very little directly to do with the handling of the codes, and in any case, I would not know which codes were kept and which were destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. But some were destroyed prior to December 7, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. That is my belief. I think there is some reference to that in the record. I would have to look it up.

Senator FERGUSON. There is reference to it. I am not bringing out anything new, except I wanted your knowledge on it.

Mr. GREW. I am afraid I cannot enlighten you on that. I did not know very much about it at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, do you recall any messages to you or to the Embassy that you were to destroy codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. GREW. I do not recall a message having been received to that effect. I shall have to look that up, [1832] Senator.¹

Mr. GESELL. May I interpose, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. In Exhibit 18, under date of November 27, is a message to the Ambassador from Secretary Hull, which, in the last portion, while not mentioning codes specifically, appears to look toward the destruction of codes at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. May I see the instrument?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Senator GEORGE. What is the date of it?

Mr. GESELL. November 27, Senator.

Mr. GREW. Is that published?

Mr. GESELL. That is one of the exhibits in this case.

Mr. GREW. But not published in Foreign Relations?

Mr. GESELL. I do not think so.

[1833] Senator FERGUSON. Will you just show the instrument to Mr. Grew?

[The document was handed to Mr. Grew.]

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it, Mr. Grew, and give us your interpretation of it?

Mr. GREW. I have read the telegram, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it into the record?

Mr. GREW. Yes, if you wish.

¹ See Mr. Grew's testimony, p. 743 et seq., *infra*. See also Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066 for statement by Mr. Gesell.

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1941.

793 Confidential for the Ambassador.

In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu when they were handed on November 26th for consideration the document described in a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions up to the present time have not yet afforded any basis which gives much promise of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement. It is of course too early to adopt any definitive opinion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but the probability that they may lapse should not be lost sight of.

The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give some advance consideration to [1834] various problems which may as a consequence arise in connection with our Foreign Service establishments in Japanese territory. As lapse of the conversations might result in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan, it would seem to us that, without any intention of being alarmist or of too hastily envisaging serious contingencies, this question should be brought to your attention so that you may have it well in mind in case it should become necessary for the Department to consult you in regard to the making of arrangements for the packing of official and personal effects and the expeditious handling of other matters which would be involved in the closing of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desired that all phases of the matter be considered confidential that that discussion of it be kept to a minimum.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you receive that telegram, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; undoubtedly I must have received it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that convey to you the idea that you were to dispose of some codes?

Mr. GREW. Not necessarily. This is the sort of telegram that any government, out of mere precaution, would send to its representatives abroad, as a purely preparatory message, to [1835] guard against possible contingencies that might arise but would not necessarily arise.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you or did you not have the codes destroyed as the result of that telegram?

Mr. GREW. That, Senator, I cannot answer definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, will you look up and see whether or not you received any telegram from which you obtained the information that you were to or that you did destroy any codes?

Mr. GREW. I will.

Senator FERGUSON. And then will you get us that information?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you had a naval attaché at the Embassy?

Mr. GREW. We did.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his name?

Mr. GREW. His name was Commander Smith-Hutton.

The CHAIRMAN. Smith what?

Mr. GREW. Smith-Hutton, S-m-i-t-h-H-u-t-t-o-n.

Senator FERGUSON. If he received a message to destroy his code it would come through your Embassy, or would it be directly to him?

Mr. GREW. It may have come either way. It might have come to me or it might have come directly to him, I don't know.

[1836] Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any messages to the naval attaché to destroy codes?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to the attack.

Mr. GREW. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Army attaché in the Embassy?

Mr. GREW. The military attaché was colonel—it has gone out of my head at the moment. We had so many different attachés from time to time, that I would like to check up on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel know, so he can help Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. It was Lt. Col. Harry I. Creswell.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any messages—was he a lieutenant?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant colonel, he said.

Mr. GREW. He was lieutenant colonel at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember any messages to the lieutenant colonel to destroy any codes at that time?

Mr. GREW. I do not recollect it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now going to the President's message to the Emperor, what time did you get it, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. I received the message in final form, after being decoded, at approximately 10:30 p. m. on December 7, [1837] Japanese time.

Senator FERGUSON. What time would that be in Washington and what date?

Mr. GREW. That would be 14 hours later. I understand that the message was sent from Washington at 9 p. m. on the 6th. I think the records show that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. The records show it reached the Japanese Tokyo post office at 12 noon on the 7th. In other words, it arrived in just 15 hours. There was 14 hours difference in time, and allowing for 1 hour in transmission.

Senator FERGUSON. So it took 1 hour to transmit it?

Mr. GREW. It took approximately 1 hour to transmit it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. The telegram was stamped "12 noon" and the telegram was delivered to me at the Embassy at 10:30 p. m. that day. It was held up all that time.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that delay if somebody did not know the contents of that instrument?

Mr. GREW. If somebody did not know the nature of it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Well, my guess would be when that message came it was probably turned over to certain authorities of the Japanese Government, who could have readily decoded it, because [1838] it was in what we called our nonconfidential code at that time, the gray code which was perfectly open to anybody, and my guess would be that the military authorities did not want this message to get to the Emperor at that time. That was always my belief.

Senator FERGUSON. It was held 15 hours by the Japanese before it was delivered to you?

Mr. GREW. It was held from noon to 10:30 that evening.

Senator FERGUSON. That night?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had some reasons then for believing that the military authorities were holding it up so that it would not possibly reach the Emperor?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely, because, as a rule, the Japanese were expeditious in getting the telegrams through.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the explanation you want to convey?

Mr. GREW. That would be my opinion, my guess. I cannot prove it.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that indicate that they knew our code, or do you think it would come from the fact that the President here made a press release that he was sending a note to the Emperor?

Mr. GREW. I think that must have been taken in conjunction [1839] with the other. Undoubtedly the Japanese had picked up the radio messages, which I picked up myself. I picked that up in the early evening, that the President had sent the message to the Emperor, I picked that up from Station KGI in San Francisco, which went all over Japan.

So the military authorities must have known that such a message was coming and they must have been on the lookout for it.

Senator FERGUSON. So it would not be due to the fact that they were decoding the message because they did not know what was in the message, they could get it from the President's announcement here?

Mr. GREW. The President did not give the text at that time, did he?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to say I understand that it was only a press release, that the message had been sent, and when the President sent the message he said he wanted it sent in the gray code, so it could be easily uncovered, and he did not care whether it was uncovered before the Emperor got it. That is in evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. I remember this "Dear Cordell" note. [1840] I remember the note, "Shoot this to Grew".

Mr. GREW. The President evidently did not mind if it was picked up.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. When you got the message 15 hours later and it was 10 something at night, you took it immediately, as I understand it, to Tojo.

Mr. GREW. To Togo, the Foreign Minister, not the Prime Minister, but the Foreign Minister Togo. I had made a provisional appointment as soon as I received the note over the radio that this was coming, and then as soon as I receive Mr. Hull's brief message, which was labelled "Triple Priority" and which did come to me—I do not know whether that was held up or not—saying this message was on its way, I promptly telephoned the message to the foreign Minister and made an appointment around midnight.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not go into the contents of the note?

Mr. GREW. Of the President's message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. I did not know the contents until the document had been decoded.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean after you received it you did not discuss its contents with the Minister that you were delivering it to?

[1841] Mr. GREW. I did not. He asked to see it. I handed it to him to read, and he did read it. Then I asked that I be accorded an audience with the Emperor in order that I could present that message to him personally. The Foreign Minister quibbled on that. He said he would like to study it first. I said, "That is a very urgent

matter and I now ask for an audience at the earliest possible moment." So he finally said, "I will present your request to the Emperor." That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. That was what hour?

Mr. GREW. That was about a quarter past midnight, about 12:15 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. What time would that be in Washington?

Mr. GREW. Fourteen hours later. That, in Washington, would have been 10 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be 10 o'clock Sunday morning?

Mr. GREW. Ten o'clock Sunday morning, December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, did you give your diary to the State Department when they checked your manuscript for your book?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have the parts that the State Department deleted from your book?

[1842] Mr. GREW. I had them at the time, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have them now?

Mr. GREW. A good many of them were deleted by me myself, because when I prepared the original manuscript it is always easier to prepare too much rather than too little material, and many passages were already marked "cut" before they were handed to the State Department at all. I do not have that manuscript now. I sent it to my publishers at the time, nearly 2 years ago now, and I suppose it has been destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not have anything then that would give us what was cut out or deleted by the State Department?

Mr. GREW. No, sir, I could not.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with the matter of the diaries, you read into the record yesterday the letter, the reply which you sent in response to my request. I can appreciate the personal aspects of the matter. I certainly would have no desire to embarrass you. On the other hand, I think you will also recognize that there perhaps has never been a matter that is of more profound national concern. While I can recognize your position, your desire to cooperate, which you have demonstrated, your own conviction that you have made [1843] available everything that should be of possible interest and concern, that statement is made in your book with the addition of the phrase that there were things which it would not be proper for you to publish at that time.

On page X you speak of this. You say "Many of the items in the original possess no permanent historic value. Others overlap. Still others cannot properly be published now." Which, I take it, is a fairly frank recognition on your part that there was material there which would be of public interest, and important, but which, owing to the exigencies of the war it would not be proper to make available at that time.

[1844] Of course I think the rule, as far as court procedure is concerned, is entirely well established, that documents or diaries which are used for refreshing one's memory, or informing one's self are available for examination.

I, at the same time, recognize all the other aspects involved, and that this is not a court proceeding, although it is perhaps more important, and it has perhaps more important aspects.

So I wondered, Mr. Grew, whether or not, you might feel justified, and properly so on your part, if you should permit our counsel, Attorney William Mitchell, in whom we all, I am sure, have confidence, as to his discretion, intelligence, and integrity, at least to make such examination as might seem warranted, to be sure that his judgment entirely coincided with yours as to the public or private character of any items that might be involved.

That is simply and solely in the interest of doing complete justice to probably one of the most important matters with which certainly Congress has ever had to deal.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to have Mr. Grew's comment on this now.

Mr. GREW. I fully appreciate that position, Senator. In making the comment in my book that certain material "could [1845] not be published now," I had in mind at least some of the documents which have been presented to this committee, quite apart from the publications of the Department of State.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. GREW. One telegram came up today with regard to our codes. That is the sort of thing that would not have been proper to publish at the time my book came out. I do not even know whether I had a record of that or not, but that is the sort of thing I had in mind.

Now, as I say, my diary was a private, personal document. I used it as a sort of sketchbook to get my ideas in order. It was a sort of scribbling from day to day, and many of the passages in it were incorrect, and could be misleading.

After ironing them out, and after checking up and trying to confirm the information which had come in to me, to elaborate my own thoughts on the situation at the time, that material then took shape in my official report to the Government, and all those official reports are on record, are on file and are available to the committee.

I would like, if I may once again, to read one little passage from my book, a very brief passage, on page 348. I will read this again. It is already in the record, but I will read it to you, to explain a little more clearly my [1846] attitude about this. This was written on November 1, 1940.

In the light of fast-moving developments, I scarcely dare read back in the diary nowadays because of its many inconsistencies which show it up for the patchwork sort of day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our thoughts and our information, some of it reliable and some of it wholly unreliable, at any given moment—the moment of writing. It shows how often we are groping and fumbling in the dark. Less and less are we able to know what is going on behind the scenes, simply because many of our reliable contacts are no longer available and also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing.

That indicates my diary was not the sort of material which ought to be used as a criterion of anything. It was full of inconsistencies, full of inaccuracies, and for that reason alone, apart from its private and personal character, I would feel very reluctant to make any of it public.

Senator BREWSTER. That was not my question. My question was

whether or not, in view of the tremendous public concern which is manifest in this situation, in order to obviate any possible personal question of purely personal adjustment, where both the wisdom and correctness of your official acts and that of others is necessarily under [1847] scrutiny, and where, as you have indicated, you have used this diary as a basis for refreshing your own recollection and determination as to any public questions that were involved, that the counsel for this committee, in whom everyone has confidence, should be permitted to make such an examination, in order that he might, at any rate, form his own judgment as to whether it concurs with yours.

That would at least be some measure of reassurance to the people of this country that no individual, as the chairman of the committee has said in presenting the resolution in this case, he emphasized very greatly that the public interest was so transcendent that no individual, high or low, living or dead, could possibly hope to be exempt from the proper scrutiny which this resolution was designed to give.

In view of questions which have been raised regarding possible limitations of members of the committee in any impartial consideration, I make this suggestion on that account, with the sole hope of serving the great public interest that is involved.

[1848] Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The Chair recognizes Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Since this hearing commenced, I have taken the position with every department of government that any papers that came into my hands, and that are entrusted to me, would be open to every member of the committee and to the full committee. I have stood on that from the start and I don't want to make any restrictions now. I think that I will have to take the position with Mr. Grew and the committee that if he, Mr. Grew, turns anything over to me to look at, I shall not withhold it from the committee members or the committee itself.

I furthermore feel an embarrassment about being put in the position of passing judgment on the materiality of Mr. Grew's material now, after one member of the committee has examined him for over 5 hours. My judgment as to what is pertinent and material and the judgment of some members of the committee might radically differ.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Mitchell, am I correct in stating it to be the law and the procedure of courts that a document of that character is available for the examination of counsel in a court proceeding?

Mr. MITCHELL. If a witness brings a memorandum into court and uses it to refresh his recollection in the courtroom [1849] it may be examined by counsel and the court, and introduced. Whether or not Mr. Grew has a right to withhold a private memorandum which he doesn't want to turn loose is a legal question that I haven't considered. I don't know what action the committee would be able to take if Mr. Grew stands on his position. You might have to bring a lawsuit against him, or a subpoena to compel him to produce it, and if he asserted his rights, then you would have a case in court for the next year or two to decide whether he had a right to withhold it or not.

That is all I can say about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Does Mr. Grew wish to make any statement about that?

The question whether the committee would, under any circumstances, feel called upon to issue a subpoena to Mr. Grew to bring his diary in before the committee on the theory that he had or had not testified by refreshing his own recollection from it as to all the pertinent facts in regard to this inquiry, that is a matter which I don't think the committee could pass on here under snap judgment and might have to consider before any action would be taken.

In the meantime, the Chair feels that Mr. Grew's examination should not be suspended or held up, while the committee might enter into a discussion on that subject.

[1850] So, Senator Ferguson, you may proceed. Is that all you wanted, Senator Brewster? Is there anything further on that, Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I quite appreciate, of course, what the Chairman says and I certainly have no desire to embarrass Mr. Grew or compel him here publicly to discuss further the various aspects of this situation. I am quite willing to let the matter rest here at the present time.

I should like to consider it further myself and I am sure that probably the members of the committee would like to consider also all aspects involved.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson has this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if there was any document, of any nature, exchanged between Mr. Grew and the State Department, from the State Department to Mr. Grew, or from Mr. Grew to the State Department, official document that is not available. It is my understanding that everyone of them are available.

Mr. MITCHELL. I might add to that that they are all available and we have gone over scores and scores of them and exercised a judgment as to what was material or not.

We have also had laid out all the exchanges which we don't think are material, and if any member of the committee [1851] wants to exercise his independent judgment on that, we will have all of the documents exchanged between them made available at once. There are hundreds of them. Relating to visas and passports, and all sorts of things. But everyone of them has been laid out so that any member of the committee who wants to see them, any official exchange between Mr. Grew and the State Department that we haven't thought worth while to produce, it is available.

As Mr. Gesell said yesterday, we only went back to January 1, 1941. Now, if you want us to go back of that, way back into 1940, why, that can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, I—

Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to make my own attitude about this whole matter abundantly clear. I have tried to do so heretofore. It is as was expressed in my letter to Mr. Mitchell with regard to Mr. Brewster's request, in which I said I wished to do everything in my power to support and further the important work of this committee. I felt all of the pertinent facts should be brought out and laid before the American people. I believed that nothing of a perti-

nent nature should be concealed. And I think—I hope—I have shown, in my testimony, that [1852] I am not trying to conceal anything. I am trying to give every possible piece of information which will be helpful to this committee.

I also said in my letter that I had gone through the last several months in my diary before Pearl Harbor very carefully to see if I could find anything that might be pertinent to this hearing and, frankly, I found nothing.

That is my position, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, you do feel, however, that your position does place in you the determination as to what is material or not material to this inquiry?

Mr. GREW. Senator, as I have said constantly, after all, the controlling factor in all of these matters is the official correspondence. The official correspondence, everything that passed between the Department of State and myself is on the record here on file, and, as Mr. Mitchell said, available to the committee.

Now, the material on which those official reports were based, I don't think would be helpful to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. But it does place in you, in you solely, that determination, the attitude that you take; isn't that true?

Mr. GREW. That is a question of interpretation, possibly [1853] legal interpretation, and I don't believe I would want to try to answer; the question as to whether any man has a right to retain his personal and private documents, that is a legal matter I couldn't answer.

Senator FERGUSON. I have just a few more questions.

Was it your custom to make over-all reports to the Secretary of State or the President, for instance, when you returned in 1939 to the United States to make a report to the President?

Mr. GREW. Well, of course, Senator, whenever I came back on leave of absence from my post, I saw the President and had a talk with him and saw the Secretary of State and had a talk with him, and naturally in those talks I painted the picture as I saw it at that time. I did not, I am afraid, keep records of those talks. When I came back I was in Washington only a short time and kept no records of those talks.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the Secretary of State kept records of those talks?

Mr. GREW. That I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Would counsel inquire if he did? ¹

Mr. Grew, it was customary then to make over-all reports when you finally returned after the war had started? I think you returned—in what year?

[1854] Mr. GREW. I returned on August 25, 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you report to Mr. Hull at that time?

Mr. GREW. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you report in writing?

Mr. GREW. Everything had been written pretty well up to date.

Senator FERGUSON. That isn't quite my question.

Mr. GREW. No; I don't recollect having submitted at that time any report in writing.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you think about that? That could be an important report.

¹ See Mr. Gesell's statement, Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066.

Mr. GREW. I can answer that question now. I did not submit, I did not file any report, any written report.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any report, did you have a report? You say you didn't file it. What do you mean by that?

Mr. GREW. Well, I—what was the question, what did I mean by a report?

Senator FERGUSON. You said that you didn't file it, and that brought to my mind "what did you mean by you didn't file it." Did you have one, and not give it to him, or what do you mean by that?

Mr. GREW. I had notes, of course, which I had taken [1855] down which appeared in my diary, and I used those notes, of course, in any talks with the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you have those notes now?

Mr. GREW. I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Where are those notes?

Mr. GREW. They have been destroyed long ago.

Senator FERGUSON. They have been destroyed?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You made a report then in 1942 to the Secretary from notes that you had?

Mr. GREW. Notes to refresh my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; to refresh your recollection.

Mr. GREW. But all of that material, as a matter of fact, is all here, in these books, all of it; the whole story is complete.

Senator FERGUSON. You had at that time original notes that you used to refresh your memory to report to the Secretary?

Mr. GREW. Yes; I had taken notes down from time to time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you suggest that you wanted to make such a final report in writing?

Mr. GREW. Of course I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be an important report, [1856] would it not?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; not necessarily, because all of the records, everything that I had to report up to the last minute, was contained in the official communications in the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is no way the committee could get what was in those particular notes that you had to refresh your memory; those have been destroyed?

Mr. GREW. They have been destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you speak to Mr. Hull about giving him a memorandum rather than just an oral statement?

Mr. GREW. I talked it over with him and I discussed some of the notes that I had taken and the whole thing was completely on the record. That was the whole story.

[1857] Senator FERGUSON. Then it was not his desire to have you report in writing or not report in writing, he didn't express himself either way?

Mr. GREW. After I had expressed my views about the situation no request was made for a written report because all the facts were already on file in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, before asking any questions of Ambassador Grew I would ask the privilege of making a short statement in order to make certain requests of counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, there is in evidence before the committee as part of exhibit 18 a document which contains a draft of a message from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister dated November 24, 1941. This draft message was prepared by Mr. Hull. It contains a description of the so-called *modus vivendi* proposal for Japan.

The draft message is accompanied by a memorandum for the President signed by Mr. Hull which states:

If you approve of this draft telegram I shall arrange to have it forwarded.

The same document contains the notation, "O. K., see addition. F. D. R."

[1858] And it also contains an addition to the draft message of Mr. Hull suggested by the President.

It appears that that draft telegram prepared by Mr. Hull describing the *modus vivendi* proposal as approved by the President and with the President's additional paragraph added was actually sent to the British Prime Minister.

We also have in evidence a message from Ambassador Winant to the Secretary of State dated November 26, 1941, which bears the title "Most secret. For the President from the former Naval Person." This message from Mr. Churchill acknowledges the President's message about Japan, presumably his description of the *modus vivendi* proposals, and raises the question whether Chiang Kai-shek was not "having a very thin diet".

It appears from the evidence that the *modus vivendi* proposal was thereafter discarded by the Secretary of State and the so-called 10-point note of November 26 was handed to the Japanese Government.

It seems entirely probable to me that the President of the United States having described at some length the *modus vivendi* proposal to the British Prime Minister in a personal message and having received Mr. Churchill's views thereon, would also have described the American note of November 26 which was actually handed to the Japanese representatives and to the British Prime Minister.

[1859] Moreover it seems equally probable that the President of the United States would acknowledge the British Prime Minister's message as contained in the telegram of Ambassador Winant to the State Department of November 26.

No such acknowledgement of the British Prime Minister's message of November 26 by the President has been introduced before us. Nor do we have in evidence any message from the President to the British Prime Minister describing the American note of November 26 in the same manner in which we describe the *modus vivendi* proposal in an earlier message.

Again on November 30 we have in evidence before us a communication to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant containing a message from the British Prime Minister to the President of the United States outlining what Mr. Churchill described as "an important method remaining unused to avert war between Japan and our two countries."

It seems to me most probably that the President forwarded some reply to Mr. Churchill's message of November 30.

It now clearly appears from the evidence before us that the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States communicated messages directly to each other.

It is also obvious that we have no complete file of such communications before us.

We have no evidence or statement from counsel that the [1860] messages from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Roosevelt and the messages from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Churchill which have been introduced in evidence constitute the only communications between those two parties in this critical period of American-Japanese relationships.

Consequently I feel obliged to make the following requests of counsel:

1. Will counsel produce from the files of the State Department all communications from Mr. Winant, Ambassador to Great Britain, to the State Department, and from the State Department to Mr. Winant, for the period from November 24, 1941, and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate from the custodian of such files in the State Department that the communications presented to the committee constitute all the communications from the State Department to Mr. Winant or from Mr. Winant to the State Department for the period specified.

I observe that the British Prime Minister in communicating with the President described himself as the "former naval person." This description and the Prime Minister's previous affiliation with the Admiralty suggests the probability that the President may have communicated with the British Prime Minister through the medium of the communications system of the Navy Department or the War Department, and that [1861] the British Prime Minister may have also communicated with the President through the medium of the British Admiralty and the Navy Department.

Consequently, I feel obliged to make the following request of counsel in order that we may be certain of all the facts:

Will counsel produce from the files of the War or Navy Department all communications from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister, or to any intermediary of the British Prime Minister, such as the British Admiralty for the period from November 24, 1941, to and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate from the custodian of such files, if any exists, and I do not know or say they do exist, in the War and Navy Departments, that the files presented to the committee contain all of the communications from the President to Mr. Churchill, or from Mr. Churchill to the President transmitted via the War or Navy Departments communications system, as the case may be, for the period from November 24 up to and including December 7, 1941.

If either Department informs counsel that there are no such files in existence in such Department, will counsel produce for the committee a certificate to that effect from the custodian of the files in either the War or Navy Department?

[1862] Now, will counsel also produce all records and copies of communications to and from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill for the period from November 24, 1941, to December 7, 1941, which exists

among the papers in the custody of the Roosevelt Estate, together with a certificate from the custodian of such papers that they constitute all such papers relating to the period specified in his or her custody on possession.

We are now examining important officials of the State Department dealing with the critical phase of the Japanese-American negotiations in the year 1941. We have affirmative evidence before us of direct communications from the British Prime Minister to the President and from the President to the British Prime Minister.

The communications which we have before us indicate, to me at least, the likelihood of their being other communications not only in reply to certain of the communications which we now have before us but on the same general topics covered by such communications.

Now, knowing this situation, I do not see how this committee or counsel can completely and adequately discharge their respective obligations without presenting the complete file from whatever source, War, Navy, or State Department, or the personal files of Mr. Roosevelt, of all communications between him and the British Prime Minister for the period of [1863] November 24 to December 7, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mitchell, could you give us information on the request that was made for all the admiralty messages, as to whether or not we have, as a committee, received all the admiralty messages that I requested many weeks ago?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks counsel should answer first the request propounded by the Congressman from Wisconsin.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought this might answer that one question about the admiralty.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is included.

Mr. CONGRESSMAN. Would you mind letting us have a copy of that memorandum?

Mr. KEEFE. I will be very happy to. Pass it over to him, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MITCHELL. So we will be able to work on it.

Mr. KEEFE. Just hand it over.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you.

I might say, without going into detail, that many of these things have been under examination and investigation to [1864] determine what there is. We would have to go over this memorandum carefully and see what we have done and see what more you would like to have us do. For instance, the White House records, we weren't going to rely on any certificate from Miss Tully. She was listed as a witness, and she would explain everything asked for. I mention that as one of the things involved. But you may be assured, Mr. Congressman, that we will do our very best, after we have studied this memorandum, to report to you what we have done and what we can do.¹

[1865] Now, as far as Senator Ferguson's request is concerned—his request put in, I think, 2 or 3 weeks ago—my memory is that he asked for all communications that passed between the British

¹ See Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3839-3842.

Admiralty and the Navy Department during the years 1940 and 1941.

We submitted——

Senator FERGUSON. That related to the Far East.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, no. The request did not say what it related to. It said all of them, on the theory, I think that—I was not to be the judge as to whether they were material or not—probably he wanted about all of them.

We made that request to the Navy Department. Their report, first orally to me, was that during those years while the battle of the Atlantic was going on and we were involved in the escorting and naval work on the Atlantic, thousands of messages passed between the Admiralty and the Navy Department.

They also told me that the communications to and from the Admiralty to the Navy Department were not all kept in one file. They were put in different files, according to the subject to which they related. That to comply with the member's request would require the investigation of files including over 375,000 papers and they said it would take 11 men I have forgotten how long, some extraordinary time to do it.

[1866] Realizing what that meant I asked the Navy if they would please at least start with December 7, 1941, and work backwards for a month or two and dig out everything they could and I reported that orally to the Senator, I think, at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mitchell, have you got all those that they have already dug out?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, we have all those that they dug out but it is only for a limited time and I would say this: If the Senator would only be willing to tell the Navy what subject matter he is interested in they may be able to locate it in one of these 375,000 papers much easier than it is with the information we have.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire? If counsel will give me what he already has I will be glad to point it out. I have not received them and I haven't any word that they received them. I haven't seen any except what you have placed here on the table.

Mr. MITCHELL. Neither have I. One of my assistants reports that material of that kind came in 2 or 3 days ago and I haven't honestly, had a chance to look at it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then you do not want to criticize the member of the committee for not giving you the information when he has not even seen it.

[1867] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I suggested that if you would be willing to state what subject matter these messages relate to, which you are interested in, it would greatly facilitate the work of the Navy and they might go much farther back than they have done.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see now what you have?

Mr. MITCHELL. You can see it as soon as we recess. I haven't it in the room.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I have in mind. Then I will give you definite information as to what I desire.

Mr. MITCHELL. That will help.

Senator FERGUSON. That will clear the matter up.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, do I understand now that the Navy at the present time is investigating 375,000 messages?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. When I found that problem confronting them I said we won't do it. We will start with December 7, 1941, and work backwards a month or two or three and get out some of this material and when you give it to us I will show it to the Senator and see if that is the sort of thing he wants. So it was finally impossible to do it as originally requested, but I am not criticizing the Senator. I am just answering his question and stating what the situation is.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to the [1868] distinguished counsel that the request which I have made is very specific. It does not cover 375,000 telegrams. It is very specific as to the type and character of information requested and very limited as to time.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the way we like to have them. This covers November 24 to December 7 and it is not an impossible proposition.

Mr. KEEFE. In making that request I had in mind the fact that there must have been innumerable communications between the Admiralty and our Navy and War Departments and I am only asking, for my purposes, for the specific information contained in that written request.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask if the Congressman from Wisconsin will yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman, will you yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. KEEFE. I am very happy to yield. I have not taken much time, but I will yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. I am not going to take much time, only to congratulate you in what you have done here in asking counsel for express information which they can get, which they can go into in a hurry and obtain the information.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed with your examination of Mr. Grew.

[1869] Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Now, Mr. Grew, I have listened carefully to your testimony and the rather extended cross-examination and my purpose in asking the few questions that I shall ask is to try and clarify some questions that have arisen in my mind and to get them into some sort of chronological order if possible.

Now, as I understand the situation, you reported to the State Department as our Ambassador in Japan beginning shortly after your arrival there, giving your impressions from time to time of the state of mind of the Japanese people and your observations and you made them rather full and complete; and during the period of time from 1932 on there developed, as I gathered from your testimony, a gradual disintegration, just gradual disintegration, with little spurts up and then spurts down diplomatically in the relationship between the United States and Japan.

I gathered from your testimony that there were in Japan some elements that were inclined to be bellicose and warminded and obsessed with their powers of greatness and expansion and aggres-

sion and that there were other groups that were fighting for peace. Is that correct?

Mr. GREW. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. And you reported to the State Department from time to time what you observed with reference to the activities of these various groups? [1870]

The CHAIRMAN. You had better make your answers orally so that they get into the record, instead of nodding your head, Mr. Ambassador. The stenographer does not get your nod.

Mr. GREW. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. And you observed the development of this Japanese war-minded spirit and the determination to expand as it developed in the years from 1934, 1935, 1936, on up to the final outbreak of war?

Mr. GREW. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you tried to impress upon the State Department in those messages your conception as to the Japanese state of mind as it existed over those years, did you not?

Mr. GREW. That, obviously, was my duty, Mr. Congressman, and I tried to carry it out continuously during those years.

Mr. KEEFE. And in line with that attitude on your part, I was greatly interested in the report which you made to the Secretary of State on February 26, 1941, which transmitted to the Secretary of State a memorandum by the counsellor of the Embassy in Japan, Mr. Dooman, which had your full and complete approval. That is correct?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

[1871] Mr. KEEFE. The message of transmittal appears on page 137 of volume 2 of Foreign Relations of the United States, and then follows on pages 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, and 143 the report of Mr. Dooman's conversations with Mr. Ohashi. You recall that, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. I do, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then follows a memoranda from you to the Secretary of State advising of the conversation which you had on February 26 Tokyo time, with Matsuoka in which you told him that you concurred entirely in the statement that Mr. Dooman had made to Ohashi on February 14. Do you recall that?

Mr. GREW. I do recall that. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, in this report of the Counsellor of the Embassy, dated February 14, 1941, he goes into great detail in setting forth the conversations which he had with Mr. Ohashi who was the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, and you are very familiar with that report?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Dooman, it appears from the report, had been on furlough to the United States in the fall of 1940 and had, as he said, and I quote from it [reading]:

Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just returned from leave in the United States and that he supposed I had received a number of interesting impressions in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that day and that I could stay as long as I wished.

And then follows the statement to Mr. Ohashi by Mr. Dooman of his observations gleaned from his trips around the country during the fall of 1940 which, by the way, was an election year and he refers to it in this statement and it finally ended up by his general statement to Mr. Ohashi that in the event that Japan continued the course that it was following it would inevitably be considered that it might lead to a diplomatic rupture and then Mr. Ohashi took the floor, do you recall?

The report says on page 140 of volume 2 of Foreign Relations:

Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in Japan during the middle twenty's.

and going on for two or three pages here setting forth the [1873] Japanese attitude.

Now, does that statement of Mr. Ohashi—I will not take the time to read it into the record because it is now in evidence—in your judgment, Mr. Grew, fairly express the Japanese attitude as you understood it?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Congressman, I haven't read this record of that conversation for a long time and while my recollection is that it was a fair presentation, I do not want to answer that question categorically without studying it. I believe it was, as I recollect it, a fair presentation of the Japanese position.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in view of your transmitting it to the State Department and your approval of the whole message I assume that it could safely be said that except for any omissions that might properly have been included it is a fair statement of at least the position of Mr. Ohashi as reflecting what the Japanese attitude was during the years from 1920 on down.

Mr. GREW. It is a fair statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, it appears that the Lease-Lend Act was approved by the President on March 11, 1941, and that on June 6, 1941, an act was approved for taking over foreign ships lying idle in United States ports. Do you recall that?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. That was in connection with the [1874] freezing of Japanese assets.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the freezing of Japanese assets did not come until July 25, 1941.

Mr. GREW. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. That came later.

Mr. GREW. Well, I do not remember the exact dates.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have a memorandum. I have a paper showing these chronological dates.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. The freezing of Japanese assets took place on July 25, 1941. Now, when did the Konoye Cabinet fall? I just want to get that correctly.

Mr. GREW. As I recollect it, it fell on October 16. I can look that up very quickly if you wish.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, my recollection is I think you are correct.

Mr. GREW. I think it is October 16.

Mr. KEEFE. It was along about coincident with the proposal to reopen the Burma Road on the 17th of October, wasn't it?

Mr. GREW. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, on August 1, 1941, President Roosevelt banned the export of aviation fuel to Japan. Do you recall that?

[1875] Mr. GREW. I did not hear your statement, Congressman. Mr. Roosevelt passed what, the aviation what?

Mr. KEEFE. Read it, please.

(Whereupon the reporter read the question as follows: "Now, on August 1, 1941, President Roosevelt banned the export of aviation fuel to Japan. Do you recall that?")

Mr. GREW. Oh, yes, I recollect it perfectly.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, these were intended to be sort of economic sanctions or pressures applied to Japan in hopes that they would be effective in implementing the diplomatic conversations that were going on, isn't that true?

Mr. GREW. They were. Those steps were taken with the thought that it would lead Japan to such a position that the more intelligent and liberal-minded statesmen might possibly come into a position where they would control.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. That is a fact, yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, it was intended to implement our general diplomatic attitude?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. That is true, is it not?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact the imposition of [1876] these trade embargoes and the other economic sanctions that were imposed against Japan did not in any sense deter the war lords of Japan in their purposes and policies, did it?

Mr. GREW. They did not in the long run, in the end, no.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, can you point to any specific indication of any action on the part of Japan that indicated a change in their continued policy made and brought about as a result of the application of these economic sanctions?

Mr. GREW. Yes, Mr. Congressman, I think I touched on that yesterday. I think that is contained, the story is contained, in my telegram of September 29, 1941, in which I said that this economic situation in which Japan found herself had, in my opinion, brought about among the more intelligent statesmen in Japan the thought that they were approaching the brink of an abyss and it was my belief that at that time they tried to reverse the engine.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I understood your testimony, pardon me, Mr. Grew, in that regard, but my question does not relate definitely to that. There were intelligent people in Japan who could see the brink of the precipice, as you have indicated it so well, and that they were about to fall off into the abyss as you have stated, or as you stated it in September; but as a matter of fact those war lords who were running the show were not stopped at all. It may have had some effect on [1877] the other crowd, but not on the war lords. Isn't that true, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. That is, in general, true, but I would like to point out in that telegram of September 25, which is already on the record—

The CHAIRMAN. The chairman might suggest that the hour of 12 having arrived, and obviously you cannot conclude before recessing, that we will take a recess until 2:00 o'clock and you will have time to refresh your recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[1878]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Before proceeding further the Chair wishes to state that inquiry has been made of him concerning the question of having a session on Saturday. The Chair is advised that the Congressman from Wisconsin, Mr. Keefe, will be unable to be here on Saturday, Congressman Murphy of Pennsylvania will be unable to be here Saturday, and that probably two or three other members of the committee will find it impossible to be here on this particular coming Saturday.

So that the committee has felt it wise not to attempt to held a session on Saturday of this week. That has no relationship to any program for Saturday meetings hereafter and in view of the importance of the hearing and the large number of witnesses, the Chair hopes that we will be able, after this week, to hold sessions on Saturday. For this coming Saturday there will be no session of the committee.

Now, Mr. Keefe, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, before the questions—

Mr. KEEFE. Just a moment, please, Mr. Grew.

May I say to the Chairman that I want to thank him for his conclusion not to hold a meeting Saturday, so far as I am concerned, and having mentioned my name may I state, for [1879] the purpose of the record, that my interest in not being here Saturday was not prompted by the Army-Navy football game at Philadelphia.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair understands that, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I am compelled, because of illness in my family, as the chairman knows, to get away from here for at least one day.

The CHAIRMAN. The chairman is glad to confirm that and his announcement that there will be no session Saturday had no relation whatever to the Army-Navy game.

Mr. KEEFE. May I say, observing the smiles on the faces of some of those in the room, they, perhaps, are likewise afflicted, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to say that several days ago Congressman Keefe advised him that on account of the illness of his wife he felt compelled to be away this coming Saturday, and the Chair is able to appreciate fully how the Congressman feels about it.

So this recess for this approaching Saturday has, for the benefit of anybody who may smile—over which the Chair has no control—no relationship whatever to the Army-Navy football game.

All right, Mr. Keefe, go ahead.

[1880] Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, may I correct one misstatement of this morning for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Is it agreeable to you, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. I would like to correct one inaccuracy in my testimony of this morning and also bring forward two documents which were requested by Senator Ferguson and which I found in the meantime.

This morning Senator Ferguson asked me if I had on returning from Japan in August 1943 submitted a report to Mr. Hull.

Well, 3 years have gone by since that time and, frankly, I had forgotten the fact that I did submit to Mr. Hull a series of dispatches, quite a number of reports, covering the whole story of the last days before Pearl Harbor, the events as they occurred in Japan, all of which is on the record, completely on the record and has been brought out, I think, before this committee, and also a general statement with regard to the period of our internment in Japan from December 1941 until June 1942.

Those reports which were turned in to the State Department are all available but, as far as I am aware, all the pertinent information in them has been already brought before this committee.

[1881] Senator FERGUSON. Might I, Mr. Chairman, inquire from counsel if we have a copy of the information that Ambassador Grew is now talking about.

Mr. MITCHELL. He is talking about some reports he made to Mr. Hull. They haven't been distributed. We haven't seen them. We will get them.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Chair understand those were reports made to Secretary Hull after the Ambassador returned from Japan in August 1942, after he was exchanged?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Along with certain other Americans held by the Japanese Government for certain Japanese held by the Government of the United States.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Such reports as you now refer to were made upon your return in August 1942?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will counsel get for the committee that information?

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean get the report?

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Keefe.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Grew had another statement [1882] to make.

Mr. GREW. The second point, Mr. Chairman, is this: I was asked, with relation to my so-called green-light telegram, which I think was in December 1940, which referred to an article by Mr. A. T. Steele, far-eastern correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, I was asked to obtain that.

I find in the State Department files a long telegram from Mr. Smythe, who was our chargé d'affaires in Peiping at that time, in which he gives a complete summary of that article.

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2068, for statement by Mr. Gessell.

He says in this telegram :

Mr. A. T. Steele, Far Eastern Correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steele is an experienced and able observer, the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions, and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the Department.

As it is a very long telegram shall I pass it on to the general counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I think that would be appropriate.

[1883] The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. GREW. The other document that I was asked about, I was asked whether I had ever been informed in Tokyo on the conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

Well, practically, as far as I knew, a report of all those conversations was telegraphed to me in Tokyo. I did not recollect this particular conversation but I have here the record in the shape of a telegram from the Secretary of State to myself dated August 18, in which it sets forth the record of the conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17.

Shall I also turn that over to the counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I see that through counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I am sure that counsel will be glad to pass it on to the Senator.

Is that all now, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. That is all I have now.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Mr. GREW. I am still making an examination, I am still exploring for certain other documents which Senator Ferguson asked me to try to find and if we find them we shall promptly produce them.

[1884] The CHAIRMAN. All right, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. When we concluded at the noon hour, Mr. Grew, I had asked you to state specifically a fact that would indicate that the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan had restrained Japan in her warlike attitude and you stated, as I recall, that you wanted to make reference to a certain telegram.

Now, I repeat that question to you this afternoon.

Mr. GREW. The answer to that question, Mr. Congressman, I think is contained in two telegrams, the report of my conversation with Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941, the then Prime Minister of Japan—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, will you refer to that telegram?

Mr. GREW. That is on the record, sir. It has been already referred to, I think, several times. Do you wish me to produce it?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, what is there in that telegram that indicates specifically any action on the part of Japan that was retarded as a result of our imposing economic sanctions?

Refer to the telegram, if you please, and point out what there is in it that specifically indicates that the Japanese were ever retarded as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions.

Mr. GREW. All right, sir.

[1885] I think there is nothing in that telegram which would precisely answer your question but I think you will find material in the telegram which I sent to the Secretary of State on September 29, 1941, which would.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, will you point out in that telegram of September 29, 1941, specifically the incidents that you refer to?

Mr. GREW. I would like to get the original text if I may, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Mr. GREW. September 29. It may be in my bag there.

I think to answer your question, Mr. Congressman, I would have to read a considerable passage from this telegram. Shall I do so? It is a very long telegram of September 29, of which I have before me only the paraphrase. I have not the true text. I shall be glad to read those passages.

Mr. GESELL. That is at page 645 of volume II.

Mr. KEEFE. I have it before me.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Where do you propose to read?

Mr. GREW. I would like to read from the second paragraph.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Mr. GREW. The second and third paragraph, I think, will [1886] cover it.

The CHAIRMAN. What page?

Mr. GREW (reading):

The Ambassador recalls his statements—

The CHAIRMAN. What page is it?

Mr. MITCHELL. 645 and 646.

The CHAIRMAN. 645 and 646, all right.

Mr. GREW (reading):

The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advances to the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force [1887] and by a demonstration of American willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also his statement that if Japan's leadership could be discredited eventually by such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific.

The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very wisely precisely this policy, which furthered by other developments in the world, has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-Wei regime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between the Soviet Union and the United States.

At the present time Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation by getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The [1888] Ambassador recalls his reports to the Department to the effect that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a program can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American policy—of forbearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, followed for many years, plus a manifest determination of the United States to take positive measures when called for—plus the impact of world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Mr. Grew, I appreciate your courtesy in reading these two paragraphs from your message to the State Department of September 29, 1941. I must confess, however, that the reading does not in any sense answer the question which I asked you. [1889] I would like to have you point out, if you can, either from this message or from any fact within your knowledge any specific fact which demonstrates that Japan was deterred in its militaristic policy of expansion and aggression by the imposition of economic sanctions.

Here you are talking about going forward with military and naval force. I am referring and limiting my questions alone to the application of economic sanctions.

Mr. GREW. The point which I am trying to bring out, Mr. Congressman, is this, that the imposition of economic sanctions on Japan had placed Japan in an exceedingly dangerous position economically, socially, and in every other way. The result of this policy that we had followed had, in my opinion, brought certain leaders in Japan—I do not refer to the militarists; I refer to certain leaders—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Mr. Grew, if I may interrupt right there.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. We are interested in the impact upon those who were formulating and carrying out the policy of Japan, not isolated leaders that were intimate with you, that were intimate in talking with you in terms of peace, but the people that were actually formulating and carrying out the policies.

Mr. GREW. I am talking about the very person who was [1890] formulating and carrying out the policy, namely, the Prime Minister at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Mr. GREW. Prince Konoye. He was the man. My talk with him, which is recorded on September 6, and the conversation which this telegram aims to analyze; that he, in spite of all his appalling record, which was set forth by Mr. Hull the other day, which, as I said, was one of the worst trains of events of international banditry in all history, he was responsible for many of the things which had been done by Japan through these years; at the same time he was intelligent enough, I think, to see the handwriting on the wall and to realize that Japan had got herself into an exceedingly dangerous position and that there were only two ways out: One way out was by war and the other way out was an arrangement and agreement with the United States.

Now, he had been in our country, he knew something about our productive capacity, he knew something about our national spirit, of which the militarists did not know, to which they paid no attention, and I think he realized at that time, I gathered from evidence which appeared from time to time, that he realized that Japan, if she should go to war with the United States and Great Britain, might readily be defeated and emerge from that war as a third- or a fifth-class power.

[1891] I think he realized the country was on the brink of an abyss and I think that with all his appalling record he honestly tried to reverse the engine.

Now, that is my precise answer to what effect our economic policy had on Japanese leaders and when I say the Prime Minister himself, I know that he was backed and supported by a considerable element among what I call the liberal leaders of Japan.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, can you point to one single objective of the Japanese war lords or militarists who were in control that they receded from or refrained from carrying out as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions?

Mr. GREW. I might read one more passage to answer that question, Mr. Congressman. I go back to—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, do you have any present recollection yourself?

Mr. GREW. Yes, I have and I can state it but I can state it more precisely by reading one passage from my report here of my conversation with the Prime Minister on September 6.

Now, nobody can possibly say how much weight we should attach to the following statement which I am about to read. It is one of those things that can never be proved; whether it was genuine or whether it was not genuine, whether Prince [1892] Konoye in trying to see President Roosevelt had wished to pull the wool over our eyes and cause a delay so that it would give Japan more time to arm and prepare, nobody can answer that question. The Japanese militarists seemed to be, so far as I could understand at that time, completely self-confident of their power; I do not think they needed more time and I think they realized that time would play in our hands.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, Ambassador Grew, pardon me. I do not want to interject myself into your answer but perhaps I am not making myself clear.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; you are. My answer will answer your question.

Mr. KEEFE. For the purpose of getting a clear answer may I state this at this time:

During the summer of 1941 and in the fall and especially in September Japan steadily continued her march to the south and her infiltration into Indo-China.

Mr. GREW. That is absolutely true.

Mr. KEEFE. Which caused you and the State Department and the President great concern.

Mr. GREW. Certainly.

Mr. KEEFE. So that the imposition of economic sanctions did not stop Japan from going on down into Indo-China.

[1893] Mr. GREW. It did not. It had not up to that point. The question arose at that time whether at the point that I am now speaking about it was going to be possible to stop that expansion.

Mr. KEEFE. May I also call your attention to the fact, so that you will have this in mind in answering my question, that we are now furnished with information that starting in January 1941 there was called into session in Tokyo representatives of the fleet to discuss a plan that had been devised in January, I believe, 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GREW. Perfectly true.

Mr. KEEFE. And that as a result of those conversations which continued during the summer, in September 1941 they had reached a full and complete agreement, very secret in their top naval circles setting out the exact plan and setting the date as of December 7, 1941. Those were the war lords in action, as we now know them to be.

[1894] Mr. GREW. That is absolutely true, Mr. Congressman, and in addition to that, I would say every country presumably has its war plans prepared long in advance to put into force, if necessary, with regard to any potential enemy. A country will have its so-called orange plan, its blue plan, its yellow plan, whatever it may be.

I have seen it in the old days in Europe. But the mere fact that this plan had been elaborated on paper in January 1941 does not necessarily mean that events might possibly have brought about a situation where that plan would, in fact, have to be put into effect.

Mr. KEEFE. Obviously, events did not occur that prevented placing that plan into effect, because it was put into effect on December 7.

Mr. GREW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to have you also bear in mind the fact that you yourself have testified repeatedly here as to the infiltration and continued infiltration into Indochina, as to its concern on you and the State Department, and the assembling of this large fleet, which was being assembled, and which later sailed down apparently to land forces on the Kra Peninsula, and into Thailand.

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. They continued right straight on with their [1895] aggressive war in China, and with the infiltration into Indochina and down to the south, one step at a time.

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, what I have asked you to do is to point out, if you will, to me, any particular act that was stopped or retarded as the result of the imposition of these economic sanctions.

Mr. GREW. I cannot point out any specific act that actually did stop that procedure, but I can point out, as is perfectly clear on the record, that we in Tokyo at that time felt if the Prime Minister and the President of the United States could meet face to face, it might be possible to put a stop to that movement.

Mr. KEEFE. It was all guesswork?

Mr. GREW. We could not tell, but that is my answer to your question.

Mr. KEEFE. That was an expression of a pious hope that that would take place, was it not?

Mr. GREW. That was an expression of a pious hope, and also, as I have said repeatedly, and I would like to repeat now once again, that in that telegram of analysis of this situation, I said, in the last paragraph of my telegram of September 29:

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador [1896] does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and

Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan.

That was a premise to all my reports.

To answer your question about the war lords I would merely read one paragraph of the report of my talk with the Prime Minister at that time. That is the telegram of September 6, 1941.

Mr. GESELL. Page 603, I think, is the one you quoted.

Mr. GREW. Page 605 of Foreign Relations.

The report which the Prime Minister has received—

Mr. KEEFE. (interposing). Could I have the page again?

Mr. GREW. That is page 605 of Foreign Relations, volume II.

Mr. KEEFE. I have it.

Mr. GREW. This is my report of the talk, of my conversations with the Prime Minister on September 6, 1941. Paragraph No. 4 says:

The report which the Prime Minister has received from the Japanese Ambassador concerning the latter's conversations with the President and the Secretary, have led the Prime Minister to think that the Administration in Washington entertains serious doubts as to the strength of the present [1897] cabinet, and that the Administration is not certain that in the event that the Cabinet should adopt a peaceful program it could successfully resist the attacks of opposing elements.

Prince Konoe told me that from the inception of the informal talks in Washington he had received the strongest concurrence from the responsible Chiefs of both the Army and the Navy. Only today he had conferred with the Minister of War who had promised to send a full general to accompany the Prime Minister to the meeting with the President; the Minister of the Navy had agreed that a full admiral should accompany the Prime Minister.

Prince Konoe added in confidence that he expected that the representative of the Navy would probably be Admiral Yoshida, a former minister of the Navy. In addition, the Premier would be accompanied by the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy and other ranking officers of the armed services who are in entire accord with his aims. He admitted that there are certain elements within the armed forces who do not approve his policies, but he voiced the conviction that since he had the full support of the responsible Chiefs of the Army and Navy, it would be possible for him to put down and control any opposition which might develop among those elements.

[1898] Mr. KEEFE. Well, were you suggesting to our State Department and the President that it was your opinion that there should be a meeting between the President and Prince Konoe?

Mr. GREW. That appears in this record, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. You warmly recommended that, did you not?

Mr. GREW. From our point of view in Tokyo at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. You felt Prince Konoe was a man inclined to peace, and that some good would come out of such conference?

Mr. GREW. I think all of us in the Embassy at that time—when I say "all of us" I mean the senior officers, the military attaché, naval attaché, commercial attaché, and all of the senior members of the Embassy believed it was a good gamble; that Konoe had come to a position where he realized the dangerous situation in which his country had got itself, and he was trying to find a way out.

Now, whether he controlled the military elements or not is a question we can never answer. It is not susceptible to proof. We cannot do it.

Mr. KEEFE. As a matter of fact, that meeting was never held?

Mr. GREW. That meeting was never held.

Mr. KEEFE. The proposal was rejected here at Washington, was it not?

[1899] Mr. GREW. Well, the proposal was never acted on. Although you will find that in August—let me see if I can put my hand on it. This is in Foreign Relations, page 572. The record shows that on August 28, 1941, when Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, had delivered to the President a letter from Prince Kōnoye, the record shows:

At the conclusion of the reading of the communication, the President said to the Ambassador that he could say to his government that he considered this note a step forward and that he was very hopeful. He then added that he would be keenly interested in having three or four days with Prince Kōnoe and again he mentioned Juneau.

He mentioned Juneau as the place of meeting.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know why the meeting was never held?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. I think Mr. Hull has made that amply clear in his statement. Mr. Hull felt that it would be futile to go ahead with the meeting unless the basis had been laid in advance in the Washington conversations.

Mr. KEEFE. The futility of it appeared, according to Mr. Hull's statement, right while these negotiations were going on and Japan continued its unrepressed march of aggression.

Mr. GREW. That is perfectly true.

[1900] Mr. KEEFE. Right on and on, day by day.

Mr. GREW. That is perfectly true.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Hull and the President continually suggested if they were in earnest and if they were honest about the peace they would put a stop to some of those things.

Isn't that the situation? But the war lords would not do it; isn't that correct?

Mr. GREW. It is more of a story than that, Mr. Congressman. It is a pretty complicated story. No one who has not lived in Japan and understands the way things work there could possibly understand it. I have tried to explain one phase of it.

Mr. KEEFE. You are making it pretty tough for me, Mr. Grew, when you say nobody that did not live there can possibly understand it. I am going to be in a hopeless situation, then, if that is the case.

Mr. GREW. The facts are these: At that time in Japan there were two camps. There were the militarist war leaders who were all out for expansion, and were carrying out the plans, as you have just said, day after day, week after week, steadily.

One the other hand, there were certain liberal-minded statesmen who realized the position their country had got into, realized the danger of war, and wanted to avert it, if [1901] they possibly could.

Now, anything that appeared on the records had to go through the Foreign Office, which was always discredited by the military people. The Foreign Office was full of young officers of extremist tendencies, many of them playing in with the Germans, and anything that went on the record, went through the Foreign Office, was promptly put through the hands of the extremists, and the Germans were constantly pressing, pressing to prevent any possibility of an understanding with the United States. That was the reason for their fear of formulas.

That was the reason why I said in this telegram that they never would be able to bring about a satisfactory understanding in the conversations in Washington for the mere fact that they were so spread on the record. They had good reason to fear, because they were constantly trying to assassinate Prince Konoye, and they very nearly did assassinate him just at this time when four thugs jumped aboard his car with daggers and tried to get at him, but failed. The former Prime Minister was also attacked. His throat was cut and he was out of the picture for many months thereafter. All these statesmen who were not playing in with the military were constantly under attack by the militarists. That is, I think, a fundamental reason why they were afraid of formulas.

[1902] Now Prince Konoye said to me, "If I can meet the President face to face I will give him assurances, commitments which we will honorably carry out. We cannot carry them out overnight, but we will carry them out in as short a time as possible."

That is all on the record here, every bit of it. He said, "A settlement of this kind will so electrify the Japanese people, showing them that they can have what they want politically, economically, and socially, they can have security without any more fighting," and they were tired out with the China war, they were subject to the greatest economic sacrifices. Konoye said, "It will be accepted by the great mass of the Japanese people, with the greatest satisfaction," and he said, "I can guarantee that this will be carried out."

He said, "It can be carried out. It may take 6 months or more, it will take some time, but we will take our troops out of China, we will take our troops out of Indochina. Of course we have got to leave certain garrisons here and there for the purpose of our own security."

I said at once when this statement was made, "What do you mean by that?" He said, "I mean just the sort of thing like you yourselves are doing, the British are doing. You have garrisons in Peiping, in Tientsin, Shanghai, and so have the British, and so have many other countries." He said, "That is what we have in mind for the purposes of security."

[1903] There is the story. Nobody in the world can prove that even if Konoye had met the President and even if he had been able to give satisfactory commitments that he could have implemented them after he came back. That was definitely in the control of the military. Nobody could answer that question, and it cannot be answered today. It is not susceptible to proof.

Mr. KEEFE. At least the President and Mr. Hull doubted his ability to implement any such suggestions with the military.

Mr. GREW. Very definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. Because they declined the invitation for the conference.

Mr. GREW. Very definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. That is true, is it not?

Mr. GREW. Absolutely.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. That is in answer to my question, unless you have something further.

Mr. GREW. I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents the point of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo.

and we were deprived of a great deal of the information which was available to the President and Mr. Hull. We had none of the secret intercepts or telegrams, we had none of the documents that have come into the State Department from time to time, documents of a secret nature, so of course [1904] the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal more information than we had available to us.

Mr. KEEFE. Am I to understand then, Mr. Grew, that from the information available to you at the Embassy in Tokyo, being denied the information contained in the intercepts and all of the other information available here at Washington, you were recommending that this meeting with Prince Konoye be held and that it would be productive of some good?

Mr. GREW. Well, sir, to get the record straight on that—and it is all on the record—I better read you exactly what was said here. This is the telegram of September 29:

In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above observations which he has every reason to regard as sound—

That was my analysis of the whole situation at that time—

American objectives will not be reached by insisting or continuing to insist during the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal convention or treaty. Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould Japan's future policy upon the basic principles they are ready to accept and then to adopt measures which [1905] gradually but loyally implement those principles, with it understood that the United States will implement its own commitment *pari passu* with the steps which Japan takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific.

I want to make clear the fact that I felt that, as far as our economic measures went, we had great leverage there and we were certainly not going to relax those measures, our freezing measures, the abrogation of our treaty with Japan, the embargoes, and so forth, unless and until we found Japan was going to loyally implement whatever undertakings they might tell us they would undertake. That was our opinion in the Embassy at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, on November 3, in your message which is in evidence, you made this statement in paragraph 5, and I am reading it:

Please realize that in discussing the foregoing grave and momentous subject I am out of touch with the Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon and it is far from my intention to imply that an undeliberated policy is being followed in Washington. [1906] It is equally far from my intentions for a single moment to advocate so-called "appeasement" on the part of the United States or that our Government should in the slightest degree recede from the fundamental principles which it laid down as a basis for adjustment and conduct of international relations, including our relations with Japan. My purpose is only to insure against my country getting into war with Japan through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic.

We need not be over-concerned by the present bellicose tone and substance of the Japanese press which has attacked the United States in recurrent waves of intensity during the past several years, but it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious preparations for a program to be implemented if her

alternative program for peace should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling with the exclusive purpose [1907] of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In that same message, Mr. Grew, you obviously must have had some knowledge of some statements that were being made in speeches here in the United States about the ability of the United States to knock the Jap Navy over in 24 hours, and all that sort of things. Those things had come to your attention, had they not?

Mr. GREW. Some of them had, undoubtedly.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you prompted, in sending this message of November 3, to warn the State Department and perhaps the American people that perhaps the Japanese were of a character that had the capacity to strike suddenly and carry on war?

Mr. GREW. Definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. And that these statements that were being made by them, and by speakers going around the country, as to the impotence of Japan and its Navy were far from the truth?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. That was your information then?

Mr. GREW. That was my information then. But where you say "Japanese" that is a pretty relative term. There are [1908] different kinds of Japanese.

Mr. KEEFE. Now I do not want to be captious or capricious about it. I am referring to those things which would govern.

Mr. GREW. Yes; I agree with that 100 percent, with every word said in that telegram.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Of course, the situation, when that telegram was sent, was very different from the situation which obtained under the previous Cabinet in September.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. That was in November, under the Tojo regime.

Mr. KEEFE. When did the Konoye Cabinet form?

Mr. GREW. October 13, 1941.

Mr. KEEFE. Shortly before you sent this telegram of November 3 that I read from.

Mr. GREW. I took about 2 weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite sure what Tojo's policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going to try to keep on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an agreement with us, and all the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers crossed. I was waiting to size it up, and after I had sized it up I sent the telegram of November 3.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact, the very fact that the Konoye Cabinet fell was an indication to you, was it not, [1909] Mr. Grew, that the militarists were continuing in full and complete control?

Mr. GREW. At that time, absolutely, Mr. Congressman. But the point which was brought out in these telegrams, is unless this meeting of the President took place, the Konoye Cabinet would fall definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. The meeting did not take place and the Konoye Cabinet did fall?

Mr. GREW. It did.

Mr. KEEFE. And who came in charge of the situation?

Mr. GREW. General Tojo.

Mr. KEEFE. He was a militarist of the first order, wasn't he?

Mr. GREW. He was.

Mr. KEEFE. And a bandit of the first order?

Mr. GREW. I would say so.

[1910] Mr. KEEFE. He was in charge of running the show, wasn't he, from then on?

Mr. GREW. Completely, he certainly was.

Mr. KEEFE. And he was not deterred by any economic sanctions, was he, after he came into control?

Mr. GREW. Not for a moment.

Mr. KEEFE. No; and nobody was deterred before he came into control, so far as their actions disclosed?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, then, I want to get into another subject. The statement was made by you and by Secretary Hull that the presence of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor acted as a deterrent and had a deterrent effect. That was the language you used, "had a deterrent effect."

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you point out to me, for the purpose of this record, one single act in the program of the war lords of Japan which was deterred by the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Congressman, that is a very difficult question to answer. I do not think I could do it. I felt out there to withdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor would be a complete confession of weakness, and the Japanese might [1911] well have struck long before they did strike if we had done so. That is something we can never prove.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not know, of course, when you came to that conclusion that due to the knowledge of the intercepts that we had, all of the information that was in the possession of the State Department here?

Mr. GREW. I did not know that.

Mr. KEEFE. No. And of course we did not know either here, or in Washington, or in Japan, except by rumors that they had entered into an agreement to strike Pearl Harbor on December 7, as indicated by your message of January 27, 1941.

Mr. GREW. That is perfectly true.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Grew, your answer to my question is, as I interpret it, that you were of the opinion that to withdraw the fleet would have been an indication of weakness on our part that might have stimulated the Japs to strike quicker than they did.

Mr. GREW. Quite possible.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I so understand it?

Mr. GREW. That would be my interpretation.

Mr. KEEFE. That was not an answer to my question. My question was: What act of the Japanese war lords, or the War Government of Japan, was deterred by the fact that we had the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

[1912] Mr. GREW. I could not point to any specific act, Mr. Congressman. As a matter of fact, this whole procedure passed over a considerable period of time. The movement of the Japanese expansionists into China and eventually into Indo-China did not take place overnight. It was going on gradually. It stopped for a while and then moved ahead for a while.

Now, it is quite possible if we had withdrawn the fleet from Pearl Harbor that expansionist movement might have gone a great deal faster than it did go. I cannot tell you that. I do not know. But I think that is a fair supposition.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I must interpret the fact, Mr. Grew, in the light of all the evidence that has been presented here, and we now have before us the evidence taken from the Jap files. Their story has been presented here by Admiral Inglis. So we not only have the story as it existed here in America, and at Tokyo, but we have the situation as it existed as shown by the Jap files.

Now, as a matter of fact, the fleet went out there early in 1940, pursuant to regular plans for orderly maneuvers, as testified to by Admiral Richardson, merely for the purpose of maneuvers; its regular base being at San Diego, and San Pedro, up at Long Beach.

[1913] Now, when they concluded their maneuvers, the fleet went into Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Richardson thought they ought to be brought back to their bases, and he received information and instruction to issue a press release, which was certainly contrary to his expressed opinion as he gave it to us here, to issue a press release to the effect that the fleet was being retained for a time at his request, and being a Navy man he followed such instructions and issued such a press release, for the benefit of the Japs, I assume, and the fleet remained there thereafter.

Now, you are not able, as the Ambassador being on the ground in Tokyo, to give to this committee one single specific instance of a case where the Japs were deterred from taking any action as the result of that fleet being there, except the general statement that perhaps they might have infiltrated into Indochina and down south a little faster than they did, if the fleet had been out there. Is that the way I understand you?

Mr. GREW. Congressman, it is utterly impossible, and it would be utterly impossible for anybody to give one specific instance, because that is not the way armies work. They do not buck ahead all of a sudden, and you cannot put your finger on it and say that was a specific instance, or one specific step that might not be taken if we did not have [1914] the fleet there. Those things move slowly over a period of time. Nobody could give you one specific instance.

Mr. KEEFE. Then it would be likewise quite impossible, would it not, for anyone to say that the presence of the fleet in Pearl Harbor actually deterred the Japs at all? If you cannot give any instances of where it did deter them, it will be quite impossible to say that they were deterred; isn't that true?

Mr. GREW. I do not believe anybody could answer that question. You cannot possibly tell whether the presence of the fleet in Pearl Harbor did or did not slow up the Japanese advance, whether they might have struck earlier than they did, whether we were much less ready than we were. The position I am taking is, from our point of

view in Tokyo, we had the feeling that the presence of the fleet in Pearl Harbor was a healthy thing, psychologically, and to withdraw it would be a confession of weakness which would be immediately taken up by the Japanese.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand that thoroughly. I am not attempting to be critical of your position in that regard, or anybody else's. I am simply trying to get the facts of this situation so I thoroughly understand them.

Now, as a matter of fact, did you know the condition that the fleet was in back in 1940 and 1941?

[1915] Mr. GREW. I knew nothing whatsoever about the condition of the fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. You assumed that the fleet was ready for action, did you not?

Mr. GREW. I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Had you known that the fleet was not prepared for action, would you still have been of the opinion that it would be a deterrent?

Mr. GREW. I am afraid that is a hypothetical question which I find very difficult to answer, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. If you cannot answer, Mr. Grew, I will not press you for an answer. Unless you feel that you can answer it, I shall not press it.

Mr. GREW. I think I would prefer to pass that question.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Now, in answer to some questions by counsel, I believe, in answer to some questions by my colleague, Mr. Gearhart, there was quite an altercation as to the meaning of the word "ultimatum." Both you and Mr. Hull were very positive in your statements that the Jap message of November 20 constituted an ultimatum. Do you recall giving that testimony?

Mr. GREW. I do not think I testified to that effect, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you hear Mr. Hull so testify?

[1916] Mr. GREW. I did, yes.

Mr. KEEFE. It is in his statement, isn't it?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it is the basis of his statement that the November 20 message constituted an ultimatum. Did you so conceive it to be an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. Well, as for my personal views, Mr. Congressman, I have never felt that any communication from one government to another was an ultimatum if negotiations continued after that notice was served.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, Mr. Grew, you must be in complete lack of agreement with Secretary Hull, because the facts clearly evidence that subsequent to the delivery of the Jap note to the Secretary of State, the note of the 20th of November, negotiations continued right on, conference after conference was held. You are aware of that, are you?

Mr. GREW. I am.

Mr. KEEFE. Conferences were held not only with the Japanese but they were held with the British. They were held with the Dutch. They were held with the Chinese, especially with relation to the proposed modus vivendi proposal that the Japs had asked for.

Now, then, in view of those facts, and in view of your interpretation of what an ultimatum is, are you prepared to [1917] say yourself that the message of November 20, was, in fact, an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. I have not said so, but I will say this, Mr. Congressman, that I think if there is any difference of opinion between Mr. Hull and myself on that point, it is a pretty technical point; it is a point as to what is meant by the term "ultimatum." It would be very difficult for people to differ as to the actual meaning of that particular word.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you read the note of the 20th of November?

Mr. GREW. Yes, certainly.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you find any language in it which indicates that negotiations were to be broken off?

Mr. GREW. I do not think it depends on the language in it so much as whether further negotiations continue after the delivery of that note.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the facts are clear, Mr. Grew, that negotiations did continue. You know that, do you not?

Mr. GREW. That is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. They continued after the delivery of the note?

Mr. GREW. That is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. And it resulted in our offering a counter- [1918] proposal on November 26.

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. You are sure of that, are you not?

Mr. GREW. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the statement has been made here that over in Tokyo a friend of yours, high in the Government circles, wrote you a letter in which he said that the people of Japan without knowledge as to what was in the November 26 message, considered it to be an ultimatum, and you construe that to be the policy of the controlled press operating under the directions of the war lords to not give the Japanese people the truth; is that correct?

Mr. GREW. Very definitely.

Mr. KEEFE. To make them believe that we terminated diplomatic relations?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I so understand your testimony?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the record discloses—and I now refer to exhibit 27, which I am advised is the first of the publication Peace and War.

Mr. GREW. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Published in 1942.

On page 137 of that short report there appears, beginning [1919] on page 135, and continuing over to page 138, a memorandum entitled "United States Memorandum of November 26," and I find this expression, a statement as to the handling of this November 26 message to the Japanese Ambassador in this language, and I quote from the top of page 136:

On November 26, 1941, the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.

This was the culmination of these negotiations that had been going on between the 20th and 26th.

In a statement accompanying the proposal, it was said that the United States earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuation of discussions with the Japanese Government; that the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted, in some respects, with the fundamental principles to which each government had declared it was committed—

and so forth.

Then appears this on page 137:

After the Japanese representatives had read the document, Mr. Kurusu said that when this proposal of the United States was reported to the Japanese Government that Government would be likely to "throw up its hands"; that this response to the Japanese proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to the end of the negotiations. The Japanese [1920] representatives then asked whether they could see the President.

Now, there was an expression of opinion of the Japanese envoy, expressed at the time the note was handed to him on November 26, and before it had even been transmitted to Japan, indicating that, after reading it, on the day that it was delivered to them, they considered it to be an ultimatum.

Do you so interpret that language?

Mr. GREW. Definitely not, Mr. Congressman. Do I interpret the language of the Japanese envoys as themselves having believed it to be an ultimatum?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. That would appear to be clear from the record.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. That is what I asked. As evidence of the fact that subsequent to November 20 there were continuing negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese envoy, I refer to page 134 of exhibit 27, after the Japs had handed their proposal of the 20th to Mr. Hull, and this appears:

During a conversation on that same day with the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu, Secretary Hull said that Japan could at any moment put an end to the existing situation by deciding upon an "all-out" peaceful course; that at any moment [1921] Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call "encirclement."

The Secretary said the people of the United States believed that the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as those underlying our aid to Great Britain and that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan the other half.

The existence of the Tripartite Pact and the continual harping of Japan's leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type, the Secretary said, served to strengthen this belief; what was needed was the manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses. He said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in East Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people opposed the idea of a "new order" under military control.

[1922] In this conversation the Japanese representatives reiterated that their Government was really desirous of peace and that Japan had "never pledged itself to a policy of expansion." Secretary Hull remarked that the Chinese "might have an answer to that point."

With which I, parenthetically, agreed.

Then:

During a conversation on November 22nd the Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that he had called in representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Far East and that there had been a

discussion of the question whether there could be some relaxation of freezing; there was a general feeling that the matter could be settled if the Japanese could give some evidence of peaceful intentions. The Secretary said that if the United States and other countries should see Japan pursuing a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan's obtaining all of the materials she desired.

Were you advised as Ambassador to Japan of these conversations relating to this proposed *modus vivendi*?

Mr. GREW. I couldn't answer that question, Mr. Congressman, without looking up the record. As I said before, I was advised [1923] of some of the conversations. In certain cases the records were telegraphed out to me. I do not know that I was advised of the records of all the conversations.

Mr. KEEFE. What records would you have to go to?

Mr. GREW. Those are on file in the Department of State available to counsel.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, then these documents that we have in evidence here, War and Peace, Foreign Relations, and your book, don't contain all the messages?

Mr. GREW. That I cannot tell you.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you turn and find any evidence in your book of any messages in reference to this *modus vivendi* proposition?

Mr. GREW. I don't recollect that there is anything there. I don't think there is.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, do you have any present recollection now, Mr. Grew, that you were informed and knew about the negotiations?

Mr. GREW. I have no present recollection of that particular point.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you advised that before any settlement of the relationships between the United States and Japan could be accomplished that it was necessary to call in consultation other powers that were interested—Great Britain, the Dutch, and the Chinese?

[1924] Mr. GREW. Was I advised, you say, that it would be necessary to call them in?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I certainly was not advised to that effect. I may have been advised after the meeting took place. I can't answer that question because, as I say, there were a great many such messages sent out to me, and I would have to check up the record to see whether that particular point was telegraphed to me or not.

Mr. KEEFE. I believe you stated that you had no knowledge of the so-called A-B-C-D agreement.

Mr. GREW. I had no knowledge of any such agreement.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you been advised recently that there was such an agreement?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know anything about such an agreement?

Mr. GREW. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I call your attention to the fact that General Marshall testified with respect to that agreement when he was a witness before the Army board of inquiry, and I read this just to attempt to refresh your recollection, if it will.

The question was:

Who constituted the military authorities representing the United States in entering into this agreement?

[1925] And the agreement referred to is the one already read into the record by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson.

The answer is:

The agreement was reached in the so-called American-British-Dutch staff conversations held at Singapore in April of 1941. United States Army officers participated on my instructions and with the approval of the Secretary of State.

The participants were: Captain Purnell, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet; Colonel A. C. McBride, U. S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Military Forces in the Philippines; Captain A. M. R. Allen, U. S. Navy, the U. S. Naval Observer in Singapore; Lieutenant Colonel H. G. Brink, U. S. Army, U. S. Military Observer at Singapore.

Does General Marshall's testimony bring back any recollection to you of the fact that there was such an agreement entered into?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; it does not, and I do not think that any report of that meeting which you just referred to came to me in Tokyo, so far as I can now recollect.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, I want to ask a couple of other questions in relation to your book and your diary.

Oh, before I get to that:

[1926] Where is Mr. Dooman at the present time, who was formerly the counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Dooman lives in Washington but he is away for a few days. I think he will be back shortly but I don't know when.

Mr. KEEFE. What is his full name?

Mr. GREW. Eugene F. Dooman, D-o-o-m-a-n.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he return with you at the time you were exchanged and came back, which I believe was in July or August of 1942?

Mr. GREW. Yes, we came back together.

Mr. KEEFE. Is he presently occupying any position in the State Department?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. He recently retired from the foreign service and the State Department. He has now no official position.

Mr. KEEFE. He is in the same position that you are?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; exactly.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he work with you when you became Under Secretary of State?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Dooman, as I recollect it—when he came back, I think he was assigned to work in the Department of State, shortly after we came back. I would have to check up on that. But I had nothing to do with that because I was out [1927] in the field speaking for the first year or year and a half.

Mr. KEEFE. Well now, reference was made this morning to this report which you made setting forth the conversations had between Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ohashi on February 14, 1941. In transmitting that report you used this language:

The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinarily direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth with the question, "Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore there would be a war with the United States." Mr. Dooman replied, "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question." Mr. Ohashi then left that subject and adverted to the character of reports sent to London by the British Ambassador. Circumstantial evidence that Mr. Ohashi was accented by the interview was

given by Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister, who called on Mr. Ohashi a few minutes after Mr. Dooman left. Sir John without being aware that Mr. [1928] Dooman had just called on Mr. Ohashi, told me that he found Mr. Ohashi greatly agitated and distraught.

I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka, with whom I have an appointment this morning, that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval.

Now, this incident has been known quite widely in diplomatic circles as the Dooman Incident, has it not?

Mr. GREW. Well, I hadn't heard that term applied to it, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. It caused some astonishment in diplomatic circles in Tokyo, did it not, when it came out?

Mr. GREW. I don't think it ever came out in public in Tokyo, so far as I recollect. Those things very seldom did come out. Is there any indication there that it did? I don't think so. Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister, appears to have known of it.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you agreed at that time, when you sent this message, that it was the considered policy of the United States that if the Japs attacked Singapore we would go to war?

Mr. GREW. It is not a categorical statement to that effect.

Mr. KEEFE. I know it is not, but what did you mean?

Mr. GREW. I think that was pretty good doctrine to spread [1929] to the Japanese at that time. I always held, during that period, that only a display of force and the establishing of the conviction among the Japanese that we intended to use it, if necessary, would have any effect out there.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Grew, if you will pardon me, I am not attempting to place any false interpretation upon the language. I could let it stand for itself. The words speak for themselves as to just what was said. I am not in disagreement with you. I hope you do not get that impression. The statement says the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the question as to whether or not we would go to war.

Now, do I understand you to say that the purpose of Mr. Dooman making this statement to Mr. Ohashi, of which you had prior knowledge and approval, was part of the program to attempt to deter the Japs from the course they had set out on?

Mr. GREW. Congressman, no one is omniscient at any one time, of course, but we in Tokyo had during those years watched the impression created among the Japanese people as to the attitude of the United States and the American people.

Whenever a speech by some prominent isolationist was made in America that speech was generally emblazoned in headlines in the Japanese press and very few other speeches were ever allowed to be published.

Whenever there was a strike in the United States, that [1930] strike was emphasized in the Japanese press in order to convey to the Japanese people that the American people were isolationists and pacifists and secondly that we were completely disunited and would never be able to fight a total war.

Therefore I felt that on Mr. Dooman's coming back from Washington it was pretty sound doctrine for him to speak as he did speak. There was no precise threat there. There was no categorical statement that

we would or would not do this. It was simply the general tone and substance of his talk which I approved.

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you, Mr. Grew, for that statement.

The fact is that Mr. Dooman was back here in the United States during the campaign of 1940, wasn't he?

Mr. GREW. I believe so.

Mr. KEEFE. That is when he was here; it says so in the statement.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, were the speeches being printed in Japan that were being made during this campaign, do you know?

Mr. GREW. I can't recollect any particular speech at any time in particular, but in general that was the type of thing which was being published in the Japanese press because, apparently, the militarists wanted to give the Japanese people the idea that we were timid, that we could easily be intimidated, [1931] and that if they showed enough force and power we would step back.

Mr. KEEFE. As I recall that campaign, there were a great many speeches made by people who never have been termed "isolationists," who were leading the people of America to believe that we weren't going to war.

I recall Mr. Willkie making those speeches and I recall the President making a speech in which he indicated that we weren't going to war.

Were those speeches published in Japan?

Mr. GREW. I can't answer that question, Mr. Congressman. I can't recollect what speeches were and what speeches were not published.

Mr. KEEFE. I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, whether or not the purpose of Mr. Dooman having the conversation with Mr. Ohashi was not to try to give him the impression that a lot of this stuff that they had heard during this campaign did not represent the real and true spirit of the people of America?

Mr. GREW. I think one of the purposes of Mr. Dooman's talk was to create the impression that the American people were not completely isolationist and pacifist as many of the Japanese had been led to believe.

Mr. KEEFE. Well now, when you came back finally from Japan you brought with you a diary consisting, as I understand [1932] it, of some 13 volumes; is that right?

Mr. GREW. I believe that is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is the diary which has been the subject of some discussion between you and the committee and Senator Brewster?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Grew, after you came back with this diary of 13 volumes, will you state whether or not you submitted it to Collier's weekly for publication; for publication by Collier's weekly first?

Mr. GREW. I did not submit the entire diary to Collier's weekly. I did submit parts of it having in mind the possibility of a series of articles but I later found that I could not write that series of articles and the whole thing was dropped.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact—and you can answer this or not, as you wish, Mr. Grew—isn't it a fact that you did submit your diary to Collier's weekly for the purpose of having it edited into a series of articles and that when it was submitted it was found that there had been passages cut out of the diary and Collier's weekly was not interested in publishing the diary with those deleted portions taken out?

Mr. GREW. I don't recollect that. The whole diary was not submitted.

[1933] Mr. KEEFE. What part was submitted?

Mr. GREW. I can't recollect. Certain parts were submitted to one representative of Collier's weekly to look over and see whether a series of articles would be worth while.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was that man?

Mr. GREW. I can't recollect his name now. He is now dead. I think he died last year. But I can't remember his name.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he not the Washington representative of Collier's weekly, the man to whom you submitted the diary?

Mr. GREW. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. I was trying to think of his name. I think I knew him.

Mr. GREW. I remember that he came down to meet me when we got off the Japanese ship to see if he could sign me up for a series of articles. I wasn't willing to sign up at that time but as he had taken that trouble I realized that if I was going to write anything for the magazines that Collier's weekly had a reasonable priority. We looked over the ground and I finally decided that I did not want to write those articles at that time and the whole thing was dropped.

Mr. KEEFE. Where were those conversations held, here in Washington?

Mr. GREW. Well—the talks about the diary?

[1934] Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. I think so.

Mr. KEEFE. What volumes of your diary did you submit to him?

Mr. GREW. I couldn't possibly tell you, Mr. Congressman. I wouldn't remember.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you wish to say that Collier's weekly categorically did or did not refuse to publish an article because of the deletions which appeared in your diary?

Mr. GREW. I don't recollect any such decision now.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, would you say that that decision was not reached or that you just do not remember?

Mr. GREW. I haven't thought of that incident. It is at least 3 years ago now. As far as I can recollect the matter, Collier's never abandoned the idea completely. I think I just didn't go ahead with it. I don't recollect that Collier's definitely declined to publish. No, I don't recollect that.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you answer this question, please:

Was it your intention to personally write the diary or did Collier's suggest that you go over it with an editorial writer that would shape up the material?

Mr. GREW. I think the idea was that certain parts could be taken out and possibly an editorial writer might go over [1935] them and write up something for me.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you discuss the matter with any editorial writer of Collier's weekly?

Mr. GREW. Only in a very general way. We never got down to details.

Mr. KEEFE. What editorial writer of Collier's did you discuss the matter with?

Mr. GREW. That was that gentleman whose name escapes me. I can't recollect it. I believe he died last year. I can't remember his name.

Mr. KEEFE. What specific reason do you now ascribe for failing to go on and having Collier's publish the diary?

Mr. GREW. Well, I can't remember exactly the reasons. In the first place, I was exceedingly busy. I was making speeches all over the country. And I dare say that at that time I possibly was thinking of a book, in which case it would have been better not to do a series of articles. I think that was the idea, that I was proposing to bring out this book and therefore that I did not wish to go ahead with the articles.

Mr. KEEFE. How many volumes of your diary did you turn over to Collier's to inspect?

Mr. GREW. I don't remember whether I turned over the actual volumes or not. I had copies of various parts of the [1936] diary which I think I showed them. Whether I showed them the volumes or not I don't know.

[1937] Mr. KEEFE. You just do not recall?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, after you decided, or it was decided, whatever the fact may be, that you were not going to have Collier's publish this series of articles, to whom did you next submit your material for publication?

Mr. GREW. To whom did I next submit my material for publication?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GREW. I then decided to go ahead with the book and I decided to put it in the hands of Messrs. Simon and Schuster of New York and Mr. Quincy Howe, one of their foremost editors whom I knew personally, went over the diary with me and helped me pick—

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you submitted your complete diary to Mr. Quincy Howe, did you not?

Mr. GREW. At one time he had it, yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And he went through it for the purpose of editing this book, did he not?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And he prepared the material that went into this book, *Ten Years in Japan*?

Mr. GREW. No, he did not prepare it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he put it together?

[1938] Mr. GREW. Well, he made suggestions as to passages that might be used and it was up to me to decide whether they should be used or not. In the last analysis I had this considerable amount of material and I decided what I wanted published and what was published.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you supervised it, Mr. Grew, I think.

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. He actually drew up a manuscript, did he not?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is, under your supervision?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And before publication could be had of that manuscript it had to be taken down to the State Department and cleared there, did it not?

Mr. GREW. As I said the other day, Mr. Congressman, in wartime everything which is published by an officer of the Government is supposed to be considered by a publication committee which then existed in the Department of State.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, I understand that, of course. It is a simple question. It was submitted, regardless of reason, to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. That is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. And the reason was that we were at war and [1939] they had a right to see what was being published.

Mr. GREW. That is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, when this original manuscript was prepared by Mr. Howe as the editor in charge of this, working for you and for Simon & Schuster, it was submitted to the State Department and there were suggestions for deletions from this manuscript, were there not?

Mr. GREW. There were.

Mr. KEEFE. And a new manuscript was prepared with the deletions?

Mr. GREW. I do not remember whether a new manuscript was prepared or whether the original manuscript was simply clipped. I dare say that the original manuscript was clipped of the passages which I determined to cut out and that manuscript was sent back to the publishers.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you remember what the deletions were about?

Mr. GREW. Well, as I said the other day, they were about a variety of things. Some of the deletions were taken out at my own initiative because I had prepared more material than could be comprised in the kind of book that my publishers wished to bring out. Therefore, that material had to be materially cut down.

In fact, when the original manuscripts were prepared there were a good many passages in there marked "cut", to be [1940] considered as to whether there was room for them or not and, if so, whether they would fit in with the type of book I was going to publish. A good many of those passages I cut out myself.

It was suggested by the committee, and I remember no demand on their part at all, but suggested that certain passages might well be omitted because they might embarrass or possibly even injure or endanger individuals during wartime, that they might be misinterpreted by foreign governments, passages of all kinds of natures which were cut out for one reason or another, but mostly of that kind.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you remember, Mr. Grew, that after the second revision of this manuscript had been prepared that the story of the death march on Bataan was published in this country?

Mr. GREW. Well, I do not recollect the precise chronology of that. I remember very well that the story on the death march in Bataan was published in this country.

Mr. KEEFE. And didn't the publication of that story precipitate the necessity for further revision of your manuscript and wasn't it revised after that story was published?

Mr. GREW. Not to my recollection whatsoever. I do not think that that had anything whatsoever to do with it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, do you want to state categorically that [1941] it did not have anything to do with it?

Mr. GREW. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Or that you just do not remember?

Mr. GREW. I frankly do not remember.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Mr. GREW. I do not believe it had anything to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you finish your answer?

Mr. KEEFE. I thought he said he had finished. Had you finished?

Mr. GREW. I finished, sir, yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, in order to prepare this book under those circumstances it was necessary at least for Mr. Quincy Howe to have the benefit of reading your entire diary, was it not?

Mr. GREW. He had the benefit of reading the diary; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he is a reputable man, is he not?

Mr. GREW. He is a completely reputable man.

Mr. KEEFE. And you would believe him, would you not?

Mr. GREW. I certainly would, otherwise I certainly would not have intrusted the diary to him.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, do you know how many other people in the office of Simon & Schuster had access to your diary besides Mr. Quincy Howe?

[1942] Mr. GREW. I doubt very much if anybody did.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he was up in New York, wasn't he?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Howe was in New York; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And the diary was with him?

Mr. GREW. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were here in Washington and out on the road making speeches?

Mr. GREW. That is perfectly correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you cannot say how many people could have had access to this diary then, can you?

Mr. GREW. Well, I cannot tell you categorically but I know that Mr. Quincy Howe is a man of such reputability that he would not have for a moment left the diary in a position where other people could have access to it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, would you have any objections to Mr. Howe testifying here as a witness as to the material that was cut out of this manuscript?

Mr. GREW. Well, that comes right down, I think, to the question originally brought up as to whether I am not within my rights in claiming that the diary itself was of a personal and private nature; that I have produced in my book the pertinent material which I think would be helpful to this committee; that I have looked through the diary for the months preceding Pearl Harbor and have found nothing further that I [1943] think would be pertinent to this committee.

The question arises on that basis if I am not justified in regarding the rest of the diary as a personal and private document. I feel very strongly on that point myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair might suggest that regardless of Mr. Grew's attitude or his willingness or unwillingness for Mr. Quincy Howe to testify about this personal diary, it may be a matter, after all, for the committee to determine whether it would call Mr. Howe to testify about that.

Mr. GREW. Undoubtedly it would be, Mr. Chairman, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the gentleman from Wisconsin if he feels that Mr. Quincy Howe would shed any light on the Pearl Harbor investigation and whether we should call him as a witness?

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Chairman, I object to those kinds of interjections. I am acting in good faith.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair hopes that the committee will not get into a discussion over Mr. Quincy Howe at this stage of the proceeding, so go ahead, Congressman, with your inquiry.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not asking foolish questions. I am trying to ascertain some facts and pertinent facts, pertinent to this inquiry.

[1944] The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Who is Mr. Stanley Hornbeck?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Stanley Hornbeck from 1928 to 1937 was Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State and in 1937 he was appointed political adviser in the Department of State. He was later, some time in the past year, made Ambassador to the Netherlands and so far as I know he is now at The Hague.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to ask the counsel at this time, is it expected to call Mr. Hornbeck as a witness here?

Mr. MITCHELL. He is not so far on our list of witnesses and nobody has asked to have him placed on it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am making that request very definitely now, that I would like to have Mr. Hornbeck as a witness. He was in charge of the Far Eastern Branch in the Department of State all through these critical times, as I understand it.

Mr. GREW. Well, he was Chief of the Far Eastern Division, which handles far eastern affairs, only up to 1937 and after that he was political adviser, although he was still closely in touch with far eastern affairs.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. It may be of some help to the Congressman. We have been trying to find out what Mr. Hornbeck's schedule [1945] is. He is in Holland at the present time. We were hoping if he was planning to come to this country during the time the committee would be in session that we could consider his availability then.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it should be said in that connection that the committee have been assured that anyone anywhere in the world who could help in this situation would be available, so that I do not think it is material as to whether he is in Holland or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt that if Mr. Hornbeck's testimony is desired here that he will be available even if he has to be brought back from Holland.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I conceive, Mr. Chairman, if you will pardon me, that Mr. Hornbeck is a very important witness in connection with the very things that we are going over and I think Mr. Grew will agree with that, that he ought to have plenty of information.

Mr. GREW. I agree completely.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as a matter of fact did you discuss Mr. Hornbeck at all in your diary?

Senator LUCAS. Probably some Senators, too.

Mr. KEEFE. That may be an unfair question. I will [1948] withdraw it.

Mr. GREW. All right. As a matter of fact, I have no recollection on that point, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I will try to refresh your recollection at the proper time, which is not now. It will be at the proper time, on many of these things, I assure you.

Now, here is one last question that I want to interrogate you on.

I have in my mind some place out of this mass of material that is hurled at you—it is hard to put your hands on it immediately—that at a time prior to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 there was a memorandum submitted to the State Department with reference to a proposal made at that time by Japan for a meeting of the great powers, quite a long memorandum. I wonder whether you have knowledge of that proposal of the Japanese.

Mr. GREW. Can you tell me, Mr. Congressman, whether that proposal was made by Baron Hiramuna as Prime Minister?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it is a proposal that I am advised does not appear in any of these documents but that is presently in the archives of the State Department. It was a proposal which embodied a proposal by the Japs for a conference of the great powers to be held in an effort to try to avert the outbreak of war in Europe. Do you recall that?

[1947] Mr. GREW. I am inclined to believe that that may have been a proposal which was made by Baron Hiramuna, then Prime Minister of Japan, to Mr. Dooman when I was at home in the United States on leave of absence in 1939 and he was chargé d'affaires. That is my impression. I think he could answer that question better than I could.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might—

The CHAIRMAN. When was it?

Mr. KEEFE. In 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I suggest that I brought that question up yesterday and asked you about it? I had the date of May or some time in 1939 and you were going to look that up. I think it is the same thing that the Congressman is talking about. That is the same point, is it?

Well, what he is asking refreshes my memory that it is the same point. You have in the book here a memorandum but not covering the particular point covered in the memorandum that I had in mind. It was a specific proposal some time in the spring of 1939 or summer, it was around in May.

Mr. GREW. Is there any indication in the record that that proposal was made to me? Because I am inclined to think it was a proposal which was made to Mr.——

Senator FERGUSON. It may not have been made to you but coming through the Embassy you would have notice of it if [1948] Dooman knew about it.

Mr. GREW. I think that took place when I was absent. I am not sure of it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am sure you were in Tokyo in May because the book indicates on page 1 of volume II, it indicates that you were in Tokyo in May 1939.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it was in 1939.

Mr. GREW. Well, I will look into that also, Senator. It is possible it is being looked into now, but if it is a fact that this was a proposal made to Mr. Dooman while chargé d'affaires I might prefer to have him elaborate the point than to try to do it myself, if it is agreeable to the committee.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Counselor, on that point, is it proposed to have Mr. Dooman called as a witness?

Mr. GESELL. He is not on the list of witnesses.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I would like to have him put on the list because he is a very important witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair would like to remind the Senators that when the committee was discussing the addition of other witnesses to those that were listed it was generally understood that any member of the committee could suggest to counsel and to the committee any additional witnesses on any subject and that in some way the committee would consider [1949] what the witness would testify to in order to determine whether his testimony was material.

Now, that might be regarded as a technical point, but it was discussed in the committee in executive session. I think we might keep that in mind.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I have that in mind, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. But may I say this: I would not for one moment ask to have someone called here who I did not feel from the search and examination of the records that I have made up to date could not throw relevant and pertinent light upon this inquiry.

We have already talked about Mr. Dooman and the message is in the record here, one of the messages.

Now, referring to the Senator from Michigan, he is referring to a very important communication that was sent to the State Department, I believe, during the time that you were on furlough, Mr. Grew, and while Mr. Dooman was in charge of the Embassy in Japan.

Mr. GREW. That is probably so.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is not suggesting anything to the contrary of that.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

[1950] Senator BREWSTER. Perhaps this is the appropriate time to point out that there are many questions of procedure, the calling of witnesses, the order of witnesses, which must be determined from time to time.

I fully agree with the chairman that those questions should be the subject of committee consideration and I think it would be well if it were in a somewhat less public forum than this, but as I must remind the chairman, we have not been called together for the consideration of any questions of this character for some time and the result has been that the only way we can make suggestions is when the committee is in public convention assembled.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair did not mean to suggest any objection in making these suggestions in public as to witnesses, but we have a long list of witnesses who were arranged for by counsel through con-

sultation with the committee and the Chair simply had in mind until we have made a little more progress in exhausting the list which has already been prepared and submitted to the committee, that we have ample time to consider what other witnesses would be called later; but, of course, the Chair has no objection whatever to putting Mr. Dooman's name on the list and having him called at some appropriate time when he is here.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the state- [1951] ment. There are two things right now which it seems to me invite consideration. One is the suggestion which has been made to change the order of witnesses insofar as Mr. Hamilton is concerned; and, second, in view of the announcement regarding General Marshall I think that there should be immediate consideration of whether or not, if he is to testify—

The CHAIRMAN. That is a—

Senator BREWSTER. May I finish?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I wanted to say something. General Marshall is under consideration at the present time.

Senator BREWSTER. Fine.

The CHAIRMAN. We have got to consult with him as to when he proposes to leave Washington.

Senator BREWSTER. I suggest this because I think that is obviously an important matter. If General Marshall is to leave shortly, I think we ought to suspend everything on the order of the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. That is being considered and General Marshall is being consulted about it. All right, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions to ask at this time of Mr. Grew, but I would like to suggest this to counsel: I would like to have him produce and obtain, if possible, the message or memoranda prepared by Mr. Hornbeck on December 1, 1941. I understand that it [1925] is addressed to the Army and Navy and has reference to the condition of the Army and Navy at that time. Will you kindly see if that message can be obtained? ¹

Mr. MITCHELL. We have made a note of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make one request?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait until we get this one disposed of. Counsel has made a note of it and that document will be sought. Congressman Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to make a request of the Navy to prepare a statement as to when we established the port and base of Pearl Harbor and whether or not we continued Pearl Harbor as our most important base in the Pacific after December 7, 1941, until the present time for our fleet.²

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gesell will take note of that.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, is Captain Kramer on the witness list?

The CHAIRMAN. At two different times.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn I would like to introduce into the record a series of five documents which were distributed to the committee 2 weeks ago, between the dates of April and December 1941, reporting conversations in South America held by Japanese representatives with representatives of the Governments of

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2085 et seq.; see also Exhibits Nos. 95, 96 and 97.

² See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2665-2666.

Peru, [1953] Brazil, Dominican Republic, Chile, and so forth, concerning the attitude of those Governments in the event Japan were to declare war against the United States and I think this series, which is all related, might be designated—

The CHAIRMAN. The committee and spectators will please be in order. We have not yet recessed.

Mr. GESELL. I think this exhibit might be designated 31 for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Those articles or exhibits will be filed under documentation No. 31.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 31".)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, has there been a change in the calling of witnesses for the near future?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is not aware of any change.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, I think there has been one change indicated by our memorandums to the members of the committee indicating that we had felt under the circumstances it more appropriate to call General Miles, Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Turner, and General Gerow prior to calling certain witnesses scheduled prior to those officers, who were in subordinate positions, our thought being to call [1954] the heads of the various units, War Plans and Intelligence, and then following them with the witnesses that have been scheduled before.

We had also hoped that in view of the very detailed State Department inquiry which we have had over the last few days that we could dispense with calling Mr. Hamilton at this time. Mr. Hamilton was originally scheduled when it was thought that Mr. Hull would not be able to give as much time as he has to the committee and before Mr. Grew and Mr. Welles were added to the list of witnesses and we feel that those responsible officials have been in the best position to cover the matters of interest to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire then what the new order will be so that we might prepare?

Mr. GESELL. As indicated in the memo handed to the committee at the end of last week, General Miles and Admiral Wilkinson will be the next two witnesses, followed by Admiral Turner and General Gerow.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that if there is to be a change in the order, recognizing the consecutive character of the presentation of the State Department and the diplomatic corps, that it should be considered by the committee. I think it is a matter of considerable importance, the appropriate order in which witnesses are to be called.

[1955] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will remind members of the committee that when the list of witnesses was originally submitted by counsel it was stated that it did not represent the order in which they would appear and, also, counsel stated that they would attempt to give the committee and the press and the public 2 or 3 days' notice of witnesses that would appear on any given day. That course has up to now, I think, been followed and the notice that we got at the end of last week with respect to General Miles, Admiral Wilkinson,

and the others, as I understood it, was in compliance with that understanding.

Mr. GESELL. We have had this problem. I am sure the members of the committee recognize this. We have had this problem in scheduling witnesses: We have had to bring responsible officers in from active theaters and we are anxious not to keep them in Washington any longer than necessary, so that they can return to their posts.

Senator BREWSTER. You are not applying that to General Miles, are you?

Mr. GESELL. No, I am not applying that to General Miles, although I do not believe he is stationed here.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions that counsel wish to ask Mr. Grew?

Senator FERGUSON. I have a question that I spoke to him [1956] about the——

The CHAIRMAN. I was speaking to the counsel first.

Mr. GESELL. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions desired by members of the committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BREWSTER. I have one or two I would like to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is now after 4 o'clock. The Chair had hoped that we might finish with Mr. Grew today, but it is entirely up to the committee whether it wants to adjourn now or continue.

Senator FERGUSON. I just have one question that I was not able to find the citation for this morning and I have it now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if we could finish——

Senator BREWSTER. I have two or three questions. I do not know that they will take any extended time.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the wish of the committee about proceeding?

Senator FERGUSON. I move to proceed.

Senator BREWSTER. What is the position of Mr. Grew as to returning in the morning?

Mr. GREW. I am entirely at the disposal of the committee, Senator. I will be glad to come back. [1957]

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I suggest this, that in view of the very extended examination of Mr. Grew that he might like to think the thing over a little himself and I am sure perhaps some of the rest of us would and perhaps get our questions in a form that would reduce rather than increase the time. I personally prefer to adjourn.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I just suggest one thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to call attention to the memorandum that was given to us on November 24 as following the State Department, the next series. That did not indicate, as I understand it, that Mr. Hamilton was not to be called. Could I show that to counsel and ask if that is the memorandum?

Mr. GESELL. That is the memorandum. I think I made clear that our point with respect to Mr. Hamilton was one that we were advancing to the committee at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, at this particular moment?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, then there have been no previous suggestions to the committee on that.

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

[1958] The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose we recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You be back at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, Mr. Grew.

Mr. GREW. I will be here with pleasure at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope the committee can conclude with you tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., Wednesday, November 28, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, November 29, 1945.)

[1959]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[1960] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Before proceeding, the Chair wishes to announce that the committee has been officially advised that General Marshall will be able to testify before the committee prior to his departure for China. As soon as his schedule in this respect is definite he will advise the committee in ample time to arrange for his testimony before he leaves the country.

I might say, in that connection, that General Marshall is just as anxious to testify before the committee as the committee is to have him testify.

When we recessed I believe that Senator Ferguson announced that he wanted to ask some questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I believe that Senator Brewster was ahead of me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, may I—

Senator FERGUSON. I can go ahead if you want me to.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Grew has something to say.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Mr. GREW. Might I clear up two or three points, Mr. Chairman, concerning information which was asked of me?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GREW. One question raised was as to whether I had been informed of the consideration in Washington of a *modus vivendi* with the Japanese at the end of November. I could not recollect whether I was informed of that in the mass of [1961] correspondence and events that occurred at that time, but I now have found a telegram from the Secretary of State to me in which he tells me the whole story. I can submit that to counsel or read it, as you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and read it.

Mr. GREW. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Does it relate to the question which I asked Mr. Grew yesterday?

Mr. GREW. I think you asked the question, Mr. Congressman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is about the *modus vivendi*.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that telegram published?

Mr. GREW. I do not think it has yet been published.

Mr. KEEFE. It is not included in your diary?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it is not included in any of these publications of the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I haven't checked it but I do not think it is.

Mr. KEEFE. And where did you get the telegram?

Mr. GREW. From the files of the Department of State.

Mr. KEEFE. You went to the Department of State after [1962] your testimony?

Mr. GREW. No; I did not go myself but several requests have been made to see if certain things took place during that period, whether I had been informed of this or that. This is one of the points raised and I instituted a search to see if I was informed of the *modus vivendi* plan and I have only this morning, just now, just 5 minutes ago, received this telegram.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

Mr. GREW (reading):

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1941.

Ambassador Tokyo, Japan, 796. Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counsellor only.

This is from Mr. Hull.

Following the Japanese proposals of November 20, the Department gave consideration to a number of alternate proposals and counter-suggestions or combinations thereof which suggested themselves to the Department for possible presentation to the Japanese Government. At one time the Department considered the question of presenting to the Japanese Government simultaneously with the proposal which was actually given them on November 26, an alternate plan for a temporary *modus* [1963] *vivendi*. The draft under consideration at that time called for a temporary *modus vivendi* to be in effect for a period of three months during which time conversations would continue toward the working out of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. At the end of the period of the term of the *modus vivendi* both Governments would confer at the request of either to determine whether the extension of the *modus vivendi* was justified by the prospects of reaching a settlement of the sort sought.

The draft *modus vivendi* which we were considering contained mutual pledges of peaceful interest, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement in northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indo-China, to limit those in northern Indo-China to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indo-China. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifi- [1964] cations, raw cotton up to \$600,000 monthly, a small amount of petroleum within categories now permitted general export on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports

in general provided that raw silk constitutes at least two thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principle of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures.

At a certain point in our consideration of the draft *modus vivendi* the representatives in Washington of the British, Dutch, Australian and Chinese Governments were consulted.

After careful consideration of all factors in the situation within the United States and in the general world situation, including the reaction and replies of the Governments mentioned above, it was decided that we should drop the draft *modus vivendi* which we had had [1965] under consideration. That draft *modus vivendi* was not handed to the Japanese, and the fact that this Government had considered a *modus vivendi* was not mentioned to them.

"The Department has informed you in separate telegrams—

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me just one minute. Will you read that last sentence again?

Mr. GREW (reading):

That draft *modus vivendi* was not handed to the Japanese, and the fact that this Government had considered a *modus vivendi* was not mentioned to them.

The Department has informed you in separate telegrams of the documents handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 28 and of the conversation which took place on that date.

Signed "Hull."

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of that telegram?

Mr. GREW. That telegram is dated November 28, 1941, 7 p. m., Washington. I will turn that over to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that conclude your statement?

Mr. GREW. I have one more point, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

[1966] Mr. GREW. I was also asked whether I had been instructed to burn our codes prior to the outbreak of war.

I have been given a telegram which was sent to me in Tokyo on December 5, 1941 but which appears to have gone via Peiping via naval radio. I do not think I ever received this telegram in Tokyo before the break. I do not think I received it at all.

It is a fairly long message, of many pages. Do you wish me to read it or shall I merely turn it over to general counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair suggests that it be submitted to counsel and that it be put in the record, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, that was my question that I had asked. I wonder whether he could read the part relating to the destruction of codes.

Mr. GREW. I think there are two paragraphs which are very pertinent, which I could read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Put the whole telegram in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have the whole telegram inserted but you may read the paragraphs in question.

Mr. GREW. All right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just read the two paragraphs which relate to this.

Mr. GREW (reading):

[1967] Strictly Confidential.

1. The following instructions are applicable to all offices in Japan, Japanese occupied areas in China, Hong Kong, Indo-China, and Thailand, and are intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case communications

with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, the evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera.

Now, the paragraph which applies to our codes would appear to be as follows [reading]:

7. It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained.

I think that is all in this telegram, so far as I know, that applies to codes but, as I say, I do not think that I ever received this message.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it will be made part of the record.

(The telegram referred to follows:)

[1967-A]

[Telegram sent]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 5, 1941. 10pm

Not for distribution.

American Embassy, Tokyo (Japan) via Peiping by naval radio.

Info: Amembasy Chungking

American Consul Hongkong

Strictly confidential.

1. The following instructions are applicable to all offices in Japan, Japanese occupied areas in China, Hong Kong, Indo China, and Thailand, and are intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case communications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, and the evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera.

2. The Department will endeavor to telegraph travel orders covering the transportation of all officers and American employees. ~~of the Legation.~~ In the event of a sudden emergency and if regular travel orders have not been received, travel expenses (including expenses for travel by air) and per diem and shipment of effects, if possible, all in accordance with [1967-B] the Travel Regulations, are hereby authorized in the discretion of the Chief of Mission or principal consular officer for all officers and American employees of the Department of State and for their wives and minor children. In the absence of regular travel orders (involving charges against the appropriation for "Transportation, Foreign Service") expenses incurred under the authority of this paragraph should be charged to Authorization No. 11-1942; while separate drafts should be drawn and separate accounts rendered.

3. The services of all alien personnel (except as noted in paragraph 4 below) should be terminated effective at the expiration of thirty days' leave less any leave previously taken in the calendar year, leave to commence on the day after the effective date of the closing of the ~~Legation.~~ The office, or, if their services are needed thereafter to commence within two weeks after closing. The effective dates of leave and termination of services of each alien employee should be reported. Officers are reminded that no salary payments may be made in advance. Department will endeavor to arrange for payment after officers' departure.

4. At those posts where the office and/or residence are owned by this Government, it is suggested that officers endeavor to arrange for the retention of one or more trustworthy alien employees as custodians of the premises. Their salaries as custodians would be at the same rate they were receiving in [1867-C] other capacities at the time the office was closed. The Department will try to arrange to pay their salaries and to provide funds for the maintenance of the buildings by such means as may become possible. If custodians are retained they should be instructed to confine their activities strictly to guardianship of the property of this Government and they should refrain

from any activities, however informal, which could possibly be interpreted as going beyond their custodial functions.

5. At posts where offices are leased, the Department leaves to the discretion of the Chief of Mission or principal consular officer whether to retain the premises, leaving the property of this Government therein, or to store the property in commercial warehouses and terminate the lease. Depending on the time at their disposal and the availability of warehouses, officers should endeavor to make the most economical arrangements that are not incompatible with the security of the property concerned. If the premises must be retained, efforts should at least be made to reduce the amount of rental. Officers will know best whether, when premises are retained, property left therein may be entrusted to landlords, or whether custodians should be retained as outlined in the foregoing paragraph.

6. The property mentioned in the above paragraphs includes furniture, equipment, and nonconfidential archives. Such archives should be sealed, however,

[1967-D] 7. ~~All~~ It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals, ~~confidential~~ codes, ciphers, true readings, protograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained.

8. All passports of any character, valid or invalid, extra visa pages, certificates of naturalization and certificates of registration and identity, blank or filled in, should be thoroughly mutilated and then burnt. With the exception of passports the first page of which should be retained for delivery to Department, a complete list should be made of all documents destroyed with identifying data when possible. In no circumstances should you attempt to bring with you any of the above documents or supplies except the first pages of passports.

9. The Department would have no objection to the storage of the personal effects of officers and American employees in Government-owned buildings or in leased buildings that are retained. ~~of the personal effects of officers and employees.~~ If such facilities not available, Department will pay local storage charges.

10. *If possible*, forms 285 and 298 should be submitted after closing the office. The Department should be informed by telegraph of the effective date of closing.

[1967-E] 11. All offices concerned ~~are~~ required to inform the Department immediately (rather than at the time of closing) by telegraph of any foreign interests represented by them which have not been the subject of any specific instruction from or report to the Department since January 1, 1941. The disposition of foreign interests in the event of closing of offices will be dealt with later in a separate telegraphic instruction.

12. Each office at the time of closing and in connection with authorizations to draw drafts and make payments to individuals against deposits made with Department shall immediately inform it of all cases of noncompliance by citing instruction numbers and dates, amounts and beneficiaries.

13. The sending of this instruction is in the nature of a precautionary measure and the authority granted in the foregoing paragraphs is intended to enable the officers concerned to deal with a sudden emergency. The concerned officers should quietly formulate plans to deal with an emergency if and when it arises. It is highly desirable that discussion be kept to a minimum and that publicity be avoided.

Tokyo instruct officers in Japanese territory.

Peiping instruct officers in Japanese-occupied areas in China including Manchuria.

Sent to Tokyo via Peiping. Repeated to Chungking and Hong Kong. Hong Kong repeat to Bangkok and Saigon. Saigon instruct Hanoi.

HULL.

[1968] The CHAIRMAN. All right. Is that all?

Mr. GREW. That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator, go ahead.

Senator BREWSTER. You were also, Mr. Grew, going to look to see whether you had been at any time consulted or informed in advance

regarding the retention of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, any time before the May 7 date.

Mr. GREW. Yes, Senator. That is now being looked for but it has not yet been found, and the belief is expressed that I never was informed of that movement.

Senator BREWSTER. So unless we do receive——

Mr. GREW. So unless you hear to the contrary you may assume that I was not informed.¹

Senator BREWSTER. Now, I venture to ask this question because of its possible bearing on the situation and you are speaking perhaps with more authority than anybody else regarding this Japanese psychology and I venture it because it was a hypothesis advanced by Arthur Krock in the New York Times which, of course, vouches for its respectability.

He advanced the theory that the Japanese may have desired to have the fleet retained at Hawaii for their own purpose and thought that the American mentality of officialdom would be more likely to retain it there if the Japanese made some strong representations about its removal.

[1969] I do not know whether you noted that suggestion but I would be interested in your comment as as whether or not that was a possible hypothesis.

Mr. GREW. I think that is a perfectly possible hypothesis, Senator. I do not believe anybody could answer the question with any assurance. I was aware of the sometimes devious workings of the processes of Japanese mentality. They were perfectly capable of doing that sort of thing, but you will recollect that I said, so far as I could remember, no official representations had ever been made to me that the fleet should be withdrawn.

The only notation that I have come across was my talk with Arita, Foreign Minister, on a certain date, but it was labeled "informal and off the record." In other words, we occasionally got together, generally at the house of some mutual friends to avoid any publicity which was always splashed in the press and those conversations were distinctly off the record and informal.

Senator BREWSTER. It was at that time that he did indicate that they were somewhat irked by the presence of the fleet there?

Mr. GREW. Yes. That record I think has been read already.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, I recall it. So you would think [1970] that was a possible hypothesis as to their state of mind?

Mr. GREW. I think that was a possible hypothesis. I do not think I would want to go further than that.

[1971] Senator BREWSTER. Now the modus vivendi which you have testified about this morning, you had indicated previously that you thought it was rather doubtful if they would have agreed to any modus vivendi along the lines that were being discussed at the time, in November.

You recall, in that connection, the inquiry of Kurusu on that morning whether or not they would consider—his exact language is on page 766—

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.

You still feel, in spite of that, that he was not serious in that suggestion?

Mr. GREW. I am inclined to feel, Senator, that the conclusion of a *modus vivendi* at that time would probably not have prevented the attack; but there again that is a supposition.

Senator BREWSTER. It was at approximately that time that the Germans were turned back from Stalingrad, in what was the beginning of their retreat and ultimate rout, was it not, early in December?

Mr. GREW. I think it was approximately at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. You have indicated in your early report—I am not sure whether you have this incorporated, but [1972] on page 702 of your report you comment on the effect on the Japanese of the varying fortunes of war in Europe. The exact quotation is:

For example, in Japan the pro-Axis element gained power following last year's German victory in Western Europe; then Japanese doubt of ultimate German victory was created by Germany's failure to invade the British Isles, this factor helping to reinforce the moderate element; and finally Germany's attack on the Soviet Union upset the expectation of continued Russo-German peace and made the Japanese realize that those who took Japan into the Tripartite Alliance have misled Japan.

Indicating, as I gather, that Japan was keenly conscious of what was going on in other parts of the world and the effect it might have on them.

By the end of the 3 months' period which is contemplated in the *modus vivendi*, although I think President Roosevelt indicated he preferred 6 months, but by the end of the 3 months' period the Germans were in full retreat on the Russian front, and I would like to ask you whether or not, if that had occurred—and here again it is hypothetical—whether that would have had a material influence on the Japanese position?

[1973] Mr. GREW. I doubt very much if that had any direct bearing on Japanese procedures at that time. The Japanese were pulling away more and more from the Germans. While the Germans were constantly egging them on and doing everything they could to prevent the Washington conversations from succeeding and to prevent a settlement between Japan and the United States, the Japanese did not like the Germans, a great many of them resented being tied up with them in the Axis Pact.

The Germans, as they had in other capitals, swarmed into Tokyo and more or less tried to control things, and the Japanese did not like it, so they were pretty unpopular there.

I do not believe the events which you speak of had any direct bearing on the event which occurred.

Senator BREWSTER. I, of course, recognize after the die was cast that was the end, but I am now speaking of the possible *modus vivendi* in connection with the events, that on December 1, 1941, the Germans had reached the peak of their power, they were at the gates of Stalingrad, had been for some time, and 2 weeks later they were turned back in a rather decisive retreat that turned into a rout. The coincidence of the two affairs had always impressed me, that Japan struck at the height of German power and it seemed almost as though the Germans had come on to Stalingrad for the purpose of getting the Japanese in.

[1974] So my question is not as to what happened but as to what might have happened if the *modus vivendi* had been in effect and at the end of 3 months the Japanese surveying the situation, had found their German friends in a very different position. I think you have hitherto emphasized that the Japanese had never believed they could conquer the world alone but that they were dependent on the success of the Axis armies in Europe for any final plan.

Mr. GREW. My belief, Senator, was that at that time the Japanese were pretty independent. They were certainly very cocky. They had complete self-assurance, and I rather doubt whether any fluctuations in the war in Europe would materially have altered their procedure.

But that is something that of course cannot be proved. It is only supposition.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now what did you feel, Mr. Grew, as to the consequences of any further southern expansion, moving into the Kra Peninsula, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, as to it requiring that we should, at all odds, take action or whether we could have tolerated any further movement safely for the sake of gaining time?

Mr. GREW. The Japanese program, Senator, was constantly expanding. In the beginning they talked about the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere, and later that developed into [1975] the coprosperity sphere for Greater East Asia including the South Seas, and that included Australia.

In other words, their visions of grandeur were constantly increasing.

Senator BREWSTER. You called it delusions.

Mr. GREW. It was constantly increasing.

Senator BREWSTER. You felt that at some point the line must be drawn, you could not let them go on indefinitely?

Mr. GREW. Very decidedly so.

Senator BREWSTER. That meant some parallel of latitude or some other definite spot beyond which you could not permit them to pass?

Mr. GREW. I never thought of it in terms of precise geography, Senator. It was the general movement which was threatening what I considered our vital national interest. It was not a question of arriving at any particular point or crossing any particular line, it was simply the general movement.

Senator BREWSTER. Now one other question, for the purpose of the historical record.

You spoke yesterday about the encouragement which was given to the warlike spirit of Japan by the publication of statements of an isolationist or pacifist character in this country, and that those were frequently featured in the [1976] Japanese press during the year 1940 for the purpose of stimulating the Japanese attitude that they could safely attack us.

Mr. GREW. It was for the purpose of creating in the Japanese mind a totally erroneous conception of the spirit of the American people.

Senator BREWSTER. In order to do complete justice I want to read the most distinguished publication on that score and I want to ask you whether or not it was published in Japan. This was on September 16, 1940,¹ a statement which I took from volume IX of Public

¹ Subsequently corrected to October 30, 1940.

Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Roosevelt, on page 434, and I quote:

And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.

I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again.

Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars. They are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away from our shores.

That is the end of the quotation. Do you recall whether or not that was published at that time in Japan.

Mr. GREW. No, sir. I would not recall whether that precise statement was published in Japan at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

[1977] Senator BREWSTER. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. In view of the fact that the Senator from Maine has brought out the quotation, I want to state in the record that there were a number of other speeches made by the same distinguished gentleman from which any fair-minded person would take a proper construction.

I would like also to say that on yesterday there was reference made by a member of this committee to certain things connected with politics, and now we have a reference to another political speech. I hope we will keep politics out of this investigation.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I certainly share the hope of the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. In order that politics may be kept out, the Chair suggests that the whole speech from which the quotation was read be made a part of the record.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, at the proper time the Senator from Illinois—

Senator BREWSTER. That is entirely agreeable.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you have concluded?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, that is all.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the Senator from Maine brings up this one quotation, the Senator from Illinois, at the proper time, will proceed to insert other [1978] speeches made by this distinguished President upon that same question, and those quotations will not be the same as the Senator from Maine quoted. I think the Senator from Maine, if he wanted to do real justice to the cause, would use more than that one quotation.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I might well have taken a single sentence, but I did not, I took the entire quotation. I think those concerned will point out the language which the President there used regarding the defense. In other speeches he used the words "unless we are attacked."

In this speech he used the words "that is for our defense," which may be considered as moderating its implication. However, I think the question is quite fair, and I certainly have no objection to any other statements of any kind being inserted, which I hope certainly are not in conflict or contradiction. I would expect a continuity of policy.

The CHAIRMAN. The speech from which the quotation was read may be made a part of the record.

(The speech referred to follows:)

[1979]

Campaign Address at Boston, Mass.

"WE ARE GOING FULL SPEED AHEAD!"

October 30, 1940

(Rebuilding the Navy and naval bases—Expending and training the Army—Defense contracts—Defense housing—Our Air Power is growing—Planes for Britain—Production capacity—Progress of agricultural recovery—Republican opposition to aid to the farmers.)

Mr. Mayor, my friends of New England:

I've had a glorious day here in New England. And I do not need to tell you that I have been glad to come back to my old stamping ground in Boston. There's one thing about this trip that I regret. I have to return to Washington tonight, without getting a chance to go into my two favorite States of Maine and Vermont.

In New York City two nights ago, I showed by the cold print of the Congressional Record how Republican leaders, with their votes and in their speeches, have been playing, and still are playing politics with national defense.

Even during the past three years, when the dangers to all forms of democracy throughout the world have been obvious, the Republican team in the Congress has been acting only as a Party team.

[1980] Time after time, Republican leadership refused to see that what this country needs is an all-American team.

Those side-line critics are now saying that we are not doing enough for our national defense. I say to you that we are going full speed ahead!

Our Navy is our outer line of defense.

Almost the very minute that this Administration came into office seven and a half years ago, we began to build the Navy up—to build a bigger Navy.

In those seven years we have raised the total of 193 ships in commission to 337 ships in commission today.

And, in addition to that, we have 119 more ships that are actually under construction today.

In those seven years we raised the personnel of our Navy from 106,000 to 210,000 today.

You good people here in Boston know of the enormous increase of productive work in your Boston Navy Yard. And that is only one of many Navy yards—one of the best. There are now six times as many men employed in our Navy yards as there were in 1933. The private ship-building yards are also humming with activity—building ships for our Navy and for our expanding merchant marine.

The construction of this Navy has been a monumental job. In spite of what some campaign orators may tell you, you cannot buy a battleship from a mail-order catalogue.

[1981] We have not only added ships and men to the Navy, we have enormously increased the effectiveness of Naval bases in those outlying territories of ours in the Atlantic and Pacific.

For our objective is to keep any potential attacker as far from our continental shores as we possibly can.

You here in New England know that well, and can well visualize it.

And within the past two months your Government has acquired new naval and air bases in British territory in the Atlantic Ocean; extending all the way from Newfoundland in the north to that part of South America where the Atlantic Ocean begins to get narrow, with Africa not far away.

I repeat: Our objective is to keep any potential attacker as far from our continental shores as we possibly can.

That is the record of the growth of our Navy. In 1933 a weak Navy; in 1940 a strong Navy. Side-line critics may carp in a political campaign. But Americans are mighty proud of that record and Americans will put their country first and partisanship second.

Speaking of partisanship, I remind you—when the Naval Expansion Bill came up in 1938 the vast majority of Republican members of the Congress voted against building any more battleships.

What kind of political shenanigans are these?

Can we trust those people with national defense?

[1982] Next, take up the Army: Under normal conditions we have no need for a vast Army in this country. But you and I know that unprecedented dangers require unprecedented action to guard the peace of America against unprecedented threats.

Since that day, a little over a year ago, when Poland was invaded, we have more than doubled the size of our regular Army. Adding to this, the Federalized National Guardsmen, our armed land forces now equal more than 436,000 enlisted men. And yet there are armies overseas that run four and five and six million men.

The officers and men of our Army and National Guard are the finest in the world.

They will be, as you know, the nucleus for the training of the young men who are being called under the Selective Service Act. 800,000 of them in the course of this year out of nearly 17,000,000 registered—in other words, a little less than 5 per cent of the total registration.

General Marshall said to me the other day that the task of training those young men is, for the Army, a "profound privilege."

Campaign orators seek to tear down the morale of the American people when they make false statements about the Army's equipment. I say to you that we are supplying our Army with the best fighting equipment in all the world.

Yes, the Army and the Defense Commission are getting things [1983] done with speed and efficiency. More than eight billion dollars of contracts for defense have been let in the past few months.

I am afraid that those campaign orators will pretty soon be under the painful necessity of coming down to Washington later on and eating their words.

I cannot help but feel that the most inexcusable, most unpatriotic misstatement of fact about our Army—a misstatement calculated to worry the mothers of the Nation—is the brazen charge that the men called to training will not be properly housed.

The plain fact is that construction on Army housing is far ahead of schedule to meet all needs, and that by January fifth, next, there will be complete and adequate housing in this Nation for nine hundred and thirty thousand soldiers.

And so I feel that, very simply and very honestly, I can give assurance to the mothers and fathers of America that each and every one of their boys in training will be well housed and well fed.

Throughout that year of training, there will be constant promotion of their health and their well-being.

And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.

I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again:

Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.

[1984] They are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away from our shores.

The purpose of our defense is defense.

The Republican campaign orators who moan and groan (laughter) about our Army and Navy are even more mournful about our strength in the air. But only last year, 1939, the Republicans in the Congress were voting in favor of reducing appropriations for the Army Air Corps.

What kind of political shenanigans are these?

Can such people be trusted with national defense?

I stress particularly what every Army and Navy flier tells us—that what counts most in sustained air power is the productive capacity of our airplane and engine factories. That ought to be almost a first-grade lesson.

We are determined to attain a production capacity of 50,000 planes a year in the United States. And day by day we are working and making very rapid progress toward that goal.

You citizens of Seattle who are listening tonight—you have watched the Boeing plant out there grow. It is now producing four times as many planes each month as it was producing a year ago.

You citizens of Southern California can see the great Douglas factories. They have doubled their output in less than a year. You citizens of Buffalo and St. Louis can see the Curtiss plants [1985] in your cities. Their output has jumped to twelve times its level of a year ago.

And, of course, we are training our young men, and training them successfully in sufficient numbers, to fly these planes as soon as they come off the lines.

But planes won't fly without engines. You citizens of Hartford, who hear my words: look across the Connecticut River at the whirring wheels and the beehive of activity which is the Pratt and Whitney plant which I saw today. A year ago that plant was producing airplane engines totaling one hundred thousand horsepower a month. Today that production has been stepped up tenfold, stepped up to one million horsepower a month.

And you citizens of Paterson, New Jersey, you can see the Curtiss-Wright plant which a year ago produced two hundred seventy thousand horsepower a month and this October is producing 859,000 horsepower.

In ten months this Nation has increased our engine output for planes 240 per cent; and I am proud of it.

Remember, too, that we are scattering them all over the country. We are building brand new plants for airplanes and airplane engines in places besides the Pacific Coast and this coast. We are also building them in centers in the Middle West.

Last spring and last winter this great production capacity program was stepped up by orders from overseas. In taking these [1986] orders for planes from overseas, we are following and were following hard-headed self-interest.

Building on the foundation provided by these orders, the British on the other side of the ocean are receiving a steady stream of airplanes. After three months of blitzkrieg in the air over there, the strength of the Royal Air Force is actually greater now than when the attack began. And they know and we know that that increase in strength despite battle losses is due in part to the purchases made from American airplane industries.

Tonight I am privileged to make an announcement, using Boston instead of the White House: The British within the past few days have asked for permission to negotiate again with American manufacturers for 12,000 additional planes. I have asked that the request be given most sympathetic consideration by the Priorities Board. I have asked the Priorities Board to give it that consideration—the Board made up of William S. Knudsen, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and Leon Henderson. When those additional orders are approved, as I hope they will be, they will bring Britain's present orders for military planes from the United States to more than 26,000. They will require still more new plant facilities so that the present program of building planes for military purposes both for the United States and Great Britain will not be interrupted.

Also large additional orders are being negotiated for artillery, for machine guns, for rifles, for tanks with equip- [1987] ment and ammunition. The plant capacity necessary to produce all this military equipment is and will be available to serve the needs of the United States in any emergency.

The productive capacity of the United States which has made it the greatest industrial country in the world, is not failing now. It will make us the strongest air power in the world. And that is not just at campaign promise!

I have been glad in the past two or three days to welcome back to the shores of America that Boston boy, beloved by all of Boston and a lot of other places, my Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Joe Kennedy.

Actually on the scene where planes were fighting and bombs were dropping day and night for many months, he has been telling me just what you and I have visualized from afar—that all the smaller independent nations of Europe—Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Ireland and the others—have lived in terror of the destruction of their independence by Nazi military might.

And so, my friends, we are building up our armed defenses to their highest peak of efficiency for a very good reason, the reason of the possibility of real national danger to us; but these defenses will be inadequate unless we support them with a strong national morale, a sound economy, a sense of solidarity and economic and social justice.

When this Administration first came to office, the foundation of that national morale was crumbling. In the panic and misery [1988] of those days no democracy could have built up an adequate armed defense.

What we have done since 1933 has been written in terms of improvement in the daily life and work of the common man.

I have discussed the falsifications which Republican campaign orators have been making about the economic condition of the Nation—the condition of labor and the condition of business.

They are even more ridiculous when they shed those old crocodile tears over the plight of the American farmer.

Now, if there is anyone that a Republican candidate loves more than the laboring man in October and up to Election Day, it is the farmer.

And the first one that he forgets after Election Day is the farmer.

Do I have to remind you of the plight of the farmer—not just the Western farmer, but the New England farmer—during the period between 1920 and 1933—declining income, accumulating surpluses, rising farm debts—ten-cent corn, twenty-cent wheat, five-cent cotton and three-cent hogs?

But before 1933 the Administration did nothing to stop that slide. But, of course, before every Election Day they always uncork the old bottle of soothing syrup and spread it thick. (*Laughter.*)

The farmers of America know from the record what the state [1989] of American agriculture is today.

Farm income this year is just about double what it was in 1932.

Farm buying power this year is greater than it was even in 1929.

Tens of thousands of farmers have had their farms saved from foreclosure.

More than 800,000 low income farmers have been able to obtain credit from the Government which they could get nowhere else. And, incidentally, credit which they are repaying.

Over a million farms have been electrified since 1933.

Over 6,000,000 farmers have received benefit payments of more than three and a half million dollars.

What does it all add up to? It means an agriculture that is strong and vigorous.

And we all know how much this is due to the patient efforts and practical vision of Henry Wallace.

The people of New England, whether they live in the city or out in the country, know that if the farmers' income in this Nation had remained what it was in 1932, they would be buying fewer shoes, fewer watches and ice boxes, less woolen goods and cotton goods, than they are buying now. Prosperous farmers mean more employment, more prosperity for the workers and businessmen of New England and of every industrial area in the whole country.

[1990] Parity—the proper relationship between agriculture and the rest of our economy—will continue to be our guiding principle.

We now have great stocks of wheat, corn and cotton—in a sense really strategic materials in a world that is threatened by war.

Surpluses not needed for reserves are now being used to feed the hungry and the ill-nourished and that is a fact that is difficult for the old Republican orators to deny.

Our school luncheon program will this year reach three million children with milk and other foods. And milk does those children more good than political soothing syrup.

While this was being done, what were the Republican leaders doing? Here is the record:

In 1933, Republicans in the Congress, in both houses, voted against the first Agricultural Adjustment Act, 88 to 52.

In 1936 they voted against the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 75 to 25.

In 1938, they voted against the second Agricultural Adjustment Act, 84 to 15.

And even in 1940, this year, they voted against parity payments to farmers by 143 to 32.

In the spring of this year, they voted overwhelmingly against the Stamp Plan to distribute food to needy people through private grocery stores.

[1991] The American farmers will not be deceived by pictures of Old Guard candidates, patting cows and pitching hay in front of moving picture cameras.

And even since the Convention in Philadelphia, all the sweet words of the Republican leaders in that Convention have not been worth the paper they were written on.

For listen to this: Last summer, only a few weeks after the Republican National Platform had been adopted endorsing commodity loans for the farmers, the Republican members of the House marched right back into the Halls of Congress and voted against commodity loans for the farmers, 106 to 37.

Among the Republican leaders who voted against that bill and against practically every other farm bill was the present Chairman of the Republican National Committee, that "peerless leader," that "farmers' friend"—Congressman Joe Martin of Massachusetts.

I would not single him out except that he is of national interest now, because at the time of his appointment as Republican National Chairman this handsome verbal bouquet, this expensive orchid, was pinned upon him: "In public life for many years Joe Martin has represented all that is finest in American public life."

Considering the source of that orchid, Martin must be slated for some Cabinet post. So let's look for a minute at the voting record of this representative of what they call, "all that [1992] is finest in American public life."

Martin voted against the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, the National Securities Exchange Act, and the extension of the Civilian Conservation Corps Act. He voted against practically all relief and work relief measures, and against the appropriation for rural electrification.

Martin voted against the Civil Service Extension Act and against the United States Housing Act.

What I particularly want to say on the radio to the farmers of the Nation, and to you here in this hall, is that Republican National Chairman Martin voted against every single one of the farm measures that were recommended by this Administration. Perhaps Brother Martin will be rewarded for this loyal service to the principles of his party by being appointed Secretary of Agriculture.

He is one of that great historic trio which has voted consistently against every measure for the relief of agriculture—Martin, Barton and Fish.

I have to let you in on a secret. It will come as a great surprise to you. And it's this:

I'm enjoying this campaign. I'm really having a fine time.

I think you know that the office of President has not been an easy one during the past years.

The tragedies of this distracted world have weighed heavily on all of us.

[1993] But—there is revival for every one of us in the sight of our own national community.

In our own American community we have sought to submerge all the old hatreds, all the old fears, of the old world.

We are Anglo-Saxon and Latin, we are Irish and Teuton and Jewish and Scandinavian and Slav—we are American. We belong to many races and colors and creeds—we are American.

And it seems to me that we are most completely, most loudly, most proudly American around Election Day.

Because it is then that we can assert ourselves—voters and candidates alike. We can assert the most glorious, the most encouraging fact in all the world today—the fact that democracy is alive—and going strong.

We are telling the world that we are free—and we intend to remain free and at peace.

We are free to live and love and laugh.

We face the future with confidence and courage. We are American.

[1993-A] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, the telegram which you brought in this morning, dated December 5, in the typewriting it is December 3, and across the "3" is marked in pen "5". You say you do not have any recollection of ever receiving this telegram?

Mr. GREW. That is the one regarding the destruction of the codes? Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I have no recollection of having received it.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get this copy?

Mr. GREW. This telegram?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. This was one of the telegrams—you remember the question was asked me at the hearing—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am asking you, did you get it from the Secretary of State's office?

Mr. GREW. I asked that an exploration be made of the archives to see whether such telegram existed, and it was found and brought to me this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell me, Mr. Grew, notwithstanding whether you received the telegram or not, whether any codes were

destroyed? I am not asking you [1994] the kind of codes, but were there any of the American codes or code machines destroyed prior to the 7th?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. As I think I have already said, some of our codes were destroyed shortly before the break. I do not know, frankly, how long before they were destroyed or how many were destroyed. I remember simply taking steps to see that at least one code was left for last minute communication with Washington in case of necessity.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice that affidavits were to be filed, according to this message.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were such affidavits prepared and filed?

Mr. GREW. They presumably were, but I could not answer that question because this was really a matter of more or less routine which I probably had nothing to do with. It might have been the counsel of the Embassy; it might have been the first secretary who would have taken charge of this particular matter.

Senator FERGUSON. The Secretary of State's office would have those affidavits?

Mr. GREW. The affidavits?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GREW. If they were kept, they were undoubtedly [1995] brought back by us to Washington when we came back on the Grips-holm in August 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you bring the papers back?

Mr. GREW. I brought a good many papers back, but I do not recollect, Senator, whether those particular papers were among them. It would have to be looked up.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then you want to convey to the committee that the destruction of the codes was a routine matter?

Mr. GREW. Well, the actual act of the destruction—

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that the actual destruction would be routine after your instructions, but you do not wish to convey to the committee that the giving of the orders to destroy the codes is a routine matter?

Mr. GREW. Oh, no, that is perfectly true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you did not receive this message—and your memory is you did not—from what did you get the information to destroy the codes prior to the 7th? When I use the "7th" I am using the day of the attack, the time of the attack is what I have in mind.

Mr. GREW. I do not recollect having acted on any document or any report, but we knew the way things were shaping up at that time. This destruction of the code may have taken place very shortly before the final break. I shall [1996] have to check up on that to answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you check up on that, as to just when they were destroyed?

Mr. GREW. I will, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would your diary give that?

Mr. GREW. No, I do not think it is mentioned there.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you conferred recently with the military or naval attachés that were with you?

Mr. GREW. As far as I know they are both absent from Washington. Senator FERGUSON. Would you give them orders for the destruction of other codes or code machines?

Mr. GREW. That would have been undertaken by themselves on the basis of their own instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Would those instructions come through your Embassy?

Mr. GREW. In a matter of that kind I assume that they would have come direct to the attachés.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that your opinion, from what you had in Japan, was such that you considered it advisable to destroy some codes and code machines and only retain one code? Is that correct?

Mr. GREW. That is correct, Senator, but I am not clear about the timing. I do not like to answer that question [1997] categorically until I look into it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you will look into it and return?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; I will.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the quotation that I used the other day, that I could not find at that time is on page 701 of Foreign Relations. My phrasing was not quite accurate, and it could have been misleading, so I want to quote what I had in mind.

It is the message of November 3, or two messages of November 3, one is a long one and one is a short one. It is the first one. I had phrased it something like this:

"What is the significance of the message that the Cabinet had made up its mind and told the Emperor?"

Then I asked you whether or not that had caused you to send the November 3 message. I had in mind the long message.

Now, at the top of the page there is a quotation in the message, "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan. Tokyo, November 3, 1941." It is signed by you.

The Foreign Minister had told him—

that is your friend, the reliable informant, as you called him—

that during the past few days he had been constantly in conference day and night with the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Navy, and that as a result, the Government had reached a [1798] definite decision as to how far it was prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an adjustment of relations with the United States. This decision, which was being held in strictest secrecy, had been communicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor on the afternoon of November 2.

The Foreign Minister had conveyed to my informant the impression that he expected to ask me to call for an extended conversation within a few days.

Now, what significance has that had; that they in effect, as I read it, had told the Emperor what they were going to do?

[1999] Mr. GREW. Well, that is really an assumption, Senator. There again is one of those things that cannot be proved.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to know what you mean by this sentence, what you are conveying to the State Department. All I am after in these questions is merely to ascertain what knowledge the State Department had, what knowledge you had, and sometime we will get to the question as to what knowledge they had in Hawaii, to ascertain how this attack could have been as successful as it was at Pearl Harbor.

¹ See Exhibit No. 91.

Mr. GREW. You spoke a moment ago about my telegram of November 3 and asked me whether this conversation with the Japanese informant had brought about the sending of that telegram. I do not think so because that telegram had been elaborated over a period of time. It represented our thoughts in the Embassy in Tokyo at the time it was sent.

With regard to this particular conversation he says that the Foreign Minister expected to call me for an extended conversation within a few days. That Foreign Minister was Mr. Togo. I don't recollect whether he did call for me or not. I shall have to go through the files to see.

Senator FERGUSON. It goes further and says the Government had reached a definite decision as to how far it was prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an adjustment of relations with the United States. That indicated that the Government, the war lords, were dictating to the Emperor just what they were going to do.

Mr. GREW. That is a fair assumption, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean that is a fair statement from what you said?

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that these war lords had at that time, as far as your informant was concerned, had taken the matter out of the Emperor's hands and they were going to dictate or decide what they were going to do; is that what you were conveying to the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I think that is a plausible assumption.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how are we going to get what you were trying to convey to the State Department? I don't want to construe it. I want you to construe it.

Mr. GREW. Senator, I think the construction of that telegram of mine of November 3 to the Secretary of State is self-explanatory. It is a very long telegram. It goes over the whole ground and it indicates our feeling at that time based on what information came to us through various channels, but I can't put my finger on any one piece of information that led to that telegram.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why you separated these two telegrams and sent two telegrams instead of putting it all [2001] in one, when you sent it the same day?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. There is a distinction there. This telegram before us, on page 700 of Foreign Relations, is reporting a specific instance. My telegram of November 3—the long telegram of November 3—is not reporting a specific instance. It was an analysis and survey of the whole situation. That is why the telegrams were separated.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did the Foreign Minister call on you as indicated in this first telegram that "he expected me to call for an extended conversation within a few days"?

Mr. GREW. That I shall have to look up the records on to see. The Foreign Minister did occasionally call for me. I cannot now recollect the dates.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that shortly after this that we had intercepted messages indicating that the 25th of November was the deadline date, as they called it?

Mr. GREW. No, sir; I did not know that fact. As I have already said, Senator, I knew nothing about any of those intercepted messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any information that what the Prime Minister and the Government had done was to tell the Emperor what the deadline had been?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no such information?

[2002] Mr. GREW. I had no information whatsoever to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew, did you get any information that we had changed the course of our ships, that Admiral Stark had issued an order about—Counsel, can you give me the date of that order?

Mr. MURPHY. November 25.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it November 25?

Mr. MITCHELL. It was in October, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it October?

Mr. MITCHELL. The order shifting the fleet? October 16, I think. My recollection is it is October 16, but we will check.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the same date as the fall of the Cabinet and I don't associate the two together.

I will get the date for you later, Mr. Grew.

Mr. GREW. In any case I shall have to look that up, Senator, and see.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall it now?

Mr. GREW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that we had withdrawn certain shipping from the Japanese area?

Mr. GREW. My recollection is that I didn't know that but there again—

Senator FERGUSON. You want to look that up?

Mr. GREW. Yes.¹

[2003] Senator FERGUSON. I will get you that date, Mr. Grew, in relation to Admiral Stark's notice of changing the route of shipping.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

Senator FERGUSON. I thought it was November 25.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman?

Senator FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in the record within the past several days the Senator from Michigan in questioning the witness on the stand made reference at various times to the note of August 17 handed by the President of the United States to the Japanese representative as being an ultimatum.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I just interrupt to say—

Mr. MURPHY. Not that the gentleman called it an ultimatum but whether or not the witness did not think it was an ultimatum.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have given no opinion whatever on that note.

I wish to convey on the record that I have not purported to convey any opinion whatever upon that note. I used the language of

¹ See Mr. Gesell's statement, Hearings, Part 5, p. 2067.

Captain Schuirmann in a war committee meeting, on the instructions of Admiral Stark, as the note reads. But [2004] I have no intention whatever of saying that this is an ultimatum or conveying to anyone that I even think that this is an ultimatum. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Chairman, by these questions is what knowledge they had here in Washington and what knowledge they had in Japan and what knowledge they had at Pearl Harbor.

This statement came from the—

Joint Board, Washington, Secret Minutes of a Meeting, November 3, 1941, at the call of the Senior Members, weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941 was held today, 2003 Munitions Building, meeting called to order at 3:40—

and this is a statement of action of the United States in the Far East in support of China; at the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action, and it is in that statement that that word was used.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to hear the Senator from Michigan say that because the question was asked on several occasions as to whether or not this was an ultimatum and reference made to Captain Schuirmann's statement that it was an ultimatum.

And so that no one will make any mistake, since the Senator has said he didn't think it was an ultimatum, I ask that there be inserted in the record a paper also handed to the Japanese [2005] representative by the President of the United States on the same day, in which the following sentence may be found:

The program envisaged in such informal discussions involved the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities.

I am not going to go on and read it all, but I ask that it be inserted in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is already in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair's recollection might be at fault but he thinks that was included as part of the record. If it is not included, it may be included now.

Mr. MURPHY. If it is not I would like to have it made a part of the record so I can ask Captain Schuirmann how the note of the 17th would be an ultimatum.

Mr. MITCHELL. May we have the page?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 558. The statement commences on page 557 of volume II, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931 to 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I hope the time never comes when the asking of a question will assume that the questioner believes that the thing is true. He is asking for [2006] information from the witness as to whether or not the witness believes it was true or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. It is for the purpose of trying to get information.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to answer Senator—

Senator FERGUSON. No, Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions except this one:

Mr. Grew, did you find that May 1939 instrument, the definite instrument from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States or the Secretary of State, in relation to an over-all settlement of all matters?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. A search is being made for that document. It has not yet come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel wish to make a statement?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator Ferguson, you asked about the date of the order putting the merchant shipping out of the normal lines through Torres Straits. I am not sure whether that document is in evidence, but I missed the date by 1 day. I said October 16, but this message, which will be presented shortly, was dated October 17, 1941. It is addressed to the commander in [2007] chief of the Asiatic Fleet with information to all the other Pacific commanders and directs they immediately route all trans-Pacific United States flag shipping, and so forth, through the Torres Straits. That is the one you had in mind?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the message. Whom is that signed by?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. MITCHELL. To the commander in chief at Naval District 12; I think that is the Pacific coast—with copies to all the other Pacific commanders.

[2008] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Before the Ambassador leaves the witness stand, I should like to obtain permission from the committee to make a statement with respect to the personal private diary of Mr. Grew.

I have seen some of the headlines in the press overnight, and in view of the fact that the question had been raised I gave it some thought and study, and would like at this time to make a statement on it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman—may I interpose?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I fully concur with what the Chairman said yesterday that it is a matter that should receive the most careful consideration of the committee. Thus far I have simply been asking about it. Before I arrive at an opinion, I should welcome a full discussion among the members of the committee on this question. I had hoped that that discussion would be in a somewhat more private form.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has no information as to what the statement is that the Senator from Illinois wishes to make. It seems to be based upon some newspaper publication.

Senator LUCAS. No; it isn't based on a newspaper [2009] publication. It is based on what the Senator from Maine said in this public forum and which got into the newspapers on the question of the private diary being admitted in the public record.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is a question of law, that is to be discussed, it might well be relegated to an executive session of the committee for discussion; if it is a matter of law to be thrashed out by the committee.

Senator LUCAS. It is not a question of law.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is a correction of any impression——

Senator LUCAS. That is exactly what I contend it is, a correction of an impression made.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator from Illinois yield to the Congressman from Wisconsin?

Senator LUCAS. I yield.

Mr. KEEFE. If statements of that character are to be interjected in the record at this time, I would like to reserve the right also to make a statement with respect to this diary at this time.

I had understood that the whole question as to the admission of this diary in evidence before this committee was a matter that was going to be discussed by the full committee in executive session, and it would seem to me highly improper [2010] for members of the committee to now indulge in statements with reference to the propriety or lack of propriety of bringing this diary before the committee. I think it is a matter that ought to be discussed by the committee in executive session. Therefore, I refrained yesterday, in connection with my examination——

Senator LUCAS. I yield just for a question, not a long speech. If the Congressman from Wisconsin will just restrain himself a few moments, he will discover that in this statement I am not attempting to say anything about what the committee should or should not do with respect to bringing this diary before the committee. I am attempting to answer the Senator from Maine, who, on yesterday, said in his opinion that this diary of the Ambassador would be subject to a subpoena duces tecum to be brought into the record.

I don't think it is material or relevant to this hearing one way or the other, and I so stated, but in view of the fact that it has been raised, I desire to answer that point. Not whether or not the committee should have the diary before it.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. I yield.

Senator BREWSTER. I am certainly sorry if any questioning by me of Mr. Grew, or the letter which I wrote, conduced [2011] to any extraneous discussion. I assured the Senator from Illinois privately yesterday that I had no final views on the matter, and I repeat that now, but I would comment that while I did mention the question of private court procedure, I wouldn't pretend to be as good an authority as the Senator from Illinois on that.

I think the chairman very correctly stated that irrespective of that, there would be no question regarding the power and authority of this committee; or, at any rate, it was a subject that could be considered by the committee. I won't say that the Chairman expressed any final conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair did not do so.

Senator BREWSTER. I share the opinion of both the Representative from Wisconsin and the Chair that we ought to deliberate on this matter carefully, and with regard for Mr. Grew and his rights and interests, and for the high public interest involved.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot pass on something that isn't before him and which has not been read, and the nature of which he does not know.

The Chair might express a sort of *ex cathedra* opinion that Mr. Grew took pretty good care of himself in his answers to these questions about his diary, and the Chair thinks he [2012] is capable of doing that not only on that subject, but on most any subject about which he might be interrogated.

But the Chair would certainly wish to discourage any discussion as to the legal power of this committee to summons Mr. Grew to bring his diary, or any other witness to bring his diary, his private property, before this committee without considering the legal aspects of it after a discussion in executive session. That is the Chair's view.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. If the Chair does not want me to proceed with this memorandum I shall not do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is not expressing any objection to that. There is this one thing we might keep in mind. The newspapers every day in reporting these proceedings, I have discovered, are not always accurate, and the temptation is constant to say something here that would refute some impression of a newspaper reporter about what the witnesses have said.

Senator LUCAS. I find there is a temptation also around this table to suggest certain things that do make headlines.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there is no way to control that.

Senator LUCAS. No; there is not.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Grew has a short statement of his own views, a one-page statement that he [2013] would like to read in supplementing his reasons already given for not producing the diary. I think it fair that he be given an opportunity to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would be glad to have him do that at the conclusion of his testimony. I wouldn't want it to interfere with the questioning.

Senator LUCAS. I do not propose to ask Mr. Grew any further questions and I will defer the reading of this statement until Mr. Grew gives to the committee what he has with respect to his personal diary. It may be that it coincides with what I have here, but I doubt that it does.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Does any member wish to ask any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. I have one question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Grew, in connection with the examination by Senator Ferguson, reference was made to a telegram which you may or may not have received with respect to the destruction of the code material in the Embassy and certain other documents.

In that telegram it was suggested that when this destruction was undertaken, that it be witnessed by two witnesses who would place in affidavit form the fact of the destruction.

Now, whether under your direction or the direction of [2014] some other official of the Embassy, certain code material was destroyed at some time, and I assume that it was customary for an affidavit to be filed, and you were asked about that affidavit and I believe you stated that you do not have the affidavit but that you will search the records of the State Department to see if they are to be found; is that right?

Mr. GREW. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. I want counsel to understand that we are requesting that those affidavits be presented.¹

Now, do you know a man by the name of Lawrence Salisbury? I believe you referred to him, or some witness did, in testimony here.

Mr. GREW. Yes, I know him.

Mr. KEEFE. Didn't he occupy a position in the State Department?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. He was formerly in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. He has been in our foreign service for many years.

Mr. KEEFE. He retired or resigned about a year ago?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you in the State Department at the time he left the service?

Mr. GREW. I was technically in the State Department. I [2015] may have been out in the field somewhere because I was moving around a great deal.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't mean whether you were physically there.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. Technically, I was in the State Department.

Mr. KEEFE. In what capacity were you acting at the time he left?

Mr. GREW. I don't recollect the exact status; I don't know whether I had then become Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, or whether Mr. Salisbury's retirement took place prior to that date. I will have to check the dates.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall that prior to Mr. Salisbury's retirement, he wrote and delivered to the State Department a document of about 40 pages stating the reasons for his resignation and leaving the State Department?

Mr. GREW. I don't recollect that document now, Congressman. I should have to check the records.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask counsel then to undertake a search of the records of the State Department in an effort to find what I am very definitely and reliably advised was about a 40-page statement prepared by Mr. Lawrence Salisbury and filed with Secretary Hull shortly prior to the time that he (Salisbury) retired from the State Department. Whoever [2016] undertakes it, I don't care whether it is Mr. Grew or counsel.

Mr. GESELL. We will undertake it. Do you have the date of the resignation?

Mr. KEEFE. I don't have the exact date, but it was some time during 1944. I do not have the exact date he left.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I asked you yesterday, Mr. Grew, with respect to the proposal that was submitted by the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1939, and about which Senator Ferguson had likewise inquired into, wherein a proposal was submitted to the President and our State Department for an over-all review of the world situation just prior to the outbreak of war in Europe. Do I understand a search is being made for that document?

Mr. GREW. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. You have not yet discovered it?

Mr. GREW. Not yet found it.

Mr. KEEFE. You were familiar with the instrument that I am requesting and that Senator Ferguson has requested?

Mr. GREW. Familiar with what?

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2067, statement by Mr. Gesell.

Mr. KEEFE. You are familiar that there was such an incident?

[2017] Mr. GREW. Oh, yes, I am.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood you to say during my examination of you yesterday you are not certain that you were at the Embassy at that time, or whether Mr. Dooman was there.

Mr. GREW. That is correct. I should like to look up the record on that before I make a categorical statement.

Mr. KEEFE. You have not refreshed your recollection since yesterday on that point?

Mr. GREW. I have not had an opportunity as yet.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. There are one or two points that I would like to better understand.

Mr. GREW, do you remember vividly the receipt of the telegram instructing the Embassy to destroy its codes?

Mr. GREW. Congressman, I think I have already stated that I have no recollection of having received that telegram. I am not sure whether it ever came or not.

Mr. GEARHART. You have since verified that such a telegram was received?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. A copy has been found and placed [2018] in the hands of general counsel.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. "Received" or "sent"?

Mr. GEARHART. You have verified that such a telegram was sent.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. After reading that telegram which was sent, the copy, does that bring back to your mind anything?

Mr. GREW. Not at this moment, no.

Mr. GEARHART. You can't even remember that any code machines or codes were destroyed; is that correct?

Mr. GREW. I have already stated, Congressman, that it is my impression that several of our codes were destroyed at about that time. I cannot give you the definite date because I don't recollect it. As you know a great many things were happening at that time of a political nature. And, frankly, the act of destroying the codes would not have lain with me. It would have lain with the subordinate officers, presumably the counselor at the Embassy. I would have to look up the whole episode and find out just how it was done and when, and by whom, in order to give a clear report on it.

Mr. GEARHART. I take it you can't remember at this date whether the codes were destroyed on your order or upon the order of a subordinate?

[2019] Mr. GREW. They were certainly destroyed on my order. They were destroyed on my order.

Mr. GEARHART. You are sure of that?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; I am sure of that. As I say, I cannot give you the dates without looking them up.

Mr. GEARHART. Can you remember the incident?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; certainly I remember the incident.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did you order them destroyed if you didn't have a message from Washington.

Mr. GREW. Congressman, things were coming to a stage at that time where I realized fully it was wise to take precautions, but before stating exactly why that order was given, I would like to check up on the actual time, which is of great importance, and without looking up those records, I don't feel that my testimony would be very helpful.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, at that time, and during that period, the tension was running pretty high; there was a good deal of suppressed excitement in the Embassy?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. Tension was high.

Mr. GEARHART. And do you mean to tell us that you are not clear as why you destroyed code machines. That is an unusual thing in an Embassy, is it not?

Mr. GREW. I have made no such statement, I believe, Mr. Congressman. The codes, when they were destroyed, were destroyed in view of the tenseness of the situation.

[2020] Mr. GESELL. Congressman Gearhart, I think I can throw some light on this which will be helpful.

Mr. GEARHART. I am really exploring the condition of mind of the Ambassador. I am wondering how they could do such an out-of-the-usual thing as to destroy code machines and his not being able to remember vividly what transpired.

Mr. GESELL. I think we have the partial answer.

Mr. GEARHART. I will be glad to hear it.

Mr. GESELL. There is a naval dispatch, which we had proposed to introduce at the time Admiral Wilkinson takes the stand, dated December 4, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the naval attaché at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, and Shanghai, for the information of the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the naval attaché at Chungking and the commander of the Sixteenth Naval District. That is dated December 4, 1941, and reads as follows:

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word "Jabberwock" Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "boomerang".

That suggests that on December 4, the Chief of Naval Operations is sending instructions to the naval attaché at Tokyo—instructions to destroy certain codes.

[2021] I thought that might be helpful.

Mr. GEARHART. Would instructions to your naval attaché or your military attaché to destroy codes result in their destruction without an order from you?

Mr. GREW. Yes, Congressman, I would have nothing to do with the decision of the military or naval attachés to destroy their own codes. That lay entirely with them.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of what has been read by counsel, are you still sure that the destruction of the codes which occurred in the Embassy was done under your order?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. The codes could not have been destroyed without my instructions. There would be no question about that.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, do you remember whether or not you were making destructions and the naval attaché was making destructions simultaneously?

Mr. GREW. I cannot recollect the actual instance, that was a long time ago, and, as I say, a great many things have happened since then, and I was exceedingly occupied at that moment with very large affairs of a political nature. I cannot recollect at just what moment the codes were destroyed or which codes were destroyed.

As I say, I would have to look it up before I could give a categorical answer.

[2022] Mr. GEARHART. Now, you had at that time a large battery of files in the office of the Embassy?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, we did.

Mr. GEARHART. Those files contained a lot of information which would have been very valuable to the enemy if they had been able to seize them?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you take any steps to destroy the secret files of the Embassy at about the same time?

Mr. GREW. Those secret files of the Embassy were destroyed, as I recollect it, immediately after the word came that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. We had those files in such a situation that they could be destroyed in a very few minutes and that step was taken, as I recollect it, immediately after the announcement of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GEARHART. Then so far as you now recall you never received any directions from any source to destroy your highly secret files prior to the actual bombing of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. I should like to have a search made before I give a categorical answer and I shall have the files in the State Department examined in order to be able to give an answer on that point.

Mr. GEARHART. I will now ask you, did you accomplish the complete destruction of all secret papers and codes before the [2023] Japanese came into the Embassy?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, we did.

Mr. GEARHART. And the Japanese obtained no information of value to them from our secret files after war was declared?

Mr. GREW. None whatsoever.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman would like to ask you a question to clear up a point.

These codes, these diplomatic codes and messages, were entirely separate from any naval or military messages or codes between the Navy Department and the naval attaché and the War Department and the military attaché?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And the State Department and you?

Mr. GREW. That is a fact. The naval attaché and the military attaché had offices in what we called our Chancellery Building. They kept their own files and their own codes separate and apart from ours.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you came back in August 1942 you made this report to Secretary Hull and in that report I presume you canvassed pretty much the ground, the events, that had transpired immediately prior to your capture by the Japanese. You had no communication with the Secretary directly while you were in captivity?

[2024] Mr. GREW. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. So, when you got back in August 1942 the natural thing for you to do was to report to the Secretary and go over with him any pertinent things that occurred in regard not only to events leading up to Pearl Harbor but what had happened after Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. That is a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you go to Tokyo first?

Mr. GREW. You mean officially?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GREW. Officially I arrived in Tokyo June 6, 1932.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was Secretary of State at that time?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Stimson.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall who was Secretary of the Navy?

Mr. GREW. Charles Adams. Charles Francis Adams.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall who was Secretary of War? Was it Mr. Hurley?

Mr. GREW. Mr. Patrick Hurley.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you familiar with the Manchurian incident? Did you become familiar with it?

Mr. GREW. I was familiar with it after the event. The Manchurian incident occurred in September 1931. I arrived some 6 months later.

[2025] The CHAIRMAN. What post did you occupy immediately prior to your assignment to Tokyo?

Mr. GREW. I was Ambassador to Turkey, to the Turkish Republic, for 5 years prior to that period.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether at the time of your arrival in Tokyo in June 1932 or thereafter the Navy of the United States was in Hawaiian waters not in any way connected with the Manchurian incident?

Mr. GREW. No, sir. Frankly, I cannot recollect whether the Navy was there then or not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to read a couple of pages from the book that Mr. Stimson published shortly after his retirement as Secretary of State in regard to that to see whether that will refresh your recollection. The pages are 137 and 138 of Mr. Stimson's book called *The Far Eastern Crisis*, under heading, "The American Fleet at Hawaii" [reading]:

Under plans which had been made and published the preceding summer, long before the outbreak of the trouble in Manchuria, the American navy had been ordered to hold its annual maneuvers in the Pacific between the California coast and the Hawaiian Islands. The prosecution of these maneuvers brought the fleet in natural course to Hawaii. Soon after the outbreak in [2026] Manchuria we discussed whether the plans should be changed, but decided that, in view of the fact that it was so well known that they had not originated as a threat to Japan, the maneuvers would be allowed to continue. Thereafter, just when the Japanese were making their attack on Shanghai, the American fleet in the course of these maneuvers came to Hawaii on February 15th—

that is 1932.

After further careful consideration it was allowed to remain in that neighborhood and was not dispersed or sent back to the Atlantic on the conclusion of the maneuvers. During the tumultuous and uncertain times which followed we were glad of that decision. With events showing that the Japanese government was falling completely into the control of militaristic leaders, backed by a

populace inflamed to a state of fanatical excitement by the events which had occurred, it was impossible to tell what coup might not be attempted. During that winter responsible foreign observers stationed in the Far East were informing their respective governments that in their opinion there was a real possibility of a Japanese attack being suddenly launched at the possessions of European and American governments in the neighborhood. In such a situation the presence of the entire American fleet assembled at [2027] a port which placed it on the flank of any such outbreak southward towards Hong Kong, French Indo-China or the Philippines, undoubtedly exercised a steadying effect. It was a potent reminder of the ultimate military strength of peaceful America which could not be overlooked by anyone, however excited he might be.

Does that passage from Mr. Stimson's book refresh your recollection in any way as to the presence of the fleet out in the Hawaiian waters?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. Well, it refreshes my memory with regard to those maneuvers. Can you tell me when those maneuvers took place? I have forgotten the precise date.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently the maneuvers took place prior to February 1932.

Mr. GREW. Prior.

The CHAIRMAN. Because this passage from Mr. Stimson's book recites the fact that the fleet appeared in Hawaii on the 13th of February, 1932, but it states that the plan for the maneuvers had been agreed to prior even to the Manchurian outbreak or the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 by Japan. That was in 1931, was it not?

Mr. GREW. Yes, that was in September 1931. That all happened before I arrived at my post.

The CHAIRMAN. It happened before you arrived there but [2028] I was wondering after you arrived whether you became acquainted with the fact that the fleet was in Hawaiian waters and remained there, according to Mr. Stimson's statement here in his book, on account of the outbreak in Manchuria and the general feeling that Japan might attack the territory of European and American Governments in that part of the world.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, I do recollect that.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, just one question about the destruction of the codes. In view of your long experience in the diplomatic service I would like to ask you whether there would be anything unusual about the destruction of codes that might exist in an embassy under circumstances that might bring about at any time an imminent breach between governments and might even result in hostilities?

Mr. GREW. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the destruction of the codes would take place only under a very tense situation.

The CHAIRMAN. It would take place as a matter of precaution?

Mr. GREW. As a matter of precaution.

The CHAIRMAN. And would it necessarily require any instructions from the State Department in a case like that, if the Ambassador representing the country felt that the situation had arrived at a critical state so that it might result in the breach of diplomatic relations or even hostili- [2029] ties? As a matter of precaution would he not do that anyway?

Mr. GREW. I think in a situation of that kind the responsibility would lie entirely with the Ambassador to do that on his own initiative.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. In your testimony the other day you stated that you did not receive information with respect to these intercepts that the American Government were making of Japanese messages to Washington?

Mr. GREW. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Chair understood you to say that it would have been indiscreet if you had been notified of that fact because if the Japanese were intercepting our messages or were in any way advised of the intercepting by our Government of their messages, it might have resulted in their changing their code so that we could no longer get the information which the messages were conveying. Is the Chair correct in that?

Mr. GREW. I am not sure that I made that precise statement but I entirely agree with it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair got the impression from what you said that it would have been indiscreet on the part of the State Department to have advised you at that time of the intercepting of these Japanese messages.

Mr. GREW. I think that is true.

[2030] The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just have a few questions owing to the Chairman's question.

Was there any other means of getting to you this information than by wire? Weren't there personal messengers coming back and forth?

Mr. GREW. We received regular pouches from the State Department which arrived every fortnight. They came out by American vessels, American ships, but the material in those pouches was, of course, very old, sometimes as old as 3 or 4 weeks, so we depended a great deal on telegrams.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not pass through any Japanese hands so that that would have been a secret means.

Mr. GREW. They passed through no Japanese hands. They were taken charge of by the captain of the ship, an American. They were turned over to an American officer on arrival of the ship in Yokohama and brought up to our Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. I spoke to you this morning that I thought that the message that I had in mind in relation to the route of shipping was on the 25th of November 1941. I have before me now the message that I did have in mind and I read it to you [reading]:

TOP SECRET

25 NOVEMBER 1941.

[2031] From: OPNAV.

Action: COM 12.

Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14, COM 16.

252203

Route all transpacific shipping thru Torres Straits. CINPAC and CINCAF provide necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.

There were two messages on that. And would you look up and see whether or not you ever received that information on the 25th of November 1941?

Mr. GREW. I will look into that, sir, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask counsel when he received this 4th of December 1941 [reading]:

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word jabberwock. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1986 and 6 and 1997 and 1998 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".

How long has counsel had this in his possession?

Mr. GESELL. We have had it only a short time. We received it, as I recall it, about a week ago and immediately sent it back to the Navy Department to be mimeographed for distribution to all members of the committee. It is in a [2032] detailed folder that we received this morning while the hearing was in session, that has got the compendium of Navy messages, so we have been making them up and we will distribute them to the committee as soon as we have copies.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, can counsel explain whether or not he knew of this message last night, when I was asking Mr. Grew these questions?

Mr. GESELL. No; I did not know about that then.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel had no knowledge of it, then, at that time?

Mr. GESELL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. He had knowledge, however, when I was asking Mr. Grew these questions this morning?

Mr. GREW. I did not get that question.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked counsel if he had this. I asked counsel if he had this at the time I asked Mr. Grew these questions.

Mr. GESELL. No; we did not have any knowledge of that message and I have no recollection of it, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. This morning I mean, when I asked Mr. Grew the question. Is there any reason why counsel did not call it to my attention so that we could have the record and not take the time up with the witness?

Mr. GESELL. Well, I think there is a reason, Senator.

[2033] Senator FERGUSON. What is the reason?

Mr. GESELL. The reason is, as I stated, this mimeographed publication did not come to my hands until the hearing was in progress and I did not have it placed before me to bring to the committee's attention until after you had finished your examination.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to assure counsel I will appreciate the cooperation, if he has any information when I am questioning a witness, that if he has it it may save considerable time.

Mr. GESELL. We have endeavored to do that from the start.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. My curiosity is still with me.

In the Japanese intercepts which directed the Washington Japanese Embassy to destroy their codes, they also directed the Japanese at the Embassy to use certain acids which they already had on hand. That suggests to me that the matter of destroying codes might be a somewhat intricate matter.

Did we use acids in the destruction of our codes and code machines in Japan?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield before the question [2034] is answered?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I just cannot see, Mr. Chairman, why we should reveal how we destroy our codes and how we could consider spreading that on the public records, or how it would help the inquiry. It may be that there is an excellent reason but I do not think that the satisfaction of curiosity is enough. I don't mean to be impertinent.

Mr. GEARHART. I assure the gentleman from Pennsylvania that I have a very excellent reason. It has to do with the credibility of the witness and the fitness of his memory on a very, very important affair.

I am asking the question if it is an intricate process to destroy codes and code machines, or is it a matter as simple as the word suggests to an ordinary person's mind, of using an axe and chipping them up?

Mr. GREW. My answer to that question, Mr. Congressman, would be that in the case of certain codes it would be a very simple matter. In the case of other codes it would be an intricate matter.

Mr. GEARHART. Did we have some of each type of codes in our Embassy at Tokyo?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

[2035] Mr. GEARHART. Then it was not a simple matter to destroy all of our code and code machines?

Mr. GREW. I cannot tell you, Mr. Gearhart, just how intricate that process was or would be, or how long it took or would take. Frankly, I had a good many duties in the Embassy and the mechanics of our coding was one matter in which I had not gone into in technical detail. I am not in a position, really, to give you very much information on that general subject.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, isn't the matter of the destruction of codes and code machines of sufficient importance to engage the attention of the Ambassador, especially when he is called upon to supply affidavits that the result had been achieved?

Mr. GREW. I have already stated, Mr. Congressman, those codes would not have been destroyed without my instructions without any question; and as to the affidavits, in all probability they were contained in the papers that I brought home to the State Department and a search will be instituted for this and we will see if we can find them. We probably can.

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't the suggestion that the codes and the code machines should be destroyed immediately create in your mind the idea that hostilities were imminent?

[2036] Mr. GREW. As I have already stated, Mr. Congressman, a step of that kind would only be taken in a very tense situation, but I also say that I am not at the present moment in a position to tell you the precise day and time at which that step was taken. I should like to look it up before I give you any further information on it.

Mr. GEARHART. I subside until we can have further information upon it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. What would have happened to you, Mr. Grew, had you not taken the necessary reasonable precautions that you should have taken as Ambassador with respect to those codes?

Mr. GREW. They might well have fallen into Japanese hands. I think it would have been quite possible that they might have done something with them.

Senator LUCAS. Supposing you had done nothing and they had fallen into the hands of the Japanese: Then when you returned to this country what would have been your status down in the State Department?

Mr. GREW. Well, it would have caused a ferment. If those codes had fallen into their hands, why those codes would have to be abandoned and new codes substituted, which [2037] would have been a very expensive and complicated matter.

Senator LUCAS. What would have been your position with the State Department in view of the fact that you failed to carry out those particular destructions in view of the tense situation that you described?

Mr. GREW. I think it would have been a very embarrassing situation, a very embarrassing position.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly in an effort to be clear on a point, Mr. Grew, with respect to the message of November 26, 1941 from the State Department to Japan.

Am I correct in my understanding of your statement that that message of November 26, 1941, from the United States Department of State to Japan was not carried in any of the Japanese press?

Mr. GREW. It was not carried in any of the Japanese press. It was not allowed to be carried. And, as I said to the committee, one paper, as I recollect it, one paper published the document after Pearl Harbor and that paper was promptly confiscated. Whether the document was ever published completely and freely, that I do not know.

[2038] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But am I also correct in understanding you to say that the impression was conveyed to the Japanese people that an ultimatum had been received from the United States to Japan?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, definitely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Although the message itself was not an ultimatum, the Japanese officials in charge of the Government at that time sought to convey the information to the Japanese people that it was an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. That is true, and in the case of one prominent Japanese, a very prominent Japanese, after I had told him the contents of the memorandum he said that if that were so, as I had related, he felt that the Japanese people if they knew those facts would be very much opposed to an intransigent attitude on the part of their Government.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair understands Mr. Grew has a statement he wishes to read. Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. GREW. Mr. Chairman, as the question of the diary has been considerably discussed in the committee and possibly as being helpful to the committee in considering the question in executive session, I would like to submit one further point.

In these hearings the question of the submission of my [2039] diary kept in Japan has been raised. In my letter of November 12 to the general counsel certain reasons why, in my opinion, the diary should properly be regarded and treated as a purely private document were set forth. I believe those reasons to be controlling. I should like, however, now to advance another reason for taking this position, a reason which I do not believe can be open to question.

American diplomatic officers abroad, as in the case of diplomatic officers of other countries, depend in considerable measure among their sources of intelligence upon those foreign diplomatic colleagues with whom they have been able to establish relations of mutual confidence. This is not always easy to do, but once done, the trust must be mutual and complete. The result of such a relationship is often of the highest value to our national interests. It was of special value in Japan where friendly Japanese were in general prevented by the secret police from imparting information of any character to foreigners.

My diary, kept during my years in Japan, as probably is the case with every diary kept by any diplomatic officer, contains the records of many talks with foreign diplomatic colleagues, sometimes of a nature the confidential character of which I am in honor bound to respect. In most cases these records are interwoven with the comments in my diary and [2040] could not be separated therefrom. To reveal these records would not only place me in a position to which, I respectfully submit, no former American ambassador ought ever to be subjected, but would inevitably place all American representatives abroad in an invidious situation in establishing their own future contacts on a basis of mutual trust. I could not willingly subject our future representation abroad to the prejudice that would surely arise from the revelation of these private records.

I cannot believe that the American people would wish their representatives abroad to be placed in such a position, or that they would wish one of their former representatives to compromise on what, to him, is clearly and unquestionably a point of honor.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will undoubtedly give consideration to that statement.

The Chair, on behalf of the committee, wishes to thank you for your appearance here and for your obvious frank effort to give it all the information that you possess in this inquiry and the committee is under great obligations to you for your appearance and willingness to testify. Thank you very much.

Mr. GREW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like to express on my part my full appreciation of the courtesy and [2041] patience of the committee in listening to me during these last several days. I thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The patience is mutual.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement made by the Ambassador and in deference to the wishes of the distinguished chairman of this committee, I shall refrain at this time from making the statement that I informed the committee I would make.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will proceed, gentlemen, with another witness.

[2042] Mr. GESELL. Before calling the next witness, Mr. Chairman, we think we should read into the record two documents among those submitted in exhibit 18, because of their direct pertinence to matters which were considered by the committee during its examination of Mr. Grew.

These documents in exhibit 18 relate to the *modus vivendi*.

The first is the message to Lauchlin Currie from Lattimore, at Chungking under date of November 25, 1941, and it reads as follows:

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "*Modus Vivendi*" now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either [2043] past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

The other is a message of the same date, transmitted to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong under cover of a letter dated November 25 which was obtained both from the War Department and State Department files.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask counsel if those messages are included in Exhibit 18?

Mr. GESELL. They are.

Mr. KEEFE. It is part of Exhibit 18 that you are now reading for the record?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

Telegram from General Chiang Kai Shek to Dr. T. V. Soong dated Chungking, November 25, 1941.

I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately.

Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. [2044] If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but none the less definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could [2045] not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the breakdown of our resistance. Our more

than four years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed know how history in the future will record this episode.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. May I request counsel to have the records of the State Department searched to see whether or not any instructions were sent to the American consuls in Japan during the last one-third of November, and first 7 days of December 1941, directing the destruction or disposition of codes and code machines and secret papers?

Mr. GESELL. We will do that, Mr. Congressman.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. So the record will be clear, as I understand it, counsel now has the Army message to the attaché and will produce it sometime later, so we may put it [2046] in as part of Mr. Grew's testimony where I have asked about the Army?

Mr. GESELL. The army is getting it and we will produce it Senator.*

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could it appear in the record at the time I was questioning Mr. Grew, so as to make the record clear?

The CHAIRMAN. The reporter will transpose this at the proper place. That record has already gone to the transcription stage and may have been typewritten by now, but the reporter will make an effort to put it in the place where the Senator asked it to go.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. At the time I asked for the paper under discussion, the Chairman said it was his impression that it was already in the record. I want to make the statement that the paper of August 17, on which the Senator from Michigan was questioning, is separate and distinct from the one to which I refer. In other words, in one volume of Foreign Relations there is one outlined on page 554, one on page 556 and one on page 557, all on the same date. I want to make certain that the one on page 557 is copied into the record.

[2047] The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection. In fact, I would like to have it copied into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the unanimous view of the committee that that ought to be done.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[2048] STATEMENT HANDED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON AUGUST 17, 1941

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on August 8 during a conversation with the Secretary of State whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoe and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is made also to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on August 16 that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two Governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2067.

* Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 38. See p. 841, *infra*.

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up these suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the Government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this Government had [2049] received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indochina. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indochina and pointed out that the Government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indochina or the acquisition of military and naval [2050] bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of [2051] the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this Government and this Government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential [2052] character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the Government of the United States would expect to use its influence

to see that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese Government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. The Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or proceeding [2053] with plans for a meeting if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

[2054] The CHAIRMAN. Will counsel go ahead now?

Mr. GESELL. We would like to call as the next witness, General Miles.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, UNITED STATES ARMY¹

(The witness having been first duly sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.

Mr. GESELL. General, will you state for the record your full name and your present rank, and duty, please, sir?

General MILES. Sherman Miles, major general, Army of the United States; stationed in Boston, Mass.

Mr. GESELL. You were head of G-2, were you, General, on December 7, 1941?

General MILES. I was, sir.

Mr. GESELL. How long have you had that duty?

General MILES. I reported on May 1, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the counsel permit the Chair, for the purpose of identification, to ask General Miles if he is the son of Gen. Nelson A. Miles, who was head of the United States Army.

General MILES. I am, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think counsel might also, for the benefit of the record, show what "G-2" is.

Mr. GESELL. That was my next question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon.

[2055] Mr. GESELL. What, in a general way, would you say are the duties and the functions of G-2?

General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff is charged with the collection, analysis, estimation, dissemination of information primarily for the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.

G-2 is a staff officer of the Chief of Staff, an assistant chief of staff for intelligence.

Mr. GESELL. G-2 is another name for Military Intelligence Division, is that correct?

¹ See p. 2486 infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by General Miles.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, prior to assuming your duties as G-2, what had been your military experience, as far as the Far East was concerned? Had you had duty in the Far East or any particular contact with far eastern matters?

General MILES. No, sir, I had never had duty in the Far East.

Mr. GESELL. Had you ever had duty in Hawaii?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What was the nature of that duty?

General MILES. I was G-3, operations officer of the Hawaiian Department, from April 1929 until May 1932.

Mr. GESELL. And who was your commanding officer during that time at Hawaii?

[2056] General MILES. I had four commanding generals during my service as G-3 in Hawaii: Gen. Fox Connor, General Wyant, General Lassiter, and General Wells.

[2057] Mr. GESELL. Now during the entire time you were there you were G-3, operations, is that correct?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Generally, what was the nature of that duty?

General MILES. I had supervision over all war plans and defense projects of the Hawaiian Department. I was the staff officer in general charge of training, I prepared maneuvers, exercises of all kinds for the commanding general.

Mr. GESELL. Had you ever had any war plans duty in the General Staff here at Washington?

General MILES. Not before going to Hawaii.

Mr. GESELL. Subsequent to that time did you have such duty, and if so, what was it?

General MILES. I did, sir. I served 4 years on the War Plans Division of the General Staff, from June 1934 to June 1938.

Mr. GESELL. In what capacity?

General MILES. I was the head of the Plans and Projects Section of the War Plans Division and as such had supervision over war plans and defense projects of the three overseas departments, Philippine, Panama, and Hawaii.

Mr. GESELL. How long have you been in the military service, General?

General MILES. I entered the military service in June, [2058] 1901, as a cadet.

Mr. GESELL. When did your responsibilities as G-2 cease?

General MILES. I was relieved of G-2 the 30th, I think, of January, 1942.

Mr. GESELL. Now, if the committee please, before proceeding with the examination of General Miles, we would like to offer for the record two basic exhibits which will be the subject of consideration as the examination proceeds.

The first, to be designated as exhibit 32, is entitled "Messages Between War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to December 7, 1941."

I would like to explain to the committee that these messages are, of course, all in the nature of radio dispatches, and primarily we have assembled these messages of a warning character or of an alert char-

acter. We believe this is a fairly complete compilation of such messages.

Mr. GEARHART. What is the date?

Mr. GESELL. From July 8 to December 7, 1941. It has been distributed to the committee and is the thin volume in pink covers.

The title requires a slight explanation also, to orient the committee to the exhibit. On November 27 there was a message sent to General Short, with which of course the committee is familiar, warning of the imminence of hostilities. [2059] On the same day some similar messages were sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur and to the General in charge of the Panama area.

We have included in this group of messages the messages sent to those other theaters at the same time, and their replies as well, feeling that in order for the committee to have the full picture it would be of interest to compare the replies of other theaters to the reply of General Short to somewhat comparable messages.

We want to point out, however, as it will appear, that the messages were different in certain respects.

We would also like to offer at this time as exhibit 33, the thick folder in pink covers, entitled "Military Intelligence Estimates Prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C."

This includes, as the index at the beginning makes clear, military intelligence estimates during the period July 1 to December 7, 1941, and there are some 30 in number of various dates, the subject matters being indicated in the index.

May those be received, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Those will be made exhibits as indicated, 32 and 33.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 32 and 33, respectively.)

Mr. GESELL. Now, General, I believe you said the Military [2060] Intelligence Division had the responsibility of assembling and disseminating military information. Was it also a function of that Division to evaluate the information assembled?

General MILES. It was, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Could you indicate to us briefly how the Military Intelligence Division was organized, the principal branches and functions?

General MILES. I believe, Mr. Counsel, that there is before the committee a chart of the organization of the Military Intelligence Division. Am I correct, sir?

Mr. GESELL. I believe I have seen such a chart. Would you indicate generally what the principal branches of the Division are?

General MILES. The latest chart I have is October 10, 1941. The principal branches were the Administrative Branch, the Intelligence Branch, the Counter-Intelligence Branch, the Plans and Training Branch, and the Information Control Branch.

Mr. GESELL. Now what were the functions of the Intelligence Branch?

General MILES. The functions, in general, of the Intelligence Branch were those duties of the War Department General Staff which related to the collation, evaluation and dissemination of military information;

that is, positive information coming from foreign countries. I emphasize the [2061] word "positive" because in the preceding war we had designated these two branches as the positive and the negative.

In other words, the difference between the Intelligence Branch and Counter-Intelligence Branch was the difference between the assembly of actual information we needed on the one hand and the information which the enemy was seeking from us, or the potential enemy was seeking from us, and our following up that information in the Counter-Intelligence Branch.

Mr. GESELL. Now what was the general function of the Plans and Training Branch? Did that have to do with the evaluation of the intelligence?

General MILES. No, sir. The Plans and Training Branch was practically entirely a branch devoted to the plans for the expansion of the Military Intelligence Division, which, in the years in which I was G-2, was very considerable, and of the training of future officers, agents and other personnel for the Division.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Information Control Branch have to do with the maintaining of security regulations and controls over the information assembled?

General MILES. It did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Was that primarily a function of the Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. It was a function. The security of [2062] information was a part of the general duties of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. GESELL. Now did the Military Intelligence Division report to any particular officer or branch of the War Department?

General MILES. It reported to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. In the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information was it charged with reporting to anyone other than the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Not strictly reporting, sir. We did disseminate information to a good many people other than the Chief of Staff, but we reported only directly to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. You mean reported in a command sense?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Was it the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Division to disseminate information to the various theaters?

General MILES. It was, sir, if I understand it to mean the overseas departments and major divisions of the Army.

Mr. GESELL. Was it the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Division to also distribute such information to the other branches of the General Staff, such as War Plans?

General MILES. Very definitely, sir, it was.

[2063] The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 12 o'clock having arrived, the committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[2064]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will proceed with General Miles.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding, there is a correction I want to make in the record.

In the quotation which I gave this morning I spoke of September 16, 1940. I find that I took the one above rather than the one below. It was October 30, 1940, so that should appear correctly in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That correction will be made.

Senator BREWSTER. And there is another matter in connection with the quotation by the Chairman this morning from Mr. Stimson in 1932. I gathered that that was to lend support to the idea that the fleet in Hawaii did act as a deterrent in the view of Mr. Stimson and possibly of his chief at that time and, if so, in connection with that I would like to have the records of that time, if they will secure it from the Navy, showing the relative strength of the American and the Japanese Fleets at that time and also the strength of the air forces as then developed, in order that in appraising the deterrent possibilities of the fleet in Hawaii in 1932 and in 1941 we may have a complete picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair might state that in presenting that memorandum from the book by Mr. Stimson he was seeking to refresh the recollection of Mr. Grew, but he has no [2065] objection to the request of the Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that was a very relevant matter, a very good piece to have in the record and I would like to have with it the relative strength.¹

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead, counsel.

Mr. GESELL. General Miles, we are discussing the organization and the responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Division. Could you give us a little more fully a picture of the activities of that Division and the manner in which it functioned?

General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division comprised a good many activities and functions. I would say that they could be largely summarized by the statement that those functions were designed to secure, evaluate and disseminate the information, to prevent information from getting to any potential or possible enemy, and to train and expand the Division for possible eventuality, even war.

During my period with G-2 the war in Europe was increasing in tempo and the situation in the Far East was certainly becoming no better, so that we were constantly branching out into activities that had not been handled by the Military Intelligence Division in time of peace and expanding enormously our personnel to handle those activities.

Mr. GESELL. What was the size of the organization in [2066] Washington, roughly, at the time of the Japanese attack?

General MILES. Within the War Department I should estimate it as somewhere in the neighborhood of 400 or 450 persons.

Mr. GESELL. There were also representatives of the Division, were there not, in the various overseas departments?

General MILES. The G-2's of the overseas department, as well as those of the corps areas, were not directly representatives of the Military Intelligence Division. They were the staff officers of their particular commanding officers, chosen by them. We had only a liaison relationship with them, if I may so express it.

¹ See table in Hearings, Part 10, p. 5183.

The military attachés and military observers overseas, on the other hand, were directly responsible to and selected by the general Military Intelligence Division.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair desires to call your attention to the fact that the spectators do not hear you distinctly and will you turn your voice to the microphone in front of you so that you may be heard distinctly?

General MILES Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. GESELL. You were discussing the attachés, General, and I gather from what you say that the military attachés attached to the various embassies and legations were directly [2067] responsible to the Military Intelligence Division.

General MILES. Yes. They were selected by the Military Intelligence Division, of course, with the consent of the Department of State. In many cases I imagine the Department of State consulted the respective ambassador or minister, and they were while so serving, of course, members of the embassy or legation staff, but they had more direct responsibility to the Military Intelligence Division than with G-2's of the various major commanders of the Army.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, as far as those G-2's are concerned, let us take a specific situation such as prevailed at Hawaii.

Is my understanding correct that the communication and contact between G-2 in Washington and the Hawaiian department would be through the commanding officer there rather than a direct relationship between the G-2 on General Short's staff and officers of your own Division?

General MILES. That is not wholly correct, sir. The G-2 of the War Department sent out a great deal of information directly to the G-2's of the overseas department and the corps areas, what might be called technical or static information. Information, however, which would imply the decision or belief of the Chief of Staff as to a particular situation, particularly if it was very important, would [2068] normally be and should be sent out by the War Department, as such, under the name of the Chief of Staff or the Adjutant General because there you are speaking directly to the commanding general of this major unit.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, G-2 in Washington kept the G-2 members of the overseas department staff informed through the submission of basic information directly to them from time to time?

General MILES. That is correct. We supplied the overseas departments with static information, revised from time to time, on countries of interest to them and also current information which affected them.

[2069] Mr. GESELL. On the other hand, if, on the basis of that information, it was felt that some specific action should be taken that was communicated, as a matter of procedure, and practice from the War Department, as such, in the matters you indicated directly to the commanding officer, in the case of Hawaii, General Short; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, whenever this information became more than information per se and became in any sense a directive or suggestion of the War Department, then that information should be and was transmitted through command channels.

G-2 was not in the command channel.

Mr. GESELL. Then I take it the reverse was also true, that G-2, at Hawaii, for example, would transmit what you call static information from time to time to the Military Intelligence Division for it to integrate with the information already available.

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will counsel have the witness explain what he means by static information? It is not clear to me what that term signifies.

Mr. GESELL. Will you explain that, General Miles?

Mr. KEEFE. I think I understand what the word "static" means, but as applied to this case, I do not synchronize it exactly.

[2070] General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division maintained what was known as a digest of intelligence on the countries of the world which were of military interest to us. Those were very voluminous documents. They were divided into headings of political, economic, combat, civil aviation, and military aviation. They were loose-leaf documents, added to and changed as information came in by the transmission of the new mimeographed sheet for inclusion in the digest.

From that digest was written, in the Military Intelligence Division, estimates on these countries. Those again were rather voluminous. They were divided into political, economic, and combat. They were always revised yearly, and from time to time also when necessary, by the forwarding of loose-leaves for inclusion in the estimates.

There was also a handbook on the Japanese Army gotten out by the Military Intelligence Division, on the 14th of May 1941.

There was another publication on the identification of Japanese aircraft, gotten out on the 24th of October 1941; a monograph on Thailand for the same year.

All that is what I have described perhaps loosely by the use of word "static." It was more or less static information, which we kept up, however, currently, as new [2071] information was received.

Mr. GESELL. So we understand, General, would it be fair to say that that information was generally of a statistical and informative character, with little evaluation material contained therein? In other words, it was designed to keep the G-2's posted as to the size of the armies and movements that might be anticipated of their forces, and matters of that sort?

General MILES. Generally speaking; yes, sir. But we also, of course, expressed definite opinion, as to the efficiency of the various forces that we were discussing.

[2072] Mr. GESELL. Some of those estimates are contained in this document that was introduced this morning, are they not, as they relate to the Far East, military intelligence estimates prepared by G-2, exhibit 33?

General MILES. Those are estimates of the situation prepared directly for the Chief of Staff. I think it is unfortunate we used the word "estimates" twice, referring to two different sets of documents. The estimates that I spoke of in answer to the Congressman's question were the static estimates, so-called, which were revised from time to

time. The estimates of the situation were our opinions of current situations written for the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. They were distributed to all the G-2's, were they, and they were not prepared with any specific reference to any overseas theater as opposed to any other overseas theater?

General MILES. They were not written with any particular overseas theater in mind, but they were written directly for the Chief of Staff and General Staff.

Mr. GESELL. Of the theaters or of the overseas departments?

General MILES. No, sir, of the General Staff, the War Department General Staff.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I think there is some confusion here. [2073] I was talking still about the static information which we were referring to and not about this volume, exhibit 33.

General MILES. Then you are correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. On the other hand, the estimates in exhibit 33 were prepared not for distribution to the theaters, but for the information of the General Staff?

General MILES. Chief of Staff and his General Staff; yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, what were your particular functions and duties in this organization, General Miles?

General MILES. I was the head of the whole organization, Military Intelligence Division, responsible for its administration, its expansion and for its output.

In other words, I spoke for the Military Intelligence of the General Staff. A paper would normally be prepared, we will say, of the Far East estimate by the far eastern section. That would then go for revision or comment to the immediate chief of the far eastern section, the head of the intelligence branch, and from that branch to me. But I am responsible for and was responsible for the output of the division.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, as head of the organization, of course, you had to give special emphasis to certain aspects of its activities, and I wondered whether there was any particular phase of the work of the Military Intelligence Division which [2074] you gave particular attention to.

General MILES. Normally I would say that my particular attention was devoted to our output in the way of analyzed and estimated, evaluated information which we called "Intelligence," but I also had a good many other irons in the fire.

Mr. GESELL. Now how were you organized within your division in respect to the handling of the far eastern information?

General MILES. The Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch was at that time under Colonel Bratton. He received all information that we obtained on the Far East from our military attachés, our observers, from the State Department, from the Navy Department, other departments of the Government, and although it was drying up considerably, information from civilian companies or press in the Far East, together, of course, with the secret information that we were getting from the intercepts—magic.

Mr. GESELL. Now to whom was he responsible?

General MILES. He was directly responsible to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, at that time Col. Hayes Kroner. There was, however, also within that branch a situation section under Lieutenant

Colonel Betts, now brigadier general. That was in charge of information bearing on the situation in all parts of the world. I described it at that time as the heart [2075] of the Intelligence Branch. It maintained situation maps both for G-2 and for the Secretary of War. All special studies, and so forth, emanate from this particular section.

Mr. GESELL. And that section would work in close coordination, I gather from your statement, with the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch in the formulation of estimates and studies, is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, during that time you have indicated you had several sources of information. You mentioned attachés, you mentioned, I believe, the Japanese intercepts, which you referred to as "magic." What other sources were there?

General MILES. We had some observers in the field. We had a mission under General Magruder in China. We had, of course, the Intelligence Division in the staff of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments that were getting us information. We had started a nucleus of what might be called a secret service under Colonel Clear in Singapore. We had little money to give him, but at least he did make progress in tying in with the British Secret Service in the Far East. We exchange information, of course, with the Department of State and Navy Department particularly, and several other agencies, independent agencies of the Government in Washington, and with the military attachés and missions, particularly [2076] British, at that time in Washington.

Mr. GESELL. And I gather that all of these sources were sources of information which contributed data concerning the Far East?

General MILES. They did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What sort of liaison did you maintain with the State and Navy Departments? What were the mechanics of that and how did it function?

General MILES. I should like to go into that in a little detail. When I took over G-2 I found that a daily liaison was being maintained with the Department of State and the Navy Department. With the Department of State it was handled directly by then Colonel Magruder. During my tour of duty three other officers in succession took up this duty. They were then Colonel Betts, Colonel Montague, and Colonel Sands.

In addition to that I personally knew several of the Assistant Secretaries of States and the Under Secretary of State, and at least two or three times went, at his request, to the office of the Secretary of State on intelligence matters.

With the Navy Department the same liaison existed, but more in detail. In other words, officers from my Far Eastern Section visited many times a week, perhaps many times a day certain days, the corresponding officers of the office of Naval Intelligence. I was always in constant touch with the [2077] three officers who successively occupied that post.

Mr. GESELL. You mean in the Navy?

General MILES. In the Navy.

Mr. GESELL. Head of ONI?

General MILES. Head of ONI.

[2078] The liaison, I think, was very close at all times. I seem to have misplaced some papers that I wrote out in respect to the time of this committee, but I can summarize it, I think, from memory.

Two steps were taken by the Military Intelligence Division during the year 1941 to increase considerably the liaison between the war Department, particular Military Intelligence, and the other departments of the Government here in Washington.

In June, I think—I have the record here—no, in July—July 14, 1941, the Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, at that time Captain Kirk, and I requested the joint Army and Navy Board, which was then the highest coordinating military agency under the commander in chief, for permission to appear before it with certain suggestions and plans for integrating intelligence into that body. We did so appear on the 16th of July, with written proposals and arguments as to why we thought a greater integration of intelligence with that body would be useful.

The three proposals were that the Chiefs of Naval and Military Intelligence be made members of the Board, or alternatively, that they be made members of the Joint Planning Committee, which was the committee serving the Board, or alternatively, that a joint intelligence committee [2079] coequal with the Joint Planning Committee be established by the Joint Army and Navy Board.

These proposals were processed through the Joint Planning Committee and the General Board, and they resulted in the recommendation of the Joint Board to the two Secretaries that a joint intelligence committee be formed.

I have records of the date.

Mr. GESELL. That was a joint committee between the Army and Navy?

General MILES. That is the Joint Army and Navy Board which had been established a great many years before. The establishment of a joint intelligence committee serving the Joint Board was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on the 1st of October, and the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, and appropriate orders were issued.

The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their first meeting on the 11th of October 1941, but did not actually function until the 8th or 9th of December.

The second step taken by Military Intelligence to enlarge liaison was this:

In April of 1941, a memorandum was written by G-2 suggesting that representatives of nine departments of the Government, including War, be assembled to discuss and formulate policies and means of exchanging information between [2080] the departments, all information which affected the policy formulation of the Government.

The Secretary approved that memorandum and wrote the letters to the other eight Cabinet members or chiefs of independent offices. Throughout that summer, meetings were held in the office of G-2, two separate plans were drawn up, two successive plans were drawn up, and finally, I think in late August or September, but I can obtain the date, the representatives of the nine agencies signed the draft of plan.

This was approved by the various Cabinet members and chiefs of independent agencies, successively, during the succeeding months. The last letter that I found in the files was dated the earlier part of October 1941, from the Secretary of Agriculture.

This plan was, in general, the establishment within each department of an officer or office specifically charged with disseminating the information received by that department to the other departments concerned and receiving from the other departments and disseminating within his own department similar information.

The plan also included certain provisions for the safeguarding of this information in the various departments.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now under the scheme you have [2081] just indicated and through the liaison that was established on a more informal basis between the State and Navy, I gather you had some facilities, at least for giving them what information you had and getting their information from them?

General MILES. I think we had very complete means of doing so, so far as any information was given to us. I don't mean to say that we would always control another department, nor did we attempt to.

Mr. GESELL. Now, one of the most important types of information with which we are concerned here, is the magic, or Japanese intercepts. Are you familiar with exhibits 1 and 2 in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military intercepts contained in these volumes which I show you?

General MILES. I have seen those volumes; yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. To what extent did these intercepts come to your attention as they were translated?

General MILES. They were brought to me and to a limited number of other officers in the War Department by my own officers in the far eastern section in lockboxes or dispatch cases to which I had a key, and I read them; put them back in the dispatch case, and sent them on.

Mr. GESELL. It was the procedure and practice then, I gather, for you to see all intercepted Japanese messages [2082] during the time that you were G-2?

General MILES. There was a great deal of what we call chitter-chat in those messages which was not disseminated. Only the messages of some importance to us were disseminated.

Mr. GESELL. Would you say that these two exhibits I have referred to contain information of a chitter-chat nature, or are these more of a type which would have come to you under the procedure, the diplomatic and military?

General MILES. These are the types of messages that were distributed.

Mr. GESELL. Have you any record, General Miles, of which particular intercepts you saw during this period?

General MILES. I have no record at this time, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you believe the committee would be correct in assuming that you, in all probability, saw all of the intercepts contained in these two exhibits which have been introduced?

General MILES. It is my belief that I saw them all, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, did G-2 have the responsibility for intercepting those messages?

General MILES. No, sir; they were intercepted by Naval Communications; they first reached Naval Communications, [2083] and the Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. GESELL. The Signal Intelligence Service of the Army?

General MILES. Of the Army, which was not a part of G-2, nor was G-2 a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. GESELL. Now, did G-2 have, as far as the messages intercepted by the Signal Service were concerned, the responsibility for translating or decoding the messages?

General MILES. No, sir. The messages were decoded jointly by Naval Communications and S. I. S., Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. GESELL. Then, do I understand that the messages reached G-2 from the Signal Service after they had been translated or from the Naval Communications Service after they had been translated.

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, to whom did these messages come in G-2?

General MILES. They came to the far eastern section, Colonel Bratton.

Mr. GESELL. Whose responsibility was it to determine which messages would be distributed among higher officers?

General MILES. Colonel Bratton, initially.

Mr. GESELL. Did you exercise any judgment or selection [2084] in that regard?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What other officers did in the Army?

General MILES. I think no one except Colonel Bratton and his subordinates.

Mr. GESELL. Now, can you tell us who, in the War Department, received the texts of the messages during this period?

General MILES. I have before me a confidential agreement drawn up in G-2 dated January 23, 1941, signed by Capt. Hugh James, Acting Director of Naval Intelligence, and myself, in which was laid down what officers or persons this magic was to be distributed to, and by whom.

Within the War Department, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the military aide to the President in exceptional cases only; he was, however, not an officer of the War Department.

Mr. GESELL. That was General Watson, was it?

General MILES. Yes, sir, that was General Watson.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

General MILES. And the War Plans Division.

Mr. GESELL. The War Plans Division, or the Chief of the War Plans Division.

General MILES. The Chief of the War Plans Division.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was that?

[2085] General MILES. General Gerow.

Mr. GESELL. So that list would include Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, General Gerow, and transmission to the President through General Watson?

General MILES. And myself.

Mr. GESELL. And yourself?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, was there anyone else in the War Department who was authorized to see the intercepts?

General MILES. No, sir. I would like to point out also that General Watson received them in exceptional cases only as per this agreement and later on the messages were delivered to the White House through the naval aide to the President, and not the military aide.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, during the time that delivery was being made by the Army to the White House, who made the determination of what messages would be sent to General Watson for the President?

General MILES. That also was Colonel Bratton's duty.

Mr. GESELL. What was meant by "exceptional circumstances," particularly significant messages?

General MILES. I imagine that that was the meaning of that phrase at the time this agreement was written.

Mr. GESELL. For what period—put it this way: When [2086] did the War Department cease advising the White House and that function was taken over by the Navy?

General MILES. My recollection is the 1st of November 1941.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, receive these intercepts?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, what was the machinery for distributing them? Were they left with these various officials for their study, or how was it handled?

General MILES. So far as possible, the distributing officer remained in the office while the officer, whoever it was, read the message. That, of course, was not always possible, particularly the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and they were then left for him to read and he transmitted them back in the locked pouch.

Mr. GESELL. The practice was, I gather, then, for all the distributed messages, eventually to be returned to the point of distribution rather than remain in the files of the officers receiving them?

General MILES. They were never to remain in the files. They were always to be returned and burned.

Mr. GESELL. Who established that procedure?

General MILES. I was responsible for the establishment [2087] of it. I don't know that I personally did it. I imagine it was done on the recommendation of Colonel Bratton who was handling them directly. I also remember the Chief of Staff was personally very much interested in the procedure and the protection of those messages which constituted so important a military secret.

Mr. GESELL. One filed copy of the messages was retained, is that not correct?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Who determined what officers and officials should see these messages?

General MILES. I hesitate to answer the question, because I don't remember that it ever arose. It was so obviously the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, and the Chief of Military Intelligence Division, were the officers directly responsible.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I quite agree that they are obvious people to be on a distribution list, but the question arises whether perhaps there should not have been others on the list, as well.

General MILES. I remember no case in which that question arose, sir.

The general tendency always was to limit these messages, the distribution of these messages, the knowledge of the [2088] existence of these messages, to as few people as possible.

Mr. GESELL. You didn't mention the Department of State. Am I correct in my understanding that these messages were sent to the Department of State, these magic messages, by the Navy?

General MILES. By the Navy and by the Army. We took over the distribution to the Department of State when the Navy took over the distribution to the White House, about the 1st of November. Before that we distributed to the Department of State and to the White House on alternative months.

Mr. GESELL. From November 1, 1941, the Army distributed to the State Department, and the Navy to the White House, as a general matter of practice?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Who, in the Department of State was authorized to see these messages?

General MILES. Our distribution was directly to the Secretary of State. What handling he had within his own Department, of course, we did not control.

Mr. GESELL. Was that handled in the same mechanical fashion as far as the dispatch cases were concerned and the return of the messages?

General MILES. That is correct, except that I believe the private secretary of the Secretary of State had a key.

[2089] Mr. KEEFE. Might I interrupt?

The CHAIRMAN. The chairman didn't understand. The private secretary had a what?

General MILES. Had a key to the box.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. It is not clear to me, this answer of the witness as to the disposition of the intercepts after they had made their routine delivery, delivery by the Navy and the Army to these various people.

I think it was said that they were destroyed or burned.

Mr. GESELL. The testimony was, I believe, and will you check me on this—I understood the testimony to be that they were all returned and burned with the exception of one filed copy, which was maintained.

General MILES. That is true. That filed copy never went on the distribution rounds.

Mr. GESELL. So that following distribution through these precautions, you had one filed copy of all messages intercepted?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. What I am trying to understand is, the intercepts that were brought back, were returned to the Army by Colonel Bratton, and to the Navy by the officer in charge of distribution for the Navy, those messages were burned?

[2090] General MILES. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. By the Army and by the Navy?

General MILES. Respectively.

Mr. GESELL. Those messages that were distributed were duplicates of messages which were retained in the file that was kept, the complete file that was kept at the Army and Navy?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Any messages intercepted by the Signal Corps were made available to the Navy and any messages intercepted by the Navy were made available to the Army under this procedure; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir. It was a joint operation of the Naval Communications and SIS.

The CHAIRMAN. What is SIS?

General MILES. Signal Intelligence Service. If one was overcrowded, the other would step in.

Mr. GESELL. Did I understand you to say that one copy or more than one copy was sent to the Secretary of State?

General MILES. One copy, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, we have been discussing here the distribution, have we not, of the actual translated texts of the different messages; not any evaluation or summary, but the actual text of the messages themselves?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[2091] Mr. GESELL. Were there any facilities under Army control at Hawaii which enabled the Army to intercept these messages at that point?

General MILES. I believe not, sir. There was a naval intercepting station at Hawaii but I think not an Army. And by intercepting I mean simply taking the messages out of the air. I don't mean breaking the code or translating from the Japanese to the English, of course.

Mr. GESELL. What I had referred to was the latter, the question being whether or not there were any facilities at Hawaii through which General Short or persons in his command would have been in a position to intercept, translate, and decode these messages which we have been discussing the magic messages?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What steps were taken to distribute the intercepted messages to the commanding officer at Hawaii?

General MILES. There were no steps taken to distribute these messages to that general.

Mr. GESELL. Do I understand from your answer that these messages as intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army?

General MILES. They were not. In some cases the substance of some messages, were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because [2092] the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code.

Mr. GESELL. Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?

General MILES. That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our ability to decode them should be confined to the least possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington.

Mr. GESELL. Was that determination by the Chief of Staff in writing or simply an expression of policy?

General MILES. As far as my recollection goes it was simply an expression of policy.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with the formulation of that policy?

General MILES. I do not now remember, but I imagine that I was.

Mr. GESELL. Can you state to the committee what the considerations were underlying such a policy?

General MILES. Yes, sir. The value of that secret, the secret that we could and did decode Japanese messages, in their best code, was of incalculable value to us, both in the period when war threatened and most definitely during our waging of [2093] that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on the distribution of those messages and of the constantly increasing closing in, as I might express it, on any possible leaks in that secret.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, I have been discussing Hawaii with you. I take it your answer would be the same as to other theaters, that these messages were not being sent by the Army to any other oversea area commanders?

General MILES. That is true, sir. It applies to all of them.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall ever having received any instructions not to transmit the messages to Hawaii, let us say?

General MILES. I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Do you ever recall any discussion with anyone concerning the advisability of sending such messages to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated?

General MILES. I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Do you ever recall any request having been made of G-2 by anyone, a commander in Hawaii or elsewhere, asking that such information be transmitted?

General MILES. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Then I am to understand from your answers, am I, General, that the question of the distribution of these [2094] messages to the commanding general or anyone on his staff at Hawaii was not, to your recollection, discussed by anyone in your presence or requested or suggested by anyone in your presence?

General MILES. That is true, sir, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. And can you give us any further information as to what officer was primarily responsible for the decision to so limit the distribution?

General MILES. I regarded it as an important policy which I knew emanated from the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. Would it be fair to say that this magic information was the most reliable and authentic information which the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and activities?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. To your knowledge was anyone in responsible position in the War Department organization at Hawaii advised of the fact that we were in a position to intercept, decode, and translate these messages?

General MILES. To the best of my knowledge and belief no one was advised. That, sir, was the essence of the secret. Not so much what we were getting from these messages but the very fact that we could decode and translate these messages.

[2095] Mr. GESELL. And it was for those reasons that I understand you to say that the decision was made not to send the text of the messages or any summary therefrom to the overseas commanders?

General MILES. That was the primary consideration, as I understand it, for that fixed definite policy of the War Department.

Mr. GESELL. Would you say that it was one of the responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Division to keep the overseas commanders advised as to matters which might be important to them in gaging the potential activities of the enemies or potential enemy?

General MILES. In general, yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The obligation of responsibility to disseminate information and the obligation to safeguard information then in this instance acted opposite to each other, did they not?

General MILES. Generally speaking, yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I gather from what you say that you resolved that in favor of the closest type of security over the messages translated?

General MILES. I think that is hardly a complete answer, sir. It must also be borne in mind that a great deal of this information did not directly apply to the overseas departments unless and until it became more than information and entered [2096] the realms of an estimate of the situation which called for military action on the part of those high commanders, and that was a function of the command, in other words, of the Chief of Staff himself. A great deal of that information was of great value to us in Washington, to all departments of the Government that were within the distribution list, as indicating the course of diplomatic relations with Japan.

But was not considered at that time that the commanding generals of the overseas departments should know from day to day the course of those diplomatic negotiations. The essence of what they should know was any situation which would call for a military decision on their part or the part of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. Now, that appraisal of the situation carries with it, does it not, General Miles, a perhaps unusually high degree of responsibility in the General Staff here to send appropriate messages to the area commanders warning them of impending developments to the extent that they were known to the General Staff?

General MILES. Yes, sir. It was a matter of great responsibility to notify the overseas departments, which were our great outpost of the moment, when war became—certainly when war became imminent, or the moment when any part of the war plans, so carefully drawn up in the preceding years, should [2097] be put into effect.

Mr. GESELL. I wonder if you quite understood my question. I take it that responsibility, in the general sense, is always present in the Chief of Staff. My point was rather that under these circumstances, having reached the decision, for the reasons you have indicated, not to transmit information to the area commanders, and knowing that you had information which the area commanders did not have, you were confronted with possibly even a higher degree of responsibility in that regard, were you not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, some of these messages, General Miles, were not of a diplomatic nature, they were of a military nature, were they not, some of the magic intercepts?

General MILES. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, does your testimony apply equally to messages of that character as compared to messages of a general diplomatic character?

General MILES. Yes, sir. Had we obtained through magic any information of a purely military character that should have been transmitted to the overseas departments, I think steps should have been taken to transmit that information in some secure way, providing always it did not come within the realms of command responsibility.

[2098] Mr. GESELL. You say you think some steps should be taken in those circumstances to transmit the messages?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, referring to exhibit 2, copy of which is handed you, will you turn to page 12. There is there a message sent from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated September 24, 1941, which was translated on October 9, 1941, reading as follows:

Strictly Secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines in so far as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area S. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, [2099] we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important), tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)

Do you recall seeing that message at the time it was intercepted and translated?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I ask you whether that is not the type of message which carried a special military significance to such an extent, taken under your previous testimony, that it should have been sent to the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. If that message were taken alone, Mr. Counsel, it would carry that military significance. It is, of course, primarily of naval interest. It should always be remembered that it was well known to everyone in the Intelligence Departments of the two services that the Japanese were following as closely as they possibly could the movement of all of our warships.

I remember on several occasions going to Admiral Kirk's or Admiral Wilkinson's secret room in the Navy Department and looking at his big map of the positions of the Japanese warships. Everybody was doing it. Furthermore, it is rather interesting [2100] to note that in that same volume, if one counts the number of messages similar to this which was sent to Hawaii or eliciting information from naval movements in Hawaii, which were translated before December 7, we find 24 of them, of which only 4 were received in the month preceding Pearl Harbor. Similar messages concerning naval movements in Panama, however, there were 20, and there were 5 in

the month preceding Pearl Harbor. Similar messages regarding the Philippines, there are 56 in the book, 16 received in the month before Pearl Harbor.

So that my answer to that question is that this message taken alone would have been of great military significance but it was not taken alone unless you look at it by hindsight, which focuses all right on the event which did happen. It was one of a great number of messages being sent by the Japanese to various parts of the world in their attempt to follow the movements of our naval vessels, a matter which we knew perfectly well they were doing, and which we ourselves were doing in regard to the Japanese.

Mr. GESELL. Why do you say this message is of great military significance standing alone?

General MILES. That would indicate they were interested in one place and one place only and it is the detail of Pearl Harbor.

[2101] Mr. GESELL. It is really, is it not, looking at it as one message alone, and, if you will, from hindsight, a plan for laying out what amounts to a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. That is exactly what it looks like now, sir, now that we know Pearl Harbor was bombed.

Mr. GESELL. You say there are similar messages in this book which were intercepted prior to December 7. Will you find me one such message, General?

General MILES. Concerning Hawaii?

Mr. GESELL. Or concerning any other point in which the Japanese were interested. Will you find me one message which is similar to this one?

General MILES. Well, if you mean similar in dividing the harbor into sections, there are no such messages that I know of, but all of the messages here from page 2 to page 16 in this book, all are concerned with information requested of or received by the Japanese on movements in Hawaii.

[2102] Mr. GESELL. Well, you recognize, do you not, General, that this message, looking at it now in the cold light of this hearing room, is quite different than just a ship-movement message, is it not? They are not anxious to find ship movements. They did not even want to know much about the ships that are at the wharves. They want to know the ones that are at anchor.

General MILES. The question is what?

Mr. GESELL. Would you consider this a ship-movement report?

General MILES. No. It is primarily a message dividing up the waters of Pearl Harbor into convenient areas for reporting the presence of ships, United States warships.

Mr. GESELL. There is no other message like this in this exhibit, is there, General?

General MILES. I have not found any, sir, similar to this in the sense of dividing any particular waters, although I think you will find in the Philippines messages questions of currents in Subic Bay, I remember a message if my memory is not at fault, and other naval information which might lead one to expect an attack in Philippine waters.

Mr. GESELL. Would it be a fair statement to say that one of the functions and responsibilities of a properly organized and functioning

military intelligence division [2103] would have been to single out this message, recognize its difference from the other message and attempt to evaluate its significance?

General MILES. Yes, sir, but we did not give it the significance at that time that it now has in the light of subsequent events.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, do you recall any discussion of this message with your staff, any review or critique of its importance?

General MILES. I do not. I recall discussing, I think, this message or certain such messages with my naval colleague, to whom they particularly applied even more than to the Army.

Mr. GESELL. Admiral Wilkinson you are referring to?

General MILES. Admiral Wilkinson after he joined; Admiral Kirk before.

Mr. GESELL. And what is your recollection of those discussions?

General MILES. My recollection is not very specific. I think that my naval colleagues agreed that it was perfectly normal for the Japanese to be searching in all areas for the position of our ships and certain specific information about the harbors occupied by our ships, or the waters.

Mr. GESELL. But this is neither of those. This is the [2104] specific location and situation of the ships in a particular harbor, is it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, do you recall discussing this message with Admiral Wilkinson or any of your other naval colleagues?

General MILES. I do not specifically recall discussing this message.

Mr. GESELL. Now, this message that was translated on October 9 and sent on September 24 was followed by other messages, was it not, messages translated prior to December 7 which indicated that the Japanese were implementing and following the pattern laid out in this particular message?

I refer, for example, to the one of November 15 on page 13 of the exhibit, where there is a message setting forth the code to be used in designating the various areas, and to another message on that page stating, under date of November 15, translated December 3:

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Do you recall seeing those messages?

General MILES. I believe I saw both of those messages, [2105] sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, do you recall finally on this subject, General Miles, seeing the message on page 15 of this exhibit from Honolulu to Tokyo, under date of November 29, translated December 5, which had this—

Mr. GEARHART. Pardon me. That was from Tokyo to Honolulu, wasn't it?

Mr. GESELL. From Tokyo to Honolulu, yes.

Mr. GEARHART. You had it just the reverse.

Mr. GESELL. Thank you, Congressman Gearhart.

Containing this single sentence:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

At page 15 of the exhibit do you recall that message?

General MILES. I believe I saw that message, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, those three subsequent messages which I have just directed your attention to gave added significance, did they not, to the message translated on October 9 to which I first called your attention?

General MILES. They did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did those added messages lead to any discussion or further consideration as to the appropriateness or desirability of sending specific information on this subject [2106] to Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Not that I remember, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I noticed and I am sure the committee and all of us have noticed here, General Miles, that many significant military messages and, indeed, other significant messages in this magic category were not translated until after December 7 although sent often substantial periods of time before that date. You have noted that in looking at some of these exhibits, have you not?

General MILES. I have, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I understood you to testify that the responsibility for translating the messages was placed in the Signal Corps of the Army as far as the Army intercepts were concerned?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, what steps did you take, if any, to encourage a more prompt and expeditious translation of these messages as they were intercepted?

General MILES. I remember no specific steps which I took. The S. I. S. was not under my direction. I do remember, however, discussing the matter and finding that it was primarily a question of personnel and of very markedly increased traffic. It took time to decode the cryptic messages, it took time to translate from Japanese into English. The [2107] S. I. S. and Naval Communications, like all other branches of the Army and Navy at that time, were much limited in personnel and in facilities.

Mr. GESELL. You say you recall discussing this matter with someone or you simply recall the conditions that prevailed? I did not quite understand you.

General MILES. I recall discussing the matter to the extent of arriving at the opinion that was the situation in Naval Communications and S. I. S. I do not specifically recall the exact incident of any particular discussion.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, it was perfectly apparent during these latter months before the attack that the situation between us and Japan was becoming more and more critical, was it not?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GESELL. All of you in G-2 would have been more and more interested in the prompt interception and translation and examination of these magic messages as they came in?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, under those circumstances and seeing as we do here from the messages that those translated before the seventh contained vital diplomatic and military information, it would seem to me to have been appropriate to take some steps to assure a prompt translation of the [2108] messages, or do I understand you

to say that you simply inquired as to the reason but you took no steps to facilitate the prompter translation?

General MILES. I assured myself that the men and facilities were doing all that they could do to get those messages out promptly. I was not able to furnish them with any additional specialists, nor with any additional equipment.

I do not like to go into the details of even the fact that I knew about the methods we used; I cannot.

Mr. GESELL. No; we do not expect you to.

General MILES. But I think it is safe to say that they are not easy to reproduce.

Mr. GESELL. Well, was any effort made to get additional manpower of this specialized type that may have been required?

General MILES. I think that manpower was being provided as fast as the two services could provide it. It had to be very specially trained manpower.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall ever having discussed with the Chief of Staff the desirability of increasing the forces and facilities for the interception and translation of these messages?

General MILES. No, sir, I do not recall bringing that matter up to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. Turning to this exhibit 2, which I believe [2109] is still before you, General Miles, I want to direct your attention to certain messages which were sent prior to the seventh but translated subsequent to the seventh.

There is a message on page 17, for example——

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, when you say "sent" you mean sent from——

Mr. GESELL. Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu?

Mr. GESELL. Tokyo to Honolulu or Washington, a Japanese message.

The CHAIRMAN. They are all Japanese messages?

Mr. GESELL. They are all Japanese messages.

On page 17 the message of November 24, where Tokyo was advised concerning mine laying operations outside Pearl Harbor, the maneuvering activities of the U. S. Fleet and the time that the vessels lay in harbor.

On page 19 the message of November 28 where Tokyo was advised that there was usually one cruiser in the waters south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor.

The message on page 20 of December 1 where more detailed information concerning fleet maneuvers in operational areas was given, with schedules of departures and return of battleships.

[2110] The message on page 21 of December 2, where Tokyo asked for information concerning barrage balloons and antimine nets.

The message on page 22 of December 3 where an agent in Honolulu sent detailed information concerning land signals to be given by flashing lights, ads in newspapers, and so forth.

The message on page 26 in December, an urgent request for information as to movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor since the 4th of December.

The message of December 6, on pages 27 and 28, where Honolulu gave Tokyo further information concerning barrage balloons and stated:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

And further stated:

In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets.

And, finally, the message on page 29 of December 6th, where Honolulu reported:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

[2111] Now, with those messages in mind is it fair to state that if facilities had been available for the more prompt translation of these intercepted messages we would have had more than ample data in our hands to indicate that there was to be a surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Those messages would certainly have indicated the strong possibility, if not actual probability, of such an attack.

I think I failed to state, sir, that it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in Washington for the decoding and translation of those messages, but also very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out of the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the same station. There was no one station that could have picked them up.

In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the few messages emanating from Japan itself was Manila.

Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by which they could promptly transmit the message intercepted to Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in Washington by air mail.

So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington, but also the actual intercepting of the message in the field [2112] and the transmission of those messages to Washington.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question? Those messages that you read last are messages that were sent from Tokyo or Honolulu and were not translated or decoded until after Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GESELL. That is right. They are all Japanese messages which were not in translated form available, as far as these records show, prior to the attack.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Counsel does not want to leave the impression that all the messages referred to are in that category, because there were several that were translated before.

Mr. GESELL. I took it Senator Lucas referred to this last bit of reading and not the first messages I have discussed.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask counsel whether he has indicated in his questions how far back prior to Pearl Harbor these messages went out that were not translated until after Pearl Harbor? Did you indicate that?

Mr. GESELL. I have indicated in most instances the date that the message was sent out. I think the ones to which I referred were all sent subsequent to November 24, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. And prior to the 7th of December?

[2113] Mr. GESELL. And prior to the 7th of December.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, I think it might be helpful if counsel will be kind enough to point out, the first one on page 16 of the exhibit, dated November 24, 1941, shows that was translated December 16, 1941. That is what counsel has in mind, is it?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. And running all the way through this exhibit to page 31 it shows messages received and translated from a few days to a few weeks after they were received.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct; and quite a number on the 8th and the 10th and the 11th and some of them later than that.

General MILES. In the desire to make the record accurate it might be pointed out, I think, that certainly the message on page 26 from Tokyo to Honolulu, which was dated Tokyo, December 6, could not possibly have been translated even with the best facilities until early in the morning of the seventh. Tokyo on the 6th—yes, it might be on the 5th, that is right. And from there on the messages are dated the 6th of December.

Mr. GESELL. General, I meant to ask you—

Mr. GEARHART. That is Tokyo time on the 6th?

General MILES. Tokyo and Honolulu.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

[2114] Mr. GESELL. I meant to ask you, General, a little earlier. After the war started did the War Department change its procedure in respect of transmitting to the area commanders information from these magic sources?

General MILES. I believe not, sir; not to my knowledge. That was always regarded up to the termination of the Japanese war as a very important vital military secret.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I wish to read a paragraph to you from your affidavit given to Col. Henry C. Clausen under date of August 16, 1945 and ask if you will give to the committee a full statement concerning the matters covered in this paragraph. The paragraph reads as follows:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called 'Magic', or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmon and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning [2115] the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

General MILES. That statement is literally correct. I regret that it was worded that way because it has been twisted out of its meaning entirely and I think very unfairly to the Chief of Staff.

What happened, of course, was preceding that I appeared before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in early April 1944, when we were in the

midst of our war with Japan. We were approaching the crisis, if you like. We had not landed in Leyte, we had not fought the battle for the Leyte Gulf. We were in the midst of a great war and this was a military secret of incalculable value to the United States in that war, the secret that we could break that code and were breaking that code. It might well have been worth to us many thousands of valuable American lives. I knew that perfectly well.

I am sorry I mentioned the Chief of Staff because under no conditions would I have appeared before the Army Board or any other group and intimated in any way the existence of that secret without specific authority of the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff.

Now, when I made that affidavit to Colonel Clausen the [2116] situation had changed entirely. The war with Japan was over; Japan had surrendered. Colonel Clausen came to my headquarters in Boston with the written authority from the Secretary of War to take my testimony on any and all subjects.

He suggested, however, that the affidavit which he himself wrote from the conversations that he had had with me, all under oath, he suggested that my affidavit, which became part of his record, be tied in with my testimony before the Grunert Board, the Army Board, and I think he drafted or maybe I drafted that paragraph that the counsel has just read.

That, gentlemen, is the whole situation there. I was not gagged by the Chief of Staff or in any way suggesting that I should do anything to cover up anything other than this vital military secret that we were all guarding with the greatest of care.

[2117] Mr. GESELL. General Miles, the Army Board held top secret sessions at which magic information was discussed by a number of witnesses. Were you called to testify in the top secret sessions relating to magic?

General MILES. I was not.

Mr. GESELL. You were aware that such sessions were held, were you not?

General MILES. Not at that time, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, General Miles, I want to turn to another subject. You referred to your liaison with the State Department, which I gather was maintained by you and by officers acting under, your direction, and you indicated that information was transmitted in both directions, that G-2 gave information to the State Department and the State Department gave information to G-2.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I want to ask you some specific questions concerning information which may or may not have been given by the State Department to G-2. The first question has to do with the *modus vivendi*, which I believe you have become familiar with, at least sitting here waiting for your turn to testify. Do you recall whether or not the Department of State discussed with you, or officers acting under your direction, the question of the *modus vivendi*, and whether or not that should or should not be submitted in a note to the [2118] Japanese Ambassadors?

General MILES. I have no recollection of any such occurrence. I feel very sure that I would have remembered it had I been consulted, and I feel very certain of being able to make the statement that I was not consulted.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, you were not advised, were you, in any way, when the decision was reached by the State Department to send the 10-point note and not to send the *modus vivendi* on November 26, 1941?

General MILES. I was not, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Department of State advise you, to your recollection, that they had received information from various representatives in South American countries to the effect that the Japanese representatives to those South American countries had been sounding out South American governments as to their attitude in the event of war between the United States and Japan?

General MILES. I have no recollection of that, sir. I would have to check the records to see if it was ever transmitted through my liaison officer from the State Department.

Mr. GESELL. The exhibit in evidence indicates that at least some of that information was sent to military authorities, and I wondered if it had been a matter of any [2119] discussion, or had come to your attention specifically?

General MILES. I do not remember at this time having those matters brought to my attention.

Mr. MURPHY. Will counsel state what exhibit that is?

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 31.

With respect to the message to the Emperor, do you recall any consultations or any information coming to you from the State Department concerning that message?

General MILES. I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Would you have been the officer that the State Department would have been most likely to consult under the liaison conditions which prevailed at that time, or did that come under the province of that other department of the General Staff?

General MILES. The liaison, Mr. Gesell, was maintained for the exchange of information. It did not, of itself, include any provision for consultation with the Military Intelligence Division by anyone. Generally speaking, the Military Intelligence Division was not consulted on the actions or decisions arrived at by the State Department.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know whether other officers of the War Department were consulted in that connection?

General MILES. I only know through listening to testimony that I have heard in this room.

[2120] Mr. GESELL. Do you recall whether or not the War Department, and specifically the Military Intelligence Division, was consulted or whether its opinion was asked by the Department of State or the President, as to the appropriateness of applying embargoes and freezing orders against the Japanese?

General MILES. I can recall no action on which the Military Intelligence Division was consulted by the Department of State in those matters.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall discussing those problems in memoranda submitted to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. I do.

Mr. GESELL. I notice, referring to exhibit 33, a series of memoranda on that subject. No. 7 of July 25, 1941, particularly paragraph 9, and item No. 9, memorandum of August 16, 1941—

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Counsel, if I may make a suggestion, it seems to me that is important enough to have it read into the record at this time. It will be done sooner or later.

Mr. GESELL. Very well, I will read the paragraphs to which I refer.

On item 7, paragraph 9 of the memorandum of July 25, 1941, signed by you, General Miles, addressed to the Chief of Staff, and copies apparently were distributed to the [2121] Secretary of War and other officers, the 9th paragraph reads as follows:

Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by us, today, would not, in the opinion of this division, force Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by Japan. Such action on our part need not and should not distract our attention from the main theatre of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a policy, we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when we place them in Japanese hands.

Item 9, the memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated August 16, 1941, reading paragraph 6, which is another memorandum signed by you, which was distributed to the President, the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the War Plans Division, Office of Naval Intelligence, and General Embick, reads as follows:

Considering all of the above, this division believes that forceful diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan, including the application of ever-increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the [2122] best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area, and of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

Item 16 of September 23, 1941, signed by you, and distributed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, reading from paragraph 7, states:

This division still believes as stated in IB-112 dated August 16, 1941, that forceful diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan, including the application of ever-increasing and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area, and also the hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

The memorandum of October 2, 1941, item 17, to the Chief of Staff, again sent to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and others, this one being signed by Hayes A. Kroner of your staff, refers to this matter in several paragraphs, and I am reading from paragraph 10, the following:

This division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders, nor economic concessions at this time [2123] would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically, and militarily for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition precedent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity not to attack Russia in Siberia.

There is then a discussion again of your position concerning economic sanctions in the same terms as before.

Item 28:

Item 28, December 5, 1941, to the Chief of Staff, reading just prior to paragraph 7 thereof, an unnumbered paragraph as follows:

Our influence in the Far Eastern theatre lies in the threat of our naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan, we could launch a serious offensive here by naval and air forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such an attack would fall [2124] short of a major strategic offensive, because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

That again was signed by you, and sent to a number of officers.

And tab A—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire what exhibit counsel is reading from?

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit No. 33.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by tab A?

Mr. GESELL. Oh, that tab A, is attached to the last memorandum I read, item 28.

Now, those statements, and I believe there are others in this exhibit, General Miles, indicate that you were preparing memoranda supporting the idea of economic sanctions over a period of months preceding Pearl Harbor, and that this memoranda, while addressed to the Chief of Staff, were also distributed to the President and the Secretary of State. I wondered if you could give us a better idea of the circumstances under which the question of economic sanctions was reviewed by you, and why these memoranda were prepared?

General MILES. These memoranda were prepared in the [2125] face of a constantly increasing diplomatic crisis, and accurately express our then views as to what we believed should be the general policy of the United States vis-à-vis Japan. We arrived at that conclusion from long study of the Military Intelligence Division as such of the economic psychological factors of Japan, and, rightly or wrongly, they were our views as to the best means of gaining what we then assumed to be and what has transpired to be the national objective.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I just clear the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

[2126] Senator FERGUSON. The reason I was not able to identify the exhibit is I thought counsel was referring to a pamphlet with tabs on his pamphlet. I saw him reading from a pamphlet with tabs, and I have not received such a copy. I inquired from counsel what it was. I have just received a copy so I know now what he was talking about.

Mr. GESELL. Senator, I am sure there is a misunderstanding. The items I was reading from are shown in the index of the copy. The tabs I was referring to are not the tabs on the copy you have.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted to explain. I thought you were referring to the book you had having tabs, and I thought that you were referring to those tabs.

Mr. GESELL. I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. I could not identify exhibit 33, because my exhibit 33 had no short tabs, and I now see that the other members of

the committee have them with tabs on. I have been unable to get such a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. There is supposed to be one for each member, but it seems that all the members do not have tabs on their copies, and therefore the Chair suggests that the tabs be furnished to all members.

Mr. GESELL. I believe we have one for each member of the committee.

[2127] I was inquiring, General, whether those views, as expressed in these memoranda at the time, were solicited from you as the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff by the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of State, or the President, or whether they were submitted by you voluntarily, so to speak, giving your position on an important subject?

General MILES. They were certainly not solicited by the President or the Secretary of State. I am not sure whether they were solicited by the Chief of Staff or not. It was a matter of routine for the Military Intelligence Division to prepare such memoranda for the Chief of Staff in situations in which it would appear that it might be useful to him.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, you were giving him the considered views of your department on matters of moment in the Japanese relations?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now during this period were you consulted at all in connection with the question of the need of getting a delay, or obtaining a delay through negotiations or otherwise, so that the maximum military preparations could be made?

General MILES. I knew that it was the desire of the War Department Chief of Staff, Secretary of War, that we obtain as much time as possible to increase particularly the forces in the Philippines, particularly the air forces in the [2128] Philippines.

Mr. GESELL. Did you participate in the drafting of the joint memorandum of November 5 which Admiral Stark and General Marshall submitted to the President? Are you familiar with that memorandum?

General MILES. I have seen that memorandum, and so far as my recollection goes, I am fairly certain in saying I had no part in its drafting.

Mr. GESELL. Your participation in that matter then was confined to making an estimate of the possibility of Japanese advance in the area of China which was under discussion at that time?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted at all in connection with the Joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President under date of November 27? Are you familiar with that memorandum?

General MILES. I would like to refresh my memory. Can you refer to it, or let me see it?

Mr. GESELL. That is Exhibit 17. Perhaps this would be an appropriate place to adjourn, Mr. Chairman. The witness can be shown that over the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, November 30, 1945.)

[2129]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2130] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will proceed with General Miles.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

Mr. GESELL. General Miles, I understand that you have one or two matters that you wish to bring to the committee's attention by way of amendment of your testimony yesterday. Would you please do that before we get under way?

General MILES. Yes, sir. There are a few points that I note in reading the transcript in which I was not as clear as I might be.

On page 2071 of the transcript, you suggested in a question to me that the digests and estimates of the Military Intelligence Division which I had referred to as static information had little evaluation material contained therein. It was a fairly long question, and I answered, "Generally speaking, yes, sir. But we also, of course, express definite opinion as to the efficiency of the various forces that we were discussing."

That is not wholly a complete answer. The digests and estimates on foreign countries were thoroughly evaluated. We had plenty of time, generally, to do that as they were static and encyclopedic information.

Mr. GESELL. Before you go on with that, I gathered [2131] from the testimony when you referred to static information, you meant background information as opposed to information requiring some immediate action. Would that be a fair statement?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

On page 2094 of the transcript, you asked:

Would it be fair to say that this magic information was the most reliable and authentic information which the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and activities?

My reply was, "Yes, sir."

That also is an inadequate reply. It was the most reliable and authentic information which we received as to Japanese diplomatic intentions and activities, the activities, as far as we could read them, of the controlling Japanese Government. But we went much further afield in seeking information of Japanese military intentions and activities.

Then on page 2108, you asked, "Was any effort made"—by the Military Intelligence Division—"to get additional manpower of this specialized type"—SIS—"that may have been required?"

I replied, "I think that manpower was being provided as fast as the two services could provide it. It had to be [2132] very specially trained manpower."

That also is an inadequate answer. As a matter of fact, as I have since looked up and found, we, for many months before Pearl Harbor, were lending to SIS one of our specially trained language officers. We ran through at least five whose names we can now remember, and one of them was on duty at the time of Pearl Harbor. We were not permitted by the personnel policies of the War Department to lend more than one at a time.

There was a limitation on actual number of officers allowed the Military Intelligence Division.

We also furnished the SIS from time to time the names of civilians who were competent to do this work. That had to be a very special selection. In the first place telegraphic Japanese is a language within a language. There were very few people then and there are very few people now capable of translating it into English.

Furthermore, we had to be particularly careful as to security. We could have probably gotten a considerable number of Nisei Japanese to do this work, but we were limited always, not only to American citizens, but to American citizens whom we knew, and knew all about. Specifically, two young men were furnished that we can remember to SIS, whom we very carefully went over and provided.

[2133] Lastly, I would like to expand, if I may, my answer to your request for a general description of the operations of the Military Intelligence Division, found on pages 2060 and 2061 of the transcript.

Beginning with the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Branch, with which this committee is mostly concerned, I should like to note that the operations of that branch can perhaps be best judged summarily by a glance at the summary of far eastern documents which is now a part of the record before this committee, and which is supported by some 15 volumes of photostats of the actual documents gotten out and disseminated in the same way by the Far Eastern Section in the years 1937-41.

Then going out from that particular section, let me note the four sections concerned in the Intelligence Division in Europe, and the Empire Section. We were still primarily concerned, up to November 1941, with the European war, the outcome of that war. We were still feverishly preparing for what we called hemispheric defense. The success of German arms was the most obvious threat to the Western Hemisphere.

We were lining up against the Axis with our lease-lend, and other means, but hemispheric defense was vulnerable through the bulge of Brazil.

[2134] That brings up the Latin-American Section of the Military Intelligence Division. Intelligence Branch, we will say, or subsection.

A side line of all of this work was the several Army schools into which we fitted Latin-American officers, arranged for their transportation to and fro, and so forth.

We also conducted two quite extensive tours for senior Latin-American officers through our training camps, and war plants.

[2135] The Dissemination Section prepared and sent out to the Army a series of tentative lessons, special bulletins on the war then waging. We were trying desperately to furnish our own people, the expanding Army, with information as to how the new war was being waged and what developments were taking place.

What did the Air Corps want to know? What did the Ordnance want to know, the Medical Corps, and so forth? We had a New York office which eventually furnished, and it was at that time furnishing, a great deal of information, later used by the Air Forces in their bombing targets. We got this information from certain civilian concerns that had detailed information of German and even of Japanese installations of great importance.

But that was only a very small part of it. Our Counter-Intelligence Branch was very extensive. We were one of the three agencies in Washington especially designated by the President to concern ourselves with all counter-intelligence activities, and we worked with two other agencies, the FBI and ONI in great detail.

The whole question of plant protection was up at that time, and the question of sabotage, strikes, labor agitation, and so forth; recommendations on the applications of aliens for employment in classified contracts, all had to be passed [2135] through us. We even sat on a committee with the FBI and ONI in the State Department passing on all passport controls issued by the Government at that time.

We were organizing and schooling and training a corps of intelligence police, something new that had to be put in in time of war.

We wrote the first antififth-column plan ever drawn up in the United States, and had considerable difficulty in writing it.

We also put into the Army a counter-subversive system by which we could gage, I hoped we could gage, any subversive activities going in the Army itself.

We ran Army extension courses in Military Intelligence for the Reserve officers and for newly appointed officers.

The geographic section of the Plans and Training Branch was expanding enormously. We knew the need very definitely for maps of all sort, and we were coordinating. We were the only coordinating branch for military graphic information between the various agencies of the Government then producing maps, such as the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and so forth, and our own Engineer Air Corps mapping activities.

In addition to that, of course, we ran all our own military attachés and took care of all the foreign military attachés and missions here in Washington. We ran language [2137] schools in Japanese

and Chinese and Russian for our own officers. We had a translation section doing an enormous amount of work in translation of various documents and magazine articles, and so forth, which were appearing of interest to the service.

We ran an office in New York which got out six foreign-language dictionaries, the only ones that were in existence when we actually got into war. They were, as I remember, German, French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and Russian.

Mr. GESELL. I think, General, that gives us an idea of the very divergent and extensive activities of the division.

General MILES. I do not want to extend it too long. Simply in the interest of the division of which I was immensely proud, I want to get before the committee the fact that we were doing quite a number of things in those days.

Mr. GESELL. I meant to ask you, in that connection, when we were discussing your military experience, whether prior to becoming G-2 you had ever had any experience in the intelligence field?

General MILES. Yes, sir; quite a lot. I first joined Military Intelligence as a young officer in 1912 when I went abroad as military attaché for five countries, later ending up in Russia in the last war as an observer for the Russian Army. I mean the next to the last war. I served other times [2138] as military attaché. I served in the Military Division immediately after the First World War and also as an officer attached to the American Peace Commission in 1919.

Mr. GESELL. I think when we closed yesterday I had asked you whether you had anything to do with the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President under date of November 27, which is exhibit 17 in this hearing.

General MILES. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I had no hand in it.

Mr. GESELL. Now, before going on, I want to return to the intercepts for a moment to see if I can clarify one or two points.

I asked you yesterday whether any of the messages which had been intercepted and translated were sent to the overseas departments and particularly Hawaii by the Army, and you said they were not.

Now, I want to be sure we understand. I take it your testimony is that the text of the messages as intercepted was not so transmitted; is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct, and also the essential information was not generally transmitted; in fact, it was only in rare cases.

Mr. GESELL. That is the point I wanted to get at. The same considerations which you have testified to of security [2139] which governed not sending the actual text of the message to Hawaii, let's say, applied equally as far as paraphrases or summaries or gists of the messages is concerned; is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct; and I would like to revert to what I said yesterday, that the heart and essence of this very important secret was the fact that we could break this code, not the message itself, and had the Japanese learned that we were transmitting, say to Hawaii, information which we could have received only by breaking their code, the secret would have been out just as clearly as if we had sent the text of the message itself.

Mr. GESELL. Now, you did state, at page 2091 :

In some cases the substance of some messages were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code.

Could you amplify that for us? That indicates that a summary or substance or gist of whatever you want to call it of the message was sent by the Navy, as you state, in some cases. Did the Army have anything to do with that?

General MILES. Oh, yes, sir. We certainly knew that it was being sent by Navy and that was quite satisfactory to us. I remember two cases specifically when we first learned from [2140] magic that orders had been issued by the Japanese to certain embassies and legations to burn their codes and I think you will find that that information was transmitted by Navy to the overseas departments, or to the fleet, which meant the same thing.

Mr. GESELL. You are referring then to what were in effect joint messages which were sent by the Army and Navy when something of a special significance such as that developed; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir; they were joint in the sense that we had every reason to believe, thought we had, that a message sent by Navy code would always be transmitted by them to their opposite numbers in the Army command.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any understanding that the Navy as a regular matter of practice was sending to Hawaii the information contained in these magic intercepts?

General MILES. I knew they were not doing so as a regular matter of practice for the reasons I have given, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I gather, then, from your testimony that your reference at page 2091 which I read, in some cases the substance being sent by the Navy, had to do with very special circumstances and didn't relate to a general practice of sending out that information?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

[2141] Mr. GESELL. In those instances, where the Navy sent the information, was that after consultation with you or someone on your staff?

General MILES. I believe I am correct in saying it was at least, I am sure, with our knowledge.

Mr. GESELL. Were you aware of the fact that over the period up to July 1941 the Navy had been sending to their representatives in Hawaii rather detailed summaries and in some cases the actual text of intercepted magic messages?

General MILES. I believe that I must have been aware of it at that time, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Was that under any arrangement or understanding with the Army?

General MILES. That I do not remember specifically, but I do know that during all that period our liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence was such as to make me believe that it was our understanding.

Mr. GESELL. Well, were you aware of the fact that in July 1941, or thereabouts, the Navy discontinued that practice and ceased sending such detailed summaries of the intercepts to Hawaii?

General MILES. I believe, for the reasons that I have given, that is, liaison, that I must have been aware of that fact at that time.

[2142] Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with the question of discontinuing the sending of that information?

General MILES. I do not remember specifically being consulted but I do remember clearly that during that summer and the months preceding Pearl Harbor we were at all times progressively closing in on this secret, trying to protect the essential secret that we were breaking codes.

Mr. GESELL. Do I gather from that then that the decision to discontinue the distribution of this magic information through Navy channels, which appears to have taken effect sometime in July 1941, was a joint decision of the Army and the Navy for security reasons?

General MILES. It was certainly based on a joint policy of the Army and Navy to close in on this secret. Now, just what conferences were held I am not at this time able to recollect.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall participating in any conferences on that?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall any consideration being given to the question whether the discontinuance was of such a nature that the theater commanders should be advised that a change in policy was taking place?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not now recall any such [2143] discussion.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know whether Admiral Kimmel or General Short was advised that a more tight control of this information for security reasons was being inaugurated?

General MILES. They were not so advised to my knowledge.

Mr. GESELL. Was it your understanding that the information that the Navy was sending prior to July was information which would be passed on to the Army representatives at Hawaii?

General MILES. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. GESELL. Did you give consideration then to advising the Army representatives at Hawaii that the information would not be sent after, say, sometime in July?

General MILES. No, not specifically. I don't think we had ever informed them that they were getting this magic. The Navy was giving them the essence of certain information we received from magic, but I do not remember that they had been informed of the source, nor was there any reason, therefore, to tell them we were discontinuing that particular source.

Mr. GESELL. Now, when I have been asking you whether that magic information was distributed by the Army to Hawaii and you have answered in the negative, your answer applies to the entire War Department, does it not, not just to G-2, since the dissemination of information was a responsibility [2144] of G-2?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, just how far, General, did this question of security go in this regard? To take an extreme case, assuming you had intercepted a message in which the Japanese said that they planned to attack Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December at dawn. I take it I am correct in assuming that that message would have been transmitted to Hawaii for their information?

General MILES. It would have been, by the Chief of Staff. I think that case is similar to the one which actually occurred on the morning

of December 7. We didn't know where this attack was coming but we very much feared an attack would come coincident with the 1 p. m. delivery of the Japanese reply and my action then was to bring this to the notice of the Chief of Staff so that an additional warning would be sent out.

Mr. GESELL. Am I correct that where the information from the intercepts was of such a nature that you felt it required some specific action by the commanders at Hawaii, you would bring that information to the attention of the Chief of Staff so that he might take such action as he felt necessary in advising the Hawaiian officers of the information you had?

[2145] General MILES. That is absolutely correct. G-2 had to be very careful that the information that he sent to General Short or General MacArthur didn't, ipso facto, practically force their hands into some definite military decision of importance. If the Chief of Staff desired such information to be sent to them, which would affect their military dispositions or inaugurate their war plans, it should definitely come through the command channels.

[2146] Mr. GESELL. Then, in other words, while you weren't as a matter of fact or procedure sending the text of the messages, or the gist of them, or a summary of them to the theaters, it was, even in the face of these security considerations, always open to the Chief of Staff to send specific instructions or directions to the commanders at Hawaii or the Philippines, or elsewhere, based on the information which had been obtained from the intercepts?

General MILES. That is true; and at that point I think I should like to go further and point out that from early August, I think it was the 5th of August, 1941, we discontinued, by direction of the Chief of Staff, presenting magic in evaluated form, so the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division Section of War, were, from then on, doing their own evaluation of the raw material that we were presenting to them in the form of magic.

Mr. GESELL. You mean that from August on, G-2 had no responsibility to evaluate the intercepted material?

General MILES. No, sir, I do not mean that, but I do mean that our responsibility in that respect was somewhat lessened by the direction of the Chief of Staff that he wanted not only the evaluation of the Military Intelligence Division, he wanted the material itself presented, the raw material itself, presented to him.

[2147] Mr. GESELL. But it was always still open to you to go to the Chief of Staff or any other officer concerned and present orally your evaluation of the circumstances?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. On the other hand, the Chief of Staff and the other officers that you mentioned also had in their hands the raw material to make their own evaluation?

General MILES. That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. That is the point.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. There is another point in the record that is not quite clear on this point. I asked you whether the Army had facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating and decoding the magic material and you answered "no." You referred to a Navy intercept station at

Hawaii. Do you know whether or not the Navy had facilities at Hawaii which enabled them to intercept, translate and decode the magic messages?

General MILES. I believe not, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, was that condition at Hawaii the same condition as prevailed in the other overseas departments or was it, on the contrary, the fact that in the Philippines, or in some other points, facilities were available for interception, translation and decoding of these magic [2148] messages?

General MILES. There were no Army facilities capable of performing all three of those functions outside of Washington.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know whether there were naval facilities at any point outside of Washington capable of performing those three functions?

General MILES. Of that, I am not sure, sir, and would much prefer that the question be answered by the naval witnesses who will appear before the committee.

Mr. GESELL. We will ask Admiral Wilkinson that question when he takes the stand.

Now, on the mechanical side—

General MILES. May I make one point clear?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

General MILES. My testimony is perhaps not quite clear. I understood, sir, that you were referring to all three of these functions when you spoke of Hawaii, and I said we had no service capable of performing all these three functions. I now know there was a monitoring station in Hawaii capable of picking the Japanese codes out of the air, but that is all they could do.

Mr. GESELL. The coded messages?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[2149] Mr. GESELL. But they couldn't read them.

Mr. KEEFE. That was an Army station?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It had no reference to the Communications Commission monitoring stations out there?

General MILES. As well as the FCC. I understand there was also an FCC and a Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. I wanted to be sure what you were referring to in your testimony was the Army.

General MILES. That was the question I was asked, Mr. Congressman, the Army.

Mr. GESELL. Well, do you know whether or not the Federal Communications Commission had any facilities at Hawaii such as would make it possible for them to perform these three functions of intercepting or monitoring, translating, and decoding?

General MILES. I know that they did not, at Hawaii or any other place.

Mr. GESELL. And so far as the Army is concerned, the only place where these three functions could be performed was at Washington, D. C.?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, we have been referring to these magic communications, and I think perhaps we ought to [2150] clarify on the

record just what facilities the Japanese were using for transmitting the messages. Am I correct in understanding that their messages were sent by radio in most instances?

General MILES. In most instances, I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, there were other facilities for communication available to the Japanese, were there not?

General MILES. There were.

[2115] Mr. GESELL. They could, of course, use the mails to communicate back and forth. Was there any scrutiny of the mails?

General MILES. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, it is also apparent, is it not, that the Japanese could have used the commercial cable system?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Were we in a position to monitor messages sent over commercial cables?

General MILES. I believe we were, but I deliberately did not know anything about the details of how we got the messages from the commercial cables. It was not within my scope and I thought the less I knew about it the better.

Mr. GESELL. Would that be a subject to be considered with appropriate officers of the Signal Service?

General MILES. Yes, sir. They would know more about it than I do.

Mr. GESELL. Would your answer be the same with respect to telephonic communications?

General MILES. There was a law of Congress on the books in those days, sir, that imposed pretty heavy penalties on tapping telephone wires. So far as I know it was not done by the Army.

Mr. GESELL. Either telephone wires here or telephone [2152] wires in and out of Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. That applied to all American territory, sir.

Mr. GESELL. In referring to the laws you are referring to the provisions of the Federal Communication Act, are you?

General MILES. I do not remember which act it was, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, when a message was intercepted, I gather from what you say in your previous testimony that it might have been intercepted by the Army or it might have been intercepted by the Navy?

General MILES. Yes, sir, or the Federal Communications Commission.

Mr. GESELL. Now, did the Army and the Navy each receive the text of the Japanese message intercepted regardless of which branch did the actual interception?

General MILES. That is a detail of the joint operation of the S. I. S. and naval communications that I do not know, sir, but you will have witnesses before you who can answer that question.

Mr. GESELL. Now, at this time, General Miles, were there any orders in effect which required G-2 to send particular types of information to the overseas commanders?

General MILES. No, sir, only the general provisions [2153] of Army regulation 10-15 that put the responsibility for the dissemination of information—a broad term—in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. GESELL. What I was getting at was this: Take the position of any overseas commander such as General Short who, presumably, would be familiar with Army Regulations and procedure; I was wondering whether he in such a position had under prevailing orders and regulations any reason to feel that any particular type of information would be disseminated to him as a matter of course?

General MILES. I do not know that that would be covered by any orders or regulations. By the custom of the service I am sure that an officer of the experience of General Short or General MacArthur would have known that the Military Intelligence Division was supplying his command, and had been for some time, with a great deal of what we have called static information, a great deal of information on a possible enemy such as Japan, and by that the Japanese Army, and so forth, and that the War Department itself, the General Staff itself, would, one branch or another, supply him with information which would affect his military movements or instigate the war plans.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, my question is a bit more precise than that. I take it that he would from past practice have [2154] a reason to feel that certain information would be sent him, but my question was, rather, whether under orders and established procedures which were in effect at that time he had any reason to feel that any particular type of information would be required to be sent to him by G-2?

General MILES. I do not want to answer vaguely but I do not know that I can make the answer any more specific than that, sir. By custom and long custom certain information was gotten out by the Military Intelligence Division to all overseas departments. That comprised a great many different types of information. I am really trying to find out just exactly what you are getting at.

Mr. GESELL. Let us come down specifically again to this magic material. That was material which indicated diplomatic moves and, to some extent contained military information of a specific character related to Hawaii.

Did the prevailing orders, regulations, and procedures of the Army at that time specify that that type of information, either in summary form or evaluated form, had to be sent to General Short?

General MILES. I know of no such orders or regulations which specified anything like that, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The question of what information was sent, therefore, under the orders do I understand to have been a [2155] matter within the discretion of the General Staff?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, I want to turn to a somewhat different subject but closely related to this, General, and ask you whether prior to December 7, G-2 had reached any conclusions on the question of imminence of war between Japan and the United States and, if so, what its conclusions were?

General MILES. G-2 is a term used, as you said yesterday, to describe the Military Intelligence Division. It was also a term used to describe one person at the head of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. GESELL. Let us take the Division first.

General MILES. What?

Mr. GESELL. Let us take the Division first.

General MILES. The Division first, all right.

I think it can safely be said that my Far East section consistently rated higher for many, many months the probability of war with Japan than did the Intelligence Branch of the Division or myself. They would have been less than human and certainly less than efficient if they had not. They were a group of men who devoted a large part of their careers to a study of the far eastern situation, who were concentrating their every thought on this one specific sector of the world. [2156] It was perfectly natural for them that they should think that their particular devil was the big devil.

I like to say that in trying to answer the question what did the Military Intelligence Division think. The estimates of the far-eastern section, of the very able and capable men that I had there, were then processed, as I say, through the estimating section and through the head of the Intelligence Branch, and then they came to me.

Now, immediately they got out of the far-eastern section they got into the much bigger picture that we were considering in those days, watching a very desperate war in Europe that seemed to hold possibilities of direct threat to the security of the United States and the whole of the activities of Latin America, and so forth, and so forth.

Now, may I speak for myself? I should say that—I am reading some notes I have here because I knew this was one of the questions I was to be asked, and to save time I put it out.

I should say that in mid-November my estimate might be summed up in this way: One thing we felt sure of was that Japan faced a crisis which would almost certainly result in radical action on her part. She had been unsuccessful in her military venture against Russia in 1939 and she had been [2157] none too successful in her long and costly war against China. Her military clique was losing face, although gaining power. We were closing in on her economically in our embargoes and other measures, but her radical action might take one or more of many forms. She might give direct aid to her Axis partners by an attack on Russia. She might seek further outlet to the south by a seizure, under some camouflage, of the Dutch East Indies. She might go for the wealth of Hong Kong and the Federated Malay States, or Thailand, or Burma. She might further increase her war efforts against China.

I remember during the months preceding Pearl Harbor a Chinese military attaché coming to me at least twice to discuss their fears that the Western powers closing in on Japan might force Japan to throw her whole effort against China to wipe her out.

Lastly, Japan might add to the enormous burden to her already strained military resources by attacking simultaneously the two great naval powers of the world. Only the latter alternative would surely involve the United States. I doubted whether, at that time, we would have gone to war in defense of the Dutch, the Siamese, or even the British in the Far East, and certainly not the Chinese or the Russians.

[2158] Mr. GESELL. Do I gather from what you have just stated, General Miles, that prior to December 7 you personally at least had not reached the conclusion in your own mind that there was an immediate possibility of hostilities between the United States and Japan?

General MILES. Oh, no, sir; that is not so. The crisis that resulted in General Marshall's telegram of November 27 certainly indicated

that the possibility of a war between the United States and Japan had very much increased.

By the 3d of December, when we knew that they were burning their codes, one would have rated that possibility, now well within the realms of probability, now even higher, so that if you are asking me on December 7 I am quite sure in saying that I would have rated quite highly the probability of an involvement immediate, or certainly in the fairly near future, of a Japanese-American war.

I remember on the 6th of December saying good-bye to an old naval friend of mine, Admiral Kincaid, who was leaving to take command of his division of cruisers, and telling him that I hoped he would hurry because I did not know whether he would make it or not.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, I would like to direct your attention for a moment to item 28 of the exhibit of estimates, which was introduced yesterday, exhibit 33. That is dated [2159] December 5, 1941, and appears to be the last of these periodical estimates of the situation which was submitted prior to the attack and turning to section 6, toward the end of that document, entitled, "The Far East Theatre," I see that you list a number of possibilities, stating that the initiative rests with Japan, as lines of action open to Japan and under none of those headings do I find any reference to the possibility of Japan being involved in war with the United States.

General MILES. Heading "E," "attack the Philippines and Hong Kong."

Mr. GESELL. Well, you felt that such an attack would precipitate the United States in war?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Am I correct in gathering from this document and from others where the estimate of Japan's course of action is made from time to time, that are also contained in this exhibit, that the various items A to I which are printed here represented throughout this period preceding the attack the estimate of the variety of courses of action which were open to Japan?

General MILES. Yes, sir. We were trying in this document to list the various possible lines of action open to Japan.

[2160] Mr. KEEFE. What is that exhibit number, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. 33.

You appear to have made a similar estimate on November 2, another on November 27, and another on November 29, which substantially state the same alternates of courses of action open to Japan?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, did these courses of action represent your views and the views of the Far Eastern Division?

General MILES. They did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Far Eastern Division rate during this period higher than you did the possibility of United States involvement in a war through an attack on the Philippines or United States territory?

General MILES. I believe that that was so and, as I said, consistently the Far Eastern Section rated that probability or possibility a little higher than I did.

Mr. GESELL. Did you at any time prior to December 7 have any information of any nature which indicated the point at which Japan would be most likely to attack the United States?

General MILES. None that I remember, except that rumor in January that came from Tokyo, from some Latin-American ambassador, that Japan would attack Hawaii, which was dis- [2161] counted both by Naval and Military Intelligence, and the ship information message, particularly the one you called my attention to yesterday, which as I pointed out at the time were only one of many and more so, actually, by an attack in perhaps the Philippines, Panama, and other parts of the world. We had no specific information then that the attack would fall on Hawaii.

Mr. GESELL. Will you explain why the Military Intelligence Division discounted the report from Ambassador Grew of January 1941 concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. One, because it was inconceivable that any sources in the know in Japan would have communicated that to the Latin-American Ambassador, I believe the Peruvian; and, second, for a great many years we had known that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was always possible. It was inherent as a possibility in any war in which we became involved with Japan.

Perhaps at this point I should invite attention to the fact that the great fortress of Oahu—and it was one of the great fortresses of the world—was built solely for one purpose, the defense of that naval base against one sole enemy, Japan, the only enemy in the world that could put on a real attack against that naval base, and the Congress of [2162] the United States in appropriating that money from time to time, and it was quite a bit of money, must also have had that in mind.

So that an attack on Hawaii was inherent in any war in which we might become involved with Japan. That is why we built the fortress. A surprise attack by the Japanese was inherent in view of the character of the Japanese.

Mr. GESELL. Well, you have not quite explained why you discounted the report. I would gather from what you said that that report would seem to tie in with the estimates that you had made of the situation, that Pearl Harbor was perhaps a likely point of attack and that the Japanese were likely to use surprise.

General MILES. Oh, I beg your pardon, sir. I discounted that report that came from the Peruvian Ambassador as being a bona fide piece of information that he got from a responsible Japanese source. I did not at any time discount the possibility of a Japanese surprise attack on Hawaii.

Mr. GESELL. You say that over the period of years before the attack it had been always considered that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Could you give us a bit more information on that?

General MILES. I have already pointed out that the only reason of being for the fortress at Oahu was a defense [2163] against a Japanese attack if we became involved in a war with Japan.

I have already testified that I was operations officer in Hawaii for 3 years, 1929 to 1932, and in charge of the Hawaiian War Plans Division in Washington from 1934 to 1938.

Now, during all those 7 years that the defense plans were under my supervision, or certainly with my very intimate knowledge, a surprise attack by the Japanese on Hawaii, made with little or no warning, was a basic consideration in the defense plans.

Many times I have drawn up a maneuver in war games situations on the assumption of a Japanese attack following a short period of strained relations.

We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic.

Mr. KEEFE. I did not get that last.

General MILES. We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic.

After all these years of planning for defense against a single enemy, with little or no warning, I had no doubt that the messages of November 27 following long months of [2164] strained relations, would effect the immediate and complete alert of the fortress.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you read that last? I did not get that.

Mr. GESELL. Would you read the question, Mr. Reporter, and let General Miles answer the question, again.

(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as follows:)

You say that over the period of years before the attack it had been always considered that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Could you give us a bit more information on that?

Mr. GESELL. Proceed to finish your answer, General Miles.

General MILES. Many times I have drawn up maneuvers in war-game situations under the assumption of an all-out Japanese attack following a short period of strained diplomatic relations.

These, you understand, are hypothetical assumptions on which you base a maneuver or a war game.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I am unable to see the witness at times and I want to know whether or not he read that answer from a memorandum, or any part of it.

[2165] General MILES. Senator, I am reading from rough notes that I have prepared knowing that certain questions would probably be asked me. This is the fifth time I have testified on Pearl Harbor. I did this in order to save the time of the committee, among other things. I have drawn up some notes so I could answer certain questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that entire answer in your notes?

General MILES. No, sir. I am interpolating.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could he designate on the record what part was read from his notes?

Mr. GESELL. Well, he has not completed his answer, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The general has not completed his answer. The Chair does not know whether, as he goes along, he can indicate what part of his language is taken from notes and what part is extemporaneous.

General MILES. These notes were made only the other day so that they are practically all the same thing. May I continue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MILES. Many times I have drawn up a maneuver in war-game situations on the assumption of an all-out Japanese attack following a short period of strained relations.

[2166] We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic. After all these years of planning for defense against a single enemy with little or no warning I had no doubt that the messages of November 27 following long months of strained relations would effect the immediate and complete alert of the fortress.

Senator LUCAS. What does he mean by "those messages"?

Mr. GESELL. You are referring to the message of November 27 to the so-called warning message sent on that date, are you not, General? I want to come to that later if that is your reference.

General MILES. To that and to the one I sent to the G-2's.

Mr. GESELL. On the same date.

General MILES. On the same date.

Mr. GESELL. The committee will find those in—

Mr. KEEFE. This message that he referred to that was sent on the 27th, is that the message that was sent from General Marshall?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, and there is one from General Miles also.

Mr. KEEFE. To the G-2's in Hawaii?

General MILES. That is right, sir.

[2167] Mr. KEEFE. And those are the two messages you are referring to?

Mr. GESELL. We will come to those two messages when we come to an examination of the first message.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. But I was interested at this time, General Miles, in getting a full understanding of the considerations which led you to feel that there was a possibility, shall we say, of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor in the event of hostilities with the United States and of that attack being made without prior warning.

I gather that while you were out there you had actually war-gamed attacks somewhat of the character which took place, is that correct?

General MILES. Somewhat of the character; yes, sir. We tried to consider all possible situations.

Mr. GESELL. Was the possibility of an attack being made on a weekend or on a Sunday one of the considerations?

General MILES. I remember one war game that I got up and that we played of an attack right straight into Honolulu Harbor, landing troops early on a Sunday morning.

Mr. GESELL. Was the possibility of an air attack launched from carriers at dawn one of the factors which was considered in these war games?

[2168] General MILES. Very definitely. I remember during the maneuvers of 1932, when the fleet was out there—I am not sure whether a carrier was in that fleet or not, it was pretty early in the development of naval carriers, but I do remember that there was a great deal of discussion as to attacks by air and later on, after I left Hawaii and was here in the War Plans, there was a very considerable correspondence initiated by General Drum, then commanding the Hawaiian Division, on defenses against a surprise carrier attack.

I have recently seen those papers. They are very interesting as to the different factors, as to the time factors.

Mr. KEEFE. As to the what?

General MILES. As to the time factors involved, how far the Japanese would be away when they launched the planes, and so forth, and then approach by night for this dawn attack.

Mr. GESELL. I am sure the committee would be interested in seeing that correspondence. Can you indicate about what the date of it was so that we might make arrangements to get it?

General MILES. General Drum went to Hawaii, as I remember, in 1935. It would have been 1935 or 1936. I have seen that correspondence recently in the War Plans Division and I can get it for the committee if you so desire.

[2169] Mr. GESELL. I wish you would. I am sure the committee would like to have it.¹

Continuing on this same general line of questioning, did these plans and estimates recognize that Japan had it within her power to launch such an attack directly from Japan itself?

General MILES. Yes, sir. There was what is known as, what we used to call, the vacant sea.

Mr. GESELL. What do you mean by the "vacant sea"?

General MILES. A great stretch of that wild ocean in the Pacific which lies between the trade routes going from Honolulu to the Far East and Japan and the big circle trade route from the West Coast going all the way up via the Aleutians to Japan. There is, or we were so told at that time, an immense body of water in there in which there is very little traffic.

Mr. GESELL. The vacant sea was the course which the Japs actually followed in making the attack, is it not?

General MILES. That I do not know, sir. From what I have heard of our information I imagine that is true. I have not plotted that out or seen it plotted out.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I will get the exhibit where it is plotted out, so we may have your answer to that question.

Referring, General, to exhibit 6, item 18, you will [2170] see on there the track of the Japanese attacking force and I ask you whether or not that attack did not take place through the area which you have indicated was sometimes called the vacant sea?

General MILES. Most of the course of the Japanese task force, as indicated on this map, lies in what we called the vacant sea. They did cross, apparently, the northern trade route where, presumably, it would have been a little broader than probably down the coast of Japan.

Mr. GESELL. Well, General, did you have any information at the time concerning the orders which were issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in October 1941 routing all American shipping southward through the Torres Straits?

General MILES. Yes, sir, I remember having such information.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in any way in connection with the issuance of that order?

General MILES. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. GESELL. Can you state to the committee what knowledge you have as to the facts and circumstances which led to its issuance?

General MILES. I only remember, sir, that the War and Navy Departments were considerably worried about some convoys that we had at sea at that time and were attempting to route [2171] them where we thought at least they would be least likely to be attacked.

¹ Read into the record *infra*, p. 868 et seq.

Mr. GESELL. Was it recognized and discussed at that time that such an order might have as one of its effects the elimination of traffic in the area where the Japanese advanced?

General MILES. I do not think so, sir. I certainly remember no such discussion and, as a matter of fact, there was very little traffic in that vacant sea at any time.

[2172] Mr. GESELL. Now, in this same connection, General, you were aware, were you not, that the Island of Oahu was, if I may state it that way, particularly vulnerable to espionage activities?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I knew that very well.

Mr. GEARHART. May I inquire as to the date of the Torres Strait order?

Mr. GESELL. I think it is October 17.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, does counsel also recall whether there was one on the 25th of November?

Mr. GESELL. The first order was, I think, in October. There is another one, Senator Ferguson indicates, subsequently issued to the same effect.

Having in mind, General Miles, this possibility of the Japs launching an attack directly from Japan, the existence of a vacant sea, the vulnerability of the island to espionage, and some of the other considerations we have been discussing, you recognized, did you not, that the defense of the island was, in large measure, dependent upon the establishment of an adequate reconnaissance?

General MILES. I did, sir. For a great many years, I thought it was pretty clearly established there was no possible way of catching a surprise attack before it actually fell, except from the Hawaiian end, by reconnaissance.

[2173] I made a statement before the Army Pearl Harbor Board which was taken up in their report, intimating rather a disagreement with it, but I would like to read it, because it is perfectly true:

I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed, and know where it was going. That was beyond our dreams of efficiency. We simply could not do it.

We knew a surprise attack was possible. We knew all of the advantages which would accrue to Japan in a war with the United States if she attacked Hawaii, and all the disadvantages which would accrue to us. There were those two vulnerable places, Hawaii and Panama, which would be essential to us in a war with Japan and essential to Japan to knock out if she possibly could. But we knew also that there was no possible way that we could see of warding off or detecting a surprise attack, except by reconnaissance from Hawaii, whether that reconnaissance was air, or surface, or subsurface, or radar.

Mr. GESELL. Having in mind the need for such reconnaissance and the inability of an intelligence service to obtain the information through its own machinery, did you ever make any inquiry during these weeks immediately preceding [2174] the attack as to whether or not a reconnaissance was in fact being conducted?

General MILES. I did not, sir. That was not at all within the responsibilities of military intelligence.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall that matter being discussed by other officers of the General Staff during that period?

General MILES. I remember it was certainly brought to my attention by the inclusion of the directive for reconnaissance in General Marshall's message sent out to all overseas departments.

Mr. GESELL. On November 27?

General MILES. On November 27.

Mr. GESELL. Except for that instance, do you recall the matter being discussed?

General MILES. I do not, sir.

[2175] Mr. GESELL. I want to direct your attention at this point to item 25 of exhibit 33, a memorandum written by you to the Chief of Staff under date of November 26, 1941, in which you refer to information concerning the disposition of the Japanese Fleet, and I direct your attention to the paragraph numbered 2, reading as follows:

The combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls.

Now this is the part that I want to address your attention to particularly:

Present location other units of this task force are not known.

Do you recall that memorandum?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. That indicates, does it not, that on November 26 you had information which was to the effect that we were not in a position to know the disposition of all of the units of the Japanese task forces?

[2176] General MILES. That is correct; but not surprising, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Had that condition occurred on earlier occasions?

General MILES. I cannot answer that question directly, but I would be very surprised to learn the Office of Naval Intelligence knew at all times the location of all the Japanese naval forces. They knew a great deal about it, and I was surprised at how much they did know.

Mr. GESELL. I quite recognize this is a subject we will want to pay particular attention to when Admiral Wilkinson is on the stand, but in view of the reference in your memorandum to the fact that the whereabouts of the units in the task force was not known, and in view of the date of the memorandum which, as we now know, was approximately the date when the Jap task force set out for Pearl Harbor, I wondered whether there had been any discussion concerning the inability to locate the task force at that time?

General MILES. I remember no such discussion, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And the fact that the task force disposition was not known did not, I gather from your prior testimony, lead to any specific consideration of the need for conducting the reconnaissance out of Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Well, on the following day reconnaissance was ordered by the Chief of Staff of all overseas departments. [2177] It was an obvious precaution.

Mr. GESELL. Was the information contained in this memorandum one of the factors which led to the reference to reconnaissance in General Marshall's memorandum or warning message of November 27?

General MILES. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I want to turn with you to these various messages and review some of them with you.

I have exhibit 32 before me, General, entitled "Messages Between War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to December 7, 1941." Have you a copy of that in your hand?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The first message I wanted you to discuss is that appearing on page 2, dated July 25, 1941, which appears to be a joint dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, calling attention to the fact that on the following day the United States proposed to impose economic sanctions against Japan; that message being sent for action to various points, including Hawaii.

Do you recall that dispatch?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you participate in the discussions which led to its transmission?

General MILES. I do not remember any such participation [2178] and do not believe that I did participate.

Mr. GESELL. This dispatch was of particular interest to me, General, because it is the only dispatch which I have been able to find where the Army gave to the overseas areas advance information of what we might call contemplated diplomatic action.

The CHAIRMAN. Might I ask right there, there is a word or symbol there that I do not understand, "adees." What does that signify?

Mr. MITCHELL. Addressees.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any particular reason why this specific diplomatic action was felt to be of such a nature as to require advance warning to the overseas area commanders?

General MILES. I do not know, sir. I do not believe that I had any hand in its preparation.

Mr. GESELL. Turning to the message on page 3, dated October 16, 1941, and to the message on page 4 dated October 20, 1941, I wish to ask whether you participated in the discussions leading up to the transmission of those messages?

In that connection, while you are getting your papers, I would like to offer for the record the memorandum dated October 18, 1941, for the Chief of Staff from Brigadier General Gerow, with reference to the dispatches in question. [2179] This will be designated as exhibit 34, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34.)

Senator LUCAS. Will you read it into the record?

Mr. GESELL (reading):

OCTOBER 18, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet.

1. The Navy dispatched the attached message on October 16. Our G-2 does not concur in the situation pictured by the Navy. War Plans Division agrees with G-2.
2. Navy dispositions may require adjustment and a special alert. This is not true for the Army.
3. Recommendation.

That the Secretary of War direct that secret radiograms, as follows, be sent to the Command General, United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; C. G. Western Defense Command.

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent end"

Do you recall this memorandum and the related messages,
[2180] General Miles?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. GESELL. Will you state your recollection of the discussions which took place at that time and the factors which led to the sending of the messages?

General MILES. I remember being consulted by General Gerow at War Plans Division as to whether or not we thought the naval message of October 16 gave a correct picture of the situation in Japan, due to the change of Cabinet, and saying that we did not; that we thought it might turn out to be correct, but we had no indication at that time that the new Cabinet would take the lines indicated in that naval message, that we had better wait a bit.

I do not actually remember seeing the memorandum that General Gerow sent to the Chief of Staff, but I do remember that I assisted in the preparation of the telegram that was sent out as a result.

[2181] Mr. GESELL. The November message, after referring to the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, stated, did it not, among other things, as follows:

Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers.

I gather that that was the portion of the message which the Army felt at that time was too strongly stated.

General MILES. I do not think so, sir. I think the next sentence was what we particularly objected to, that the possibility at that time, based solely on the change of Cabinet, the personnel of which we were not thoroughly acquainted with, or at least their views, should call for the precautions which the Navy message included. In other words, neither General Gerow nor I felt that the information which we had on the 18th of October warranted the statement contained in the October 16 message of the Navy, and particularly in the directives therein contained as to precautions and preparatory deployments, in the Navy message.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any knowledge at that time as to the state of the alert of the Army command at Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. I do not remember that I had any [2182] knowledge, except that I know no alert, or message which would call for alert, had up to that point been sent by the War Department. But I do not think I knew whether the commanding general himself had put any of that in his command.

Mr. GESELL. The feeling that you and General Gerow had, if I understand you correctly, came down to this, then, did it, that you did not feel the change of the Cabinet created a situation which justified Washington ordering a specific alert, or state of preparedness on the part of the Hawaiian commander?

General MILES. I think that is a correct summary of it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the fall of the Konoye Cabinet and the assumption of power by Tojo; is that right, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. I take it that is the reference, yes.

That is the reference, is it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir; the reference in the Navy telegram "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet is a grave situation," and so forth.

Mr. GESELL. Now, the next message, General Miles, is that on page 5.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just inquire on that message [2183] on page 4, who "Adams" is? I do not think that is clear.

Mr. GESELL. Adams is The Adjutant General, is he not?

General MILES. He was, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And his function was what with respect to the signing of messages of this character?

General MILES. He signed all messages for the War Department, except in the very exceptional circumstances where the Chief of Staff desired to sign his own name.

Mr. GESELL. Did Adjutant General Adams have any responsibility for the decision to send the message or to formulate the contents of the message?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. This, in effect, was a message from the General Staff which was transcribed and Adams' name was signed to it and then transmitted following the customary procedure.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The next message is that on page 5, dated November 24, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to the various naval posts in the Pacific and elsewhere, which again appears to be a joint message with the Army because of the instruction for the addressees to inform the senior Army officers in their areas, and the reference that shows [2184] a copy of the message was sent to the War Department. That message states, in part:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, these messages are not very long. It seems to me they are important enough to read them.

Mr. GESELL. I will.

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch, concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Do you have any recollection of having participated in any conference or discussion which led to the transmission of that message, General Miles?

General MILES. I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know of any Army officers that did participate in the drafting and transmission of that [2185] message?

General MILES. I do not know of any officer, of my own knowledge.

Mr. GESELL. I now wish to refer to the message at page 7. This is a message dated November 27, 1941, and signed by General Marshall, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., Message No. 472.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you should carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to [2186] minimum essential officers.

Signed "Marshall."

Before questioning you concerning this message, I would like also to read the message signed by yourself which appears on page 10 of the same date, November 27, 1941, addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only.

Signed "Miles."

General, do you recall having participated in negotiations and discussions concerning the transmission of these two warning messages that I have just read?

[2187] General MILES. I do not recall having taken any part in the drafting of the first message that you read, the one signed "Marshall." The second message, as far as I remember, I drafted it myself and sent it out.

Mr. GESELL. You prepared, did you not, on January 31, 1942, a memorandum for the record on the subject of "warnings sent to Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941"?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to offer that memorandum for the record at this time in connection with General Miles' testimony, to be designated "Exhibit 35."

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

Mr. GESELL. Copies are before the members of the committee.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 35.")

Mr. GESELL. You state in that memorandum with respect to General Marshall's message of November 27:

The contents of this dispatch was known to me at the time, though I do not remember to have seen an exact copy.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Under what circumstances did you learn of General Marshall's message?

General MILES. To the best of my recollection I learned of it verbally and of its contents from General Gerow with [2188] whom I was, of course, in very close contact. I would like to point out, I would

like to state here, that General Gerow has a somewhat different recollection in regard to my participation in the drafting of that message.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to have your recollection of your participation.

General MILES. My recollection is very clear that I had no part in the preparation of that message. I base that negative statement on the fact that on the 30th of January in preparing, as I did prepare very carefully that memorandum for record, I stated at that time, as you have read, that I had no recollection then of having seen the draft. I also base that negative statement on the fact that my recollection is very clear even today of the part I played in the second message that you have just read and in the subsequent Arnold-Adams message of November 28, which undoubtedly will be read, and I cannot understand how my memory, defective as it may be, could have entirely failed to recall the even more important Marshall message if I had had a hand in its drafting.

Mr. GESELL. I gather from your testimony, then, that you believe you had no hand in its drafting, but General Gerow spoke to you about the message?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, will you tell us what conversations you [2189] had with General Gerow concerning the message and what led to the transmission of the message signed by yourself of the same date?

General MILES. There must have been some conversation between General Gerow and myself regarding the question of whether subversive activity was included in the Marshall message. I say there must have been because there is in existence a photostatic copy of a first draft of the Marshall message in which there is such a sentence and it was scratched out by General Gerow.

Senator FERGUSON. May I have the answer read?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel have a first draft?

Mr. GESELL. It is right in front of me and I was coming to it, Senator.

You may go ahead, General Miles.

General MILES. So that I knew that subversive activities had not been included in the message. Military Intelligence was specifically concerned, particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned so far as the General Staff went with antisubversive precautions and operations. That was one reason that I sent the G-2 message out.

Mr. GESELL. By the G-2 message you mean the one signed by yourself?

[2190] General MILES. Yes, sir. The other obvious reason was that I wished the G-2's of corps areas and the overseas departments to be particularly alerted in view of the Marshall message.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to have designated as exhibit 36 a photostatic copy of a draft of the Marshall message of November 27 signed by Brigadier General Gerow which contains the text of the message as sent and as printed here in exhibit 32 with the following sentence which did not appear in the message as transmitted stricken. Apparently it is stricken by General Gerow because his initial is opposite the deletion.

The sentence which appears immediately before the phrase "Report measures taken," reading as follows:

Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately.

May that be received?

The CHAIRMAN. You want that first draft printed as a part of the hearings?

Mr. GESELL. I think as an exhibit. I have called attention to the only portion necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be marked "Exhibit 36."

Mr. GESELL. That is the sentence that you refer to, is [2191] it not, as having been stricken?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that there will be reference to that by members of the committee and in view of the fact that the message as sent was put in the record, I think that this ought to be spread in the record at this point.

Mr. GESELL. That is perfectly all right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is entirely agreeable.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 36" and follows herewith.)

SECRET

By authority of A. C. OF S., WPD

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

WAR PLANS DIVISION

Washington

WPD 4544-18

Date: 11/27/41 Initials: CAG

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General (through Secretary, General Staff):
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, message be dispatched by cable, radio, or telegraph (whichever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following:

[2192] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

* Commanding General, Western Defense Command.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately** Report measures taken. Should [2193] hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

*Written initials JB

**Written initials LTG

Nov 27 1941

Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff B

JB

Shown to Secretary of War

JB

NOTE: Paraphrased—information copy of radio No. 461, 11-27-41 to C.G., CDC furnished C. of S., GHQ on 12-5-41 pursuant to instructions of Major Van Sickler. ehb-1712.

ACTION TAKEN

11-27-41 by priority radio No. 472 to C.G., Haw. Dept. & priority radio No. 461 to C.G., Crbn. Def. Cmd. ehb-1712.

NOTE: No come-back received with this memo. ehb-1712.

SECRET

[2194] Mr. GESELL. General, that is the sentence that you referred to as having been stricken, is it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The result of striking that from the Marshall message of November 27 was that the Marshall message did not contain any instructions to the addressees as to action to be taken concerning sabotage and subversive activities?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. You stated that it was a function of G-2 to guard against such subversive activities and that for that reason you felt you had to specifically alert the G-2's in that regard?

General MILES. That was one of the reasons, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What did you say was the other reason?

General MILES. The importance of the Marshall message being brought directly to the attention of the G-2's, because of the critical situation therein exposed.

Mr. GESELL. Now, earlier we referred to the question of reconnaissance and I direct your attention to the fact that General Marshall's message of November 27 contains, among other things, this phrase:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be [2195] carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.

Did you at that time have any knowledge as to the relative responsibilities of the Army and the Navy at Pearl Harbor in respect of the conduct of such a reconnaissance?

General MILES. I don't think I had any detailed knowledge at that time, sir. I, of course, had general background knowledge of the war plans and the responsibilities of the two services for reconnaissance.

Mr. GESELL. Did you understand that the Army was in a position to institute a long-range reconnaissance?

General MILES. I don't think at this time that I knew exactly what ships they had there. I believe I thought they had some reasonably long-range ships but I knew that a thorough system of long-range aerial reconnaissance by the Army was beyond its capability because of the enormous extent of the periphery which you would have to cover on a night approach of a Japanese task force.

Mr. GESELL. When you refer to "ships" you mean airplanes?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall any discussion at the time this message was sent as to the extent and nature of the reconnaissance which the Army was in a position to conduct, if any?

[2196] General MILES. No, sir; I recall no such discussions.

Mr. GESELL. Were you familiar with the message that the Navy sent under date of November 27, to Hawaii and other points also giving a warning?

General MILES. I was shortly after that. I don't remember on what day I became aware of that, but I certainly knew at the time I knew of the Army message that the Navy was sending a somewhat similar message.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Gesell: Before you leave—you may be going to cover it, I don't know—but I would like to have this witness interrogated now as to his knowledge of the agreement which had been entered into between the Army and the Navy as to this matter of reconnaissance. I understood they had a written contract or agreement.

General MILES. That was one of the details of the Hawaiian war plans as existed at that time that I was not familiar with, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. You did not know what responsibilities the Army had and what responsibilities the Navy had at that time in respect of long range reconnaissance?

General MILES. The actual subdivision of that responsibility I do not believe that I was aware of.

Mr. GESELL. General Miles, when did you see General Short's report to the Marshall memorandum, Marshall message?

[2197] General MILES. Sometime in January 1942, sir, when I was preparing that memorandum for record which you have before you.

Mr. GESELL. The message I have been referring to appears at page 12 of exhibit 32, dated November 28, 1941, from Fort Shafter to Chief of Staff, which is signed "Short," and states:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty-seven.

That is the message that you understood I was asking you about, is it, General?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And you say you did not see that until sometime in 1942?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. You were aware, were you not, that General Marshall's message of November 27 specifically asked the addressees to report measures taken, were you not?

General MILES. I am not sure that I was aware of that detail. I knew the general contents of that Marshall message. I may or may not have been aware of the fact that it required an answer.

Mr. GESELL. Was responsibility for examining and appraising [2198] and evaluating whatever report was made a responsibility of G-2?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What division of the General Staff had that responsibility?

General MILES. The War Plans Division.

Mr. GESELL. That would be General Gerow's division?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall having any discussion with any officer of the General Staff concerning General Short's reply at the time it was sent?

General MILES. I did not know it was sent until the following month.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I asked you when you had seen the message and I wanted to be perfectly clear that you had not only not seen the message but you did not know of its existence until January 1942; is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct.

[2199] Mr. GESELL. You recall no discussions concerning whether or not there had been a report?

General MILES. I recall no such discussion.

Mr. GESELL. General Miles, on November 28 additional messages were sent to the Hawaiian Department concerning, among other things, the question of sabotage and subversive activities, were they not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The messages in question appear at pages 13 and 14 of Exhibit 32; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to read the messages at this time.

The first is signed "Adams" and is dated November 28, 1941, and states:

482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren C paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all [2200] activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

The second message of the same date, reads:

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter:

Attention commanding general Hawaiian airforce period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren C paragraph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following [2201] colon protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment command property and establishments period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security period Para It is also desired that on or before December five this year reports be submitted to the chief army forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions period Signed Arnold.

ADAMS.

I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we might recess at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Twelve o'clock having arrived, we will recess until two.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 p. m., of the same day.)

[2202]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

The chairman is detained a moment or two. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed may I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURPHY. It has been called to my attention that there was some reference to a top secret Army report. It is my information we have been furnished all of the top secret Army reports, but there has been something said about a top secret Army report that changes the previous report.

Mr. GESELL. There is no top secret Army report that has not been available to counsel from the outset and been available to the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. Counsel has been furnished with all top secret Army reports?

Mr. GESELL. That is my understanding, Mr. Congressman.

At the recess, General Miles, I had just completed reading two messages on pages 13 and 14 of exhibit 32 which were sent, as far as the exhibit indicates, to the Hawaiian Department, concerning the question of subversive activities and sabotage.

It is my understanding, and I wish you would check me on this, that these two messages were also sent out at the same [2203] time and in the same text to other overseas departments. Is that correct?

General MILES. And to the corps areas in the United States; that is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Now, will you state to the committee what conferences and discussions you had at Washington with the other officers concerned relating to the transmission of these two sabotage messages of the 28th?

General MILES. I can best answer that question, sir, by referring to paragraph 4 of my memorandum prepared in January of 1942 and dated January 1, 1942.

Mr. GESELL. That is exhibit 35 before the committee.

General MILES. Shall I read that paragraph?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; you may read it, please.

Mr. GESELL. Page 2 of exhibit 35; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir; paragraph 4. Do you wish me to read that paragraph?

Mr. GESELL. If that is your statement as to what occurred; yes.

General MILES (reading):

November 28, 1941. At some time during this day, I think in the morning, General Arnold told me that he was extremely worried about sabotage of planes.

He stated that a number of bombers had been received from different points in one of the western [2204] depots, all having a certain defect which indicated sabotage. He told me that he proposed to send out drastic orders to all Air Forces at home and abroad to take all precautions against sabotage. I told him that a general warning on sabotage had been sent the previous day to the G-2's.

Mr. GESELL. Just a moment there, General. That message that you were referring to is the one we have already discussed, that was sent out by you on the 27th, which appears at page 13 of exhibit 32; is that not correct?

General MILES. That is correct. I continue:

He was not satisfied with this, and insisted that specific directions be sent by his staff to all Air Corps Commands. This directive was written by Major C. R. Blake, Chief of the Counter-Intelligence branch, Office of Chief of Air Corps, at the direction of General Martin Scanlon, A-2. It directed inter alia the Air Commands to "initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage." I strongly objected to this message going out to Air forces only. I was in complete accord with the Air [2205] Corps in believing that sabotage was a real danger and that the necessary precautions should be taken, but I did not believe that the Air Forces alone should be given additional warnings, or that so broad and general a directive should be given to so many different commands. I feared all kinds of drastic measures against civilians which would have disastrous repercussions. I knew that the policy of the Chief of Staff was not to alarm the civilian population, as indicated in the WPD warning message of November 27.

That was the warning message of which we have recently spoken. I continue:

My objection to the proposed Air Corps directive finally resulted, late in the afternoon on the 28th, in a Staff conference in General Bryden's office attended by General Gerow, General Scanlon and, I believe, General Gullion.

Mr. GESELL. Will you indicate the duties of the various officers mentioned there? General Bryden was Assistant Chief of Staff?

General MILES. General Bryden was Deputy Chief of Staff. General Gerow was Deputy, War Plans Division. General Scanlon, A-2, that is to say, the Intelligence Officer on the General Staff of General Arnold, and General Gullion was Provost [2206] Marshall General. I continue:

The result of this conference was the approval of a message drafted by me but containing also the sentence quoted above from the Air Corps draft, modified, however, by a prohibition against illegal measures and a reference to the delimitation of responsibility in subversive activities as between the Army, Navy, and the FBI. This message as approved in the Staff conference was sent by the Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals of all corps areas and overseas departments.

Mr. GESELL. May I interrupt there and ask you which of these two messages that I read is the one that you are referring to? There were two messages on that day, appearing at pages 13 and 14. Is it the one with General Arnold's name signed prior to Adams' on page 14?

General MILES. No, sir; it is the one on page 13. I will get to the one on page 14, signed by both Arnold and Adams, later on.

Mr. GESELL. Thank you.

The message to Hawaii was numbered 482 and sent at 8:37 p. m. It was also agreed at the above mentioned Staff conference, at the insistence of the

Air Corps, [2207] that identical messages would be sent by the Air Staff to all Air Commands, and this was done.

I interject here. That is the message you referred to on page 14 signed by Arnold and Adams. I continue:

The message that went to Hawaii was numbered 484 and sent at 9:23 p. m.

[2208] Mr. GESELL. Well now, so I understand the situation, you sent a message, a G-2 message on the 27th, in which you said, among other things, "Subversive activities may be expected," that message being addressed to the G-2 at the Hawaiian Department, and on the 28th there were two additional messages sent to Hawaii, one that was agreed upon in the General Staff conference, which you drafted, and another which was signed by General Arnold, which was intended for the specific attention of the Hawaiian Air Force, but also addressed to the Commanding General; so that in the space of these two days, there were three messages that went to Hawaii concerning subversive activities, or sabotage; is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct, except that I would like to add that I drafted that message in the Bryden conference.

In other words, I was the one who was raising these questions about it, so I got the job of drafting the message which resulted from the compromise decision of General Bryden.

Mr. GESELL. You were not in favor of sending either of the two messages on the 28th to Hawaii; is that correct?

General MILES. No, sir, I can't say that. I was specifically charged with subversive activities so far as the General Staff was concerned. I was deeply concerned [2209] with the danger, and I was certainly not in position, nor did I desire to, oppose anybody who went along with me in feeling the necessity for warnings. My objection, or whatever it amounted to, simply resulted in limiting it only to my pointing out that a general warning against subversive activities had gone out and in objecting to any other going out in drastic terms beyond the policy of the Chief of Staff and of our agreements with the FBI and ONI, and addressed only to Air Force officers.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion or consideration given in these conferences to the question whether or not three messages concerned with sabotage being sent in such close proximity might not unduly emphasize that point in the minds of the addressee, General Short?

General MILES. I am very sure of my recollection that no such discussion was held and the idea did not enter my mind.

Mr. GESELL. Now, following the 28th, this exhibit 32 indicates that there were no other warning messages sent to the Hawaiian Department until the message of General Marshall on the morning of the 7th, with which we are all familiar, which did not arrive in time. Is that in accord with your recollection that there were no other warning messages sent from the 28th of November to the 7th of December?

[2210] General MILES. I think that is correct. You are speaking of warning messages that went directly from the War Department?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct, from the War Department to Hawaii.

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall any discussions or conferences being held in that period from November 28 to December 7, concerning the advisability of sending additional warning messages?

General MILES. I have been trying to recall those days and that specific point. I have a vague recollection of some discussion or conference with General Gerow and General Bratton and myself. I think it arose in connection with what we at the time thought might be the implementing broadcast of the winds message, but my recollection is not very specific in the matter.

Mr. GESELL. Well, we will have occasion to call you back to the witness stand at a later date to discuss conferences concerning the winds message, as I think you know under our proposed presentation we wish to put on everything concerning that at one time. The same, of course, is true with respect to the events of the 14th part and 1 o'clock message.

[2211] Do you recall any other conference or any other discussion of a proposed message except the one you have just indicated during the period of November 28 to December 7?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Do you remember ever having had a meeting at the Navy Department attended by Captain McCollum of the Far Eastern Branch of ONI either around the first of December or on the afternoon of the 6th of December at which there was any discussion concerning a proposed message?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Would it be correct for us to understand that by the 27th of November when the warning message that we have been discussing, signed by General Marshall was sent out to Pearl Harbor, that G-2 had reached the conclusion that there was a possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. I think it fair to say that by that time we had reached a pretty definite conclusion that war with Japan was rating as a fairly high possibility, if not probability; and, as I testified this morning, it was certainly in everyone's minds that inherent in a war with Japan was the strong possibility, if not probability, of a Japanese attack on Hawaii and on Panama.

[2212] Mr. GESELL. Well, with that in mind, and having in mind your testimony of this morning, as well as your present testimony, I have been wondering why the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor was not specifically indicated in your estimates of the situation, particularly in your memorandum to the Chief of Staff of December 5, 1941, which we discussed earlier, which was sent to him and other responsible officers in the Navy.

General MILES. In that estimate and the estimates of that time we were laying down the probable lines of advance of the Japanese, if they did advance. We were strongly persuaded that, late in November, I would say, and early October we were strongly persuaded that an advance to the South was indicated, and as subsequently transpired, that was the direction of the main Japanese effort.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me get those dates. Did you say late in October and early in November?

General MILES. I thought I said late in November and early in December.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You said late in November and early in October.

Mr. KEEFE. How should it be?

General MILES. Late in November and early in December.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

[2213] General MILES. It is true that Hawaii was not mentioned in those estimates, nor was it ever considered necessary, because, as I have repeatedly said, it was a fortress, built for one sole purpose, defense in a Japanese war. It was quite obvious to all experienced officers that if we did get into a war with Japan, Hawaii and the Panama Canal were factors of immense value to us in the prosecution of that war, factors of immense value to Japan to attack. We did not mention other points that were also within certainly the realms of possibility, if not probability, of a Japanese attack if war came, such as, for instance, Guam, Samoa, the Aleutians.

Mr. GESELL. So that in these estimates you were emphasizing the points other than the United States points which you felt it was likely the Japanese might attack?

General MILES. The lines of advance, yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. You wish us to understand that you always had in mind that there was a possibility of an attack against other United States points, other than those mentioned, including Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. If war came, it was inherent in the situation that Hawaii and Panama, at least, were extremely liable to Japanese attack.

Mr. GESELL. Now, you said, I believe, that there were [2214] no other warning messages sent by the War Department after November 28, until the message of December 7. I want to direct your attention to exhibit 1 in evidence, page 195. There is a message there to Washington from Tokyo dated November 28 which was translated on the same day in which Tokyo advises the Japanese ambassadors, among other things, as follows:

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. November 28 and translated November 28.

Mr. KEEFE. The same date.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

I also direct your attention to a message which appears at page 204, Tokyo to Berlin. This message is dated November 30, translated December 1. There the American Ambassador at Berlin is receiving instructions concerning an interview with Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and is given this instruction:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms, and add that [2215] the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Now, having those two messages in mind, General Miles, I want to ask whether any consideration was given to sending a message to Hawaii subsequent to November 28, which would have emphasized the information which you had received indicating the real possibility of some immediate action being in the offing?

[2216] General MILES. You asked if any discussions were held?

Mr. GESELL. Any discussions concerning sending such a message.

General MILES. I remember no such discussion. The message of November 27, signed "Marshall", was, I knew, designed to alert the Hawaiian Department. That was a command action.

Had the Chief of Staff or his Assistant for War Plans thought that the Hawaiian Department was not sufficiently alerted, they would have, I felt sure, taken appropriate steps.

G-2 was not a command agency, nor did its responsibilities cover the alerting of major commands for war or any other implementation of war plans.

G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information. The essential information contained in the Chief of Staff's November 27 message, that hostilities might occur at any time on the initiative of the Japanese, held good right up to December 7. The information on Japanese code burning and the President's appeal to the Emperor emphasized the increasing tension of the crisis.

But these things were known in Hawaii. That Fortress, like a sentinel on post, had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for being. Anything else was considered to be redundant.

Mr. GESELL. I want to come in a moment to the code, but [2217] I want to stay on this for a second longer.

The two messages that I have read indicate that action by the Japanese was expected in a matter of days or very immediately. The message of November 27 referred, as you state, to a possibility of action at any moment. I merely asked you whether there was any discussion concerning sending a message which would give more information to the Hawaiian Department of the immediacy of the situation. I gather you said "No" as to that?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, with reference to the question of transmitting information concerning burning of codes, if the committee please I wish to introduce at this time, as exhibit 37, a folder which has been before the committee designated "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches."

These are Navy dispatches and this exhibit will be considered primarily in connection with the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson.

The CHAIRMAN. Exhibit 37.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 37.")

Mr. GESELL. I wish to read to you from that exhibit, General Miles, two messages, the first one of December 3, 1941, which appears at page 40 of the exhibit, from the Chief of [2218] Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and others, reading as follows:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Senator FERGUSON. What page is that?

Mr. GESELL. Page 40.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. GESELL. Now, turning to page 41.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel just wait until the members of the committee get the exhibit.

Mr. MURPHY. It is the one distributed yesterday.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches." It has just been introduced as exhibit 37.

Senator FERGUSON. The exhibit number is what?

Mr. GESELL. Thirty-seven.

The CHAIRMAN. The dispatch which you just read is on page 40.

Mr. GESELL. Page 40.

The CHAIRMAN. And it goes over?

[2219] Mr. GESELL. No. There is another message on page 41 which I now wish to read, of the same date, December 3, to Admiral Kimmel and others:

Circular twenty-four forty-four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy machine, Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo, December 2 Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents, British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.

[2220] Mr. GESELL. There are other messages here concerning codes which I will not read at this time except for this message of December 6 to Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. What page is that?

Mr. GESELL. On page 46, to Admiral Stark, from "COM Fourteen" in Hawaii, stating:

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

My question, General Miles, is whether you knew at the time that the Navy was transmitting messages to their representatives in Hawaii advising Hawaii of the intercepted Japanese messages indicating code destruction?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with that?

General MILES. I believe that I was. I know that I knew that those messages were going out.

Mr. GESELL. Did you know that a message had been received from Hawaii stating that they had knowledge there that the local consul was destroying his code?

General MILES. I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General MILES. No, sir.

[2221] Mr. GESELL. What is the explanation of that?

General MILES. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Mr. GESELL. It is a fact, is it not, General Miles, that none of these messages contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to the Army representative at Hawaii?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And that was the practice where joint messages were sent sometimes, as we have seen, was it not?

General MILES. That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities at Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Any instruction to the Navy?

Mr. GESELL. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them? [2222]

General MILES. No, sir; that was not considered necessary.

Mr. GESELL. May I ask you, General, what significance could properly be attached at this time to the number of messages which we had intercepted from the Japanese in the period from December 1 to December 5 and later indicating that the Japs were destroying their most secret and confidential codes in Washington and in fact throughout the world?

General MILES. The inference would be that the Japanese had either planned for the outbreak of war, in other words, planned to initiate a war as they did or feared war coming suddenly through what was described in that message you recently read, a class of arms.

Mr. GESELL. Therefore, the information concerning code burning and destruction was of a specific and vital military nature, was it not?

General MILES. It was, sir.

Mr. GESELL. You stated, I believe, a moment ago that the information concerning code burning was known in Hawaii. Was your reference to these messages that I have just read?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you have any information as to whether or not General Short or other Army officers knew of these Navy messages? [2223]

General MILES. I had every reason at the time to expect that they would be transmitted to General Short or his staff.

Mr. GESELL. But do you have any specific information?

General MILES. But I have no specific information on that point. Obviously, if the Navy in Hawaii on the sixth knew that the Japanese consul there was burning his code, the Army must also have known it.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I wish to introduce at this time a message that we present in view of Senator Ferguson's questions the other day,¹ a message signed "Miles" to the Military Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941. This is to be designated Exhibit 38.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 38.")

Mr. GESELL. The message reads as follows:

Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD [2224] used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador.

(Signed) MILES.

Do you recall sending that message?

General MILES. I do, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Just as a matter of information, General Miles, was it a practice for the Military Attachés to use the same or different codes than the Ambassador and the diplomatic staff?

¹ P. 775, supra.

General MILES. It was, sir. We had our own Army codes.

Mr. GESELL. So this related to the Army code system of communication between you and the Military Attaché at Tokyo?

General MILES. It did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that offered in evidence as an exhibit now?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. It is Exhibit 38, and has been so received, I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. And made a part of the transcript.

Mr. GESELL. Now, there is just one further question.

In exhibit 33, General Miles, there are two items—items [2225] 29 and 30, being two memoranda sent by you under date of December 6 to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, in which you set forth estimates of Japanese air and ground forces and strength in Indochina.

Could you state to the committee, please, what were the circumstances which led to the preparation of these memoranda, if you recall it?

General MILES. I do not recall specifically what those circumstances were. I do recall that in general in connection with what was commonly felt would be the main line or certainly the first line of Japanese advance to the south, that the strength of the Japanese in Indochina was a particular factor of interest. There were also, of course, as we know now, telegrams from the Chinese Generalissimo with regard to the possibility of cutting the Burma Road. That occurred sometime previous to those estimates of December 6.

Mr. GESELL. Just one final question, General Miles.

Did you know in the period from November 26 on that the Navy had lost track of the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

General MILES. I knew it about that time, sir; it was brought out by your question this morning that a part of the Japanese Fleet was not identified as to location by Navy.

Mr. GESELL. Specifically, did you know that that part [2226] included a substantial portion of the Japanese carriers?

General MILES. I do not believe that I did know exactly what that force was.

Mr. GESELL. I have no further questions, if the committee please. I simply would like to again point out that we have not included in General Miles' examination anything concerning the "wind" code messages or the events of the 6th and 7th as they relate to the fourteenth part and 1 o'clock messages, for the reason that those subjects are to be covered later on, and General Miles will return to the stand for that purpose, in accordance with the procedure we have outlined.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question before the cross-examination of this witness begins?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Does counsel have here the testimony of General Miles on all previous occasions? Is it available for examination? He said he testified five other times.

Mr. GESELL. I notice you said five, General Miles.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to see all five of them.

Mr. GESELL. I think on five occasions. Will you tell us what those five occasions were, General Miles, so that I can answer Congressman Murphy's question?

[2227] The VICE CHAIRMAN. He said this was the fifth.

General MILES. I appeared before the Roberts Board; I appeared before the Grunert Board, the Army Pearl Harbor Board; I appeared and gave testimony before Brigadier General Clark, G-2, the month after my appearance before the Grunert Board; and I was again under oath as shown by my affidavit to Lieutenant Colonel Clausen.

Mr. GESELL. All of that material has been available to us.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. And it will be available during the course of this examination?

Mr. GESELL. Well, we have in some instances only one copy. In some instances we have seen the material.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I make this request owing to the statement just made, that when counsel gets material that is available to the committee, if not for a member of the committee asking for it, that the committee members be individually advised as to the receipt of that material or of their having it so that we might inquire about it.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I am sorry. We will try to do that. I thought the committee understood that we had received all of the reports and transcripts of testimony of all of the various inquiries conducted by both the Army and the Navy, as [2228] well as the Roberts material.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you understand that the committee knew that Colonel Clark, or General Clark, had made an investigation?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, I thought so.

Mr. KEEFE. I never heard of that one. It is news to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Permit the Chair to make this observation: In many instances in which documents or testimony has been made available, or in some instances at least, it has not been available in sufficient copies to permit each member to have a separate copy of his own. In other cases it has been. And in cases where there is only one copy of available testimony it is more or less difficult for all members to examine it simultaneously and in instances of that sort those who get it first ought to seek to accommodate themselves to the desires of other members so that sooner or later all of them can see it. I do not know how many have seen this.

Mr. GESELL. Well, would this be helpful to the members of the committee: If, prior to the appearance of each witness, we handed to each member of the committee the record references in these various reports and documents where that particular witness has appeared on prior occasions? We will do that if the committee wishes it.

The CHAIRMAN. It would help. The Chair might suggest [2229] that it obviously is impossible, as the Chair understands it, for each member of the committee to have simultaneously the complete record of the testimony given by all the witnesses in all the previous investigations that have been held. Is the Chair correct in that?

Mr. GESELL. We have only one copy of quite a bit of that material.

The CHAIRMAN. And to make additional copies sufficient for all members would be quite a task and quite an expense, but if any member gets possession of one of these copies first, the Chair would suggest that as soon as possible that he make it available to other members in turn.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, you may go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we get this material that we at least have it 48 hours beforehand or 24 hours, so that we may review it, rather than receive it at the time that a witness is on the stand or coming on. It is very difficult to prepare and we will cut down the period of time that it takes to question a witness if we have it sufficiently in advance.

Mr. GESELL. The Senator is quite right on that and we will try to make up a list for the members of the committee [2230] showing where each person testified and have it available as much ahead of time as we can.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is obvious that in cases where only one copy is available that, naturally, counsel who under our arrangement have the first examination of a witness, would like to feel that they should have the right to examine it first in order to become familiar with it, but as soon as possible in such cases after they do so that it be passed around as rapidly as possible to the various members of the committee.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have one request.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. It seems to me in view of the nature of the testimony we have received from General Miles that each member of the committee ought to be furnished before Monday morning or before Sunday if possible with a photostatic copy of all of his previous testimony. I think it is extremely important and I would like to go into it pretty thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is unable to say whether that is physically possible but every effort will be made to do that.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought that I was more or less familiar [2231] with all of the so-called Pearl Harbor investigations but reference has now been made to a General Clark investigation, which is entirely new to me. I never heard of it, until General Miles mentioned it and I would like at this time to make some inquiry as to the nature and scope and character of that investigation. When was it held and under whose direction and for what purpose and where are the records, if available?

Mr. GESELL. Congressman Keefe, I think I can explain in this fashion. That was a technical investigation into a very detailed aspect of this situation and I have just explained—

Mr. KEEFE. You mean with respect to the codes?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. And that sort of thing?

Mr. GESELL. And I have just explained the situation to the Senator from Michigan. I will be very glad to discuss it with you, Congressman Keefe, after we adjourn. That has been available to the staff and to the committee from the outset of the inquiry.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it has never received any particular notice so far as the committee is concerned, I think; at least I have never heard of it before. Is it because of the fact that it does contain restricted material relating to [2232] codes and code breaking and that sort of thing?

Mr. GESELL. I believe that must be the reason, Congressman Keefe, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might say he has heard in a general way of a report made by General Clark, who is a member of the General Staff, as he understands, but the Chairman of the committee has not seen the result or the testimony which General Clark took on the code situation, with which the Chairman understands he dealt exclusively.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I presume that will be made available to the committee at a certain time.

Mr. GESELL. Oh, yes; Congressman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I am sure this is not in the spirit of "I told you so," but I raised this question at the very first meeting of the committee in executive session.

It now appears that there have been eight exhaustive investigations, eight reports written and testimony given in support of those reports. I knew that, with the exception of the Clark investigation, when we had our first meeting and I made the request that the testimony be digested so that we [2233] would have it in such form that we could compare the testimony of witnesses given at different times and I was given the impression as a result of that first meeting that that was being done.

Then at the last meeting of this committee in executive session I learned to my astonishment that nothing had been done along that line. I then asked, after having gone out of my way to call one of the great law book publishing companies to see if they could furnish us an editorial staff, I made the suggestion that even at that late hour that we employ people to compare that testimony for us, classify it as to subject so we could compare the testimony given by individual witnesses at different times to the same points and at that time the committee referred it to a sub-committee.

So today we are now confronted with the situation where we have a tremendous mass of testimony, probably thousands upon thousands of pages, probably eighty or ninety or a hundred volumes according to figures that have been given to me offhand and now we are talking about bringing that testimony in and dropping it on the desks of the different members of this committee expecting us to analyze that testimony on the spot, testimony given by the same witness at different times and then intelligently cross-examine a witness sitting on the stand here in respect of what he may have said at different [2234] times.

If anyone has ever been vindicated in offering something which should have been acted upon in the first place, which has not been acted on at all, I certainly am in reviewing the situation which confronts the committee at this particular time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair simply wishes to observe that Congressman Gearhart did at one of our executive meetings suggest that the staff of the West Publishing Co. of Minneapolis, Minn., be brought down here to digest the previous testimony. The matter was discussed. No action was taken upon it. Whether wisely or unwisely may be a matter of opinion. It was not done. The Congressman did suggest that that be done.

Now, counsel, are you through with your main examination?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; Mr. Chairman.

General MILES. Mr. Chairman, may I add one thing that I am afraid I did not make myself wholly clear on?

The counsel asked me several questions in regard to the messages of November 3, I believe, or December 3, sent by Navy regarding the Japanese and the burning of their codes and pointed out also to me that on some other occasions the War Department had specifically asked that the Navy messages be transmitted to Army.

[2235] I think it only fair to state, therefore, why I believed and why I think everyone in my department believed that Navy messages were being transmitted to the Army in Hawaii and vice versa.

I come down to three principal reasons. One is my intimate knowledge of the basis and policies governing the plans for the defense of Hawaii, in which it was always emphasized, so far as I can remember, the great importance of close liaison between Army and Navy. It was a tight little fortress which demanded primarily the close cooperation of the two services.

Second, my knowledge that General Marshall as Chief of Staff always emphasized the necessity of close cooperation and liaison with the Navy here in Washington and, I felt sure, to his senior officers in command of the major units of the Army that had any connection with Navy, as was particularly the case in Hawaii.

And, third, I received an official letter on the 17th of September, dated the 6th of September, from the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, Colonel Fielder, stating, *inter alia*:

The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete.

[2236] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the whole letter should go in. We should not have only the *inter alia*.

General MILES. I will read the entire letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the whole letter or message go into the transcript at this point.

General MILES. This refers to summaries of intelligence which we were sending them.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that?

General MILES. The date? I will read the whole message. [Reading:]

6 SEPTEMBER 1941.

Subject: Summaries of Information

To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2,
Washington, D. C.

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

[2237] 3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,

Lieut. Colonel Inf.,

Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

General MILES. That is the complete letter, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I would like to clear up some of the terminology used by the War Department with respect to matters about which you testified.

You have down there, I believe, "G" by itself and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 and maybe some other G's, but what is "G" by itself?

General MILES. "G" was an abbreviation that we adopted in the first World War from the French. To us it meant the General Staff Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the Chief of Staff? Would that also indicate the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. It was used both to describe an office or a department of the General Staff and loosely applied to the individual heading that department. There were five divisions of the General Staff, four G's and the War Plans Division.

The CHAIRMAN. So that standing by itself "G" either [2238] means the General Staff or the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. A General Staff division or the Chief of Staff, depending upon context.

The CHAIRMAN. What is G-1?

General MILES. Personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. And G-2?

General MILES. Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Intelligence.

General MILES. G-3 was Operations and Training; G-4 Supply and War Plans Division.

The CHAIRMAN. And you designate that by the initials "W. P. D."?

General MILES. "W. P. D."; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did the Chief of the Division of Intelligence, in Military Intelligence under the symbol G-2, have charge of all military intelligence in the War Department?

General MILES. He was the Assistant Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff. He was the man in charge of military intelligence of the General Staff.

I had better read it directly from the Army regulations. The Army regulations current at that time, No. 10-15, state in paragraph 9 [reading]:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GENERAL DUTIES

[2239] a. The Military Intelligence Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information.

b. The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning—

(1) Military topographical surveys and maps, including their reproduction and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).

(2) The custody of the General Staff map and photograph collection.

(3) Military attaches, observers, and foreign-language students.

(4) Intelligence personnel of all units.

(5) Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the Government and with duly accredited foreign military attaches and missions.

(6) Codes and ciphers.

(7) Translations.

(8) Public relations, to include all forms of publicity.

(9) Censorship in time of war.

And added to it the acquisition of military topographical [2240] maps, as well as their reproduction and distribution, and the custody of the War Department map collection.

The CHAIRMAN. Did each of these divisions, G-1 and G-2, 3, and 4 and also the War Planning Division have at the top an officer who was a member of the General Staff and designated as Assistant Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes, sir; or Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Acting Assistant.

Now, yesterday I think you testified that you had no control or supervision or what you call SIS, which I understood was Signal Intelligence Service?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How does it happen that there would be any lack of supervision by the member of the General Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of any particular phase of military intelligence such as SIS, Signal Intelligence Service, which is under the Signal Corps? Why would there be that hiatus between the control or supervision of the Chief of Military Intelligence of that branch, of that essential branch of military intelligence that came under the Signal Corps, which was very active and no doubt expected to be active in the obtaining of information?

[2241] General MILES. Senator, the theory on which the General Staff was established was that the divisions of the General Staff were not operating agencies. They were divisions of a staff serving the Chief of Staff whose principal duty was as military adviser to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States.

Now, the SIS was a technical branch which served Military Intelligence just as the Quartermaster Corps was a technical branch which served the Supply Division of the General Staff, if I may use that analogy.

Does that answer your question, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, in a way, but I would like to know to whom SIS was responsible and to whom it was expected under the regulations to make its reports?

General MILES. Directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were under no obligation then to report to you as head of the Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. They formed no part of the Military Intelligence Division. They were part of a technical service, the Signal Corps of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. But that technical service was charged with the responsibility of obtaining information, was it not?

General MILES. No, sir, of transmitting. It was a com- [2242] munications service.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it reported under that arrangement directly to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. No, sir; it reported directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom did he report?

General MILES. All heads of the different branches of the Army were directly under the Chief of Staff. Those branches of the Army were divided in General Staff Divisions and the technical or service staff if you like to call them that.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there was no obligatory connection between the Military Intelligence of which you were the head and the Signal Service Corps except such as might be informal or voluntary?

General MILES. That is true, sir. I had no right or authority whatever to give any orders to the SIS or any other part of the Signal Corps or any other part of any other technical branch of the Army. It was, of course, expected that great cooperation would exist and if I want to General Maughborne, Chief Signal Officer, and said that I wanted something very badly he would and did get it for me if he possibly could.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there or not have been an advantage [2243] in a crisis such as that which we are discussing, an imminent conflict, if there had been a more direct connection between the Signal Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service of which you were the head?

General MILES. Well, Senator, that goes pretty deeply into the theory of the organization of the General Staff and the organization of the War Department which I do not feel competent to go into at this time. I can only say that it was set up that way with the approval of the Congress of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. In exhibit No. 2 entitled, "Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, etc.," which covers Hawaii and the Panama Canal, the Philippines, southern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, the west coast and then miscellaneous and under the respective headings of which we find many intercepted messages with respect to the movement of ships through the Panama Canal and also the movement of ships in Hawaii and in the Philippines and in the Southeast Atlantic, southeastern Asia, and the Netherlands, which is the Southeast Pacific region or Southwest Pacific—which was it geographically, Southwest Pacific. It was southeast Asia, but it was geographically where?

General MILES. Southwest Pacific, yes, sir.

[2244] The CHAIRMAN. The Southwest Pacific?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any particular difference in the relative importance given to these intercepted messages with respect to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines, southeast Asia, or any other regions covered by these intercepted messages relative to the movement of ships?

General MILES. If I understand your question, Senator, these messages as a whole primarily indicated to us what we already knew or could very easily suspect, that the Japanese were doing everything they could to follow the movement of our warships, as I said yesterday, just as we were doing with regard to following the movement of Japanese warships.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were getting information from their representatives either in Panama, for instance, or through some South American country with respect to all movements of not only warships but commercial ships through the Panama Canal in both directions?

General MILES. I did not get the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I say they were receiving information as to the movement of ships, both naval and commercial, through the Panama

Canal in both directions, according to these intercepted messages?

General MILES. That was their intent and I have no doubt [2245] they carried it out pretty thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. And they also were receiving information, as these intercepted messages show, concerning the movement of ships in and out of the Philippines region in Manila Bay, were they?

General MILES. That is true, sir. I mentioned yesterday that I have counted 56 of those that I have deciphered.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Hawaiian Islands. Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running from 1940, some period in 1940 up to and approaching the 7th of December 1941, and the question I would like to ask is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way and with the same degree of importance, or whether they singled out this information from either the Panama Canal or from Hawaii or the Philippines or southeast Asia for any special treatment in regard to precautionary measures which might be taken in any of these different regions?

[2246] General MILES. Well, they were primarily messages which concerned the Naval Intelligence rather than the Military. Obviously, Senator, we were more interested in the fact that the Japanese were following our ships in our own waters, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, than we were the Dutch East Indies, or any other places headed here "miscellaneous".

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the activity of the Japanese Government in obtaining this information through these messages from various people at the Panama Canal, Manila, Honolulu, the Dutch East Indies, and Southeast Asia, was there anything in any of them, so far as you know, as head of the Military Intelligence Division, to indicate whether the Japanese Government intended to make an attack at any of these points, and, if so, which one was singled out as the most likely to be the object of such an attack?

General MILES. No, sir, taking the messages as a whole, I do not think they indicated any particular place in which you could say the Japanese will attack there, or the most probable, that they will attack there, solely based on those messages.

The CHAIRMAN. Now yesterday I think you testified with reference to the shortage of competent help in the interception, the translation, and decoding of these various messages. I would like to ask you specifically what effort you made, as [2247] head of that Division, to secure additional help so that they might be translated, decoded and intercepted more promptly than they were in many cases?

General MILES. I testified this morning, Senator, that for a considerable period of time before Pearl Harbor, I cannot definitely define it, we had lent one of our language officers, successively through at least six of those gentlemen, to the S. I. S. We were not permitted, due to restrictions on personnel, to do more than that with those language officers. Although they were trained language officers, even then we had to put them through a course of training for that particular duty of translating from telegraphic Japanese, which is a language within a language, before they became fit to carry on.

In addition to that, we did what we could to find for the Signal Corps competent civilians, to aid them in this work. That, as I explained this morning, was very difficult, because there were very few in existence who could translate telegraphic Japanese accurately into English, and we must be accurate, and they had to be not only American citizens but American citizens on whose absolute loyalty and discretion we could count.

We were handling a very important secret.

The CHAIRMAN. How were those appointments made? Were they made under civil service, or did the War Department have [2248] some special plan by which it was able to secure competent persons who were able to intercept and also to translate and decode these messages?

General MILES. Well, the interception, Senator, was made by various stations of the Army, Navy, and FBI, and the FCC. That was simply a matter of pulling a message out of the air, then transmitting that message as it came out of the air in coded Japanese to Washington. Now the decoding and translation was altogether another matter, a very difficult proposition.

[2249] The CHAIRMAN. Now, pulling the message out of the air at Hawaii or Panama or the Philippines, or any other point, was simply pulling it out of the air as it was going through the air in Japanese?

General MILES. In coded Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. In coded Japanese. They recorded the message in the Japanese code, and it had to be then transmitted from whatever station it may have been intercepted, Panama or elsewhere; is that true?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it Washington it had to be decoded and translated into English; is that it?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that those who were charged with that responsibility and that duty had to be, in the first place, able to pull the message out of the air, then they had to be able to decode it and translate it so it could be understood in English, and then passed on to whoever was expected to get it finally; is that true?

General MILES. Yes, sir. The same personnel that pulled it out of the air was not the same that decoded and translated it.

The CHAIRMAN. He could pull it out of the air just like it was but he could not translate it after he got it [2250] out of the air?

General MILES. That is so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice many of these messages were translated and decoded within a few days after they had been received and in many other cases it was a month, or maybe in some cases, 2 months, before the translation and decoding took place. How did that happen? It seems they were not being decoded or translated in the order of their receipt or in the order of their being pulled out of the air.

How did that happen, that they were not decoded and translated in relation to the date of their receipt?

For instance, some messages received in December were not decoded and translated until February, and others were translated within a few days. Now, until they were decoded and translated, did any-

body have any idea of the relative importance of these messages so as to give priority to their translation and decoding? And if that is true, how did it happen that some of them waited a month, or 2 months, to be decoded and translated while others were decoded and translated within a week and in some cases, 3 or 4 days, and some on the same day?

General MILES. Obviously, Senator, we could not evaluate the messages or give them any priority in the ordinary case. In the case that we were looking for a particular message, [2251] as was the case in the days before the receipt of the Japanese reply beginning on the 6th of December, we knew that message would be coming. We knew it would be along, we knew to whom it would be addressed, and undoubtedly that got a high priority.

But to answer your question, primarily the delay was due two factors: One, the fact, as I have already testified, that, as I understand it, the intercepting stations that picked these out of the air—and there were various stations—did not have the same facilities for transmitting that message to Washington. Some had teletypes, and they could put the message on in teletype and send it through.

Sometimes I imagine they had to be checked and re-sent because many errors were made, and would be a perfectly meaningless message to the person sending or receiving it. Other stations had no such facilities, and had to send them by mail, and airmail usually was used.

The second reason, of course, was the traffic rate. Sometimes that increased enormously, and a backlog was created in the decoding and translating agencies here in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. I find here a message intercepted from Honolulu (Okuda) which I suppose means the Japanese representative there, to Tokyo. It is No. 003. It seems to be in reply to No. 002.

Battleships *New Mexico* (flag)—
which I presume means flagship—

Oklahoma, *Idaho*, and *Mississippi*, together with many cruisers and destroyers left Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 6th for training.

That is the day before this message was sent.

It is reported that they will return on the (12th?)

Then there is a question mark after that in parentheses, indicating probably some doubt as to whether they would return on that day. That was a Navy translation on the 10th, which is three days after that message was transmitted.

Then there is another one on January 9, 1941, translated on the 25th, with reference to other movements:

It is reported that the light cruiser *Cincinnati* returned here from the Philippine Islands. This message sent to Washington and Manila.

That is a message by some Japanese representative to the Japanese Government at Tokyo.

Then on the 16th of January, 1941:

1. The capital ships returned to Pearl Harbor immediately. The *Pennsylvania* arrived on the 14th.

2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning of the 16th was as follows: Five battleships [2253] (*Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, *Idaho*, *Pennsylvania*, *Oklahoma*), five light cruisers of the Omaha class (of which one is in dock) 19 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 - - - , about 6 small submarines, 1 submarine tender, 1 patrol boat, 7 vessels which may have been patrol boats, 2 transports.

3. The *Yorktown* is not in port.

All of which would indicate that somebody in Honolulu almost day by day was reporting to Tokyo the movement of all of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor, and in and out of Honolulu. Some of these messages were translated and decoded within a very few days, while others were not.

Some of these translations were by the Navy, probably most by the Navy, and some by the Army.

Do you know, as head of the Intelligence Division of the War Department, by what rules, or lack of rules, some of these messages detailing the movements of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and in and out of Honolulu as far back as January 1941, nearly a year before the attack was made, were translated and decoded in some cases almost immediately, and in other cases not for weeks? Have you any explanation from your knowledge, as to why that happened?

General MILES. Beyond what I have testified, Senator, I have not. I understand you are going to have Colonel Sadtler [2254] as a witness, who can give you the details of that. I could add, however, of course, that these messages we had already discarded. We knew the Japanese were following the movement of our ships, very naturally, in Hawaii.

Much has already been said before this committee as to whether or not the presence of that fleet was a deterrent to the Japanese, but their interest in the movement of the ships was a perfectly natural activity on their part, because of the obvious fact that there was a fleet on their flank, whatever direction they chose to go, north or south.

The CHAIRMAN. The question which arises in my mind is, in view of the fact that these decoded, intercepted, and translated messages go all the way from January practically up to the attack, showing that they had detailed information with respect to the movement of the ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and in and out of Honolulu in the Hawaiian Islands, whether that gave any emphasis to the possibility of an attack in Pearl Harbor more or less than any emphasis that might have been given with respect to a possible attack on Panama, in view of the same information they were receiving from Panama or Manila, in view of the information they were receiving from Manila, or the Southwest Pacific, or southeast Asia, with respect to the same traffic information they were [2255] receiving from that region. In other words, as these intercepted messages show that Japan at Tokyo was receiving from these various points similar information with respect to the movement of all ships in these four or five regions, did the War Department, through you or your division, give any particular emphasis to anyone of these points over other points about which the same information was being conveyed?

General MILES. No, sir. Those messages as a whole, as I tried to testify yesterday, meant simply to us what we already knew, or suspected, that the Japanese were following the movement of all of our ships anywhere they appeared.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the knowledge of that fact cause any particular apprehension to the Intelligence Division that there might be an attack at any of these points in the event the situation developed to a point where there might be hostilities between the two countries?

General MILES. We knew, Senator, that, as I have said before, attack on our principal bases, Honolulu, Hawaii, and Panama, in-

cluding the Philippines, was practically inherent as a high possibility or probability in any war with Japan. The messages themselves had very little effect in emphasizing that point.

The CHAIRMAN. You testified, I believe this morning, [2256] with respect to the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor and the possibility of a sudden surprise attack. How do you evaluate the possibility of a sudden and surprise attack at Pearl Harbor or Hawaii with relation to the possibility of a sudden or surprise attack on Manila or on the Panama Canal, or any other of these points about which the Japanese Government was making inquiry as to the movement of ships?

General MILES. I should say that our evaluation would have been that Hawaii and the Panama Canal were about equally likely to be attacked for somewhat different reasons, but both of them were of immense strategic importance to us and immense value to the Japanese, if they could be injured or put out of business.

The CHAIRMAN. When you were in Hawaii—as operations officer was it?

General MILES. G-3, operations officer; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. For how long? Some three years?

General MILES. Three years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you indulged in many war games, based upon assumptions of various kinds?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And in those war games you assumed that there might be an actual physical invasion of the [2257] Hawaiian Islands by the landing of troops in the harbor at Honolulu, did you, or Pearl Harbor, or both? Which was it?

General MILES. I only remembered one in which we envisaged the lading of Japanese troops in Honolulu Harbor. It was generally presumed they would land at different points of the island.

The CHAIRMAN. That was based, of course, on the possibility of landing military troops from transports and engaging such forces as we might have on land in the Hawaiian Islands?

General MILES. Based on the principle of surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That they might produce a surprise landing of troops and actually invade the Hawaiian Islands.

General MILES. Yes, sir. One maneuver, or war game, that I mentioned was based on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Testimony has been adduced here to the effect that the Japanese rather insisted that we take the entire Pacific Fleet out of the Pacific Ocean and put it back into the Atlantic, in which event, of course, the air raid on the fleet itself in Pearl Harbor would not have taken place. But if that had been the situation, would you wish to express an opinion—which may be more or less speculative—as to whether the Japanese would have attempted or could have attempted and succeeded in effectuating a landing [2258] on the Hawaiian Islands by an army and thereby capture the islands themselves, instead of bombing from the air the fleet that was in Pearl Harbor? Would you care to express any opinion on that?

General MILES. Well, sir, it was subject to a long study during my time in Hawaii, and also it was up time and time again during my course of duty here in the War Plans Division.

I remember running a general staff study on that when I was in Hawaii. It was always considered a possibility. There were very cogent reasons why the Japanese, even with the fleet in the Atlantic, should have attacked Hawaii, preferably an attack based on the capture of Hawaii. Had the Japanese captured Hawaii, we knew perfectly well we could never begin the offensive war which we have fought against the Japanese until we recaptured Hawaii—a very difficult operation.

Could they have knocked out the naval facilities of Hawaii, it would have given them a lesser time, but still a very considerable period of time before we could have begun any offensive operations in the Pacific, because those facilities would have had to be built up again. All those things were inherent in the situation, if I may so express it.

[2259] The CHAIRMAN. Well, if we may presume that the object of the Japanese attack, as it took place, was to cripple or destroy the fleet in Pearl Harbor so as to make it ineffective in resisting the encroachment, the movement of the Japanese Army and the fleet from Japan south, and into Indochina, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or any of that territory, is it, from a military standpoint, sound to assume that if that fleet had not been there, or within that region, that instead of making an attack upon the fleet from the air and leaving with whatever damage occurred they could have captured the islands—and of course, such attack would have brought war just as the attack on the fleet had brought war—what effect would that have had on our ability to fight Japan in the region where we had to fight her, with the Hawaiian Islands in her possession and the necessity to recapture them before we got far beyond them, and if they had captured the islands, would they have been able to base their own fleet in Pearl Harbor instead of our own? What would the effect have been on our ability to fight Japan further west in the Pacific, in the region where she was up to that time making her depredations?

That may be an involved question.

General MILES. The effect would have been that we would have been forced to recapture the Hawaiian Islands [2260] before we undertook any major offensive against the Japanese in the middle or western Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when did you first go to Hawaii, General?

General MILES. April 1929.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the military or naval authorities while you were there—you were there until 1932?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there when the fleet was maneuvering in the Hawaiian region in 1932, 1931, and 1932?

General MILES. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in the Hawaiian Islands when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931?

General MILES. In 1931, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were there when they made the attack on Shanghai?

General MILES. No, sir, that was considerably later, I think, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What year was that?

General MILES. Somewhere in the middle thirties. I do not recall offhand.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably 1935. I do not recall exactly. As operations officer in charge of G-3, I believe you said, in the Hawaiian Islands from 1929 to 1932, was any consideration given to the possibility that the Japanese aggressions in Manchuria and the possible attack upon Shanghai, or an attack upon any European possession or any American possession in that region, would bring about hostilities between the United States and Japan, and was that in any way related to the maneuvers of the fleet in Hawaiian waters in 1931 or 1932?

General MILES. To answer your last question first, I do not believe that the Japanese aggression, which began in September of 1931, if I remember correctly, in Manchuria, had any particular bearing on the maneuvers, the joint Army and Navy maneuver of February or perhaps March of 1932.

To answer the second question, I think it is fair to say that beginning with the Japanese aggression of Manchuria in the fall of 1931, the possibility of a Japanese American war increased from then on. They were a bandit nation out on the rampage in a war game that was real.

[2262] The CHAIRMAN. Our Government protested against the invasion of Manchuria at the time it took place?

General MILES. It led the protest.

The CHAIRMAN. It led the protest and never at any time recognized the Manchukuo Government set up by Japan?

General MILES. I believe that is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the position of the Secretary of State at that time as stated by him that when the maneuvers of the fleet were concluded that the fleet was still retained for a time in Hawaiian waters because of the Manchurian situation; are you familiar with that?

General MILES. I have heard that. I read that in Secretary Stimson's book. I did not know it at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you finally conclude your service as Chief of Military Intelligence here in Washington?

General MILES. I think it was the 31st of January 1942; and 30th or 31st.

The CHAIRMAN. Some 2 months, approximately, following the Pearl Harbor attack?

General MILES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all

Congressman COOPER.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I desire to inquiry briefly of General Miles.

[2263] First, General, along the lines of the chairman's original questions to you, I might refer to the fact that I had a brief service in the Army of 2 years during the First World War in the Infantry. Of course, the Signal Corps of the Army is a definite branch of the Army like the the Quartermaster Corps or any other part of the Army.

General MILES. That is correct. It is one of the technical branches of the Army—technical services of the Army.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And this Signal Intelligence Service is simply part of that branch?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, the Signal Corps has the responsibility of stringing telephone lines and indulging in various and sundry types of service—furnishing communications?

General MILES. Many other activities.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, and this Signal Intelligence Service was simply a part of that?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And, of course, intelligence was distributed all through various units of the Army; isn't that true?

General MILES. Yes, sir; all the tactical units and to a certain extent the technical services, particularly the [2264] Air Force, the Air Corps in those days, were running an intelligence of their own.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Even during the First World War an infantry regiment had what was called an operations and intelligence officer.

General MILES. Oh, yes. All combat units in the field.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had intelligence service.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If I may interrupt, Congressman Cooper, there is one question I overlooked.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When these intercepted messages, intercepted at Panama, Hawaii, or the Philippines, or southeast Asia, were sent here for decoding and translation, were the officers in these various regions thereafter notified of the contents of the message which they had intercepted but which they could not translate or decode?

General MILES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was true of all these points, including the Hawaiian Islands?

General MILES. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no different treatment of these messages, or no information given to high authorities, those at Panama, Manila, and southeast Asia, after these messages [2265] were sent here in the original form and decoded and translated, that information was kept with the War Department here and not disseminated to these various points?

General MILES. There was no difference made between the different overseas departments.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, I would like to inquire briefly, if I may, with respect to certain pages of exhibit 2, with which you are thoroughly familiar, beginning on page 16, which has the heading "B. Messages translated after 7 December 1941," and continuing to and including page 29 in this same exhibit, which, I believe, embraces the messages received before the attack on Pearl Harbor which were translated after the attack on Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir; though not necessarily received in Washington, probably not received in Washington. This one, as an example, is dated November 24. It was not translated until the 16th of December. In all probability that was picked up, although I cannot state it as a fact, by an intercepting station which did not have the facilities for rapid transmission to Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, that was the next question I had intended to present to you, General. These pages to which I have referred show that the space of time from the date shown [2266] at the top of the message to the date shown at the bottom as the date of translation varied all the way from 2 days to 22 days.

Now, I was in the act of asking you whether that date at the top of each of these messages indicates the date that the message was received by the Army Intelligence Service here in Washington.

General MILES. No, sir; it does not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That means—

General MILES. It is the date which that message was sent from Tokyo, or wherever it was sent from.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The date at the top of the message is the date that it was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo or from Tokyo to Honolulu, or whatever the case may be?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, is there anything on this page 16 to which I now invite your attention, that shows the date or the time that that intercepted message came to the attention of the Intelligence Service here in Washington?

General MILES. Yes, sir. The date at the bottom of the page is the date of its translation and almost invariably it was passed on from SIS to MID, ONI, on that same day.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then is it correct to understand that all of these messages contained on the pages to which [2267] I have invited your attention were decoded and translated in Washington the day they were received in Washington?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not say that. You asked me, as I understood it, Mr. Congressman, was there anything in this message to indicate the date on which the Military Intelligence Division received the message. I replied, "Yes, that was the date on which it was translated in the great majority of cases, or at least the next day."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, let's try to be more specific, if I may, General. I am just seeking light. I know you are anxious to help us and give all the light you can.

Take this page 16 in exhibit 2:

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
November 24, 1941.
Number 234 (part 1 of 2).
Re your number 114-a.
Strictly secret.

Now, I will not take the time to read the message, which covers most of the page.

Down at the bottom:

a—Not available.

Under that:

Army.
[2268] 26351.
(Japanese).
Trans. 12-16-41 (2).

What is there on that page to show when this intercepted message reached G-2 of the Army?

General MILES. The date of translation, sir, was almost invariably the date on which we received it. In other words, when this message was decoded, translated, it was very promptly sent from SIS to Military Intelligence Division. If it came in very late one night it might arrive very early the next morning. There might be one day's difference on the record.

Mr. GESELL. May I interpose, Congressman?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I believe the difficulty is that General Miles is telling you when the message was received by G-2 and I believe the Congressman is anxious to know when the message reached Washington, i. e., the Signal Corps. That is, perhaps the difficulty in the question.

General MILES. To answer that last one, sir, there is nothing to show when this intercepted message, uncoded and untranslated, was received by SIS.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the Signal Intelligence Service?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

But I have no doubt that they have records in additon to [2269] what is shown on this page which might indicate that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I—will you yield, Congressman?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I have in mind that if counsel through General Miles over the week end may be able to find in the Department some information on that, it will be helpful, so that we could have when each one of these messages was received by the Signal Corps here in Washington. The information is not complete on this data.

Mr. GESELL. The information is not complete here, Senator.

If I may suggest, since the question of receipt and translation is a matter within the province of the Signal Corps and not in the province of General Miles, it would be appropriate to present that information through the Signal Corps officers who are going to testify.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will appear?

Mr. GESELL. They will appear. Colonel Sadtler and others, who will be familiar with those details.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I might say, naturally I felt disturbed when I examined these pages and saw that from what was apparent here from 2 days to 22 days of time had elapsed between the date of the message and the time it was translated. [2270] I was concerned about that.

Now, I was just wondering how General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to whom this information was given by you as G-2 of his staff, could operate with a full degree of understanding if 22 days had elapsed from the time that a message was intercepted before it was translated and decoded and presented to him for his attention.

That was one thing I was hoping to get some light and information on.

As I understand it, officers of the Signal Corps would be the ones to whom I should address those questions?

General MILES. They would be able to give you more tactical information than I. I think you will find that the average times was far less than 22 days.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, this particular one to which I have been inviting your attention was sent November 24 and translated December 16. That is 22 days.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the same thing is true of the one appearing on page 17. It was sent on November 24 and translated December 16, which was 22 days.

The one appearing on page 18 was sent November 28, translated December 8, which was 10 days.

The one appearing on page 19 was sent November 28, [2271] translated December 8, which was 10 days.

The one appearing on page 20 was sent December 1, translated December 10, which, of course, is 10 days.

The one appearing on page 21, the first one, was sent December 2, translated January 30, which was 28 days.

The CHAIRMAN. December 30.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. December 30, which was 28 days.

The second one on that page was sent December 3, translated December 10, which was 7 days.

On page 22, one sent December 3, translated December 11, which was 8 days.

And so on, without calling attention to each individual one. The time varies from 2 days to 28 days that elapsed from the time the message was sent until it was transmitted.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to ask counsel whether or not there has been produced up to this time the report of the SIS or the Signal Corps of the Army. Have you any reports from either the SIS or the Signal Corps with relation to their transactions during this period under questioning?

Mr. GESELL. I believe, Congressman, that some of the information that you inquire about is contained in the Clark report to which reference has been made.

[2272] Mr. KEEFE. I have been trying to get my hands on the report of the Signal Corps and the SIS without success up to date. Now, is that a restricted report?

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, you asked for the annual report of the Signal Corps. It came into our hands either yesterday or the day before and I dictated a note and ordered it delivered at your office. It was a Signal Corps report for 1 year that you asked for.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I wanted.

Mr. MITCHELL. It ought to be in your office now.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I haven't been there, of course, this afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire from counsel—

Mr. MITCHELL. I might say, I looked it over. I don't think there is much in it that helps but if there is anything else you want we will try to get it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the Congressman yield for a question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. These messages, the Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth, in the yellow booklet, do they come to us in the original, showing all the checks and

information on them? Do they come [2273] to us just as you print them here?

Mr. GESELL. These messages, Senator, as contained in exhibit 2, as I am quite certain was explained at the executive session of the committee, have certain technical data deleted for reasons of security, but the text of the message is not in any way affected thereby.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get at is this, did they have any method of time stamping on the receipt of these messages by the various departments, so that if we saw the original message we could get the information that Congressman Cooper is now endeavoring to get?

Mr. GESELL. No. It is my understanding that that information is not on the originals of these messages that are in the file. I believe to the extent that the data is available, and there is a great deal of it that is, it will have to be assembled from work sheets and other detailed notes of the people concerned with translating and decoding in the SIS.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, so that I understand, what is deleted from the messages? Let's take the one on page 25 as an example.

Mr. GESELL. I would prefer to discuss that question with the Senator, as we have done before, in executive session, but the text of the message is complete and full as here printed.

[2274] Mr. MITCHELL. The only thing deleted, Mr. Senator, is some technical information.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the kind of a code?

Mr. MITCHELL. Things of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't any desire to get that kind of information, but I am desirous of getting the information as to the time of receipt of the message in the various departments and if they are not marked I would like to have some witness explain why the departments didn't keep track of when they received the message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what I have been trying to secure but I got the impression from the statements of counsel and General Miles that probably we could get that information better from officers of the Signal Corps.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will also produce photostats of some of these messages which are of particular moment, like the fourteenth part message, so you will have an exact copy of just the way the record looks in the War Department. We will have the original here and the work papers. That has been arranged for.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will ask one more question and suspend, as the hour of adjournment has about arrived.

[2275] General, I understood you to say that for years it had been understood by the Army—I assume that means, of course, the high-ranking officers of the Army—that hostilities with Japan would involve an attack on Hawaii, and that a knowledge of the Japanese people caused the anticipation of a surprise attack.

That is substantially and in essence your statement on that, isn't it?

General MILES. That the possibility if not the probability of an attack on Hawaii was inherent in a Japanese war. You gentlemen of the Congress appropriated millions of dollars for that fortress. Against whom were you building it?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but what I am trying to get at is your statement that it had been understood by the Army for years that that was the situation.

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then would it naturally follow that the military commander at Hawaii might reasonably be expected to understand that also?

General MILES. I could certainly say that the four generals under whom I have had the honor to serve at Hawaii gave me every indication that they understood that situation all right.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until [2276] 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Monday, December 3, 1945.)

[2277]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2278] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

When the committee recessed on Friday, Congressman Cooper was in the process of examining General Miles.

Before we resume, the chairman would like to ask counsel, in view of the interest in the time when General Marshall will appear before the committee, and in view of the statement that was made the other day that he would advise counsel and the committee what his schedule might be so that we might determine that matter, I should like to ask counsel if he has any information on that matter.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. On account of his plans to leave for China, he has a rather tight schedule and this morning, about a half an hour ago, I was advised that he would like to testify, commence his testimony on Thursday, December 6, at 10 o'clock and that arrangement has been made, subject, of course, to the committee's approval.

General Marshall's examination will cover all phases of the inquiry with which he was concerned, including the events of December 6 and December 7, as to which we had originally expected to make a special order later.

At the conclusion of General Miles' testimony, we would like to call General Gerow and get as far as we can with him before General Marshall is called, because there are certain things that General Gerow knows that would be well [2279] to lay into the record, if we can, before General Marshall is called.

But it is 10 o'clock Thursday, if that is agreeable to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of General Marshall's situation, I am sure there is no objection on the part of the committee to having him come Thursday, no matter whom it may displace.

Congressman Cooper.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, before Congressman Cooper begins, there are two other matters I would like to bring to the attention of the committee.

General Miles informed me this morning there are two points in his testimony which he wishes to modify, and I think he should be given that opportunity before the examination commences.

Also the question was raised during General Miles' examination, both by questions from counsel and members of the committee, concerning this matter of the delay in translations of certain messages which were sent by the Japanese prior to December 7, but not translated, decoded, and made available to the Military Intelligence Division until sometime after the 7th or late on the 6th.

I, when that came up, advised the committee that we had witnesses scheduled, both from the Army and the Navy, who [2280] would give detailed information concerning that matter. I would like to elaborate that statement for the information of the committee, and point out that in the case of the Army, the Signal Corps, not the Military Intelligence Division, was responsible for interception, decoding, and translation, as has been testified.

We have made and are making a detailed inquiry into the Army and the Navy records and will be in a position with respect to all of the messages in question, we believe, or at least, the great bulk of them, to present to the committee through those witnesses, both from the Army and Navy records, the following information:

The time at which each of the messages in question was intercepted;

The monitoring station which intercepted the message;

The time at which the message was forwarded by the monitoring station to the Army Signal Intelligence Service or to Naval Communications, as the case may be;

The method by which the monitoring station forwarded the message, whether by airmail, teletype or radio;

The time at which the intercepted copy was sent by the Army Signal Corps Intelligence Service, or Naval Communications, or vice versa, for processing, that is to say, decoding and translation.

[2281] That material is all being assembled and will be presented to the committee through the witnesses who were directly concerned in those phases of the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. General Miles, before Congressman Cooper proceeds, do you want to make a statement with reference to your testimony heretofore given?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

General MILES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I find that, on reading the transcript, that in one case my testimony was wrong. I understood, or got the impression, erroneously, that counsel was speaking in the past tense. What he asked me was:

Do you have any information as to whether or not General Short or other Army officers knew of these Navy messages?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind indicating what page of the record that appears?

General MILES. On the bottom of page 2223.

I replied:

I have no specific information on that point.

That was true as of 1941. It was not true as of today, or as of last week.

I had seen last week, and before I gave this testimony, [2282] a copy of an affidavit from Col. George W. Bicknell, assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in Hawaii, before Colonel Clausen.

[2283] In this affidavit Colonel Bicknell says:

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consul, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere.

[2284] The other point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that I fear on rereading my testimony that I have given the impression of complacency on my part and on the part of my Division with regard to these delays in the magic messages. I very deliberately avoided testifying to the technical side of the decoding of these messages.

(1) Because I am not competent to really go into the technical side of it; and

(2) Because you will have before you a competent officer of the Signal Corps who handled this matter directly.

It was not, of course, my province, but I would like to say we were by no means complacent about it. We knew simply the difficulty of doing this work. Three processes had to be performed. A message had to be deciphered, then it had to be decoded, and then the Japanese had to be translated into English.

I have testified as to what my Division was able to do to aid the Signal Corps in translations. The other two very important and highly technical processes of deciphering and decoding we were not competent to aid in, and I felt sure that those devoted men who spent so much time on it were doing everything they possibly could in the matter.

The astonishing thing, Mr. Chairman, was not that these messages were delayed in the process of translation from [2285] Japanese to English, but that we were able to do it at all. It was a marvelous piece of work on the part of the highly technical men who handled that extraordinary job of breaking codes and ciphers.

[2286] The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, toward the end of your testimony at your last appearance I asked you a question that I would like to

repeat at this time to connect up with the previous testimony that you have given.

On page 2275 of the record I asked you the question:

General, I understood you to say that for years it had been understood by the Army—I assume that means, of course, the high ranking officers of the Army—that hostilities with Japan would involve an attack on Hawaii, and that a knowledge of the Japanese people caused the anticipation of a surprise attack.

And then I asked you if that is substantially and in essence your statement on that point.

Then you answered:

That the possibility if not the probability of an attack on Hawaii was inherent in a Japanese war. You gentlemen of the Congress appropriated millions of dollars for that fortress. Against whom were you building it?

Then I asked you:

I understand that, but what I am trying to get [2287] at is your statement that it had been understood by the Army for years that that was the situation.

And you answered then:

That is correct, sir.

Then I asked you:

Then would it naturally follow that the military commander at Hawaii might reasonably be expected to understand that also?

And your reply then was:

I could certainly say that the four Generals under whom I have had the honor to serve at Hawaii gave me every indication that they understood that situation all right.

Now, that answer, of course, still stands as you gave it there?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it does come within your knowledge, then, that the four generals who were in command of the Hawaiian Department during your period of service there understood the situation as you have indicated by the statement you have made here?

Senator LUCAS. Did he answer?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I can make that absolutely flat statement. I worked under those commanding generals in [2288] the preparation of war plans, the revision of war plans and of the defense projects, and I am convinced that all of those four gentlemen, as well as General Drum, who later took command, and when I was here in the War Plans Division, thoroughly understood that that outpost had one sole mission, the defense of the naval base in a Japanese war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, as far as you know, that was the understanding by all of those who were in command of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, I assume that the whole purpose of all of these war games and similar activities in which the Army engaged from time to time was more or less as a practice to be trained and prepared for the time when the real thing might come, is that true?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And throughout the years there had been various war games and maneuvers and practices of that kind?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, the results of those war games and practices were reported to the War College and other divisions and branches of the Army for study and preparation, were they not?

[2289] General MILES. Reports were made on the large maneuvers by the Hawaiian Department to the General Staff in Washington. They were usually reviewed by the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Many local maneuvers, war games and exercises were not, as I remember it, reported to Washington.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But it was the practice to make use of the experience gained during those war games and practices of that type, wasn't it, for the benefit of our officers of the Army who were not engaged in the particular game at the time.

General MILES. Yes, sir. Our war plans for the defense of Hawaii, the defense project and the war plan itself had been built up during years of study and experience of various maneuvers and exercises. It was a splendid command in which to serve as a G-3, both from the point of training and of operations, because there was but one situation you had to consider and one enemy and all of your experience and the experience of men who had gone before you was all down one path.

General Wells particularly saw that every officer landing in Hawaii, saw to it that every officer landing in Hawaii for duty with the Hawaiian Department, read certain documents on the defense of Hawaii, documents which used [2290] the term "Orange" as the term for the enemy and everybody knew who "Orange" was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was a part of his duty to do that, wasn't it?

General MILES. That was an order of General Wells, certainly, regarding all officers of all ranks who joined the Hawaiian Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, wasn't it a part of the duty of any officer in command of Hawaii to do that, to be familiar with the experiences gained through these previous war games and maneuvers and experiences of that kind?

General MILES. I would say so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So, then it would be reasonable to assume that it was a part of the duty of any commander in command of the Army forces in Hawaii to familiarize himself with the experience gained through previous war games and maneuvers of that type?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I think that is a correct statement. When I was in the War Plans Division in the middle thirties we went even beyond that and attempted to have ordered to Washington for a short period of duty not only commanding generals going out to Hawaii but their chief staff officers, so that we could have consultations with them on that very point, the existing war plans and the experiences [2291] that were behind those war plans. I remember distinctly General Patton coming to Washington at our request before he went to Hawaii as G-2.

Mr. GESELL. Congressman Cooper, I do not like to interpose but I think the committee should be informed—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I yield with pleasure, of course.

Mr. GESELL (continuing). that General Miles has made available to us this morning the excerpts from the memoranda of General Drum which he referred to in his testimony as relating specifically to the matter that the Congressman is covering in his testimony.

I have one copy of these excerpts here and have just glanced at them. I think they are quite pertinent and I would like to hand them to you or have them put in the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, read it at this point.

Mr. GESELL. The reference occurred at pages 2168 and 2169 of the transcript and I think one of the members of the committee or counsel, I forget which, asked General Miles to make available the material that he was referring to in the correspondence of General Drum and that is the reason that it is material to have this come to us at this time.¹

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, read it in at this point. Allow me to inquire, though, before you do that, when was General Drum in command at Hawaii?

[2292] General MILES. General Drum, as I remember, sir, took command in 1935, I should say about the middle of the year 1935 and I think he was out there 3 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Three years, is that right?

General MILES. But I am not sure of that. I think 3 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 1935, and that would take him to about 1938?

General MILES. And General Herron was in command before General Short.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

General MILES. Perhaps General Drum was there only 2 years.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed then, Mr. Gesell and read them.

Mr. GESELL. The first is entitled: "Excerpt from memorandum from Major General H. A. Drum, Commander, Hawaiian Department, to the Adjutant General, War Department, dated September 21, 1935: Subject: Defense mission Hawaiian Dept." [Reading:]

Many assumptions are plausible as to an enemy's action against Hawaii. The variable factor relates to the location of our fleet at the time of an emergency or [2293] its success in an encounter with the enemy's main fleet. We can enumerate enemy's possible modes of action as including blockades, air raids, naval raids, landing raids, air attacks, naval attacks, landings in force, local uprisings and sabotage or any combination of these. We can assume with some certainty that local uprisings will occur on all the islands of the territory and that the first enemy hostile action will be attempted as a surprise. With our fleet present in the Pacific and undefeated, hostile external action will probably be limited to air, naval, and land raids combined with local uprisings. Hostile naval success would, no doubt, be followed by a combination of blockade and landing and air operations in force.

Pearl Harbor, with its drydock, its shops, gas and oil tanks, and ammunition storage, and our air installations on Oahu are extremely vulnerable to air attacks. One oriental power is strong enough in surface vessels and aircraft to execute successful air attacks against these objectives unless intercepted in sufficient time and with sufficient strength to defeat the attacks.

The doctrine that the only certain way to defeat an aggressive air force decisively is to destroy it on its base is sound and is applicable to the defense of [2294] Oahu. To prevent the destruction of or serious damage to our air fields on Oahu and Pearl Harbor by hostile aircraft, carriers must be sunk or driven off before they can launch their aircraft and the enemy must be prevented from establishing air bases on other islands within range.

From either an offensive or defensive viewpoint of our problem, timely information of a hostile approach is essential. The essential factor in this connection is to receive warnings of the approach of hostile air forces in sufficient time to permit our air forces to leave the ground and attack the enemy's carriers before they are within airplane operating radius of our vital installations on Oahu.

Assuming that carrier-based bombardment airplanes have an operating radius of 200 miles and that our bombardment is "in readiness" and loaded with the proper types of bombs—the highest practicable degree of readiness—first infor-

¹ P. 822, *supra*.

mation of the carriers must be received when they are at least 300 miles from Oahu in order for our bombardment aviation to attack the carriers before they launch their aircraft. Advance notice of greater length of time is desirable. The maintenance of an aerial screen nearly 2,000 miles long requires a large number of airplanes. Economy demands the operation of some of our airplanes from the most distant islands in the Archipelago such as Kauai and Hawaii in order to reduce the time of flight to and from the 300 miles circle.

Now, the other memorandum, if the Congressman wishes me to proceed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, I would like for you to proceed but let us have the date of the one you just read.

Mr. GESELL. That was dated September 21, 1935.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a memorandum of General Drum?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To the War Department?

Mr. GESELL. To the Adjutant General, War Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. War Department. All right, go ahead.

Mr. GESELL. Now, the next one is an excerpt from the memorandum of Maj. Gen. E. T. Conley, the Adjutant General, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated April 2, 1936.

I take it this is a memorandum going the other way, from the War Department to the Commanding General, dated April 2, 1936.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would be correct, wouldn't it, General?

[2296] General MILES. Yes, sir. That was the final answer of the War Department to General Drum's letter of September 1935, which the counsel has just read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was the statement from the War Department to the Army commander at Hawaii?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. This reads:

4. "The need for suitable air fields (on the outlying islands) as an essential and vital element of the defense plans of the Hawaiian Department."

a. This point concerns our use of outlying air fields in defense, primarily against hostile sea-borne aviation. The enemy's use of such outlying fields would be dependent, as already indicated, upon our ability or inability to deny them to him, and upon his ability to repair the damage done to them by our initial demolition or subsequent air bombardments.

b. In the basic letter (Paragraph 3 b) the point is stressed that the only certain way to defeat an aggressive air force decisively is to destroy it on its bases. From this it is argued that our air forces based on Hawaii and Kauai would be of appreciable advantage in attacking hostile air forces while still on their carriers.

[2297] c. The War Department recognized that the installations at Pearl Harbor are vulnerable to air attack; that the enemy may have sufficient seapower to make such an attack from carriers; that the only certain way to defeat such a hostile air force is to sink or drive off the carriers before they can launch their planes; and, finally, that timely information of a hostile approach would be the essential factor in this problem.

d. The question therefore arises whether our air forces based on Hawaii and Kauai could solve this problem. This appears very doubtful when viewed in the light of the latest information on possible enemy sea-borne air power.

e. Information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence is to the effect that each of the four Orange carriers is capable of a sustained maximum speed for 8 or 10-hour runs of between 25 and 28.5 knots an hour. This would mean that these carriers, during an 8-hour night, could make an approach of between 215 and 245 miles, or in a 10-hour night an approach of between 270 and 305 miles.

f. Furthermore, according to information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, the radius of action of existing Orange carrier-based bombers is 330 miles. [2298] This radius will undoubtedly be materially increased as

aviation is further developed. But it is not even safe to use the radius of existing Orange bombers in our calculations, since the enemy might conceivably expend his planes in non-return flights provided the target is of sufficient importance. On such flights they could go about 600 miles (the range equals somewhat less than twice the radius with bombing loads). Hence the fastest Orange carrier running in to launch a bombing attack against Oahu could be at least 600 miles, and might be 900 miles, from Oahu by dusk of a ten-hour night. If, upon reaching her dusk position, she were discovered by a Blue observation plane, she could be prevented from successfully launching her bombers the following dawn only—

(1) If our observation plane tracked her throughout the night, a most difficult operation involving continuous circling and about 900 miles of flight; and

(2) If our bombardment planes were so accurately directed as to catch the carrier just at dawn.

g. In order to surmount these serious difficulties and enable our bombers to catch the carrier before she enters the screen of night, we would have to discover her before she reaches her dusk position, i. e., 65 [2299] miles (or 100 miles if the enemy chose to expend his bombers) from that position (distances covered by carrier at cruising speed while our bombers were coming out 600 miles (or 900 miles)). Our observation plane would then have to track the carrier for 4 (or 6) daylight hours, in spite of whatever the carrier's pursuit planes could do. In any event, it would necessitate the carrier being discovered 665 miles (or 1,000 miles) from Oahu.

h. An observation screen even 665 miles from Oahu would require that our planes cover a perimeter of about 4,180 miles—an impossible task.

i. Lastly, it should be noted that, if the hostile carrier and her bombers approached from the northeast, with the trade wind, they would have the following advantages:

(1) The hostile sea and air speeds would be increased, whereas our air speeds would be reduced, and, in consequence, our observation screen would have to be still farther from Oahu than indicated above.

(2) The enemy would at all times be closer to Oahu than to Hawaii or to Kauai, because of the geographical configuration of the Hawaiian Archipelago. [2300]

(3) His bombers would approach Pearl Harbor from the most favorable direction, that over the Koolau Range, which is almost continually shrouded in a cloud bank.

j. The air bases on Hawaii and Kauai would be, respectively, 222 and 120 land miles from Pearl Harbor. It can be shown diagrammatically that should the hostile carriers approach Oahu from any point in a segment of 325° approximately from the northeast clockwise around to the north, these air bases would be of value, both in the maintenance of the observation screen and in the interception of the carriers by our bombers. But there would still remain a segment of 35° of possible hostile approach in which these air bases would be of no value, and a hostile approach from this segment would be materially aided by the prevailing trade wind.

k. For the above reasons it would appear that long-range bombardment based on Hawaii and Kauai, while of assistance in the defense of Oahu, would not solve the problem presented and, therefore, could not justify the great initial and continuing expenses involved in peace-time garrisons adequate to their ground defense in war.

[2301] I am sorry to interpose, but it seems that is pertinent to what you were reading.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Am I correct, General, in my understanding that these two documents just read into the record by counsel relate entirely to Hawaii?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The first document read was a memorandum from General Drum, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, covering his views and ideas with respect to the defense of Hawaii, and that memorandum was sent to the Hawaiian Department; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir; it was an official letter covering General Drum's ideas and desires with regard to the defense of Hawaii from an attack by Japanese planes based on carriers. That is to say, so much of the letter as has been read refers to that particular point.

The second letter the counsel read was the official reply of the War Department to the basic or original letter from General Drum in which the whole matter was thoroughly gone into from the War Department point of view. It should, of course, be noted that in early 1936 we were just beginning to build our big bombers and radar was unknown.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The second memorandum read into the record by counsel was the War Department's views and position [2302] with respect to the points raised in General Drum's memorandum to the War Department?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And all of it related to the possibility of an air attack from carriers by Japan upon Hawaii and Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, is it correct to assume that succeeding commanders of the Hawaiian Department had the benefit of this expression and information from the War Department on this point?

General MILES. I have every reason to believe that that important letter, correspondence, was on file in the Hawaiian Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And for practical purposes, that letter from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department amounted to a blueprint as to a defense to meet hostile air attack from carriers from Japan?

General MILES. It amounted to a discussion of that problem, Mr. Congressman. I cannot say it was a blueprint, because at that time we were not able to give General Drum, nor were we ever able to give the commanding general out there sufficient airplanes to cover this enormous perimeter.

It is a discussion of the problem as it existed in 1936 [2303] when, as I pointed out, radar was unknown.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, the fact that radar later existed, would be an additional advantage that the commander of the Hawaiian Department might utilize in furthering that defense program, was it not?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The fact is that everything the War Department told him in that letter or communication would still obtain, and if subsequent to that time radar or anything else that might contribute to a defense of Hawaii came into existence, why that would be that much additional that he might have to utilize for the purpose of defending Hawaii?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And of course the fact is that the actual attack on December 7, 1941, was made by Japan as an air attack from airplane carriers?

General MILES. So far as I know, sir, it was made almost exactly as we had worked it out with General Drum in 1935-36.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The actual attack occurred almost exactly as was worked out in this communication from General Drum and

from the War Department back to the commander of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. So far as I know, from what has been published on the Japanese operation, the actual operation was [2304] very similar to what we had worked out with General Drum in 1935-36.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, General, I understood you to state that during the time you were stationed in Hawaii—I believe as an Operations Officer—

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That war games were worked out and executed that involved an air attack by Japan on Hawaii at that time.

General MILES. Yes, sir. It was always assumed that no serious attack could be made on Hawaii without the use by Japan of strong air forces. It was always assumed, even in a landing attack, with no intent to bomb the fleet, it would have to be supported by very strong air forces.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, General, just a few other questions. I do not want to detain you too long because I know other members of the committee want to inquire of you.

Did you, as a general officer of the Army, and as G-2 of the Army General Staff, consider the message of the Chief of Staff of November 27, 1941, to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department as sufficient warning to cause proper and necessary alerts to be put into effect?

General MILES. I did, sir, most definitely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then the following day, I believe [2405] November 28, you, as G-2 of the General Staff of the Army sent a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you regarded that as a sufficient warning to cause an alert to be put into effect?

General MILES. I did not regard my message to the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department as one which in itself would have caused any action by the Commanding General. If I had so regarded it, I would not have sent it. My message of November 27 was supplementary to the message sent by General Marshall, Chief of Staff, so that in any warning to my opposite number in Hawaii, the G-2, I was simply carrying out a policy, a decision which had been made by my chief, the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it would serve the purpose of further accentuating it, would it not?

General MILES. I understood so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, isn't it true that after a sufficient warning was given to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, such as you considered the message from the Chief of Staff of November 27, 1941, to be, he was presumed to know what to do to defend Hawaii, and those under his command?

General MILES. I assure, sir, that he had no other [2306] purpose or reason for having that command than that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No other reason for them being there, was there?

General MILES. That was the essential reason, from the commanding general down to every last soldier who was on that island.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department at that time was a major general, wasn't he?

General MILES. He was a lieutenant general, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. A lieutenant general.

Well, of course, then, there was not any corporal or sergeant in command there, and a lieutenant general of the United States Army would be presumed to know what to do if somebody started shooting at him, would he not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[2307] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now one other question, if I may, General, with respect to these intercepted Japanese messages.

I, of course, expect to wait until the officers of the Signal Corps appear to ask them more in detail about it, but I understood you to say that the Signal Corps of the Army was under the Chief of Staff, or the chief signal officer of the Army reported to the Chief of Staff.

General MILES. Yes, sir. The heads of all branches of the Army were directly under the Chief of Staff.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the Signal Corps did not come under G-2 or Army Intelligence?

General MILES. It did not come under G-2 or directly under any other branch of the General Staff.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, did the Quartermaster Corps, the Engineer Corps, and various other similar branches of the Army also come under the Chief of Staff and not under G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, as the case might be?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. These intercepted messages had been received by you prior to the time about which I inquired the other day, had they not? The inquiries I addressed to you at the other session were with respect to the messages received and sent from November 24, 1941, to about December 6, 1941, but intercepted messages from Japan had been brought [2308] to your attention before that time, had they?

General MILES. Oh, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Had your attention been attracted by unusual delay in the decoding and translation of those messages?

General MILES. No, sir. I remember that I knew and noted that the period of time between when the message was sent and when I saw it in English varied considerably with different messages, which I thought was perfectly natural, knowing something about the difficult science of cryptology, and the ability of all countries to change rapidly their ciphers although they could not change their codes very rapidly.

I thought at that time I had every reason to believe that the SIS section was doing everything possible to give us those messages as rapidly as they could, and I repeat, the amazing thing was that they could give them to us at all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I could well appreciate that point, General, but the fact is that they did intercept them and that they did decode and translate them.

General MILES. Decrypt, decode and translate them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as shown by these exhibits to which attention has been invited, it took varying periods of time for that to be done.

General MILES. That is true, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, the message was intercepted [2309] the day it was sent from Tokyo or from Honolulu, as the case might be, was it not?

General MILES. That was certainly true of all radio messages.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, would not any message have to be intercepted at the time it was being transmitted?

General MILES. By radio; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, by radio. So that the date that it was sent was the date that time began to run so far as the decoding and translating of that message was concerned?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, one other question, I believe, if I may, General.

Has it been the custom of the Army for a long time in peacetime to allow all personnel of the Army who can be spared from essential work to take week-ends off?

General MILES. If they can be spared, if the situation is such that they can be spared it was normally the custom that, in times of peace, the officers could leave their posts by permission of their commanding officers, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What I was endeavoring to get at, General, has not that been the practice, or the custom, for a long time when we were not at war for personnel of the Army to be given the opportunity to take week-ends off?

[2310] General MILES. Yes, sir; as long as I can remember. Of course that was under the limitation that you could not take too many of these. Somebody had to be back on the job.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I realize that, but I just happen to recall, at times when I visited, as an illustration, Walter Reed Army Hospital, or the Navy hospital at Bethesda, to visit friends on Saturday or Sunday, I was rather impressed with the very minimum number of people who were on duty, and that all the others were taking the week end off. Was my impression correct?

General MILES. I think that is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did that same custom prevail through all branches of the Army?

General MILES. I think you were correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that just the very essential and what might be termed the minimum number of people were kept on duty, and all of the others were given an opportunity to be off during the week end?

General MILES. I think that is generally correct, sir. Of course the essential number depended on what the situation was, but in the piping times of peace it was usually reasonably easy to get the permission of your commanding officer to leave on Saturday, or perhaps from Saturday to Sunday.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, whatever the situation [2311] may have been in Hawaii on that historic week end of December 7, 1941, it was under the control of the commanding general in command there?

General MILES. In the final analysis it was under the control of the commanding general; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And if personnel did have the week end off, why, it had to be at his permission, or certainly in accord with his policy?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum which I neglected to bring with me this morning. I will pass at the present time. I want to ask a very few questions later.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. General Miles, the term "alert" has been used frequently in the course of these hearings, the word "alert." Just what does that term fully signify in military parlance?

General MILES. "Alert" is a status of readiness. You alert a command, for instance, to be ready to receive an order to move. In the war plans for many years we had established a certain status of alert, 1, 2, 3, or A, B, C, each one being definitely directed to a certain situation, and the purpose of the alert was to see that the forces alerted were prepared [2312] to meet that situation.

Mr. CLARK. Now the terms "surprise" and "surprise attack" were also frequently mentioned in this record. Would you mind stating to the committee what your understanding, in a military sense, of that term "surprise" is?

General MILES. Well, I should define a surprise attack as one whose objective was to catch the enemy unprepared, unalerted to meet that attack. There is no hidden or technical meaning that I know of in that term. It means exactly what the English words convey.

Mr. CLARK. Well, there was a thought in my mind that coincides with your own, but I also considered whether or not a military attack without a previous declaration of war would be considered as a surprise attack.

General MILES. A surprise attack in the highest form of surprise, I would say.

Mr. CLARK. Now in the analysis and evaluation of the military situation in the Pacific, which you have already been asked about, you stated several alternatives that would be open to Japan, including movement into Indochina, attack on Hainan, and other things, the Philippine Islands. You did not in that evaluation anywhere touch upon the question of the possibility of a surprise attack. I was wondering why you did not go into that.

[2313] General MILES. Those were lines of action which we were trying to define as possible lines of action for Japan. We did not go into the question of how she would conduct tactically any attack which she made, and surprise is one of the tactical principles. We knew, from the characteristics of the Japanese people and from sound military doctrine, that they would, if they could, utilize the tactical principle of surprise. But we were not, in those estimates, referring to any tactical principles she might employ, we were looking at it from the broader point of view of the lines of action she would be apt to take.

Mr. CLARK. That was more or less the natural line of action, was it not?

General MILES. What we thought were the obvious actions. I would not say the natural actions, but the most obvious actions from all the information to the existing situation.

Mr. CLARK. Now at that time there had been a message from the Ambassador to Japan to which you have referred, suggesting a surprise attack on Hawaii, and I believe the Secretary of State had something to say about the possibility of a surprise attack after the 26th of November.

I notice in the messages released by the Chief of Naval Operations, I think Admiral Ingersoll, in which he speaks of a surprise aggressive attack. Now in reading your analysis [2314] and evaluation of the military situation in the Pacific, and in the light of the action by Japan, the question arose in my mind as to why you should not deal in that analysis with the element of surprise.

General MILES. The documents to which I think you refer, Mr. Congressman, were written for the Chief of Staff and other military officials covering a great many difficult subjects. We did not think it necessary, and I still fail to see why it should be necessary, for us to constantly repeat in such documents the obvious. All soldiers have been taught the principle of surprise; it is among the principles of war. I knew in my own mind, so far as Hawaii was concerned, we constantly thought of the element of surprise being in any form of attack that the Japanese might make, that it was a possibility or probability.

I think that is the answer, sir. We did not want to constantly repeat the obvious to the gentlemen who had a great deal to read, and we were asking them to read an awful lot anyway.

Mr. CLARK. I recollect your statement on your direct examination that you considered an attack on Hawaii as being inherent in the military situation.

General MILES. As the possibility or the probability of an attack on Hawaii I considered it inherent in any war with [2315] Japan we might have, no matter how that war started.

Mr. CLARK. Now, from a military standpoint and aside from the fact that the Hawaiian command was taken unawares, leaving that out of consideration, was the attack of December 7 a surprise attack?

General MILES. I fail to understand the question, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I am asking you, from a military standpoint strictly and in view of your statement that an attack there was inherent in the military situation, I am asking you whether in that sense the attack was a surprise attack.

General MILES. Surprise to me or to whom, sir?

Mr. CLARK. Yes; to you.

General MILES. I would like to expand on that question a little bit, sir. In estimating the situation, whether verbal or on paper, there are two principles that should be followed: One is never to lose sight of or ignore anything that the enemy may do which is within its capabilities whether you think it is wise for him to do that or not.

The second is to concede to your enemy the highest form of good sense and good judgment.

Now I think we have followed both of those principles. Now if you would like to ask me whether I thought it was a surprise, we never lost sight of the fact that Japan, if engaged in war, would very probably attack Hawaii, and we took action [2316] on November

27 in warning our outposts, "This situation for which you have been billeted is facing you."

Then we also followed, I think, the same principle. We did grant the Japanese the best of good sense. We did very much question whether he would attack Hawaii, because such an attack must result from two separate decisions on the part of the Japanese, one to make war against the United States, which we thought at that time in the long run would be suicidal, as has since transpired, and, two, to attack a very fortress and fleet, risking certain ships that he could not replace, and knowing that the success in that attack must rest very largely on that surprise being successful; in other words, finding that fortress and that fleet unprepared to meet the attack.

[2317] Mr. CLARK. Do you mean unprepared or unalerted?

General MILES. I mean both, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Well, cannot a command be prepared even if it is unalerted?

General MILES. Not if they were unalerted, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I mean aside from that. You said something about there being no proper element of surprise, that surprise is based on unpreparedness, or the failure to be alerted.

General MILES. Are you speaking, sir, of the military weapons and means available or of the personnel that handle those things? No gun will go off unless the man pulls the trigger, and if the man who is supposed to pull the trigger is not prepared to pull the trigger then that gun is unprepared.

Mr. CLARK. I am speaking of both, General, and asking you whether the success of that attack rested on the lack of the things you have just mentioned, the lack of alertness?

General MILES. I think, sir, it can safely be said that the success of that Japanese attack depended, in very large measure, on their catching the forces unalerted and therefore unprepared to meet that attack.

Mr. CLARK. Well, it comes down then to a question of not being on the alert, does it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[2318] Mr. CLARK. I had in mind to ask you some questions about the delay in decoding and translating these messages, but in view of the counsel's statement that other witnesses will be called on that, I will waive that.

I would like to call your attention now to the message of General Marshall of November 27. I understood you to say on your direct examination that the mere fact that that message was signed by the Chief of Staff himself had a certain significance.

General MILES. Yes, sir; it had great significance.

Mr. CLARK. What was it?

General MILES. The messages commonly go out on the signature of the Adjutant General. Any assistant chief of staff could have directed the Adjutant General to send a message, or an assistant chief of staff could sign it himself. Very rarely was there a message signed by General Marshall.

Mr. CLARK. Let me interrupt you a moment just there. Messages were sent prior and subsequent to November 27 to the Hawaiian Command by the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. What is the significance of this particular message being signed by the Commander in Chief himself, or the Chief of Staff himself?

[2319] General MILES. Well, the significance lies in the fact that he was Chief of Staff, that he was doing something which is not ordinarily done, and by putting his name to that message, it carried to any military mind, I think—it certainly would to mine—a much greater significance than had it been signed “Adams,” or “Miles,” or “Gerow,” or anybody else.

Mr. CLARK. And that would be well understood by the commanders, the several commanders to whom it was sent?

General MILES. I think so, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Were any others of these numerous messages that we have examined signed by the Chief of Staff himself?

General MILES. I did not hear the first part of your question, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I say, were there any others of these numerous messages we have examined signed by the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. I recall none, sir.

Mr. CLARK. I wish to direct your attention briefly to the language of this message. It says: You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures you deem necessary. I understood you previously to say there were three methods of reconnaissance available: above the water, on the water, and under the water. Is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[2320] Mr. CLARK. Now, what were the existing facilities in Hawaii at that time for reconnaissance generally?

General MILES. The Army Air Forces and radar.

Mr. CLARK. Could ships have been used for that purpose?

General MILES. I presume so; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. The reason I asked you that question, I understood you to say the other day there were three methods open: By air, by surface operation, and by submarine operation. That is what I understood you to say.

General MILES. Yes, sir. Of course, the Army controls no submarines and very few surface ships.

Mr. CLARK. I was not speaking particularly of the Army, General. I mean all of the facilities at the command of the commanding general.

General MILES. You refer, Mr. Congressman, to that particular sentence in General Marshall's message to General Short?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, sir.

General MILES. That is why I was answering for the Army only, sir.

[2321] Mr. CLARK. This message also directed what should be done in the event of hostilities, that Rainbow No. Five should be put into operation insofar as the Japanese were concerned?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, there is a short sentence in this message consisting of three words “Report measures taken.” That was an order from the Chief of Staff, was it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Can you direct the committee's attention to any message that complies with that order?

General MILES. The committee has, I believe, before it, General Short's reply to General Marshall's message referring to General Marshall's message by its number. I did not see that message.

Mr. GESELL. That is the one that appears at page 12, I believe, Congressman, of exhibit 32.

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Now, that message, dated November 28, from General Short, says, "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy"—the next word I am not familiar with, "REURAD"—

General MILES. "Reference your."

Mr. CLARK. "Reference your 472 27th."

[2322] That "472 27th" was, of course, General Marshall's message of that date, was it not; General Miles?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you have told the committee that in the preparation of that message of General Marshall, all reference to sabotage was eliminated; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Do you consider that message from General Short that I have just read, in any responsive to the message from General Marshall of the 27th?

General MILES. I certainly do not consider it an adequate reply, if that is what you have in mind, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Does it in any way refer at all to the Marshall message except by number, or to anything in the Marshall message?

General MILES. That is true, sir; the Marshall message did not mention sabotage, nor did it mention liaison with the Navy.

Mr. CLARK. Now, I am asking whether you, as a military man consider that message from General Short in any way responsive to the message from the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Did you at the time catch the fact that it was not responsive?

[2323] General MILES. I didn't see the message until the following month, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. CLARK. Whose business was it to see this message and ascertain whether it was responsive to the message of the Chief?

General MILES. The message was sent by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division. I believe no other officers of the War Department.

Mr. CLARK. Now, that is the only message, is it not, from General Short that even purports to refer to General Marshall's message of the 27th?

General MILES. So far as I know, that is correct, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Well, doesn't it indicate to any military man who would examine it that the Hawaiian command had done no more than to go on an alert against sabotage?

General MILES. I would much prefer that that question be answered by one of the officers who did see the message, sir, at the time.

Mr. CLARK. Well; I don't want to press you, General, but it seems to me with your long and varied experience, you are well qualified to give the committee an opinion.

General MILES. Very well, sir.

My opinion is that that message itself was a totally inadequate reply to the message it purported to reply to. [2324] Although it did not say the department was alerted against sabotage only, there

is certainly an inference that that was the fact. The next phrase about liaison with the Navy might or might not have implied that General Short was in consultation with the Navy regarding the measures which he would put into effect, and hence that a further reply might be expected from General Short, or might not.

Mr. CLARK. Well, now, the Marshall message, as you have already said, contained the one sentence order to report measures taken, and on the following day this short Short message came in. What I am asking is whether or not that doesn't disclose to a military man that he had taken no measures other than anti-sabotage?

General MILES. There was that inference which might very well be drawn from General Short's reply.

Mr. CLARK. What other inference would be possible from that reply?

General MILES. The further inference—the other inference was, or might have been, that a reference to liaison with the Navy meant that General Short was then in communication with the Navy regarding the measures which would be jointly put into effect and that a further reply from General Short might, therefore, be expected.

Mr. CLARK. Now, this same message, from the Chief of [2325] Staff of the 27th was sent, in substance, to the West Coast Command and the Philippine Command and the Panama Command, was it not?

General MILES. It was, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, I direct your attention to the action of the Philippine Command—it appears on page 11 of these messages, in which General MacArthur refers to the order from General Marshall, or the message from General Marshall, as to reconnaissance being extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy:

Ground security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations, every thing is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

I should like also to direct your attention to the action taken by the Western Command, a rather long message of more than a page, in which the state of alert is mentioned, and the measures that are being taken are gone into in some detail. And then the message from the Panama Command, which sent a short message on the 29th saying that a full report was being made by mail which was followed by a letter of some three pages detailing all of the measures taken by that command in response to the message from the chief of November [2326] 26th. You are familiar with all of those?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Isn't there a very marked and noticeable difference between the response from these other commands and the response from the Hawaiian Command?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Doesn't it make, in fairness now—I am trying to get my own thinking straight, General; that is all I am after. I am not meaning to cross-examine you in the ordinary sense of that term—but doesn't it make the failure of the Hawaiian Command to respond specifically at a time which you have yourself referred to as a crisis conspicuously outstanding?

General MILES. Yes, sir; it reflects the very definite degree of alertness of those four commands you mention.

Mr. CLARK. Coming a little closer home, ought not somebody in the War Department to have detected and called attention to that difference?

General MILES. There again I would very much rather that question be answered by one of the gentlemen who did see that message.

Mr. CLARK. But with this conspicuous difference, and what I hope I am fair in terming a wholly unsatisfactory response from the Hawaiian Command, the records in the War [2327] Department remained in that condition from the 27th of November to the 7th of December, without any further report from the Hawaiian Command; that is correct?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. CLARK. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. General Miles, with respect to the testimony that you just gave to the Congressman from North Carolina, did you see any of these messages that were sent by the other commands other than the Hawaiian Command?

General MILES. I saw no others.

Senator LUCAS. You saw none of those messages until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Were any of those messages discussed with you by anyone in the Army previous to Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. I remember no discussion on those messages, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So, insofar as these important messages are concerned, you knew nothing about any of them until after the Pearl Harbor attack?

General MILES. That is correct, sir. They were not a responsibility of my division, and I did not know about those messages.

[2328] Senator LUCAS. Whose responsibility was it?

General MILES. The implementation of War Plans, war preparations, was the responsibility of the War Plans Division, General Staff.

Senator LUCAS. Who was the head of that?

General MILES. General Gerow.

Senator LUCAS. Did he ever discuss with you at any time, either before or after, these messages?

General MILES. No, sir; he did not.

Senator LUCAS. General Miles, in the early part of your testimony, you related to the committee that being in charge of G-2 of the General Staff, you reported the information assembled to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall.

Will you give the committee just a little more detailed information upon that phase of your responsibility?

General MILES. Providing information to General Marshall?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

[2329] Can you elaborate just a little on what you did in the way of giving information to General Marshall, Chief of Staff. How often did you see him and what did you discuss when you gave him this information during this crisis?

General MILES. Well, sir, all of the magic, of course, was going directly to General Marshall through my own officers. I saw General Marshall from time to time when he sent for me. Largely I avoided

going to see him on my own initiative unless I had something very important because he was an extremely busy man. I had the responsibility and did prepare certain memoranda giving him information on various points and it is all now before the committee.

Senator LUCAS. When you say General Marshall was an extremely busy man, would you care to elaborate just a little more on that for the record and tell the committee just what he was doing, say, a couple of weeks before this attack took place? What was his chief responsibility at that time?

General MILES. He was doing a herculean task. We were building an army. We weren't getting any too much support from the American people at that time. Looking back on it, we have had 4 years, nearly 4 years of war, when the Congress of the United States was giving us everything we asked for and the people were entirely behind us, but in those pre-Pearl Harbor days that did not exist. We were fighting [2330] to build an army of the United States. General Marshall had to appear before various committees of Congress on numerous occasions. He was doing a great deal of work himself in supervising the training, the maneuvers of the new army, the equipment of the new army, all sorts of problems were being presented to him. He was in direct communication with the higher policy-making officials of the Government: the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, of course, and the President, and the Secretary of the Navy. He was carrying an enormous burden, which later had to be very largely taken off of his shoulders by the complete reorganization of the War Department and the establishment of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

But at that time he was not only directing the higher policy and strategy of the United States so far as the military strategy went, but building an army, literally building an army, and administering that army at the same time.

Senator LUCAS. In that important work that General Marshall was doing at that time it was obviously necessary that he depend upon subordinates for much vital information that went into making the final decision?

General MILES. It was, sir.

Senator LUCAS. G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 were the four important branches of the military government that was constantly furnishing him the information?

[2331] General MILES. Yes, sir; and he was even in more direct touch with War Plans Division.

Senator LUCAS. You also stated, General, that this same information that you gathered from time to time from various sources was disseminated to others, including the overseas departments.

Now, I want to deal with the Pearl Harbor disaster as an example in your giving military estimates to the overseas departments from time to time. Let me first ask you this question: With whom were you dealing in Hawaii at the time of the disaster and some weeks before?

General MILES. All the information we were sending to Hawaii went through the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

Senator LUCAS. And who was the officer in charge of G-2 in Hawaii?

General MILES. Colonel Fielder.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Fielder?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did General Short, who was commanding the Hawaiian Department, have complete control over the activities of Colonel Fielder in charge of Military Intelligence there?

General MILES. Yes, sir, Colonel Fielder occupied the same relation vis-a-vis General Short I occupied vis-a-vis [2332] General Marshall. Colonel Fielder was an Assistant Chief of Staff to General Short.

Senator LUCAS. What were your instructions to Colonel Fielder with respect to disseminating information you sent to him to General Short?

General MILES. I had no responsibility and took no action in that matter, sir. That was a matter entirely within the purview of the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, how they wanted to run their own staff.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, after you sent information to G-2 in Hawaii that was the end of your responsibility?

General MILES. Yes, sir. It would have been absolutely and entirely out of my waters if I had attempted to lay down any rules or regulations as to how General Short's staff should be run.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that, but you being interested in sending out this information to G-2 in Hawaii, from the standpoint of Intelligence, did the colonel who was in that branch of the service in Hawaii and under the direct command of General Short report to you as to the receipt of this information or give you any evaluation upon it from his point of view?

General MILES. Yes; the G-2's of the overseas departments were sending to us information which they had received or [2333] evaluations of information which we were furnishing them from time to time, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, then, am I correct in my understanding that what you sent to G-2 in Hawaii was information only?

Colonel MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Insofar as the Intelligence Branch of the Government was concerned?

General MILES. Yes, sir; evaluated information.

Senator LUCAS. It was in no sense a directive and couldn't be under regulations?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The only person who had the power to issue directives, as I understand it, to anybody in the Hawaiian Islands was General Marshall himself?

General MILES. Yes, sir; any directive that involved a tactical decision or implementation of war plans.

Senator LUCAS. And if no directive was sent by General Marshall, then the evaluation of any information that you sent from the Intelligence Branch of the service in Washington to Hawaii became solely a matter for General Short and his officers in Hawaii?

General MILES. Yes, sir; for whatever use they wanted to make of it.

Senator LUCAS. I think I asked you but I am not sure [2334] that I clearly understood you: Did you get reports from Colonel Fielder—was that his name?

General MILES. Fielder.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Fielder. Did you get reports from Colonel Fielder upon the information that you sent to him?

General MILES. I remember no specific instance, Senator, but I do know that it was the common custom from time to time to receive from G-2 overseas departments their "come-backs" as we used to call them on information that we were sending them.

Senator LUCAS. Was there any regulation or order in the War Department which compelled Colonel Fielder to report back to you the receipt of this information and his evaluation of it in any way?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, whatever information you sent to G-2 in Hawaii, as far as the command there is concerned, they could completely ignore and you would have no way of knowing whether they acted intelligently on it or not?

General MILES. No, sir; that depended on the regulations or policies of the Hawaiian staff, as to how they wanted to use that information.

Senator LUCAS. Well, don't you believe that it would have been wise and judicious for the Chief of Naval Intelligence [2335] here in Washington to have known whether or not they were intelligently using this information, from your viewpoint?

General MILES. The Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Senator LUCAS. No, no. I am talking about the Intelligence Department in Hawaii in the command of General Short. I am merely asking you whether or not you don't believe it would have been valuable information for you to have been informed from time to time as to what they were doing with the information you were sending.

General MILES. It would have been valuable, and I think it was so understood. It was always valuable for Military Intelligence to receive what we called "come-backs" from our people in the field. But I want to make this point clear, that General Short's staff was General Short's staff.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

General MILES. And neither G-2 or War Plans Division, or anybody else in the General Staff in Washington had or should have had authority to require any of General Short's staff officers to do anything.

It it came to a situation in which G-2, we will say, in Washington, thought that G-2 in Hawaii, or Manila, was completely falling down, his only recourse was to go to the Chief of Staff and say, "Will you please inform the commanding general in this place that we are not getting the proper response from his staff and he is not being properly served by his staff."

[2336] Senator LUCAS. Well, now, in addition to the intelligence officer in Hawaii on behalf of the Army, there was also an intelligence officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know what the agreement or what the regulations were with respect to these intelligence officers in Hawaii coordinating the information that they got from Washington and agreeing upon the effect of it?

General MILES. The policy that has always been in effect, so far as I know in the Hawaiian Department, was a complete exchange of information between the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department and the

intelligence officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, or when the fleet was present, of the fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Well, did your G-2 officer report to you at any time that that was being done?

General MILES. No, sir; and he was not my G-2 officer. He was General Short's G-2 officer.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; that is correct, that is my error, but at the same time he is the individual to whom you were sending the information, and not General Short.

General MILES. I was sending it directly to the G-2; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I want to ask you this, General Miles: In making up these military estimates that have been [2337] referred to by counsel from time to time in the record here, what were the factors here in making those determinations, and how did you acquire them?

General MILES. How did we acquire the information?

Senator LUCAS. Yes; that is right. How did you acquire the information upon which you based these military estimates that you sent to overseas departments?

General MILES. We acquired information which eventually went into the estimate of, we will say, Japan in a great many different ways, Senator: Through our military attachés, through our observers, through the State Department and all of its ramifications, including its embassies, legations, and consulates, through contact with civilian firms and the press, through contact with the Office of Naval Intelligence, FBI, a great many different sources of information, and, as I testified, I was constantly trying to enlarge the scope of the information coming in by establishing close liaison with the other departments of the Government.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, much discussion has centered around the intercepted messages sent out by the Japanese Government. I think you have testified that those intercepted messages were also included as one of the factors in making your determination as to what military estimates you would send to the departments. Is that correct?

[2338] General MILES. The estimates actually sent to the departments were estimates on different countries, sir.

Senator LUCAS. On different what?

General MILES. On different countries.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir; that is correct.

General MILES. Based on the running digests that we maintained on that country.

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, I am confining these estimates primarily to the Japanese situation.

General MILES. Yes, sir. Magic gave us current information rather than static information as I have used the word, which formed the basis of the estimates that we sent out.

I have already gone into the fact that the information that we received from magic was not officially sent to the overseas department because of the great value of the secret that we were breaking the code.

Senator LUCAS. I appreciate that but I was wondering what weight you gave, if any, to these decoded messages that were received from time to time in making up your military estimates on the Japanese situation, or did you give them any consideration at all?

General MILES. Oh, yes, sir; we gave them great consideration, as far as the estimates that we were submitting to the Chief of Staff and to the President and to the Secretary of War, and so forth. [2339]

Senator LUCAS. Well, I understood you to say in answer to a question asked you by Senator Barkley—as I recall, the chairman, Senator Barkley, asked you this question:

Was there any particular difference in the relative importance given to these intercepted messages with respect to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines, Southeast Asia or any other regions covered by these intercepted messages relative to the movement of ships?

General MILES. If I understand your question, Senator, these messages as a whole primarily indicated to us what we already knew or could very easily suspect, that the Japanese were doing everything they could to follow the movement of our warships, as I said yesterday, just as we were doing with regard to following the movement of Japanese warships.

And that was the answer that sort of led me to conclude that perhaps from your viewpoint this information was not considered so important because you say that it primarily indicated the things that you already knew.

General MILES. The intercepted magic on the movement of ships was not by the Military Intelligence Division considered of primary importance, it was primarily naval, and the messages taken as a whole indicated something that we [2340] already very strongly suspected, that they were following the movement of every one of our ships.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I believe, General Miles, that I agree with you, taking these messages as a whole, that they were dealing with the arrival and departure of warships, but I want to direct your attention, as counsel did, to the message that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on September the 24th, 1941, and interrogate you just briefly about that message.

That message was transmitted by the Army on November the 9th, 1941, some 15 days after it was intercepted.

Mr. MITCHELL. October.

Senator LUCAS. On October the 9th, that is right.

Now, as I understand, this was an Army intercept and came directly to you in due course. After it was intercepted and decoded and translated it came then into your hands?

General MILES. It came to me; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, do you recall at the time of discussing this particular message with anyone when you received it?

General MILES. No, Senator, I do not recall any specific instance in which I discussed this particular message with anyone. Since this message has again been brought up I would like to point out that as we now see it, it looks very [2341] much like an indication of Japanese intent of some sort with regard to Pearl Harbor, but at that time also it meant, if you like, the interest of the Japanese as to whether or not and when the fleet was going in or out of Pearl Harbor.

Pearl Harbor is very narrow, has very restricted waters, and the position of those great ships there, as I understand it, particularly those that are tied up to the dock, would indicate to a naval mind something of the intent of the commanding Admiral of the Fleet to take his fleet to sea within a reasonable time or not, or it might indi-

cate that the position of these ships was very much desired because of the Japanese intent to execute a submarine attack on these ships.

Senator LUCAS. Well, either of these versions, had you looked at it then as you look at it now, of course, would have given you serious concern, I take it.

General MILES. Well, you cannot take a message like that singly, Senator, and say that it is very serious when you know that back of this message there have been all sorts of other messages that we had intercepted regarding Japanese interest in our ships wherever they might be.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that is true, General, and I should like to direct your attention to the first message that is in this exhibit, which was received, decoded, and translated, [2342] dated December the 2d, 1940, and that message was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo and it tells about the ships that were observed in Pearl Harbor.

I don't know whether you know it or not, but from that time on, from December 2, 1940, until September the 24th, 1941, there were, as I understand from an examination of this exhibit, 17 messages sent between December 2, 1940, and September 26, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo and there wasn't a single message during that time that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu.

Now, would that have any significance had you noticed that at the time in making up your military estimates on the Pearl Harbor situation?

General MILES. I do not think that that point came to my attention at that time, Senator. It was so obvious to me that Tokyo need say very little to Honolulu because Honolulu was in a position from those hills to look down on Pearl Harbor and to study the movement of every ship entering in and going out and her berth, and so forth, where she was berthed. It was obvious to us that we could not prevent the Japanese from reporting very accurately the movement of our ships in Pearl Harbor and its adjacent waters.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that may be, General, but I want to take a little more time with this. I want to talk a [2343] little about this message in paragraph—well, first, it comes from Tokyo (Toyoda)—I don't know how to pronounce that, but as I understand it he was the Foreign Minister of Japan at the time the message was sent and that was during the reign of the Konoye Cabinet.

Do you know whether or not Tojo was in the Konoye Cabinet?

General MILES. In which Konoye Cabinet, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Well, on October 16, 1941, when it fell; was Tojo connected with that cabinet in any way?

General MILES. I cannot tell at the moment.

Senator LUCAS. Well, anyhow, he became the Premier immediately following the fall of that cabinet.

Now, in paragraph 2 of this message it says:

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor.

Now, where did they anchor warships and aircraft carriers with respect to Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Would you tell me what page you are reading from, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. Well, I am reading from exhibit 2 on page 12.

General MILES. Yes, I have that. Oh, yes.

[2344] Senator LUCAS. It says:

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor.

Then it says in parentheses:

these are not so important.

What does he mean by that?

General MILES. I think just what it says, sir, those anchored in Pearl Harbor and not tied up to wharves or in the docks.

Senator LUCAS. Why does he say that? What would be your reaction now when he says "these are not so important"? What does he mean by that?

General MILES. Well, obviously, I suppose—it is not so obvious. I would suppose that the ships tied up at wharves and in the dock, he meant the drydock, were not prepared for immediate sortie from the harbor or at least prepared to leave the harbor as soon as those which were anchored in the fairway.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I am glad to have your impression of what that means.

Then we go to the message, which proceeds to say:

If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.

[2345] Why should he want that information, in your opinion?

General MILES. I do not know, sir, of course, but I would assume that they wanted it because two or more vessels tied up at a wharf would mean that at least the inner one could not come out as quickly or as soon or did not expect to leave as soon as the outer one or the one anchored in the fairway.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, it seems to me—I do not want to press the question unduly, but it seems to me that a careful reading of this one message at the time, with a fair analysis of it, would have indicated that something pretty serious and desperate was going to happen at Pearl Harbor because, as I understand this message, it does not talk about the arrival and departure of warships. They are asking and seeking to get definite information about Pearl Harbor and the ships that are in there.

General MILES. Well, there was a great fleet in that harbor and I think it was perfectly natural that the Japanese wanted to know the condition of that fleet as to its ability to leave that harbor or its intent to leave that harbor within a reasonable time. I have forgotten how long it took the fleet to actually sortie from the harbor, but it was some considerable time.

Senator LUCAS. Do the words "strictly secret" on [2346] that telegram indicate any unusual significance?

General MILES. I do not know what import that phrase had, sir. All of these, of course, were——

Senator LUCAS. Well, on all the telegrams that were sent from Honolulu to Tokyo the words "strictly secret" or "secret" does not appear and I wondered if that had any significance at all in view of all of the telegrams going from Honolulu to Tokyo avoiding the use of the words. Apparently it does not, in your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, 12 o'clock having arrived the committee will suspend until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[2347]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Lucas, you may resume your questioning of General Miles

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

Senator LUCAS. General Miles, when we adjourned at noon we were discussing the message sent by the Tokyo Government to Honolulu on September 24 of 1941.

There is another question or two I desire to interrogate you upon with respect to that message.

You advised me this morning that this message was decoded and analyzed by the Army. I want to know what other members of your force in the Intelligence branch of the Government had an opportunity to examine and scrutinize that message or any others that came to your attention.

General MILES. That message, like all other messages of magic, was seen by Colonel Bratton and his small group of officers who were handling the Japanese intercepts. Aside from those few officers in the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence Division, no one except myself in the division saw those messages.

Senator LUCAS. Did Colonel Bratton see this particular message, the message that we are now discussing?

General MILES. Did he see it?

[2348] Senator LUCAS. Yes.

General MILES. I feel sure that he saw it; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you remember having any discussion with him about it?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I direct your attention to page 13 of exhibit 2, which is the reply message from Honolulu to Tokyo and also it seems as though they sent the same thing to Washington, D. C. Again they refer to the message as "strictly secret." Do you recall ever seeing that message in view of the fact that it was translated by the Navy?

General MILES. In all probability I saw that message. Senator, it made no difference whether the Navy translated it or the Army translated it so far as my seeing the particular message is concerned. If it was of importance I saw it.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you had a liaison between the Navy Intelligence and the Army Intelligence whereby all of these messages that were intercepted, decoded, and translated were analyzed and examined by both branches?

General MILES. It was more than that, sir. The actual translation, of course, including the decrypting and decoding was a joint activity of the Signal Corps and Naval Communications.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

Will you give to the committee those who were assigned to [2349] that joint mission of analyzing and taking care of these messages?

General MILES. The analyses of the messages were made by the Intelligence Service of the Army and Navy.

Senator LUCAS. Whom did that include? What I am trying to find out is the different people in the Army and the Navy who actually saw these messages which started coming from Tokyo on September 24, 1941.

General MILES. Within the Military Intelligence Department, as I have already testified, Senator, were Colonel Bratton and one or two of his subordinates who immediately handled messages, and myself. That was all in the Military Intelligence Division. Who saw them in the SIS of the Signal Corps I am not prepared to state but you will have witnesses who can testify on that.

Senator LUCAS. I am not going into that. You are not prepared to state who saw these messages or who analyzed them in Navy Intelligence, I take it?

General MILES. No, sir, I am not prepared to state that, in view of the other witnesses you will have.

Senator LUCAS. On that same page of exhibit 2 there is another message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 15, 1941, No. 111, which reads as follows:

As relations between Japan and the United States [2350] are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Do you understand that that message was referring to the message sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on September 24?

General MILES. I don't see any indication that it was directly—that it directly referred to the message of September 24, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

This message comes from Tojo, who was at that time at the head of the Military Government in Japan, was he not?

General MILES. On the 15th of November?

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

General MILES. This is "Togo". Not "Tojo".

Senator LUCAS. "Togo". Who was Togo?

General MILES. I think he was Foreign Minister but I am not positive.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Now, do you recall having any discussion with any of the members of your staff with respect to that message or the message that I just previously read from Honolulu to Washington telling about the mooring of ships in the vicinity of Ford Island, the Navy dock in the Navy Yard, and other matters [2351] contained therein.

General MILES. I remember no specific instances, Senator, but I would like to point out that the message dividing Pearl Harbor into districts for espionage reports, like other messages concerning the fleet based on Pearl Harbor, were primarily within the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence to evaluate. I knew that ONI regarded them as being a part of the Japanese espionage net covering all movements of United States warships and vessels everywhere they

appeared. I am not competent to testify as to what ONI should have done or should not have done about messages directly concerning the fleet.

I can point out in the same book of messages items that might well indicate Japanese intentions to attack Panama and/or the Philippines. But what does all this come down to? We had known for many years that all three of those outposts would probably be subject to an attack in a Japanese war. That is why we had our forces on them and why the Chief of Staff warned them when he considered the time had arrived that hostile Japanese action was possible at any moment.

Senator LUCAS. Will you point out to me one message that went from Tokyo to Panama that indicates that they are going to attack the Panama Canal, that is now found in exhibit 2?

General MILES. On page 34 is a message in which is exhibited Japanese interests in maps and charts of the Panama [2352] Canal Zone.

Senator LUCAS. Page 34 of exhibit 2?

General MILES. Of this exhibit which we have before us.

Senator LUCAS. My exhibit reads "From Buenos Aires to Panama; Buenos Aires to Tokyo." Is that the one?

General MILES. From Buenos Aires to Panama.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

General MILES. It was regarding a series of maps and charts which we were very much interested in getting ahold of. It was being passed around among the Japanese agencies.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, I am talking about messages that came from Tokyo to Panama; not from Panama to Tokyo. And that is because of the importance I attach to the first message that came from Tokyo to Hawaii on September 24, 1941.

General MILES. I do not find, Senator, any specific message from Tokyo to Panama in this respect, but the messages from Panama to Tokyo were along intelligence lines which might very well have indicated the interest of Japan in formulating plans for an attack on the Panama Canal.

[2353] Senator LUCAS. Well, as the head of G-2, did it make any difference from the standpoint of the importance of a message whether it came from the consul in Hawaii to Tokyo or the consul in Panama to Tokyo, or whether the message came from the War Minister in Tokyo to Panama or from the War Minister in Tokyo to Hawaii?

General MILES. I think, sir, that it was more the substance of the message which was important rather than the sender. A message from Tokyo to one of the Japanese spy agencies, if we may call them such, if it indicated the line of intelligence they wanted followed was, of course, of great significance but also the messages going the other way indicating what line of intelligence was being sent and apparently received with approval by Tokyo was also significant.

Senator LUCAS. I agree with you that both messages were significant but what I am trying to ascertain is what the intelligence branch of the military service considered more significant, whether a message coming from the War Minister of Japan to the consul or one from foreign countries to Japan or whether it makes any difference or not?

General MILES. I cannot say that it made any difference per se who sent that message. It was the substance of the message more than the sender.

[2354] Senator LUCAS. In other words, then, your conclusion is that a message going from Honolulu to Tokyo, sent by some spy or the Jap consul, or somebody interested in the Japanese Government, took on no more significance from the standpoint of military intelligence than a message coming direct from the Foreign Minister of Japan to Hawaii or Panama or some other point?

General MILES. No, sir. Both indicated an interest of the Japanese in the particular line of intelligence which the message contained or directed.

Senator LUCAS. Well, as I looked over these records, General Miles, I found that from August 2, 1941, to November 22, 1941, there were 24 messages going from Panama to Tokyo and there was only 1 message coming from Tokyo to Panama, and that was on August 2, 1941, which is the first message translated in exhibit 2; and as I examined these messages I hoped that I might even get the answer from you as to the real significance of messages going from foreign governments to the home government, or whether there was any significance, any different significance in the messages coming from the home government to the foreign government where consuls or their agents were located, and I hope that I am not wrong in my assumption that you say that there is very little difference.

[2355] General MILES. There is very little difference per se in the sender of the message. The substance of the message in both cases told us or indicated to us what the Japanese were interested in finding out about that particular place.

Senator LUCAS. And that is your conclusion notwithstanding the fact that every indication from September on was to the effect strained relations with Japan were getting worse and worse all the time?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I direct your attention to another one of these messages found on page 15 of exhibit 2, and it is dated November 20, 1941, "Strictly secret." It says:

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Then the last one from Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941, and which does not have the secrecy attached to it. It seems to me there is a reason for it because they ask for no particular information other than this:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

that being transmitted by the Navy.

Now, with respect to the Philippines you stated that [2356] there were messages that you could pick out from the Philippines that were comparable to the one which I read, discussing and analyzing the blueprint for the bombing of Pearl Harbor. I would like to have you find that for me if you could.

General MILES. You wish one, sir, from Tokyo to Manila?

Senator LUCAS. That is right, Tokyo to Manila.

General MILES. On page 71 from Tokyo to Manila, October 4, 1941, from Tokyo (Toyoda); I believe he was a member of the cabinet at the time. [Reading:]

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west, and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

That was the first one I find; there may be others.

Senator LUCAS. And you think that message is just as significant as the one that was sent to Hawaii or Honolulu on September the 24?

General MILES. I cannot say that it has exactly the same significance, no, Senator. What I am saying is that there are messages in here like the one I have just read, indicating strong Japanese interest in obtaining information which might help them in an attack on the Philippines as well [2357] as on the fleet. The fleet, of course, was primarily a matter of responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence and I hesitate very much to give an estimate or an evaluation of a purely naval message.

Senator LUCAS. Well, you want the committee to understand that it is the responsibility, then, of the Naval Intelligence Service to evaluate these messages which went directly to Hawaii and the Philippines involving what seems to us now from what we know as a possible attack upon either Pearl Harbor or the Philippines?

General MILES. Those messages which had to do primarily with the United States Fleet then based in Pearl Harbor or near Pearl Harbor, yes, sir, that was primarily the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence to put a naval evaluation on those messages.

To continue further, if you like, with messages from Tokyo to Manila, there is another one on page 82 in which it is stated [reading]:

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:

These items in regard to each port of call:

(1) Conditions at airports on land.

(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.

[2358] (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.

(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

Senator LUCAS. Was that a factor in the consideration of the evaluations that you made for Military Intelligence in connection with the overseas possessions?

General MILES. I did not quite understand you, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You just now read the message from Tokyo to Manila dated November 5, 1941. When you transmitted this military intelligence to overseas possessions did you take that into consideration?

General MILES. When we were estimating on the possibility or probability of Japanese lines of advantage we did take this message and other messages into consideration. We did not transmit any magic to the overseas departments.

Senator LUCAS. No; I understand you did not transmit any magic to overseas possessions. What I am asking you is whether or not when you were notifying the overseas possessions of the possibility

of an attack on the Philippines by the Japs you took into consideration this particular message?

General MILES. Yes, sir. The Chief of Staff undoubtedly took all of these magic messages into consideration as I certainly did on the 27th of November when the Chief of Staff [2359] decided that the time had arrived to warn the overseas departments.

Senator LUCAS. General, that brings me to this conclusion: It is difficult for me to understand how you took this into consideration with respect to an attack on the Philippines and did not take into consideration the message of September the 24th and the following messages into real serious consideration with respect to the attack upon Pearl Harbor, because to me the messages with respect to Pearl Harbor were more clear in what they were attempting to do than the latter. That is my opinion and my own conclusion.

General MILES. Well, Senator, exactly the same warning message was sent by the Chief of Staff on November the 27th to all three of the overseas departments and the West coast. They all had the same warning and the warning was based on the fact that we had believed for many years that they would be all subject to attack in the event of a Japanese-American war. That was why they were there and the only reason in the case of Hawaii, at least, why they were there.

Senator LUCAS. I want to direct your attention to the testimony that you gave Friday on page 2244—no; I will strike that because I went over that this morning. That was the question that Senator Barkley asked you and which you answered and I think I have included that in the previous tes- [2360] timony.

But on the following page, 2245, Senator Barkley asked this question:

And the Hawaiian Islands. Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running from 1940, some period in 1940 up to and approaching the 7th of December 1941 and the question I would like to ask is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way and with the same degree of importance, or whether they singled out this information from either the Panama Canal or from Hawaii or the Philippines or Southeast Asia for any special treatment in regard to precautionary measures which might be taken in any of these different regions?

And your answer is:

Well, they were primarily messages which concerned the Navy Intelligence rather than the Military. Obviously, Senator, we were more interested in the fact that the Japanese were following our ships in our own waters, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, then we were the Dutch East Indies, or any other places headed here "miscellaneous."

[2361] And, as I understand it, your answer there, like the previous answers to my questions on all of these matters, was that it was your understanding that these messages primarily concerned the Naval Intelligence rather than the Military Intelligence for a correct analysis of what might or might not happen as a result of the information you were getting.

General MILES. Senator, the Chairman's question concerned the movement of ships and my answer is yes, sir, for all these messages concerning the movement of ships and particularly those which concerned directly the United States Fleet based in Pearl Harbor it was

primarily the responsibility of Naval Intelligence to analyze and evaluate such messages.

Senator LUCAS. Well, of course, there you just talk about the movement of ships; but we have been talking all the way along about all of these intercepted messages regardless of whether or not they had anything to do with the movement of ships.

Your next statement below there on that same page [reading]:

Taking the messages as a whole, I do not think they indicated any particular place in which you could say the Japanese will attack there, or the most probable, that they will attack there, solely based on those [2362] messages.

Of course, that includes all of the messages that you received, I assume, upon which you based that statement.

General MILES. The latter reply does, sir, but the first reply at the top of that page was a direct reply to the Chairman's question concerning the movement of ships. [Reading:]

Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running from 1940, some period in 1940 to and approaching the 7th of December 1941 and the question I would like to ask—

all in one sentence—

is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way.

That clearly referred to the intercepts on the movement of ships. I am very sorry if I misunderstood the Chairman in making my answer.

Senator LUCAS. I may have misunderstood the question and answer and the General has explained.

Let me direct your attention now to page 2220 of the record where Mr. Gesell asked you this question—he was discussing there the question of the burning of the codes. [2363] There was a message sent out by Admiral Stark which states as follows—this was sent out on December the 6th, I think it is.

Mr. GESELL. December 3.

Senator LUCAS. December 3?

General MILES. December 3.

Senator LUCAS. (Reading):

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

Mr. Gesell, continuing, says:

My question, General Miles, is whether you knew at the time that the Navy was transmitting messages to their representatives in Hawaii advising Hawaii of the intercepted Japanese messages indicating code destruction?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with that?

General MILES. I believe that I was. I knew that—

General MILES. Senator, would you tell me the page again?

Senator LUCAS. I am sorry. It is 2220.

General MILES. 2220, all right.

[2364] Senator LUCAS. Beginning down past the middle of the page.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS (reading):

General MILES. I believe that I was. I know that I knew that those messages were going out.

Mr. GESELL. Did you know that a message had been received from Hawaii stating that they had knowledge there that the local consul was destroying his code?

General MILES. I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. What is the explanation of that?

General MILES. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Do you know, General Miles, whether or not that message [2365] was transmitted from the naval authorities to the Army authorities?

General MILES. I know now, sir and have testified to it, bringing in the affidavit of the officer in the G-2 office in Hawaii who saw those messages regarding the burning of the code.

Senator LUCAS. And it was transmitted then from the Navy to the Army?

General MILES. It was transmitted; they were transmitted.

Senator LUCAS. According to that affidavit.

General MILES. According to that affidavit; yes.

Senator LUCAS. You received no report on it at the time from anyone in Hawaii?

General MILES. I did not receive any report at the time.

Senator LUCAS. Was there any arrangement or any agreement between the Navy and the Army at that time which would definitely fix that question as to when a message so important as this was transmitted by the Navy that it would be ultimately transmitted on to the Army?

General MILES. Yes, sir; there was a long-standing agreement or policy of complete interchange of information between the Army and Navy (both in Hawaii and other places [2366] where we operated together.

I have testified, Senator, that not only was that so, but I knew the strong desire of the Chief of Staff for his subordinates of all ranks to keep in close contact with the Navy wherever we were operating together and I had received a letter from the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stating specifically that his liaison with the Navy as well as with FBI was complete.

[2367] Senator LUCAS. Of course I am only taking your statement, which was made in answer to an inquiry of Mr. Gesell, that you had every reason to believe that the message would be promptly transmitted.

It occurred to me to ask why, when war was hanging in the balance, you relied upon the assumption at that particular time that an important message of this kind was to be transmitted by the Navy rather than the Army.

General MILES. Well, sir, the question of relying on an assumption, based, as I say, on their good knowledge of what had been laid down as a policy, and the letter from the responsible G-2 say-

ing he had complete liaison, as against the risking of this secret of using the two codes, we were not ready to risk the secret if we could possibly avoid it.

Senator LUCAS. Of course you did use two codes to Hawaii.

General MILES. Never in sending the same message.

Senator LUCAS. What I am trying to determine in my own mind through these questions, General Miles, is as to the importance that you attached to obtaining a reply from General Short in connection with the burning of the codes, and what you did to follow it up, or whether you just trusted that the Navy would use its communication system, would do it for you?

General MILES. We trusted the Navy and the Army. Liaison [2368] is a two-way proposition, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; but the one-way proposition now is with the Navy, because that is the code which you fellows believed was the most secret.

General MILES. But it was equally the responsibility of the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see that we maintain a close liaison, that we should get such important information as the Navy collected, as it was the Navy's responsibility to give it to the Army.

Furthermore, let me say Hawaii had already been warned many days previous of the impending war by the Chief of Staff, and the burning of the codes was simply a strengthening of the information which the Chief of Staff, over his own signature, had given to Hawaii, that there might be a Japanese attack at any time.

Senator LUCAS. I certainly agree with you that the burning of the code would seem to any ordinary reasonably prudent man, whether he was in Washington or whether he was in Hawaii, as being about the last act before the happening of serious difficulties between the two nations.

I am not trying to defend anyone and I am not trying to offend anyone here. I am trying to ascertain what the facts really were with respect to knowledge and the importance attached to the burning of the code, and what you did with [2369] respect to it, or what the Navy did. That is my chief point, General Miles.

I wanted to direct your attention again to this page 2221 where Mr. Gesell asked you another question:

Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities at Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Any instructions to the Navy?

Mr. GESELL. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them.

General MILES. No, sir, that was not considered necessary.

I think you have already probably answered that question with the answer to my previous question that you did not consider it necessary.

Now that brings me to this question that I want to ask you. It may not be quite within the realm of this investigation, but in view of the fact that here was an important message that was to be sent by the Military Intelligence of the Army in Washington to the Military Intelligence of the Army in Hawaii, you depended primarily and solely upon another branch of the service to transmit that information for you at a critical [2370] period here in the history of our country. I am wondering whether or not you would care to make any state-

ment as to what you think about having both of those branches, the Army and Navy Intelligence, under one command and one service, so that there could not be any question about you wondering whether or not the Navy, or assuming the Navy was going to transfer an important message of this kind?

General MILES. Senator, I believe thoroughly, and have believed for many years, in the unification of the services. I think that is one point that you have just brought out as an argument for unification.

Senator LUCAS. Of course I do not know what the Navy would say about that, but I wanted to get your opinion upon it.

Now there is one other question. General Miles, do you know General Grunert, General Russell, and General Frank, who made the investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster in behalf of the Army?

General MILES. I do, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They make this statement in their report concerning the Military Intelligence Division:

The advantages accruing from this situation could have been calamitous. The Japanese Armed Forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This [2371] was a problem of all-out intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

Do you agree with that statement?

General MILES. I do not, sir. I think the documents before this committee show clearly we knew a great deal about the Japanese Military Forces. We certainly knew a great deal about the Japanese Army, the Japanese Air Forces, and the Navy knew a great deal about the Japanese Naval Forces.

Senator LUCAS. I only have before me the report. I never examined the testimony that was taken before the committee.

Do you know what they based that conclusion upon?

General MILES. I do not, sir. They did not ask me any questions which would have, to my mind, substantiated such a statement.

Senator LUCAS. Are these gentlemen who were selected to make this investigation retired officers or are they still active?

General MILES. They were all active at the time. General Grunert is now retired. I do not know whether General Russell and General Frank have been retired or not.

Senator LUCAS. They further said:

We must know as much about other major world [2372] powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligence planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our Intelligence Service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem.

In the past our Intelligence Service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these.

[2373] Now, in view of the fact that they were talking about you primarily as head of the Military Intelligence at that time at the time of this disaster, I wonder if you would care to elaborate upon any statement that they made, or to discuss it?

General MILES. To the extent that the Japanese knew more about us than we knew about them, that is true, sir. The Army and Navy had no money for espionage service. I do not think that the Congress

of the United States, I do not think that the people of the United States would have been willing to appropriate the money through years and years which would have been necessary to build up an espionage service against the Japanese comparable to what we suspected and knew, and now know they had against us.

We have simply never gone into that. I think that to that extent the observations of the Grunert board are correct.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it is true that all major powers of the world, except this country, have had for a long time past permanent world-wide intelligence services, have they not?

General MILES. And we had permanent world-wide intelligence services, but greatly limited in personnel and expenditure, and we kept above board also. We were not spying.

Senator LUCAS. Did we have any foreign secret intelligence [2374] service prior to the war?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe, from what you know as an expert in military intelligence, that we should know, or that we should have that type and kind of service throughout the world, as other nations do?

General MILES. It depends on what you want, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. I want to protect my America.

General MILES. So do I, sir.

Senator LUCAS. National defense is all I am interested in in this country. I am asking that question for information of a man who is an expert upon this question.

General MILES. My answer then is decidedly "Yes." I consider a secret service, such as we eventually evolved in this war after we got into it, is a necessity for national defense at all times.

Senator LUCAS. Do you believe that if such a system was provided for by the Congress of the United States, it should be linked with the military and naval intelligence, or should it be set out as in independent agency of its own?

General MILES. It must be linked with military and naval intelligence, sir, for the simple reason that only the military and naval intelligence can tell the agents of the people as to what type of information is really desired.

[2375] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair desires to announce that the bell you heard is undoubtedly a roll-call vote on the Donnell amendment to the pending bill of the United Nations Organization.

While the Members of the Senate have been excused by the Senate from attending the proceedings of the Senate while these hearings are on, if any Senator wishes to vote on that, he is at liberty to do so. The Chair thinks he ought to know what it is about before he can exercise his own judgment.

Senator LUCAS. Can the Chair tell me whether it is going to be a close vote or not?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot. The Chair can only hope it will not be a close vote.

Senator LUCAS. Will the reporter read what General Miles said in his last answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator LUCAS. You believe that would be true whether we were in peace or in war?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. One other question.

Something has been said, General Miles, about the men on watch in Hawaii on the evening of the 5th, 6th, and 7th. [2376] I think it would be well to state just how your men operated at that particular time with respect to hours; that is, in Washington, D. C.

General MILES. On the night of the 6th?

Senator LUCAS. I was thinking of the 5th, 6th, and 7th, just previous to this attack, or anytime within a few days previous to Pearl Harbor.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. The 7th is when it happened.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, the 7th.

General MILES. The officers of the Far Eastern Section concerned with magic were on duty in the War Department all the afternoon and evening of the 6th. There was also on duty an officer of the division itself. I was there, of course, during the 6th. I do not know exactly when I left on the afternoon of the 6th. I do know I returned early on the morning of the 7th.

Do you wish me to go into a little more detail?

Senator LUCAS. I was trying to ascertain the number of men that you had on duty at that particular time, and what the hours were. Did they have a 24-hour watch at that particular time?

General MILES. I cannot answer that question without referring to the records, Senator, with any accuracy.

Senator LUCAS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

[2377] The Vice CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

Mr. MURPHY. General, I notice on page 2216 of the record, that you make the statement, at the bottom of the page, speaking about whether or not any messages had been sent subsequent to November 28, you stated that General Marshall had sent a warning, and then you say, "Anything else was considered to be redundant."

Do you want to stand on that statement?

General MILES. What page?

Mr. MURPHY. 2216.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you consider messages about the codes being burned by the Navy to be redundant?

General MILES. Redundant to the warning, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. By "redundant" you mean unnecessary, don't you? Isn't that what redundant would mean?

General MILES. Desirable, but unnecessary, I would say, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is redundant then, to tell them that the codes are being burned throughout the world?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel then, it was a waste of time to do it, do you?

[2378] General MILES. No, sir, I agree entirely with this message.

Mr. MURPHY. If it were up to you in your department, those messages would not have been sent to Hawaii, is that right?

General MILES. No, sir, that is not right.

Mr. MURPHY. If you felt it was redundant, would you do it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why did not you do it?

General MILES. Because it was desirable to send those particular messages through naval channels. The command had been warned by the Chief of Staff and we had every reason to believe they were on their toes. We, however, did send, were glad to send, through naval channels a message still further strengthening the information which the Chief of Staff had already given the Hawaiian Command.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel that the message of December 2, the two messages of December 3, the message of December 4, three messages, the message of December 6, two messages, were all redundant, do you?

General MILES. Which messages are those, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. MURPHY. You said everything after the 28th was redundant up to the 7th. I am now speaking of exhibit 37, [2379] page 39, December 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Your answer is, as I understand it, they are all redundant.

Mr. GESELL. General, we have just handed you a set of those.

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I think it only fair to look at my answer on page 2216 and the use of the word "redundant."

Mr. MURPHY. Let me read it for you, if you will, please. I am quoting now from the record, at the bottom of the page:

But these things were known in Hawaii. That fortress, like a sentinel on post, had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for being. Anything else was considered to be redundant.

Now, the interpretation I gather from that is you feel that these messages from the 28th to the 7th were redundant.

General MILES. Redundant in the sense of warning that command, yes, sir. That is what I am speaking about, the warning of the danger.

Mr. MURPHY. You realize that the Navy sent them. I take it if they were here now in your office they would not have been sent.

General MILES. No, sir; that is not true.

Mr. MURPHY. Then why did not you send them?

General MILES. You do not have to tell a commanding [2380] general but once that a danger faces him. You may, however, see fit to give him further information as to the situation he faces.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, your office did not send any of them, did it?

General MILES. My office did not send any of them for reasons I have given.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also say it was inherent in the situation that there would be the possibility, probability and likelihood of an attack on Hawaii. Was it inherent in the situation that war would be commenced that way?

General MILES. Not necessarily.

Mr. MURPHY. I understood you to say that the reason why you did not put in your message of December 5, and other messages, something about a possible surprise attack on Hawaii, was the fact you did not want to, in effect, explain the obvious.

General MILES. Did not want to what, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Explain the obvious.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was not that the purport of your testimony as to why you did not include that in the note of December 5?

General MILES. The note of December 5?

[2381] Mr. MURPHY. Yes, or the report of December 5. I will give it to you.

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 33.

General MILES. Memorandum of December 5 to the Chief of Staff? Is that the one you refer to, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. Do you have that?

General MILES. I have the memorandum.

Mr. MURPHY. On the 5th you spoke of all the likelihoods, you spoke about the possibility of an attack on Russia to the north, you spoke about an attack possibly on Indochina; you spoke about the possibilities to the south, and you spoke about the possibilities to the Philippines, but you did not say anything about Pearl Harbor.

I understand you, on many occasions throughout the record, say it was inherent in the situation about an unexpected attack there, and I am wondering why it would not also be inherent in the situation to expect an attack on the Philippines at the very time you gave the report, that you would include the Philippines in one or two paragraphs, but you never mentioned Hawaii?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, in the document to which we refer, we were trying to evaluate the lines of action which the Japanese might take at that particular time, or in the period which we were trying to cover. Now, one of [2382] those lines of action which we thought very probable was a southern expansion, which might involve the Philippines and that was why the Philippines was mentioned, but since it was inherent in the situation if we went to war with Japan that Hawaii and Panama particularly might very well be attacked, because of the great advantage which Japan might accrue from a successful attack on those places, it was not necessary to repeat in that particular paper this obvious fact, known to military men.

The sole reason for the garrison on Hawaii was the defense of a naval base in a Japanese war.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the reason for the garrison at Manila, if it was not for the same purpose?

General MILES. Primarily for the same purpose.

Mr. MURPHY. Then why make a distinction in one and not in the other?

General MILES. We did not make a distinction as to the probability of Japanese attack, sir. We simply said one of the lines of advance might involve the Philippines.

Mr. MURPHY. The thing that disturbs me, General, is that throughout your testimony I certainly get the inference that you were probably the only person in Washington who expected the attack at Pearl Harbor, simply from your testimony, because each time you go back to say how obvious it was, and [2383] how inherent it was in the situation, and yet I have read these reports of yours through from cover to cover and I have not seen it mentioned once. Apparently people at Hawaii did not think it was so obvious because they were taken by surprise, and apparently the others in Washington did not think it was so obvious because they were taken by surprise.

I am wondering if it is a fair inference to take from your testimony that you thought there was at least a great likelihood that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor, and that, by the way, com-

menced the war? I think that is a fair inference from what you have been saying throughout this hearing.

General MILES. I am very glad to answer that question if that is your inference, Mr. Congressman. It comes down to what I have already testified on these two principles which follow in making an estimate. I did not ignore any action of the Japanese which was within their capability. I knew they were capable of making an attack on Hawaii just as I knew they were capable of making an attack on the Philippines or Panama.

I did not believe, up to a very late date, that it was probable that they would make that attack at the outbreak of war, for the reason that I have already stated, that such [2384] an attack as was actually made had to result from two separate decisions of the Japanese; one to take on a war with a great naval power, and presumably with the two great naval powers, a very risky proposition in the long run as has transpired; and second, to start that war, or at least make this attack on a great fortress and fleet, which inherently jeopardized the Japanese ships making the attack to some extent, and which rested almost solely for success on the unpredictable circumstance that they would find that fortress and that fleet unprepared to meet that attack.

The Grunert board make a statement that before Pearl Harbor everybody in Washington expected the attack on Pearl Harbor, and afterward everybody was surprised except the Secretary of War.

Mr. MURPHY. I think, judging from your testimony, that there was at least a likelihood of an attack. That is what troubles me.

General MILES. That is the difference between what you know is possible for the enemy to do, and what you are rather surprised at what he is doing, because you have given him credit for the best good common sense. I think "surprise" even in that sense is too strong a word. You did not think it probable that he would make that particular attack.

Mr. MURPHY. General, I notice on your report of [2385] December 5, section 28 of exhibit No. 33, on the second page of that report, the following—and this is as of December 5, 1941—

The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theatres of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long-range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

Do you think that was an accurate statement on December 5, 1941?

General MILES. That is at page 2?

Mr. MURPHY. That is on the second page, under tab 28.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. The last paragraph on the bottom of the page.

I assume you include in there the United States, and you make the statement that the anti-Nazi nations would have 4 months in which to strengthen their position, and that was 2 days before Pearl Harbor.

General MILES. I was not referring to the United States, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You were leaving the United States out [2386] when you spoke of the anti-Axis powers?

General MILES. Yes, sir. The anti-Axis powers were those powers then in war against the Axis powers.

Mr. MURPHY. You did include Japan then under the theory that she was one of them under the Tripartite Alliance?

General MILES. She was an Axis power.

Mr. MURPHY. And we were not an anti-Axis power at that time?

General MILES. We were not anti-Axis; we were neutral at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. In view of what we were doing in the Atlantic to aid in the defeat of Germany, we were not at war, but would you not call us an anti-Axis power at that time?

General MILES. My use of the term "anti-Axis" in this paper referred to those nations actually at war with the Axis powers.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Now, then, I ask you to turn over to the page at which you mention the Far Eastern theater under your subheading 6. Have you got the page?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You state there, on December 5:

The most probable line of action for Japan is the [2387] occupation of Thailand.

Now, were you speaking only in the event she went south, or were you speaking of the next move when you said that?

General MILES. I did not quite understand that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the reporter read that?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. MURPHY. Let me make it clearer. Under the subheading 6, you said:

Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military over-extension. She has the following lines of action open to her:

And then you list a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, and i, and then you say:

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.

Was that the action you expected Japan to take on December 5, 1941?

General MILES. That was the line of action we expected her to take as the most probable.

Mr. MURPHY. You certainly were not looking forward to an attack on Hawaii as the most probable thing they were going to do at that date, were you?

[2388] General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you state that the fleet was primarily a problem for naval intelligence while it was in the port at Pearl Harbor, and there has been time and time again through the reports I have read something to the effect that while the fleet was in port, its protection was the responsibility normally of the Army.

Would that change your answer? At sea the fleet takes care of itself, but while in port the fleet is supposed to be protected by the Army; is that true?

General MILES. Yes; that is true. My reply, however, is that the evaluation of those messages that primarily concerned the fleet was the primary responsibility of the ONI.

Mr. MURPHY. It normally would be, General, but if there were going to be a bombing of Pearl Harbor, it was the prime responsibility of the Army to protect the fleet while it was in the harbor. That would be shifting quite a good bit of the responsibility on your shoulders, would it not, in the evaluation of the report?

General MILES. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice at page 2189, General, at the bottom of the page:

Military intelligence was specifically concerned,
and this is General Miles speaking— [2389]

particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned so far as the General Staff went, with antisubversive precautions and operations.

Is not that a very strong statement, in view of the fact that you were also obliged to give reports from time to time as to the situation of the armies throughout the world as viewed in the eyes of the Army, and what the enemy was doing?

General MILES. I see now, Mr. Congressman, that is an ambiguous answer. What I meant to say was that so far as the General Staff was concerned, we were the division primarily, particularly and almost solely charged with looking into antisubversive activities.

Mr. MURPHY. That was one of your functions, but certainly not the sole purpose.

General MILES. No, sir; not in the least one of my main functions.

Mr. MURPHY. You were one of the General Staff who was to look after antisubversive activities?

General MILES. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You would not let your answer stand that "military intelligence was specifically concerned, particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned so far as the General Staff went with antisubversive precautions and [2390] operations"?

You mean by that that you on the General Staff, that that was one branch to take care of that, but not to the exclusion of your other duties?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice on page 2197, as well as in many other places throughout the record, that you did not see General Short's reply until the early part of January 1942, and I am wondering why or how it could happen that there was a message sent out on the 27th of November which would seem to indicate that war was coming, and your responsibility in G-2 was to find it out, and I cannot understand how it could be that your department would not know of the reply from the war theater, from November 27 to January 1942, when the very purpose that you were created for was to be advised and to be advising on what had taken place throughout the world, as well as in our own army.

General MILES. No, sir. Military Intelligence had no responsibility as to the measures taken.

Mr. MURPHY. I did not mean that. But you were to advise. You were advising all of these people on this list about what was happening in Russia, what was happening in Germany, in the Middle East, and why you would not also want to advise what was happening in our own theaters?

[2391] General MILES. Mr. Congressman, please note that General Marshall's message of November 27 directed General Short, General MacArthur, and the other generals to report measures taken, I believe, is the phrase used. The answer then was presumably just that report of measures taken by one of the major divisions of the

United States Army, and on that subject Military Intelligence had no responsibility.

Mr. MURPHY. It take it that it was part of Military Intelligence Division's responsibility to follow the movements of the Germans and Russians, and to follow the movements of the British Army and to follow the movements of the Dutch armies, but not to follow the movements of the United States armies.

General MILES. It was no responsibility of Military Intelligence to follow the movements of the United States armies. Generally, I knew, as did all officers of the Army, particularly those stationed in Washington, of the main movements, the maneuvers of the United States armies as a matter of interest, but it was no responsibility of Military Intelligence Division to follow those movements or any measures taken as the result of the warning message of General Marshall.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about generally throughout the war. Did not Military Intelligence throughout the war follow [2392] the progress of the American armies and did not they have to write reports on what progress we were making, how the enemy was disposed, and how the American Army was disposed; would not that be the function of Military Intelligence?

General MILES. No, sir: that is the function of operations.

Mr. MURPHY. The Military Intelligence did not stop working when the war started, did it?

General MILES. They did not what?

Mr. MURPHY. They did not stop working when the war started?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They followed only the enemy movements rather than following our own forces; is that right?

General MILES. I did not get that.

Mr. MURPHY. They went only to the enemy instead of following our own forces in their movements?

General MILES. Yes, sir. Military Intelligence is charged with informing Operations and the Command as to what they think the enemy is doing or what they think the enemy is about to do, and not to follow our own forces.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you did not see the Short telegram, or know of its existence until January of 1942, [2393] or some 6 or 7 weeks after November 27, 1941?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice in all of these reports you have made, exhibit 33, that you have signed your name as the acting head of G-2. Were you not the actual head, or were you just acting temporarily?

General MILES. I was the actual head, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why did you sign it "Acting"? Did Marshall sign his name as the acting Chief of Staff?

General MILES. No, sir. That "acting" was due to the fact that my previous service with troops in the 6 years preceding my detail as G-2 had not been sufficient to enable the Chief of Staff to make me a member of the General Staff, so he made me the acting Chief of Staff, G-2. For all practical purposes, I was Chief of Staff, G-2.

[2394] Mr. MURPHY. Now, were you the only member of the staff, of the General Staff, who signed his name "Acting"?

General MILES. I believe I was, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice it is brigadier general on December 5, and I notice now you have the rank of major general. That was subsequent to December 5, was it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir; that was, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I also notice, General, throughout the record, that you first state that so far as the consular officials, the Intelligence, they were directly responsible to you; that would be our military attaché at Tokyo, he would be directly responsible to you, would he not?

General MILES. In the military hierarchy, yes. Of course, he was also a member of the ambassador's staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. G-2 at Hawaii you would reach ordinarily through General Short?

General MILES. The G-2 of any overseas department was an officer directly responsible to the commanding general of that overseas department selected by him.

Mr. MURPHY. Then this question of intercepts, as to whether or not you would send the intercept, you stated quite clearly that you did not convey the intercept as such because of security reasons. You then stated, however, that you did not—at least several times in the record—that you did not [2395] convey any of the substance of the intercepts, and, apparently, because of the reason that the chief of staff, General Marshall, was responsible for that happening. There was one place in the record, however, where you do say that from time to time you did send some of the substance of intercepts. At other places you say you didn't send it because of security reasons.

My question is would there be anything to prevent you from sending the substance of the intercepts without ascribing the origin to the intercept itself and thereby give the theater commander the benefit of information you were getting?

General MILES. Only the same security reason which prevented our sending the text of the message. In other words, if the Japanese found by breaking our code—we didn't know whether they were doing it or not—that we were sending information to Hawaii or anywhere else you like which we could have gotten only from magic it would have divulged the secret just as much as if we had sent the text of the message.

Mr. MURPHY. Didn't the Navy do exactly that between December 2, 1941, and December 6, 1941?

General MILES. In certain cases they did.

Mr. MURPHY. But the Army never did; is that what you mean?

General MILES. I am not prepared to state offhand without examining the record if the Army ever did.

[2396] Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't it have been difficult in writing your appraisal of the situation from time to time to rule out of your mind the fact that you had these different impressions gained from a reading of the intercepts and weren't you giving the Command the benefit of the knowledge that you had from the intercepts in your reports?

General MILES. I don't quite get the question.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you wrote reports from time to time to the general staff. The general staff would send out messages to the theater commander. Do you follow me so far?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then; in order for you to write your report to the general staff you based that upon certain information, some of which information you obtained from the intercepted messages; isn't that right?

General MILES. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. So that in effect in giving your reports based upon all the knowledge you had at the time to the general staff and then having that go out to the field you were in effect passing on the substance of what you had learned in the intercepted messages; weren't you?

General MILES. To that extent; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Throughout the record you have created the impression, to me, at least, that the responsibility for the [2397] substance of this information not going to the field was General Marshall's responsibility apart from any wishes you might have had in the matter.

Did you mean to create that inference?

General MILES. I think I said, sir, that the responsibility for any message, whether it came from magic or otherwise, which caused the implementation of war plans, or any other major tactical decision by a major unit of the United States Army, should emanate from General Marshall or his principal assistant for war planning operations.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, supposing it weren't up to the point of implementing the war plans, but was a very vital piece of information which the Commanding Officer ought to have. Was there anything said to you by General Marshall that prevented you from seeing that it went out to G-2?

General MILES. The magic had to be safeguarded.

Mr. MURPHY. You could give the substance of it. The Navy did.

General MILES. We could have, if we thought it necessary, give the substance of that message, but we were closing on that secret as much as possible.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, at page 2188 of the record—I just want to lay the ground for what is to come. As I understand it, there is an absolute difference between you and [2398] General Gerow as to what part you took, if any, in the preparation of the message of November 27?

General MILES. Page 2188?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it General Gerow's feeling that you did have something to do with that message?

General MILES. It is, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, you say you never saw that message except some weeks afterward?

General MILES. I stated in my memorandum of January 30 that I was not sure that I had seen the actual text, but I knew the substance.

Mr. MURPHY. I am wondering why you and several generals would sit around a table and discuss the adequacy or inadequacy of a message, as to whether or not it should be supplemented, without having a look at the message itself. You sat down with General Bryden and others and talked to them about warning the Air Corps group at Hawaii and elsewhere. Then you yourself sent a subsequent message and/or an additional message against subversive activities. That would have

you participating in the sending of two additional messages. Do I understand that you sent the two additional messages without having looked at the original message itself?

[2399] General MILES. Yes, sir. The two additional messages sent on November 28 had nothing directly to do with General Marshall's warning message of November 27. My message of November 27 to the G-2 did, however, and I knew, I must have known at that time, at the time I sent it, that antisubversive warnings had not been contained in General Marshall's message.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, wouldn't it have been a good idea to look at the message to see what it did say when sending out supplemental messages? What was wrong with looking at that message of the 27th? Why didn't you?

General MILES. I don't remember that I saw the text of that message but I did know its contents. Why I didn't actually go over to War Plans Division and insist on seeing the textual message I don't know sir.

Mr. MURPHY. G-2 wasn't interested in the contents sufficiently to have a copy in its files?

General MILES. No, sir; we would not have kept a copy of so secret a message in our files. It belonged in War Plans Division files.

Mr. MURPHY. G-2 wouldn't have anything in their files to show the substance of that message in order to follow the progress of future events?

General MILES. Not in G-2 files; no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it General Gerow's opinion that you did [2400] have some participation in the formulation of the message of the 27th of November?

General MILES. I believe it is, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, at page 2079 of the record you spoke about your accomplishments in setting up a Joint Intelligence Committee. You said that that committee had its first meeting on October 11, 1941. You also stated that you felt that a crisis was developing about the middle of November.

Why didn't you call a meeting, why didn't somebody call a meeting of that Joint Intelligence Committee instead of waiting until after the war started?

General MILES. That, Mr. Congressman, is one of the best examples that I know of of the need of unification of the services. It actually took from July 14 to December 8, in those critical days, to integrate and establish a committee for intelligence within the Joint Army-Navy Board, which was the high policy-making agency of the armed forces.

Mr. MURPHY. But you have already said, at page 2079, that you already had a meeting on October 11. Why didn't you call a meeting between then and December 7 or 8? What efforts did you make to have a meeting? Whom did you consult about it?

Here is a working organization formed on October 11, 1941, and a crisis is developing and there are no meetings until the day after the war started. Why not?

[2401] General MILES. I regret to say, Mr. Congressman, there were still discussions and difficulties going on between the War and Navy Departments as to just what the functions of that committee would be, where it would sit, what rooms it would have, what secretary it would be allowed, et cetera.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you personally, as acting head of G-2 of the Army, make any effort to have a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee after the middle of November and prior to December 7, 1941?

General MILES. I pressed several times for the establishment and operation of that committee.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you state exactly what you did between November 15 and December 7, 1941; to whom did you talk and to whom did you protest and with whom did you press?

General MILES. I went several times, I am sure, to General Gerow, who was the War Department representative on the Joint Planning Committee, the Joint Board, urging action in that matter.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you give the date, as best you can?

General MILES. I cannot give the dates from memory of any discussion of this matter. I only know that during that period I was constantly pressing for an establishment, which I myself had initiated, in which I was very much interested.

Mr. MURPHY. Turning to page 2079 of the record I want [2402] to quote you exactly:

The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their first meeting on the 11th of October, 1941, but did not actually function until the 8th or 9th of December.

I ask you this question: Was General Gerow a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

General MILES. He was not.

Mr. MURPHY. Why would you go to him to have your own committee meet? Who was the head of it? Who was the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

General MILES. The Joint Intelligence Committee was to consist of the head of Military Intelligence, myself, and the head of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. MURPHY. Why would you ask General Gerow to hold a meeting?

General MILES. Because, sir, the whole proposition of the Joint Intelligence Committee had to be processed first through the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board and then receive the approval of the Joint Board. There was great difficulty with the Joint Planning Committee as to how we would work with them, where we would work. General Gerow was the representative on that committee with whom I was dealing.

Mr. MURPHY. Were there any minutes taken at the meeting of October 11, 1941?

[2403] General MILES. Any what, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Any minutes, notes?

General MILES. That I do not know, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything in writing that will tell what the functions of that committee were and why it was set up?

The record shows, while you are looking it up, that the establishment of the committee was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on the 1st of October and by the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, and that appropriate orders were issued.

That is your testimony at page 2079.

General MILES. In looking up this matter, Mr. Congressman, I consulted Colonel Montague, who was then one of my officers, and a former secretary to the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee. I think

he was the first secretary. He has given me a memorandum dated the 2d of November this year on this matter.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there any official document we might call for that would show us the function of that committee and its purpose and what had been done to formulate it up to December 7, 1941, and why it didn't meet?

General MILES. The memorandum from Colonel Montague states this:

* * * there are in the file rough drafts of J. B. 329 (Serial 710) by General Gerow and Admiral Turner re- [2404] spectively. These papers indicate a controversy between them as to the scope of the functions of the proposed J. A. N. I. C.

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee.

General Gerow wished the committee to collate, analyze and interpret information with its implications, to estimate hostile capabilities and probably intentions. Admiral Turner wished to limit it to presentation of such factual evidence as might be available, but to make no estimate or other form of prediction. In J. B. 329 (Serial 710) Admiral Turner won.

It also makes a statement here which sounds rather ridiculous in these days, but that was what was going on:

The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee was not fully activated until 1941 because until then the head of the foreign branch office of Naval Intelligence was unable to obtain agreement within the Navy Department as to the office space to be provided. Except for this difficulty the committee might have been activated by the first of December.

Mr. MURPHY. There were only two members. Wouldn't you be able to have a meeting at your office, with war coming on and a crisis developing?

General MILES. No, sir; we did not meet until we could [2405] finally get actually to work on it. The personnel of that committee, the actual working personnel of that committee were not, I think, the heads of G-2 and ONI, but subordinate officers detailed by them. We were then to review their work.

Mr. MURPHY. I am going to ask counsel, Mr. Chairman, to go into this matter more thoroughly. I think we ought to have brought before us somebody who can tell us the detail of why this committee didn't function and a survey of the whole picture.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel will take note of that request.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Congressman, I think, on the request of why the committee didn't function, on the Army side General Miles is the best witness.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, as I take it, your answer on the record is that the reason you and the Admiral did not meet during the crisis from November 15 to December 7 was as contained in your answer which you read from the paper, a statement of Colonel Montague to the effect that the Navy man was having difficulty in getting an office in which you were to meet, you two men?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is what you read; that is the way the statement read. What was the reason you didn't meet?

General MILES. Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, and [2406] I met frequently during that period. The actual Joint Intelligence Committee, as such, as part of the Joint Board, was

having a great deal of difficulty in getting established, a difficulty which I think would be largely eradicated if we had had a unified department of national defense.

Mr. MURPHY. I will come to that, but you do say, however, at page 2079 of the record:

The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their first meeting on the 11th of October 1941 but did not actually function until the 8th or 9th of December.

At any rate, that is a fact.

General MILES. That is factual so far as the meeting is concerned; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You talk about a unification of the services, and I am not going to get into that, but will ask this: If you felt the messages from the 27th of November to the 6th of December were redundant and the Army was the head of this board what would have happened to those messages?

General MILES. They would have been sent.

Mr. MURPHY. By whom? Who was going to settle your differences?

General MILES. I thought they should be sent and have repeatedly so testified.

Mr. MURPHY. You may interpret "redundant" a little. [2407] differently than I do.

General MILES. They were redundant to the warnings of which I was speaking when I used the word "redundant."

Mr. MURPHY. Now, let me ask this question, General:

I see in exhibit 37 a number of messages sent to all of the commands between the 27th of November and the 6th of December about destroying codes and machines, but I don't see any message from either the Army or the Navy to Hawaii as to what to do. Do you know of any such messages?

General MILES. No, sir; we didn't want them to destroy their codes.

Mr. MURPHY. At Hawaii?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You thought that was a very likely place to be attacked?

General MILES. Surely.

Mr. MURPHY. You have them destroying the codes every place else in the world except one of the places where an attack was quite probable.

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, the Army and Navy and State Department ordered the destruction of codes only in places in which those codes could be immediately seized by a foreign power.

Mr. MURPHY. If they had ships that day they might have [2408] been; I mean on the 7th of December.

General MILES. What did you say?

Mr. MURPHY. They might have been, isn't that so? God forbid, but they might have been.

General MILES. I think the authority in Hawaii would at least had time to destroy their codes. Even if they landed on Hawaii we did expect considerable resistance to be given to the Japanese.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I see a message from the Navy, none from the Army, but a message from the Navy, to Alusna Tokyo Alusna Bankok, Astalusna Peiping, Astalusna Shanghai, I see an-

other for the co mardet Peiping, co mardet Tientsin, I see another for Navsta Guam. But I see nothing about Hawaii.

At any rate, neither the Army nor Navy told them at Hawaii to destroy their machines or codes?

General MILES. No, sir, we did not want those machines destroyed for any reason we could then foresee. We expected Hawaii, at least, to put up a very good fight and allow time to destroy codes and anything else.

[2409] Mr. MURPHY. And that notwithstanding the fact that a message came from Hawaii on December the 6th that the Japanese at Hawaii were destroying their codes.

General MILES. Yes, sir; but our police at any time after war was declared could have jumped that consulate and taken those codes but they could not jump our headquarters.

Mr. MURPHY. General Miles, as I understand it—and I wish you would correct me if I am wrong—in your predictions of what might happen you expected a possible attack on the Maritime Provinces to the north, which would be Russia, or an attack to the south, which would be the Malay Peninsula or Thailand or the Dutch East Indies and that the Japs would probably—not probably, but might—attack the Philippines so as to prevent the Philippines being on their flank, isn't that right?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And then the other step, that if they were going to attack the Philippines because they did not want a flank movement they might take the other step and go on and get the fleet and stop that from being another flank, to protect them in their march to the south, isn't that right?

General MILES. That is correct, sir. The minute they became involved with the United States they might take Hawaii, Panama, or anything else.

[2410] Mr. MURPHY. But, as I understand it, no one of responsibility in Washington or elsewhere anticipated that the Japs would take the move to attack the fleet before they attacked the Philippines, to remove any subsequent attack on their flank; isn't that right, so far as you know?

General MILES. If by the word "anticipate" you mean that they thought it the most probable thing or even a probable thing, I think you are right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is exactly what I meant, as the possible thing and the most likely at the beginning of the war.

General MILES. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. I was wondering, General: Over at page 2177 there was a joint dispatch on economic sanctions and there was not a joint dispatch about the possible likelihood of war beginning.

General MILES. 21—

Mr. MURPHY. On page 2177 there is a joint dispatch stating that economic sanctions would be placed in effect but there is a separate message about the likelihood of war.

Mr. GESELL. That joint dispatch is also in the exhibit, is it not, Congressman, exhibit 32?

Mr. MURPHY. I think I have it here.

Mr. GESELL. At page—

Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit 32, yes, at page 2; yes, page 2.

[2411] Mr. GESELL. Page 2.

Mr. MURPHY. Dated July 25, 1941.

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

General MILES. What was the question, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. MURPHY. My question is why did they have a joint, or why did you, the Army and the Navy, have a joint dispatch dealing with or telling about the likelihood of economic sanctions and a separate dispatch on November 27, 1941 about the likelihood of war?

General MILES. I am not able to answer that question, Mr. Congressman. I do not remember that I had any part in the drafting of the dispatch of July 25, which you refer to as the joint dispatch on economics, and I have already testified that I do not remember of having had any part in the dispatch on November 27.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have any part in the dispatch of November 24th on page 2184 of the record?

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 5 of Exhibit 32.

General MILES. No, sir, I do not remember of having had any part in the drafting of that dispatch.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster would be the next in [2412] order but he advises the Chair that he is unavoidably absent this afternoon and Congressman Gearhart will now proceed to inquire of General Miles.

Mr. GEARHART. General Miles, Hideko Tojo was the Premier of Japan and I am told that there was a Foreign Minister of Japan by the name of Togo. Now, that name Togo in Japan is just about the counterpart of the names of Jones, Smith, and Johnson in the United States. In view of that I wonder whether or not the name Togo which is signed to these telegrams which were sent to Honolulu inquiring about the disposition of ships was, in fact, the Foreign Minister or somebody else in the government who was assigned to carry on that particular inquiry. Do you know?

General MILES. I do not know, sir. I do not think it was the Foreign Minister, but I did not raise that point when I was being asked.

Mr. GEARHART. I don't think so either for the reason that he does not sign the similar notes of inquiry to Panama and to Manila.

I have been very interested in your testimony in respect to assuming that the attack might come at Hawaii, especially interested in view of the fact that that assumption is not reflected in any of the papers that I have seen that have been offered in evidence in this case. In fact, from the papers [2413] the contrary would seem to the case.

As a matter of fact, wasn't there a widespread opinion in Navy and military circles that the mighty fortress of Pearl Harbor was beyond even thought of attack, as was the mighty British bastion down at Singapore?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not think there was any widespread—I never heard of any opinion that Hawaii or any other of our overseas departments were invulnerable to attack.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, how do you account for the fact that the exhibits that have been introduced here practically ignore the possi-

bility, as far as writing is concerned, of an attack upon either Singapore or upon Hawaii?

General MILES. Well, they did not ignore it, sir. The messages, the warning message of November 27 very definitely did warn Hawaii. Now, if you are referring to my estimates of the situation or other papers prepared for the General Staff it is, I have repeatedly said, true that I did not burden that very busy gentleman with what I knew that he knew.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you point out one message which warned Hawaii which was not one of a series of messages sent to all of our overseas commanders?

General MILES. I know of no message sent particularly to Hawaii and not to any other overseas command warning them.

[2414] Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, that does not answer my question, does it, that Hawaii was considered by everybody all of the time as being a place that was within danger during the last week of November and the first week of December of 1941?

General MILES. Yes; definitely I think, sir, that the message which went to Hawaii as well as the other overseas departments—

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you said there was no message which was sent to Hawaii which was not also sent to the other outlying departments.

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there is one that was sent to Hawaii which was sent to Hawaii which was not also sent to the other outlying departments.

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there is one that was sent to Hawaii which was not sent to the others, is that not true?

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman, I think the witness said he knew of no messages sent to Hawaii that were not sent to others. He said that he knew of no such messages.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I do not want to put any words in the mouth of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Yes; I understand.

Mr. GEARHART. So I will ask you to answer the question yourself, General.

The CHAIRMAN. The question that the Congressman asked you was whether any other message was sent to Hawaii which was not sent to other stations and your answer was that you [2415] knew of no such messages.

General MILES. I knew of no warning message which was sent to other overseas departments.

Mr. GEARHART. Then to refresh your memory I will call your attention to the message that General Marshall sent on the 7th day of December 1941. Was that sent to all of the other outlying bastions?

General MILES. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. GEARHART. The same message was sent to Manila that was sent to Hawaii?

General MILES. It was.

Mr. GEARHART. The copy which appears among the other papers of this particular exhibit, the small one in the pink binding, does not indicate it; but do you know, as a matter of fact, that that message was sent to the Philippines and to Panama, other places?

General MILES. I do, sir, of my own knowledge know that that was the Chief of Staff's direction.

Mr. GEARHART. That appears very clearly from the other messages but it does not appear clearly from the copy of this particular message.

Why were not copies that were sent to the others included in this book, or if different ones were sent why were not they set forth, or if the same one was sent why doesn't [2416] it appear in this book? Are you sure of it? That is what I want to know.

General MILES. I am absolutely sure that the message of December 7 was by direction of the Chief of Staff sent to Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines and the West coast.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. What did you think should have happened in the Hawaiian Islands when they received their message of November 27?

General MILES. I thought that they would go on full alert prepared for any eventuality that might happen to them in a Japanese war.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you see the report that General Short made in reply to that order or that direction that he received on November 27?

General MILES. Not until the following month.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, his reply was:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage.

Liaison with Navy re your radio 472 27th. Short.

Do you know whether or not that message was received by General Marshall?

General MILES. I know now that it was received by General Marshall.

Mr. GEARHART. You know now that it was not received by him?

[2417] General MILES. I know now that it was received by General Marshall.

Mr. GEARHART. That it was received by General Marshall.

You also know, as one who keep in touch with these papers, that General Marshall did not voice or telegraph any objections to the precautions that General Short had taken as reported in the telegram that I have just read?

General MILES. I do, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It must have been satisfactory; is that not a correct conclusion to draw from that situation?

General MILES. I would prefer, Mr. Congressman, that General Marshall answer that question. He is to appear before you this week.

Mr. GEARHART. I will draw your attention that a similar telegram was sent on the 27th to General MacArthur in Manila and in order to emphasize the difference in the reports I am going to read from the MacArthur report and then I will ask you how do you account for the difference. General MacArthur says in his report:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio 624, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Ground security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development in this theater of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between the Army and the Navy. MACARTHUR.

Now, how do you account for the fact that these two gentlemen, officers of the United States, replied so differently? How do you explain it?

General MILES. I can only account for that, Mr. Congressman, by the assumption that those two commanding Generals viewed General Marshall's message, a similar message sent to the two of them, in a totally different way.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, isn't it a fact that the telegram that was sent to MacArthur was different from the telegram that was sent to General Short and it was that difference which brought forth those differences in replies? Is that not correct?

General MILES. I do not remember, Mr. Congressman, that there was any material difference between the message sent to General MacArthur and that sent to General Short.

General MILES. I do not remember, Mr. Congressman, that there was any material difference between the message sent to General MacArthur and that sent to General Short.

Mr. GEARHART. There is a very material difference and it consists of just this sentence which is contained in the message to Short but is not in the message that was sent to MacArthur [reading]:

Suggest reconnaissance and other measure as you may deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civilian population or disclose intent.

Now, it is that omission of that phrase in the telegram to MacArthur that probably accounts for the difference in the two replies, is that not correct?

General MILES. I do not think that is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Let me hear what you think about it.

General MILES. The prohibition against disturbing the civilian population in this way applied far more at Hawaii, American territory, than to the Philippines, in which there was a much smaller number of American citizens, but the essential thing, Mr. Congressman, it seems to me, is that the prohibition was as old as the United States Army. We have always attempted to do our job without unnecessarily disturbing or alarming or alerting the civilian population. I think, since you asked me, that it had practically no effect in that very important war-warning message.

Mr. GEARHART. Then why did you prepare a different telegram, one containing it and the other not containing it? That is not your practice, is it, when you send joint telegrams all over the different departments that we have in the United States? You send the same telegram. Here you gave General Short definite instructions not to do something, [2420] whereas you did not give General MacArthur the instructions not to do the same thing.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, may I interrupt? This witness had nothing to do with it. He did not give these instructions.

Mr. GEARHART. I thought this witness testified that he had a part in the writing of this telegram of November 27.

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

General MILES. I testified exactly the opposite, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You did not have anything to do with it? Then you cannot account for the differences in those two telegrams?

General MILES. I cannot state that of my own knowledge.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, as a military expert could General Short have sent airplanes all up into the air on reconnaissance and establish a reconnaissance all over those islands without exciting the people?

General MILES. I believe he could, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Could he have alerted the island under a No. 3 Army alert without apprising the people of some intent behind it?

General MILES. I had seen exactly that situation in the Island of Oahu under the guise of maneuvers, and I do not remember that the civilian population was very much disturbed. [2421] The preceding general, as we know, had them out on the No. 3 alert for several weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you completed your answer to that last question?

General MILES. Have I what?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you complete your answer to the last question?

General MILES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, unless the Congressman is practically through we will recess here.

Mr. GEARHART. No; I am not practically through.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow. General, you be back at that time.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Monday, December 3, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, December 4, 1945,)

[2422]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 319), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2423] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

When we recessed, Congressman Gearhart was examining General Miles. You may proceed, Congressman.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

Mr. GEARHART. General Miles, since our interrogation of yesterday I have ascertained to my satisfaction that the message of December 7 was sent in identical form to the usual points of distribution throughout the world in identical language. That seems to be established as a fact.

Now I am directing your attention to your message of November 27, 1941. As it appears in the pamphlet of copies of messages which has been furnished us, nothing would indicate that I can see that that message was sent to all of the distributing departments in outlying bases of the United States. The message that I refer to is the one reading as follows:

Japanese negotiations have come to practically a stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only. MILES.

General MILES. Yes, sir; that message went to Hawaii, Panama, and all nine corps areas in the United States; that is including the West Coast Command, of course.

[2424] Mr. GEARHART. Then as a rule, or would you say it was a rule, that all messages of this type that were sent out were sent out in identical form to all of the overseas outlying posts, such as Hawaii, Panama?

General MILES. As a rule, that is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That brings me to the point of inquiring again for the purpose of clarity, why was the Marshall message of November

27th sent out in different forms, one form to Hawaii and another one to Manila?

General MILES. I regret, sir, that I cannot answer that question. I had no part in the drafting of those messages.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you any information or have you any way of telling or have you as a military expert an inference which would explain the fact that General MacArthur and General Short acted differently on those different messages?

General MILES. I have no knowledge or information bearing on that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think it was just as important not to alarm the people of the Philippines as it was not to alarm the people of Hawaii?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I would very much rather that that question be answered by the two gentlemen who will succeed me in this witness stand and who did have a very direct hand in preparing those messages. I feel myself incompetent to [2425] answer.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you prefer not to comment upon this additional phrase that was put in the message to General Short:

But these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

You prefer that that comment be left to General Marshall?

General MILES. I would, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And still as head of Military Intelligence you are supposed to understand these messages and keep yourself abreast of the reasons of the whys and wherefores of these distinctions, are you not?

General MILES. I did know the substance of that message so that I was informed of the substance, at least, of that message pretty thoroughly I think.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you testified yesterday that you have not observed the distinction in these two messages.

General MILES. What is that, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. I say you testified yesterday that you have not observed the distinction in these two messages.

General MILES. I think I testified, sir, that I did not at that time, yesterday, remember this particular distinction that you were drawing up, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I have reminded you now. Do you have any further comment to make now?

[2426] General MILES. I would very much rather not comment on the Chief of Staff's message because it was the Chief of Staff's message and because I had no part in its drafting, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact isn't it true that in Washington and the Washington Naval and Army circles there was a fixed belief that Singapore and Hawaii were so impregnable and so invincible as fortresses that they would not be attacked?

General MILES. I never heard that opinion expressed in Washington circles, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, it was up to you to keep in contact with the policies and philosophy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was it not?

General MILES. No, sir. I had nothing to do with what might be called the Joint Strategical Staff unless and except when I was in-

formed by the Chief of Staff or by his direction through General Gerow what was going on. I commonly had no part in any of the activities of the—I think you call it the Joint Strategical Board.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, directing your attention to the message that was sent to the President by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark under date of November 27, I will read you the first paragraph:

[2427] If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: The Burma Road; Thailand, Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

Can you account or do you know why absolutely no mention is made of Singapore or of Hawaii?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not. I had no part in the drawing up of that particular document.

Mr. GEARHART. Wouldn't you say it was a legitimate inference that a possible attack upon those two bastions was not within the contemplation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Army and Navy high authorities of the United States?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I would rather not pass on the implications of a paper signed by the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations in which I had no part in drawing it up.

Mr. GEARHART. All right, get back to your own personal self.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you cite me one document which you have yourself signed in which you spoke of the possible attack that might occur upon Hawaii?

General MILES. I do not think there was any document in those particular days which I signed in which the possible [2428] attack on Hawaii was mentioned because it was an obvious concomitant, if you like, result, an obvious possibility in any war in which we might become involved with Japan, so obvious that it would be known to all military men.

Mr. GEARHART. It was a possibility but did the Army and Navy regard it as a probability?

General MILES. I think they did, sir, regard it as probable for reasons that I have already testified, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And still it is not mentioned in this tremendous volume of literature that has been placed upon the desks of the committeemen anywhere, that there was a possibility, a probability that Hawaii singled out alone would be the object of attack?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But there is plenty in all of this literature, an abundance, which points out the possibility of attack in the Philippines, in the Kra Peninsula, in Thailand, in Indochina, everywhere except on those two very great fortresses at Singapore and Hawaii.

General MILES. No, sir; not everywhere except. I do not think you will find any mention of the obvious fact that in a war with Japan the Panama Canal might be attacked, the Island of Guam might be attacked, the Island of Samoa might be attacked, Midway, and so forth, and so forth.

[2429] Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

General MILES. Those things were quite obvious as possibilities in a war with Japan.

Mr. GEARHART. They are all mentioned over and over again in this literature that has been laid on our desks, except Singapore and Hawaii. Singapore has been spoken of as possibly being menaced by an invasion of the Kra Peninsula but that is as far as any of this literature has gone in respect to Singapore and it has not gone that far in respect to Hawaii anywhere along the line. If I am mistaken in that will you point it out?

General MILES. I do not know what documents you are referring to, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. GEARHART. I am referring to every document that has been laid before us.

General MILES. Well, I cannot very well answer about that but I think you are mistaken, sir. I do not remember any document of importance which specifically mentions the possibility or probability of attack on Panama, Guam, Midway, Samoa.

Mr. GEARHART. Why, there has been specific mention of Guam as an object of attack, there has been specific mention of Panama, of the Philippines, specific mention of Indochina, the Kra Peninsula, but never a specific mention of the Hawaiian [2430] Islands. If you have anything to the contrary I would like to have you point it out and if you find one document among all of these I will be surprised.

Why, even on the 27th, after Mr. Hull had handed his final statement to the Japanese, a letter was written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which they point out all of these other places as possible objectives of Jap attack, and Hawaii is not mentioned even then.

General MILES. Do they point out Panama or Guam?

Mr. GEARHART. No.

General MILES. Or Samoa?

Mr. GEARHART. No; but they point out the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay, Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, the Russian Maritime Provinces, and discuss each one on the basis of the paper later on.

But, General Miles, things happened on the 6th of December which suddenly centered your attention upon Hawaii as a possible object of attack, did there not?

General MILES. Things happened on the morning of the 7th of December, sir, which centered my attention on the probable Japanese attack somewhere coincident with the delivery of the Japanese reply at 1 o'clock that day.

[2431] Mr. GEARHART. You are familiar with the so-called 14-part Japanese reply to the Hull message of November 26, are you not?

General MILES. I am, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When they speak of it as the 14-part message they are referring to the method the Japanese used in transmitting that message, are they not?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It came in in installments, in other words, rather than in a solid typed coded message; is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Thirteen parts of that message were received in Washington on the 6th day of December, were they not?

General MILES. On the late evening of the 6th they were received, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When did they start coming in, and when was the thirteenth part finally received?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I cannot answer that question with any degree of certainty. You will have witnesses before you who can answer that, sir; witnesses who handled that particular activity.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I will yield.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I just want to see if I am right about it. I understood General Miles was supposed to return [2432] at another time and a special inquiry would be made along that line. Is that correct, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct, Congressman Cooper. The procedure called for having here at one time all witnesses concerned with those messages so that we could get a composite and detailed investigation into that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. GEARHART. I will yield.

Senator FERGUSON. Just for a question of the chairman. As I understand it now, Mr. Chairman, the plan is to call General Marshall on Thursday morning. I am just inquiring as to how we might proceed with General Marshall on the particular items that we are omitting from General Miles, such as the wind message.

Mr. GESELL. I think we indicated—if I may answer that—we indicated in the memorandum distributed to the committee that we felt, under the circumstances, an exception should be made to our procedure as to General Marshall, and that General Marshall should be questioned concerning the wind message and questioned concerning the events of the sixth and seventh, inasmuch as he may not be available again for some time to appear before the committee.

Our thought was there should be no division of his testimony, [2433] that all subjects should be covered with him while he is on the stand.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might say in that connection that the exigencies of General Marshall's departure have made it necessary to rearrange, if not disarrange, the order of witnesses, because of the necessity for him to leave before the time when he would be regularly reached.

Now, inasmuch as he will be away, the Chair understands he will be asked about all matters within his knowledge, just as if he had not come on the stand until he had been reached in the regular course of the schedule.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, that is not the inquiry I am making this morning. My inquiry is along this line: If we are to properly examine General Marshall on these points it appears to me evident that the men who dealt with him on those points, such as General Miles, General Gerow, should be questioned on those points first, so there will be no necessity of calling General Marshall back to try to get information from him after he leaves, because we haven't any idea what these gentlemen are going to say as to their dealings with him in relation to these particular messages.

The CHAIRMAN. The plan is to put General Gerow on prior to General Marshall's appearance, if we get through with [2434] General Miles in time.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not answer my question.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not know whether he can answer your question or not. The Chair cannot control questions that will be asked the witnesses by members of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. That is perfectly all right, if that is the rule.

Mr. GEARHART. I might say, Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware of the understanding we had with reference to grouping all the witnesses on this question and interrogating them at a subsequent meeting of this committee, but in view of the change in the program that has been made, it becomes incumbent now to go into this question with this witness, who is one of the actors with respect to what was done.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. We will probably save time by going into it now to such an extent as the gentleman may be able to testify about it.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, if that is to be the procedure we will, of course, want to present certain documentary material concerning those events, so there can be the fullest kind of examination. We did not cover it in our examination at all, as the committee is aware, for the reasons I have indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the counsel will understand that the change of the program by the necessity of calling General Marshall [2435] as soon as possible may make it necessary to change the collateral program surrounding his testimony and his activities.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, just a point of inquiry. The program that has been outlined is entirely possible, as I would conceive it. General Miles may not have with him certain documents and records that he might want to refer to. In fairness that ought to be borne in mind.

General MILES. I am prepared to answer any questions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We can probably find out about that by going ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. I do not intend to ask any questions that will require the revealing of a lot of documents, but I do want to ask these questions now in order to prepare myself, as I hope other members of the committee will, in their examination of General Marshall when he appears.

Now you have told us that the 13 parts arrived on the 6th. That is correct, is it not?

General MILES. On the evening of the 6th; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know when the last one was received on the evening of the 6th, the thirteenth part?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not know accurately the hour in which that was received, but you will have witnesses before you who can testify to that, which is more than I am able to do.

[2436] Mr. GEARHART. Do you know when the fourteenth part was received on the 7th of December?

General MILES. I understand that that was received fairly early on the morning of the 7th, at 7 or 8 o'clock. Again I am not able to testify as to the accurate hour.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know when the so-called parallel 1 o'clock directive was received and decoded?

General MILES. That also was received on the morning of the 7th, but I am unable to identify the hour.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know whether it came before or after the fourteenth part of the reply to Mr. Hull was received?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not of my own knowledge know that.

Mr. GEARHART. As soon as those several parts were received they were immediately delivered to the usual recipients of that kind of information, is that not correct?

General MILES. I again would much prefer that question be answered by the officers who actually did it and will be witnesses before this committee.

[2437] Mr. GEARHART. That was a matter peculiarly within your jurisdiction, was it not?

General MILES. It was a function of my department to make those deliveries from my officers to the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, G-2, and Secretary of State.

Mr. GEARHART. And the President?

General MILES. No, sir; not the President.

Mr. GEARHART. You did not make those deliveries to the President?

General MILES. Not at that time; no, sir. That was done by Navy.

Mr. GEARHART. You were impressed with the importance of that fourteenth part of the message, were you not?

General MILES. When I read it, I was very much impressed with the fourteenth part.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you make any out-of-the-ordinary directions in reference to its immediate delivery to the ones that were entitled to receive copies from an emissary from your division?

General MILES. It had been delivered to the recipients about coincidental with its delivery to me, with the exception of General Marshall with whom I was in touch either directly or through Colonel Bratton to get this information to him.

[2438] Mr. GEARHART. Did you make any special effort, by telephone or otherwise, or by calling at his office, to inform General Marshall of the receipt of that fourteenth part of the message?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you successful in contacting him?

General MILES. I was, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you inform him of the fourteenth part of the message?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I have written notes on my activities on the 6th and 7th which, perhaps for clarity and saving time, I might read.

My wife and I dined at the house of Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, then Chief of ONI. We were there from 8 p. m., until about 11 p. m. Shortly before we left, I think about 10:30 p. m., Commander Kramer came to the house, bringing with him a summary, I think, although it may have been the full translation of the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our note of November 26. This was the first knowledge I had that these 13 parts were in.

These 13 parts had little military significance. They concluded only with a Japanese refusal to accept the American proposal of November 26 as a basis of negotiation—a result which had been expected and discounted for some time. [2439] I, therefore, contented myself that night by calling Colonel Bratton at his home about 11:30

p. m., and assuring myself that the full reply would be disseminated the next morning on Sunday, and that he and I would be in our offices then.

Mr. KEEFE. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman, to ask the counsel whether or not we have received the first 13 parts as they came in? I have the full message, but in the form that it was received and delivered that night, have we been furnished the first available copies of those 13 parts?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. Of course, the first 13 parts are printed in exhibit 1.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Mr. GESELL. By parts. Congressman Keefe, when you were absent yesterday, we stated we were building up documentation on these crucial messages, and it had been our plan to present that to the committee in connection with General Marshall's testimony. We are a little ahead of that now.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair suggests that General Miles be permitted to complete his recital as he started out to do, so that we may have that in the record in regular form.

Go ahead, General.

General MILES. Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton called me at my house, told me that important information was in and that he was trying to get in touch [2440] with General Marshall. I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come out to Fort Myer to see him if he desired. Either Colonel Bratton or I called General Gerow. These telephone messages were designed to effect a meeting of the Chief of Staff with General Gerow, Colonel Bratton, and myself, which subsequently took place in General Marshall's office.

I then went to my office. There I saw the full Japanese reply, and the 1 p. m. delivery message, and discussed them with Colonel Bratton. The latter message and the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply struck me immediately.

Some arrangement had been made for us to be notified when General Marshall arrived. When so notified, I went to General Marshall's office. What took place in his office is best recalled by me in a memorandum I prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated December 15, 1941, subject: "Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941."

This is the memorandum that I refer to, as my recollection of what occurred.

Mr. GESELL. May I interpose there?

The memorandum that General Miles is now reading we are just distributing to the committee. I sent for it as soon as this change in program developed. It is included in a series of memoranda, some prepared by General Gerow, [2441] one by General Miles, and some by other officers, all recording events that took place on the 6th and 7th. I feel it will be of advantage to the committee to have all these memoranda in the record as a basis for this examination.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you desire to read the memorandum of December 15, 1941, at this time?

Mr. GESELL. Well, General Miles is starting to read his memorandum of December 15. I thought perhaps all of them should be introduced as an exhibit, since they all relate to the same subject matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GEARHART. What number will it bear?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. One at a time, please.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the record may be clear, I want to know when these papers that have just been handed to us were prepared and as to why we could not have them earlier; I want you to explain that on the record.

Mr. GESELL. You are asking me?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. These documents relate to a phase of the case which we had anticipated would come on several weeks [2442] from now. I think they were prepared and put in our hands a day or two ago. We had not distributed them because we did not think they were a matter to come immediately before the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. I find, Mr. Chairman, I received papers this morning that are on my desk here, that are material to the committee's examination, and I wondered why I had not received them before.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is not in a position to explain why any document that comes to us did not come sooner. I suppose counsel are making every diligent effort to get the documents to us as soon as possible.

Mr. GESELL. What documents are you referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the one signed by L. T. Gerow, brigadier general, dated November 27, 1941, placed before me this morning at 10 o'clock.

Mr. GESELL. That is right. That was placed there this morning. We were going to introduce that in connection with General Gerow's testimony. It is his memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it has no connection with General Miles whatever?

Mr. GESELL. I do not know whether it has any connection with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it connected directly with [2443] General Miles' testimony? I understand he was the intelligence officer, and I assume he had all matters pertaining to intelligence under his jurisdiction, and therefore he should be questioned on it.

The CHAIRMAN. This seems to be a paper prepared for the Chief of Staff by General Gerow on November 27. It does not seem to mention General Miles in any way. It is presented by General Gerow and directed to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. This is General Gerow's memorandum concerning the message of November 27.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, but we were talking yesterday with General Miles about the the information that was known in the Philippines, and he was telling us what he knew was known in the Philippines. This memorandum would indicate some things in relation to knowledge in the Philippines. There is attached to it an instrument, "H. R. Stark, 26 November 1941, G. L. Tucker," indicating that certain messages were going to the High Commissioner of the Philippines from the President.

My inquiry is why we could not have these at the time they were received, rather than to have them placed on our desk here at the opening of this morning's session, when we are examining the witness.

[2444] Mr. GEARHART. I think I can answer that question myself. The reason is, the members of this committee are not supposed to have before them, or consider any evidence whatsoever, until it is offered to us by the counsel of the committee. That is the policy which has changed this committee from an investigatory body into a judicial body.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement is without the slightest foundation in fact or theory, or even suspicion. Documents have been filed before us so voluminous—

Mr. GEARHART (interposing). I will point out I have received about 4 feet high of typewritten matter, any part of which could have been served upon me within the previous 2 months that we were waiting for these hearings to commence, brought to me and given to me at a time when it was utterly impossible for any human being to read it, and at the same time keep up the proceedings in this committee room.

Now, of course, I would not say for one moment that anybody planned it this way, but the result of it is—and there is no escaping this conclusion—that we are now sitting here listening to testimony, listening to the reading of documents which we have had no chance to contemplate or evaluate before these hearings commenced. That is a judicial proceeding. We are sitting as judges on the bench listening to evidence as it is fed to us, spoon-fed to us, [2445] if you please.

We have been denied the right to personally investigate and to personally have the papers before they were dumped in our laps in this hearing.

That is what I have objected to all along the line, and that I will constantly object to as long as there is breath in my body.

[2446] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes that we could go ahead with the witness. The comment about whether we are being fed with a spoon is not very relevant. If the member is not satisfied with that instrument maybe we could get a scoop.

Mr. GEARHART. Undoubtedly other things of the same kind which will contain evidence that ought to be a scoop for the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us proceed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel offered as an exhibit these documents here. I request that they be received and we be given the number.

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 39, I believe, Congressman.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 39.")

Senator LUCAS. I would like to make one observation—

Mr. GEARHART. I do not wish to yield. My cross-examination has been interrupted for the last 15 minutes.

Senator LUCAS. I am very sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will try to protect the member from interruption. The Chair understood that he had yielded.

Mr. GEARHART. I had yielded and I think my yieldings to date have been very helpful.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The witness was in the act of reading his memorandum. Do you want him to complete that?

[2447] Mr. GEARHART. Yes; I would like to have that completed, if possible.

Will you go on with your memorandum, General Miles?

General MILES. [Reading exhibit No. 39:]

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a. m. We were almost immediately joined by Colonel Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1:00 p. m. that day.

You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Colonel Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply—1:00 p. m.—an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and [2448] the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you thought we should send out warning as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied, you put down the telephone and said that the Admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Colonel Bratton and I nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

You then wrote out the warnings message. There was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.

At about this time General Gerow and Colonel Bundy arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had some significance and warning messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your [2449] handwriting was then given to Colonel Bratton to take immediately to the Message Center. (There was a little discussion here as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery. General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them to give first priority to the Philippines if there is a question of priority" or something to that effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty.

Colonel Bratton states that he looked at his watch on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a. m. He further states that the Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.

Signed by me.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you remember when you first saw the full message of the 14 parts?

General MILES. I cannot identify the hour exactly, sir. [2450] I only know that I got down there to the office fairly early after this telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton, and I think that General Gerow, although of that I am not quite certain, and that I had considerable time to read the message and discuss it with Colonel Bratton before the arrival of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GEARHART. Who else was at that dinner party with you at Admiral Wilkinson's?

General MILES. It is my recollection that Admiral Beardall, the naval aide to the President, was there, but as Admiral Wilkinson will appear before you I think he could give you more accurate information.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, when you left the office from day to day at nighttime and General Marshall left his office from day to day at nighttime, did you always leave word as to where you could be found and did he always leave word as to where you could find him if you wished?

General MILES. I don't know, sir. I don't believe that we had that in effect in those days. It has always been in effect since. But I should doubt if we had it in effect at that time, although I am not sure.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you had a lot of discussions about the 1 o'clock directive, didn't you, when that was decoded and laid on your desk?

[2451] General MILES. Yes, sir; I discussed that with Colonel Bratton and, of course, as I testified, with General Marshall.

Mr. GEARHART. Various interpretations as to the possible meaning of that message were given by the various persons you talked with?

General MILES. I don't remember any details of the discussion, sir, except that it obviously, we thought, fitted into the time schedule of the Japanese somewhere.

Mr. GEARHART. And, as a matter of fact, didn't the officers that you talked with, all of the trained officers, immediately reach the conclusion that that meant an attack upon Hawaii, and that 1 o'clock in Washington mean dawn there?

General MILES. I don't remember that that point was expressed, sir. We weren't trying to guess where it was coming. We wanted to warn the overseas departments that something probably would come at that time somewhere.

Mr. GEARHART. But the very use of 1 o'clock by the Japanese Government in directing their Ambassador and Envoy to present that at that hour certainly excited in the minds of every officer who saw that message much comment in respect to its possible meaning, did it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir. It was a very unusual request to make on a Secretary of State of a foreign power, that he receive a message at 1 o'clock on a Sunday afternoon.

[2452] Mr. GEARHART. And isn't it true that the opinion among those with whom you were in consultation was unanimous that it meant trouble in Hawaii?

General MILES. No, sir; I have no such recollection.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there anything said by any of the officers with whom you discussed this message that all previous maneuvers at Hawaii had all contemplated an attack at the dawn if the attack were to be an attack from the air?

General MILES. I don't remember that those maneuvers were discussed at that time, sir.

[2453] Mr. GEARHART. Well, you wouldn't forget what was discussed in respect to a matter of such tremendous importance, would you?

General MILES. I do not clearly remember the details of the discussion. My clear recollection is of the urgency of getting warnings out.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you have—

General MILES. At the last we knew something about a time, although we didn't know anything about a place.

Mr. GEARHART. You have already testified that you regarded that 1 o'clock directive as highly significant of something. Now you tell

me that you don't remember what anybody said about it that they thought was significant.

General MILES. No, sir. If I have given that impression. I have not clearly expressed myself. We all thought it was extremely significant as a time factor. We were guessing in the dark if we tried to determine where the operations, which were to be coincident with the delivery of the reply, 1 o'clock Washington time, would take place.

Mr. GEARHART. You contemplated what 1 o'clock would be at Hawaii, what 1 o'clock in Washington would be at Manila, what 1 o'clock in Washington would be at Indochina, didn't you?

General MILES. I am trying to remember, Mr. Congressman [2454] but I do not remember that any of those places specifically were discussed, or that we related the 1 o'clock in Washington to any specific place. We thought the line of action would be Thailand, still thought it that morning, but we wanted our overseas departments and the west coast alerted, and it was an awful urgency about it.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. What did 1 o'clock in Washington mean in Hawaii?

General MILES. One o'clock, as we now know, meant about 7 o'clock, I think, in Hawaii.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did you put that phrase in your answer "as we now know"?

General MILES. Because I have testified——

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't you know it then?

General MILES. I don't remember the point being discussed on the day in question, the 7th of December 1941.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, at 7 o'clock in the morning is a likely time of attack upon the islands, under all of the opinions of the experts in yesteryears who had under consideration the possibility of an attack on Hawaii; isn't that correct?

General MILES. That was a likely time; not the only time.

Mr. GEARHART. What time was that, 1 o'clock in Washington, [2455] in Manila?

General MILES. I wouldn't be able to say offhand, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was the middle of the night, in round figures; is that not correct?

General MILES. I would not be able to say offhand.

Mr. GEARHART. Is the middle of the night a likely time to attack anywhere?

General MILES. It depends entirely upon what kind of an attack. Landing attacks have been made at night. There have always been two schools as to whether a landing attack should be made under cover of night, or at dawn when you have the advantage of a little light.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, night fighting was developed in World War II for the first time as an important factor in attacks; is that not correct?

General MILES. No, sir. There was a great deal of night fighting in the first World War.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

General MILES. The landing at Gallipoli, one of them, was made under cover of darkness.

Mr. GEARHART. Early morning darkness, though, wasn't it? The idea was to put the attacking force on the ground as the dawn broke; is that not correct?

[2456] General MILES. I wouldn't be able to testify offhand without looking that up. I do know there were two definite schools of thought as to an overseas landing attack. Do you want to use the cover of darkness, or do you want to use the light of early morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you completed?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Three times I thought you had.

Now, as a matter of fact, prior to World War I, a dawn attack was considered about the best kind of attack that could be made because it would catch the enemy usually just before they got up, and it would give the attacking force the benefit of the first light to make their attack; isn't that correct?

General MILES. I am trying to project my mind back to what we knew or thought in those days, sir. I don't really remember. I expect you are correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Generally speaking. I know there are exceptions.

General MILES. I don't want to argue the point. I think you are right. The consensus of military opinion would be that dawn was a very good hour to make a landing attack. Certainly before the First World War.

Mr. GEARHART. I know that night attacks have been made. [2457] We haven't forgotten the crossing of the Delaware on Christmas Eve when everybody was having Christmas parties. But it was a very unusual thing, and only because of very unusual circumstances that night attacks were ever undertaken.

So a dawn attack was within the range of probabilities; a night attack was merely within the range of possibility in the conception of military and naval leaders prior to World War II; isn't that correct?

General MILES. I think that is substantially correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When you consider air attack, it is especially advantageous to the attacking force to ride in on the rays of the sun, so to speak; is that not correct?

General MILES. I believe that is substantially correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That was the conclusion all military and naval experts had arrived at after studying for 50 years the island known as Oahu?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I think I can clear your line of questioning very easily by saying that on that rather hectic morning of the 7th of December, we probably didn't stop to figure out what hour in the different parts of the world would coincide with 1 o'clock in Washington. [2458]

What we all wanted to do was to get out warnings to all of the four vital areas and tell them the hour we feared something was going to happen. They knew in Hawaii what hour that was in their time. They knew in Manila. They knew in Panama. The main thing was to get the warning out and do it fast.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you mean to tell me that the 1 o'clock directive was not the principal thing discussed when General Marshall sent this message worded as it is? Doesn't it reflect the very fact that 1 o'clock was the one topic of discussion, the one subject that was giving you very much concern at that time?

General MILES. That was one of the two main subjects. The other was the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply which, couched in the language that was used, meant very serious trouble, we thought. But, yes, sir, you are right. We wanted to get the hour out to the overseas departments and let them translate it into their own time.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, it was the use of 1 o'clock Washington time that directed your attention forcibly to the possibility, yea, probability of an attack upon Hawaii, for the first time. Isn't that correct?

General MILES. No, sir, I am sorry, I cannot agree.

Mr. GEARHART. Let's refresh your memory by reading the [2459] message General Marshall sent out on that day:

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but we are alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

So General Marshall thought that the important idea was to tell everybody in the field that 1 o'clock was a significant thing?

General MILES. That is just what I have testified, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, but it was particularly significant in its application to Hawaii, wasn't it?

General MILES. Yes, sir. We know that now, looking back on the event.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you want to say and commit yourself as a military expert that it was not significant to you then?

General MILES. It was very significant to me then that this meant the possibility of attack on any one of our vulnerable points. I did not conceive the idea of an attack on Hawaii for the first time through reading that message. I had always thought an attack on Hawaii, as I have repeatedly [2460] stated, was possible if not probable, if we got into a war with Japan.

These two messages we had, the fourteenth part of the reply and the 1 o'clock, meant two things: (1) That war is very likely because of the language used by the Japanese, and (2) something is going to happen coincident with 1 o'clock Washington time. That is all we knew. That is what we sent out. But the main thing was to get it out.

Mr. GEARHART. What time did you meet General Marshall in his office on that fateful Sunday morning?

General MILES. I wrote on the 15th of December 1941, which was 8 days after Pearl Harbor, that I found General Marshall alone in his office at about 11:25 a. m., on Sunday morning.

Mr. GEARHART. When was the conference completed insofar as the determination to send a message was concerned?

General MILES. I wrote on that same day, December 15, that Colonel Bratton looked at his watch on delivering General Marshall's message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a. m.

Mr. GEARHART. 11:50?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was the message at that time encoded, or did it have to be encoded after 11:50?

[2461] General MILES. It was in General Marshall's handwriting, in plain English, and had to be encoded by the Signal Corps.

Mr. GEARHART. How long did it take them to encode the message, if you know?

General MILES. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When was the message sent? When was it on the wires? Or in the air—which was it?

General MILES. The message to Hawaii went by Western Union, I understand, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That means it went by wire to San Francisco, and by cable to Hawaii?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. The wire and cable were commercial wire and cable?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as you sat in General Marshall's office, he writing the message, were there any other and faster methods of conveying information such as you were sending out that were available?

General MILES. Radio is about the fastest method that probably could have been used. There was, of course, the telephone and had that been used, it might have been faster. That depends on getting the communication, the connection in [2462] Hawaii. We also had a scrambler on the telephone in those days, and that could have been put on and a message sent that way.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, how many radios were available for the sending of that message?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I am not prepared to testify as to the technical details of signal communication. You will have witnesses before you who will testify on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now, as a matter of fact, the FBI had a short-wave radio to Hawaii, and that was available to the use of the Army, if you had desired to use it; is that not correct?

General MILES. I have heard that statement made, sir. I don't know of my own personal knowledge.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact the Navy had a short-wave radio that could have been used to transmit this message to Hawaii: is that not correct?

General MILES. I have heard that also, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And right on General Marshall's desk was a telephone that he could have used to call Hawaii commercially, if he had so desired; is that not correct?

General MILES. There was a telephone on his desk.

Mr. GEARHART. And also, there was a scrambler apparatus that could have been attached to the telephone had he desired [2463] to use the telephone; is that not correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir. There was, as I remember it, a scrambler apparatus in a neighboring room.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, when you had decided to send the message, and General Marshall had written it out, was there any discussion among those present at that time as to what method of transmission should be utilized?

General MILES. No, sir; I remember no such discussion. It was a very important message, an urgent message, in the Chief of Staff's own handwriting. The Signal Corps had the responsibility of sending such a message by the fastest available means, and I don't think it occurred to anyone in the room to discuss that question or decide as to how the Signal Corps would handle their own affair.

Mr. GEARHART. You had in mind the difference in time in Washington and the time in Hawaii, the time in Manila and the time in Panama, and still the slowest method was selected without any comment from any of the high-ranking Army officers who were then and there present?

General MILES. I did not know what method was selected for the sending of the Hawaiian message until several days later and I am quite sure that neither General Marshall nor General Gerow knew what method was selected. But I would like to point out that General Marshall was so anxious to [2464] get this message out as rapidly as possible, that after Colonel Bratton had delivered it he directed Colonel Bratton to return and find out exactly how long it would take to send it to the recipients.

Colonel Bratton came back and made that report as to what he had been told by the Signal Corps.

Mr. GEARHART. And later you learned that it arrived in Hawaii just 22 minutes before the first bomb fell, and that it was not decoded and delivered until some two hours after the last bomb had exploded?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

I discovered that later.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to have you tell us, General Miles, just where you were all day Saturday, up to Saturday night, until you went to bed and where you were all the time on Sunday until you went to bed.

General MILES. I am afraid I can't, sir. I can only identify in my memory two occasions on Saturday. Undoubtedly I was in my office most of the day, but I don't remember anything significant that occurred in the office that I can pin on Saturday, December 6. I do remember lunching with Admiral Kincaid, who was leaving that afternoon to take command of his ships. I do remember Admiral Wilkinson's dinner and what transpired that evening. I do remember telephoning [2465] Colonel Bratton when I returned home that evening. I do remember what I have testified to, and what I wrote out 8 days after Pearl Harbor as to what happened on Sunday morning. Beyond that I cannot recall.

Of course, I do recall, if you want to go into that, what happened when the announcement came over the radio that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, and I rushed back to my office. I had returned home for lunch. And I spent the rest of the day, and I think that night, in my office.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know why General Marshall was delayed in getting to the office that Sunday morning?

General MILES. I believe that he was out horseback riding that morning, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You know that he was informed of this message by telephone by Colonel Bratton, and he said that he would be in.

General MILES. I know he was informed of this message by Colonel Bratton; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And he was informed quite early in the morning, while he was still out getting his exercise, horseback riding?

General MILES. I cannot identify the hour, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But he did not present himself at the office until the time you mentioned, around 11 o'clock?

[2466] General MILES. So far as I know, he came in about 11 : 25.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, a very eminent ambassador arrived in Washington by air that day, did he not?

General MILES. Not that I remember, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I am not sure about it, but didn't Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff arrive from Russia on the morning of the 7th?

General MILES. If he did, I have no recollection of it at all, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I may be in error, but I am informed that he was met by General Marshall on that morning; is that correct? Do you know?

General MILES. I have never heard that before, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, there is very much more I might go into, but I have consumed altogether too much time, so I will reserve any further cross-examination until you reappear when we go into these other messages in detail.

Thank you very much.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the committee, in view of the Congressman's statement, whether it is expected that General Miles will be recalled on that subject?

Mr. GEARHART. From the statement made by counsel, yes.

[2467] Mr. GESELL. We would like direction from the committee on that.

Mr. GEARHART. I understand that you are going to devote special time to a discussion of certain messages, such as the wind message. If you are going to do that, it will be necessary to recall General Miles.

Furthermore, I think that a witness who had such intimate contact with what was transpiring should stand by available for recall at any time his appearance may be necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is difficult for the committee to say at this moment whether General Miles will be wanted back again.

The Chair assumed from what counsel said that when you went into these wind messages, and other messages, that General Miles was to be recalled to testify about that. Whether General Marshall's appearance earlier than expected will interfere or make that unnecessary, I don't know that the committee could determine at this time.

Mr. GESELL. My only question is, if we are to examine General Miles concerning the events of the 6th and 7th and the winds message now, there are a substantial number of questions in addition to those the Congressman has asked which should be asked. If he is to be recalled for that [2468] examination, we can defer that examination on those questions until that time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can only express his view, that in view of the more or less superficial result of the inquiry of General Miles on that subject today, it might be well to hold him in reserve for further examination when we reach that phase of the question.

[2469] Mr. GEARHART. I might say to counsel that my cross-examination of this witness was directed to two specific ideas which I wanted to develop. One was the significance of the 1 o'clock message. The other the effect it had upon the minds of those who learned of it and what transpired in the sending of the warning message. That is as far as I wanted to go at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would suggest to counsel, for whatever it is worth, in view of the fact that that phase is to be dealt with later,

the Chair sees no necessity for laying the foundation at this time for examination of General Miles on that subject which would be gone into at a later date.

Mr. GESELL. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George, we passed you.

Senator GEORGE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles, since the question of the 6th and the 7th has been brought up this morning, I want to ask you some questions on those dates.

Was there any discussion in General Marshall's office at the time that message was drafted or after, up until the message left the room, as to how the message would or could be sent?

As I understand it, when you arrived there it was 11:25. That gave you an hour and 35 minutes up to 1 o'clock.

[2470] Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any discussion as to how that message would be sent?

General MILES. I remember no discussion as to what means the Signal Corps would employ in sending that message. The only clear idea conveyed to Colonel Bratton was to get this off as soon as possible. We didn't even stop to have it typed or anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said about the Army radio being out of order?

General MILES. I never knew that the Army radio was out of order until some time later, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that the Navy had a high-powered radio that you could have reached Hawaii with?

General MILES. I think I did; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you only think that you knew that? Didn't you know that?

General MILES. I can't say positively that I knew it, but I am very sure that it was within my knowledge at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, had you ever used the telephone, the scrambler telephone, to Hawaii?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you didn't know how long it would [2471] take to do that?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said to the effect that the Army wouldn't be up at 7 o'clock in the morning and therefore you would send it by commercial radio?

General MILES. No, sir; I remember nothing like that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was anything said about that?

General MILES. I remember no such discussion, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, this was a Sunday in Hawaii, was it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you anticipate that the commercial radio, at 7 o'clock in the morning in Hawaii—it would be before 7—would be functioning so that it could deliver immediately a message to the Army?

General MILES. You mean, Senator, the commercial cable?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you consider that at the time of this meeting, that Sunday morning, before 7 o'clock, a commercial institution may not be functioning at that time?

General MILES. No, sir; I didn't consider that, Senator, because the question of the use of commercial cable never arose. I didn't know they were going to use commercial cable. I didn't know they had used it until several days later.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles, no more important message [2472] ever went over the wires or by communication between these two points, in your opinion; isn't that correct?

No more important message ever was sent between these two points than this particular message?

General MILES. I think that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And speed was of the essence because it was 11:25 when you got together that morning, although you had had the message from 7 o'clock; is that correct?

General MILES. I cannot identify the hour when I first saw this message. I am quite sure it was not as early as 7.

Senator FERGUSON. What time was it?

General MILES. I cannot identify the hour. I can only tell you I think reasonably early. I think between 7 and 8 I had this telephone call with Colonel Bratton and then went to the office.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you get to the office?

General MILES. I don't know, sir. I wish I did. I think I got down to the office before 9 o'clock but I can't identify the hour.

[2473] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, would you say that you arrived there before 9 o'clock, or what time would you say Bratton called you and told you that the message was in, the 1 o'clock message?

General MILES. Certainly some time before that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how long before?

General MILES. Senator, I wish I could answer your question, sir, but I cannot. I remember only that there was a telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton and I was trying to insure that I could meet General Marshall and General Gerow. I did not care whether I went to Fort Myer or went to the Munitions Building. I wanted to meet them, I wanted to see them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, General Miles, you were the Intelligence officer?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the purpose of Intelligence is to anticipate what the opposition or the enemy is going to do, isn't that correct?

General MILES. That is the ideal, sir; that we strive to attain.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the purpose then, the use to which you could put this message was to anticipate what the Japs were going to do on Sunday, isn't that correct?

[2474] General MILES. That is true, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do you tell us that, as the chief Intelligence officer, it took you from 9 o'clock to 11:20 to get the only man that had the right to act upon this message, and that was General Marshall? Is that what you want to convey to this committee—that it took you 2 hours and 25 minutes to get this message to General Marshall?

General MILES. I cannot state the exact time that it took me, but I think you are substantially correct, sir. I do not know when I first saw those messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir. Now, will you explain why it took from 7 o'clock, if the message was in the office at 7, until 9 to get you, the only man that could act? It took 2 hours to get you and then 2 hours and 25 minutes for you to reach the man that could act, General Marshall, which is 4 hours and 25 minutes, to act on this important message. Will you give us an explanation on that?

General MILES. You are assuming, Senator, that the message came in or was known to Colonel Bratton at 7 o'clock. Accepting that assumption—I cannot deny it because I do not know the hour, but accepting that assumption—Colonel Bratton first attempted to get General Marshall. He then called me up and I asked him to convey to General [2475] Marshall when he did get him that I would be glad to go out to Fort Myer, Colonel Bratton having told me that he had important information, as I remember it, but I do not think he told me what it was, but I was looking for important information.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Will you read the last part of the answer? You were looking for important information?

General MILES. Yes, sir; definitely; the Japanese reply.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I then went down to my office. Whether I stopped to have a bite of breakfast, whether I was fully dressed or shaved when Colonel Bratton called me, how long it took me to get my car out and get down to the office I do not know. I would assume that I got down to the office about 9 o'clock, perhaps a little before, perhaps a little later, but I cannot identify the hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever known a soldier to go to his duty without shaving? This was important that morning, wasn't it?

General MILES. I do not know whether I shaved that morning or not, Senator, if you press me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you just told us that that is what you did.

[2476] Mr. GESELL. No; he has not said that.

Senator GEORGE. He did not say that. He said he did not remember whether he shaved or not.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say about shaving?

General MILES. I said I did not remember whether I was dressed and shaved when Colonel Bratton called me on the telephone, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know if you shaved before you went?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. How far do you live from your office, I mean at that particular time?

General MILES. At that particular time?

Senator FERGUSON. At that particular time; I am talking about that time.

General MILES. I lived at that time at 1761 N Street.

Senator FERGUSON. How far would that be in miles?

General MILES. Well, at 10 blocks to a mile it was a little over a mile down to the Munitions Building.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a car?

General MILES. I had a car, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you know what time you got the message from Colonel Bratton that the message was in?

General MILES. No, sir; I cannot identify that hour, [2477] Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the night before you were at Admiral Wilkinson's and he was your opposite?

General MILES. My opposite number; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Navy?

General MILES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You had 13 parts in this message and from those 13 parts you could tell that relations were going to be broken off, there was sufficient in those parts?

General MILES. That that diplomatic conference was going to be broken was a clear assumption.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct. Well, now, did you and Admiral Wilkinson—he was an admiral at that time, was he not, or was he a captain?

General MILES. Captain, I think, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a captain?

General MILES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss that message that night?

General MILES. Not in great detail. I remember that we discussed the——

Senator FERGUSON. You expected the next morning that you would have to act on it. How does it come that you did [2478] not discuss it or go over it in detail that night that you got it?

General MILES. I think I only saw a summary of it that night but in any event, Senator, please note that the thirteenth part of that message only results or concludes with the statement that the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal, that is of November 26, as a basis of negotiation.

Mr. GESELL. That is the fourteenth part, isn't it?

General MILES. That is the thirteenth part.

Senator FERGUSON. So that gave you an inkling as to what was going to happen.

General MILES. That had already been discounted. We were thoroughly prepared and had been for some days to receive an unfavorable reply to the message of November 26.

I would like also to invite your attention, Senator, to the fact that we had received a message and decoded it from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington directing him to put this Japanese reply in the safe when he received it and wait for further instructions on delivery.

Senator FERGUSON. I am familiar with that and I want to call to your attention now on page 238 of these messages, "Re my 844a," from Tokyo to Washington December the 6th—will you read that—indicating that on the night that you [2479] were with Admiral Wilkinson, then Captain Wilkinson, that you knew or expected there would be a delivery time. Will you read that?

General MILES. Yes, sir. Read the whole message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. (Reading:)

The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902b (in English).

This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in 14 parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

That was decoded on the sixth. It indicates very clearly that the message was not to be delivered automatically when received but that the Japanese Ambassador was to keep [2480] it secret until he received further instructions and in the meanwhile, although he had been told that was a very long message, he was to put it in nicely drafted form which should have taken some time.

I submit, sir, that that message would not indicate that the Japanese reply was likely to be delivered to the American government on Sunday the 7th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles, it is a typographical error on page 239 saying that this translation was 1/26/41. It was 12/6/41.

General MILES. That is what I have testified, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you know what time this message was translated on the 6th?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you know of it?

General MILES. My impression is very strong that I knew of that message on the evening of December 6. I certainly knew it—

Senator FERGUSON. Before you went home?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you what arrangement was made at the Army for the receipt of the fourteenth part? Isn't it true they stayed up all night to get this and got it some time early in the morning and translated it?

[2481] General MILES. I believe that is true, sir, but I can not testify as to the mechanics of handling that message.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, who delivered the message to you at the Wilkinson home?

General MILES. No one delivered the message to me at the Wilkinson home.

Senator FERGUSON. Who delivered it to Wilkinson?

General MILES. Commander Kramer of the Navy is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate to you that it at that time was being delivered to the White House and to the Secretary of State because they were in charge of that delivery?

General MILES. The Navy was in charge of delivering it to the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

General MILES. We were in charge of delivering it to the Secretary of State, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not it was delivered that night to the Secretary of State? Did you know that?

General MILES. I called Colonel Bratton and I am sure that I asked him what was the place of delivery of those messages.

[2482] Senator FERGUSON. What did he tell you that night?

General MILES. I do not remember, sir, exactly what he told me but he satisfied me that the messages were being delivered or would be delivered early the next morning when the complete message was in.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that the Navy was delivering 13 parts and you in charge of the delivery of the 13 parts to the Army decided with Bratton that you would not deliver those 13 parts until morning, is that correct?

General MILES. I do not remember, sir, exactly what was decided between Colonel Bratton and myself that night. I called him for the purpose of—

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you call him?

General MILES. May I finish, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I called him for the purpose of finding out what had been done, what was going to be done with these first 13 parts, but I wish to call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the first 13 parts as such was not of great military significance. We had already discounted through many days the fact that in all probability the Japanese reply to our note of November 26 would be unfavorable and that was all that the first 13 parts [2483] told us. When we got the fourteenth part we saw quite a different picture, when we got the 1 p. m. message we saw quite a different picture, but there was no reason for alerting or waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of December 6 that I could see.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, is it your opinion now that you told Bratton it would be all right to wait and deliver the remaining sections in the morning?

General MILES. I think that is probably what happened, sir. When the total message was in he was to see that it was promptly delivered, but I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your best judgment at the present time?

General MILES. Yes, sir; that is my best recollection at the present time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did Wilkinson call Admiral Stark that evening when you were at his home?

General MILES. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss with Wilkinson about calling Admiral Stark?

General MILES. Not that I remember, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see Admiral Wilkinson, then Captain Wilkinson, on the morning of the 7th?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not.

[2484] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the message was going to Hawaii on the 7th, that is, the message of the 7th, by commercial radio?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not discussed, as far as you were concerned?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read certain parts of the 13- or 14-part message and see whether or not it did not indicate what the fourteenth part would be. Page 240 [reading]:

While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

Will you see on page 240? I am reading the last sentence out of the one part, part 2 it is. It starts out [reading]:

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavors toward the stabilization [2485] of East Asia,

and so forth.

Was that significant to you, those sentences, or the change of tone of these messages?

General MILES. It signified to me that this Japanese reply was unfavorable and it was going to be unfavorable, just as we had rather expected that it would be, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the part 2, then, carried out just what you had in mind, that the negotiations would end, is that correct?

General MILES. There is no clear indication that I can see in the first 13 parts that the negotiations as such are definitely ruptured. That comes in the fourteenth part. The 13 parts, as I see them, Senator, are a rehash of Japanese arguments which they have put up in this negotiation time and time again, ending with the conclusion that they could not accept our message of November 26 as a basis of negotiation. That did not mean even that they were going to rupture the conference per se, although it indicated that it probably would.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know at the time of the delivery of the message of the 26th that Japan had treated it as an ultimatum and said that the negotiations were de facto broken off?

General MILES. Yes, sir; we knew that Japan was, or [2486] certain Japanese officials regarded our message of November 26 as a last word or ultimatum in the diplomatic negotiations in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you personally try to reach General Marshall on the morning of the 7th before he went to his office?

General MILES. I did, sir, through Colonel Bratton.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

General MILES. I did, sir, through Colonel Bratton.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us your conversation with Colonel Bratton in relation to trying to reach General Marshall and what did he say to you?

General MILES. Again I would like to refer, sir, to my memorandum which I wrote.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you prepare that memorandum?

General MILES. I prepared this part of the memorandum, Senator, last week. I thought for a moment that you were referring to something that was contained in my memorandum of December 15, 1941, but I was wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you prepare a memorandum with Colonel Bratton on the 10th of December 1941?

General MILES. I prepared a memorandum which I read over to the Chief of Staff on the 15th.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Did you [2487] prepare with Colonel Bratton or for him a memorandum on the 10th of December 1941?

Senator LUCAS. On what?

Senator FERGUSON. Any kind of a memorandum, the one that he testified from later.

General MILES. I do not recall it at this time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Bratton says on page 80 of Top Secret (B) [reading]:

Colonel BRATTON. On or about the 10th of December 1941 I would say, sir, that was prepared by General Miles with my assistance as a memorandum for the record of what happened.

What memorandum was that?

General MILES. I think that is the memorandum which I read into the record of December 15, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You haven't clearly identified the paper you are reading from.

Senator FERGUSON. I identified it as Top Secret Testimony (B), page 80.

Mr. MURPHY. That is better.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that that is——

General MILES. I remember only one memorandum written [2488] at that time and that was the one written at the specific request of the Chief of Staff for a memorandum of my recollection of what had happened in his office on the 7th of December and that has been written into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you just refresh your memory on when the so-called pilot message or the one saying that it would have a delivery time coming, that it came in on the morning of the 6th? You indicated you did not know about that message until the evening of the 6th.

Mr. GESELL. No; he did not say that.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you—now, is counsel telling the witness what he did say or are you trying to tell me?

Mr. GESELL. I am trying to tell you, Senator, that he did not testify.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, why don't you come and tell me?

General MILES. Senator, I think personally——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment until I get counsel straightened out. What does counsel want to tell me?

Mr. GESELL. I want to tell you that my recollection is that General Miles did not testify that he saw the 1 o'clock message, or that it came in on the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. Now, I am talking about the [2489] pilot message, the one that indicated there would be a delivery time. If counsel had been listening he would have got that from the question.

General MILES. May I answer, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, you understand the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead and answer the question. Please do.

[2490] General MILES. I cannot identify the hour in which I saw that pilot message. I believe that I saw it on the afternoon of Saturday, the 6th, or I may have seen it on the morning of Sunday, the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now when you were with Admiral Wilkinson on the night of the 6th, at his dinner, you mean to tell the committee

you did not know there was to be a time for the delivery of this message coming in in 14 parts?

General MILES. I do not remember whether I knew it at that time or whether I did not know it until the morning of the 7th. I think I knew it on the afternoon of the 6th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The pilot message tells you that it will be in 14 parts, isn't that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you knew on the evening, the night of the 6th, that there was only one remaining part to come in?

General MILES. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you and Admiral Wilkinson discuss that at all, that there would be only one more part coming in?

General MILES. I do not remember any discussion of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you go home that night, do you recall?

[2491] General MILES. I think I left Admiral Wilkinson's house between 10:30 and 11, probably nearer 10:30.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you communicate with Wilkinson after 10:30 until after the attack?

General MILES. No, sir, I do not remember to have done so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, there was no collaboration between your office and the Navy in relation to this 14-point message or this 1 o'clock delivery time?

General MILES. So far as I can remember there was not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Board was not functioning at that time?

General MILES. The what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The Board that Congressman Murphy talked about yesterday.

General MILES. The Joint Intelligence Committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that you did not confer with the Navy on this important matter? You were the Intelligence officer and Wilkinson was the Intelligence officer and, as I understand it, Intelligence is to anticipate what the enemy is going to do. Now how do you account for the fact that you and Wilkinson did not confer [2492] on this important matter, which could indicate what the enemy was going to do?

General MILES. I do not remember to have conferred with Admiral Wilkinson probably because I saw no particular reason. I wanted to confer definitely with the Army authorities, the Chief of Staff and Chief of War Plans Division and get a warning message out.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you do to get in touch with the War Plans Division on Sunday or Saturday night?

General MILES. I testified, sir, it was my recollection that either I or Colonel Bratton did call up General Gerow that morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you reach him?

General MILES. I remember very definitely that it was my desire to have this conference as soon as possible with General Marshall and General Gerow.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you reach Gerow before you went to General Marshall's office?

General MILES. Either Colonel Bratton or I, whoever telephoned him, did reach General Gerow before we went in to see General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did reach him?

General MILES. We did reach him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to him about this message?

[2493] General MILES. No, sir, we were not talking over the public telephone about this message.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MILES. I think if I personally talked to General Gerow I probably said, "G, we have got something important. Will you come down to your office?"

Senator FERGUSON. Down to his office? Is that what you say?

General MILES. To his office; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did he come to his office and did you meet him there?

General MILES. General Gerow, I have every reason to believe, did go to his office. I did not actually meet him in his office, I first met him in General Marshall's office.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attempt to meet General Gerow in his office?

General MILES. I do not remember to have done so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you at General Marshall's office before General Gerow came in?

General MILES. I was, sir, as far as I remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you had no conversation whatever with the War Plans Division about this message prior to going into General Marshall's office?

General MILES. That is my recollection, sir.

[2494] Senator FERGUSON. They would be in control of putting war plans into effect, would they not?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they have any exact knowledge of this message prior to going into General Marshall's office?

General MILES. Well, General Gerow was on the list of those who were to receive these magic messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he received this magic message on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th, or did he have it at all prior to the time that you met him in General Marshall's office?

General MILES. My recollection is I knew at that time that he had received the magic messages before going to General Marshall's office. I do not believe that he received them on the night of December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be due to the fact that you had discussed with Bratton the fact that it would not be important to deliver those messages on the night of the 6th?

General MILES. Presumably; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I want to take up the subject in relation to the British Intelligence. You knew, did you not, that the British were intercepting and decoding the Jap messages the same as you were?

General MILES. I did, sir.

[2495] Senator FERGUSON. And when did you first learn that the British were decoding these messages?

General MILES. I think it was sometime in January of 1941 that they were given the means of decoding these messages.

Senator FERGUSON. And after December 1941 the British, in your opinion, had access to all of the so-called magic messages; is that true?

General MILES. All that they could intercept; yes, sir. I do not remember whether they always had the same messages that we had.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you have a committee with the British on this question?

General MILES. Did I have what?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a committee, or board, liaison, or joint committee between the British and the Americans on this question of intercepting these messages, or did you just give them the means of intercepting? You told us you gave them the means of intercepting and decoding.

General MILES. We gave them the means of intercepting, and I also had some discussions during that year 1941 with the British military attaché and Canadian military attaché, because certain of these messages were being intercepted by Canada, but not any other part of the British Empire. The Canadians did not have the means of breaking them nor did they [2496] know anything about the technical details of decoding. We were very anxious, however, to get from them any messages that they could pick up out of the air which, for any reason, we could not or the British could not.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was the means of the so-called tracking the code, so far as the British were concerned; was it in London?

General MILES. I believe it was in London, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not they have a means of picking it up in Singapore?

General MILES. I imagine they did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You just imagine it. Don't you know it as an intelligence officer?

General MILES. I know nothing now. I might have at the time, but I know nothing now about the details of where the British intercepting stations were, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now after you gave them the means of decoding and intercepting and getting the information in January, 1941, did you ever get from the British any information that they obtained from Japan by means of decoding?

General MILES. I cannot answer that question, Senator, offhand. I would have to look up the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Why cannot you answer?

General MILES. Because my memory is not sufficiently good [2497] to allow me to say "yes" or "no".

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any files of any memoranda or any evidence that you have received information from the British?

General MILES. I doubt if we made those matters a matter of record. The whole question was treated with great secrecy, and these conversations I spoke of between the British and Canadian Military Attaché and myself were always verbal conversations, not reduced to writing.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not what I am talking about. I want to know, after you gave Britain the means of getting these communications, decoding the messages, receiving the messages, whether or not they ever gave you any of the evidence, as intelligence officer, that they received? That is a clear question, isn't it?

General MILES. It is a very clear question, Senator. I wish my memory were sufficiently clear to enable me to give you a clear answer. Unfortunately it is not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you told us yesterday that Congress would not give to the Army enough money for intelligence work, and you told us about the money, as I recall, that England was spending, that it had a much bigger staff, and so forth.

That is true, isn't it?

General MILES. On the secret service; yes, sir.

[2498] Senator FERGUSON. And you delivered to them—that is, our Government, delivered to them the means of decoding these messages and after we gave them the means in January 1941, we never received any information from them until we were struck at Pearl Harbor? Is that what you want to tell this committee?

General MILES. No, sir; that is not what I want to tell this committee.

[2499] Senator FERGUSON. What do you want to tell the committee?

General MILES. I want to tell the committee that I cannot answer your question from my memory, Senator. I would, if you like, attempt to find the records, or other means of arriving at an answer to that question, but I would not do it purely from memory.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel, have we any files given to us by the Army showing that Britain did give us this intelligence service, that we enabled them to get, or cooperate with us in giving us what they received so we could compare it with what we received?

Mr. GESELL. We have no information, Senator, as to whether the British did or did not give us any results of their interceptions of magic. We can inquire about that if you wish.

Senator FERGUSON. Now going back to General Miles, where do you think, General, that you will find information as to whether or not the British were giving up this intelligence?

General MILES. I should look into the records of the far eastern section of the Military Intelligence Division and also in the SIS, the Signal Corps.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any other agency [2500] was getting this information? Have you ever heard of any other agency getting it? Now, I am talking about agencies such as the Secretary of State, the White House, executive branch, the Navy the Air Corps, the FBI.

General MILES. No, sir; I do not remember ever having heard of any other branch or division of the Government receiving such information.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will ask you why we gave this means to the British if it was not to help us, if that was not one of the purposes.

General MILES. Senator, you phrase one of your questions "The United States Government gave this means," and you phrase the several others that I gave this means. I prefer the former one. I did not personally give the means, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Explain how it got there. You were the intelligence officer, and I assume you had full control and full knowledge of all intelligence. Is that correct?

General MILES. I did not have any control whatever over the SIS of the Signal Corps, from which these means were found when it was decided to give them to the British Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the SIS, the Signal Corps, would not be interested in looking over all of the [2501] intelligence, analyzing it, and determining what it means, would it?

General MILES. No, sir; that was the function of Military Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was your function?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you would be interested, and not SIS, in what the British were giving to us, in what messages they picked up; isn't that correct?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you now have absolutely no memory of ever receiving any information from the British?

General MILES. I have no recollection of any specific information we received from the British, coming from magic.

Senator FERGUSON. But you will look that up. Can you do that at noon, General? Can you do that at noon so I can have it?

General MILES. I doubt very much that I can get an answer during the noon hour, but I will try, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Bratton is sitting right behind you, so you can confer with him, and so we can go into this matter.

General MILES. Do you wish me to confer with him now, sir?

[2502] Senator FERGUSON. No. We only have 5 minutes, and after that you can confer with him.

General MILES. Very well, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to go into what means of intercepting we had on the Philippines. As an intelligence officer, do you know what means of intercepting we had on the Philippines?

General MILES. I think I knew that we had a radio station capable of intercepting wireless in the Philippines. I am pretty sure of that, but that again did not come under my responsibility of jurisdiction.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that in the Philippines they had a means of decoding these diplomatic messages?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you now be surprised to learn that they did have that means and gave all the messages to General MacArthur?

General MILES. I would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how could you evaluate what General MacArthur knew unless you knew what he was receiving? Tell us, as an intelligence officer, how you could evaluate that unless you knew what he was receiving?

General MILES. I knew what he was receiving from us. I thought that he was not receiving any magic directly from [2503] any facilities that we had available in the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if I told you from the Hewitt report—

General MILES. From the what?

Senator FERGUSON. From the Hewitt report. Did you ever hear from the Hewitt report?

General MILES. Admiral Hewitt; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. If I tell you that he was giving these messages, would that make any difference in your testimony?

General MILES. It would make no difference in my testimony, sir. I am testifying and have been testifying to what I remember, and what I thought I knew at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. This will be along the line of cooperation—

Mr. MURPHY (interposing). Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You have in your files there an affidavit from General MacArthur, himself, as to what he received.

Senator FERGUSON. And I have testimony before me showing what he did receive.

Mr. MURPHY. The affidavit is in the Clausen report, which you have.

Senator FERGUSON. I have other testimony in the Hewitt [2504] Report indicating what he did receive. I will produce it this afternoon.

I want to know whether or not you knew about this message. This is a message of H. R. Stark, OPNAV, November 26, 1941, G. L. Tucker, from the President, for the High Commissioner, Philippines. I will ask you to look at it and see whether you ever knew about it? You were in the Intelligence Branch.

General MILES. Will you pass it over; please, sir?

(The document was handed to General Miles.)

General MILES. I have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch until this moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it into the record? It may refresh your memory.

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair inquire what exhibit this paper appears in?

Mr. GESELL. This is the dispatch that was laid on the committee table this morning, and will be the subject, or part of the testimony of General Gerow when he follows General Miles, and will also be part of the testimony of General Marshall.

[2505] Mr. MURPHY. Part of exhibit 39?

Mr. GESELL. It is not an exhibit as yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it, General?

General MILES (reading):

From: The President.

For: High Commissioner Philippines.

A copy of a dispatch will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart which, with my approval, the CNO and COS addressed to the Senior Army and Navy Commanders in the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrison and naval forces in the mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by U. S. forces. However I am more particularly concerned over increasing opposition of Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming apparent in China, Formosa and Indochina for an early aggressive movement of some character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines. Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I [2506] consider it possible that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur, you shall, in great confidence, present my views

to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people. Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult.

There is apparently no signature.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[2507]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator FERGUSON. You were examining General Miles. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

General MILES. Senator, I am happy to report, sir, that Colonel Bratton has called to my mind a circumstance that enables me to state of my own knowledge that shortly after the British were given the means of deciphering the intercepted Japanese messages the Signal Corps, that is to say, the SIS, arranged with the British a simple code by which we could mutually assure ourselves that both got the same messages. If we failed to get one through that code, the British supplied us with that message, and vice versa.

I am also glad to know from Colonel Bratton that he has much more distinct information, specific information, as to the times of arrival and the sending of telephone messages, and so forth, on the evening of the 6th and the morning of the 7th than I was able to give you and no doubt he will be able to give you that information when he comes before you.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you were over Colonel Bratton at that time? He was under you?

[2508] General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You understood the question?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you learn about our negotiation with the British in relation to the codes? Who told you about the agreement that had been made in January of 1941?

General MILES. Undoubtedly the Signal Corps told me that, sir. I was in close relation at that time with General Maughborne, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, who was principally responsible, I think, for that magnificent work of breaking those codes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that only because of Colonel Bratton's statement to you that you recall that we were getting messages from Bratton?

General MILES. Senator, the matter was a blank in my mind this morning. I was trying to remember. In a few words he recalled something that I now clearly remember. That very often happens I think, sir, after 4 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you examined the book known as exhibit 1?

General MILES. The magic messages?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[2509] Senator FERGUSON. I note that on page 178 that the message that is coming through is 836.

General MILES. Page 178, sir? Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; page 178. Do you have that?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is a message from Tokyo to Washington?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is about the time that we were delivering the message of the 26th, is it not?

General MILES. That was sent on the same day that we delivered the note of the 26th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you will note, there is no other message from Tokyo to Washington in this book until you get to page 185 and the number of the message is 841. Do you have that?

General MILES. 841; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not these numbers were the Japanese numbers or our numbers that are being used on these messages?

General MILES. I understand the number that follows immediately the date is the Japanese number. Our number is to be found at the bottom of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. And apparently they were using consecutive numbers to the messages sent here, is that true? [2510]

General MILES. I imagine that was true; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not we intercepted the messages between 836 and 841?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not know that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I would like to ask, does counsel know whether we did or not?

Mr. MITCHELL. This is not a complete series. It was not intended to be in this book. There are messages that came in, administrative messages, visa messages, messages about shipping Japs home, and things of that kind that we left out of the compilation. They are available.

Senator FERGUSON. My question to counsel is whether those numbers are available?

Mr. MITCHELL. I assume they are.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you check that?

Mr. MITCHELL. We cannot tell till we look it up.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you check that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I will just pass this then for the time being.

Mr. MITCHELL. Between those dates?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; between those numbers, 836 to 841.

[2511] Mr. MITCHELL. All right.¹

Senator FERGUSON. We may have to have this witness back.

I wanted to question you now and bring out that these numbers were Japanese numbers and they indicated that they were sending them in consecutive numbers to the embassy here. Is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct to the best of my knowledge, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you will note that if they sent a message to Honolulu it had another number, did it not? I don't think there is

¹ Included in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1716-1717.

any in this particular book. Is that your recollection whether or not it did have another number?

General MILES. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, getting back to what you knew, and that is what I am interested in, what you knew that General MacArthur knew.

You say that you did not know about the message that I had you read into the record from the President—No—Yes; it is from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippines.

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know whether or not when a message was sent like that from Stark through the Navy if the Army would get it in the Philippines?

[2512] General MILES. From an examination of that message which I have seen only today, I would suppose that that would not be turned over to the Army. It was from the President to a definite High Commissioner. The message does, however, say something about Admiral Hart, but I see nothing to indicate that it would be turned over to the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what it says [reading]:

I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation in the general outline of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of the Philippines.

This message indicated that it was to be taken up with General MacArthur, did it not, before he conferred with the President?

General MILES. It directed the High Commissioner to consult General MacArthur and Admiral Hart before he, the High Commissioner, spoke to the President of the Philippine Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, as an intelligence officer, would you draw the conclusion that General MacArthur had seen this instrument?

General MILES. I should think it very likely that the High Commissioner in discussing the—in giving General Mac- [2513] Arthur some reason for his discussing with General MacArthur the Army data that he was told to discuss, would have shown him a copy of that message from the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether there was close liaison between the Army and Navy and the Philippines?

General MILES. I have every reason to believe there was a close liaison, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I show you this instrument, and ask you to read it.

(The document was handed to General Miles.)

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind identifying that instrument, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Could we have an exhibit number given to it? Will you show it to counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a typed copy of a message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Forces to the Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been filed as an exhibit, or is it a part of any exhibit that has been filed?

Mr. GESELL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was just received through counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Read it.

Mr. MITCHELL. It reads this way:

[2514] Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain Armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From whom to whom?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is from Hart of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, information copy, it says to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of it?

Mr. MITCHELL. December 1941. I do not see a date on it.

Senator FERGUSON. December 7. They strike out the number that is not used, and leave the one that is used.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would not know about that. That identifies the message. Do you want it numbered as an exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 40 is used on that document.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 40.)

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you read it into the record, General?

General MILES. Very well, sir. [Reading exhibit No. 40:]

[2515] Classification: Secret—confidential—restricted.

No indication which one it is.

From: Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

To: OPNAV.

Information: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be from Admiral Hart, would it not? He was the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet?

General MILES. Yes, sir. "To OPNAV."

Senator FERGUSON. That is to whom?

General MILES. To Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral Stark, who was head of the Naval Operations here in Washington?

General MILES. Yes. And for information of Admiral Kimmel of the Pacific Fleet.

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

And at the bottom is "TOP SECRET."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever know about that message?

General MILES. To the best of my knowledge and belief this is the first time I ever saw that message, or heard of it.

[2516] Senator FERGUSON. Would it be material to evaluate the evidence as to what was going on? Would that have been material?

General MILES. Yes, sir; it would have been very material. It would have been checked and found to be correct, if we had made such promises to the British.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to come to that again a little bit later on so that would be an item that was known in the Pacific, and with

close liaison between the two, General MacArthur would have known about that?

General MILES. I should think he would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You assume that he would.

Now, I call to your attention the basic exhibit of dispatches. Has that an exhibit number? Is that exhibit 37?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 37, page 39.

By the way, going back to that other exhibit, the 7th in the Philippines is the 6th here, is it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would assume then that that came in here on the 6th? Is that correct, General?

General MILES. I did not quite hear.

Senator FERGUSON. You would assume it was received here at Washington on the 6th?

[2517] General MILES. It was sent from Manila on the 7th; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be on the 6th here. Have you got page 39 of that exhibit?

General MILES. I have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read that into the record, sir?

General MILES (reading from exhibit No. 37):

TOP SECRET

2 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF.

That is from Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you interpret those? That is from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart?

General MILES. From Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart.

PRESIDENT DIRECTS THAT THE FOLLOWING BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WITHIN TWO DAYS IF POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT THIS DISPATCH. CHARTER 3 SMALL VESSELS TO FORM A "DEFENSIVE INFORMATION PATROL". MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY AS U. S. MEN-OF-WAR ARE COMMAND BY A NAVAL OFFICER AND TO MOUNT A SMALL GUN AND 1 MACHINE GUN WOULD SUFFICE. FILIPINO CREWS MAY BE [2518] EMPLOYED WITH MINIMUM NUMBER NAVAL RATINGS TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE WHICH IS TO OBSERVE AND REPORT BY RADIO JAPANESE MOVEMENTS IN WEST CHINA SEA AND GULF OF SIAM. 1 VESSEL TO BE STATIONED BETWEEN HAINAN AND HUE ONE VESSEL OFF THE INDO-CHINA COAST BETWEEN CAMRANH BAY AND CAPE ST. JAMES AND ONE VESSEL OFF POINTE DE CAMAU. USE OF ISABEL AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT AS ONE OF THE THREE BUT NOT OTHER NAVAL VESSELS. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN TO CARRY OUT PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. AT SAME TIME INFORM ME AS TO WHAT RECONNAISSANCE MEASURES ARE BEING REGULARLY PERFORMED AT SEA BY BOTH ARMY AND NAVY WHETHER BY AIR SURFACE VESSELS OR SUBMARINES AND YOUR OPINION AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE LATTER MEASURES.

Senator FERGUSON. General, did you ever know about that message?

General MILES. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this is the first time I have ever seen that message.

Senator FERGUSON. That indicates that that was sent from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart under the direction of the President?

General MILES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 2d of December 1941?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that message have been of [2519] value to you in the evaluation of your information?

General MILES. It would have informed me that a small reconnaissance patrol was being established as per this dispatch.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not the fact of the source of the instrument be of value to you? Would not that place more value on it than ordinarily?

General MILES. You mean that it came from the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. That would have meant to me simply that the President was very definitely interested in the establishment of this naval patrol.

Senator FERGUSON. And that he must have had certain things in mind, and you can read from the instrument what he had in mind, could you not?

General MILES. That he wished the Navy to pick up, if possible, movements of presumably Japanese ships or convoys in the waters mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you would assume that that went to General MacArthur, would you not?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I would have supposed that the Army and Navy in Manila, Admiral Hart and General MacArthur were maintaining so close liaison that an important message like that from the President would be communicated [2520] from Admiral Hart to General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us analyze it and see whether or not it would have been of value to you.

The first thing was that they were to have "three small vessels to form a defensive information patrol."

Then it says:

Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. Men-of-War.

Now, as an intelligence officer, what would you say that meant?

General MILES. That "minimum requirements" business?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. That was for the protection, undoubtedly, of the personnel, had they been captured by an enemy.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if they had been captured by the enemy, they could not be treated as spies; is that correct? They would have to be treated as prisoners of war?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What does that signify to you?

General MILES. That signifies to me only what we knew at the time, that there was a strong possibility of a clash of arms, or an outbreak of war with Japan in some other [2521] form.

Senator FERGUSON. And this was a message directly from the Commander-in-Chief, the President?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that it says "to mount a small gun and one machine gun would suffice." Would that make it a man-of-war?

General MILES. I am not competent to answer that question, Senator. It is purely a naval question.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us go to the next sentence:

Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio—

that assumes, does it not, that there would be radio on the small boat?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam."

The next one I better read:

1 vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue,—

do we have a Navy man here that can put a map up with these places on it?

Commander BAECHE. We have some Navy men here.

[2522] Senator FERGUSON. We have a Navy man here, but could he handle a map?

Is there anyone here that could get us a map and show us where these places are located?

I would like to get them on record.

Commander BAECHE. We could supply that kind of information.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[2523] Mr. MURPHY. You have already been furnished such a map. It is in your file. It is in the Navy folder.

Senator FERGUSON. Has the Congressman got his map here?

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't mine here.

Mr. MURPHY. I say you have been furnished it. (A map was put on the easel.)

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently it is not on that map. Will you try to place in the record where this vessel would be if stationed between Hainan and Hue? Do you know where that would be?

General MILES. I know the Island of Hainan but I do not know Hue.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be from Hainan over to the Philippines or would it be toward the China coast?

General MILES. I cannot say, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

One vessel off the Indo China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques.

Do you know where that would be?

General MILES. I know Camranh but I don't know Cape S. Jaques.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is Camranh Bay?

General MILES. Camranh Bay, if I remember correctly, is in that bulge of Indochina. Indochina comes out in a distinct [2524] bulge to the eastward and it is right in there. It was the bay that

Admiral Roztrvezvsky took refuge in before the battle with Japan, and also Admiral Dewey before the battle of Manila.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be up in the Gulf of Siam?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice it starts out with "Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam".

General MILES. I think Camranh faces on West China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would the next vessel be? It says, "One vessel off Pointedecamau."

General MILES. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could these vessels be scouting for transports, or Japanese men-of-war coming for the Philippines? How far would these points be from the Philippines?

General MILES. Well, as I remember, sir, quite some distance. It is very difficult to testify without even a map before you, Senator. They are on the other side of the water, the Chinese side.

Senator FERGUSON. How many hundred miles? Do you have any idea?

General MILES. I should guess six or eight hundred miles. That is a pretty wild guess.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't make it too wild.

[2525] Senator FERGUSON. Now it is said in here that the "use of *Isabel*"—that would be the name of a ship, would it not?

General MILES. *Isabel*, as I remember, was a small gunboat.

Senator FERGUSON:

Use of *Isabel* authorized by President as one of the three but not other naval vessels.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what was in mind there, that we could use one naval vessel but the other two were not to be naval vessels?

General MILES. I should imagine that we did not want to reduce Admiral Hart's slim forces by more than the detachment of the *Isabel*.

[2526] Senator FERGUSON. Now the next sentence, "Report measures taken to carry out President's views." Did you ever see a report coming back as to what had been done in relation to this message?

General MILES. I have no recollection of ever having seen such a report, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then going on:

At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea, by both Army and Navy, whether by air, surface vessels or submarines, and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

Did you ever get such a message, as to what reconnaissance was being used at sea, whether by air, by both the Army and Navy? It says:

whether by air, surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

General MILES. I do not remember, Senator, ever having seen any report on the reconnaissance, or types of reconnaissance being conducted by Army and Navy in the Philippines at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now if you were having close liaison between Admiral Wilkinson and yourself, being the opposite, one in the Army

and one in the Navy, how do you account for not getting this original message and not getting the replies, if there were any replies?

[227] General MILES. Senator, I had very close contact with the Office of Naval Intelligence. I had no contact nor was I expected to have any contact with the Office of Naval Operations. I do not ever remember seeing, or being called into any consultation or handling in any way any message to or from Naval Operations. I do not want to appear to—

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to now call attention—

Senator LUCAS. Had you finished, General Miles?

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you had finished, General. Go ahead if you have not.

General MILES. I don't want to appear to avoid any line of questioning, but it might help if I would state frankly now that I did not know, I was not in the group consulted generally, and I think I can say always, as to Naval Operations' messages or deliberations between the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of State or the President. All of those things were above my level, we will say, if you like to put it that way. I was not called into that group at all.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you an affidavit made by General MacArthur.

Would counsel let me have the exhibit—it may not be in an exhibit.

It is the Clausen report, which has an affidavit of [2528] General MacArthur.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Barkley has it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just reading it.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want him to read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the one dated—

Senator FERGUSON. Sometime in 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. May 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Will you read that, General, because I want to ask some questions about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Read it, General, so we can all hear it.

General MILES (reading) :

Top Secret. Affidavit of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says :

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that mean?

[2529] General MILES. United States Army Forces, Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General MILES (reading) :

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B" consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this

intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the [2530] Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.

/s/ DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Sworn to 7th May 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel.

Senator LUCAS. What page of the report is that on?

Mr. MURPHY. 186.

General MILES. 188. No. 186.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how General MacArthur spells his last name?

General MILES. I thought it was "M-a-c".

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way it is signed, is it not?

[2531] General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, at the top how is it spelled?

General MILES. "M-c".

Senator FERGUSON. "M-c". Well, at least that would indicate that no one in MacArthur's headquarters prepared that affidavit, wouldn't it?

General MILES. That was prepared, undoubtedly, by Colonel Clausen.

Senator FERGUSON. Who didn't know how to spell MacArthur's name?

General MILES. I would say that was it.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take up some things in that exhibit.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B" consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages.

Do you know what they are?

I would like to have you keep that affidavit.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that was?

General MILES. It was a collection of the magic messages, as I remember it, which was called "Exhibit B."

[2532] Senator FERGUSON. Was it all of the messages now in exhibit 1?

General MILES. That I cannot say, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is an "ultra" message?

General MILES. What is a what message?

Senator FERGUSON. "Ultra"?

General MILES. Ultra is the same thing as—it is another word for "magic" or "top secret" as applied to these intercepted messages.

Senator FERGUSON. In that paragraph, the last line is:

I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters U. S. A. F. F. E.

What would that mean to you?

General MILES. That would mean, sir, he saw all of these Japanese intercepts decoded by Navy which were turned over to his headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you any knowledge as to how many were turned over to his headquarters?

General MILES. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. But it would indicate that he had certain things turned over to him from the so-called magic messages; is that right?

General MILES. It would.

[2533] Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether the same thing was turned over to General Short at Hawaii?

General MILES. To the best of my knowledge and belief there was no decrypting and decoding units set up in Hawaii by either Army or Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we take this to be true, that if General MacArthur was getting the purple or ultra code messages, the magic, in the Philippines, and General Short was not getting them on the Hawaiian Islands, at Pearl Harbor, they were getting different information?

General MILES. Yes, sir. That is true. It would also apply to General Andrews in Panama and General DeWitt on the west coast.

Senator FERGUSON. We come to the next sentence:

I have not previously seen the British S. I. S. message dated 27 November 1941, and 3 December 1941.

What is that?

General MILES. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any idea?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give me any idea who would know, so we can ask counsel to get it?

Mr. GESELL. If I may interpose, Senator, those are exhibits in the Clausen report.

[2534] Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel later on point those out to me?

Mr. GESELL. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you do it now?

Mr. GESELL. I thought you said later on. I will have to get it.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it now because it may be material.

Mr. GESELL. It is in the exhibits, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. What exhibit is that?

Mr. GESELL. Well, the Clausen report has 12 exhibits, 12 bound volumes of exhibits, which are not here before the committee now. This is only the report itself, that General Miles has in his hands.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next sentence:

I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons in Honolulu T. H.

Do you know why such a question would be asked of General MacArthur?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Coming down to the next sentence:

The Signal Intelligence Service—

is that your service?

[2535] That is SIS?

General MILES. That is SIS.

Senator FERGUSON. Transmitters and receivers of the messages.

General MILES. And decoded and decrypted in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before the 7 December 1941.

The next one—Do you know when that station was opened?

General MILES. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was that station used to collect intelligence for you?

General MILES. It was used to collect intelligence for the Signal Intelligence Service which later on transmitted it.

Senator FERGUSON. To you?

General MILES. To me, when decoded and decrypted. It had nothing to do with my department until it came to me in plain English.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't the source of material be material to you in evaluating material?

General MILES. No, sir; whether a message was picked up in Manila or in the State of Washington out of the air [2536] would have had no particular significance to me.

Senator FERGUSON. That wouldn't have been of any value to you at all?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just to give you an example, one of those small radio boats that was put out, as we find at least was ordered out, suppose that kind of a short-wave message had been transmitted and it had only a certain radius and would be picked up at the Philippines. Wouldn't that be an indication as to its value, where it was coming from, rather than coming out over a long-range radio?

General MILES. Well, I imagine that there would be some indication if it were picked up in the Philippines and not picked up on the west coast that it emanated from some station not powerful enough to cross the Atlantic, but the message itself when translated into English by the S. I. S. would have been the significant thing to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't also the place where it was sent out and its radius have something to do with its purpose, its value, in other words?

General MILES. I can't imagine a situation in which the station, the location of the station that intercepted a message coming over the air, would have been of any particular value in analyzing that message from the point of view [2537] of military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next :

Diplomatic messages in purple code,—

and I assume, and is it correctly assumed, that all in exhibit 1 are purple-code messages, or is that not a correct assumption?

General MILES. That is my impression, but I am not sure of it. That is a technical question for the SIS.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now the code used to send the most important messages from Japan was the purple code; is that correct?

General MILES. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, those messages, and they would be diplomatic messages would they?

General MILES. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would they be military and naval messages also?

General MILES. I imagine they would be in certain circumstances, but I do not know these different codes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, those picked up by the Army, it appears, were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to headquarters. USAFFE. It would indicate that the Army headquarters was getting the purple messages; is that correct?

[2538] General MILES. That is the inference from this statement; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know.

I want to ask you there whether or not there was any system in the Intelligence Office or in the SIS office where a person could later ascertain what message had been sent from one agency, the Army or the Navy to the other. Had you any system that you could check whether a message had been sent or not sent?

General MILES. Here in Washington we did have a system. I am not acquainted with all the details, but I do know that Colonel Bratton is prepared to testify on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would G-2 be in this picture over the Philippines? It would be in the headquarters USAFFE, would it not?

General MILES. I presume so, but that was a matter for decision of General MacArthur. It was his G-2 and not mine.

[2539] Senator FERGUSON. Now, wasn't all of G-2 together, weren't you over all G-2 whether in the field or in Washington?

General MILES. No, sir. I have testified that the G-2's of the overseas departments were staff officers of their commanding generals, selected by them and directly under them.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that the intelligence in the field was not your concern, but the concern of the commanding officer?

General MILES. It was my concern so far as giving information to the field, and giving information to the Chief of Staff from the field,

but I did not directly control the G-2's of the overseas departments, staff officers of the commanding generals thereof.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they inform you as to what they had?

General MILES. They sent us a great deal of information which they got from various sources. I have no recollection of any information coming from the G-2 of the Philippine Department regarding magic.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I come down to the message again in exhibit 37 on page 39.

General MILES. Thirty-nine?

[2540] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is not in there. That is not in the Clausen report. You are not referring to the Clausen report?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what he had in his hand.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I neglected to ask you one or two questions on that Clausen report.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to the 7th of December 1941.

Do you know what messages, what dispatches he was talking about there?

General MILES. I presume, sir, he was talking about General Marshall's dispatch to the overseas department commanders on the 27th of November.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that would have to be taken into account in evaluating with everything else, that MacArthur knew all the other purple messages he had, and all his own Intelligence had; isn't that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir; but it was a message from the Chief of Staff of the Army which gave him a definite [2541] warning, directed him, as I remember it, to do certain things.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming back to certain things, one of them was reconnaissance, was it not?

General MILES. I haven't got the message to General MacArthur before me, but that is my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. He was to use reconnaissance. Will you look at it? I think you will find it at page 9.

General MILES. I have found it.

Senator FERGUSON. It says:

* * * Take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised rainbow five which was delivered to you by General Brereton. Chief of Naval Operations concurs and requests you notify Hart.

So, there was reconnaissance mentioned in that message; is that true?

General MILES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. We go back to the message on page 39 of exhibit 37. This is on the 2d of November 1941.

General MILES. Second of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

It says:

[2542] Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At the same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy, whether by air, surface vessels, or submarine and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

That indicates that the President is anxious to know exactly what reconnaissance is being taken at the Philippines; is that true?

General MILES. I would assume so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was any such message sent to Admiral Kimmel or General Short?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't the message of December 2 directed to all those sea areas that you couldn't find on the map and which were far distant from the Philippines? Not only to the Philippines, but up and down the coast down to Indochina?

Senator FERGUSON. What did we have at the places mentioned by the Congressman?

General MILES. What do we have there?

Senator FERGUSON. He mentioned other places.

Mr. MURPHY. Talking about the sea.

General MILES. You mean Camranh and Hainan Islands?

[2543] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I don't think we had anything there.

Senator FERGUSON. So it couldn't be sent there? This message couldn't be sent to any of those places?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was Admiral Hart at the time?

General MILES. Where was Admiral Hart?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. On the 2d of December 1941?

General MILES. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account at all for the fact that you didn't get this information that was sent out on the 2d of December 1941, on page 39 of exhibit 37?

General MILES. Yes, sir. I think I have already accounted for it by my statement that I was not in that channel of command or concentration, whatever you would like to call it. I don't remember ever having been consulted or informed of, directly, any naval operation message or any Presidential message.

Senator FERGUSON. I find among your evaluations, on December 1, that you gave an evaluation of this whole situation, the Far East, on December 1, 1941. You recall that, or is it December 5? It is a supplemental brief periodic [2544] estimate of the situation on December 1, 1941, to March 4, 1942.

General MILES. Yes, sir. I have that before me.

Senator FERGUSON. Numbers 27 and 28 in exhibit 33?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you evaluate the intelligence without being in this circle you talk about and not know what was going on there? For instance, not getting the reply back as to the air reconnaissance at the Philippines?

General MILES. I had to depend on other sources of information, perhaps not so good in many cases. That was why I particularly, sup-

ported by my naval colleague, naval intelligence, was trying to integrate our activities and those of the joint Army-Navy Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know why specific reconnaissance, such as these three small men-of-war was being taken at the Philippines, and not taken—similar action was not being taken at Hawaii?

General MILES. I do not know but I would suppose that the action taken from the Philippines was directed primarily to the observation of the Japanese shipping of various sorts, military and commercial down the China seas. No such movement was obtainable or going on at the time in the vicinity [2545] of the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion was not the Vacant Sea and the space north of Hawaii just as important an area as the one over along the China coast and the Gulf of Siam? Talking about your opinion now, as an expert.

General MILES. Yes, sir; I think it was, but it was a great deal harder to cover.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not consulted as to what should take place in those areas? That was above your range?

General MILES. About the reconnaissance in the China Sea?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the one in the Vacant Sea, you were not consulted as to what reconnaissance should be taken?

General MILES. I know nothing of any reconnaissance in the Vacant Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to go to the Hewitt testimony. It is in the Hewitt testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. What page, and volume? There are three volumes.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 88-C.

Corregidor had liaison with the British unit at [2546] Singapore, and everything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington.

Did you know that fact, that it first went to Corregidor and then later came here?

General MILES. From what source, sir? From the British?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it says:

Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and everything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington—

General MILES. Well, we had a Colonel Brink—

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

In like manner, any translation of particular importance to the commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet was sent out from Washington.

In other words, Admiral Hart had two means of getting his information, one was from Washington, the other from Singapore, Corregidor to Hart. As I understand it, Kimmel had one means and that was Washington to Kimmel. Is that correct?

General MILES. Senator, I am not prepared to testify nor am I competent to testify on these naval-communications arrangements.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to find out, General, is how much knowledge you had, you being the top and the [2547] head of our Intelligence Branch in the Army—

General MILES. Yes, but—

Senator FERGUSON. We had no source higher than you in the Army, had we, for Intelligence?

General MILES. I was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the War Department.

[2548] Senator FERGUSON. The highest man in the Intelligence.

General MILES. In the Army?

Senator FERGUSON. In the Army.

Now, the function of the Army was to defend the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?

General MILES. Defend that naval base at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet would have occupied the naval base, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the purpose of Intelligence is to anticipate what an enemy or prospective enemy is going to do; that is its very purpose?

General MILES. That is our ultimate, ideal purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would anyone else have knowledge in a higher position than you, that could give us what knowledge was known by the Intelligence branch of the Army? Is there anybody above you in the Intelligence branch? It went from you to General Marshall?

General MILES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you understand that there were consultations between people in a higher level on this Intelligence?

General MILES. There may have been. There were certainly consultations on a higher level than I occupied.

Senator FERGUSON. It involved evaluations of Intelligence?

Senator LUCAS. Let the General finish his answers.

[2549] Senator FERGUSON. I mean to. Any time you haven't finished your answer, just say so.

Senator LUCAS. Counsel continues to break in about the time the General has his mouth open.

General MILES. May I have the question again?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General MILES. I imagine it did. Certainly action was taken on the information that Intelligence supplied.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this higher level have certain intelligence that you did not have? For instance, I take it the reply to the instrument on page 39 of exhibit 37, which was the reconnaissance being taken at the Philippines, and the effectiveness of the measures.

General MILES. Yes, sir. I never saw the answer to that request.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if those answers came back this higher level that you are speaking about would have different facts to evaluate than you had?

General MILES. That is true, sir. It was true not only of information coming from the Philippines but information here in Washington. I did not know, never did know, what the Secretary of State or the President was saying to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you examine all the diplomatic [2550] messages so that you would have and know what this higher level knew? These diplomatic messages that we were intercepting?

General MILES. I examined all the intercepted messages that were

sent to me. In other words, all of the important messages that we intercepted from the Japanese. I knew a good deal of what was going on in this diplomatic conference. I knew also from my liaison with the State Department additional information about that diplomatic conference. I knew there was a great deal of information in the higher level that I did not get.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, did you know what messages we were sending out in our diplomatic relations with the Far East?

General MILES. Generally speaking not. Only if they were given to my liaison officers in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you how you could evaluate the Japanese messages in reply and the memorandums sent by the Japs if you didn't know what they were replying to and what the original message was. How can you possibly evaluate?

General MILES. Well, generally I knew the important messages. I certainly knew the substance of our note of November 26.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't it take knowledge of more than the substance of that note to realize its significance?

[2551] General MILES. Well, I think I also knew, I am pretty sure I also knew, from my liaison officer in the State Department, what certain officials of the State Department thought of the chances of acceptance of that note.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when you were giving your testimony on page 113, question No. 82 on page 112—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pages 112 and 113 of what?

Senator FERGUSON. Secret, No. 2, Army Pearl Harbor Board, testimony of General Miles. [Reading:]

General, when in your opinion did it become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?

This is your reply:

General MILES. On the 27th of November when we learned that we had practically given what might have been considered and probably would be considered by them an ultimatum to them. From then on I considered war as very probable if not inevitable.

General MILES. Senator, that testimony should be changed to "if not ultimately inevitable."

Senator FERGUSON. That is a correction there?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "If not ultimately inevitable."

General MILES. May I also call your attention to the succeeding page, and I would like to read my statement there.

[2552] Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read the one that I read the way it should be read.

General MILES (reading).

General MILES.—

Senator FERGUSON. There are no corrections here, but as I understand it at the end you made many corrections?

General MILES. I made quite a few corrections, largely typographical errors.

Senator FERGUSON. So that accounts for this mistake here?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the page it is just as I read it, is it not?

General MILES. On page 113 it reads:

On the 27th of November when I learned we had practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by them an ultimatum, from then I considered war as very probable if not ultimately inevitable.

Then I wasn't satisfied with that answer and you will find on page 114 of the same testimony:

I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27—

Senator FERGUSON. Wait, General. That isn't the way [2553] it is written here.

General MILES. I know. It is corrected here.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it first how it is on the page and then tell me how it was corrected later.

Let me clear something up.

[2554] Do I understand that you were given your testimony by the Army Board so that you could make corrections some time later?

General MILES. I was given my testimony by the Army Board almost immediately on my return from Boston, at my appearance down here before the Army Board. Whatever corrections were made I made in my own handwriting in ink and forwarded it by covering letter to General Grunert, and I understand those corrections were accepted.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is this true, then, that what I read was the way you gave it first and then you corrected it some days later?

General MILES. It was the way the stenographer took it down, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

General MILES. I am not at all sure it was the way I gave it.

Senator FERGUSON. Very well.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed now, General, with your original answer.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to read first the way the stenographer had it in the record and then the way you corrected it.

General MILES. You wish me to do that, sir?

[2555] Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I want to see the correction.

General MILES. Very well. [Reading:]

I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer there.

Correction. Crossing out the word "there" and amaking it much more understandable, my answer regarding inevitable war. I continue. [Reading:]

I did not want to give.

I corrected it to say:

I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27th war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely—

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. That is not the way it is in my sheet.

General MILES. Well, I am noting each correction that I made, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you first read it the way it is?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed to read it, General, and the Senator can follow and try to get the differences as they appear.

General MILES. All the corrections are in red pencil, sir, and I am reading the English as it was sent to me by the Board.

[2556] Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Do I understand then the Chair will not permit the witness to answer the question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Chair is holding that the witness, in the Chair's opinion, is trying his best to answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, is the question clear? I would like to have it read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If the witness has a different text from what the Senator has, why, the witness will have to be supplied with the text the Senator has.

Senator FERGUSON. I give you the text that I have and ask you to read it the way the stenographer has transcribed it and then give us the way you corrected it.

General MILES (reading):

General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer there. I did not want to give the impression that I thought war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely an action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once; that that, necessarily, would be an overt and open attack on the United States. I did not feel at all sure that war with Japan was practically inevitable at any time—

note the contradiction, please, in those two sentences—

but there were [2557] a good many things Japan could have done if she did break those negotiations short of open war with the United States and we were considering all of these matters.

My corrected statement is as follows:

General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely some action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once but that need not necessarily be an overt and open attack on the United States. I did not feel at all sure that war with Japan was immediately inevitable at any time. There were a good many things Japan could have done if she broke her negotiations in Washington short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all of those possibilities.

Senator, you will please notice that in your version there is a direct contradiction between two sentences. I picked that up immediately and corrected it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, from the information that you had did you ever come to the conclusion prior to the attack—I am talking about any time prior to the at- [2558] tack, prior to notice to you of the attack, prior to that time that war was inevitable with Japan?

General MILES. No, sir. "Inevitable" precludes any other alternative as I understand the word and in that sense I never regarded war as inevitable until I knew that war was on.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, getting back just for a moment where we were before, on the information known by the higher levels.

I want to call your attention to another instrument given to me this morning, dated November 27, 1941.

Does counsel have another copy he could give the witness?

Mr. MITCHELL. What is it?

Senator FERGUSON. It was given to me by counsel this morning, I would like to have the record show.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, here is a copy for the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a memorandum of November 27, 1941, "stamped notation: November 28, 1941 Noted—Chief of Staff (WBS—handwritten)."

Do you see what I am reading from?

General MILES. I think it is William Bedell Smith, but I am not sure, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position with the Army [2559] at that time, on the 27th of November 1941?

General MILES. He was Secretary of the General Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is: "Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff (WBS—handwritten)." What is that?

General MILES. I think that is the same, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So he signed it for General Marshall and signed it for himself as Deputy Chief of Staff, is that correct? He signed it in two capacities?

General MILES. He did not sign for himself at all that I can see, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, "Deputy Chief of Staff." Who is Deputy Chief of Staff?

General MILES. General Bryden, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Right under that is "WBS—handwritten." What is that?

General MILES. I think, sir, that is the initials of General Bedell Smith.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he signed for himself and signed for General Bryden, is that correct—or signed for General Marshall?

General MILES. For General Marshall and General Bryden.

Senator FERGUSON. For General Marshall and General Bryden, is that correct?

[2560] General MILES. That is apparently correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that something that you have a copy of?

Senator FERGUSON. You have received it this morning.

Mr. GESELL. We delivered it this morning in anticipation of General Gerow's testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

That is General Marshall, is it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 A. M., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present.

This is signed by L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. He was in War Plans, was he not?

General MILES. Yes, sir. He was Chief of War Plans.

Senator FERGUSON. He was Chief of War Plans. The Secretary of War was Mr. Stimson at the time, was he not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

[2561] General Bryden was present.

Now, you say he was Deputy Chief of Staff?

General MILES. General Bryden was Deputy Chief of Staff; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading).

The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

What is that instrument? I will not try to identify it. You identify it. [Reading from the letter:]

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

What is that message?

General MILES. I presume it is the message on page 5 of this exhibit 32, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is the Senator satisfied on that identification or can counsel help?

Mr. GESELL. You will note, Senator, that that message, while a Navy message, says: "Addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas" in the body of the text, making it a joint message and it bears the date November 24, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, we have identified that. Going on with the letter (reading):

[2562] I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting.

What is that, General?

General MILES. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see it?

General MILES. I cannot identify it, Senator. I was not at that meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. And now, reading it, you cannot identify it?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, continuing reading:

He—

meaning the Secretary of War—

He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Mr. GESELL. You left out a sentence, didn't you, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I beg your pardon. Yes; I left out a sentence. [Reading:]

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.

I will read that over so the record will be straight. [2563] Strike the other out. [Reading:]

Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Did you ever have that knowledge?

General MILES. Did I have what?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have that knowledge that the President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines?

General MILES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted in relation to that at all, to give them what intelligence you had; what information you had?

General MILES. I have no recollection of any such consultation, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it goes on:

Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and, to Mr. Sayre were discussed.

Who was Mr. Sayre at the time?

[2564] General MILES. He was the High Commissioner in the Philippines, I believe, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would that indicate that what they were discussing was this instrument which you read right before the noon recess, the one from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippines?

General MILES. It would so indicate, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON (reading).

A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached).

May I ask, counsel, if there was a copy attached to this when we received it, having that joint message?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; I think that is the joint message printed in Exhibit 32, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. On what page?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 5.

Mr. GESELL. No; not page 5. The one of November 27 to MacArthur, which is a joint message, telling him to inform Hart.

Senator FERGUSON. So we get the right page. Page 9, is it not?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; I believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. So it is joint between MacArthur and Hart?

[2565] Mr. GESELL. The last two words are, "Notify Hart."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That makes it joint with MacArthur and Hart?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with that message?

General MILES. I was not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that message was signed by General Marshall. Do you see that on the bottom of it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were not consulted prior to the 7th about that message?

General MILES. I was not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have knowledge of it prior to the 7th?

General MILES. I did, sir. I had knowledge of the substance of the warning messages which were sent out to all of the overseas departments and the west coast.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had not seen the messages; you just had their substance?

General MILES. So far as I can remember, I did not, as I stated in my memorandum of January 30 of the following year, 1942, remember seeing an actual text of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you know that on the 27th of November that General Marshall was not in Washington?

[2566] General MILES. I probably did at the time. I remember very well that he was not in Washington on the 28th.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it just the opposite, that he returned on the 28th and that he was not here on the 27th? Does that refresh your memory?

General MILES. I think not, sir, because he was not here when we were discussing the Arnold antisabotage messages on the 28th. That was the reason that General Bryden presided at the conference.

Senator FERGUSON (reading on):

The Secretaries—

I take it that means the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy—were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President.

Now, what memorandum are they referring to there?

General MILES. I have seen recently a copy of a memorandum that I think that refers to.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I show you exhibit 17. Do you have it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, does that refresh your memory?

General MILES. Exhibit 17 is apparently the memorandum referred to in General Gerow's memorandum of the 27th.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever seen it?

[2567] General MILES. I have no recollection of having seen it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not certain recommendations were made in it?

General MILES. Yes, sir; three recommendations appear at the bottom of it.

Senator FERGUSON. What are the recommendations made?

General MILES. Do you wish me to read it, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES (reading):

It is recommended that:

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get knowledge of that paper, of those facts? [2568]

General MILES. To the best of my belief, Senator, I got knowledge of this particular paper about a week or ten days ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, reading on from the memorandum:

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.

Do you know anything about that statement?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that General Marshall and Admiral Stark were to prepare a memorandum to the President? That is what is indicated immediately above, is it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the instrument that you read from?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.

[2569] Would you say that that was an indication that the Secretary of War was telling General Marshall and Admiral Stark what they should put in their recommendations or what they should put in their memorandum?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire whose message is this that the General is testifying from?

Senator FERGUSON. It is L. T. Gerow's. I am trying to get him to interpret it as an Intelligence officer and also as to what knowledge he had.

Senator LUCAS. If course, I am not going to make any objection but it does seem to me that General Gerow is about the only individual who can give the committee any real information as to what he had in mind when he gave out that statement. It is my understanding that General Gerow is to come on the stand and testify as to all of these matters.

General Miles here has practically told us nothing. He has assumed and supposed, and so on, and so forth. He does not know much about it and it does seem to me we are wasting a lot of time, but maybe we are not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as far as this Senator is concerned we are not. I am trying to find out—

[2570] Senator LUCAS. I knew that, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out exactly what this man knew, and what those above him knew, and what those below him knew, and if it is going to take some time, considering that the other time that has been taken I do not consider that I have wasted this time and I would like to continue asking these questions.

Senator LUCAS. No; the only thing I say, if I may reply to the Senator, it is pretty well understood as to how this matter was to come on, and it does seem to me that we are adding a lot of confusion to what was presumed to be an orderly prepared case, and now counsel will have to go over this thing tomorrow, the same thing over and over again, when General Gerow gets here.

Senator FERGUSON. General Gerow cannot say what this man knew.

Senator LUCAS. General Miles doesn't know anything about Gerow's language and its interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would assume, and I suppose the committee would assume, that in a message sent by General Gerow to anybody, if there is any difference in the interpretation of that message as between General Miles and General Gerow, as between General Miles, who did not send it, and General Gerow, who did, the committee would consider whether General Gerow's interpretation was entitled to greater force [2571] and weight than General Miles'. I suppose that is a matter that the committee may have to decide.

Senator LUCAS. Then I would like to inquire how many officers we can bring here from the Intelligence Service to interpret messages sent out by General Gerow and everybody else? There will be no end to this if we follow that procedure.

Senator FERGUSON. I now ask the question, Did you ever know that the Secretary of War had spoken to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, or either of them, about what should be in their memorandum that went to the President, and as to whether or not they wanted to make sure, to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations?

General MILES. I did not, Senator, and I repeat, sir, that I was not called in in consultation in any way that I can remember between the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of War and the President, or the Chief of Staff and the President in reference to this paper or any other paper. I was simply not a part of that hierarchy that handled those matters.

[2572] Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any knowledge about the paragraph:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or South of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands?

General MILES. I have a distinct recollection, Senator, that I did know of the existence of certain negotiations or discussions going on at that time about a line beyond which certain powers would agree that the Japanese might not go without incurring war.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get that information? Pardon me. Are you through?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I am through.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get that information?

General MILES. I cannot say exactly when. It was during this period of late November, or the latter half of November or early in December.

[2573] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that there was a message given to the Jap Ambassador on August 17, 1941? That is in volume II of Foreign Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Has somebody got volume II?

Senator FERGUSON. I will get it later. I will pass that for the time being. Did you know of any message to the Japs by the President in August of 1941 in relation to their movement south?

General MILES. I cannot now recall any such message, sir. I might have, but I do not remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I read you what was in this memo of the 27th from General Marshall and Admiral Stark about the line, and you said you knew about that.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get that information from General Marshall?

General MILES. I do not think I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know where you obtained it?

General MILES. I believe I obtained it verbally from General Gerow.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate it was part of our war plan, would it not?

General MILES. Oh, no, sir; not a written war plan.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we have a war plan on that?

[2574] General MILES. None that I know of, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you use that fact in evaluating your material?

General MILES. The fact that there was a discussion about such a line?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I presume I did, sir, but I would give it very little evaluation, knowing that no such definite agreement had been made or transmitted to the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean that last part of your answer? You would not expect us to transmit that to the Japanese in that particular language, would you?

General MILES. That is what the suggestion in this paper implies, sir. The United States, British, and Dutch Governments indicated that an advance beyond that line may lead to war, that Japan was warned by the United States, British, and Dutch Governments that an advance beyond that line that was indicated may lead to war.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that warning was ever given?

General MILES. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversations with the Secretary of War during this period that you were evaluating this evidence?

[2575] General MILES. I do not remember any specific conversation, sir. I saw the Secretary not infrequently.

Senator FERGUSON. Your best knowledge now is you got this information about the ABCD agreement from General Gerow?

General MILES. The ABC and D agreement No. 1, as I remember it, was the result of a Joint Staff conference with the British in the preceding winter. Are you speaking of that, Senator, or this line?

Senator FERGUSON. Did that involve the line; the one in the winter?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They are two different things, are they not?

General MILES. They are two separate things; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now the first agreement you say was agreed upon in the winter. What was that? What knowledge do you have on that?

General MILES. I sat as a conferee in that conference. I had pretty complete knowledge of that.

Senator FERGUSON. You had direct knowledge of that?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that agreement?

General MILES. That was an agreement contingent on the United States being drawn into the war, of certain basic concepts [2576] or policies that would be followed by the United States and Great Britain.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in April of 1941, was it not?

General MILES. As I remember, that conference took place in, I would say, February or March, or it may have been March or April of 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. And where did it take place?

General MILES. Here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Attended by the British, Canadians, and the Dutch?

General MILES. No, sir; by the British and Americans.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the British and Americans?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was this line fixed at that time?

General MILES. No, sir; I have no recollection of any such line being discussed at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get information on a line?

General MILES. As nearly as I can fix it, sir, sometime about the middle or latter part of November, perhaps even as late as the first days of December 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you tell us, as nearly as you can, what that information was about the line?

General MILES. That there were discussions then in hand [2577] between representatives of our Government, the British, and Dutch, fixing a line by latitude and longitude beyond which Japanese penetration would not be permitted, except at the cost of war.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that, to your knowledge, the line in the part that I read? Have you got it there?

General MILES. I think this is the same line, sir. But I, of course, am not familiar with this particular paper or memorandum to the President of November 27.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would look on page 203, October 2, 1944, transcript of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, General Marshall's testimony, and see whether or not this same line was not discussed by you when you were in conference with the British?

General MILES. I haven't got the testimony before me, sir, and I have never seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Pass it to him.

(The document was handed to General Miles.)

General MILES. Page 204, did you say, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 203, at the bottom of the page. You will have to read it up in the other part to identify it.

General MILES. I think that General Marshall is referring here to a conference held in Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that conference held?

[2578] General MILES. Sometime during the fall of 1941, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on page 204 and see whether or not it does not give it?

General MILES. Yes, it says here:

The agreement was reached in the so-called American, British, Dutch Staff conversations held at Singapore in April of 1941.

I think that is a mistake. I think it was nearer October 1941. There were no Dutch in the Staff Conference that we held here in Washington in the early spring of 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were not a party to the one that General Marshall is talking about?

General MILES. I have never been in Singapore, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of that line before when you were dealing with the British in that conference?

General MILES. No, sir. I testified I have no recollection of the line ever being mentioned in the Staff Conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I have volume II of Foreign Relations, and I ask you to look at the last paragraph on page 556—going back to the question I asked.

(The book was handed to General Miles.)

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of that?

General MILES. I do not recall knowing of this at the [2579] time, sir, although I may have read it in magic.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have a talk with General Marshall about the Pearl Harbor attack after the attack on December 7, 1941?

General MILES. To the best of my recollection, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It would not impress you so that you would remember such a conversation, if you had one?

General MILES. A conversation with reference to the attack that had already occurred?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I do not believe that I ever had such a conversation.

[2580] Senator FERGUSON. This memorandum that you made about the 15th of December, referred to at one place as the means of communicating with the General, you made a memorandum rather than talk with him about it; is that right?

General MILES. No, sir. My recollection is that he asked me and he asked General Gerow and I think Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy to prepare for him memoranda as to our recollection as to what happened in his office on the morning of Sunday, December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. But you never spoke to him over the telephone or personally about it?

General MILES. About what occurred in his office?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; about the Pearl Harbor incident or attack.

General MILES. I do not remember discussing the attack that had already taken place with him subsequent to the event. I do not remember any discussion with him as to what had occurred in his office, just

prior to the attack. I think that was fully covered by his request to me, which may have been made by telephone, to give him a written memorandum on the best of my recollection as to what had occurred in his office.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were there any staff studies or investigations of the efficiency of G-2 after the 7th [2581] of December 1941, by the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, or a representative of either of them?

General MILES. Not that I remember, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, don't you think that you would remember that if they did make an investigation of your office, the efficiency of your office?

General MILES. I think I would remember. I was, however, absent a good deal of the time after December 7 until I was finally relieved at the end of January.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you when you were absent?

General MILES. In South America, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume on your intelligence work?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever hear that there was such an investigation, or study?

General MILES. No, sir. The nearest thing I can come to that is that I knew we were turning over a great many of our records to the Roberts Board, but I never heard of a representative of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War making an investigation of MID at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. In testifying before the Pearl Harbor Board on August 8, 1944, you said G-2 was trying, and I quote you, "to gather all possible information about Japan."

You stated further that your system was a running digest [2582] and will you tell us further whether it was not also a part of the function and mission of Military Intelligence to furnish all possible information to the commanding officers of overseas installations and their subordinate units of the Army?

General MILES. It was the duty of G-2 of the War Department General Staff to furnish all information to the major units of the United States Army which we believed would be of use to them, subject, of course, to the restrictions which I have already pointed out, of security, and of getting into the command channel.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any limitations from the Chief of Staff on your duties in relation to your last answer?

General MILES. He put no direct limitations on me that I know of, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Either in writing or verbally?

General MILES. Either in writing or verbally.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 96 of your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board you stated that "Army G-2 freely exchanged information with the British and Dutch."

Did you ever receive from the British and Dutch any notice that they had intercepted any implementation of the winds messages?

[2583] General MILES. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether there was any information at all from those sources that they had that message?

General MILES. The implementing broadcasts to the winds message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

General MILES. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no knowledge of that implementing broadcast ever reached the Military Intelligence Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any knowledge that they had the original message?

General MILES. That the British had the original winds code?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the winds code messages.

General MILES. I assume that they had because of the arrangement that existed between SIS and British communications whereby we checked to see that each one received all of the broadcasts.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you check to see that each one received all of the broadcasts?

General MILES. Senator, that is a question that I would very much rather you ask Colonel Sadtler when he comes, because it is a technical question of the SIS [2584] and British communications.

I did know that such a system existed, and was run by a reasonably simple code.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you recall whether any liaison existed at that time between the United States Navy, or Army Intelligence Service, and the British or Dutch in order that the final wind message would be promptly flashed to us by them, or to them by us if and when it was intercepted? Who would have knowledge of that?

General MILES. In our search for that implementing broadcast, we acted through the SIS, through the Federal Communications Commission, and we also asked SIS to check with the British to see that we did not miss that implementation, but it was a broadcast in plain Japanese that we were waiting for, certain Japanese phrases in plain Japanese put into weather reports in a certain way, and we undoubtedly were just as capable of picking that out of the air, or rather more so, than the British or the Dutch.

[2585] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I see it is 4 o'clock and we might adjourn before I start on the questions in relation to the wind message, that I ask to clean up in the morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, General Marshall is coming along Thursday morning. Of course, that has completely disarranged our schedule.

I would like to have the committee's consent that General Gerow may go on the stand in the morning and that the further examination of General Miles be taken up afterward. We cannot finish with General Gerow before General Marshall comes on, but we can do the best we can to lay down a lot of basic material that General Marshall will have to deal with.

Considering we are advancing General Marshall's testimony, completely upsetting our arrangement and causing confusion, that is the best solution I can offer. We can call General Gerow at 10 o'clock in the morning and go through with him until 4 and then we will have to let him get off and put General Marshall on Thursday, and then recall both General Miles and General Gerow.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks that is a reasonable request on the part of counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection to that, Mr. Chairman.

[2586] The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

General, we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow. It appears that you will not have to be here tomorrow, if you desire to be elsewhere.

General MILES. Very well, Mr. Chairman. I will not be called until after General Marshall has testified?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General MILES. Very well, sir.¹

(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 10 o'clock a. m., Wednesday, December 5, 1945.)

Part 3—December 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945—follows.

¹ Gen. Miles' testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 3, p. 1541.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)


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INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
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PART 3

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HARBOR ATTACK

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Schuirmann, R. E., Rear Adm.		404-412			194-218, 311-318, 692-732		
Schukraft, Robert E., Col.						201	4910-4933 4659-4672
Schultz, Lester Robert, Comdr.							
Settle, F. A.	1579-1583						
Shaw, C. H., CH/T	1138-1146						
Shirley, J. P.			2354-2360				
Shivers, Robert L.	1401-1447		3201-3225			88-96	
Shoemaker, James M., Capt., USN	1191-1205						
Shoemaker, Thomas B.			4366-4383				

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 15, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Short, Arthur T.....	37-169,		3644-3650	220-270				2921-3231
Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen.....	1617-1647		276-541, 4411-4445					
Shortt, Creed, Pvt.....	452-455		3265-3286					
Sisson, George A.....							4-9	
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.....						69		
Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen.....					2	195-197		
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen.....		32-65		528-572			335-375	3354-3378, 3521-3555
Smith, William W., Rear Adm.....								
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN.....				1077-1081				5009-5027
Smoot, Perry M., Col.....	1738-1742							
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr.....					2			
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen.....								
Staff, W. F. CH/CM.....	1186-1190			2-194, 320-324, 774-810				2096-2223, 2244-2477, 5153-5175, 5202-5269, 5543-5555
Stark, Harold R., Adm.....	1805-1808							
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR.....		323-334						
Stilphen, Benjamin L.....			1539-1575					5416-5440 ²
Stimson, Henry L.....			4037-4094 ^C					5441-5463 ¹
Stone, John F.....								
Street, George.....						203-204	411-413	
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen.....						185		

[2587] ¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2588] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. General Gerow, will you be sworn, please?

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW, UNITED STATES ARMY ²

(Having been duly sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is counsel ready to proceed?

Mr. MITCHELL. I want to make a short statement to the committee which I think may help it in connection with the next two or three witnesses, including General Marshall.

Calling General Marshall out of turn, of course, upset our order of proof, and we are bringing up some matters now which we had not intended to present to the committee until sometime later.

One, I think, is the story of the so-called "winds" message, and the other is the detailed record in handling, analytically, and so on, what is known as the fourteenth part of the message which came in on December 6 and 7.

Our order of proof originally was for taking those things up as a special order of proceeding. We intended to call all our witnesses on that at one time, and in advance of General Marshall's testimony.

Now that he is coming on he will have to be asked about that.

My statement is intended to sort of orient the committee as to what we know about the situation, so that they will [2589] understand the testimony and be better equipped to do something about it until General Marshall comes in.

Now, the first thing is this "winds" message. That is a sort of a romantic term. I want to report now just generally what the state of the inquiry is in regard to the "winds" message, so the committee will understand.

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

² See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2490, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by General Gerow.

The winds message, originally the winds code, which is found on page 154 of the diplomatic intercepts, exhibit 1, I want to call the attention of the committee to the fact at the start that if the Japanese had used that method of communication and we had intercepted their diplomatic message what you would have learned was that the diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were in danger, and that instructions had to be given to burn the code.

My first reaction to the winds message was, if we had intercepted it, we would have had little more than we had already, because we knew our diplomatic relations were in danger and we knew they had given orders to burn the code. So my original reaction was there was much ado about nothing in the winds message.

But passing that I want to also call to the attention of the committee the fact that the code, as set up by its very terms, provides:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our [2590] diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave news broadcast:

That shows on its face that the Japs only set this method up for an emergency system, in case they could not use the ordinary means of communication.

Now the proof already shows that they were using the ordinary means of communication right up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So the question arises at once whether they did send out those messages.

Heretofore all the assumptions have been that they did, and there has been an inquiry by the other boards as to who received them and what was done with them.

Now we have made a plan to dig out all the facts on that, and I just want to report the present status of that.

In the first place, in our effort to find out whether the message ever was sent we have already the FCC report from one of the best monitoring stations, we have the exact report from them as to just what they picked up. That report was that one of the messages picked up on the 4th of December by the Japanese listener on the FCC station, which he picked up because it resembled—did not exactly comply with the code but resembled the code—had the statement in it, "North wind cloudy," which [2591] meant war with Russia and not with the United States and Great Britain, and that we can talk about as the false winds message, which was probably a real broadcast and not a code broadcast, and caused, of course, confusion among witnesses as to whether they ever saw the message or not.

We also had from the FCC the report that on the afternoon of December 7, after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after the ordinary means of international communication had been closed, a winds message was received. That message said nothing about "East wind rain," which meant war with the United States, because that was already known all over the world, but it did use the expression which meant war with England.

That is the message received by the FCC after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and was an implementing message to warn the Japanese people abroad that they were about to have war with Great Britain.

The next thing we did was to inquire from the Dutch and British and Australia, through the State Department, as to whether either of

those nations had any record of intercepting, prior to December 7, an implementing message which said "East wind rain," which meant war with the United States. We heard from the Australians and they say no, they did not. We have not yet had our report from the Dutch and British.

Now we also had sent to General MacArthur some time ago [2592] a request that he endeavor to find from the Japanese, from their records, whether they ever sent a winds implementing message prior to December 7. The report from General MacArthur is that the Japs say they sent none out until the afternoon of December 7, which covers this implementing message they sent out which we intercepted, the FCC intercepted, showing a warning of war with Great Britain.

That report, for whatever it is worth, did not indicate that the Japs sent out any messages other than those picked up by the FCC.

Now we also have had communications from and have been busy bringing here witnesses from every one of the monitoring stations, witnesses who were in the stations during the critical period November 28 to December 7, and witnesses who were present at the stations at the time, and those witnesses will be here and we will find out all they know about the situation.

[2593] Now, there is just one other point about the winds message. There has been a statement to the effect that there was a message numbered 7001 in the Navy files. The tab in it shows the number is canceled, and there is no message in there. It has been thought that this missing 7001 was a winds message. The Navy reports, which are quite voluminous, in their search and effort to find what 7001 was, shows, among other things, that if the winds message had ever been received, it is not the type of message that would have been put in the file with the serial numbers which 7001 would require, for the simple reason that they filed under 7001 only coded intercepts.

Of course, this was in Japanese broadcasting language and would not have been put in that file, if it had ever been received.

Now, that is as far as we have gone up to date with the winds message, and as long as we are to have General Marshall, I thought we ought to have a review of the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't understand, do I, from counsel that he is intending this morning to determine what the evidence will show, or what his opinion of certain evidence in other hearings is?

Do I understand that you are passing upon what the evidence will be?

[2594] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am trying to explain to the committee what kind of witnesses we are going to call, and what the result of our present inquiry has been. If I have expressed any opinion about the weight of the evidence, I didn't intend to.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't wish to convey to the committee the weight of any of this evidence?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I have my opinion about the weight of the evidence, and if it has crept out in this hearing, why, I don't think I need to apologize.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you do not wish to express to the committee what you think about the weight of the evidence?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't know what you understand. My words

speak for themselves. As I stated, I am trying to report to the committee what the situation is. That is my only object.

The CHAIRMAN. As the Chair understands, counsel is, in a sense, forecasting for the benefit of the committee what the testimony will be.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Now, I want to turn to the 1 p. m., and fourteenth part messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire [2595] whether there will be any conflict on this winds message, that it did come in?

Mr. MITCHELL. There was a great deal of conflict, as you know, among various witnesses called before the other boards of inquiry as to whether they saw a message of that kind. Great conflict with it. And that is one reason I was anxious to get at the root of the matter and find out whether the message was really sent or not. I don't understand that there is any conflict about anything I have told you except I haven't yet talked to the witnesses who had charge of the monitoring stations and I don't know what they are going to say about ever having received it, or anything they have to say about the destruction of their records.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel when it is contemplated that the testimony with respect to the winds message will be submitted to the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. As soon as this inquiry is complete. Our original plan, Mr. Congressman, as our record shows, submitted on November 2, called for the story of the winds message pretty well down the line, and a great many witnesses before it, and the only reason I bring it up now out of order is because General Marshall has been advanced and that has upset our schedule. But it is hard for me to predict with certainty when the witnesses will be called because I can't tell how [2596] long the examination of each witness is going to be.

We intend to, as soon as we can get around to it, and just as soon as it is ready, we will bring in all the witnesses that bear on the winds message and make a special order of it and give you everything we have. The only reason I am bringing it up today is to report on the extent and direction of our inquiry and what it relates to. And the things I stated as to what the record shows that we have already got are not in dispute so far as I can see.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, Mr. Chairman, you would expect a member of the committee to give consideration to the testimony when it comes in and the weight to be given to it is a matter for determination when the testimony is in.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of course.

Mr. KEEFE. Any conclusions to be drawn must necessarily await the conclusion of the introduction of all of the testimony relating to this subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, have I said anything to the contrary this morning?

Mr. KEEFE. I make that statement because there seems to be an impression that your own conclusions are already formed in certain aspects of the situation, and while that may be proper, yet I think you would concede that as a member of this committee I should be compelled to await any conclusions on it [2597] until the testimony is all in. That would be proper, would it not?

Mr. MITCHELL. I haven't any question about it. If you really want to know what my present impression is, for what it is worth, I confess that on the state of the inquiry up to date I have very, very grave doubts whether the Japs ever sent out a winds implementing message prior to the afternoon of December 7, but that is a matter for the committee to decide when they hear all of the proof, and I didn't intend to express an opinion that the committee would have to accept. I was just trying to give you a picture of our inquiry up to date so you would know.

[2598] Mr. KEEFE. So it will not be necessary to cross-examine General Miles or General Gerow, or anybody else, with respect to their knowledge of this winds message now. The whole subject, if they have any testimony to give on the subject, or were in any way interested and can produce any proof, that will be submitted at the time you take up the winds message?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the way I would like to have it, but General Miles was already asked about the winds message, as I understand it, yesterday morning, although I wasn't here.

Mr. KEEFE. I think only just a few questions.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was that all?

Mr. KEEFE. At the end of his testimony; yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is quite agreeable to me to leave the winds message out of the picture as far as these two generals are concerned, but not General Marshall, because we won't have him back. So what he knows about it the committee will want to ask him about. That is the reason I made this statement, so you would be able to frame your questions in the light of the report as to how far our investigation has gone and what questions we have sought to resolve.

Mr. KEEFE. You referred to a communication from General MacArthur this morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand you have such a communication.

[2599] Has the committee been supplied with it?

Mr. MITCHELL. No; we haven't given you any of those documents, I have been told, but we were planning to do that well in advance of our proof about the winds message. You see, General Marshall is coming and I wanted you to know what we had. If you want to look at anything we have up to date before General Marshall is called, you may.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the committee be furnished copies of this before tomorrow?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you see General Marshall's inquiry has been advanced so rapidly, it has so disarranged it, that we haven't had time to have these reports mimeographed. I have only one copy. If you would like to have the information up to date on it, I will try and have it mimeographed. But I tried to tell you in a general way what these documents consist of.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask counsel whether after General Marshall's testimony, and such information as we may get from him with reference to the winds message, in view of his early departure and his probable absence during the rest of the hearings, is it then planned to go back as far as possible on to the original schedule and deal with the winds message, subject to, of course, General Marshall's testimony?

Mr. MITCHELL. Precisely. Of course, our winds message [2600] inquiry isn't complete. When I get reports from the British and Dutch as to whether they received the message or not, why, if they say they did, I would recast my doubts about it ever having been sent. I am not in a position to express any opinion on it as yet.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. The other thing I wanted to call attention to was the so-called 14 part and 1 p. m. messages. Before General Marshall was supposed to be called we had intended to call all the basic witnesses to show the exact routing of those messages and how they were handled and the hours it was done and what was done. That might take us a week, to call those witnesses, or more. So we have to go on with General Marshall leading up to that subject, and we haven't had an opportunity to present that proof.

Now, there are one or two things I have which I hoped would aid the committee. One of those things is the document which has been distributed this morning in mimeograph entitled "Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages No. 901, 902, 907, 910." That is the 14 part and 1 p. m. messages. The pilot message that came in. And the code-burning message afterward.

This document which I am going to offer in evidence now, for whatever use the committee wants to make of it, will be [2601] Exhibit 41.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is this one [indicating]?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Prepared by the Army and Navy and is understood to state in detail all the information as to the handling of these messages. That is a matter of documentary proof, of course. They haven't attempted to put in any information that depended on recollection or memory of a witness.

So you find the history of the detailed handling of the fourteenth part message and the 1 p. m. message as far as documentary support of the routing is contained in this exhibit. And as to each part of the message.

The committee will remember that 13 parts were discussions by the Japs as to our position and the fourteenth part was the part of the message in which they said they had broken off negotiations. And the 1 p. m. message which followed was the message requiring or directing Ambassadors to deliver their message at 1 p. m. on Sunday, December 7.

[2602] Also, on this Exhibit 41 you will find there are references on the margin to exhibit pages on which the text of the parts, various parts, appear.

The CHAIRMAN. That refers to the pages in Exhibit 1?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry about that of counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 6, at the top of the page, page 6 of Exhibit 41, at the top, will you have a witness, or will you supply the information as to when each of those processes was completed?

Mr. MITCHELL. Wherever there is a gap in the information shown on this, it means that there are no documents, and we will have to call witnesses. So that whenever you find a gap—and there are gaps—

which you would like to fill, you will know we haven't the documents, but have to call witnesses and depend on their memory and recollection.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be No. 41, and it is now before the committee as an exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; I just offered it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

[2603] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 41.")

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Counsel, for your explanation.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, will you state your present rank and station?

General GEROW. Leonard T. Gerow, lieutenant general; station, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

Mr. MITCHELL. What are your duties at Fort Leavenworth?

General GEROW. I am in command of the post and also commandant of the Command and General Staff School.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the principal general staff instruction point of the Army?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were you in the War Plans Division in the War Department in 1941?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. When did you receive that assignment?

General GEROW. I reported, sir, in November 1940, and left the War Plans Division in February 1942.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were head of the War Plans Division during that period?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you had experience prior to that time in war-plans work?

[2604] General GEROW. Yes, sir. I had served previously in the War Plans Division as Executive for War Plans Division, during the period, as I recall, the early part of 1935 to the early part of 1939, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you left the War Plans Division, what was your next command?

General GEROW. I was assigned to command the Twenty-ninth Division, sir, at Fort Meade, Md.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you had charge of training and the preparation of that division?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Infantry division?

General GEROW. I had complete command and trained the division as an infantry division.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was your next move?

General GEROW. I took the division to England in October of 1942, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And remained in command how long?

General GEROW. Until approximately June 1943 when I was assigned to command the Fifth Corps.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Fifth Corps?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How many divisions in the Fifth Corps?

General GEROW. The number of divisions varied from [2605] time to time. The average, I should say, was three divisions at that time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you take your Fifth Corps into France?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. The Fifth Corps was one of the corps that was designated to assault the Normandy beaches and the Fifth Corps landed on the Omaha beach on D-day, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And how long did you remain in command of the Fifth Corps?

General GEROW. I remained in command of the Fifth Corps until January 16, as I recall, 1944, shortly after the Von Runstedt breakthrough, when we started the counteroffensive. I was then assigned to command the Fifteenth Army.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you ever been stationed in the Hawaiian Islands?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What were the functions of the War Plans Division in 1941?

General GEROW. Those functions, sir, are as stated in Army Regulations No. 10-15. If I may, I would like to read those.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. You may. Just a part of the regulations relating to the War Plans Division.

[2606] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

I quote paragraph 12:

War Plans Division, general duties:

a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theatre of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

- (1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications;
- (2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense;
- (3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division);
- (4) Actual operations in the theatre of war;
- (5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the Supply Division on major items of [2607] equipment.

Those are the responsibilities of War Plans Division, 1941, sir.

[2608] Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to offer in evidence now as exhibit 42 a copy of Army Regulations No. 10-15 dated August 18, 1936, which includes all amendments up to December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. All amendments, did you say?

Mr. MITCHELL. It includes all amendments. It is an up-to-date copy of the Army Regulations, defining the War Department General Staff duties, each department. It not only relates to War Plans but to G-2 and gives a short picture of the complete set-up.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be filed as Exhibit 42.

Mr. MITCHELL. Each member of the committee has it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 42.")

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, do you remember that during the time you were in the War Plans Division there were certain conversations with the British with respect to a joint war plan in case the two nations were drawn into the war?

General GEROW. I do, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is called the ABC, which means American-British Conversations, does it?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir; ABC-1.

[2609] Mr. MITCHELL. ABC-1?

General GEROW. And there was an ABC-2.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was also a British staff plan, was it, a joint plan with Britain?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember whether during that time there were conversations between military officers of the United States and Canada with respect to a joint operation with Canada in case we were drawn into the war?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; there were such conversations conducted.

Mr. MITCHELL. And do you remember also that there was a similar conference held at Singapore or some place in the Far East between officers of the Army and Navy of the United States and with the British and Dutch, which resulted in a plan or recommendations made by that conference out there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; there was such a conference conducted.

Mr. MITCHELL. I show you a document here which is entitled, "American-Dutch-British conversations, Singapore, April 1941." You have seen that document, have you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have seen this document. It is a report of the conversations at Singapore, sir, between the Americans, Dutch, and British.

[2610] Mr. KEEFE. Is that Exhibit 43?

Mr. MITCHELL. I haven't had it reproduced. If the committee want it, we can do it. It is an elaborate staff plan.

These plans, I might say, the British-Canadian and the one with the Dutch, Americans, and British are brought up now with a view to ascertaining whether we can ascertain from them whether there was any commitment by the United States to engage in war with Japan, that is the purpose of it, but if the committee want it reproduced we will have that done.

Did you have anything to do with setting up the personnel—

Mr. KEEFE. Before you finish I personally would very much like, in view of General Marshall's previous testimony, I would like to have that exhibit made available.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will have it mimeographed. You mean copies to each member of the committee?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Congressman yield to his colleague?

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if it would not be better to defer your request that it be reproduced until we see what significance there is to it and how much of it you might [2611] need? Maybe only a portion of it would be necessary for the examination of General Marshall or maybe we could use the original.

Mr. MITCHELL. The exhibit has been available for some time and it has been loaned out to one member of the committee or another off and on, but we never have had it reproduced for all of them.

Mr. KEEFE. That has always been the trouble, Mr. Counsellor, that when you ask for a thing it is always in the hands of some other member of the committee. Now, I would like to see that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if it is possible to have it all mimeographed the Chair would suggest that it be done so that each member can be furnished a copy.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is rather difficult to see it when any member gets it and keeps it for awhile.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, my question, General, was whether you had anything to do with the assignment of United States Army or Navy officers to attend that conference at Singapore in April 1941?

General GEROW. The assignment was made, sir, by the Chief of Staff as I recall now, sir. The War Plans Division did make certain recommendations to the Chief of Staff with [2612] regard to such assignment.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice that the document states that the representatives of the United States were Capt. W. B. Purnell, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff of the Asiatic Fleet; Col. A. C. McBride, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff of the United States Military Forces in the Philippines; Capt. A. M. R. Allen, U. S. Navy, United States Naval Observer at Singapore; and Lt. Col. F. G. Brink, U. S. A., U. S. Military Observer at Singapore.

You think they were selected by the staff here, by the Navy and Army?

General GEROW. No, sir. I would like to change my statement with regard to that. I think the commanders out there were instructed to furnish suitable representatives for this conference; that is, the Naval and Army commanders out there, sir, the Commanding General of the Far East and the Commanding Admiral of the Asiatic Fleet. That is my recollection at the moment.

Mr. MITCHELL. On page 6 of this document I find under the head of "Introduction" the following statement:

The following conditions apply:

(a) State of war between Germany, Italy and Japan on one hand and British empire with its present allies and the United States of America, referred to [2613] herein as associated powers, on the other.

(b) No political commitment is implied.

(c) Any agreement is subject to ratification by the government concerned.

Now, is that the usual system that our staff plans had of making certain assumptions?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir. Practically all staff plans have as one of their initial provisions the assumptions under which the plan is drawn.

Mr. MITCHELL. You called this "Conditions." Was that a British or American term?

General GEROW. That was a British term, sir. This paper was apparently handled largely by a British secretariat.

Mr. MITCHELL. "Terms of Reference," it says. [Reading]:

(2) Prepare plan for conduct of military operations in the Far East on the basis of report of Washington conversation.

(3) Particular points for agreement are: plan for employment and disposition of forces in the whole area, Indian Ocean, Pacific, Australian and New Zealand waters before and after arrival of the Far East Fleet as agreed in Washington conversations and summarized in Admiralty telegram 1848, of 4th of April. [2614]

(b) Details of arrangements for cooperation, eg. communications, exchange of liaison officers.

You have examined this document thoroughly, have you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, from your knowledge of War Plans and the systems of getting up war plans, how would you characterize this? What is it?

General GEROW. It is a technical agreement between military personnel for the conduct of operations in the event that the powers referred to should become engaged in war.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you find anything in the document to the effect that Captain Purnell or any of his associates had attempted to commit the United States to engage in war?

General GEROW. They had no authority to commit the United States to engage in war, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is meant by this term, "No political commitments and any agreement is subject to ratification by the government concerned"? Does that mean what it says?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; exactly what it says.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, this document refers to British-American conversations and I will ask you to refer to another staff plan I have here which is labeled "ABC-1 and 2." Have you examined this document? [2615]

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You are quite familiar with it, are you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice this document, the first part of it, is dated March 27, 1941. That was prior to the Singapore meeting?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It states that:

The staff conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941 between the United States staff committee representing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army and the United Kingdom delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were associated with United Kingdom delegates during the course of these conversations but were not present at joint meetings.

It says that the United States representatives were Maj. Gen. S. D. Embick; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles; Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow; Col. J. T. McNarney; Rear Adm. R. L. Ghormley; Rear Adm. R. K. Turner; Capt. [2616] A. G. Kirk; Capt. DeWitt C. Ramsey; Lt. Col. O. T. Pfeiffer.

You yourself were a member of that delegation?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And took part in those conferences?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And in framing this document?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice that under the head of "Purpose" it says:

(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with it should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

Without going through the details of this staff plan, is there anything in it, or was there any understanding reached or attempted to be reached that the United States would engage in war?

General GEROW. No, sir. Those were purely staff discussions.

Mr. MITCHELL. On assumptions that she might be drawn into war?

General GEROW. She might be compelled to resort to war. [2617]
yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have any authority on behalf of the United States to make any commitment that the United States would engage in war under any conditions?

General GEROW. We did not have such authority, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. This document then is entitled "A Report." To go to whom, the Chiefs of Staff?

General GEROW. To be submitted initially to the Chiefs of Staff, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you know whether this ABC 1 and 2 were even approved by higher authority in the United States?

General GEROW. My recollection, sir, is it was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit an inquiry at that point, as to whether or not the question which you now relate, as I understand it, to the A-B-C agreements Nos. 1 and 2 having been approved by the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War and Navy, have you asked or will you ask the same question with respect to the other agreement, the A-B-C-D agreement?

Mr. MITCHELL. I should have done it before, but I was now getting to that.

I show you, General Gerow, copy of a memorandum taken [2618] from the files of the War Department, dated June 9, 1941, which appears to be signed by W. P. Scobey, lieutenant colonel, General Staff Corps, secretary of the Joint Board, and a letter dated June 2, 1941, preceding that, addressed to the President at the White House by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy.

I had better read those. They ought to go into the record.

The letter from Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox to the President, dated June 2, 1941, is as follows [reading]:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Joint Board has prepared Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 which with the report of United States-British Staff Conversations concluded on March 27, 1941, we have approved, and now transmit them for your consideration, recommending your approval. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 is based upon agreements contained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations.

Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 states the concept of war and provides for initial dispositions and operations of United States forces, should the United States associate in war with the Democracies against the totalitarian powers. As such [2619] it constitutes the basic directive for United States Army and Naval Forces in a war effort.

The War and Navy Departments have been advised that the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations has been agreed to provisionally by the British Chiefs of Staff and that it has been submitted to the British Government for approval.

Now, the second document, a letter of June 9, 1941, or memorandum for the Chief of Staff, signed by Colonel Scobey, reads as follows:

Subject: J. B. No. 325 (Serial 642-5)—Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and Report of United States-British Staff Conversations—ABC-1.

The President on June 7, 1941 returned the two subject plans without approval. In explanation of the President's failure to approve or disapprove the plans, his Military Aide, Major General E. M. Watson, stated to the Undersigned in substance as follows:

The President has familiarized himself with the two papers; but since the report of the United States British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been approved by the British Government, he would not approve the report at this time; neither would he now give ap- [2620] proval to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, which is based upon the report ABC-1. However, in case of war the papers would be returned to The President for his approval.

(Signed) W. P. SCOBEE.

Now, you said that this ABC-1 had been approved by the two secretaries. Did it ever get any farther than that, do you recollect, in the way of approval?

General GEROW. To the best of my knowledge and belief it was never approved by the President.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I notice that this document says not only ABC-1 but ABC-2. I should have asked you what ABC-2 is.

General GEROW. ABC-2 was a report of a special committee that was set up to consider air collaboration only.

Mr. MITCHELL. Air?

General GEROW. Air collaboration only; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Air what?

Mr. MITCHELL. Air collaboration.

The CHAIRMAN. I see; air collaboration. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was the same type of document as ABC-1, a staff plan for a proposed plan of joint operations in case the Nation should be drawn into war?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[2621] Mr. MITCHELL. Now I would like to ask you whether you know whether the Singapore report, the Dutch-British-and-American joint report from Singapore about joint military plans, was ever approved?

General GEROW. That document was never approved either by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MITCHELL. So if it was not approved by them it never went to the President for approval, I suppose.

General GEROW. As far as I know it never went to the President, sir, and I do not believe it was submitted to either the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy for formal approval, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, let us turn to the Canadian document.

There were certain other staff conferences with Canada at about that time, were there not?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Which one of these documents would contain that report?

General GEROW. That would be ABC-22, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. ABC-22?

General GEROW. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have that before you, have you, and have you examined it?

[2622] General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have examined it and I have a copy.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice on the first page of that under date of August 12, 1941, is a memorandum from the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board (reading):

Subject: Joint Canadian—United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title—ABC-22).

Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan (draft of 28 July 1941) with permanent Joint Board on Defense letter of transmittal, dated: Montreal, 30th July, 1941.

The subject plan, which was prepared in collaboration with the War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments, is transmitted herewith with recommendation that it be approved.

(Signed) L. T. GEROW.

Did you personally represent the United States at that conference in Montreal?

General GEROW. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice the signatures of our representatives are S. D. Embick, major general, United States Army; H. W. Hill, captain, United States Navy; Forrest Sherman, commander, United States Navy; Clayton Bissell, lieutenant colonel, United States Army.

Did you have anything to do with the selection or appointment of our representatives?

[2623] General GEROW. I cannot recall specifically that War Plans did make such a recommendation to the Chief of Staff, but I imagine that it did recommend to the Chief of Staff who our representatives should be.

Mr. MITCHELL. The section 1 of this document under the title, "Purpose of this plan," says (reading):

1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversations held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United Kingdom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government for their concurrence. The report, which bears the short title "ABC-1," includes a United States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan.

2. ABC-1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United States for common action in war under the concepts of ABC-1 will conform generally to the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Conversations. This plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to provide for the most effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the purposes listed in paragraph 3, should the United States and the British Commonwealth be associated in a war against Germany and her allies.

3. Under such circumstances, cooperative action by Canadian and United States Forces will be required primarily for purposes connected with:

- (a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas;
- (b) the protection of sea communications within the coastal zones;
- (c) the defense of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland (which includes Labrador) and the northern portion of the United States.

You have examined this document and, of course, know its general tenor and purpose?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was it anything different in scope or nature than any other United States or Joint Staff plan for joint operations in case of war?

General GEROW. No, sir. It followed generally the other war plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was this Canadian-United States joint plan approved?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; it was approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of [2625] War and the Secretary of the Navy and approved by the President.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have here a document obtained from the War Department, dated August 20, 1941, signed by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, addressed to the President at the White House as follows [reading:]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Joint United States-Canadian Permanent Defense Board has prepared Joint United States-Canadian Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22) providing for common action in war against Germany and her allies in the defense of contiguous territories, including Newfoundland and Alaska, and adjacent waters.

This plan has been examined and approved by The Joint Board, and we also have approved it. It is transmitted herewith for your consideration with recommendation that it be approved.

Following that is the other document from the War Department, dated August 29, 1941, as follows [reading]:

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title—ABC-22), J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717).

[2626] 1. You are advised that The President has, on August 29, 1941, given approval to the subject serial by indorsing the Joint Planning Committee report as follows: "OK, F. D. R."

(Signed) W. P. SCOBEX,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C., Secretary.

And bears the endorsement:

Sep. 4, 1941

Noted—Chief of Staff

Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff.

So that of these three plans the Canadian was the only one that ever was finally approved by the President?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have here a document which we will mark exhibit 43—the committee has this—captioned: "Statement by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff."

Have you a copy of that?

General GEROW. I have a copy; yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 43.")

[2627] Mr. MITCHELL. This document is a document of instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the representatives of the United States at the American-British Staff conferences that resulted in the report which has been marked ABC-1 and 2?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; these are the instructions to the United States delegation, sir. It is a joint statement that was to be made by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations before a meeting of the Joint Committee, both United States and British.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you mean it was prepared and not given to the representatives, or wouldn't you know about that?

General GEROW. Well, sir; it was furnished the United States representatives and I think it was presented verbally at a joint meeting to the combined British and United States representatives.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see. That document offered as exhibit 43 I think ought to be read into the record. I will read it.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States are aware of the advantages that will accrue to both nations in the prosecution of any war in which the United States and the British Commonwealth may participate as associates, [2628] should tentative understandings be reached in advance concerning military cooperation. Therefore, they have prepared this statement in the hope that it will clear the way for the discussions which are to follow.

2. As understood by these two officers, the purpose of these staff conversations is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war—

The date of the document, I should have read, is January 27, 1941. Is that right?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL (continuing reading):

and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained, it must be supported by their responsible military and naval authorities. Therefore, no specific commitments can now be made except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisaged must, for the present, remain contingent upon the future political action of both nations. All such plans are [2629] subject to eventual official approval by the two Governments.

4. The present national position of the United States is as follows:

(a) A fundamental principle of United States policy is that the Western Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American military and political control.

(b) The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war against Germany.

(c) The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory.

5. If the United States Government decides to make war in common with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that:

(a) The broad military objective of United States operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily must also maintain dispositions which, under all eventualities, will prevent the extension in the Western [2630] Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.

(b) The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions.

(c) The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or from attacking the Dutch.

(d) Should Japan enter the war, United States operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.

(e) As a general rule, United States forces should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived from United States-British joint plans.

(f) The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain, but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportion as to provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for [2631] defeating Germany.

6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination of those military efforts which will contribute most directly to the defeat of Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation, tentative agreements should

be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations. Staff conversations should also include an examination into the present military situations of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situations that might result from the loss of the British Isles.

7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if the British Staff Representatives could furnish the United States Staff Representatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth as a preliminary to the staff discussions.

Now, General Gerow, do you know of any other Joint Staff [2632] conversations between the United States and Great Britain, and the Dutch and the Canadians and the Australians or anybody else during that period in 1941, other than those I have adduced?

General GEROW. No, sir; other than informal conversations between members of our own staff and the members of the British mission and the missions of other nations that were assembled in Washington at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I mean conversations of a more formal character that would produce some kind of a joint staff plan for possible future operations.

General GEROW. To the best of my knowledge and belief there were no such conferences.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you at any time during your service in the War Plans Division see or hear of any agreement which had been entered into by anybody, any executive officer of the United States, War, and Navy, or anybody else, including the President, which assumed to bind the United States to engage in war against Japan before Japan attacked the United States?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There have been discussions here in the committee based on memoranda, I think, including this Singapore plan and memoranda by General Marshall and Admiral [2623] Stark, in which they recommended that no military operations should be conducted against Japan unless certain eventualities occurred, such as an attack by the Japs on the Philippines, and one of the eventualities was said to be "or unless the Japs should cross a certain latitude and longitude line." Do you remember that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was a recommendation and report based on the Singapore report, carried on forward to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy by the Marshall memorandum, is that right?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I think that statement appeared initially in the Singapore conversations, in the recommendation of the conferees at that conference.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 17 has already been offered in evidence. It is a memorandum dated November 27, 1941. [Reading:]

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

Signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and addressed to the President. On the second page the report says:

It is recommended that:

prior to the completion of the Philippines reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only [2634] if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

Do you know or did you know at the time whether the President took any action on that recommendation?

General GEROW. I do not know whether the President took any action on it or not, sir.

[2635] Mr. MITCHELL. There was offered in evidence yesterday as exhibit 40, a message from the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, marked "Information to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet," dated December 7, eastern time, I suppose, Philippine time, 1941, which reads as follows:

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Do you know of any assurances that we had given the British at Singapore of armed support under three or four eventualities?

General GEROW. I know of no such assurances, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. May this report, that has been obtained from Singapore, have been founded on this Dutch-American-British conference report to which we referred?

General GEROW. It may have been; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. May I have the last answer?

Mr. MITCHELL. I asked him if it was possible that this report that Admiral Hart had might have referred to this Singapore plan. He said he does not know; it might.

We have tried to get Admiral Stark's reply to this message, but we have not succeeded in doing it up to this morning.

[2636] Senator FERGUSON. I might help counsel on the Admiralty report—

Mr. MITCHELL. I would be glad to get any help I can.

Senator FERGUSON. We asked that we have the Admiralty reports cleared up with the British.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the messages from the British Admiralty?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; to our Navy.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, those, as I told you in our conversation yesterday, Senator, ought to go through clearance.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I say. I ask you now to get them cleared so we can clear up this point.

Mr. MITCHELL. You were going to give me a list of those you wanted cleared so we could narrow it down as much as possible.

It is quite a job to send messages to England and to get the British Government to clear the message.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you can clear that up later.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right, we will try.

Now, General Gerow, getting back to another subject, I show you a document dated December 30, 1940, signed by Admiral Bloch, ad-

dressed to the Chief of Naval Operations [2637] which is already introduced in evidence here, which is a report by Admiral Bloch on the problem of aircraft raids on Hawaii. It bears the endorsement of Admiral Richardson, who forwarded it under date of January 7.

Do you remember whether you ever saw that? It went to the Chief of Naval Operations and not to the War Department?

General GEROW. I do not recall having seen that at the time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The record shows that the document I referred to is part of exhibit 9.

I call your attention now to exhibit 10, which is a letter from Secretary Knox to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and part of the same exhibit, a letter dated February 7, 1941, from the Secretary of War Stimson to the Secretary of the Navy, in which, to refresh your memory, Secretary Knox said that the dangers at Pearl Harbor in the order of their probability, were—

1. Air bombing attack;
2. Airtorpedo plane attack;
3. Sabotage.

Do you remember having seen that correspondence?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I did see it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember whether, as the result [2638] of the correspondence so instituted and during the year 1941, following this correspondence, various reports and plans were made dealing with air defense at Pearl Harbor?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There has been offered in evidence here a book containing extracts from various plans, not joint plans but United States Army and Navy plans having to do with the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack.

I think this document itself, which the committee has, was not offered as an exhibit, but extracts of it were read into the record.

I think it advisable at this time to mark as exhibit 44 this document which is entitled "Copies of Defense Plans" and contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans dealing directly with the question of defense against air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it be filed as exhibit 44.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44.")

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you a copy of this document before you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you produced here the various plans on which this document, Exhibit 44, is based, as listed in [2639] the index in 13 items, that is, the War Department part of it?

General GEROW. I do not understand the question, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you checked these basic plans that have been produced here against the index?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of Exhibit 44?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There are 13 items in the list of contents. Have you checked these documents against the index?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are all the documents that are listed in this index present here? You have checked them, haven't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will ask you to look at them and just state generally, as you go over each item, what they are. The first is extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan—orange (1938); is that right?

General GEROW. This is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan—orange, 1938, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What does that mean?

General GEROW. That means it is a war plan that pertains specifically to operations against Japan. Japan was known as "orange." [2640]

Mr. MITCHELL. And item 2, extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan—Rainbow No. 1, what is that?

General GEROW. This document is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 1.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is Rainbow No. 1? Can you tell us what the relation of it is to the other plans, or something of that kind?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. If I might refer to the document, I can give the scope of the plan, rather than from memory.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I want you to do.

Mr. KEEFE. Why not do the same thing with respect to the orange plan?

Mr. MITCHELL. Start with orange, and tell the committee, in a general way, so we can orient these various plans and understand what they were and what their relations were to each other.

General GEROW. This joint Army and Navy basic war plan, orange, 1938, constitutes the basis upon which all Army plans, orange, and all Navy plans, orange, and all joint plans, orange, and all supporting allocations for an orange war shall be formulated and developed.

[2641] Orange, as I stated, was the code name for Japan. The document contains assumptions with regard to such a war, the concept of the war, the means assigned jointly to the Army and Navy and means assigned to each of the Army and Navy forces; joint decisions that were made by the Joint Board approving this plan; categories of defense.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that plan covered any sort of operations in that area in a war with Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; limited to the Pacific area.

Mr. MITCHELL. Limited to the Pacific?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that, of course, included Hawaii?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. As part of the area?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, give us the same information about Rainbow No. 1, which is the second item. What is the date of Rainbow No. 1?

General GEROW. Rainbow No. 1, sir, was approved on August 14, by the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. August 14, what year?

General GEROW. 1939, and August 14, 1939, by the Acting Secretary of War. This document was prepared prior [2642] to my assignment to duty in the War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand that. I am asking you, as a War Plans man, to tell the committee in a very general way, what that plan dealt with, and what its relation was to orange, 1938.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The general situation on which this plan was based, was that at the time this directive was issued, the European war was in progress, which may involve other nations, and expand the field of military action.

There is an ever present possibility of the United States being drawn into this war. There is also the possibility that peace in Europe may be followed by a situation in which the United States will be forced to defend without allies the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and our interest in the Pacific.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that plan cover operations in the Atlantic and Pacific?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does it assume a possible engagement with Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I should like to read the reference to the special situation on which it was based, sir.

[2643] Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

General GEROW. Special situation for Rainbow No. 1 [reading]:

The termination of the war in Europe is followed by a violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled with armed aggression by Japan against United States interest in the Far East. Other nations are neutral.

The purpose of the plan was "to provide for the most effective use of naval and military forces to defeat enemy objectives, particularly those in the territory and waters of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude 13 degrees south. This plan will restrict initially the projection of U. S. armed forces to the American Continents and their outlying islands, north of 13 degrees south latitude, and to the United States possessions in the Pacific westward to include Unalaska and Midway. This plan will visualize the subsequent extension of United States control into the western Pacific as rapidly as possible, consistent with the accomplishment of United States objectives in the Western Hemisphere, but no plan for such extension of operations will be prepared at this time."

Mr. MITCHELL. Go to the third item in the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 5; please look at that [2644] and give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan is, or was?

General GEROW. This plan was approved on November 19, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. I think I can best describe this plan by reading from the plan the general assumptions on which it was based, and that is:

That the associated powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

- a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
- b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Indochina, and Thailand.

That the associated powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

That even if Japan, Indochina and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

That Latin American republics will take measures to [2645] control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected

to direct attack; in general the territorial waters and land bases of these republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere defense.

Those were the assumptions on which this plan was based.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, turn to the next item, extracts from War Department Operation Plan—Rainbow No. 5. What is that?

General GEROW. After the joint Army and Navy basic war plans were prepared, the Army and Navy then separately prepared their own plans, based on that joint plan. This War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5 of 1941, is the Army plan that was prepared, based on the joint Army and Navy basic plan—Rainbow No. It contains many of the statements that are contained in the basic plan. It contains the concept of the war, the assumptions under which the war will be fought, the means of allotment of forces, the directions to subordinate commanders to prepare subordinate plans, the coordination that must be had with other departments of the Government.

Mr. MITCHELL. It includes in its scope the area of the Hawaiian Islands, does it?

General GEROW. It does; yes, sir.

[2646] Mr. MITCHELL. Did you give the date of that?

General GEROW. This document does not contain on it the date of approval, but I am sure it was in August 1941, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 44 has a note on it "Approved by the Chief of Staff, August 1941."

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I think I have that somewhere in my documents.

Mr. MITCHELL. Never mind. That is near enough.

General GEROW. I know it was sent out to Hawaii in August 1941, and the receipt was received back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell us the scope and nature of that document, and the date?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. This document was prepared initially in Hawaii. It is a local plan based on the War Department plan which I have just discussed.

Mr. MITCHELL. A plan worked out by the local commanders in 1940?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. By the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Department?

[2647] General GEROW. By the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District?

General GEROW. No, sir; this is not a joint plan. This is an Army plan. It is a little different from a plan, sir. It is what we call a defense project.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

General GEROW. It contains the objective to be accomplished, but is primarily directed toward setting up the means that are required to carry out that war mission in considerable detail.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask of the General: You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in August 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates?

General GEROW. This defense project is prepared annually and revised annually. This is the 1940 edition. The 1941 edition had not been completed at that time, but the orange plan of 1938 and the rainbow plan No. 1, contained the war missions for Hawaii, and those plans were taken together with the other data with which to revise the defense project which was in existence at that time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is that? [2648]

General GEROW. This is a joint plan that is prepared by the local commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy, based on the joint plans, Army and Navy plans furnished by the War Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the date of it?

General GEROW. This document was approved at the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, the 11th of April 1941, and Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, 11th of April 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will state that that document is in Exhibit 44, set forth in full, not a mere extract of it. The whole thing is in this exhibit 44.

The next item is No. 7, annex No. VII, to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is the date of that, and what is it?

General GEROW. Will you repeat that question, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is annex No. VII to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is that document, the nature of it, and the date of it?

General GEROW. Annex No. VII, sir; to that document is a local plan prepared by the Fourteenth Naval District and the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. It is dated the 28th of March 1941, and covers joint security measures, protection of the fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

[2649] Mr. MITCHELL. The next item in the same volume, No. 8, is the Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement).

What exhibit is that?

Mr. GESELL. Forty-four.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever see the report dated August 20, 1941, entitled "A Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii"?

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of that, please?

Mr. MITCHELL. August 20, 1941.

It is entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii," addressed to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., through Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., which has heretofore been marked Exhibit 13. Did you ever see that report?

General GEROW. I cannot recall at this time as having ever seen that report, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the report which considered the vulnerability of Hawaii to an air attack at a time that it would likely come, in the morning, from carriers, and things of that kind, and then went on to estimate the ways of defeating it, and the number of planes that would be required to run a 360° long-range reconnaissance to detect the Jap carriers the evening before.

General GEROW. I have read the document since, just prior to this investigation.

[2650] Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't see it at the time?

General GEROW. At the time I don't recall having seen it, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. 9, the next item in the index, "5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department."

Will you look at that and tell us what it is?

General GEROW. That document, sir, is contained in the operation orders of the Hawaiian Department dated 1941, sir. It is, as stated, a standing operating procedure.

Mr. MITCHELL. Promulgated by whom?

General GEROW. By the commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. On his own, not a direction from Washington?

General GEROW. No, sir; on his own.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the document in which General Short directed his air alerts 1, 2, 3, or am I wrong about that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; they are included in this document.

Mr. MITCHELL. Alert 1, sabotage without threat from without, and so on?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see that document before December 7, 1941?

General GEROW. I don't recall ever having seen it before [2651] December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it came in later in 1942.

Mr. MITCHELL. The 10th item is "Field Order No. 1," and 11, "Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan"; 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41."

Those are Navy documents and Admiral Turner can describe them more fully, but just to complete the story here will you look at them and tell us in a general way what the nature of them is?

General GEROW. That is number 10, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. 10, 11 and 12. Ten is the first, "Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department." Give the date of it and, if you can from inspection, the general nature of it.

General GEROW. No. 10, sir, "Field Order No. 1 (Naval Security)," is an Army document.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. And it is the operations order as gotten out by the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It has no date. It is intended as an order to be put into effect when the emergency arrives.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is No. 11? 11, 12, and 13, they are Navy documents?

General GEROW. No. 11 is a Navy document, sir, based, as [2652] this paper indicates, on Rainbow No. 5.

Mr. MITCHELL. It would be a corresponding document to the Army operations plan on Rainbow 5, similar?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It was prepared in compliance with the directive contained in the joint Army-Navy basic plan, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41 (revised)—Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

What is the date of that?

General GEROW. That is dated, sir, October 14, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. By whom is that issued or authorized?

General GEROW. The heading shows that it is issued by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. MITCHELL. The 13th item is "Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District."

What is the date of that and by whom issued or authorized?

General GEROW. That is dated 27 February 1941 and is issued by the Headquarters of the Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, General Gerow, you have gone over these documents and also you have gone over Exhibit 44 which contains either extracts or complete copies of them, have you not?

[2653] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And I asked you to prepare on the basis of your study of all these plans a condensed statement giving as a War Plans man, your analysis and conclusions as to the respective functions of the Army and the Navy or the 14th Naval District or the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Have you done that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you coordinate that with Admiral Turner who was War Plans Officer in the Navy when you were in the War Plans in the War Department? Did you submit the matter to him and get his consideration of your memorandum, your conclusions?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I took this paper, after I prepared it, over to Admiral Turner and informally discussed it with him and asked him if he concurred, and he said he did, sir, and I furnished him a copy.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you give to the committee the answer to the question I submitted to you? That is, the question is to present to the committee a brief statement of your analysis and conclusions of all these plans with a view to stating what the respective functions of the Army and the Navy were against an air attack in the defense of Oahu.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. May I read from this paper that I have already prepared?

[2654] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could the record show the date of the request and whether the instrument was written recently?

Mr. GESELL. It has been distributed to all members.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, but that brings up the question of distributing these papers on the morning. It is just impossible to go through and read these papers while we are listening to a witness. Is it possible to get these papers in the evening and not have them put before us in the morning? This is an example. I have been trying to read these papers and listen to witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can't answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we get an answer from counsel right now?

Mr. MITCHELL. We got this document late last evening. We have had the mimeographing agencies of about every department of the Government chasing up and down getting these copies out, we have been running them ragged about it, and we are doing the very best we can.

I didn't get this summary, or even a draft of it, from General Gerow until a day or two ago, and then we had to have it mimeographed, and we got it last night.

Senator FERGUSON. How long has counsel had these other papers that were put before us?

[2655] The CHAIRMAN. Might the Chair suggest that we go into other papers at a different time from a time when we are on the verge of hearing General Gerow read the paper that he prepared. You asked when it was prepared and I think that is proper. But let's not go to the other papers.

Senator FERGUSON. We will go back to this one. Did we not have a rule, or at least a semblance of a rule, that we were to get any statements read by a witness 24 hours in advance?

The CHAIRMAN. We had an understanding that where a witness testified from a manuscript we would attempt to get the manuscript at least 24 hours in advance. The Chair does not understand that that applies to a mere memorandum that a witness would use during his testimony which is oral. If the Chair misunderstood, he is subject to correction.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, this is an answer to a direct question that was given to this witness sometime ago. Why could the committee not have had this answer in advance?

Mr. MITCHELL. I have answered that question. I have stated that I asked the witness to give us his estimate. I didn't know that he wanted to write it out, necessarily, but to come here and testify to it. When he got to work on it he found he could do it better if he put it in memorandum form [2656] and consulted Admiral Turner about it. He did that within the last day or two and we didn't get the statement until late last night. If the committee wants him to state his conclusions orally he will do it. He has asked permission to read this document and comment on it so that his statement may be more accurate and better organized.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, as I understood counsel, the statement was received a day or two ago and then it had to be mimeographed. Did I understand correctly?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't remember of having seen it at all until yesterday. Yesterday was Tuesday, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Don't you have a record—

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to know whether we are examining this witness or cross-examining counsel. I stated we have done our best in this matter and I don't see that counsel's office is under any criticism, proper criticism, in a case like this. You understand the facts fully. The witness was asked to prepare his conclusions and an analysis of those plans as to the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy. He went to work on it. At the last minute he wanted to put it in writing so that he could read it. He having put it in that shape we wanted to have it mimeographed so that the committee could follow it. It was done late last evening [2657] and delivered last night.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair suggests that General Gerow proceed to read his statement.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I think this thing should be clarified. I gather from what has been said that it may be that additional help is required to enable counsel to perform what the committee agreed was most desirable.

I have followed the practice with every document which I have received from counsel of noting not only the date but the hour. That practice is followed in all Government departments. I would like to know the day and hour when this document was received. And then, if counsel has not adequate mimeographing assistance, with all the facilities of the Government at his disposal, we ought to see that he gets more.

This is an illustration of what can be found in connection with Pearl Harbor, that they didn't have adequate help. We agreed we needed these things in advance. I see no reason why the committee shouldn't provide whatever facilities are necessary to do that in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not know how many mimeographing outfits there are in Washington. All those that are available for our use are being utilized, I understand, for that purpose.

[2658] The Chair does not think that a memorandum, in the midst of oral testimony, comes within the rule that we provided for that in advance manuscript testimony should be furnished to the committee 24 hours in advance, or any other length of time in advance.

General Miles the other day read a memorandum which he wanted to read in the midst of his oral testimony and no question was raised about it. The Chair thinks General Gerow should be permitted to read this memorandum if he thinks it is more accurate than he could give it orally.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As a suggestion, it is now 5 minutes to 12. I suggest that we recess at this point and that will give the members 2 hours to read this memorandum which is now before them and we can meet at 2 o'clock and hear General Gerow read it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Gesell reminds me also that one of the difficulties we are up against right now is, as indicated by this situation, due to the complete disarrangement of our order of proof.

General Gerow was not on the list until we got through with General Miles. Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner also came ahead of him. We had to jam him on the stand today in order to give some basic material as a basis for General Marshall's testimony.

[2659] If General Gerow had come in his regular order we would not have this situation. We must take that into account.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee undoubtedly understands that it has been necessary to improvise due to the change of schedule, which is due to General Marshall's appearance this week.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make a short statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The statement about which so much fuss is being made is 6½ pages. Substantially all of what the witness has covered has been in the hands of the committee for over 2 weeks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I suggest that we recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[2660]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will proceed with General Gerow.

**TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW
(RESUMED)**

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to my statement this morning. Since the noon recess, at half past twelve I received a report from the State Department. They heard from the British and Dutch about the intercept messages.

I reported this morning the Australians reported they did not get any such message, and that the British reported they haven't, but that report was not quite complete. They say some message got into Singapore 6 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, and we are taking steps to get the text of that, to see what kind of message it was.

The Dutch said they haven't.

I also should have said this morning that the FBI have reported to us they have no trace of ever having had it, and having it in their file.

About this difficulty about mimeographing, I want to state additions to my staff would not help us any. It is a question of getting the mimeographing and photostatic equipment and the trained men. We are using now the mimeographing [2661] and photostatic equipment and personnel of the Navy Department, and that in the War Department, and the central mimeographing and photostatic equipment, and if there are any other mimeographs stationed around that I could get hold of I would be glad to take possession of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will the committee be presented with that information? I have in mind the exact information that comes in on this so-called winds message.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; I have not had it mimeographed because it is not complete. I wanted to do a complete job and hand it all to the committee in advance of our proposed arrangement to have the winds message taken up as a special order.

I have now one report from the FBI, and I have letters from the State Department. I have one copy, I think, and maybe more, and I think that has been mimeographed, of the report from General MacArthur. I will give you mimeographed copies as we get them.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands that the counsel is now reporting informally but later he will give the committee the official report to which he referred.

Mr. MITCHELL. The only reason I brought this up this morning was that once before I was criticized by allowing certain members of the committee to proceed in an examination that assumed certain facts to be so when I had information in [2662] my possession and kept quiet on it, so that they were proceeding on a false assumption. I was merely trying to aid the committee so they can guide their own questions and not make assumptions of fact which might not turn out to be so.

I also did it because, as I say, before General Marshall was called we expected to give the committee the full record on the thing, and,

not being able to do it, I thought I ought to make an attempt, at least, to show the state of the inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee appreciates that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the thing that disturbs me, as a member of the committee, is the fact—and it can be indicated here—that counsel has drawn certain conclusions. I am unwilling to draw any conclusions at this time, until the committee has all of the sworn testimony and evidence before it.

I am quite disturbed over the fact that, on this particular evidence, it appears that counsel is drawing certain conclusions at this particular moment, prior to the committee getting the exact evidence upon which those conclusions are drawn.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to state that he hopes, and I am sure the whole committee hopes, that the committee as a whole and as individual members will draw no conclusions about any phase of this investigation until the whole testimony [2663] is in. The Chair understood counsel to be merely trying to bring the committee up to date as of today, in view of the disarrangement of the program and schedule made necessary by General Marshall's earlier appearance. The chairman did not understand that counsel was drawing any conclusions, except reporting up to this hour, or up to this morning, what had been found or had not been found in regard to official records and documents.

Mr. MITCHELL. I did say this, Senator, I said on the record as it stood up to date I had grave doubts as to whether the winds intercept messages, indicating war with the United States, had ever been sent out, and I expressly reserve the right to change my view after I have heard all the rest of the testimony on it.

Now, I do not think a man is going to be blamed for having serious doubt, on the present state of the record, about it. I am guilty of that, I admit, for whatever it is worth. I never got this far in a lawsuit before without having some idea of what the probabilities of the case were. I do not think I would be worth anything as a lawyer if I didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the committee understands that any of our doubts, or I might say any of our preconceived notions can be subject to change in view of evidence that may be brought to the committee, and therefore we have all proceeded [2664] on the theory that we are open-minded on any proposition respecting this investigation until the whole evidence is in.

At any stage of the hearing we may have some doubts about something that has been done up to date, but we will not make up our minds until all the evidence is completed.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether or not the difficulty does not arise somewhat from the unusual relationship of the counsel in this hearing. We all more or less recognize our places. I take it that the counsel necessarily takes a position that this hearing is quasi-judicial, so that his expression of opinion in this fashion, before the evidence is all in, does have a little anticipatory aspect.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. It will undoubtedly be overcome by evidence that any such message was received.

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The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, let us hear the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will proceed with the witness.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, you were about to give a statement of your summary of the respective functions of the Army and the Navy at Oahu under the existing plans with respect to defense in an air attack.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is, the plans up to December 7, 1941.

[2665] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you please do that.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared and issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These responsibilities were expressed in the various plans in terms of joint missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the exception as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war plans current in 1941, as follows:

JOINT MISSION

To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

NAVY MISSION

To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

ARMY MISSION

To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army mission "to support the Naval Forces" was deleted, and the following was substituted: "Support Naval Forces in the [2666] protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases."

That is the statement of the Army mission as it appears in Rainbow 5.

I desire to invite the attention of the committee to:

3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for mutual support.

4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed to accept certain responsibilities for defense against air attack. These agreements are to be found in the various local joint plans and the separate plans of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current plans in Hawaii on December 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans and agreements contain the following major provisions pertaining to defense against air attack:

I shall discuss, first, antiaircraft defense.

The responsibility of the Army for antiaircraft defense was as follows:

Army—(1) "Shall provide for: a. The * * * anti- [2667] aircraft defense of Oahu."

(2) Army Antiaircraft, "supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft."

(3) The Army, "Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in Pearl Harbor and the Army antiaircraft defense as may be practicable."

The Navy's responsibility was:

"The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District * * * are taking certain security measures, which include:

"(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor. * * *

In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shorebased on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

"The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District * * * shall: (a) exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack. (b) Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced." * * *

"(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense."

I have drawn some conclusions from those different agreements. They are mine.

[2668] I believe that the commanders on the ground that made these agreements are in a much better position to interpret them, and say exactly what their intentions were at the time, than I am, but these are the conclusions that I have drawn from those paragraphs:

The orders and agreements on the part of the local Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army but that the Navy had a secondary responsibility in connection therewith.

I go next to the Aircraft Warning Service.

The responsibility of the Army for antiaircraft warning service was:

(1) The Army "shall provide for: * * *

b. "An antiaircraft * * * intelligence and warning service."

The Navy responsibility was:

During the period prior to the completion of the aircraft warning service installation, the Navy, through use of radar, and other appropriate means will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks that may be practicable."

My conclusion with regard to the aircraft warning service is as follows:

The Army had primary responsibility for the establishment of an aircraft warning service. [2669] The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means as it had, pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that relate to what we have called radar, or is it broader than that?

General GEROW. It relates to radar, sir.

I might say in that connection that I understand that the radar on Navy ships is not particularly effective when there is an intervening terrain obstacle. It is all right across the water, but not so effective when close to an intervening article.

Aircraft defense: I have broken it down into three phases; the reconnaissance phase, the defensive air phase, and the offensive air phase. I state first the reconnaissance phase.

The responsibility of the Army:

(1) "Shall provide for:

* * *

"Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu Defensive Coastal Area in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol."

The responsibility of the Navy:

(1) Navy "shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol. b. An offshore patrol * * * i. Distant reconnaissance.

[2670] (2) "When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be

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under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations."

Defensive air, I shall discuss next.

The Army's responsibility for defensive air operations is:

The Army was responsible for:

b. "Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army."

The Navy responsibilities were.

(1) "Each commander will * * * make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant."

(2) "With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable."

I turn now to offensive air operations.

The Army will:

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea within range of Army bombers."

The Navy's responsibility—

[2671] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may we have order?

I can't hear the witness for the buzzing that is on the right.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

General GEROW. The Navy responsibilities. The Navy:

(1) "Shall provide for * * * j. Attacking enemy naval forces."

(2) "Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy."

My conclusions, as to the responsibility for aircraft operations in defense of Oahu against attack from aircraft are as follows:

The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile surface craft. The Army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of the service primarily responsible, the opposite service was charged with supporting the operation within the means available to it.

To summarize, it will be seen from the above analysis that:

(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against aircraft;

(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility [2672] for anti-aircraft defense, aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the Navy had the primary responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air operations, each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the other with the means available to them in order to provide the maximum effective defense.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, returning for a moment to these three joint plans, the Singapore plan, the British conversations, and the Canadian plan that we took up this morning, were any deployments, or steps ever taken by the United States prior to December 7 to put any of those plans into operation? December 7, 1941. You told us that the British and Dutch plans were never approved and only the Canadian had been finally approved. I want to know whether approved or not approved, the United States ever put those plans, or any part of them into effect before December 7, the joint plans, if you know?

General GEROW. I don't believe, sir, I can answer that question offhand. We certainly made some preliminary dispositions so we would be prepared to carry out those plans but without studying the

history of the orders prior to December 7, sir, I prefer not to answer that question.

[2673] Mr. MITCHELL. You will kindly look that up for us so that when you return to the stand after General Marshall has testified you may be able to answer, please.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Could any of these other nations, as you read these joint plans, put them into effect without the consent of the United States, so as at any time to obligate or make necessary that the United States do likewise?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, in this matter of preparation of war plans, whether our own plans or jointly with some other nation, has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the contingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities with other nations?

General GEROW. Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for operations against any major power or combination of major powers, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is, you didn't make any distinction, generally, between those we were friendly with and those we were unfriendly with. Do you have plans against everybody practically?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, at one time I think we had plans against most everybody, sir, and I think that is the [2674] practice of every general staff of every nation.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is partly a matter of training in drawing plans and partly a matter of being ready if trouble comes; is that it?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that is especially true, of course, in the situation where our foreign relations with any particular nation are becoming tense?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. We concentrate then on a particular plan that pertains to that nation.

Mr. MITCHELL. If the General Staff did not do that and got caught without any plans if hostilities started, it would be a rather sickly situation for the General Staff, would it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. We would be accused of neglecting our duty.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to this pink book, telegraph messages between the War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to December 7, 1941. It has been offered in evidence as Exhibit 32. You have examined that, have you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Could you tell us whether you knew about those messages or had copies available to you at or about the time they were sent, what the practice was about that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I knew about most of these [2675] messages. There are one or two that I didn't know about, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Can you identify those that you didn't know about?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I do not believe that I had the copy of the message referred to in this document at page 19, sir, dated the 4th of December.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is a dispatch from the commanding general at Hawaii to the Chief of the Army Air Corps; is that the one you refer to?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; on page 19, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How did these dispatches come to you? Some of them you participated in preparing, did you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. Some of them are what might be called joint messages prepared by the war plans of both the Army and Navy working together. Others were messages that were prepared in the War Department for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Counsel, if I may interject, this exhibit you are now referring to, the folder I have shows December 10. That must be an error.

Mr. MITCHELL. What page?

Senator LUCAS. Page 19. Exhibit 32. Is that the correct date?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

[2676] Senator LUCAS. That came after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mr. GESELL. There is an earlier message, Senator Lucas, from General Short, which appears earlier. This one, however, I think, was dated December 10.

Senator LUCAS. All right. I apologize for interrupting.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. GESELL. That may have been sent somewhat earlier. I think the December 10 date is the arrival date.

Mr. MITCHELL. It says on it, "Received December 10."

Mr. MURPHY. It says, at the beginning, "December 4, No. 1033." "No. 1033 December 4th." Right below "Chief Army Air Corps," top of the page on the left.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir. Sent on the 4th, received on the 10th.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

[2677] Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, on November 21, 1941, I understand you attended a conference with Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark, and Messrs. Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Ballantine, of the State Department, and I will ask you to refer to your memorandum of November 21 to the Secretary of State, part of Exhibit 18. Have you that before you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have that exhibit, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was a memorandum you made of the conference that was held on the 21st, was it, at the time you made it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it correctly records the proceedings at the meeting as you remembered them on the 24th of November 1941?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Why don't you read it?

Mr. MITCHELL. Shall I read it? It is in evidence.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a memorandum to the Chief of Staff. "Subject: Far Eastern Situation," dated November 24, 1941, and signed by General Gerow. It says [reading from Exhibit No. 18]:

A conference was held in the State Department at 9:45 a. m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark, and

[2678] General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy rep-

representatives to express their informal views from a military standpoint on a draft of a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan. (Tab A.) He explained that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted by the State Department.

The various provisions were discussed. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were of the opinion that, in general; the document was satisfactory from a military viewpoint. They requested, however, an opportunity to make a more detailed study of its possible effect on the military situation. It was agreed that comments would be submitted early the same afternoon.

The comments of Admiral Stark (Tab B) and my own (Tab C) are attached. I informed Admiral Stark verbally that I regretted the reference to Army forces in the Navy comments on provisions A 1. I feel that no restrictions should be placed on Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure.

I informed the Secretary of War and General Dryden verbally of the conference.

(Signed) L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General.

Do you remember what that related to?

[2679] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was it? That is, the document that Secretary Hull said was a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; it was a proposal, a tentative draft proposal for delivery to Japan of a modus vivendi.

Mr. MITCHELL. You got into the modus vivendi picture at that time then, did you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you make a subsequent memorandum for the Secretary of State on that subject?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. Or was it an earlier one?

General GEROW. I made one the same afternoon of the conference, November the 21st, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see. The memorandum I just read to you to the Chief of Staff was made on the 24th and related to the conference on the 21st. Now, the memorandum I am just calling your attention to was made on the same day as the conference, was it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It was agreed we would put in our views on the State Department paper that same afternoon, sir.

[2680] Mr. MITCHELL. And this one I have just referred to is your view on that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. As you made it then?

General GEROW. The one dated November the 21st.

Mr. MITCHELL. That has been offered but not read. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. Read it; yes.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the exhibit number?

Mr. MITCHELL. It was part of Exhibit 18. There were several documents together.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a memorandum for the Secretary of State. Maybe you should take a shot at it.

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I will read it.

Senator FERGUSON. May I interrupt? Both are part of Exhibit 18?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

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The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, General.

General GEROW. This is a memorandum headed [reading from Exhibit No. 18]:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION.
Washington, November 21, 1941.

[2681]

Memorandum for the Secretary of State.
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement between the United States and Japan," and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives—the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan.

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of paragraph B.—5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia. The geo- [2682] graphical lay-out in the Manchurian-Siberian area is such that military time and space factors are all in favor of Japan. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to reach an agreement as to what are "equivalent forces" and the measures to be taken to insure that no unauthorized increases are made in those forces. Such an arrangement would increase the vulnerability of the Russian position, particularly in the Maritime Provinces, and at the same time remove the very real threat to Japanese cities of the Russian air bases therein. From the United States viewpoint, it is greatly to our advantage to have the possibility of access to Siberian airfields securely guarded by a potential ally.

The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such changes.

The Chief of Staff is out of the city and consequently this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views expressed above.

(Signed) L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

[2683] Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you had a meeting again on November 24. General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Under Secretary Welles, and yourself, and possibly others, were present. Have you any memorandum of that meeting? Do you have a record of such a meeting? Do you remember anything about it?

General GEROW. I cannot recall at this time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, at this meeting on the 21st, when this proposed *modus vivendi* message was under consideration, do you remember the discussions that took place at that meeting beyond your memorandums?

General GEROW. No, sir. The memorandum would be much more correct than my memory at this time, sir. I cannot recall the details.

Mr. MITCHELL. During your conferences with the State Department people about the *modus vivendi*, do you recollect having had your attention called to a message from Mr. Churchill in which he said it was all right with Great Britain, but how about the Chinese, and it was rather thin diet for the Chinese? Do you remember having

brought to your attention the message from Chiang Kai-shek in which he protested against the modus vivendi because it would result in the collapse of the Chinese Army and defense? Do you remember anything about that?

General GEROW. I do not recall this message; no, sir. [2684] I attended this particular conference in the absence of the Chief of Staff, and that may have been discussed at some other conference at which I was not present. I do not recall that, however.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have more than one meeting that you attended with State Department people—here was Welles, of the State Department, not Mr. Hull—that dealt with this modus vivendi? Can you recall more than the one?

General GEROW. I can only recall the one, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, did you know at the time that the modus vivendi idea was going to be abandoned?

General GEROW. I do not recall that I knew that, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have a part in drafting the warning message sent by the War Department to General Short on November 27, 1941?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What function had the War Plans Division in sending a message of that character?

General GEROW. It was the responsibility of War Plans Division to prepare such draft messages for consideration of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, do I understand that it was not your function to send merely information messages? Weren't you confined to sending messages that had to do with [2685] active operations or orders?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. The responsibilities of War Plans Division were confined to operational messages. The sending of purely information was the responsibility of the G-2 Intelligence Section, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So the reason that you were brought into this warning message was because it had something in it that directed some deployments or action on the part of the addressee; was that it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It would require operations on the part of the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you your memorandum of November 27, 1941, to the Chief of Staff about that? Do you have a copy of it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have a photostat copy of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will mark that Exhibit 45. It has not yet been introduced. I offer it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It has been distributed?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. It was distributed yesterday, Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" and follows.)

[2686] Mr. MITCHELL. Will you please read that memorandum that you wrote to the Chief of Staff? Read all the notes at the top of it as well.

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General GEROW. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
War Plans Division

WASHINGTON.
WPD 4544-13.

Mr. MITCHELL. How does the first sentence start out so I can be sure I have the same thing?

General GEROW. "The Secretary of War sent for me."

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it. Well, you read the photostat then.

General GEROW. Very well, sir.

Dated 11/27/41. Initials "C. A. G." Dated November 27, 1941. There is a number "4544-13." Under that, "November the 28th, 1941. Noted: Chief of Staff" with initials that I cannot decipher. Also "Noted: Deputy Chief of Staff," with the same initials which I cannot decipher. [Reading from Exhibit No. 45:]

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. [2687] The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

[2688] 3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

(Signed) L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Then there is a notation, "Filed in O. C. S." "2 Incls: Memo. for President, 11-27-41; Memo. for TAG, 11-27-41."

And then written in: "Copy in General Gerow's book" and initials which I cannot decipher. The figures "11-28." Other figures "—11-27-41."

Then "Memorandum for TAG, 11-27-41." Then written in, "File in OAS record room." Then at the bottom lower right hand corner. "OCS-18" — it appears to be "36-125." Two letters there which I cannot decipher. Then "11-28-41."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is this Exhibit 45?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of counsel if that does correctly represent the copy furnished the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. The only difference is these different routings and notations on the bottom of it.

[2689] Senator FERGUSON. But it does show who received it on the photostatic copy but not on the other?

Mr. MITCHELL. The mimeographed copy contains these notations: "Noted: Chief of Staff, November 28" and "Noted: Deputy Chief of Staff" with the same date. The only difference is some of these routings or dates that are immaterial. The notations of who received it are on the mimeograph.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, at this meeting that you spoke about where the Secretary of War sent for you, was there considered at that meeting a draft of a proposed message to Hawaii, Panama, and other places, or only at that time the MacArthur message? Do you remember about that?

General GEROW. The conference was directed primarily to the message to the Philippines and the commanding general of the Far East, but the other messages, as I recall, were discussed and I referred in my memorandum to that fact. There were various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre discussed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Can you tell in your own way, independently of this memorandum, just what happened at that meeting, or can you add anything to the memorandum?

General GEROW. I believe now, sir, that I was in the office at the time that the Secretary of War telephoned to the [2690] Secretary of State. I believe that I heard one end of the conversation.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is, you were in the Secretary's office?

General GEROW. In the Secretary of War's office, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you heard him telephone the Secretary of State?

General GEROW. That is my recollection; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you heard one end of the conversation?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And then what did the Secretary of War report that you remember as to what the other end of the telephone had said?

General GEROW. The Secretary, after he had completed this conversation, stated to me that it is too abrupt to say the negotiations shall terminate, that the Secretary of State won't quite go along with that. "He says to all intents and purposes," I recall, "with the barest possibilities of their being resumed" and based on that I cannot recall whether I noted the exact wording in the message that was sent, or whether the Secretary wrote it down in his own handwriting. I cannot recall at this time, sir.

[2691] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you are speaking now of the message to the Philippines?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; the message to the Philippines, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you used that same phrase in your message later to Hawaii, didn't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. The Philippines message, which was, I know, definitely approved by the Secretary of War, formed a basis for the preparation of the other messages to the other three commanders in the Pacific area.

Mr. MITCHELL. In other words, the War Plans Division took upon itself the task of drafting in its own way the messages to the other commanders on the basis of the one that had been agreed upon for the Philippines, was that what had happened?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; but I cannot recall whether all of them were presented to the Secretary of War later on for approval or not; I cannot recall at this time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I notice that so far as concerns the dispatch to General Short and the one from the Navy to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy did not put any qualification about negotiations being resumed, did they?

General GEROW. I cannot remember exactly what happened about the Navy message that was sent. I believe it was [2692] written earlier, prior to the conversation that I had with the Secretary of War, and I believe that it might have been sent prior to the dispatch of the message that was sent by War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the Navy was not present then when this conversation between the Secretary of War with Secretary Hull over the telephone took place. Is that your recollection?

General GEROW. No, sir; I believe that the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Stark were both there at the time of that conversation but I cannot be sure, sir. I cannot accurately state whether that was my first conference that I had with the Secretary of War when he called up or the second one, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will call your attention to this: The message which you drafted for General Marshall, to go over General Marshall's name to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department says:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

That was put in there at the suggestion of Secretary Stimson after talking with Mr. Hull over the telephone, as I understand it.

[2693] General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, the Navy message of the same date from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet says this:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Stop. Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

Now, there is a difference between those and it is evident, I think, that the Navy dispatch did not know anything about the conversation with Mr. Hull or the man who wrote the Navy dispatch. So are you sure that the Navy was present at this conference that you spoke about, which you and General Bryden attended with the Secretary of War?

General GEROW. I am sure that the Navy was not present at the first conference. I am positive that Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark were present at the second conference.

Mr. MITCHELL. You say:

Later in the morning I attended a conference with Secretary of War and Navy and Admiral Stark.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember whether at that second conference at which the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral [2694] Stark were present their attention was called to the fact that Mr. Hull wanted to water down the statement that it was a complete breach or termination of negotiations with Japan? Do you have any recollection about that?

General GEROW. Well, the entire message was discussed. I cannot recall now whether there was any particular reference to that particular sentence.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, do you remember anything further about the discussion other than what you have stated in your memorandum here of November 27, 1941? Does anything come back to you that I haven't asked you about?

General GEROW. No, sir; I cannot remember anything else, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, the original draft of the message that was prepared to send to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department contained, I understand, some phrase about sabotage, did it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you seen Exhibit 36, the photostat copy of the original draft?

General GEROW. I have a photostat copy, sir. I imagine it is the same one that you have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it. I call your attention to the fact that in this draft, dated November 27, which was a memo- [2695] randum for the Adjutant General through the Secretary of the General Staff, says:

The Secretary of War directs that the following, considered as a priority message, be dispatched by cable, radio, or telegraph to each of the following: Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department; Commanding General of the Caribbean Defense Command.

Then there is a line:

also to the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command.

and that seems to be stricken out.

Do you see that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And then at the bottom of that page in the draft are these words:

Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately.

A line is drawn through those words and the initials "L. T. G." there. Did you cause both those deletions to be made? The upper one does not seem to be your deletion.

General GEROW. No, sir, the upper one is not my initials, I do not know who made that, sir, but I do positively recall making the deletion which referred to subversive activities, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How did that, or at whose instance did [2696] that original statement about subversive activities get into the draft, do you know?

General GEROW. No, sir. Some time during the preparation of this message by the officers of War Planes Division under my instructions that phrase was inserted. Whether it was done after a conference

with G-2 or not, I do not recall it, but when it was brought to me for approval I objected to the inclusion in the message.

Mr. MITCHELL. On what ground?

General GEROW. This message was intended to warn the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of the possibility of an attack from without, not against subversive activities, so I asked for a meeting—

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean not only against subversive activities?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, but primarily directed against the possibility of an attack from without.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, except for that sentence that you struck out, there isn't a word in the draft about subversive activities or sabotage?

General GEROW. No, sir. That was primarily a responsibility of G-2, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you state you struck it out because you did not want it limited, is that the idea, or you did not [2697] want any specific danger to be mentioned. What is your recollection about that?

General GEROW. Well, I wanted to be sure that this message would cover only—that this message could be interpreted only as warning the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from without.

Mr. MITCHELL. So it was stricken out at your suggestion?

General GEROW. At a conference held that afternoon in the office of General Bryden, attended by General Miles and Colonel Bundy and myself, there was quite a considerable discussion. It was finally agreed that the phrase should be stricken out and it was also agreed that General Miles would send a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department with regard to being on guard against subversive activities.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, can you remember anything more about the discussion relating to striking out those two lines?

General GEROW. No, sir, except the fact that I did not feel it to be appropriate to include a reference to subversive activities in this War Plans Division operational message.

Mr. MITCHELL. You made that point at the conference, you mean?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[2698] Mr. MITCHELL. And who urged the other view, if anybody did, that the subversive activities be mentioned in the main dispatch? Do you have any recollection about that?

General GEROW. General Miles felt very strongly, as I recall, sir, that some reference to subversive activities, protection against subversive activities should be transmitted to the commanding general in Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it was settled that it should not be in the main warning but would take the form of another sabotage dispatch from the G-2 in Washington to the G-2 officer on General Short's staff?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know at the time of the sending of the second subversive and sabotage message over General Adams' signature and the other one over General Arnold's, at his request? Did you know about those?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I attended a conference with regard to that message, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Whom was the conference with?

General GEROW. As I recall—

Mr. MITCHELL. There are two messages I am referring to, one over Adams' name and the other one over the Chief of the Air Corps' signature.

General GEROW. I do not recall the one over the signature of the Chief of Air Corps. I do recall the one that was sent over the signature of Adams. That was a conference attended by General Miles and, as I recall, General Scanlon and myself. I do not recall who else was present. [2699]

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember the nature of the discussion?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. The discussion revolved, as I recall, largely around the fact that General Miles was concerned that in preventing subversive activities that the military might exceed authority and cause some difficulties.

Mr. MITCHELL. That the military might what?

General GEROW. Might apply—

Mr. MITCHELL. Illegal measures?

General GEROW. Well, not illegal measures, no, sir, but measures that might antagonize the—

Mr. MITCHELL. People?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I am not clear in my mind, sir, on that particular message because that was a G-2 responsibility and I was called into that conference only incidentally.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, do you remember anything about the other message, sabotage messages that went forward over General Arnold's signature?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was addressed to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department? [2700]

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not recall that message.

Mr. MITCHELL. Under date of November 28. It was sent over General Adams' signature, but the last two words are "Signed—Arnold." That would be an Air Corps message?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I do not recall being in on the preparation of that message, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have referred to you for examination the reports of the various commanders to whom these warning messages had been sent, the Army commanders?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. Those reports came over my desk, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You saw the report from General Short on November 28, 1941, 5:57 a. m.? Would that be Honolulu time?

General GEROW. May I find the report, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is on page 12 of exhibit 32, the pink book covering telegraph messages between the War Department and Hawaii. Do you have it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. 5:37 a. m. That means Honolulu time as you understand it?

General GEROW. I do not know, sir. That is put on by the Signal Corps and I do not know, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see. That report reads this way:

[2701] Report Department alerted to prevent Sabotage Period Liaison with Navy REURAD Four Seven Two Twenty Seventh. SHORT.

Now, I will ask you to look at the one from MacArthur on the previous page, page 11, which reads:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy Stop Ground security measures have been taken Stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense Stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

You got also a telegram from General Andrews. Is that Frank M. Andrews in the Caribbean area?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Under date of November 28, on page 16 of Exhibit 32. His answer is:

REURAD four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested being forwarded air mail.

And on page 18, 18-A and 18-B of this Exhibit 32 we find General Andrews' report that came in by air mail in response to the message you sent him. He says:

[2702] Naval measures. At the present time, it is believed that the defensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal; however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy has been worked out and coordinated with the various Naval commanders in the Caribbean Theater. In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance.

Did you see that report from General Andrews?

General GEROW. I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see also the one from General Dewitt on page 15, which goes at length into the measures he had taken?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, I believe that I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was General Marshall out of the city on the 27th when the warning message was sent over his name?

General GEROW. To the best of my recollection and belief he was, sir.

[2703] Mr. MITCHELL. Do you know whether he had anything to do with the draft of it before he left?

General GEROW. There was some discussion of a message, informal discussion, at the Joint Board meeting. I do not recall the details of that discussion, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was a meeting at which General Marshall was in attendance?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How long before the 27th?

General GEROW. That was the day preceding, sir; the 26th.

Mr. MITCHELL. On the 26th?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. At the time you received Short's reply was your attention directed to the brevity of it as compared with the other re-

ports, the reports that you had received from other commanding officers?

General GEROW. No, sir, it was not. The procedure in the War Plans Division at that time was for the executive officer to bring to my desk for information copies of important messages and letters. This document came to my desk and was initialed by me. It was then routed to the proper section of War Plans Division, which in this instance would be the Plans group, headed by Colonel Bundy who is now dead. I did not see this message from General Short again prior to December the 7th. I stated in my—

[2704] Mr. MITCHELL. Just a minute. I show you a photostat of General MacArthur's report of action taken of November 28, to which is attached a photostat of General Short's report, and attached to that is a routing sheet, and I will ask you, have you that before you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, I have that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would the routing sheet show whether those two reports were attached together as they were routed through the department. Could you tell? The routing sheet shows two message numbers, doesn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I am trying to identify those numbers.

Mr. MITCHELL. Look at the lower right-hand corner of each of the two messages, and you get the number as shown on the routing sheet, do you not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So it is quite obvious, is it not, from these documents that MacArthur's report and Short's report were fastened together with a single routing sheet as they came to your hand? I notice, "Noted W. P. D." with your initials on it on the first message. That is right, isn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the same thing on the second message?

[2705] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will offer this in evidence as Exhibit No. 46.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, that will be accepted as Exhibit 46.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 46.")

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice also on the MacArthur message "Noted H. S." Is that Secretary Stimson?

General GEROW. It looks like his signature; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Like his own writing? It says under it "Stimson." What does that mean? Is that somebody's else writing?

General GEROW. I should say so; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are the initials in "Noted H. S." Mr. Stimson's initials, do you know?

General GEROW. They look to me like they are, sir, from what I can remember of his writing.

Mr. MITCHELL. And underneath that "Noted L. T. G." Can you tell which one of you saw it first? Would the routing message show that?

General GEROW. No, sir; I cannot tell from this who saw it first.

Mr. MITCHELL. The same thing appears on the Short [2706] report on the next photostat page.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice at the top of MacArthur's message on the right, the words "To Secretary of War, G. C. M." Is that in General Marshall's handwriting?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That means that General Marshall probably saw it before Secretary Stimson saw it, does it not? He was directing it to be forwarded to the Secretary of War?

General GEROW. It would indicate that; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice General Marshall's initials do not appear on the next page, which is the Short report, but only on the first one. Is that correct?

General GEROW. His initials do not appear on the Short message.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire where General Marshall's initials are on the photostat?

Mr. MITCHELL. On the right-hand corner.

Senator FERGUSON. Up at the top of the page?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman might also note that the "Noted Stimson" looks like there are three initials there [2707] instead of "H. S."

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, his middle initial, "H. L. S."

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, does the original have on the bottom of it "Noted, Chief of Staff," and no initials under that? Both of them have "Noted, Chief of Staff," and then one has a special note up at the top of the initials. What does this stamp mean? Does counsel know?

Mr. MITCHELL. I suppose it was stamped on there for the Chief of Staff to initial. He did not do it, but instead of that he noted up at the top "To Secretary of War G. C. M."

Senator FERGUSON. What is the "O-4-c"?

Mr. MITCHELL. I will have to ask the witness about that. I am not in a position to guess about it.

The first question, General, is on the first message, the first page being the MacArthur report, a photostat of it. Above the words "Noted W. P. D." and your initials, "L. T. G." are the stamped words, printed with a stamp, "Noted Chief of Staff," and under it there are no initials to the effect that General Marshall noted it. Now, can you understand why that stamp would be put on there? Would it be in preparation of a signature, or what? When the thing came to you, were the words "Noted W. P. D." stamped on there?

[2708] General GEROW. Yes, sir, they would be stamped thereon by my office. The "Noted Chief of Staff" would be stamped by the Office of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see. Before it was shown to him?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. By the way, it was stamped "Noted W. P. D." before it was shown to you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So you infer instead of noting his initials down there, the general put the message up at the top, "To Secretary of War G. C. M."?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

May I bring up, sir, the question of this routing slip?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; anything you think of that we ought to know, General.

General GEROW. You will note that the routing slip is a routing slip from the office of the secretary, General Staff. That would normally come down to the War Plans Division, as is indicated here with those two papers attached. My executive may or may not have kept the routing slip on there. He may have removed it, or put the War Plans Division slip on it. What they did I do not know, sir, but it is necessarily true that that routing slip appeared on these [2709] messages when they were brought to me, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. This is the way the record stands in the War Department, that it was put on there at some time?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean after you saw it.

General GEROW. No, sir. When these messages went into the Office of the Chief of Staff, for example, sir, the secretary of the General Staff would put his routing slip on it to send it to the War Plans Division, attaching the two messages, and the messenger would bring it down to my executive and my executive would receipt for it, and then that paper may or may not continue to keep the same routing slip.

Mr. MITCHELL. What would be your conclusion from that? I do not quite get the drift?

General GEROW. No conclusion, sir, except I understood a minute ago you asked me if that routing slip was on it when it came to my desk. That was my understanding of the question, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, is that correct? You know that these two documents came together, do you?

General GEROW. I cannot testify to that fact. I do not recall that now, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is only because there is a routing [2710] slip, with both numbers on the same routing slip that you infer they did come together?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I think we would like to be sure about it.

Is it your conclusion that the routing slip does not show that they were together when they were presented to you, or that it does?

General GEROW. They show that they were together when they were presented—handed to my executive officer because he initialed it. Whether it continued on there I cannot testify at this time. I think it is rather immaterial as to whether it did or not, sir.

[2711] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, where did your executive officer initial it?

General GEROW. He initialed, if you notice, on the routing slip, sir. You see "A. C. of S., WPD, noted WPD, CAG." That was Colonel Galey, those initials, my executive officer.

Mr. MITCHELL. This assistant secretary, or assistant chief of staff, War Plans Division, noted and those initials, are your secretary?

General GEROW. My executive, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your executive?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, he initialed the routing slip covering both messages?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So the routing slip must have been on there when it got to your office.

General GEROW. When it reached the War Plans Division; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why do you think it would be detached when it was handed to you?

General GEROW. It might have been detached, sir, since that was the routing slip from the Office of the Chief of Staff. Whether my executive might have put on other papers afterwards to route it to a division section within the War [2712] Plans Division, I cannot state at this time, sir, but we had certain routing slips within the War Plans Division itself, just as the Office of the Chief of Staff had a routing slip.

Mr. MITCHELL. You say you saw both messages?

General GEROW. I saw both of those messages; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You are in doubt whether you saw them both attached together at the same time?

General GEROW. I am in doubt, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it is certain that they both came together to your executive, did they not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And where was your executive's office?

General GEROW. His office was adjacent to mine, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then is it your theory that after the two papers with the routing slip came to your executive, he detached the routing slip before he handed it to you for initialing?

General GEROW. I do not remember his exact procedure.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why should he take the routing slip off? If the two messages came in with the routing slip and he initialed the routing slip showing both messages were there and then he brought it into your office to show it to you, why would he take the routing slip off?

General GEROW. Well, you see, sir, the routing slip is [2713] a routing from the office of the Chief of Staff to the Office of the War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

General GEROW. Now the War Plans Division itself had routing slips if the executive routed the paper from the executive office to the chief of plans group, for example, or the chief of projects group.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the routing slip was prepared in your War Plans Division then?

General GEROW. No, sir. This routing slip was apparently the routing slip that was prepared, as you notice, by the Office of the Secretary, General Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. It got to your office with both these messages attached to it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then your theory is it may have been taken off before you saw it?

General GEROW. The messages may have been separated by the executive officer in War Plans Division for routing to the section of the War Plans Division which would handle that message.

Mr. MITCHELL. After you saw it?

General GEROW. I do not know, sir, whether it was before or after, but I saw both the messages, sir.

[2714] Mr. MITCHELL. You may have a chance later to clear that up. I do not believe I quite get the result.

When you saw the Short message did you then know about the joint arrangement required under which the Navy would conduct long distance air reconnaissance and that the Army would supply to the Navy for that purpose such heavy bombers as it had available for that work?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I knew of the agreement in Hawaii, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you saw General Short's reply I wish you would state, in your own way, General, just what your reaction was to it, and what you thought about it.

General GEROW. Well, sir, as I testified before the Roberts Commission, I assumed when that message came through that it was an answer to the G-2 message that was sent out by General Miles to the Hawaiian Department the evening before. I was probably led to that assumption by the fact that the question of sabotage had been discussed quite at length after that conference on the evening before.

I do not remember now, at this late date, what my reaction was to the message.

The message was then sent out, as I stated before, to the plans group, which was headed by Colonel Bundy, who is now dead. I do not know what Colonel Bundy's reactions were to [2715] that message. I don't remember ever discussing it with him. It is reasonable to assume that he may possibly have interpreted the message to mean, or that part of the message which said "liaison with the Navy," that the commanding general out there had instituted protective measures against sabotage and was working with the Navy to arrange for other defensive measures, including reconnaissance.

I do not know that that was Colonel Bundy's thought, but it was a reasonable assumption from the way the message was worded. I did not see the message after it was sent to Colonel Bundy prior to December 7.

The message contained two short sentences: One, "Alerted against sabotage," and the other stating "liaison with the Navy." It also contained a reference to a No. 472, as I recall. That message meant nothing to me at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the number meant nothing?

General GEROW. The number meant nothing to me, sir, because that number was put on by the Signal Corps and it was not the number assigned to that particular document by the War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean you had to go to the Signal Corps office to find out what the dispatch was that was numbered 472; is that it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. Insofar as I know, sir, no [2716] inquiry with regard to that message was sent to General Short. In the light of subsequent events, I feel now that it might have been desirable to send such an inquiry, and had such inquiry been sent it would probably have developed the fact that the commanding general in Hawaii was not at that time carrying out the directive in the message signed "Marshall."

If that had been done, there would have been an opportunity to correct the situation, but I do not believe that the message could necessarily be interpreted as meaning that sabotage measures only were being taken.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there was nothing there to suggest that there was anything else but sabotage measures, except the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And what interpretation did you place then, if you know, on the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General GEROW. As I testified, sir, I had assumed that the message was in answer to the G-2 message and it was then routed to a section of War Plans Division. I did not see that message again, so I did not have an opportunity at that time, or did not make any assumption regarding what the phrase "liaison with the Navy" meant. I think my executive officer, or the chief of my plans group, might possibly have interpreted the message that way, and that is why it was not brought back [2717] to me and my attention invited to the fact that it did not explicitly cover the operation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, if you interpreted this message as an answer to G-2, or Adams, as a sabotage message, then you were left in the position of having no report at all from Short about the main warning message that you sent over Marshall's signature?

General GEROW. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. To strengthen that position?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did it occur to you to wonder why Short did not respond to the main warning message?

General GEROW. Well, sir, I was handling a great many papers at that time, and it was the responsibility of the officers in my division to check the messages and correspondence and bring to my attention anything of importance that required action on my part, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Even if your staff had the responsibility of following up on these things, the comparison between the two-lines dispatch from Short and the elaborate report from MacArthur and Andrews, and the western base command was rather sharp, was it not, General?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The message that you helped draft on [2718] November 27, No. 472, was not a mere transfer of information. It was a command, was it not, involving an order or directive?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me read it again. We all know it. It says:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period A separate message is being sent to G dash two Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in United States period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned [2719] in Rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan period

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Now, there is a direct order there, is there not? It says:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Now, did that mean if you did not deem it necessary, you were not going to take any reconnaissance or other measures?

General GEROW. No, sir. The intent of that message was to invite his attention to the necessity of conducting reconnaissance.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean he was supposed to take some measures, but the extent of them and the nature of them you left to the discretion of the local commander; is that it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had given him an order then and you got a report that as you interpret the order, this message of Short's had been a response, or you thought it was a response, to 472, and it would be a report by Short that he failed to carry out your instructions, would not it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that why you thought it was a report about the sabotage messages?

General GEROW. Well, it never occurred to me, sir, that [2720] General Short would not take some reconnaissance and other defensive measures after the receipt of this message. He was an experienced commander and it never entered my mind that he would not take such action.

[2721] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have been following this testimony very closely, and I would like to ask counsel at this time, if he can, to pin down this one thing: This message is directed from Fort Shafter to the Chief of Staff. Short's message is directed to the Chief of Staff.

Now, if it had been a reply to the G-2 message, to whom would the reply to the G-2 message normally be directed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you answer that question, General? You say you thought it might have been a report of Short's about the sabotage message. Now, one of those was Adams', wasn't it; that is, Adjutant General?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The other was Adams over the signature of the Army Air Forces man.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The third one was signed Miles.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of G-2.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, the Congressman would like to know, and so would the committee, the reply to any one of those three, when it was addressed to the Chief of Staff, wouldn't Short have wired back to the man who sent the message he was reporting about?

[2722] General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So that right on the face of it, it showed that it was a report on your message 472.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is, if you stop to think the other messages weren't signed, "Marshall."

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel right there, because I would like to get this pinned down while we are going through it, do I understand the witness to testify now that upon further recollection and consideration of this message, the reply of General Short to the message that went to him from Marshall, the fact that the message is directed to the Chief of Staff is in itself proof that it was a direct reply to the Marshall message and not a reply to any message sent by G-2 or anyone else?

Mr. MITCHELL. He has just stated that. Is that correct?

General GEROW. Yes. In my mind, the message in question was a reply to the message from General Marshall.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a little more than that. It is clear that it was, apparently, but I am asking you whether on the face of the message that ought not to have been clear to you when you saw it?

[2723] General GEROW. I didn't notice that fact, sir, when the message came over my desk.

Mr. MITCHELL. Assuming that you thought it was not a reply to your main instruction to take reconnaissance and other measures, on that theory you never got a report from Short about your 472 message, although you asked him to report measures taken; isn't that correct?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So far as you know there was no follow-up by you or any member of your staff to elicit from General Short a more complete report or further information or any word as to what he had done, no follow-up prior to December 7?

General GEROW. No, sir; there was no follow-up sent to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that counsel follow what Congressman Keefe had in mind. The message from General Short was routed to Secretary Stimson's office also by the Chief of Staff. Whether that would make any difference as to whether it was a reply to the Miles or the other message when the Chief of Staff routed it to the Secretary of War.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry.

I understand the anxiety of the distinguished Senator [2724] from Michigan, and I understand the anxiety of the distinguished Congressman. But there is an order of procedure here. I have a lot of questions I would like to ask too.

I realize they are anxious to get information, but the rule was to be that counsel would conduct the examination and then the witness would be turned over to each of us to dissect his testimony. If we are going to have suggestions, I have four or five to make too.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to state that the rule which we adopted doesn't seem necessarily to preclude the members of the committee from asking counsel to clear up a point that he is inquiring about at the time.

The rule applied to the examination of the witness by members of the committee by rotation after the counsel had concluded.

Mr. MITCHELL. Within reasonable limits, it doesn't bother me.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to say that I agree that the suggestion of the Senator from Michigan and of the Congressman are excellent suggestions, in view of the fact that we are going to have General Marshall here in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the reason I suggested counsel asking that question, because General Marshall will [2725] be here in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has ruled.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I don't want to ignore the suggestions anyway.

I am going to ask the General whether he knows from this routing slip, or the notations on it, whether when it came to him, it had the notation by General Marshall to send it to the Secretary of War, and whether it had Mr. Stimson's handwriting, the word in Mr. Stimson's handwriting "Noted." Could you tell us about that?

General GEROW. I can't recall now, sir, whether it was on at the time it came to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the ordinary course of procedure, would it have reached you before it went to the Chief of Staff? What was the practice with a message like this? Would it go directly to the Chief of Staff and then to you?

General GEROW. I would say that in this particular case it would go to the Chief of Staff first. Messages did come both ways. There were messages coming to me that I would send up to the Chief of Staff. This, I believe would have gone to the Chief of Staff first.

I think the way the initials are shown on there, we could presume that it had gone through that channel.

Mr. MITCHELL. So your inference is that it went to [2726] General Marshall first, went to the Secretary of War next, and then came down to you; is that right?

General GEROW. I would presume that, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So that at that stage of the game, you know that the report had gone directly to General Marshall, being in answer to a message that had gone out over his signature?

General GEROW. I didn't understand.

Mr. MITCHELL. You knew from the face of it that it had gone—the Short report—had come first to General Marshall, because it was an answer to the message sent over General Marshall's signature.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. If General Marshall signed a telegram and his name was appended to it, and the answer came in, it was the practice to send it to him, was it, or did it come to you first?

General GEROW. I believe the practice would be it would go to him first, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know at the time you saw General Short's report that he had established locally what he called Alert No. 1, which said "Look out for sabotage with no threat from without"? Did you know about that?

I think maybe I asked you that this morning. Did I?

[2727] General GEROW. No, sir; you didn't ask me that.

Mr. MITCHELL. I did ask you if you had prior to December 7 seen the local order of General Short establishing what he called Alert No. 1, and you said it didn't come in until the following year sometime.

General GEROW. That is correct. It came in sometime, I think, in March 1942, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you have had any way of knowing what his Alert No. 1 was, if you didn't have that order before you?

General GEROW. No, sir; I would not have known what Alert No. 1 was.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember after the Short report was received that you had any discussion with anybody, with General Marshall or anybody in the War Plans Division, about the Short report, or the question of its sufficiency, or the question of whether it ought to be supplemented, or a further report should be asked for?

General GEROW. I do not recall any such discussion, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, I am going to read to you a paragraph in Secretary Stimson's report on the Pearl Harbor incident, in which he says this:

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in [2728] response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of actions, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action.

While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless, a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered.

The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done, and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

Do you think that is a fair statement of the situation?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to the War Department [2729] for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility must rest on War Plans Division, and I accept that responsibility as Chief of War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, we find that the Short report and an opportunity to compare it with the MacArthur report went up higher than you. It went to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War. It wasn't their function to follow up things like this?

General GEROW. No, sir; I was a staff adviser to the Chief of Staff, and I had a group of 48 officers to assist me. It was my responsibility to see that those messages were checked, and if an inquiry was necessary, the War Plans Division should have drafted such an inquiry and presented it to the Chief of Staff for approval.

As I said, I was chief of that division, and it was my responsibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether the committee would be willing to sit a little longer tonight.

I have some other matters that we ought to go into before General Marshall is called.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate is not in session. It has already adjourned for the day. Is it agreeable to the committee to sit a little while longer?

[2730] Without objection that will be done.

Senator GEORGE. Let me ask how long.

The CHAIRMAN. About how long, Senator George asks.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is hard for me to estimate. I will keep going until you think I ought to stop.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Might I offer one brief suggestion to counsel. General Marshall initialed this top paper, which is the MacArthur message. I think it would be helpful to find out whether this Short message was also attached to that and whether it would be reasonable to assume that those initials of General Marshall applied to both of these.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have done all I can with the general about that. Those two were brought in together. The two documents were attached, and he saw them both together.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest that General Marshall has already testified on his impressions on that very thing and will do so tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's get going and get to him.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, I show you four intercepted Japanese messages concerning military installations and ship movements that I found at pages 12, 13, 14, and 15, in exhibit 2, which is entitled "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc." [2731]

We turn first to the one on page 12. You have examined that message, have you not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, and translated October 9, which directs the spies or somebody in Honolulu—Jap spies—to divide the harbor area, the Pearl Harbor waters, into five different areas, and calls for specific information, not merely as to ship movements, but as to location of the vessels specifically in each one of those areas.

Then on page 13 is a message from Honolulu to Washington. The message states:

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels.

This is dated September 29, translated October 10

It is suggested repair dock in navy yard will be called KS.

Navy dock in the navy yard, KT.

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island, FV.

And the east and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Then there is one in the same series on page 14 which is a report from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18, [2732] translated December 6. That is rather late, but I will refer to it. It is a report of battleships and other vessels in specified areas.

Finally, there is one on page 15, Tokyo to Honolulu, November 18, translated December 5, and one dated November 29, translated December 5, which reads:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

I have called your attention to those messages before, have I not, and their possible significance?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did they come to your attention at or about the time they were translated?

General GEROW. I believe they did, sir. Most of those important intercepted messages were brought to my attention, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you any personal recollection of their having been received by you?

General GEROW. Not of these particular messages; no, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would there be any record in the War Department by which it could be told whether they were shown to you or not?

[2733] General GEROW. No, sir. These messages were brought to me in a locked dispatch case by an officer. He unlocked the dispatch case and stood there while I read the messages. Sometimes there would only be 1 message, and other times 10 or 15. I kept no record and I believe he kept none of the ones I actually saw.

Mr. MITCHELL. And after you saw them, the officer would go out with the messages?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. They were not left with you for evaluation?

General GEROW. No, sir; they were not.

Mr. MITCHELL. Unless something was shown you that was so apparent that you saw it instantly, and made an evaluation of it, you wouldn't do any evaluation work on it, would you?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you have been allowed to keep these dispatches in your possession for some time for the purpose of studying them if you wanted to?

General GEROW. No, sir. Under the instructions I had received, they were to be returned immediately to the officer presenting them to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where would they go for evaluation?

General GEROW. G-2, sir.

[2734] Mr. MITCHELL. And I suppose you don't know, not being in the Signal Corps, what the explanation may be for the delay between the actual interception of some of these Japanese messages and the time when they were actually translated?

General GEROW. No, sir. That was a Signal Corps responsibility, and I never had occasion to inquire into it. I did at one time ask a Signal Corps officer how it was done and he told me that he had positive orders not to divulge that except on order of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. You don't mean as to the delay?

General GEROW. No, sir; not the delay.

Mr. MITCHELL. You never noticed that?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose a message came in and was shown to you that was of a character that, when evaluated, would call for action by War Plans Division, not merely transmission of warning, or information, but a directive, such as the message you sent to General Short on November 27. As I understand it, the War Plans only interfered in

these messages when there was an operational directive involved? Is that right?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you depend on G-2 for evaluation of [2735] messages intercepted which might lead to directional orders by you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I depended on G-2 for the evaluation of all enemy intelligence.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why were they shown to you?

General GEROW. For information, sir, and to keep me abreast of the general situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, is there any doubt in your mind about the respective responsibilities of G-2 and the War Plans Division for evaluating messages about the military installation?

General GEROW. There is no question in my mind at all sir. That is a responsibility of G-2.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, to put it bluntly, suppose one of these messages intercepted from the Japanese was brought in to your office in a pouch and that message had stated boldly "Be all ready on December 7. That is the date we are going to attack." Would you have any responsibility to do anything with that message?

General GEROW. I certainly would have had; yes, sir.

I would have taken it and prepared at once the warning message for the approval of the Chief of Staff and submitted it to him as quickly as possible.

Mr. MITCHELL. That would be a message directing him [2736] to take measures to meet the attack?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. That would have been an operational message.

Mr. MITCHELL. So, if the evaluation of the message was obvious, then you were supposed to make an evaluation of it.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. If the message obviously indicated operations were necessary on the part of our Army forces, I would take action, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The question was asked General Miles:

Then, in other words, while you weren't as a matter of fact or procedure sending the text of the messages or the gist of them or a summary of them to the theatres, it was, even in the fact of these security considerations, always open to the Chief of Staff to send specific instructions or directions to the Commander at Hawaii or the Philippines, or elsewhere, based on the information which had been obtained from intercepts?

General MILES. That is true, and at this point I think I should like to go further and point out that from early August, I think the 5 of August, 1941, we discontinued, by direction of the Chief of Staff, presenting magic in evaluated form. So the Chief of Staff and the Chief of War Plans Division, Secretary of War, were from then on [2737] doing their own evaluating of the raw material that we were presenting to them in the form of magic.

Do you remember anything about that?

General GEROW. I am sure I was never informed that G-2 had discontinued evaluating magic.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you know whether there was any direction of the Chief of Staff that you should make your own evaluations?

General GEROW. I do not. There was no such direction issued to me, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to have you refer to your memorandum of November 3 to the Chief of Staff on the far eastern situation, exhibit 16. It is one of the documents in exhibit 16. Have you that before you?

General GEROW. I have it; yes, sir. That is the memorandum of November 3, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair asks that the committee be in order. There is a good deal of confusion—conversation.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before we get into another subject, it is my understanding that General Miles' testimony was that he was ordered in August to pass on the raw material, but there was nothing in General Miles testimony, as I understand, that he was to discontinue acting as G-2 in evaluating in addition to supplying the raw material.

[2738] Mr. MITCHELL. I guess you are right, because the next question on this page, that I could have read to the general, was this:

Mr. GESELL. You mean that from August on G-2 had no responsibility to evaluate the intercepted material?

General MILES. No, sir, I do not mean that, but I do mean that our responsibility in that respect was somewhat lessened by the direction of the Chief of Staff that he wanted not only the evaluation of the Military Intelligence Division, but he wanted to see the material itself, the raw material itself, presented to him.

That seems to clear the matter up, doesn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. From that time did you still continue to get evaluations from G-2?

General GEROW. I received from G-2 estimates.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you had also the opportunity, under this pouch delivery system and inspection, a chance to at least read over the raw material, did you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your memorandum of the 3d of November, 1941 to the Chief of Staff, part of exhibit 16, speaks of a conference held at the State Department on the morning of November 1. Do you want to add anything to the incident [2739] that isn't contained in your memorandum?

General GEROW. I don't believe there is anything I can add at this time from memory, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In that memorandum you speak of the policy derived in the American-British Staff conferences. Does that include the Singapore conference, preliminary conference—on page 2 of the memorandum?

General GEROW. That would apply to both the ABC conference held in Washington, and the Singapore conferences as well.

Mr. MITCHELL. You speak there of the fact that one of the recommendations is that the movement of counteraction against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan, and one of those is the movement of Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the west of 100° east or south of 10° north, meaning there a recommendation that had been made by the Singapore conference?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will offer now, Mr. Chairman, as exhibit 47, some supplementary documents that are underlying documents for this

memorandum, or report, of General Gerow on November 3, which is contained in exhibit 16.

This document I am now offering contains a telegram [2740] from Chungking to the Secretary of State in Washington, signed by Mr. Gauss. I think he was the State Department man out there. Dated November 3. Another one of the same date from Chungking to Washington, signed by Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they both included in exhibit 47?

Mr. MITCHELL. They are both included.

There is also another one in exhibit 47. This is Navy Department, office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, memorandum for the Director, dated November 1, 1941, signed by R. A. Boone for A. H. McCollum.

And a telegram from Alusna. That means the Chungking naval attaché.

The CHAIRMAN. The documents will be received as exhibit No. 47.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47".)

Mr. MITCHELL. I will not stop to read them now.

General Gerow, you remember that there is in the record what we call a 14-part message and a 1 p. m. message, which was the Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to their Ambassadors in Washington which came in on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[2741] Mr. MITCHELL. We offered this morning in evidence, as exhibit 41, a summary of the movements of that message and the date of its interception, and when it was received in Washington, and when it was decoded and so on, and so far as the documentary proof shows, eliminating matters that have to be established by witnesses—I am just reminding you what the message was so that I can ask you questions about it.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have anything to do with that message or know if its receipt on the 6th or any part of it?

General GEROW. No, sir. I did not know of the existence of the message and I did not see it on the 6th of December. I understand there has been some testimony in previous investigations to the effect that it was presented to the War Plans Division. It was never presented to the War Plans Division on the 6th of December.

Mr. MITCHELL. The message, according to this record, which we will assume is correct for the present, 13 parts of it, if I may remind you, consisted of a long discussion by the Japanese about their diplomatic position and about ours.

The fourteenth part of that 14-part message was the clause [2742] that said they were through, that they thought negotiations were no longer necessary.

The record here shows that that fourteenth part, the breaking off, was translated at least after midnight December 6, because it bears the translation date of December 7. Then there followed what we call a 1 p. m. message, which was a supplementary message directing the Ambassadors at Washington to present that final message to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., on Sunday, December 7.

That, according to this record, was translated on the 7th, which was sometime after midnight.

Does that refresh your recollection any on it at all as to the message, that is, as to any of the incidents connected with it?

[2743] General GEROW. Well, the first time the 14-part message or the 1 p. m. message was in the office of the Chief of Staff on the morning of December 7th was about 11:30 o'clock.

Mr. MITCHELL. Can you remember what you were doing on the evening of December the 6th?

General GEROW. No, sir; I cannot recall at this time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you have any record? Do you keep a diary?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is a great contribution to this cause.

Mr. MITCHELL. You cannot recall what you were doing. You had a good many things since December 7 to engage you, including such little things as the Omaha Beach attack, haven't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you tried to cast your memory back to those events as far as you could?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; and I cannot recall what I was doing.

Mr. MITCHELL. What you were doing on the night of December 6?

General GEROW. What I was doing on the night of De- [2744]
cember 6; no, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You do not remember whether you were at your office or at your quarters or what not?

General GEROW. No, sir; I cannot recall. If there was a large volume of work I probably worked down at the office until 6 or 7 or 8 o'clock. If there was not I probably was home. I do not recall being out to dinner on that particular evening.

Mr. MITCHELL. But you are confident that you never saw that 14-part message, or any part of it, or the 1 p. m. message until you got into General Marshall's office around 11:30 on the morning of the 7th?

General GEROW. I am positive, yes, sir, of that fact.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest one thing? As I understand it he did not see the 13 parts either.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is it?

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, his testimony is that he did not see any part of the 14 parts, either one.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he says now.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you seen lately this memorandum from you that is already in Exhibit 39 in evidence, dated December 15, 1941, called a "Memorandum for Record" and signed by you, recording the events of the morning of De- [2745] cember 7? Have you examined that lately?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I read it recently, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose you take a look at it.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That memorandum states that about December—I suppose that this document is a more reliable record of what had occurred because it was made December 15, 1941, than your present recollection would be?

General GEROW. It will be, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You will have to depend on this, will you not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That states that :

About 11 : 30 A. M. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, General Marshall called me to his office.

That was the occasion for your going to his office?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that mean that you were in your office?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And called to his [reading] :

General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the [2746] State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East ; CG Caribbean Defense Command ; CG Hawaiian Department ; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

Do you remember anything more about that meeting in General Marshall's office on the morning of December 7, 1941, than is stated here in this memo?

General GEROW. No, sir ; I do not.

Mr. MITCHELL. This message was one which was obviously important, especially when it got down to part 14 and the 1 p. m. part of it. Is that message which in the ordinary course of practice in the War Department somebody with [2747] a pouch would probably have brought into your office in the Department?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had that been done prior to your going to General Marshall's office?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever make any inquiry as to why it had not been delivered to your office before 11 : 30, when it had been translated at an earlier hour?

General GEROW. No, sir ; I did not.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, have you a memorandum of November 17, 1941, that you presented to General Marshall regarding efforts of the Army and Navy to arrange a unity of command in Hawaii and at other points?

General GEROW. Yes, sir ; I have here a copy of such a memorandum, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of that, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. MITCHELL. This is November 17, 1941.

Your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated November 17, 1941, "Subject : Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers," is a short one and a longer one on the same date.

Were they both presented at the same time? I have two memoranda for the Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941, [2748] signed by you, both of which relate to the method of coordination of command in coastal frontiers. Have you both of them before you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir ; I have both copies.

Mr. MITCHELL. Both documents?

General GEROW. Both documents; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to number as exhibit 48 and now offer in evidence three documents, all in one exhibit: November 17, 1941, memorandum from General Gerow to the Chief of Staff about the method of coordination of command in Coastal Frontiers; another one, memorandum of the same date on the same subject from General Gerow; and a letter which clears up the story, dated December 20, 1941, "Personal and Confidential", addressed to "My dear Emmons." That is General Emmons who succeeded to the command of the Hawaiian Department about that time?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. This memo or letter is signed by "G. C. Marshall."

Senator LUCAS. Was this memorandum dated December 20 issued after the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, that is November 17.

Senator LUCAS. Oh, I see; November 17.

Mr. MITCHELL. The letter of General Marshall directed [2749] to General Emmons and dated December 20, 1941, was after the attack on Pearl Harbor. That letter was directed to General Emmons, who succeeded General Short. The two letters of General Gerow are dated November 17.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Mr. MITCHELL. They both relate to coordination of commands in Coastal Frontiers and, among other things, do they include Hawaii?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you tell in your own way, General, just how—

The CHAIRMAN. Those documents will be received under the title of exhibit 48.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 48").

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you just state in your own language how this subject happened to come up for consideration and who considered it and what the proposal was?

General GEROW. I just saw these papers yesterday, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see, Would you rather have me read them first?

General GEROW. I can read them, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, read them into the record. They are somewhat important.

[2750] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And I think the committee would like to hear them. Read the short ones first.

General GEROW. The short one of November 17 first.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the memorandum from you to the Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. (Reading:)

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning Committee since last February. At a recent meeting of The Joint Board, Admiral Stark suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.

2. The case is divisible into two main subjects—Changes in Coastal Frontiers and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philippine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The Joint Planning Committee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of Command in the Coastal Frontiers.

3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined in the attached Memorandum to you. [2751] The Memorandum also embodies my views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

4. If the Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that you approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate by mutual cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command at this time I can hold the case in suspense for the time being.

(Signed) L. T. GEOW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

The second and longer memorandum reads as follows:

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

I. Discussion.

1. Joint Board case (J. B. No. 350, Serial 678) prescribing coordination of command is now before the Joint Planning Committee.

2. The Navy section proposes changes in command relations in the following coastal frontiers:

a. Caribbean.

[2752] Coordination by the method of unity of command, command being vested in the Commandant of the 10th Naval District.

b. Panama.

Coordination by unity of command, command being vested in the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department except when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations in either the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean. In this contingency command would be vested in the Commandant of the 15th Naval District.

c. Hawaii.

Coordination by unity of command as follows:

(1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian Department when the most important strategic problem is one of territorial defense of the Hawaiian Islands and when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.

(2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th Naval District when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.

3. The Army section proposes the following, appli- [2753] cable to all coastal frontiers:

a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the defense of a coastal frontier is vested in the Army, except when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet or the major portion thereof is operating against comparable hostile forces within the radius of possible support by Army aviation operating from bases within the coastal frontier. In the excepted case, unity of command is vested in the Navy.

b. In a specific operation, unity of command in coastal frontiers may be transferred from the Army to the Navy and vice versa, when the senior Army and Navy commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

c. Unity of command does not authorize the service in which it is vested to assign missions that will require the forces of the other service to operate from bases outside the coastal frontier.

4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have been unable to reach an agreement on a compromise solution of the problem of unity of command. The Army section does not believe that unity of command in coastal frontiers is essential. It is believed that [2754] the Navy section will agree to a continuation of coordination by mutual cooperation.

5. The vesting in a single individual of full responsibility for a military operation is a generally accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective military action. In theory at least, no amount of personal willingness to cooperate can eliminate the objections inherent in the committee system of control of military forces. The most frequently cited recent example of the effect of such divided responsibility is that of failure of the defense of Crete as contrasted with the

successful attack on that island in which the attacking force presumably was commanded by a single individual.

6. Unity of command is the accepted method of coordination within the Army and within the Navy, themselves. However, the many practical difficulties encountered in the application of that principle as applied to joint operations of the Army and Navy have usually led to the adoption of the method of coordination by mutual cooperation except when specific tasks are planned.

7. The difficulty of determining the service in which unity of command should vest in the defense of a coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in [2755] advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and the extent of the operations. For that reason it is difficult to foresee which service will play the major part in the defense and will have primary interest. The major responsibility may well pass from one service to the other during defensive operations. On the other hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations requiring support from Naval forces, such as those in Libya, present problems in which the service having preponderance of responsibility can readily be determined. The time such an operation should begin, as well as terminate, and its nature and extent can be forecast and the service having the preponderance of responsibility definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby indicating the service in which unity of command should vest. In such operations the preponderance of responsibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other as might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers.

A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that although the major operation is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the [2756] Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services.

II. *Action recommended.*

That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee.

[2757] Mr. MITCHELL. Now that report states the fact that the Army and Navy representatives on the Joint Planning Committee were in direct disagreement about this question of unity of command in Hawaii and other coastal frontiers?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And your statement there is that the Army does not think the unity of command is essential. Was the Army making any effort to secure unity of command at that time?

General GEROW. I think that statement means essential under the conditions which we had at that time. I think the only way you can have effective unity of command is for the tops of the services to say, "So and so is in command, and he is in command from now on." You cannot vary that command from day to day depending on what the operation is. One man must be responsible for preparing that place for operation, and he must be responsible for commanding it after he has prepared it.

Mr. MITCHELL. This report of yours would indicate that the people in that conference of the Planning Board wanted a scheme by which that command would shift back and forth from the Army to the Navy and from the Navy to the Army depending on the nature of attack or defense?

General GEROW. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not believe in that?

[2758] General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The result was, because of these differences between the Army and Navy you came in and recommended the only thing you can do is to get mutual cooperation?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I thought mutual cooperation would be better than a continual switching of command. I did not think either the Army or Navy planning group would agree to say wholeheartedly, "You take everything and it will be agreeable to us." Neither would agree to that. That is the only way I saw it could be done.

Mr. MITCHELL. That somebody at the top had to knock their heads together and tell them what to do?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You remember that in the local plans—I call them "plans" but it may not be the right word—arranged between General Short and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor there was a provision there that they had agreed, if they did agree to it, there would be unity of command if the two got together and fixed on one of them for the commandant, do you remember that provision?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; they do have authority, the commanders on the ground out there, to agree to such unity of command and who would exercise it.

Mr. MITCHELL. But you had no information on that, as to [2759] whatever was attempted by the commander prior to December 7?

General GEROW. I have no information that such an agreement was entered into.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now I will read this letter from General Marshall to General Emmons on December 20, 1941:

MY DEAR EMMONS: Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning unity of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama.

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both [2760] Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.

This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him this morning.

You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support you.

[2761] Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL.

General DLOS C. EMMONS,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, T. H.

Now, if the committee please, I have not finished entirely with General Gerow, but I feel I have finished everything that I can do tonight which will help in the Marshall examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Under those conditions we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

General Gerow, you will come on later after General Marshall.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, December 6, 1945.)

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel, Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2763] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
General Marshall, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL, SPECIAL ENVOY TO CHINA¹

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Marshall, when were you appointed Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff on July 1, 1939, and formally appointed and confirmed Chief of Staff on the 1st of September 1939.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you served until what date?

General MARSHALL. I think it was until November 20 just past.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of this year?

General MARSHALL. Of this year.

Mr. MITCHELL. During your service in the Army have you ever had any service in the Far East?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I spent about 5 years in the Philippines and a little short of 3 years in China.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was your service in China?

General MARSHALL. I was either in command or executive officer of the 15th Infantry at Tientsin.

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall, will you move a little closer to the microphone, please.

[2764] Mr. MITCHELL. Did you learn the Chinese language when in China?

General MARSHALL. I wouldn't admit that to a language student, but I can carry on a conversation.

Mr. MITCHELL. The gentleman who said you didn't know anything about China the other day will have to revise his ideas, probably.

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2483, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by General Marshall.

Now, will you state in your own way what the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army were during 1940 and 1941?

General MARSHALL. With your permission I will read the Army regulations on the subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is Exhibit 42.

General MARSHALL (reading):

The Chief of Staff is the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the military program. He will cause the War Department General Staff to prepare the necessary plans for recruiting, mobilization, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training the Army of the United States for use in the national defense and for demobilization. As the agent, and in the name of the Secretary of War, he issues such orders as will insure that the plans [2765] of the War Department are harmoniously executed by all agencies of the Military Establishment, and that the military program is carried out speedily and efficiently.

As Commanding General of the Field Forces.—The Chief of Staff, in addition to his duties as such, is, in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field operations and the general training of the several Armies, of the oversea forces, and of the GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the Field Forces after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a Commanding General thereof.

Those are the regulations.

Mr. MITCHELL. During 1940 and 1941 will you state in a general way what your general activities were and what problems you were dealing with?

General MARSHALL. They rather subdivided themselves into about four categories. In the first place, there was the mobilization of the Army which referred specifically to personnel and the organization of that personnel. The mobilization procedure was carried out into the corps areas of which there were nine of the United States under my direction. The [2766] organization and creation of the Army I delegated in large measure to a command I set up at what used to be the Army War College with General Leslie McNary as my deputy and he with his staff was held by me directly responsible for the organization and the training of the Army in the continental United States.

The relations with the overseas theaters, the Philippines, Hawaii, Caribbean, that is, Panama, were carried out as to detail, as to plans, proposals for me by what was then called the War Plans Division of the General Staff, now the Operations Division.

[2767] The matériel aspects of the activities were in the hands of a series of bureau chiefs—Chief of Ordnance, the Chief Quartermaster, Chief Signal Officer—and in the case, for example, of the Chief Signal Officer he not only had the problem of procurement of material but also certain operational responsibilities.

I dealt with them partly in person but largely through the medium of the four sections of the General Staff which coordinate supply and the plans and policies relating to supply.

In addition to that, there were special groups on which I had to depend, notably, that of the allocation of matériel which was probably one of the most trying problems of the day in relation to the Russians, the Chinese, the British, and to our own training and to our overseas theaters for their defense.

There was also the problem of priority which a special board, Army and Navy Board, operated and with which I was directly concerned. There was a subdivision of responsibility here, in that the Assistant Secretary, now the Undersecretary of the War Department, was chargeable under the law for the procurement activities in the field of civilian production.

The ordinary administrative point of the Army, as to [2768] records and matters of that kind, I depended largely on the Adjutant General's Department. The general coordination of administration details, I depended at that time on the senior Deputy Chief of Staff, but I created a second deputy who looked after for me the matériel factors concerned.

I think that is the general outline.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice in Secretary Stimson's report, in this Pearl Harbor Army inquiry, he makes this statement:

It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War and make plans for and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of the great army for global war, to advise on and himself to make decisions regarding the basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop, and in any other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hopelessly cripple the performance of those great and paramount duties, should the Chief of Staff allow himself to become emerged in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our Army outposts.

Does that fairly picture in your mind the situation of [2769] the Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. I think it does, sir. Throughout all of that, of course, it was my responsibility to determine, as far as it was humanly possible, what were the critical affairs in all these activities.

I omitted one reference, which was a very responsible duty, and a very difficult duty. That was in the preparation of the budget estimates of the War Department, and the representation before the committees of Congress.

Mr. MITCHELL. What policy did you have during your term as Chief of Staff with respect to the responsibility of commanders in the field, including overseas commanders, in respect to their independent initiative and responsibility and decentralization of action?

General MARSHALL. My endeavor was to select the ablest people available at the time, have their missions defined, and give them the responsibility for the positions which they occupied.

Mr. MITCHELL. You attended the Atlantic Conference at Argentina, did you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. What part did you take in that?

General MARSHALL. I was concerned with what amounted to a first getting-together, coming to know the British Chiefs [2770] of Staff. We had no agenda for our meeting.

We met and discussed general matters, largely regarding the matériel desired by the British, and then we broke up into groups, myself and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the head man of the ground forces of the British Army.

There was no question of matériel between us because we had given them all of the matériel we could afford to dispense at that time.

I believe on the Navy side, and I am quite certain on the Air side, there was considerable discussion on matériel.

With Field Marshal Sir John Dill and myself, our conversations were almost entirely devoted to a general résumé of the war situation, what the hazards were, what the anticipations were, particularly as to the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and Singapore.

[2771] Mr. MITCHELL. Did you at that meeting know of any commitment that the United States made at that meeting to engage the Nation in war if we were not attacked?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I did not. I was not involved in the political discussions.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you learn anything at that meeting about this proposal to make the parallel protests to the Japanese by England and the United States?

General MARSHALL. My recollection as to that is that I knew nothing of that until a meeting of the liaison group of the State, War, and Navy Departments in Mr. Sumner Welles' office after my return from Argentina.

Mr. MITCHELL. And what did you learn then about that, do you remember?

General MARSHALL. I was given either the information, general information with regard to, or heard read—I do not recall which—a message the President had sent.

Mr. MITCHELL. After he had sent it?

General MARSHALL. After he had sent it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you seen, or did you know about certain conferences that were had by representatives of the Army and Navy with the British on the one hand, called the ABC-1 and 2 conferences, with the Dutch and British in the Far East and with the Canadians?

[2772] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Admiral Stark brought up the proposition and I acquiesced. He arranged the meeting. I went to his office when we were receiving these officers the day they arrived.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was the British here in the United States?

General MARSHALL. Yes sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know about similar staff conferences that were being held at Singapore between the Americans, Dutch, and British?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I was familiar with that.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the one with the Canadians?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. My recollection of that is, though, that except for the defense board we afterward created, of which Mr. LaGuardia, I think, was the senior American member, we only had one meeting and that was an informal meeting at dinner and after dinner at the home of the Chief of Naval Operations out near the Naval Observatory. That is the only time I saw them.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you had an opportunity to look over those three reports; do you have copies of them?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And are you familiar with them?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[2773] Mr. MITCHELL. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I think we will offer those in evidence. We had only one copy heretofore but now they have been mimeographed. I will offer in evidence as exhibit 49—

The CHAIRMAN. All three as one exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir; I had better separate it. The report of the United States-British staff conversations in the United States; as Exhibit 50 the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore in April 1941; and as 51 the report of the conference with the Canadians.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be filed as 49, 50, and 51?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 49, 50, and 51," respectively.)

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you any knowledge as to which, if any, of those conferences were finally approved, the reports, I mean?

General MARSHALL. The report on the Canadian, with the Canadians was, I believe, formally approved by the President. My recollection is and my knowledge is at this time he gave no formal approval of any of the others.

Mr. MITCHELL. In your examination of those reports do you find anything in that other than the ordinary military [2774] and naval plans to be used on the contingency that you get into trouble with somebody?

General MARSHALL. Would you please repeat that question?

Mr. MITCHELL. What I want to know is whether you interpreted those plans as committing the Government of the United States to engage in war with anybody prior to our being attacked?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not think they do. It was not our intention that they should; quite the contrary. It was our effort to be prepared against what appeared to be a possible eventuality.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did the Army make any deployments or dispositions of troops pursuant to those plans that you remember prior to December 7, 1941?

General MARSHALL. I do not think there were any definite moves unless it may have been into Iceland and I do not recall that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever hear, during your service as Chief of Staff, of any commitment that the President or anyone else had attempted to make with any of these other nations by which the United States was committed to engage in war without being attacked?

General MITCHELL. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was there anything about these plans that [2775] you can see by which one of the other nations who participated at the conferences by their action could bring us into war?

General MARSHALL. I do not think there is.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to what we called in this case the Herron alert in 1940 and at this time, Mr. Chairman, I will offer in evidence as exhibit 52 the book containing the communications between the War Department and General Herron concerning the 1940 alert at Hawaii. General Herron was commander of the Hawaiian Department at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so filed.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 52.")

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you examined those communications as contained in that book, General?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I read it through yesterday morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember the fact that the alert was given to General Herron in June 1930?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember the circumstances under which that was done?

General MARSHALL. My recollection of the matter is that it was on the recommendation of Gen. George V. Strong of [2776] the General Staff of the War Department as a result of several branches of information, largely "magic," that there was a possibility of a threat by the Japanese in that area and, therefore, the alert.

Mr. MITCHELL. The alert, the book shows, was given to him over the signature of Adjutant General Adams.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was that at your direction?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the book shows that he continued in his state of alert, though somewhat diminishing, for several weeks after that..

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You are familiar with General Herron's reports that in obedience to the alert he puts his entire command on alert, kept his pilots out at daylight every day?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Ran reconnaissance by air?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And did all those things, kept his gunners at their guns with live ammunition?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And with the report he made that there was very little, if any, excitement among the population [2777] of Hawaii about it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you know how it happened that the Navy did not send any corresponding alert to Admiral Richardson?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the circumstances. I recall, apropos of the reconnaissance, that either through the Chief of the Air Corps or otherwise there was great concern over our wearing out the engines and we had no replacements in the planes. The problem was how long we could continue that; and, also, we were wearing out the crews.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the alert continued for several weeks?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you have noticed the reports of General Heron to the effect that there was no serious destruction of matériel?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Or wearing out of personnel even during that length of time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, General, Admiral Richardson has said that he had some conversation with you on one of his visits here respecting that alert and he quoted you as saying:

That was simply an exercise and I thought if I did [2778] not state it was an exercise, the exercise would be carried out more completely.

Do you remember any such conversations with Admiral Richardson?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. Admiral Richardson came out to my house for lunch and we had a talk then after lunch. There were some other guests at the time who also happened to be in Washington that day and I think there must be a misunderstanding in his mind because there was never any question about the purpose of that alert.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to make on behalf of Admiral Richardson a correction he wanted made in his testimony. He stated that he wired in to the Chief of Naval Operations and wanted to know what this was all about, this Herron alert, and never got any reply.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read it into the record now?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. I will not read his whole letter but the substance of it is that he has checked up on that, examined the original record and that there was a reply sent to him on June 22 which reads as follows:

War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue cooperation.

[2779] And he says that he has checked the records and found that that was actually sent and that he was mistaken. He actually received it.

The CHAIRMAN. Put the whole letter in the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will put the whole letter into the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could we have the date of the letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. The letter he writes me is dated the 28th of November 1945, and he said in his testimony that he would write such a letter after he had checked it up.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Admiral Richardson's letter follows:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 28 November 1945.

Hon. WILLIAM D. MITCHELL,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

DEAR SIR: On 21 November, 1945, I stated to the Committee: "I have not had an opportunity to verify what- [2780] ever evidence there is in official records with respect to dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark regarding the Army alert and, therefore, I request that the members of the committee hold in abeyance their judgment on that subject until I have had an opportunity to search the original records" (Page 815 of Report of Proceedings).

I have examined microfilm and photostatic copies of the original records and I find that;

(a) On 22 June 1940 I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations by radio a dispatch reading:

"Commanding General Hawaiian Department received orders War Department placing forces on alert against hostile trans-Pacific raid and since no information received Navy Department have assumed this exercise. Navy patrol planes are participating" (Page 810 of Report of Proceedings).

(b) On 22 June 1940 in reply to the above dispatch the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me by radio a priority dispatch reading:

"War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue cooperation" (Page 811 of Report of Proceedings).

[2781] The last quoted dispatch was sent from the Navy Department at 10:10 p. m. and was received by me in person as is shown by my initials on the photostatic copy of the dispatch. This dispatch was received by me after 5:00 p. m. Honolulu time on Saturday 22 June when my mind was fully occupied with secret sortie of the major portion of the Fleet which was to take place early Monday morning and since the reply left me in doubt as to the reality of the warning the fact that I received any reply escaped my mind with the result that in early July in Washington I asked both Admiral Stark and General Marshall whether the Army Alert was a real one or an exercise and testified before this Committee that I never received a reply to my dispatch.

J. O. RICHARDSON, *Admiral, USN (Ret.)*

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to the document which is in our exhibit 16, being a joint memorandum presented by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, to the President under date of November 5, 1941; that is in evidence. Have you examined that memorandum?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I read that yesterday.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state in your own way what that incident was and how you happened to make that report or [2782] memorandum?

General MARSHALL. My recollection of the matter is that there was a very urgent appeal from the generalissimo, Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, for assistance in meeting what he thought was a dangerous Japanese threat in an advance from the south toward Kunming. He wished American and British air assistance and other assistance that might be made possible for him. That, of course, would terminate the Burma Road if successful. That is my recollection of the basis of this particular joint memorandum to the President from Admiral Stark and myself.

Mr. MITCHELL. And your recommendations were?

General MARSHALL (reading):

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were you asked to prepare the memorandum?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

[2783] Mr. MITCHELL. There is another memorandum, joint, by you and Admiral Stark under date of November 27, 1941, that is our exhibit 17. Will you kindly look at that and state the circumstances or the occasion under which that was made?

General MARSHALL. The circumstances, as nearly as I can recall them now, were a combination of affairs: The quite evident threat south through the China Sea toward Malay, Malasia, and the Dutch East Indies, the development of Japanese power in Indochina, the report of the conversations recently completed at Singapore. Those, as I recall, were the principal factors which brought about this particular memorandum.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your recommendations were what?

General MARSHALL (reading):

That prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements [2784] with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice a little earlier in the memorandum this statement:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Were you there referring to this military conference held at Singapore in April 1941 that we have just discussed?

General MARSHALL. That, I believe, was the basis of their recommendation, their conclusions there.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you say there that the Dutch, British, and the United States military authorities had agreed to that action did you mean that they had made an agreement on behalf of the United States, or agreed to recommend it to their governments?

[2785] General MARSHALL. Agreed to recommend it. They had no power whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated, I think, in the—

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you made a recommendation at that time that the President join with the other nations in giving warning to Japan that if they did certain things or advanced beyond a certain point it might lead to war. Was that recommendation carried out, was any such message or warning sent to the Japanese at that time?

General MARSHALL. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to exhibit 24, dated November 30, 1941. It is a message for the President of the United States from the former naval person—that was the term used to describe Mr. Church—in which he says [reading]:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the direct character of a further aggressive step. I [2786] beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress" or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war.

That was just 3 days after your recommendation was made. Did you ever see this communication from Mr. Churchill?

[2787] General MARSHALL. I don't recall if I ever saw it.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was the same proposal, wasn't it, to make some kind of joint message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, that is the way I understand it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Or some kind of threat to Japan as to what would happen?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your recollection is that no such recommendation, either from Mr. Churchill or yourself, or Admiral Hart, was actually carried out?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall.

Mr. MITCHELL. I now go back to the question of preparations in defense of an air attack at Hawaii.

Admiral Richardson has testified that during 1940 he protested against keeping the fleet in Hawaii. He has also testified, and his documentary protests to the Secretary of the Navy show, that he based his protest not on the question of security of the fleet in port, but because the facilities for training, equipment and preparing the fleet for war were inadequate and he wanted to go back to the coast to do it.

Then it appears he testified when he went back to Honolulu, or Pearl Harbor, in December 1940, at the suggestion of Admiral Stark, he started the investigation as to the [2788] situation, as to the defense against an air attack, and we have in evidence what I call the Bloch report, which is a report that he sent in under date of December 1940 to the Chief of Naval Operations, which was signed by Admiral Stark who was the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District out there, and endorsed by Admiral Richardson.

Did you have that called to your attention when it came in, or do you remember seeing that before?

General MARSHALL. As nearly as I can recall, this is the first time I have ever seen it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, following that report the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War under date of January 24, 1941—that is our exhibit 10—in which letter he had some very strong statements, and he said:

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (5) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

He called on the Secretary of War to give his attention to the matter, and the Secretary replied that he thoroughly [2789] agreed with him, and from that time on the subject was considered ended.

Did you see that correspondence of the Secretary of War.

General MARSHALL. Yes. My recollection on this particular matter is that I must have been absent when the letter was received, but the draft of the reply for the Secretary of War's signature to the Secretary of the Navy came to me from the War Plans Division.

As I recall that draft, they did not think there was any matériel that could be made available, or virtually no matériel that could be made available earlier than October. I am not quite certain about that, but that is the impression I have now. That, I felt, whatever the circumstances, would put the Secretary of War in a rather impossible position, and therefore I started in with the War Plans Divi-

sion, with General Moore, my Deputy for Supply, and with General Arnold on the air side, to see what radical measures we might take to meet, to a degree at least, some of the requirements set forth by the Secretary of the Navy.

I might insert here apropos of your question as to whether or not I had seen—did you call it the Bloch letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Bloch report, yes.

General MARSHALL. That I had thought it was not Admiral Bloch but it was Admiral Kimmel that had generated this letter [2790] from the Secretary of the Navy up until almost this moment.

The measures we took under the circumstances were, first, as to planes. After discussing the matter with General Arnold I made the decision that we would rob practically all the Combat Pursuit Squadrons of the United States of most of their P-36 planes which was our then most serviceable type as the new P-40 had certain engine defects which had not yet been eradicated.

My recollection is—General Arnold can give you the positive testimony—that we cut most of the squadrons in the United States down to three planes. The difficulty there was, of course, that stopped the training of the Air Corps, which had to be expanded from about 1,800 men to two million and a quarter.

I took up with Admiral Stark over the telephone the problem of getting these planes to Hawaii without the necessity for crating them, which takes time for disassembling and which takes time for assembling. Whatever the conversations were, it was determined that a carrier could come into San Diego in February and pick up those planes, and I think there were other naval and marine matériel to go on the same carrier.

A number of these planes were sent out, thirty odd, I think, sufficient, with the 19 P-36's then in Hawaii, to make an even 50.

[2791] I also directed General Arnold to take up with the Curtiss people in Buffalo the expediting of their production schedule, to turn out the new P-40, which had more modern equipment and presumably would have eradicated the engine difficulties of the original model, in time for them to be shipped out to Hawaii at an early date. The date was fixed as March 15, as I recall now, as the only time a carrier could be spared from Hawaii to come into San Diego to pick up the planes. Just why that time was fixed I do not recall now.

Therefore the schedule of the Curtiss-Wright plant had to be greatly expedited. General Arnold can give you the facts.

My understanding of the matter was that the head of the firm came to Washington to see General Arnold and stated that he could not expedite the program. General Arnold brought this to my attention and I directed General Arnold to go to Buffalo and bring heavy pressure to bear on those people to at least make the effort. He did that and was successful, they made the effort, and the last planes were cleared on March 9, in time to fly to San Diego and take off in the carrier on March 15.

The other details as to matériel are covered in the letter of the Secretary of War in reply to the Secretary of [2792] the Navy.

In all these matters the great problem was how we could meet the requirements of developing an army, which had to have the tools

with which to train and without which it cannot train; how we could get something for the Philippines, which literally had nothing; how we could develop the Panama Canal defenses, which were very deficient, and how we could meet certain commitments that we had with our Allies, notably the British, in order that they might not be found wanting at a critical juncture in the coming fighting.

It stated—do you wish me to read the letter of the Secretary of War?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. This is addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, February—and I cannot read the date—1941.

In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of [2793] the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

The Hawaiian project provides for 148 pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii 36 pursuit planes; 19 of these are P-36's and 17 are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have 31 P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next 10 days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to 50 of the P-36 type and 17 of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, 50 of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

There are as present in the Hawaiian Islands 82 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 20 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns (enroute), and 109 caliber 50 anti-aircraft machine guns. The total project calls for 98 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 120 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, and 308 caliber 50 anti-aircraft machine guns.

With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the [2794] equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and Base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and 84 being manufactured—40 for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for 2,950 balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the [2795] local Naval authorities in making those measures effective.

Signed, "Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War."

Mr. MITCHELL. Now during the remainder of 1941 did you keep in touch with the resulting plans that were made for defense against air attack at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have in evidence as our exhibit 44 a joint estimate made by General Martin as commander of the Army Air Force at Hawaii, and Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of the Naval Air Force of the 14th Naval District, dated March 31, 1941.

[2796] The estimate was:

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange—that was Japan—

are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our Fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service.

In paragraph III they say:

Possible enemy action:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area;
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

[2797] They say also:

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.

They say also:

A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

They say:

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

Then, they go on on at great length, and I will not read the rest of it, but visualizing the way the situation could be handled and the possibility of long-range reconnaissance, and keeping track of the Japanese the night before.

Do you remember seeing that report?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is another one that came in later by General Martin, a study of the air situation in Hawaii, addressed by him, under date of August 20, 1941, to the [2798] Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., and forwarded by General Short. That is exhibit 13. Have you had your attention called to that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, I recall seeing it at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. He deals there very vividly with the possibilities of an air attack and the possible defense against it. You have that before you.

Now, I will offer in evidence as exhibit 53, a book containing the correspondence between—

General MARSHALL. May I interrupt?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, do so.

General MARSHALL. Before we pass these last two documents by, there was a memorandum from me regarding this air situation in Hawaii which more or less started up these various reports.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you that memorandum with you?

General MARSHALL. I haven't it with me, but I will obtain it and have it sent to you. I was shown it yesterday. It was signed by Colonel Orlando Ward.

Mr. MITCHELL. Signed by whom?

General MARSHALL. Signed by Colonel Orlando Ward, the then Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will get that later.

[2799] Senator BREWSTER. It is dated July 17, 1941. That is in exhibit 13.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 13 is the letter from General Short to the Commanding General of the Air Forces.

Senator BREWSTER. The first paragraph.

Mr. MITCHELL. It says in the first paragraph:

In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS, 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941—

General MARSHALL. That is what I am talking about.

Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii, there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

That is the memorandum that you referred to, and that you prepared, that called for this report?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Has the whole memorandum been available?

General MARSHALL. I will obtain it and send it to the committee.

[2800] I interrupted you, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am glad you did.

General MARSHALL. You started to read that correspondence.

Mr. MITCHELL. We were about to offer in evidence as exhibit 53, a book of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short, commencing in February 1941.

Before we go into that, I will call your attention to a memorandum dated February 6, 1941, of a conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff. The initials are "O.W."

Whom does that mean, do you remember?

General MARSHALL. I think that is Col. Orlando Ward, the Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. This memorandum states that the conference was held and present were yourself and General Arnold, General Miles, and General Gerow, and the subject was defense of Pearl Harbor.

General MARSHALL. Do you wish me to read it, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. I will save your voice a little and read it myself.

General MARSHALL. I do not mind.

Mr. MITCHELL. Try it, then. I will relay you occasionally.

General MARSHALL. (reading):

Present: General Marshall, General [2801] Arnold, General Miles, General Gerow

Subject: Defense of Pearl Harbor.

General Marshall indicated that the Navy had insufficient nets for defense against either submarine or plane carried torpedoes. He further indicated that there was a possibility of a Japanese attack.

This is February 6, 1941.

General Miles stated that nothing in G-2 indicated any such probability.

General Marshall stated that the planes in Honolulu were, in general, obsolescent, and that we should have a reasonable number of top flight planes which would out-perform any the Japanese could bring on their carriers.

General Arnold recommended that 31 P-36s be sent immediately in a Navy carrier to Honolulu, and that 50 P-40Bs be sent as soon as available (in March).

General Marshall stated that we really had two active defense issues—one, Panama, and the other, Honolulu.

General Arnold was to make the necessary preliminary arrangements in connection with changing plans and report to the Chief.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you said we had two active defense issues: one, Panama, and the other, Honolulu, will you develop what your idea was at that time? What was your idea in [2802] mentioning those two points?

General MARSHALL. They were the great outposts of our continental defense. We had the Philippines at that time but the equipment there and the number of troops was so inadequate that no defense against a first class power was conceivable; it would be just a desperate sacrifice.

(The correspondence between General Marshall and General Short, referred to above, was marked "Exhibit No. 53.")

Mr. MITCHELL. There is a letter from you to General Short which is dated February 7, 1941, in this Exhibit 53, which I will read for you, General.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is addressed [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

Lieut. Gen. WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter,
Territory of Hawaii.

MY DEAR SHORT: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though [2803] he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. I gathered that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that he had, in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding in his qualifications of command, and that this was the opinion of the entire Navy.

I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather that you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is *the* rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question [2804] about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in [2805] one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P38 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information, has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20 mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, [2806] delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

[2807] You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited materiel we have for Alaska, for Panama, and, *most confidentially*, for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine,

constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. [2808] Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

Faithfully yours,

[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Does that letter to General Short fairly reflected the difficulties you had at that time in obtaining matériel, planes, and other equipment?

General MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. All through this letter in your discussions, were you considering equipment, planes, and guns needed for defense against an air attack?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention now to the minutes of a meeting of the General Council, February 19, 1941.¹

What was the General Council as it stood at that time?

General MARSHALL. I haven't the regulation here which creates the General Council.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was that established by some regulation?

General MARSHALL. It was established, I think, by General MacArthur. That involved all the principal chiefs of the War Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was a War Department council and not a general council?

[2809] General MARSHALL. Purely War Department. It was the basis for keeping all the various and numerous chiefs of the War Department coordinated and aware of the general situation and requirements.

Mr. MITCHELL. The minutes of this General Council meeting show you were present, Major General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Infantry, the Chief of Cavalry, Chief of Field Artillery, Chief of Coast Artillery, Chief of Air Corps, General Brett, and many other officers.

The minutes start out with the statement that this is not a complete record of the minutes, but contains extracts and the statement which we understand you made there was:

To give you a further view of the special circumstances we have been pressed by the Navy to provide more security for the Fleet that has been gathering at Manila.

And you discuss the Manila situation and the general Philippine situation and then you proceed:

Out in Hawaii, the Fleet is anchored, but they have to be prepared against any surprise attack. I don't say any probable attack, but they have to be prepared against a surprise attack from a trick ship or torpedo planes. Our whole Navy power in general is concentrated there; they can't cruise for the next six months.

¹ Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 54.

[2810] And you discussed at some length the question of anti-aircraft guns and planes which might be available.

General Mauborgne said that another question has to do with change in priorities;—

General Mauborgne, is that?

General MARSHALL. General Mauborgne, Chief of the Signal Corps.

Mr. MITCHELL (continuing):

these pursuit people can't work without their detectors and if the situation is such that you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere in Hawaii, that you are going to have to change priorities and get some aircraft warning units mobilized.

General Marshall said we are on that right now.

General Moore said that we are making a complete study of that whole question on aircraft warning and also with reference to priorities and where we are going to establish this service first. The question came up in connection with the Alaskan aircraft warning service.

General Marshall said that with reference to priorities, he had put the cards on the table with Admiral Stark and said, where do you want it. The protection of the Fleet is of major consideration. He said that Admiral Stark was quite embarrassed. When the next planes come out over and above the .50 millimeter planes, it is a question of where [2811] they go, to Panama or the Philippine Islands. That will be up to the Navy. "I am going to allow them to practically dictate where those planes should go until we reach a certain degree of security." We haven't any modern medium bombers. They are just beginning to come off the line. The question is where do they go. That is a Navy decision, for the protection of the Fleet, and at the present time for the protection of our shores. I don't think they want the first ones in Manila. They will probably say that they want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in Panama. The Navy can almost tell us. Those priorities will all have to be solved in terms of protection of the Navy in the immediate situation.

Was that your policy all through this period?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[2812] Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want to add anything to what the minutes of the meeting report?

General MARSHALL. I can think of nothing at the moment.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to a letter from General Short to you under date of February 19, 1941, in this book we have just offered in evidence, Exhibit 53.

He says [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7, as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

He says that he is getting along well with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair-splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces.

As a result of my short study of the conditions here, I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes.

1. Cooperation with the Navy.
2. Dispersion and protection of aircraft and the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.

[2813] 3. Improvement of the antiaircraft defense.

4. Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.

5. Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.

6. Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.

7. Bomb-proofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and Communications Centers.

8. Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

Then he discusses the dispersion and protection of aircraft and bomb ers; improvement of the antiaircraft defense; and other activities that didn't directly relate to antiaircraft defense.

He also mentions bomb-proofing of vital installations, such as command posts and communication service.

That is a defense movement against air attack, is it not, bomb-proofing of vital installations?

General MARSHALL. Against air attack, against, maybe, fleet bombardment and against, maybe, a landing, if it should take place.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you any comments to make on that letter, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It did make you aware of the fact that [2814] General Short had taken your letter of February 7 to heart and was actively interested in aircraft, antiaircraft measures out there?

General MARSHALL. Very much so.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to the minutes of a meeting of the "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff" Tuesday, February 25, 1941.

I think I did not offer this in evidence, the one of February 19, which I should have offered, as Exhibit 54. That is "Notes on General Council Meeting," February 19, 1941.

I offer it as exhibit 54 and I will offer the minutes of the conference of February 25, 1941, in evidence as Exhibit 55.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 54 and 55," respectively.)

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you go through that, General Marshall, and make any comments on it that occur to you. I will read it if you like.

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I am scanning it here.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think maybe I had better read it.

General MARSHALL. I can read it for you.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right, sir.

General MARSHALL (reading Exhibit No. 55):

Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff at 10:00 a. m., Tuesday, February 25, 1941.

[2815] Present: Chief of Staff, General Emmons, General Arnold, General Brett, General Spaatz, General Gerow, Colonel McNarney, Colonel Anderson, Colonel Twaddle.

CHIEF OF STAFF. In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fleet is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be [2816] jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31 P-36 ships there. The Curtis plant has moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes

to March 10th; the Navy is sending a Carrier back for these ships. The issue is the priority with regard to new equipment. Admiral Hart has six new submarines, one old cruiser, and not one AA gun. They have now brought up the question of moving some armament from Corregidor. The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type which the Chinese turned down. If we had a single squadron of modern planes in the Philippines, it would at least give the Japanese something to think about. Then we have the question of Panama—no modern planes. I understand that the P-40s have some engine trouble which makes them dangerous flying over water. Consequently, our original allocation will be changed by the Japanese situation. Also I have a memorandum with reference to a British request for 50,000 airplanes, to be delivered in 1942. We have a deficiency of 10,000 in organizing the 14,000 program. We are concerned with the reduction of the assignment to the GHQ Air Force. It was thought to our advantage to have as many as possible in foreign garrisons. I have just been talking about pursuit. We have started [2817] a proposition to fill up outlying garrisons, those close to home aren't so much of a problem.

Colonel ANDERSON. We have made a tentative allocation of planes as follows: First priority: to the Philippine Islands—one interceptor squadron, one medium bomber squadron. To Alaska—one composite group. To Hawaii and Panama—sufficient strength to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico—one pursuit group and two bomber groups. Second priority: The equipment for an emergency force to South and Central America—three groups of heavy or medium bombers, two groups of light bombers, and two groups of intercept. Third priority: Remainder of the GHQ, minimum training requirements for the remainder of the 54 group program. We will complete training requirements before January 1942; will complete the 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; fighter pursuit in July 1942; heavy bombers in April 1942; medium bombers in December 1941; light bombers in April 1942.

CHIEF OF STAFF. What do you think about this, Emmons?

He was the commander of the GHQ Air Force.

General EMMONS. We have little means to accomplish [2618] or plans in GHQ Air Force. We are 850 officers short on the 25-group program and we won't get the shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of training centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we will have less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. With respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to the P-36 we had to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 31 out, due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present airplane strength is the B-18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P-40's we now have only 175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 50 B-17's, also 4 P-39's and 5 A-20A. We are also short of spare parts. Although we have on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 300 in the air.

General ARNOLD. The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July 1941; the 54 group by April 1942.

General EMMONS. With regard to sending equipment on foreign service it would be a mistake to send new planes overseas until the defects inherent with new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P-40B's to go to Hawaii, probably won't make much [2819] difference except with the engine.

General BRETT. The engine is improving all the time. The P-40D has a new engine.

CHIEF OF STAFF. How about the Air Depot in Hawaii?

General EMMONS. It functions very well.

General ARNOLD. With regard to this shortage of parts, we are going to have to manufacture parts in the depots—we used to do it before.

General BRETT. The shortage in parts is due to the fact that we have pushed the plane manufacturers so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect, in a measure, the production of spare parts.

General EMMONS. With regard to organization equipment, we are in pretty good shape. The only shortage is in cameras and octants. With regard to the allocation, I don't know what to say. With regard to a tactical point, Hawaii has a peculiar situation—pursuit is of little value at night, at which time—due to phosphorescence in the water—primary targets, dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand

out on the darkest night. They will have no warning service until they get detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would have long range bombers and not send pursuit, but bombers.

Conference Adjourned.

[2820] Mr. MITCHELL. Does that reflect the problems you were dealing with at that time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you any comment to make on that situation that is developed by that conference?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I don't think of anything that isn't pretty well covered.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to a letter you wrote to General Short on March 5, 1941. It says [reading from exhibit No. 53:]

MY DEAR SHORT: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being sent to you.

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set [2821] up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.

Now, what inspired that request for an early review at that date from General Short of the situation in the Hawaiian Department?

General MARSHALL. The fact that we were beginners at the business of organizing for the meeting of air attacks, the employment of radar and operation of these boards where all the movements of the ships were kept graphically illustrated, the directions to meet varying attacks. The British, of course, had developed that to a high degree in the Battle of Britain. General Chaney was directed to observe all the details of their procedure in England. He was an air officer. I recalled him to the United States, stationed him at Mitchel Field in Long Island, with directions to develop there a practical method of handling aircraft and antiaircraft in resisting air attacks and the employment of radar.

He carried on quite a development and finally had maneuvers. We carried those maneuvers eventually down the entire coast [2822] and also finally out on the west coast.

I was concerned that everybody in the Air Corps, everybody concerned with the anti-aircraft, understood the technique and its application. I, therefore, wished General Short to be brought into the picture and to have the last word so far as we could determine as to the best method of meeting air attacks.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well now, your letter was dated March 5, and there appears in this book a letter from General Short to you dated March 6. That could not have been a reply to your letter. It doesn't so state. The letters probably crossed in the mail.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That letter to you of March 6, 1941, in it General Short says [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

Dear General Marshall: One of the first projects which I investigated in this Department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these Islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about 5 miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to 120 miles, and in these Islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by [2823] which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the Fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and had communicated this concern to the Navy Department; as you know, the Secretary of War has advised the Secretary of the Navy that the equipment would be received in this Department sometime in June and the stations be operating shortly thereafter. I have discussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured him that personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within 30 days after receipt of the equipment.

I probably ought to read the rest of it.

All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 March 1941 just received from the Adjutant General regarding the Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and a paraphrase of my reply are enclosed for ready reference. The Adjutant General's radio indicates to me that the seriousness of this situation has not yet been [2824] appreciated in the War Department. It lists certain restrictions regarding construction, and if it is necessary to comply with these, the completion of this station will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at the summit of Haleakala is one of the two most important in the warning net; its commanding location gives it greater coverage than any of the others, and its early completion is vital. I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission cannot be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.

Defense of these Islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board of officers in this Department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be [2825] decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

Do you remember that Secretary of War Stimson was especially interested in these radar detectors?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, he was very much interested in that particular development.

Mr. MITCHELL. It may be anticipating, but do you know how many mobile or fixed radar detector outfits were sent to Hawaii before December 6?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is that there were six mobile sets in operation at that time and three fixed sets known in operation.

Mr. MITCHELL. In your letter of March 13 to General Short you say:

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local Naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying.

Since the Navy deployment in Kaneohe Bay has exceeded the project originally contemplated, I agree with you that the Army should consider assuming responsibility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it within the means available.

[2826] The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including \$3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared.

Here is a letter from General Bryden to General Short, dated May 15. That wasn't one of your letters.

Senator LUCAS. March 15.

Mr. MITCHELL. March 15, 1941. It says.

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance [2827] of the reservation.

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941 outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. The War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Interior for the use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their cooperation in the transfer of large areas of public land. It is not believed that it would be advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of the Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the discussion through official channels.

We are as anxious as you are to work out a solution for these problems with the least practical delay, and I know that I can count on you for fullest cooperation.

Signed "William Bryden, in the absence of the Chief of Staff."

Senator FERGUSON. Would counsel read the distribution of that letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. It says:

Distribution: 1 Chief of Staff.

Showing a copy of the letter went to the Chief of Staff.

[2828] Here is another letter from General Short to you dated March 15, 1941. It appears to be in answer to your request for a report from him about the air situation.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, before counsel proceeds, I am wondering if General Marshall would care to comment on that letter of March 15.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you. I should have asked him for a comment. I get so interested in these myself that I forget.

General, you heard me read this letter of March 15 which related to sites for the installation of fixed radar stations in Hawaii and the discussion as to the attitude of the Department of the Interior.

General MARSHALL. My recollection of the situation here was General Short pressing very hard to have early action taken to permit the installation of that radar. He had selected a point in one of the National Parks which was a volcanic peak to which the Department of the Interior, or the National Park Service, rather, on the ground objected, and that objection was supported for the time being at least by the Department of Interior National Park Service here in Washington.

[2829] Another site was proposed but that site would have involved about either 25 degrees or 25 percent of the total arc of observation or, rather, of registration of the radar, so that being the case any planes that approached within that arc could not have been detected.

Therefore, General Short was very much concerned to have the radar established on the peak, which gave all around service. He can, of course, tell you the details of this much better than I can.

He was pressing us to get the authority out of the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service. He was also pressing us to secure authority to proceed with the building without any delay which would be involved in sending the plans to the United States for approval here by the National Park Service in the Department of the Interior.

We had been endeavoring through the ordinary channels, so far as I can recall, that follow any business between two separate departments of the Government represented by Cabinet heads and had quite a difficult time obtaining authority to establish the radar section on the peak of the volcano most desired by General Short. That authority was obtained.

However, we were unable, and I think that was the situation at the time of this letter of General Bryden's, though I am not accurate about that, to secure authority for General [2830] Short to proceed with the building without the delay of submitting plans to Washington. General Bryden evidently wrote this letter in order to make clear to General Short our difficulties here and just why we could not obtain that necessary authority.

The records will show, I think, and my recollection is that General Short sent another message or two pressing again that we go after this more vigorously. I then personally went into the matter and talked by telephone with the head of the National Park Service, I believe it was the head, I do not remember the gentleman's name, to secure authority to go ahead with the construction of the station without the delay involved in sending the plans back to the United States.

He told me that could not be; that in each case, notably those where we were constructing similar radar station sites in Maine, along the coast of New England, each one had to be approved in the Department, in the Department of the Interior, before any building could be gone ahead with, if the site lay in any National Park area.

Mr. MITCHELL. This letter—

General MARSHALL. I might finish, though, by saying that that conversation ended with the statement that they could not grant the authority for General Short to go ahead; and, incidentally, what he was trying to do was to get the [2831] station installed and ready to receive the equipment that was then due in June.

Later, and as I recall that afternoon, word came either from the National Park Service or the Department of Interior or otherwise which permitted, as I recall, us to go ahead with the plan, sending just the general statement of the plan by air mail. I think the records will show that development.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, this letter from General Bryden to General Short states that the reason the National Park Service and the In-

terior Department require the structure plans to be submitted to them in full before they would permit the reservation to be used for such a purpose was based on the question as to whether they were architecturally attractive or altered the natural appearance of the reservation.

Is that your understanding of their basis?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, this letter of March 15, 1941, from General Short to you appears to be a report in response to your letter of the 5th in which you asked him for a review of the air defense situation there. He starts out and says (reading from Exhibit No. 53:)

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack.

He develops that at length and reports on the anti- [2832] aircraft artillery. He says:

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS)——

What does "AWS" stand for?

General MARSHALL. Air Warning Service.

Mr. MITCHELL (continuing to read from Exhibit No. 53:)

—which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only 4½ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range of 120 miles.

Then he discusses the shortage in personnel, which he says is serious.

The coordination of antiaircraft defense. He says of that:

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so small [2833] that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barber's Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on this subject.

Then he refers to the west coast defense exercise which you have mentioned and said he would like to send both General Martin and General Gardner.

When that report came to your attention did you consider that it showed a sufficiently lively and active interest in the antiaircraft defense on the part of General Short?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You said in your letter to him of March 28 [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

I was very glad to receive your letter of March 15 reviewing the air defense situation in your depart- [2834] ment.

Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details

to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes will be included in estimates.

A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and further increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available.

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows.

Then you give him a list of guns and their dates [continuing to read from Exhibit No. 53]:

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft garrison.

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise.

Have you any comments to make about that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

[2835] Senator LUCAS. Those dates, Mr. Counsel, in the fourth paragraph are pretty important.

Mr. MITCHELL. The fourth paragraph?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. I did not want to tire the committee or keep the general waiting on account of my reading too long [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: sixteen 3" antiaircraft guns, December, 1941; one hundred and fifteen 37mm antiaircraft guns, February, 1942; caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns, in 1942; four SCR No. 268, April, 1941.

That means four outfits?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were they mobile or fixed, those SCR's, or don't you happen to know about that?

General MARSHALL. I do not know offhand. I think they were mobile.

Mr. MITCHELL. (reading):

Five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April and May, 1941.

Do you happen to remember whether those antiaircraft [2836] warning instruments, AWS, for radar were sent out there on the expected dates or would you have to look your records up on that?

General MARSHALL. I think you will have to go to the records for that. All I can tell you offhand at the moment is that there were six mobile stations in operation, as I understand it, on December 7, 1941 and three fixed setups not in operation.

Mr. MITCHELL. I only mention General Short's letter to you of April 14 to call attention to the fact that in that letter he concludes with this statement [reading from exhibit No. 53]:

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.
3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

[2837] Would you have had time to examine those documents at length, or do you remember having done so?

General MARSHALL. I think that I remember the documents, although I am not quite certain, that arranged for the coordination of air action and defense. I became somewhat familiar with them for the reason that the air officials of the War Department—I do not recall whether it was General Arnold personally or part of his staff, or both—brought objections to me to General Short's arrangements in the coordination in this matter with the Navy, which had to do with the Army Air Corps reluctance in regard to the over-water reconnaissance responsibilities which in this coordinated agreement was naval, and the Air Corps was thinking of their long-range four-engine bombers and what later developed into the great strategical air bombing force.

I did not think their position was sound and I thought General Short's arrangement was sound under the then circumstances which, incidentally, included the fact that he had very few B-17's, about 12 of them, and possibly some old B-18's, that the agreement with the Navy, with its PBV's of long range and considerable endurance at the time, supplemented as might be considered necessary by the Naval Chief by Army planes, was the efficient method of meeting the conditions under the circumstances.

[2838] Mr. MITCHELL. You thought that the long over-water reconnaissance ought to be handled by the Navy with such assistance as the Army Air Forces could give it?

General MARSHALL. Certainly, under the conditions that then existed as to equipment on both sides.

Mr. MITCHELL. You understood at that time then that the arrangement was between the commanders out there that if the naval commander needed additional long range planes to make reconnaissance he would call on the Army for them?

General MARSHALL. And those planes would operate under naval direction.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

General MARSHALL. The complicated part of the procedure, of course, was not that. It was the control of the various fighter planes and the antiaircraft in the very restricted area, particularly of Oahu, especially if the Fleet were there. That was made the responsibility of the Army commander and I thought in terms that were practical of accomplishment.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you agree with General Short's conclusion when he spoke in his letter about radar equipment, that even if they had radar equipment of a range of maybe 130 or 150 miles it would necessitate very prompt take-off of pursuit planes in order to respond to such a warning?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I do not know just to what [2839] specific reference that you are referring in connection with that but this is certainly the case. One hundred and twenty miles represents a very few minutes of flying time and that study by General Martin presents possibly other factors which would make the issue even more complicated unless the force is picked up at a great distance.

The planes have to be ready all the time for immediate action and a certain number warmed up. We had that same problem in Panama where it went on week in and week out, almost year in and year out, making it a very difficult problem to meet, the more so where enemy action was not always evident.

Mr. MITCHELL. After he sent you his letter on the 14th enclosing the joint plans and estimates concerning possible air action you seem to have written General Short on May 5, 1941, as follows [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

My dear Short:

Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.

You say at the end of the letter:

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate [2840] to write at any time.

I take it you were assured by his report that this matter of anti-aircraft defense—I mean the defense against air attack—was being given very diligent attention out there?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a good time to stop. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon at 12 noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[2841]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel may proceed with the examination of General Marshall.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. General Marshall, I know the reading of these documents is tedious, but there are only a few documents left that I want to call your attention to before I ask you some general questions.

The next one is a document signed by Harry J. Malony, brigadier general, addressed to the Chief of Staff on May 13, 1941.

I see that it generally relates to "installation of dispersed protection bunkers for 263 pursuit ships, and 95 bombers," and paragraph 3 says [reading from Exhibit No. 56]:

War Plans Division believes:

a. That the danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from carrier based aviation is not serious.

Would you tell us what would be meant from a military standpoint by the word "sustained"?

General MARSHALL. My reaction to that at the moment— [2842] I couldn't tell you specifically what it might have been at the time—would be that he was referring to a continuous attack on Hawaii, such as occurred at Okinawa during the landing and heavy fire, rather than a raiding attack, which is of short duration.

Mr. MITCHELL. And he thought for that reason the bunkers against gas and bombs of secondary importance; is that the idea?

General MARSHALL. That would be my conception of it now. I don't recall what conception I had at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will offer that memorandum in evidence as exhibit 56.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 56.")

Mr. MITCHELL. I have here a memorandum of a conference in the office of the Secretary of War under date of May 19, 1941. Have you that before you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you mind reading it?

General MARSHALL. This is a conference on May 19, 1941, in the office of the Secretary of War:

Present: The Secretary of War—Mr. Stimson
The Under Secretary of War—Judge Patterson
[2843] The Assistant Secretary of War—Mr. McCloy
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air—Mr. Lovett
The Chief of Staff

myself—two deputies—three deputies at that time: General Bryden, General Moore, and General Arnold.

The Secretary, General Staff—Colonel Ward.

Mr. MITCHELL. You might omit the first subject.

General MARSHALL. The first subject relates to Martinique which I understand you wish me to omit.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. The next paragraph having to do with boats for the First Division.

General MARSHALL (reading):

The French cruiser in Martinique is a first class cruiser ship with a top speed of 40 knots.

The Secretary of War asked whether she was in good condition, and was informed that she was.

General Marshall indicated that it would take about ten days for the Navy to get boats for the First Division. He further indicated that it was primarily a naval mission but that the Army Air should participate, both for the help it could give and the experience it would gain. He indicated that the B-18's in Puerto Rico would be staged at St. Croix. Puerto Rico is almost 400 miles from Martinique.

General Marshall then indicated that there were now in the United States 14 B-17's of the most modern type which [2844] he thought should not be sent out of the country in view of the current situation. These had been withheld from the Hawaiian Department contingent.

The Secretary of War asked if this would affect the impregnability of Hawaii.

General Marshall said that it would not. He further said that we need some B-17's (but not of the most modern type) in Panama, and that he is recommending that 9 be sent there. This matter is under consideration.

General ARNOLD. There is now available 50 B-17's without leak-proof tanks and without armor.

General MARSHALL. High bombing is possible in the Caribbean area, due to weather conditions, and these ships without leak-proof tanks could be effectively used there.

[2845] Mr. MITCHELL. We will offer that in evidence as Exhibit 57.

The CHAIRMAN. That is dated May 19, 1941?

Mr. MITCHELL. May 19, "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 57".)

Senator BREWSTER. You read it as if St. Croix was in Puerto Rico.

General MARSHALL. I missed the punctuation. I should have given the distance from St. Croix to Puerto Rico.

Senator BREWSTER. That is in the Virgin Islands, is it, St. Croix?

General MARSHALL. I am confused at the moment. I don't know.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention further to a letter dated May 29 from General Short to you. Page 35. Have you found it?

General MARSHALL. I have a copy of it here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you kindly refer to that and read the first two paragraphs.

General MARSHALL. It is dated May 29, 1941, signed Walter C. Short (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

[2846] DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I know that you will not have time to look over a detailed account of our recent maneuvers but feel that you might like to have a birdseye view of what we did and the purpose back of it.

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field Fortifications and of Engineer Tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under Navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by Naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying Islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of the Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise. Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually [2847] issued before and we got considerable data in regard to the time and transportation required to complete the issue.

Mr. MITCHELL. You understand that relates to training or practice, simulated attack by air on Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[2848] Mr. MITCHELL. The rest of the document relates to the other phases that were not related directly to the air attack, were they?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. On July 25 it appears that there was a joint Army and Navy dispatch to Hawaii about economic sanctions. That dispatch was sent by the Navy under date of July 25, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanding general of the—or to the commanding chief of the Pacific Fleet and others and it bears in it a statement that it was a joint dispatch from the C. O. and the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. It is on page 2 of Exhibit 32.

Was it the practice at that time occasionally for one department to send a dispatch and in it have a request that it be communicated to the other department in Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that was a very common practice all the way through in order to protect our codes.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was the occasion of your notifying the Army and Navy commanders at Hawaii of the placing of these embargoes and restrictions?

General MARSHALL. I did not hear the last word.

Mr. MITCHELL. Through these embargoes and restrictions on commerce.

General MARSHALL. That was to apprise them of the developments of the situation in relation to Japan. [2849]

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, was there any idea in your head that the imposition of those embargoes might probably intensify the strain between Japan and the United States?

General MARSHALL. My best recollection is that it was as we say here:

Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is a letter under date of August 19 from you to General Short. Would you kindly look at that?

General MARSHALL. Is that on page 40?

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 40, yes. You might read the whole letter, General.

General MARSHALL. All right, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it relates all to air matters.

General MARSHALL (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

AUGUST 19, 1941.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Your letter of July 11 has been received recommending the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku Point Field as a base for the 15th Pursuit Group. The [2850] advantages and disadvantages of each site have been considered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the Kahuku Point Field outweigh those of the Kipapa Field sufficiently to result in my decision to establish the base on Kahuku Point.

The following factors are among those having a bearing upon my decision:

a. Low clouds and ground mist frequently obtain over the Wheeler Field-Kipapa area, while at the same time on the north shore of Oahu visibility conditions are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place two pursuit groups in an area subject to the same adverse weather conditions. Pursuit operations in defense of Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather conditions. Selection of the Kahuku Point site places one group in a location where relatively favorable weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa area.

b. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy air bases in the Schofield Barracks—Pearl Harbor area has resulted in a situation under present conditions which necessitates continuous coordination and control of air traffic in the interests of safety. The addition of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably aggravate [2851] this situation.

I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval Installation and accordingly, will entertain favorably and proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. I hope, therefore, that they will be agreeable to our proposal to establish an air base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim they may have previously established to any part of the area involved.

With best personal regards,

Faithfully yours,

(Stamped) (Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you happen to remember whether the site you recommended was actually selected?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall right, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will ask you to turn, General, to the letter from General Short to you dated October 14, 1941, appearing on page 43.

General MARSHALL. Do you wish me to read that, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, if you please.

General MARSHALL (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

[2852]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H., October 14, 1941.

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff of the Army,

War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7229

men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu would come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per [2853] month of their time. It seems to me that they should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the final defense of the air fields I would like to be so advised.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, that was a proposal of General Short's to train Air Corps men for guard duty, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. Well, it was Military Police duty.

Mr. MITCHELL. And to defend the planes on the ground?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And on the next page I think is your letter in which you disapproved of that proposal.

General MARSHALL. I will read that if you wish me to, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

[2854]

OCTOBER 28, 1941.

DEAR SHORT: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to [2855] allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situations.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember how many divisions General Short had at the time? Were there two divisions?

General MARSHALL. I think he had a division and a fraction; roughly a reinforced division. I am not quite certain. That is readily obtainable from the figures.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do I understand your idea was that he should use part of his Infantry divisions for work of that kind rather than the Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. To the extent indicated in that. What was going on there back of the letters was this: The Air Corps was engaged in an unprecedented expansion both as to the extent of expansion and the speed with which we had to make it and the Air Corps people themselves were very sensitive to anything that diverted their personnel from the development under that expansion and their representatives [2856] here in Washington, General Arnold and his staff, appealed to me to get this modification so that nothing should interfere with the completion of the technical training of the Air Corps personnel.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, there is just one other document I want to refer to and that is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 24, 1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, and commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th naval districts.

It was a joint dispatch with instructions in it to inform the senior Army officers. It states:

‘ Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippine or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Do you remember having authorized that dispatch?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[2857] **Mr. MITCHELL.** Now, General Marshall, with all these documents before us showing your contacts with Hawaii and your knowledge about the situation there and the question of defense against air attack, will you cast your mind back, if you can, to the latter part of November 1941 and give us the estimate you then had as to the capacity of the forces at Hawaii to resist an air attack, an air raid? I am not asking you now whether you expected one but what your estimate then was of the situation and the capacity with the matériel they had to resist such an attack successfully.

General MARSHALL. The Hawaiian garrison on the Army side was short of four-engined bombers, only having 12; it was short a few three-inch antiaircraft guns and it was short more seriously in lesser calibers of antiaircraft guns. It had been built up to a considerable extent in fighter aircraft.

It had a moderate radar set-up of the portable type then functioning. It had what I thought were ample troops to defend the beaches successfully against a landing attack.

The military forces on Hawaii were in numbers and in equipment more nearly up to the desired standards than any other installation in the Army. My own impression was that the garrison was sufficiently established and equipped and organized to prevent a landing and to successfully resist an [2858] air attack and to defend the naval base.

I was always of the opinion, as indicated particularly by my letter to General Short of February 7, I believe, that the principal problem there was to be prepared against an emergency of a surprise attack which might come at any time, presumably with the least possible advance notice. In that letter I stated, if you recall:

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Would you repeat your question again to me, please, to see if I got it straight?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I was trying to draw out your judgment as of the latter part of November 1941 and the early part of December as to the capacity of the forces at Hawaii, assuming they used all they had to the best advantage to—

General MARSHALL. I think they had a sufficient amount of matériel at their disposal there to successfully resist [2859] an enemy effort in the form of either a raid or a more serious attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, these reports of Admiral Bloch and the Martin-Bellinger reports and all these other documents we have in evidence dealt very heavily with the question of reconnaissance. The general tenor of them was the conclusion that if you wanted a complete, sure defence against a carrier-borne air attack you should have a reconnaissance the evening before and catch the carriers at dusk before they started their night run, and the alternative, if that was not done, was to try to get the planes out and break up the attack after the carrier planes left the carriers the next morning, which was not so certain.

Now, the studies that were presented there that we have been offering and considering this morning indicate that a pretty large number of patrol planes would be needed for the long reconnaissance and then a very large number of bombing planes would be needed to go out and smash the carriers after they were discovered and I notice that in the recommendation of General Martin made in his study of the air situation in Hawaii under date of August 20, 1941, exhibit 13, which we referred to this morning, he made this recommendation [reading from Exhibit No. 13]:

It is recommended that the War Department give [2860] immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 833 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows:

72 for daily search missions.

36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs for a mission).

72 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the attack force.

180 total B-17D's.

36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.

Now, his report shows that he was considering a 360° reconnaissance, all around the circle and which was the extreme requirement for a perfect defense against any attack from any direction.

Now, there are other figures in his report as to reconnaissance over limited arcs.

Now, compared with what Martin recommended on August 20 for a complete security there against air attack we had [2861] a very slim equipment, did we not?

General MARSHALL. Well, I stated, if you recall, we had a serious shortage in four engine bombers. We only had 12.

[2862] Mr. MITCHELL. As an aid to Navy PBY air reconnaissance, that was practically nothing, wasn't it, or almost nothing?

General MARSHALL. Little more than that, sir. Not only a small supplement to the Navy reconnaissance, but it left no striking force.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is it. After you located them, you had not any bombers to sink the carriers?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It seems to be the fact, according to these figures, and your judgment is, isn't it, that as far as security by long-distance reconnaissance and bombing the carriers the night before the proposed air attack is concerned, the equipment was quite inadequate.

General MARSHALL. Was deficient.

Mr. MITCHELL. What would be the result of that—that they would have to confine their long-distance reconnaissance to the limited sector that you stated, or what could they do under those circumstances?

General MARSHALL. The provision of General Martin there is for complete and perfect reconnaissance. That is all right. That certainly is to be done, if you can provide the planes. I might, incidentally, say even at the top of our production, we were never able to give Hawaii, in 1943 and 1944, what the commander of Hawaii wanted, any more than [2863] we were able to give any commander all he wanted. That was an unavoidable situation always, in a war of the character we were involved in. However, there were ways to improve the situation by increased vigilance, by the operation of the attack planes, the interceptor planes, in every way we could in that fashion.

There was also this to be considered, which we always had in mind, and that is the great hazard the enemy undertook in sending his people so far from home. A surprise is either a triumph or a catastrophe. If it proved to be a catastrophe, the entire Japanese campaign was ruined, and advance into Malaysia, and advance into the East Indies would have been out of the question.

Singapore would not have been captured, the Burma Road would not be cut off, and the attack on New Guinea probably would not have occurred. So you have an enemy hazarding a great risk in this stroke. Therefore you measure somewhat your means of defense against the hazard he is accepting in doing it.

I agree with General Martin that if the planes were available that was a very appropriate assignment. It was on the side of conservatism which is certainly a good side to take in the defense of a fortress such as Hawaii, and the fleet more than the fortress against air attack. Does [2864] that explain my point of view?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Your answer deals with two problems: One is the question whether you expected an attack and the other one, what position you were in to defeat it.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I was intending to confine my first question to this proposition: Assuming the attack is made, to what extent, under the circumstances, and with the material they had available, would you conclude that they had adequate means for either breaking up the attack at sea, or on the carriers, or else destroying it, mitigating it the next morning.

General MARSHALL. I think they had at least the means to so have broken up that attack that it could do limited harm.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was your last answer?

General MARSHALL. I think they had sufficient means to sufficiently break up the attack so it could only have done limited harm.

Mr. MITCHELL. By that, you mean if everybody had been on the alert and the radar operating and reporting planes at distances of 130 to 150 miles, and every pilot was in the seat, the motor going, everybody on the alert, and the antiaircraft men with ammunition, with that amount of [2865] warning that you could get from that sort of reconnaissance, you could have mitigated the attack.

General MARSHALL. Roughly, sir. I would not say every pilot in his seat, but in a condition of alert.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your idea is with the forces available, they could have broken up the Jap planes in the air to an extent?

General MARSHALL. It would have greatly lessened the damage done.

Mr. MITCHELL. These reports which you had and considered laid a great deal of emphasis on the need for an aerial reconnaissance, did they not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I might add at this time the question was the availability of matériel. I think at that time we had about 148 B-17's of which an appreciable number were of the old model, without leak-proof tanks and with other deficiencies of equipment; we had 12 B-24's altogether.

Mr. MITCHELL. You do not mean in Hawaii, do you.

General MARSHALL. I mean altogether.

Mr. MITCHELL. The whole army?

General MARSHALL. The United States Army. We had four in Panama; we had 35 in the Philippines; we had 12 in Hawaii; we had a few on the West Coast, and we had 50 to 60 to [2866] develop the pilots for the production of planes then in prospect.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know here in Washington at that time, or keep track of the number of bombers that were in commission and those that were not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That was a continual check with us, because we had so few, and everybody wanted them.

I might add there again in connection with this, that the greatest trouble was we had to have crews prepared to fly these planes as they came off the production line which, as I say, was then approaching the full quantity production. That demanded planes that had to be in the air almost constantly, and tremendous maintenance, while at this time we only had about 50 or 60 altogether to produce crews for the flow of planes then in prospect.

[2867] Mr. MITCHELL. The first days of our hearing we had figures introduced by Colonel Thielen and Admiral Inglis as to the types of planes, both Naval and Army planes, in Hawaii on December 7, and how many were in commission and how many were out. It is

given by fields there in that data, but we attempted to total it, and while our compilation may not be absolutely correct, the way we calculated it, it means the Navy had available on the Hawaiian Islands on December 7 the following: Patrol planes, many of which were not in full condition for use—but I am giving you the total planes and some of them were out of commission—they had 54 PBV-1, 27 PBV-3, and 8 PBV-1, or a total of 89. And on that day there were in addition, I think, 7 fighter Naval planes left by carrier.

On the same day the Army had 50 bombers of various types. B-17's, they had a total of 12, and only 6 in commission. That is the four-engine bomber. Then the B-18, what is that?

General MARSHALL. That is a two-engine bomber of an earlier type.

Mr. MITCHELL. Fit for reconnaissance work?

General MARSHALL. They are good for reconnaissance, not because of great range, but they are a sturdy, reliable plane.

Mr. MITCHELL. There were a total of 33 there, of which 21 were in commission. The A-20, what type is that?

[2868] General MARSHALL. That is a fighter or interceptor plane.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the B-12?

General MARSHALL. That is a rather obsolete bomber type.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, they had in addition 152 fighters of various types, of which less than 100 were in full readiness for use, I mean fit to fly.

General MARSHALL. For operation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, for operation. So there was a great shortage of both fighters and bomber planes.

Now the Jap attack was made with six carriers, and I ought to remember but I think there were two or three hundred planes, which would greatly outnumber anything in the way of fighting planes that existed at Hawaii.

Is it your idea that with that very large power of the Japs in the air, with our limited fighter forces at Hawaii we could have mitigated the attack very considerably or only partially?

General MARSHALL. I think so. They could not stop it, but they could have greatly lessened the damage that was done. They could disorganize it, taken it off its targets.

Mr. MITCHELL. You say you had to weigh the situation there and the risk by considering not only the matériel that [2869] you had but the probability or possibility of the Japs risking an attack. Your idea, as you stated it, as I understand, was it would be a risky performance for the Japs and they might not have hazarded a considerable part of their carrier fleet for such an enterprise.

General MARSHALL. It was accepting a hazard to do that, for several reasons: One was the effect in bombing by a few planes on carriers. It does not take very many hits to do grievous harm. The other was the action of our shipping that was not damaged in the fight.

Mr. MITCHELL. It might turn out in a chase and sink the Jap task force?

General MARSHALL. We had some carriers in the Hawaiian district.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, with the Japs planning an attack down along the Asiatic Coast as their main venture, the smart officers over there would feel, would they not, that it would be a great stroke to protect

their flanks and give them more time if they made a surprise attack that is temporary but at least it would cripple the United States Fleet at Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. That was the whole purpose of it. It was a subsidiary raid in order to protect the Japanese operations in the south against any action by our fleet.

Mr. MITCHELL. That would be an objective that any smart [2870] officer would think about as a thing to be attained, if he could, wasn't it? In other words, the Japs, in their plan of attack, stick that up as number one. Their proposal was to cripple the American fleet at Hawaii, if they could.

General MARSHALL. The distances in their advance south toward Singapore were very great. If there was an effective fleet on their flank their hazard would have been greater.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would your judgment as to the probability of the Jap attempt by air attack be affected by the knowledge that the Japs had an espionage system in Hawaii which made them completely familiar with our whole situation there, our forces, our movements, their habits and nonalertness, nonreconnaissance, and that they had, up to an hour of that attack, free use of commercial cables and other international means of communication to report that situation to their home country, would not that have encouraged them very considerably to take the risk that you spoke of?

General MARSHALL. It could have. My own reactions, as nearly as I recall them, which is extremely difficult to disassociate with the back sight, is that that specific operation was not visualized by me. I was more inclined to feel that the hazards were too great and that they would not risk it, which would mean that in their movement to the south they would have to proceed somewhat conservatively rather than [2871] dash in to great distances, as they actually did, once our fleet was crippled. I think that is, as nearly as I can give it, a fair estimate of my thinking at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. In other words, you were 2,000 miles away and you might not visualize or be conscious of the local conditions, and you would expect your local commanders to be conscious of the local conditions?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not mean that. I mean regardless of the distance from here to Hawaii my thinking, as nearly as I can recreate it now, was that the hazard of coming in there, with the sizable naval force, was so great, in my opinion, that they would not risk it, but would rather proceed on a more conservative basis of actual operations to the southward, to the China Sea, toward Malaysia. As it was, they went without regard to any fears, and went out on the end of the plank through all of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the New Guinea district.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if they knew exactly what the conditions were at Hawaii, the lack of reconnaissance and alertness and all that during the few days in December, their risk would not appear to them to be quite so great.

General MARSHALL. You have to take into consideration the length of time involved in that movement, and of course it could be recalled at any time by radio message, and the [2872] great change that had been effected if active offensive-defensive measures had been

taken, as to what would happen to their air force, as to the loss of one or two carriers alone.

They knew we had other planes. Whether or not they knew they were en route there, whether or not they knew they were only passing through there, all those are factors to be considered.

As a matter of fact, as you know, the reinforcement planes from MacArthur, that finally took off after the delay due to adverse winds, arrived during the middle of the attack. All those were considerations that the Japanese general staff, the Japanese naval staff, would have to take into consideration themselves, and they could have made quite a difference in the result.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, all the time, I think the record shows or will show, they had complete data of the conditions right down to December 6.

General MARSHALL. No question about that at all.

Mr. MITCHELL. And they could have recalled their flight at the time if they got information that an alert really had been made?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were you aware of the fact that the merchant shipping had been diverted from the northern ship [2873] lanes and sent down to the Torres Strait area in October and that left a wide swath of the ocean without any traffic in it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I was aware of that situation, and the reasons for it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know that during the end of November and the first week in December the Navy, particularly its direction-finding system in the Pacific, for a week prior to Pearl Harbor had lost complete track of all but one division of the Japanese carriers?

General MARSHALL. I have a faint recollection that I did not know all the time where all the Japanese ships were. I do not recall being aware of the fact that it was the carrier divisions that were the missing ones. It may be I knew it, but I do not recall.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have anything to do with the decision to shift the merchant fleet, merchant vessels into the Torres Strait area, or was that purely a naval matter?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall. It may have been discussed with me, and it probably was, but I have no recollection. I do recall the shift.

Mr. MITCHELL. The shift?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was it a safety measure, to prevent the [2874] loss of the merchant shipping?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. From Jap attack?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Admiral Stark, of course, can give you more direct information on that, but that was the reason. It was a more secure voyage, in the light of the developing situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. You used the words "merchant shipping." I think technically it would be more correct to say the slow boats.

General MARSHALL. The slow boats?

Mr. MITCHELL. The slow boats.

General MARSHALL. It was those that made something around, probably, I will say, under 12 knots, maybe under 10 knots. The faster ships, like the Dollar Lines, went straight through to the north of Guam.

Mr. MITCHELL. During the last week or two in November and early in December did you have frequent conferences with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark, and possibly the President about the situation?

General MARSHALL. I had practically daily conversations with Admiral Stark over the phone or personally, and the same with the Secretary of War personally, and very frequently with the Secretary of State, during which, I think on [2875] practically every occasion, the Secretary of the Navy was present, and usually Admiral Stark, when I was present.

Mr. MITCHELL. What did those discussions relate to? In other words, did they have anything to do with the imminence of war and prospects of an attack by the Japanese?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. They had to do with the measures to be taken diplomatically, on a high Government level, toward Japan. They had to do with the military situation, as Admiral Stark and I viewed it. They had very specifically to do with our hope that action, war action in the Pacific, could be delayed as long as possible.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will offer in evidence at this time as exhibit 58 a document labeled as follows:

1. List taken from President Roosevelt's appointment book specifying his engagements with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, for period October 1 to December 7, 1941.

2. Telephone calls made from outside through White House switchboard on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators notes available.

I understand that means calls from outside through the White House switchboard with persons outside of the White [2876] House, not messages to people in the White House—

3. List of dinner guests at White House Saturday evening, December 6, 1941.

4. List showing the President's appointments Saturday, December 6, 1941.

5. List showing the President's appointments Sunday, December 7, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all exhibit 58?

Mr. MITCHELL. All that is exhibit 58.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be filed.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 58.")

Mr. MITCHELL. During these conversations you say they related quite often to the question of postponing Japanese attack, if possible, until you could get better prepared.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was the situation at Hawaii discussed specifically in any of those conversations or conferences?

General MARSHALL. I think so. We covered the whole Pacific: Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you tell us in your own way just what, if anything, you can remember about the conversations at those discussions?

General MARSHALL. From a purely military side Admiral [2877] Stark and I together endeavored to put forward the policy of the necessity of taking every measure that we could think of, politically

or diplomatically, to carry along the situation in the Pacific without disruption, at least until we had an opportunity to prepare the forces there. The first consideration at that time in the matter of preparation was in relation to the Philippines, which up until April 1941 had literally nothing in terms of numbers and equipment. As early as February we had taken the women and children out.

I had gotten authority to double the number of Philippine Scouts from 6,000 to 12,000, and then I issued an order which stopped the return of men who only had 2 years, who had completed their 2-year tour, which I believe possibly was illegal; I do not recall now. In order to provide experienced people to assist General MacArthur, or to assist General Grunert at that time, in the development of additional scout organizations and also in the development of a Philippine Army, basic training, we also had to have the time to collect the shipping, to go through the lengthy procedure of withdrawing these ships from South American runs, against which there was very serious opposition from all sides virtually, and to obtain troops sufficiently trained at that time to be sent out there.

We were then in the process, beginning roughly the 1st [2878] of August, of receiving the first of real quantity production, and we were trying to rush that through to the Philippines primarily, until we gave them sufficient reinforcements to make it dangerous for the Japanese to make any movement either against the Philippines or, more particularly, to the south of the Philippines, leaving them free to be attacked on the flank.

We needed time for this. It was estimated that the principal reinforcements and matériel could be gotten out there by about the 5th of December. Of course, there were the delays in obtaining the ships, there were the delays in delivering the planes, and there were the delays produced by adverse head winds to that then difficult and considered dangerous flight by a B-17 in that period from the west coast to Hawaii.

On the naval side, Admiral Stark, of course, can speak for himself, but I recall very specifically he was struggling to get a delay until about the 1st of February, in order that the fleet could be outfitted. I believe the fleet training was the main consideration. That I cannot testify to with any authority. I refer to most of the items that pertain to the Army side of the affair.

Now in all these discussions we analyzed the situation as it changed from week to week, as delays developed which [2879] would not permit us to reach the stage of defensive security that we had hoped by the limiting date that had been suggested, some time in December, and a discussion of the measures that might be taken appropriately by the Government toward the Japanese which would at least maintain the status quo until we were in better shape.

Of course, in those matters I was not a factor, you might say, in the discussions, except where it had a military implication, although there was complete freedom for expression if I cared to inject myself into the diplomatic statement in the communications proposed.

But, of course, it was more appropriate for me to confine my observations to the phases of the discussion or the documents that had a direct military implication.

Does that give you a fair idea, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. That gives me a fair idea. You were kept informed, I suppose, of the diplomatic developments.

General MARSHALL. I think in the main I knew about all that was going on, because I not only sat in on a great many of the discussions personally, but in addition to that Mr. Stimson would always talk to me when he returned from any of his discussions with Mr. Hull.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember whether, in that latter period, the latter part of November and early December of 1941, [2880] in any of these discussions the question was raised about the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, or whether, because of lack of preparedness and the chances out there something ought to be done with the fleet, that it either put to sea or move back toward the coast? Was there any discussion of that kind?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall discussions of that kind once the fleet was in Hawaii. I have a very faint recollection, a very definite recollection, as a matter of fact, of a long series of discussions regarding the location of the fleet before it went out to Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was in 1940?

General MARSHALL. Well, at the time it went out there. I must admit that I have forgotten a good many of the pros and cons that were being discussed at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Those discussions related to the suitability of Pearl Harbor as a training place for the ships. They did not have any question at that time, prior to December 1940, after the fleet had gone out there, as to the question of the security of the fleet in port. I am wondering whether in any of these conversations, as you approached December 7, you or Admiral Stark in your presence, or the Secretary of War or Navy raised any question about the dangers to the fleet in Pearl Harbor at that time, and the question whether, [2881] if air attacks were at all possible and you were not in perfect defense, you should do something about it?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that specifically, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember with whom you had your discussions in 1940 about the question of basing the fleet originally at Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940?

General MARSHALL. I think they were with Admiral Stark, with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and I believe the President, although I do not know whether the discussion was with him directly or whether I got the result of his statement and then we made the presentations, I do not recall.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember yourself what objections were made or advanced at that time toward putting the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. As I said a little previously, I am sorry to have to state to you that I do not recall the details well. I do not recall the argument between the Atlantic and the Pacific, which at that time was a great issue, as to how much of the fleet would be in the Atlantic, how much would be in the Pacific. We had a tremendous problem then of the sea lanes across the Atlantic, the deficiency of the British in guarding the convoys, and the hazardous position of the [2882] British Isles during that period.

Now I do not recall exactly, as I say, the pros and cons of that, but I know it was going on at that time and I was in the middle of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, we come up to this question of the *modus vivendi*. You and Admiral Stark had been working for more time. Were you aware that on November 20 the Japs had made a proposal to the United States that involved practically our termination of aid to China and our opening up of the freezing regulations and furnishing the Japs with oil?

General MARSHALL. I have no definite recollection, but I am quite certain there was.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have access to those diplomatic intercepts during that period, that is, the decoded Japanese messages to and from Tokyo and Washington?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. The majority of them went over my desk, those that were supposed to be critical.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember seeing any of those in which the Japs instructed their Ambassadors here to get an affirmative agreement first by the 25th of November and later at least by the 29th?

General MARSHALL. I remember that very well, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember those messages which said, if they did not get it signed, sealed, and delivered at that [2883] date something automatically would happen?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I remember that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, when the *modus vivendi* came up—what date was it, do you remember? Around the 25th or 26th?

General MARSHALL. I think it was earlier than that. About the 21st, was it not?

Mr. MITCHELL. The 21st?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. What part did you have in that discussion?

General MARSHALL. I was absent on that particular day on an inspection trip, as I recall, and I learned of the matter on my return from General Gerow. I believe there was a memorandum from him to me. He had attended the meeting with Admiral Stark and he had expressed a view in regard to the outcome.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

General MARSHALL. And he submitted the memorandum to me describing the conditions and giving me the data.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you agree with General Gerow's position?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Which he reported in that memo?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; particularly that portion where he states that he informed Admiral Stark verbally that [2884] he regretted the reference to Army Forces in the Navy comments on proposition A-1. He felt that no restrictions should be placed on the Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure.

The point was we had almost nothing there, we had everything to put there, and if we did not do anything we were helpless, and we continued helpless if the thing broke.

Mr. MITCHELL. You learned that that proposal had been dropped?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I learned that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you learn at that time of the fact that Mr. Churchill had wired him about it and that it was sent back for the Chinese, and did you know about Chiang Kai-shek's protest in which he said the Chinese Army would collapse if anything like that occurred?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of seeing Mr. Churchill's message, but I have a very clear recollection of Mr. Hull describing the Generalissimo's reaction. Whether or not I read his message I do not know, but I know I was clearly aware of his very energetic opposition to the proposal.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the light of what you just said and what you knew, were you reconciled to the Secretary's decision not to attempt the *modus vivendi* proposal?

[2885] General MARSHALL. I think I was, sir. I recall this, that we were very much disappointed that we could not get this through, because it looked like a very slender hope of delaying matters to give us more time, and as I also recall, and the records will show, we had movements on the ocean at that time that were very critical, Marines coming out of Shanghai, and hazard to some movement, a more serious one was a group, I think, of four vessels of fair speed that were moving to the north of Guam straight into the Philippines and a large convoy of slow vessels that was moving south toward Torres Strait.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now did you know, in advance of its submission to the Japanese, the contents of Mr. Hull's statement to them of November 26, 1941?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were you consulted about that?

General MARSHALL. I do not think I was, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. To go back shortly to something I omitted, I call your attention to a document called "Aide Memoire—Defense of Hawaii." It is a photostat. It seems to have some writing at the head of it. Do you know whose handwriting that is?

General MARSHALL. I do not think that is mine. The writing at the bottom is distinctly mine.

[2886] Mr. MITCHELL. That is a memorandum you gave to the President, is it, at or about the time that it is dated, 5-3-41?

General MARSHALL. I am told—this is purely hearsay—I am told that I was called to that conference at the White House to discuss—I have forgotten what the issue was, it did have a relation—I think it was the movement of the fleet—and I made a hurried call—this was sent me, and I made these notes on the face of it, and gave copies to the President. I made this note at the bottom of the page.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am told, and it will appear later, that this handwriting at the top is—

Mr. GESELL. General Watson's, the Military Aide to the White House.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will offer this in evidence as Exhibit 59.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it be identified and filed as Exhibit 59.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59.")

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you mind reading it for us, General?

General MARSHALL (reading from Exhibit No. 59):

[2887]

AIDE MEMOIRE

Defense of Hawaii

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and

more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense.

Air Defense. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective, the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit.

Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force [2888] available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable.

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.

Now, the footnote refers back to the paragraph, "Hawaiian Air Defense," which reads as follows:

Including the movement of aviation now in progress, Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses * * *

Due to make a mass flight from mainland to Hawaii May 20. A number of this type of plane could be dispatched immediately if the situation grew critical.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that number of the most modern flying fortresses that you visualized in May, did they arrive at Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. They did not, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So this estimate was made then on the supposition—

General MARSHALL. As to the prospective delivery of planes.

[2889] Mr. MITCHELL. Which couldn't be made?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember how you happened to give that memorandum to President Roosevelt? What was the occasion of it?

General MARSHALL. That was what I was trying to recall. I have forgotten at the moment just exactly what the discussion was. I will try to stir up my memory. There was some definite thing that was under discussion. I have forgotten what it was. Rather, a definite consideration under discussion.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Watson has in his handwriting at the top:

Modern Planes have completely changed the situation as to defensibility.

Was that a subject of discussion on your part, that memorandum by him?

General MARSHALL. I had no discussion with General Watson at all that I can recall. I have a vague recollection that there was something about the capability of Hawaii to defend itself without the presence of the Fleet, but I will check up on that and try to refresh my memory.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice in the paragraph in the memorandum entitled "Air Defense," you assume here that "enemy [2890] carriers, naval escorts, and transports will come under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles." That visualized a sufficiently adequate patrol force at Hawaii, air reconnaissance to detect the enemy carriers at that distance?

General MARSHALL. It visualized the available reconnaissance force and also the available striking force,

Mr. MITCHELL. To hit them after they were discovered?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is pretty nearly the limit of the Martin-Bellinger requirement, isn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is a reference in that memorandum to "sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage."

Was that your point of view in May 1941 that sabotage would be a greater peril than any other kind of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. Not a greater peril, but it was, as expressed here, the first in sequence, because sabotage was always one of the difficult points—the disposing of troops to meet it without unduly exciting everybody, and the maintenance of them in that dispersed condition to control it. And, of course, military control of the islands would have exercised a very great restraint on all of the people, which [2891] would have lessened the hazard decidedly, just as was done when we got on a war basis.

Mr. MITCHELL. In this "Aide Memoire" you also assume a state of alertness and the best use of the equipment at Pearl Harbor, a state of alertness against air attack?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have, General, a memorandum for the President on the subject of ground forces, submitted to him by the Chief of Staff. It is undated. It does not seem to have so much to do with air attacks as the furnishing of additional ground forces for distant installations, and outposts. Have you a copy of it before you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; in skeleton form.

Mr. MITCHELL. The only thing it says about Hawaii is on page 3. In the first full paragraph, it says:

Hawaii. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval installation (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack. Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in the United States to give Fleet freedom of action.

Did that paragraph refer wholly to the ground forces in Hawaii as distinguished from—when I say ground forces I mean forces to defend against landing attacks—or did it—

[2892] General MARSHALL. It is a résumé of the entire Ground Forces. The idea was to so build up that command in Hawaii that it required no naval assistance; that a secure base was maintained, with the task of defense resting in the hands of the Army.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the margin of the paragraph I read about Hawaii, are the words "O. K. Leave as is." It will later appear that that is in the President's handwriting.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that made an exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will make it one now. Exhibit 60 is the memorandum to the President, subject "Ground Forces" just referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be filed as No. 60.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 60.")

Senator FERGUSON. Has the date of that been fixed yet? Could counsel place the date?

Mr. MITCHELL. I can't. It is a document we obtained from the White House files, but it is undated.

General MARSHALL. We have been unable to find any record of it in the War Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This was a memorandum from General Marshall to the President?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right, on the subject of Ground [2893] Forces in all areas, a great many places.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does the General have any idea what time it was submitted?

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you happen to have any idea yourself, General?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of it at all. It doesn't show here on this copy that I even signed it. Sometimes it was the case, and it may have been here, that the President would call me to appear very quickly to discuss a certain subject, on which I had no notes at all, and they would give me some papers that pertained to it and I would do the best I could with those papers.

There may have been something of that sort here. I don't know.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Marshall, we have here a transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 35, as of Tuesday, September 26, 1944, and on page 4050 there is testimony given by Mr. Stimson about a statutory war council meeting in the Department.

Secretary Stimson said:

General Marshall read a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports throughout the Islands.

[2894] Then again—I think Mr. Stimson was reading from his own diary here.

Well, I started too soon. I meant to start with November 25, 1941. He read:

'At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three-months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all of our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.'

Then we had a long talk over the general situation there which I remember.

Then he quotes from his diary:

We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. At 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one.

He says:

That's an hour and a half.

Then the diary proceeds as follows:

At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that were [2895] likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do.

We conferred on the general problem.

The diary continues:

When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that a Japanese War had started. Five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President, of the message.

Do you remember that conference?

General MARSHALL. I have no detailed recollection of the conversations back and forth, but I have a very distinct recollection of the

situation that was developing at that particular moment in the China Sea.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you any recollection of this beyond the statement of President Roosevelt, have you any memory of that?

General MARSHALL. I don't remember, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was on the 25th.

Now, I call your attention to this message that was sent to General Short over your signature on November 27. Were you in the city on the 27th?

[2896] General MARSHALL. I was not, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where were you?

General MARSHALL. I was in North Carolina.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was going on there?

General MARSHALL. General McNair was having a very large maneuver, I imagine about 300,000 troops, or thereabouts. It was a vital day, and I flew down on the afternoon of the 26th to see the operations on the 27th, and flew back late that evening, so that I appeared in the office on the early morning of the 28th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Before you left on the 26th, had this proposal to send a warning message out to the overseas outposts been discussed with you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. My recollection of it, which is rather confirmed by the memorandum of General Gerow under date of the 27th, I believe that we had a considerable discussion on the joint board on the morning of the 26th, at which it was decided that an alert should be drafted and dispatched immediately.

General Gerow had the task of drafting the alert. Whether or not he had a draft copy with him at the time or whether he was to prepare it after he returned to the War Plans Division I do not recall. I left in the afternoon following this meeting of the joint board in the [2897] morning. Present at the meeting was Admiral Stark, myself, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General Bryden, General Gerow, and I believe at that time the officers of the Air Corps, and their opposites were present from the Navy.

Mr. MITCHELL. The message was sent over your name then while you were away?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. When did you see the draft after you returned?

General MARSHALL. I saw it, the actual message, as it was sent, I think, the moment I reached my desk on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. MITCHELL. This memorandum referred to by General Gerow of November 27 is the one in which he states "The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m. November 27, 1941." That is the one you refer to, is it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you saw the message of the 27th to General Short after you returned from maneuvers, what was your reaction as to its contents and sufficiency?

General MARSHALL. I concurred in the message and the manner in which it was drawn.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see at the same time the [2898] identical message sent to the Commander on the West coast?

General MARSHALL. I saw the message—

Mr. MITCHELL. To all the commanders?

General MARSHALL. Pacific commanders.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see General Short's response and the responses of the other commanders to the warning message that had been sent to them?

General MARSHALL. I assume I did. I find in looking at the copy I did not initial it. I assume I must have seen it.

[2899] Mr. MITCHELL. Have you seen this photostat?

General MARSHALL. Well, I saw the actual—

Mr. MITCHELL. The original of it?

General MARSHALL. The original of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. The photostat showing the report of General MacArthur of November 28 and the report of General Short on November 28.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is our exhibit 46.

You are not relying on your present recollection but on the existence of this document?

General MARSHALL. In what respect?

Mr. MITCHELL. To know whether you received it or not?

General MARSHALL. Well, I know I received this because there is my own reference of that to the Secretary of War and my initials on the copy, and the two were clipped together.

Mr. MITCHELL. You remember that they were both clipped together?

General MARSHALL. No; I don't remember the clipping together. When I checked back to find out about the thing I found them clipped together and noticed I had not initialed the under copy but I assumed that I saw it.

Mr. MITCHELL. How did you happen to route it to the Secretary of War?

[2900] General MARSHALL. Because I thought it was very important that he should see this particular message. It had been my custom always when there was anything up that was out of the ordinary that he might miss I always initialed it for him and had it taken directly to his room.

Mr. MITCHELL. The fact that he participated in your absence in the drafting of the message to which these were responses, did that have anything to do with your sending it to him?

General MARSHALL. It might have; I don't recall, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What do you remember now about your appraisal of or reaction to General Short's message of the 28th?

General MARSHALL. I have not a clear-cut recollection at all because shortly after the attack—I presume about an hour and a half—I was in conversation with Colonel Bundy in regard to the measures we were then taking to reestablish ourselves on the west coast, to get the convoys straightened out, and see what other measures we had to take throughout the United States for security, and he mentioned this message, which he apparently had reexamined, and referred to the sabotage factor in it, and also referred to the implication he had gotten from the liaison with the Navy which is included in the message.

[2901] He did that while he was standing at my desk just before his departure from my room, when we concluded the other part

of the conversation, which was the virtual redeployment of all our military sources to meet the situation as it developed.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was the date of that talk with Colonel Bundy?

General MARSHALL. I would say that was an hour and a half or an hour, thereabouts, after the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. On December 7?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well then, at that time Colonel Bundy brought up with you the question of Short's report of November 28?

General MARSHALL. My recollection of it is that when we finished this business I had him in there for, he being the officer in immediate charge of all details relating to the Pacific, that was his subsection of the War Plans Division, or the section of the War Plans Division, he would be in charge, and so I was doing business with him direct as to what we were to do to reestablish the situation, and when we finished that, as I recall the incident he was leaving the room and stopped about halfway out of the room and made a reference to the message, which he evidently had looked back [2902] on it to see what was going on, and referred to this sabotage clause, and I have forgotten just what his reference to it was. I recall his reference to liaison with the Navy. He referred to that. They had gone ahead with the procedure.

[2903] Now, my difficulty in answering your question was it is very hard for me to associate myself with the statement about what came next because from that instant on I was completely involved in the most active period during the war, the next 6 weeks.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I was referring more especially to your appraisalment of or reactions to this message of Short's on November 28 when it was shown to you, or you saw it on the 28th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you notice the brevity of it or the difference in contents—

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection regarding it at all.

Mr. MITCHELL. (Continuing)—by comparison with any of the other reports that you received?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection regarding it at all, other than the fact that I find the two messages together and that I signed the upper one.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the ordinary course of operations in the department of the General Staff where would the messages have gone for consideration?

General MARSHALL. It would have gone to the War Plans Division and by the Executive officer there would have [2904] been routed to the particular section that had that, which was Colonel Bundy's section.

Mr. MITCHELL. At no time between November 28 and the 7th of December did anybody ever come back to you and mention the Short report or question its sufficiency or anything of that kind?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of any comment.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you any information that after the warning message was sent there was no air reconnaissance being conducted at Hawaii for any distance, any considerable distance?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I had no intimation of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, did you after November 27, when this warning was sent out, make any inquiry as to what measures were being taken at Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. None that I recall.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you make any inquiry, any further inquiry about what measures were being taken at these other posts where the warning message had been received, or one like it?

General MARSHALL. None that I recall. We were deeply engaged in the business of trying to get our matériel rerouted to General MacArthur as rapidly as we possibly could and we had, as you will see, in magic, picked up the fact of the [2905] report that he was unloading at night. I learned that from the Japanese. I did not learn that from MacArthur.

Mr. MITCHELL. To make my question clear, I was talking of the period between November 28 and December 7, as to what information, if any, you had about the stage of the alert or what steps were being taken in Hawaii for defense against—

General MARSHALL. I said as to Hawaii, I had no information and I thought you then asked me about the other places.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. And I said there, I think, that I had nothing regarding the alert but we had information regarding what was going on which we obtained through magic, as related to the Philippines. I have forgotten the date of the magic but it is in the record, as to unloading and rushing of supplies ashore being carried out at night so that the Japanese could not see exactly what was going on.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I take it then that your recollection about Short's reply of November 28 in the very brief examination you made of it you are not in a position now to remember and to state what your reactions were to it?

General MARSHALL. I cannot state any reactions that I had to it. It came through the office.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was there any consideration given in the War Department that you had knowledge of after November 28 [2906] and before December 7 of sending any additional warnings to General Short or any other commander?

General MARSHALL. I had no recollection of such.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was the liaison committee?

General MARSHALL. The liaison committee was a group consisting of the Under Secretary of State, representatives of the War Department—usually two would go over—the same from the Navy Department, which met in the office of the Under Secretary of State and discussed matters pertaining to all three departments, largely attaché details, equipment for South American and Latin-American countries, sometimes Chinese matters, and it developed during the period after I become Chief of Staff and before the outbreak of the war for us into many larger considerations; but in the early stages it was engaged mostly in minor details regarding requests of Ambassadors and the desires of the State Department that affected the Army and Navy, particularly as to matériel and equipment to Latin-American countries. Eventually the larger matters were discussed.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think you told us that you currently saw these decoded intercepts of the Jap diplomatic messages.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you also see these decoded intercepts of Jap messages relating to military installations and ship [2907] movements?

General MARSHALL. I would assume I would, yes, the same as the diplomatic.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the record shows, I think General Miles said that at a certain date about that time, in the summer or early fall of 1941, you ordered not only the G-2 evaluations of those messages but the raw material or original copies of dispatches should be shown to you.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember that at that time?

General MARSHALL. I have a recollection of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. He said it was commencing August 5, 1941.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. How did they come to you? Were copies delivered and kept in your files?

General MARSHALL. I beg pardon, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. Were copies delivered and kept in your files?

General MARSHALL. At first they came in somewhat of a loose-leaf arrangement and they were all returned and I stopped that and required that they be put in a locked pouch because I found in the various offices there was inevitable carelessness and also I felt inevitably the fact that we were doing this would leak out.

[2908] I had been told when I became Chief of Staff that my predecessor, General Craig, was very guarded in the matter, primarily because he thought it was illegal and that, therefore, if we were to continue we would have to be exceedingly careful. That factor, of course, more or less vanished from consideration and was replaced entirely by the urgent necessity, from our point of view, of guarding the secret.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I understood that last statement of General Marshall. You mentioned the fact that your predecessor, General Craig, considered the practice, some practice, as being illegal?

General MARSHALL. The intercepting of these messages.

Mr. KEEFE. The intercepting of these foreign messages?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As being illegal?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; contrary to the Espionage Act, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. I wanted to be sure that I understood you.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you happen to know at that time of the provision in the Federal Communications Act which forbids the interception of communications?

General MARSHALL. What is that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know anything about it then?

[2909] General MARSHALL. I think that is the act I should have referred to. When I said the Espionage Act I should have said the Federal Communications Act.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that the Supreme Court held before December 1941 some time that that applied to Government Intelligence or police authorities as well as to private persons?

General MARSHALL. I think I knew that, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were you aware of the fact that at Hawaii, for instance, there wasn't any legal way up to December 7, when the attack occurred, of obtaining copies of the Jap messages that the Japs sent from Hawaii to Tokyo or that Tokyo sent back to their spies in Hawaii that came over commercial cables?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I was aware of that, particularly because, as I recall, Mr. Stimson was very much concerned in his desire to obtain that information.

Mr. MITCHELL. But afterwards you were concerned with the question of security?

General MARSHALL. When you say "afterwards," I am not referring to December 7. I am referring to about a year back before that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Prior to that day.

General MARSHALL. Prior to that day.

[2910] Mr. MITCHELL. I mean after the remark had first been made to you about the matter.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the fear of war became apparent.

General MARSHALL. The minute the danger of war to America became apparent our intense concern was the secrecy of the source because its value was quite evident.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was there any regulation in the War Department that you established or knew about that forbade the people in the War Department, such as G-2 and War Plans Division, from sending of Hawaii not the text of any intercepted messages, nor a paraphrase of it, nor the fact that they had decoded it, but the substance of the information that they had derived by the intercept?

General MARSHALL. I am unaware of any regulation on that subject. As a matter of fact practically everything concerning magic was oral rather than written, in my recollection.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know that G-2 was not sending out the gist of those intercepted messages in all cases?

General MARSHALL. Was not sending out the gist?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not sending out the gist. General Miles testified that he never, of course, sent a copy of a message, [2911] of an intercepted Jap decoded message to Hawaii and he would not send a paraphrase of it and he did not want to let them know at Hawaii that he was cracking the code and he went further, I understand, and I think said that the information derived in that way could not in a covered-up way be passed on to Hawaii. Was that your understanding of the practice?

General MARSHALL. I do not know as I got that understanding but I know that the G-2 of the War Department, whoever he was, General Miles, General Strong, General McCabe or Colonel McCabe, General Lee and later General Bissell, always were emphatic in their safeguarding of the source and not advertising anything that was done, to hazard the source.

The extent to which they might transmit the information was one that I am not familiar with, just what they did, because there was a

continual passage of data from the G-2 of the War Department in the performance of his mission to the G-2's of the various overseas divisions and as the security factor was always ever present in the mind of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Army, that thought that he would be reckless had never occurred to me. His fear was that I would be reckless.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember of ever seeing these intercepted Jap messages relating to dividing Pearl Harbor into area A, B, C, D, and E and locating the——

[2912] General MARSHALL. I do not recall the message. I know the one you are referring to.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have examined the book?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I saw it in the book.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you have no recollection of ever seeing it?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are you familiar with the decoded Jap message of November 19, translated November 28, which appears in the book of diplomatic intercepts at page 154, which set up an emergency system of communication between the Japs and their foreign representatives by the use of certain words and weather broadcasts?

General MARSHALL. I remember seeing this winds message at the time it came through. This is the winds message, I believe.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the message that established the code, the one on page 154. It is in Japanese there.

General MARSHALL. Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly that. I am familiar with that specific winds message which would utilize this code, I believe, would it not?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there are two. There is this message which came in on the 19th of November and was translated on November 28th, it says here, in which the Japs said to [2913] their Washington diplomatic representatives:

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

General MARSHALL. I think I can say now specifically I did see it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember then that after that message was received that any attempt was made to alert monitoring stations to listen in to the Japanese weather broadcasts to see whether what we call an implementing message was later sent out?

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether I knew just what it was then but I know now what instructions were given by G-2, so whether I knew it then or not I am not prepared to say.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever see or know of any second message, an implementing message by which the Japs in the weather broadcast said the "East wind—rain" or "North wind—cloudy," indicating war with the United States?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of such a message or such data, rather.

Mr. MITCHELL. How?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of such data.

Mr. MITCHELL. The FCC, the Federal Communications Commission monitoring station which had been alerted to listen. [2914] for this implementing weather broadcast report shows that on December 7, after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did intercept an implementing message weather broadcast which contained not the expres-

sion "East wind—rain," which meant trouble with the United States, but "West wind—clear," which meant trouble with Great Britain. That was after the Japanese attack. Did you ever hear or know of that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not know anything about that.

Mr. MITCHELL. What were your usual office hours during the first week in December 1941?

General MARSHALL. Well, at that period of short days and cold it was my custom to arrive at the War Department about 7:30 and to leave the Department somewhere between 4:30 and 5 and then ride in the evening from 7 to 9. On Sunday, which brings into question December 7, it was my habit to have breakfast about 8 and then ride after that and then go to the War Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then go to the War Department?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the 14-part message and the 1 p. m. message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[2915] Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that, and under what circumstances?

General MARSHALL. I first was aware of this message when I reached the——

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest, General, it is now practically 4 o'clock.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, it is 4 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless the General wishes to go on, the committee might wait until tomorrow.

General MARSHALL. What is your pleasure?

The CHAIRMAN. We have been adjourning at 4 o'clock. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m. an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Friday, December 7, 1945.)

[2916]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2917] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. General Marshall, yesterday in connection with Exhibit 13, which is the Martin report on air defense, you mentioned that you had instituted an inquiry that resulted in that report and you were going to produce the memorandum. Have you the memorandum here with you this morning?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I have it here. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. MITCHELL. If you will, please.

General MARSHALL. This is dated July 17, 1941 [reading]:

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. AIR FORCES

The Chief of Staff desires that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii to include:

"a. Provision for the increase of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength (personnel and planes) of the Hawaiian Department up to one group.

"b. Any further increases to be limited to pursuit, light and medium bombardment and observation types, [2918] in order to reduce the concentration of air power in Hawaii by holding any additional heavy bombardment aviation required from Hawaiian defense in readiness on the mainland for rapid reinforcement of the Hawaiian garrison as required.

c. Outlying fields to be organized at operating strength by rotation of personnel and organizations from parent airdromes.

This study will be made in collaboration with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, who is being furnished a copy of this directive.

(Signed) ORLANDO WARD
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Mr. MITCHELL. This memorandum, General, speaks of one group of heavy bombers. What does a group mean in the Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. I think at that time a group consisted of about 3 squadrons of either 9 or 12 planes each. The organization changed quite frequently. I am sorry I cannot give you an accurate count on that but the Air Corps officers who will follow me can.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I want to refer to some testimony you gave—
[2919] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel intend to offer this as an exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it was read into the transcript and I did not think I would waste another number on it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MITCHELL. I want to inquire about a matter you testified to yesterday in connection with the so-called "winds" implementing message.

In reading over the transcript I am not sure that it is as clear as it should be and I want to be sure it is clear. In the first place, I want to call your attention again to the message in Japanese code that we intercepted and translated appearing on page 154 of Exhibit 1, which is the intercepted diplomatic messages.

At the left hand bottom of the page it is dated November 19, 1941, translated November 28, 1941 and it reads this way:

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

[2920] (1) In case of Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME", which translated, the record shows, means "East wind—rain."

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI", which translated, according to the record, means "North wind—cloudy."

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE", which translated means "West wind—clear."

The dispatch continues:

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

Now, I spoke of that as the message which set up the code system. You understood that, did you? And on the next page, at the top of page 155, there is a second message from Tokyo to Washington intercepted on November 19, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, the Jap number on which is just the succeeding number to the previous message. That sets up a slightly different system of giving out this news. It says:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end [2921] of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, 'HIGASHI'"; that is the first word, you will notice, in the number 1 in the previous messages and I understand that means "East", just the word "East"; no "East wind-rain"; no "wind" about it.

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, 'KITA'." That is the first word or part of the first word in the second paragraph in the preceding message. That means "North."

"(3) Japan-British-relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.): 'NISHI'." That is the first word in the third item in the previous message and means "West."

Now, those are what we call the initial messages which were received on the dates shown and in my questions I used the word "implementing" message which I intended to describe as any subsequent messages in which the Japs were using this code, in which the Japs using this code had sent out these warnings.

Now, I notice when I was inquiring on page 2912 of the transcript yesterday—my assistants have called my attention to the fact that one of my questions was not clear.

I called your attention to the first message this way:

"Are you familiar with the decoded Jap message of [2922] November 19th, translated November 28th, which appears in the book of diplomatic intercepts at page 154, which set up an emergency system of communication between the Japs and their foreign representatives by the use of certain words and weather broadcasts?"

"General MARSHALL. I remember seeing this winds message at the time it came through. This is the winds message, I believe."

Did you understand I was referring to the one at the bottom of page 154?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL (reading from transcript of testimony):

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the message that established the code, the one on page 154. It is in Japanese there.

"General MARSHALL. Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly that. I am familiar with the specific winds message which would utilize this code, would it not?"

"Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there are two. This is the message which came in on the 19th of November and was translated on November 28th, it says here, in which the Japs said to their Washington diplomatic representatives:

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency."

And then without my having completed my question and [2923] shown what the other one was you said: "I think I can say now specifically I did see it."

Now, when I said "two" in that question I was referring to the one on the bottom of page 154 and the second one on the top of page 155.

General MARSHALL. Are you asking me now specifically did I see both of these messages?

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, having that statement I would like to know if you remember knowing about these two messages of November 19th which set up these code systems? The first one had the "winds" word in it and the second one did not.

General MARSHALL. I have no distinct recollection of the break-down between the two messages.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

General MARSHALL. But I am quite certain I saw them both.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I think maybe we have been clear on this on the next page, page 2914, but I will ask you again:

Prior to December 7, 1941, did you ever see or hear of any later message in which the Japs in using this winds code sent out word that there was "East wind—rain," which meant trouble with the United States?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of either seeing or hearing of such a message. [2924]

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, when we closed last evening I had just asked you a question. I will repeat it now:

"Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the 14 part message and the 1 P. M. message?"

Your answer was, "Yes, sir."

"Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that and under what circumstances?"

And you got as far as saying: "I first was aware of this message when I reached the"—and then we adjourned.

Will you give us now the answer?

General MARSHALL. When I reached the office on the morning of Sunday, December the 7th.

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I had seen of other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do not know; but between [2925] 8 o'clock and the time I went to the War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I went for a ride.

Now, as to the probable duration of such a ride I can only say that there were very limited places to which one might ride unless you crossed from the Arlington side of the river up over Memorial Bridge and the park system on the Washington side, which I did not do but once, I think, in the previous 6 years. My rides took me almost invariably down to the site of the present Pentagon Building, which is the Government experimental farm.

On a few occasions I crossed the approaches to the Memorial Bridge, not the bridge itself, and rode along the Potomac about two-thirds of the way down to where the present National Airport is, but no farther. The average length of my rides was about, the time period of my rides is about 50 minutes because I rode at a pretty lively gait, at a trot and a canter and at a full run down on the experimental farm where the Pentagon now is and returned to the house, so I would say that the high probability is that the ride was an hour or less, generally or certainly not longer.

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower, either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton [2926] had something important and wished to come out to Fort Myer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about 10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I have no recollection.

[2927] On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 1 o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to deliver this thing at 1:00 p. m. Sunday to the American Government?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that 1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the west coast, which included Alaska. Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone, [2928] and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was that he called me back. I am told now that the White House telephone records show that I called him back. I had no recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message, saving the last sentence.

However, one way or the other, there was a call or conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show this to your Naval officers," which I did in longhand.

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately to the message center and start it. There was a proposal then that we have it typed. The decision was there was no time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

On his return I questioned him as to the length of time involved and I could not make out whether or not he was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe [2929] others state that there was no third trip. There were certainly two—my own recollection is there were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dispatching of the message.

Do you wish me to go ahead?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. The next information I had was the notification of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. Of my own recollection I do not recall whether I was at the War Department or at the house. I am told on one side by the Secretary of the General Staff at that time, the Acting Secretary at that time, General Dean, that I had returned to the house. I am told, on the other hand by my orderly that I was at the War Department. I do not know where I was.

Anyway, shortly thereafter, if not immediately then, I was at the War Department, because it was a very quick drive, and on Sunday there was no traffic. It was a matter of about 7 minutes from my house to the Munitions building.

The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of

Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time. He was endeavoring to tell me what was actually happening.

[2930] My questioning, as I recall, was with relation to a report that had come from somewhere—and there were many reports of course at that time, rumors and authentic, confusion—that a Japanese landing was being attempted, as I recall, below Barber Point, and my recollection is my inquiry of Colonel Phillips was to the facts in regard to that.

I talked to Colonel Phillips because, as I recall, at that time General Short had gone to his command post and therefore was not able to talk to me directly.

The procedure on the dispatch of the messages did not come to my attention in detail until I was before the Roberts Board. The fact that the one message had been sent by the Western Union to San Francisco on a direct line, relayed by the RCA and presumably teletyped, which was not done in Hawaii, I did not know about that.

Admiral Stark tells me, and I am quite certain he is right—I do not recall it but he is undoubtedly right—that he asked me at the time of our second conversation that morning, or he said that they had rapid means of communication and if I wished to use it, and I told him no. That must be a fact—I do not recall—that must be a fact.

That, I think, covers the main details.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now do you remember your movements on the evening of December 6, as to where you were?

[2931] General MARSHALL. I can only account for them by sort of circumstantial evidence. The only definite thing I have is that I had no dinner engagement. I found our engagement book, or Mrs. Marshall's engagement book, and between the 1st of November and 7th of December I had one dinner engagement, that was the 2d of December.

Also they checked on the post movie. It was about our only recourse for relaxation, and I had never seen the picture. So I was not there.

We were not calling. We were leading a rather monastic life. There was also in that record the affairs of the day for her, which involved, I think, an old-clothes sale, I think, all day long, to raise money for one of these industries they had down there, so the probability is she was tired and we were home.

[2932] Mr. MITCHELL. You are sure you were not at the White House that evening?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; not at all.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is a statement in the Army Board report that the warning message that you got out on the morning of the 7th you telephoned to the Philippines. Is that your recollection?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I talked to Colonel Phillips, as I explained here, after the attack was going on, because we could hear the explosions at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not telephone any such message yourself?

General MARSHALL. I did not telephone anywhere.

Mr. MITCHELL. After you drafted this warning message to the outposts that you were prepared to send as the result of having seen

this 1 p. m. message, is it your recollection that you called Admiral Stark first before he called you? Originally, I mean.

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain of that. I called him first.

Mr. MITCHELL. What did you say to him?

General MARSHALL. As nearly as I can recall, I asked him if he had seen the message. He stated that he had, and I proposed that we send a message apropos of this to the [2933] various commanders concerned, and he replied as I have outlined, he feared that that would tend to confuse them, that we had given them an alert and now we were putting something else into the picture.

I then went ahead and wrote the message, and I don't think I said to him in concluding that first conversation whether or not I was going to do it, but I did write it out immediately in longhand.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then your recollection is he called you?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is he called me, but the records of the White House telephone exchange show I called him.

Mr. MITCHELL. And what was the subject of the second conversation?

General MARSHALL. I had thought that he called me to say he wanted this shown to the naval officer. It would seem from the record at the White House that I called him and maybe read the message. In any event he did ask me, and I am specific about that, he did ask me to put into the message that it be shown to the naval officer.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you exhibit 58 before you?

General MARSHALL. No.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will have to show it to you, General.

This is a record of telephone calls on December 7 by [2934] outside parties through using the White House exchange.

It says, and I will show it to you—the record says “11:40 A” which means “A. M.,” I suppose.

General Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—O. K.

11:30 A—Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—O. K.

In that particular instance, according to the White House records, these hours are reversed. The 11:40 A is ahead of 11:30, which does not seem to be the practice, and we are not sure just what it means.

Will you look at it and see if it means anything to you? That is exactly what the record shows there, that the time 11:40 precedes the entry of the 11:30 message.

General MARSHALL. I would not know what the significance of that is.

Mr. MITCHELL. You would not know anything about it?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. It does this, though. It gives the time one way or another of the completion of the message following the reading of the 14-point thing and the preparation of this other message.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then at least you did read the message and were in the act of preparing a warning by 11:30 or 11:40?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; 11:40 would be quite evidently the completion of it, because I had it all written [2935] except the last sentence.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will offer now, as Exhibit 61, a photostat which reads as follows: “December 7, 1941.” It is typed.

1112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary,
General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army;

And the message is this:

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

MARSHALL.

It has the signature of General Gerow on it. Has the committee a copy?

[2936] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the committee will note that underneath it is a record:

"Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41 by Code Room, WDMC."

General MARSHALL. War Department Message Center.

Mr. MITCHELL. And another was dispatched 12:05 to Manila; another one to Hawaii at 12:17; the one to the Caribbean Command is blurred. It looks like 12:00 o'clock, and the one to the Fourth Army at San Francisco at 12:11.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is Exhibit 61?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 61.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 61.")

[2937] Mr. MITCHELL. Did you give any instructions to the Communications Center as to the means of transmitting this message to Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. Their business was to dispatch it in the most efficient and rapid manner possible. This photostat of this document of General Gerow's should be read in the light that it was written after the event. The message was sent from a longhand pencil copy on an ordinary ruled sheet of paper—which, incidentally, was before the Roberts board.

Mr. MITCHELL. The original message was in your hand-writing and you gave directions that it should not be typed?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. It was carried by hand by Colonel Bratton and checked on the second trip by Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy, and then I thought there also should be a third trip by Colonel Bundy, but there was a difference of opinion on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the message center it was necessary to take your handwritten draft and encode it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; encode it first.

Mr. MITCHELL. And then put it on the way?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was there any report made to you at that time that there was any difficulty in reaching Hawaii on [2938] the telephone?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I mean before the attack?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I did not ask the question.

Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't ask the question as to means of transportation?

General MARSHALL. I didn't ask the question about the telephone.

Mr. MITCHELL. What did they estimate to you would be the required time for delivery to Fort Shafter of the Hawaiian message?

General MARSHALL. I don't recollect, sir. I have a faint recollection of being told that it would take 8 minutes to get it through, but I think you will have positive testimony on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. You sent the message to all the commands without any special selection of Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. Exactly. I sent each commander involved in the Pacific situation. The Western Defense Command, which is the Fourth Army, the Caribbean Command, the Philippine Command, and the Hawaiian Command.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you make any inquiry of the communications people or your subordinates as to the prospective time of delivery of that message to Hawaii?

[2939] General MARSHALL. That was the reason I sent Colonel Bratton back with Colonel Bundy, to give me a clear picture of what the time involved was, because when I first questioned Colonel Bundy I couldn't tell whether he was including the time necessary to encipher the message, and so I sent him back to determine that for me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, what report did he make to you, do you remember, about that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the minutes. I think it is shown in one of the documents. I couldn't tell you offhand. I think they are prepared to give you that, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did anybody in your office, when you were reading the 14-part message and the 1 p. m. supplement, on the morning of the 7th, make any mention of the fact that 1 p. m. in Washington would be about 7:30 a. m. in Honolulu?

General MARSHALL. There was no mention of the 1 p. m. message until I came across it at the end of the pile. I am quite clear about that, because I was very much taken back by the time I had spent on the preceding lengthy message in trying to understand its significance, and then arriving at this, to me, very critical one of 1 p. m.

Mr. MITCHELL. You thought you ought to have been shown the 1 p. m. part first?

General MARSHALL. I don't know about that. I am just [2940] talking about my own reaction.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, was any discussion had when you saw the 1 p. m. message? Any discussion about the corresponding time of day in Honolulu or the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that. I don't recall that at all. The whole thing was, it was a significant message, and what would we tell these commanders, and I went ahead and wrote it out myself.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you talk to the President on the morning of the 7th before the attack?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection. I think I had an appointment, I think the records show it, and that is my only source for speaking now, that I had had a previous appointment for 3 o'clock

that afternoon. I had no recollection of that until I was shown the record. I know I went to the White House that afternoon.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have your staff organized at that time so that if an especially significant or important intercept was made of a Jap message, was there anyone on duty who had authority, if they were unable to reach you, to send a warning message out?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, I don't think there was a set-up for that special purpose. We had always had an arrangement there whereby the officer on the receiving end, at the [2941] central point in the War Department, knew where the principal people were, where to reach them. In my own case, for example, during that period and for about a year thereafter, I always maintained an orderly at the house at the telephone. If I left the house to go to a moving picture, which was about the only place I went, he was there and knew where to reach me. These various sections of the War Department Staff, notably the G-2 section, were all working pretty much overtime. General Gerow's section, I know, was working at that rate practically all the time. Too much so, as a matter of fact.

Mr. MITCHELL. If they had not been able to reach you on the morning of the 7th, or at any time when an important message came in, was there anybody but yourself that had authority to send a warning message to the outlying post?

General MARSHALL. Yes. The authority was vested, for instance, in the Deputy Chief of Staff. Or even the head of War Plans Division. There is no dispute about that, I do not think, because the actions always had been on a very decentralized basis. We selected the men and we trusted them. That does not go down the line, of course.

I was asked on one of the investigations if Colonel Bratton would have had authority to send such a message. I would think that would be asking a great deal of him, to do that. I don't think that would apply in this case. He would [2942] certainly not be responsible for sending such a message.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was General Miles high enough up in the list to have authority to send out a warning message to G-2?

General MARSHALL. General Miles had responsibility for dispensing information. He could not issue a command message. This goes as a command message.

The same information, of course, might have been sent as just information of what was happening.

Mr. MITCHELL. The thing that made this a command message — General MARSHALL. Was the positive direction.

Mr. MITCHELL. A direction to be on the alert accordingly?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. He would only have authority to send the facts. As to any deductions he might make, he couldn't tell them what to do.

Mr. MITCHELL. But the War Plans Division would have operational authority to send a message that involved action?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was the Deputy Chief of Staff the only other one that had authority to send a message without reaching you?

General MARSHALL. I think that would be the accurate way of stating it, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have, of course, been speaking of the [2943] military officers. The Secretary of War, if he had information, for instance, he wouldn't have had to ask your permission. He would have directed an order.

Secretary Stimson, if this think had come to him, and he had felt a warning ought to be sent out, he would have had authority to send it out?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have any talk on the morning of the 7th with Secretary Stimson before the news of the attack came in?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall it. He was at the State Department I knew, but I can't recall that I saw him before lunch.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you know at the time that a meeting was being held at the State Department?

General MARSHALL. I think I did, but I am not certain. You see, my time, when I reached the Department, was completely taken up in reading this lengthy message and trying to digest it, and nobody could talk to me while I was reading it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have any meeting with the President, or an appointment with him, on the 6th of December? The White House records say; 10 a. m., Justice William O. Douglas 11:15, Director Harold Smith. Those are under the head of President appointments. Nobody else for the 6th

[2944] General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of any contact with him.

Mr. MITCHELL. When one of these Jap intercepts was translated there was a system of delivering copies of the translation to you, was there not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was that done at your office?

General MARSHALL. My office desk.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was it the practice to send copies of those intercepts out to your quarters, your home?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that we ever did that. That would have been strongly opposed by the G-2 people. I don't recall ever having received any at my home.

Mr. MITCHELL. You stated that the first time you saw this 14-part message and the 1 p. m. message was when you arrived at your office on the morning of December 7; is that correct?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you learned prior to that time of it, prior to the time you actually saw a copy, did you learn that any such dispatch had been received, had it been told or telephoned you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember whether you had been told [2945] or telephoned or informed in any way on the evening of the 6th, late in the evening, that any arrangement had been made for a meeting between Secretary Stimson and Mr. Hull on the next morning?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I have no such recollection.

[2946] Mr. MITCHELL. General, I want to go back a little bit over the question of the estimates as to the possibilities of the success

of a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, and the estimates as to the possibility of whether an attack might be made by the Japs.

The record here shows that the question of a possible air attack on Pearl Harbor had been carefully considered. There is the Martin-Bellinger report, and the Martin report, and others.

Those reports show that an assured, complete defense that would practically guarantee the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor could only be accomplished if you had a long-range reconnaissance which caught the enemy carriers at sea at a distance of 800 or a thousand miles the evening before, followed up by a bombing attack on them to destroy the carriers before the planes had left.

The conclusion in all those reports was that the probable selection by the enemy of the hour would be to reach a distance at a point some thousand miles or so, or 600 miles, the night before and then run in the dark, and discharge their planes early the next morning.

I think the reports make it clear that the quantity of patrol planes needed to make a daily reconnaissance out that distance in all directions was something more than [2947] double the number of patrol planes they actually had, and bombers available for a striking force were quite few.

Now, on the basis of those reports and the available matériel on December 7, isn't it fair to say, first, that the best that could be done with the available patrol forces was what you might call a sector long-distance reconnaissance each afternoon, choosing one sector one day and another sector another.

Isn't that the conclusion you draw?

General MARSHALL. That is, I would say, roughly the case. They had to, certainly, modify the procedure according to the means available, which, however, is a common situation with any commander.

Mr. MITCHELL. That necessarily involved some element of luck. If you selected one sector for a long-distance reconnaissance one day and another for another day, you took some chance of missing the Japs.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. You have to accept that.

Mr. MITCHELL. So, with the available matériel, there would necessarily be considerable risk of their not being able to run such a reconnaissance as would locate the Jap carriers; is that the way you judge these reports?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, that meant that there was no definite [2948] assurance that they could strike the carriers and destroy the attack before it got launched?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. The alternative to that, if they couldn't reach them, was to hit the Japs in the morning, put our fighters out with radar detection, or some other reconnaissance, spot the Jap attack coming in or just leaving the carrier, and try to destroy their planes and break up their attack; that is the alternative, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. It would be the alternative in one sense, but also your dispositions might be changed to meet that situation. Your degree of alert arrangements might be altered accordingly. The dispositions, Naval, as well as Army, might have been modified to meet that.

Of course, what the modifications would be, I don't know, but certainly you make various adjustments to meet a critical weakness in order to lessen the possibility of damage.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, all of my questions are based on the assumption that there was a complete alert, that everything was ready that could be ready. Of course, if you are not, that presents a different problem, but I am assuming in [2949] my questions that they are completely on the alert in the light of everything they had to face.

Now, the Japs had 6 carriers in this attacking force and their records show around 360 planes. The record isn't quite clear as to whether they sent all of them in, or whether they may have kept some as a screen. But the number of planes that we had available in service to resist their attack seems to be less than a third of the Japs'.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; assuming on the Japanese side that they knew where our carriers were which also had some planes, and which also necessitated their holding certain planes on their Japanese carrier force.

Mr. MITCHELL. I naturally assumed that because the daily ship reports which were intercepted kept reporting whether the carriers were in and out.

General MARSHALL. And, as I recall, the carriers were out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Now, with the available matériel at Hawaii, there wasn't sufficient in the way of air forces, bombers, and so forth to insure that the Japanese air force could not get in to the fleet, was there? Wasn't there a risk that some of the planes would get through and that damage would be done?

General MARSHALL. There was always that hazard.

[2950] Mr. MITCHELL. It was a question then, under the conditions, of whether if they had been completely on the alert, the air forces we had would have been able to break up the Japanese attack in such a way as to minimize or mitigate the damage?

General MARSHALL. It was a question of the deployment, the status, alertness, the various arrangements made with the means available.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, would it seem that under the circumstances, if it had been definitely expected that an air attack would be made, would you have felt, considering what I have just said, knowing or believing that an attack was going to be made, that the risk ought to be taken of keeping the fleet in the port. Have you any estimate of that?

General MARSHALL. You are getting, Mr. Mitchell, into a very technical naval question, which I do not think I am competent to answer, because how you might otherwise have disposed those vessels is distinctly a naval problem involving considerations of which, as a land man, I do not have the information to speak, and therefore I am not prepared to answer that. I will merely say that we created what we thought was a fair defensive set-up for our islands which was quite unusual for our degree of unpreparedness at [2951] that time and that everybody there was aware, as indicated by the communications of the hazard of an air attack or a submarine attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then I think it comes down probably to what you said yesterday, that considering what was to be done, the question of the hazards of an air attack and the lack of complete assurance that

it could be wholly defeated, was tempered with a question of judgment as to whether or not an attack ought to be expected at all in sizing up the situation; the two things blend, do they not?

General MARSHALL. I don't know as I quite understand your question, but I would say this as to the problem of the attack not being expected at all, the question of whether or not there is an attack depends on what you do yourself, to a great extent, on which the enemy makes his estimate, and you always have to suppose that he will do the thing that is most embarrassing to you.

Perfection of defense is seldom ever achieved. Even in our most carefully laid-out operation, in which we took about 2½ years to prepare for the landing in Normandy, we were short of LST's, and there was a bitter battle over getting them from the Pacific and the Mediterranean.

I presume had that failed, there would have been an investigation as to why we went into Normandy until we had [2952] the full number of LST's necessary for the operation.

Mr. MITCHELL. You stated in your testimony before the Army Board, I think you used this phrase. I think "we" did not expect the attack at Pearl Harbor. When you said "we," were you speaking generally of the high officers in the War Department?

General MARSHALL. That was a rather careless expression. I will make that "I."

Mr. MITCHELL. And when you say the enemy would judge whether he would attack on whether he knew you were going to be ready, did you, in that conclusion take into account the fact that the Japs knew we weren't alert?

General MARSHALL. I didn't take that into consideration because I thought we were on the alert.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your estimate that you didn't expect it was based on the theory that what you had was ready and if ready, the Japs probably knew it was ready?

General MARSHALL. It is a little bit like, in my mind, the present discussion as to the postwar organization of our Army. If we are ready, the other man will not involve us.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to have that last answer read. I didn't quite get the purport of it.

(The answer referred to was read by the reporter.)

[2953] Mr. MITCHELL. General Marshall, it appears here from the record that commencing with Admiral Stark's letter to Admiral Richardson of November 22, 1940, directing him when he got back to Hawaii to start in motion facilities for air defense against an air attack, from that time, the Bloch report, the Knox and Stimson letter, and all those plans, and the Martin-Bellinger report, and right up to the end of August, at least everybody that had anything to do with the subject, both in the War Department and the officers at Hawaii, seemed to be worried over the possibility of an air attack; people out there were reporting that they were vulnerable and were demanding new matériel and you were doing your level best to shoot matériel out there to help them prepare, and the thing was batted back and forth right up to that time, everybody seemed to be on his toes about an air attack, and the possibility of it.

Have you anything you could say that would help this committee by way of explanation that after all that stir, when it came to the last

critical days, the people at Hawaii, certainly the people in the War Department had gotten into a frame of mind where at least some of them, I don't say all, where they feared, or dreaded—thought—the danger of an air attack had faded away? To a layman that is the [2953-A] thing that is interesting, and if there is anything you want to say on that, we would like to have it.

General MARSHALL. Possibly I can explain it in this way:

In the first place, taking the latter part of your question—your statement—the fear of an air attack, as far as the War Department was concerned, had not faded away. The point was this. A new commander for the Fleet had been appointed. A new commander for the Air Forces in Hawaii had been appointed. They had brought up various things they wished to have done in order to insure capability of carrying out their missions. We were then in a state of woeful inadequacy of all such material. Also, combined with that fact, what little we had, a material proportion had to be used or we couldn't develop an Army or air force. We couldn't prepare the crews for the new planes which were soon to appear.

Therefore, through the late winter, at least beginning in February, and running up into the summer, we did our utmost one way or another to provide the things that the Navy thought were needed and the Army commander in Hawaii thought were needed. We did our utmost to provide the material that was needed. We had gone to the point where we thought they were reasonably prepared in meeting the [2954] requirements they had stated.

The last one, of course, was this Martin-Bellinger report, which we never did come up to, up until the end of the war.

We then, as quantity production came in, turned for the first time to try to send something to General MacArthur. The indications, the positive indications, by observation, by reconnaissance, by magic, were definitely a Japanese evil intention south of the China Sea. We had that, as I say, by reconnaissance. We had it by many sources. By magic.

General MacArthur had little or nothing. If we could make the Philippines then reasonably defensible, particularly with heavy bombers in which the Air Corps at that time had great faith, in their action against hostile shipping, we felt that we could block that Japanese advance and block their entry into the war by their fear of what would happen if they couldn't take the Philippines, and we could maintain heavy bombers on that island. So from the latter part of August, having given Hawaii all we could afford to give them up to that time, and there having been elaborate arrangements made, modifications, readjustments one way or another, we turned and tried to do something for General MacArthur, and most of that went through the Hawaiian Islands, incidentally, by Navy or by air. So our struggle from that [2955] time on was to give the Philippines an adequate defensive set-up. Theretofore they had little or nothing.

[2956] I might put in the record here now the fact that on at least two occasions and possibly three the President, a long time back, in 1940, and Admiral Stark, in the presence of the President and to me personally, had expressed the hope that we could do something for the Philippines and in each case I had given them the reply that we could not; that it would be the seed corn.

We first had the defense of the continental United States. Hawaii was a vital factor in the defense of the United States; the Panama Canal was a vital factor, a great bottleneck in connection with the defense of the United States. To create the necessary forces we had to have experienced people, we had to have matériel, we had to create those forces not so much to arm them as to permit them to prepare themselves.

Therefore, anything we sent to the Philippines that could have had any possible effect on the situation out there would practically deny us the ability to create an Army, to create a defense out there that was in any degree effectual.

Now, as I have said, quantity production was making its first appearance really in about August 1941 and, as I have said, we turned from the meeting of the demands in Hawaii and not fulfilling the Martin-Bellinger request for 180 B-17's of which in all we possessed all over the world 148 [2957] at that particular time. We turned to our endeavor to set up a sufficient force in the Philippine Islands to guard the islands to be a threat to any Japanese movement through the China Sea and to possibly avert a war in the Pacific.

We had equipped, so far as we thought it possible to equip and instructed, so far as we thought it was necessary to instruct, the garrison in the Hawaiian Islands. We were now engaged in trying to do for General MacArthur that what he so urgently required.

I think that is a reasonable explanation of why from August on we were working in the Far East rather than a continuation of discussions of one kind and another and of matériel items to the Hawaiian garrison. Have I made that fairly plain, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. It appears that some B-17's were flown from the Pacific coast to Hawaii leaving December 6 and that arrived at Pearl Harbor during the Jap attack. What do you know about that?

General MARSHALL. We had succeeded in getting 35 Flying Fortresses to the Philippines, incidentally, sending them via Wake Island and then Port Moresby or Rabaul or Port Darwin or Balikpapan in Borneo, north of the Philippines.

Those had been made available by reason of the additional funds that were appropriated by Congress to expedite production, which always costs a great deal more money. [2958]

The result of that was that the following deliveries, which we had assumed would immediately come after those 35 from the plants, were delayed several weeks, I think about 3 weeks. There was a gap, in other words, in the delivery of the B-17's.

Not only that, but after we got the crews into the delivered ships we then found that the adverse winds at an unexpected period between Hawaii and California prevented the flight.

I might add that the flight of the 35 was the first time that a B-17, in other words, a land-based plane, had attempted a crossing from 24 to 27 hundred miles. It became a common thing later on with wider cruising radius.

So these ships were held on the west coast, the B-17's. General Arnold can give you practical testimony regarding this. From my point of view and memory, I sent him out personally to the west coast to see if they were doing everything possible, first to get these

planes completed with the extra tanks and the things that it required, and next to take off for the flight.

Naturally, the young men, the squadron leaders, could not be told all the various factors in the case except that we wanted them to leave as quickly as possible.

[2959] So General Arnold made the trip personally. My recollection is he called me up on the 'phone shortly after he had arrived out there and he said, "These damn fellows don't realize how serious this thing is," and I told him, "Well," I said, "you are there and they are your people. You start them out." And he drove the harder to make an early departure.

His criticism, of course, must be moderated to the point that they were doing their best and it was a very dangerous flight. The limitation on the quantity of gasoline you could carry was very decided and it gave them a small factor of safety, so it was not one to be stepped into lightly unless a great emergency was in existence. The question was how thoroughly the great emergency was realized by the senior officers directing the men.

Actually, under his urging and presumably under a moderation of the winds, the adverse winds, the flight of the first squadron took off and arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you say the first flight was the one that got there during the Jap attack?

General MARSHALL. My understanding is that they arrived in the air over Hawaii while the Japanese were bombing Pearl Harbor.

[2960] Mr. MITCHELL. The record shows that those planes were unarmed; that is, they were not provided with ammunition.

General MARSHALL. I think they did not have any ammunition. That was explained, I think, by the fact these pilots were trying to get every gallon of gas they could in the plane and they did not anticipate fighting this plane on that long hop from California to Hawaii.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you know anything about their actual equipment at the time they left the west coast with regard to arms or anything like that?

General MARSHALL. I do not know that. General Arnold can probably tell you that specifically. My recollection is that they had their arms but they were covered with cosmoline to protect them against the salt air and that they did not carry ammunition.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will ask you to consider the suggestion about unity of command in Hawaii. There has been a memorandum introduced here, General Gerow's, dated November 17, 1941, reporting to you about the efforts of the Army and Navy in joint conference to reach some agreement in respect to unified command at various posts, including Hawaii.

Will you tell us what you know about that? There was also offered in evidence with that a letter you wrote on the 20th. Is that attached to that file?

[2961] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. There is missing from this my endorsement on General Gerow's paper, though. My recollection is that I wrote a specific endorsement to General Gerow on his paper; on his proposal. If you haven't got it here I will obtain it for the committee.

Mr. MITCHELL. I wish you could get it from the War Department. Will you please tell us what you know about the situation dealt with in that report and your letter of the 20th?

General MARSHALL. We had been endeavoring for a long time to reach a more efficient command basis where the Army and the Navy were both in the same area. It presented, of course, certain very definite complications along the coast because you had the close-in defense, the coast defense guns, you had, we will say, the fighter planes which operated fairly close in and you had naval reconnaissance planes which go tremendous distances out to sea and may become involved with the fleet or naval task forces in a sense remote from the coastal defense itself, so it presented a complication in working out a system which would enable control without producing confusion.

Admiral Stark and I—I am certain for myself and I am quite certain from his point of view—were endeavoring all the time to find a basis of unity in control of these matters.

[2962] As has always been the case, you could do more at the top than you could down through the line because there a hundred complications would come up and differences of view, very decided.

I had considered a long time before this of a proposal to the Navy that they take unity of command in Alaska and the Aleutians because I thought that if there was an actual landing attempt up there by an enemy that the matter was predominantly naval. For various reasons it was not accepted. I do not know, I do not recall at the moment, I do not know that I knew at the time exactly why. I thought possibly—I may be utterly wrong—that they had felt that that would be taken as the basis for carrying the thing further on.

We thought it was very important that we have unity of command in the Panama Canal on the part of the Army, where its interests are so predominant, we felt, though the Canal was for the service of the Navy.

There was no question in my mind but what Hawaii was a predominant naval factor. The question was how you worked this out.

I have said this before; I will repeat it again. It is a very simple thing to have unity of command if you give it to the other man but that also applied in all of our dealings with the British and among ourselves and always will [2963] continue to be so.

So we made every effort to bring this to a head and as I think I stated in my letter to General Emmons when it was finally determined, I covered a good many of the reasons. I will read the particular paragraph. This is the letter of December 20 to General Emmons, then in Army command in Hawaii, an air officer who had been the commander of the GHQ air force and for that reason I had sent him out there.

Unity of command had just been ordered and it was to be a naval command in that region. The same occurred in Panama. It was to be an Army command in that region. (Reading:)

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the

coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time [2964] that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to—

That is Hawaii and Panama—

have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.

[2965] Now I will add this further item in connection with that. After Pearl Harbor and preceding this letter I brought General Eisenhower in and he worked on the details, as I recall, and drew up what I might designate a bill of particulars or exceptions in Panama to meet various naval objections, things that we would guarantee on the Army side we would not do, we would not do this, we would not do that, with these reservations in favor of a naval situation. It was quite a long list. I know he worked most of the night on it, and I worked with him part of the time.

When we turned to the Hawaiian side we put in no Army proviso, and bringing them in that way the net result was, as I recall, there were no provisos on either side, and we accomplished unity on that basis.

It might be interesting to the committee, although it is not pertinent to this hearing, that we ran into exactly the same situation in determining unity of command in the western Pacific with Wavel. We had to write a great many provisos and restrictions in the document in order to get a general acceptance of the proposition. Later on those were almost forgotten. The minute we had unity the solutions became evident and resolved themselves right within the command. But the start was always the same, and in that case also General Eisenhower helped me with the details of [2966] provisos in order to get the acceptance by the other party to the proposition.

Mr. MITCHELL. Has unity of command at Hawaii been maintained up to the present time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I say the present time—I do not know what has happened in the last 10 days.

Mr. MITCHELL. Without asking you any questions about the unity of command, complete unity of command generally in the Army and Navy Departments, limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii, or Panama, for instance, do you want to express any views as to the wisdom of maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as compared with war?

General MARSHALL. I think it is an imperative necessity.

Mr. MITCHELL. During this period, from what you learned about the operations of the intelligence branches of the Navy and Army, and what not, and the question of uncertainty or difficulty in exchanges and assurance of having all branches informed of all information, have

you any views to express about unity of consolidation or centralization of the Military and Naval Intelligence?

General MARSHALL. I think it is very necessary.

Mr. MITCHELL. I may have some more questions of the General but not until after lunch anyway, and if the committee want to inquire they can start in.

[2967] It is 10 minutes of 12.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 10 minutes to 12, and while some members of the committee might properly inquire of General Marshall in that 10 minutes, suppose we hold 10 minutes later this afternoon and make up for that lost time?

Therefore we will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a. m., the committee recessed until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[2968]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Counsel may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding further with General Marshall there is one point on which I would like the instructions of the committee.

In September 1944 General Marshall wrote some letters to Mr. Dewey during the Presidential campaign. Without going into details I will say that I think that these letters are material to this inquiry and the incident ought to be gone into and the letters put in evidence but, unfortunately, in those letters there is a sentence or two, a few words, which disclose technical cryptoanalytical methods which we had adopted to break the Japanese code and the question arises whether those words should be deleted or whether the whole letter should go in.

I have here copies of the letters that are complete. I also have here copies of the letters in which those statements of our technical methods of cracking the Japanese codes are deleted.

The deletion, in my judgment, does not change the tenor of the letters or their continuity and for the purposes of [2969] this case I should think that the deletions have nothing to do with what you are interested in.

My own feeling is that in the interests of national security the deletions should be made but I do not think all the members of the committee have yet seen these letters.

I am bringing that question up now so that I can have the instructions of the committee as to whether we should offer in evidence the complete letters or those copies which have that cryptoanalytic information deleted. I can supply the committee with copies if anyone has not seen them.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to make a statement in that connection which he thinks ought to be made on behalf of the committee and in justice to General Marshall and to the counsel for the committee.

In September 1944, during the Presidential campaign, it is the understanding of the Chair that General Marshall received information that the question of cracking the Japanese codes might become involved in the campaign; whereupon he wrote a letter or two letters to Governor Dewey who was a candidate for President.

In the letter or letters General Marshall referred to the cracking of certain codes which was then current. That is, they were in progress then in September 1944.

General Marshall felt that in view of the fact that this [2970] information was confidential and was not related necessarily to the Pearl Harbor situation but dealt with a situation that was current in 1944 and may be even current now in 1945, that there was a sentence and a phrase or two in that letter to Governor Dewey that might well be deleted so far as this record is concerned.

The committee met this morning in executive session to discuss that question and it transpired that there was a division within the ranks of the committee as to whether these parts that General Marshall felt that so far as he was personally concerned, due to relations existing between our Government and one of our allies, might well be omitted from the transcript.

I think the committee recognized the fact that unless they could unanimously agree to the deletion and even though they unanimously agreed to the deletion, that it would be difficult to maintain that situation in view of the avenues by which information is obtained, that notwithstanding General Marshall's feeling about it that so far as he was personally concerned that this information was given in confidence and notwithstanding the view of the counsel that it should be maintained in confidence, the committee was unable to agree that it should be and in effect decided that the letter should be made a part of the record and that it should be made a [2971] part of the record without deletion and that the committee accepts the responsibility of whatever consequences may ensue in regard to our relations with any other country among our allies for the publication of the full letter and its inclusion here in the record.

I think that it is fair to General Marshall and to counsel and to the committee to make that statement and, therefore, it is the viewpoint of the committee as a whole that the whole letter should be placed in the record at this time and made public.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, the Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the record should also show that I was unable to bring my thought to the conclusion that I should attend the executive session where there was a witness who wanted to give statements or testimony to the committee as a committee in executive session. Therefore, I am not familiar with the contents of this letter.

I felt that because of the statements of the Chairman previously on the floor and my own stand that all meetings should be public meetings and that all evidence should be produced in the public and for that reason I am not familiar with the contents of this letter.

[2972] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might also state—

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Illinois.

The Chair will also state that the Senator from Illinois also took the same position and excused himself from the executive session.

The object of the executive session was to discuss the very question involved here because it was thought it could be more freely discussed in executive session than here in an open session, as to whether the entire letter should go into the record or as to whether there should be eliminated the sentence or two to which I have referred and to which General Marshall called our attention.

Now, the Senator from Illinois may amplify that statement in any way that he may see fit.

[2973] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, the position taken by the Senator from Michigan is not the same position that the Senator from Illinois takes. The Senator from Michigan absented himself from the committee meeting and refused to participate in executive session and hear General Marshall's statement upon this question.

The Senator from Illinois also absented himself from the executive session. I know nothing about the contents of the letter. The Senator from Illinois was not willing for one member of the committee to absent himself from the meeting without himself going out with the General.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Congressman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion it was a question whether or not the rules of this committee, or the feelings of any individual on this committee should come before the security of the Nation.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Maine.

Senator BREWSTER. I think in order to complete the record, it ought to appear that the members of the committee who remained excused General Marshall at the same time that we excused the Senator from Michigan, or the Senator from Illinois, so no information of any character was received [2974] from General Marshall aside from that given in the letter, with the underlining of the passages which he previously stated he thought perhaps might be left out.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement is correct. The committee excused General Marshall simultaneously with the excusing of the two Senators, who had excused themselves. The Chairman might suggest if we had excused anybody else we might not have had a quorum present.

The upshot of the whole thing is the entire letter will be read into the record and made public. I might say that the committee accepts responsibility for that procedure.

I might also say it was the viewpoint of the Chairman that notwithstanding any possible embarrassment that might accrue between our Government and an allied nation over the publication of confidential information contained in General Marshall's letter, that in the long run, it would be less embarrassing to publish the whole letter than to be required later to explain why we left any of it out, and for that reason the Chair felt, and now feels that the entire letter should be made part of the record, and made public.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I, of course, accept my part of the responsibility to which the Chairman has just referred, but I [2975] regret exceedingly that some sensible and perfectly simple plan could not

have been adopted, as I think it could, to the satisfaction of everybody who is reasonable about it, rather than to put us up against exposing a matter here that is wholly irrelevant to Pearl Harbor, that may have consequences that we cannot foresee.

Under the circumstances, while I accept my part of the responsibility, I regret the circumstances that make it necessary.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I might add one more sentence.

While I feel it is the responsibility of this committee at the present time, the occasion with which we were confronted this morning, was occasioned by two people other than people who are in this room, and one of whom will be before this committee later, at which time I wish to question him about the circumstances that brought about this morning's meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. We will cross that bridge when we reach it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to make it clear that my only reason this morning, as I stated, was not that General Marshall was a witness—I have the highest respect for [2976] General Marshall—but it is the fact that I was unwilling to take any testimony in executive session, no matter what it was about, or who was the witness.

I sat on the sofa outside with General Marshall. We were very friendly, and we discussed a portion of Pearl Harbor, and things relating to it. It was not the question that General Marshall was the witness, it was merely that all meetings, in my opinion, should be open meetings, no matter what is to be discussed with the witness. They should be here and be sworn as witnesses. We should get our testimony from the witnesses in sworn statements, in an open hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it is obvious that probably from time to time there will have to be executive sessions of the committee to determine with respect to testimony brought out in the open hearing.

The Chair might volunteer this suggestion. In view of this situation, it is his opinion that the result would have been the same in this particular instance if the entire committee had remained present and if General Marshall had been permitted to remain in it too, that the result would have been the same as we now face, and therefore the Chair is ready to suggest to the counsel that he proceed along the line of the committee's suggestion to inquire about [2977] this correspondence that he mentioned.

Mr. MITCHELL. The only thing I have left to say is there are two members of the committee now in the position of never having seen the letter or the proposed deletions, and their judgment has not been asked as to whether the deletions should be made or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, gentlemen, it is the consensus of opinion, and the Chair is going to take that responsibility—if the committee decides otherwise, we will abide by the decision, but in view of the discussion, it is the view of the Chair that the committee decided these letters should be made a part of the record without deletion.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Marshall, did you have some correspondence with the Honorable Thomas E. Dewey in September 1944?

General MARSHALL. I did, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand you wrote him two letters.

General MARSHALL. I did, sir, and I have the letters here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you read the two letters, first the one of the 25th of September, and then the one of the 27th of September?

These are complete copies, are they?

[2978] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

On the 25th of September I addressed the following letter to Governor Dewey, who at that time was traveling in Oklahoma.

[2979] Senator LUCAS. Will you read the top two words, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. "Top Secret. For Mr. Dewey's Eyes Only."

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, in order that we may understand this letter at the beginning, and before General Marshall starts reading, he is referring to the fact that he addressed the letter to Governor Dewey on the 25th of September, and another on the 27th.

I would like to have the record show, Mr. Mitchell, at the start as to whether or not this letter was sent through the mail or by courier, or delivered in some other way?

Mr. MITCHELL. I will cover all that, Mr. Congressman, as to just how the letters were delivered and all the rest. I just want to get the letters in first.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will go right to that. Please read, General, the first letter of September 25th; every word on it.

General MARSHALL. The heading at the top of the paper is "Top Secret." To the left in capitals "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY." It is dated the 25 September 1944.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am writing you without the knowledge of any [2980] other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you whether to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Carter Clarke who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the presidential campaign is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our [2981] cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the

[2982] battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

[2983] You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attaché Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such [2984] conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counter-attacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL.

[2985] The second letter is dated the 27th of September, 1944, and is headed "Top Secret", and "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY".

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph" and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.

1130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a [2986] communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

Mr. Chairman, the remainder of the letter is a repetition of what I read in the first letter. Do you want me to read it?

[2987] The CHAIRMAN. No. I suppose it will be published in full as it is without the necessity of reading it. It is exactly the same?

General MARSHALL. It is exactly the same.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will have it copied straight through in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. These two letters will be printed in full as they appear in the transcript at this point.

(The letters referred to follow.)

[2987A]

[Copy]

TOP SECRET

For Mr. Dewey's eyes only.

25 September 1944

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Carter Clarke who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the presidential campaign is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possess a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no refer-

ence whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes. German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's message from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place [2987B] at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute [2987C] greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking toward the early termination of the war.

I am representing this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counterattacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL.

1132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Copy]

[2987D]

TOP SECRET

For Mr. Dewey's eyes only.

27 September 1944.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph," and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphered their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turned was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State [2987E] Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance,

we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

[2987F] As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other officials have knowledge.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Marshall, what means did you take in presenting your first letter of September 25 to Governor Dewey?

General MARSHALL. It was sent by the hand of Colonel Clarke who flew out to some point in Oklahoma and he boarded Governor Dewey's train at some point in Oklahoma and saw Governor Dewey personally.

Mr. MITCHELL. When Colonel Clarke came back did he bring back with him your letter of September 25?

General MARSHALL. He brought back the letter with the statement that Governor Dewey felt he could not accept the proviso of the first paragraph, which I will read again in order to make it clear:

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

[2989] Mr. MITCHELL. Did Colonel Clarke report that Mr. Dewey had stopped there and read no other part of the letter?

General MARSHALL. He read no further, according to Colonel Clarke.

Senator BREWSTER. I wonder if you are clear that the letter of the 27th, the remainder, is the same. It seems to me there is a paragraph

missing between the reference to Mr. Donovan, and the reference to Mr. Harness on the third page. That paragraph is left out.

Mr. MURPHY. It is shifted over on the other page. It is in a different place in the second letter.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that General Marshall read the rest of the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is any question about it, suppose you begin where you left off in the second letter, and read the rest of it.

Mr. KEEFE. It is all in there, only it is on the third page.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks it is in there, but it is in a different place in the second letter.

General MARSHALL. I will continue reading.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is important in connection with any copies that have been given out that we be clear [2990] for the information of everybody as to whether or not the paragraph which appears in the second letter appears in the first. I don't see where it is in the first.

Mr. MITCHELL. What paragraph do you refer to, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. With reference to the British—"a further most serious embarrassment."

Senator LUCAS. The second paragraph on page 3 of the September 27 letter.

Mr. MITCHELL. Go ahead, General, and read the letter of the 27th completely so there won't be any mistake about it.

General MARSHALL. Shall I go back to the beginning?

Mr. MITCHELL. How far did you read?

General MARSHALL. I read to the words "in brief, the military dilemma is this."

Mr. MITCHELL. Continue then with the letter of the 27th commencing with the words "in brief, the military dilemma is this."

General MARSHALL (reading):

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese [2991] were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their [2992] naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the

rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

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You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

[2993] The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attaché Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other officials have knowledge.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

[2994] The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I think I asked you if Colonel Clarke brought the earlier letter of September 25th back to you.

General MARSHALL. He did. I discussed the matter with him, Governor Dewey's comments, and also with General Bissell, head of the Army Intelligence. I came to the conclusion that the matter was so important that we must make it a matter of record,¹ and I sent Colonel Clarke—incidentally, in civilian clothes—to Albany. He there secured

[2995] an audience with Governor Dewey, and he telephoned me, as I recall, from Governor Dewey's office that the Governor was unwilling to read the letter until he had at least one adviser similarly aware of the circumstances I was bringing to his, the Governor's, attention, and also that he felt he must keep the letter in his file, because he did not know what might happen to me, and he would have no record whatsoever of the occurrence.

Governor Dewey, as I recall, then came on the phone, I having told Colonel Clarke that I was ready to make those agreements. The

¹ See General Marshall's correction of this sentence, p. 1165, *infra*.

Governor spoke to me personally about a Mr. Bell, who was, I think, the State Bank Examiner——

Mr. MITCHELL. Superintendent of Banks.

General MARSHALL. Something of that sort, who was thoroughly to be trusted, and he, the Governor would see that it was locked up in his most secret file case, whatever that might be.

He also said that he must keep the letters to have with his records.

I then agreed to that, and on that basis the letter was left in his hands. There was no discussion between us as to what his decision might be. As a matter of fact, I do not think he read the letter beyond the first paragraph at the time of this conversation.

[2996] Colonel Clarke returned to Washington and reported to me that the Governor had read the letter, had discussed it with Mr. Bell in the presence of Colonel Clarke,¹ and I do not recall that he gave us any assurances. All I know is that there seemed to be no further reference to the matter in the campaign.

Do you wish me to go on?

Mr. MITCHELL. Go ahead, General.

General MARSHALL. Do you wish me to go into any further conversations with Governor Dewey?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. After the election and the defeat of Governor Dewey, I thought it was due him that he should know more the basis of this letter, so I had General Bissell proceed to Albany, gain an audience with the Governor, and General Bissell took with him a number of copies of magic showing at that time the movements of the various Japanese convoys, and of the Japanese naval craft on which we were basing our operations, so that the Governor could gather some idea of just how important the matter was. As far as I know, he was greatly interested. It was more or less in appreciation of the action he had apparently taken.

[2997] I saw Governor Dewey for the first time in connection with this incident at the funeral, I think, of Mr. Roosevelt. At the end of the funeral services we were thrown together there and I asked him to come to the War Department with me. He did and we showed him the situation out in the Pacific. Showed him also the current magic, giving the Japanese movements at that time, and made as plain as we could to him just what the importance of these matters were.

His attitude was very friendly and very gracious.

At a later time—no, I am wrong.

When General Bissell returned from Albany, having gone up in effect to see Governor Dewey and to show him these copies of magic as to the current operations in the Pacific, the Governor told him and he, General Bissell, told me orally on his return that he, the Governor, understood there was going to be a further discussion in the near future in the Congress regarding Pearl Harbor and he, Governor Dewey, inquired of General Bissell to me as to whether I desired him to intervene to the extent that he might be able to suppress such debates.

General Bissell was telling me this on his return to Washington. He suggested that I telephone Governor Dewey but I thought it was

¹ See p. 1165, *infra*, for General Marshall's correction of this sentence.

better that General Bissell should have the conversation, and I told him what to say. He called up. [2998] This is all hearsay.

Mr. MITCHELL. Tell us what you told him to say.

General MARSHALL. I told him to tell Governor Dewey that I had already embarrassed him with requests which had affected his personal actions and that I would not make any further request of him. I told General Bissell that Governor Dewey would probably say that didn't matter, that he would be interested in the conduct of the campaign, the successful conclusion of the war, and if he said that to again repeat that I had anticipated that response and that I still had no request to make of him.

That is exactly the way it took place. General Bissell told him what I had said. He replied that that was not the point, it wasn't a question of personal embarrassment, it was a question of the progress of the war.

General Bissell told him that I had anticipated some such reply and I still had no request to make.

And I will add that, so far as I know, certainly not in the immediate future after that, there was no debate on the question in Congress.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice in these letters there is a reference to the fact that at some time prior to September 1944 as a result of the OSS getting into the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal, the military attaché Japanese codes [2999] all over the world were changed. Was that just one of the Japanese codes?

General MARSHALL. That was one of their codes, which we had broken down.

Mr. MITCHELL. You continued to decode up to the time this letter to Mr. Dewey was written, the diplomatic codes that we have had here in evidence?

General MARSHALL. We continued right through that time, and, I might add, it played a very important part, the decoding of these messages, deciphering of these messages, played a very important part after the termination of the Japanese struggle in connection with our movement of troops into Japan and particularly into Korea, because we had the communications of the Japanese officers and we knew whether we had to go in with a regiment or an Army corps.

We went into Korea with—that was General MacArthur's action but I think this is approximately correct, on September 3 with, I believe—only a regiment, when the original plan was September 23 with a whole Army corps, because we had the communications of the Japanese commander in Korea appealing to his own government to expedite the movement of the American troops into Korea, which meant to us we need not anticipate any violent reaction from the Japanese.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was about what date in 1945?

[3000] General MARSHALL. That was after VJ-day. That was some days in August and possibly early September.

Mr. MITCHELL. With the exception of this change—

General MARSHALL. Also I might add that in the final phase of the war we obtained information regarding the campaign in Manchuria which was helpful to the occupation of the Allied troops.

Mr. MITCHELL. With the exception of this military attaché code which you lost the ability to decode, prior to 1944 had you, since Pearl Harbor, lost the ability to crack these other Japanese codes?

General MARSHALL. They lost some of them from time to time due to the regular changes. Then it would take a while to bring it down to date. But on that attaché code the whole code went out. Almost all codes have frequent changes, some daily.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is a sentence in your letter of the 27th of September, at the bottom of page 1, which reads:

Therefore we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until [3001] the last message before December 7th which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now, I would like for you to look in the intercept book, Mr. Hannaford, and find the messages you marked, and—

General MARSHALL. I can tell you the character. The only message I had in mind was where they were talking about lights in the windows. That was the first one that came to my attention regarding the Pearl Harbor affair.

Mr. MITCHELL. That pointed at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Of course, at this time there had not been the exhaustive search of all of these various records.

(A document was handed to General Marshall by Mr. Hannaford.)

General MARSHALL. It is a lengthy message from Honolulu to Tokyo. 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What is the page in the book?

General MARSHALL. Page 22.

Mr. MITCHELL. That message we are showing you, about the lights in the windows, appears not to have been translated until December 11, and your letter refers to a message that didn't come into your hands until the 8th.

General MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, the point was, I didn't [3002] go back and check on these dates and translations, but was speaking from memory three or four years afterwards in dictating this letter to Mr. Dewey. It may have been that it didn't get to me until the 11th. I was not looking at any record. I was talking three years later. But it was a message that came to my attention after the event and this was the one I was talking about.

Mr. MITCHELL. At page 27 of the book you are looking at there is a message that was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 6, and was translated December 8. That is the message which says:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

General MARSHALL. The one I am referring to is this lengthy one.

Mr. MITCHELL. You don't identify the one I have read?

General MARSHALL. I don't have a recollection of that. I have a definite recollection of this elaborate message here on page 22 though I didn't read it at the time, I didn't have it available, I have never seen it from that day until now.

Mr. MITCHELL. In your letter of the 27th you refer to the last message before December 7 "which did not reach our [3003] hands

until the following day, December 8." As I understand it you were not referring to this 14-part and 1 p. m. message?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I am referring to this message, as nearly as my recollection permits, and am quite clear this was the one, beginning at page 22, dated the 3d of December, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo; and I repeat I have never seen the message from the time I looked at it until today and I was dictating a letter offhand in a very few minutes to Governor Dewey.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you tell the committee what occasioned your writing Mr. Dewey at all?

General MARSHALL. It was reported to me by the Chief of Army Intelligence that these various comments were being made on the floor of Congress referring to Pearl Harbor, and the comments being made at frequent intervals in the campaign speeches of the various members of the parties were leading inevitably to the conclusion, the Chief of Army Intelligence, General Bissell thought, that other Governments would decide that we had a method of breaking their code, and the matter was growing more pointed as the campaign was becoming more violent, and some action ought to be taken in a hurry or we were going to lose our tremendous source of information in the Far East.

[3004] The recommendation made to me by General Bissell—and you can call him as a witness—was to go to the President for some assistance in the matter. I didn't think that would do. I thought it over overnight. The next morning I dictated this letter of September 25 and sent for General Bissell, read the letter to him, and asked him his view on this procedure. He thought that was all right.

I then sent him, as I recall, with the letter personally to Admiral King to let Admiral King see it and get his reaction. His reaction was to concur. Then the discussion was how to get the letter into Governor Dewey's hands without attracting attention to procedure. I have described the method we took.

In explanation of that procedure of addressing the letter to Governor Dewey, I felt, and Admiral King concurred, that it was absolutely necessary that Governor Dewey feel that no one other than ourselves, that is, that the President, the Secretary of War, and other officials of the War Department or the Navy Department, had no knowledge whatever of this action, and its success would depend entirely on Governor Dewey feeling that that was the case.

Therefore, we followed a purely nonpolitical procedure entirely in the interest of the conduct of the operation. That is the way, I understand, Governor Dewey accepted the approach. I never told the President, I think he died with- [3005] out knowing anything about this, I am quite certain he did, and I have no recollection after the event of ever telling the Secretary of War.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think I have finished, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall, I have two or three questions I would like to ask.

Going back into the spring and summer of 1941, I think you stated on yesterday that not only you but other officers of the War Department and also officers of the Navy Department, insofar as you felt it proper to do so, were urging that everything be done to postpone any clash that might result in armed hostilities between the United States and Japan?

General MARSHALL. That is the case.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present during any of the discussions in the latter part of 1940 or any part of 1941 with reference to the location of the Fleet in the Hawaiian region?

General MARSHALL. I was present at some discussions with reference to the fleet changing its base from Long Beach and San Diego to Hawaii and with regard to portions of the fleet being drawn into the Atlantic.

[3006] The CHAIRMAN. What was the general understanding, what was your understanding of the general opinion of those responsible in the various branches of the Government, that is, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy, with respect to the maintenance of that fleet, Pacific fleet, as it finally came to be called, in the region of Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall, as I said before in my testimony, the pros and cons of the argument regarding the fleet at Hawaii. I heard it—I am sorry to tell you that I don't remember. I think I had a very definite view in the matter. I know I had a very definite view in relation to the reinforcement of the naval forces in the Atlantic, and I am rather foggy about that.

So much happened after that, and it was a naval issue, that I have lost the thread of the discussions. I know that I was intensely interested in the development of the fleet train, as it was then called, and I recall specifically taking it up in a liaison meeting in an effort to assist Admiral Stark in getting the necessary craft which would have to be drawn from commercial use, particularly Latin America, at that time.

I am sorry I can't give you any definite reactions regarding the movement of the fleet from the west coast out [3007] to Hawaii, or regarding the reinforcement of the Atlantic portion of our Navy from ships in the Pacific, though I sat in on a good many of the discussions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what your own view was during the progress of the Japanese encroachments from Japan down to the south in the direction of Indochina, Thailand, and the Kra Peninsula, as to whether that encroachment endangered the security of our interests in the Philippine Islands, and other regions of the Southwest Pacific.

General MARSHALL. My view was that it clearly did endanger our interests, endanger the security of the Philippines, if the Japanese moved in force into the south of the Philippines, southern Indochina, Borneo, Thailand.

The CHAIRMAN. And your view was, as I understand it, that while attempting to postpone any actual clash, while attempting to play for time, as we might say, in the relationship between Japan and the United States, such efforts might be, would be taken, or should be taken as would in some measure convince Japan that it was hazardous for her to proceed further south?

General MARSHALL. That was the effort that we were making in connection with the reinforcement of the Philippines, which began in a material way in August 1941 for the [3008] purpose of so strengthening the Philippines that the Japanese would think it unsafe to proceed further south.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that, taking the Panama Canal, the Caribbean area, into consideration, and the Pacific Coast of the United States into consideration, and the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine Islands into consideration, in view of the limited material we had for distribution to all of those points, that Hawaii was better taken care of in the way of matériel than any of these other points that I have mentioned?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. At that time, I think, to which you referred, virtually nothing had been done about the Philippines, and Panama had been about halfway developed up to the standard we thought necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you began to make some intensification of effort to give General MacArthur in the Philippines something of the matériel and supplies which he had been for quite a time requesting?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. There were two factors.

One is, we had reached in the delivery of matériel or troops, or both, to Panama and to Hawaii to the degree where we thought they were reasonably safe, and, quantity production just coming in, we started to build up the Philippine Island defenses.

[3009] The CHAIRMAN. Was it in pursuance of that policy that these unarmed airplanes had left the west coast on the 6th of December for the Philippines? Were dispatched?

General MARSHALL. That is correct. That was the first squadron reinforcement of 45 flying fortresses, to be added to the 35 which had already reached the Philippines in early September.

The CHAIRMAN. They left from some point in California?

General MARSHALL. They left Hamilton Field, right near San Francisco.

The CHAIRMAN. Destined for the Philippines, but with a view of stopping in Hawaii to refuel.

General MARSHALL. Refuel and have the engines gone over and give the pilots a rest.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume it is safe to say that it was obvious to those planes, inasmuch as they were unarmed, they did not expect to run into a war in Hawaii on their way to the Philippines.

General MARSHALL. No, sir. That was a natural reaction on their part.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this morning, I believe you said, or yesterday, that when General MacArthur's dispatch to you of November 28, which was in reply to yours to him of the 27th, and General Short's dispatch of the same date were handed to you, you did not recall whether they were attached [3010] together by a clip or not, as they now appear.

General MARSHALL. I don't think I said I did not know whether they were attached together, or not. I do not know. All I do know is that I initialed the first upper copy, and apparently they came in in that form.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say you did or did not remember whether you saw General Short's reply?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember whether or not I saw General Short's reply, but the presumption must be that I did. In any event that was my opportunity to intervene which I did not do.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you sent on the 27th almost identical messages to Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Pacific Coast of the United States.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was apparently one difference, I think. In your message to General MacArthur in the Philippines you did not caution him with reference to alarming the civil population, which you did include in your message to the Hawaiian Islands. Do you recall that?

General MARSHALL. There is that difference between the two messages. The reason, quite evidently, is that Hawaii had quite a mixed population, including 130,000 Japanese, which is quite a different situation from that in [3011] the Philippines, and the position of vital installations which related to the city proper presented a condition in Hawaii considerably different from that in the Philippines.

Clark Field is to the north of Manila, and Corregidor at the entrance of the bay, 35 miles from Manila. And, may I add, a very definite reason in connection with that was to try not to upset the procedure that Mr. Hull was following in an effort to stall action in the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. In your conversations with the War Department and the Navy Department, and the President, with reference to obtaining time, as much time as was possible in order to prepare better before there might possibly be any clash of arms between Japan and the United States, do you recall what the President's attitude was toward that approach to the subject in conversations you had?

General MARSHALL. As far as I can recall, it was identical with ours, and Mr. Hull's. "Ours" meaning Admiral Stark and myself; the Secretary of War, Colonel Knox.

The CHAIRMAN. In your message to these various areas on the 27th of November, after calling attention to the fact that the negotiations with Japan appeared to be on the verge of termination, to all practical purposes, and so forth, you gave them what apparently amounted to instructions [3012] with respect to reconnaissance, and the taking of all other steps necessary in their judgment to meet an attack or to meet the situation as it might develop in view of that situation. That instruction, or that directive, was present in all these dispatches from you to Panama, Hawaii, the west coast, and the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you received a reply from General MacArthur on the 28th, the next day after you sent it, in which he stated:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio 624 air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Ground security measures have been taken within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations. Everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

Do you regard that reply of General MacArthur as responsive to your message to him of the day before?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3013] The CHAIRMAN. On the same day on which you sent these various messages, General Miles as Chief of G-2 sent this message to Hawaii:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only. Signed "Miles".

You received from General Short on the 28th of November, the day following your message, this message:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy—there is some word there which I do not understand—"four seven two twenty seventh."

Did you say in your testimony yesterday that you remembered whether you saw that reply from General Short?

General MARSHALL. I said I could not remember whether or not I saw it but the presumption must be that I did see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, whether you saw it or not, looking at it now as it is and comparing it with your message to him of the day before, do you now regard it as having been an adequate response to the instructions that you gave him?

General MARSHALL. In the light of all the events, Senator, it is quite evident it was not adequate.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that General Miles wired him tage and in view of the fact that his message to you mentioned only on the same day, the 27th, to look out for some [3014] sabo-sabotage, would it have been possible for him to have confused General Miles' message with yours and replied to General Miles but sent it to you?

General MARSHALL. I understand that you have the exact records here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Or, rather, I am told that the records show that the dispatch of General Short's, his message was dispatched prior to the receipt of General Miles' message. I did not know that, of course, nor did I know of General Miles' message.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if General Short's reply was sent before he received General Miles' dispatch, obviously it could not have been intended as a reply to General Miles.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That would be a matter of record, I presume. The point here, I think, Senator, is this: that the fact that General Miles sent that message—because it was not known to me I presume it may have been known in the Operations Section, I do not know, but the G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information.

The CHAIRMAN. The Operations Section, that was the section that was originally called the War Plans?

General MARSHALL. War Plans.

[3015] The CHAIRMAN. War Plans Division.

General MARSHALL. War Plans Division. I am sorry. I misnamed it before. The War Plans Division.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the section or division of which General Gerow was the head?

General MARSHALL. He was the head. Whether or not he saw that I do not know, but, you see, G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information but not permitted to issue directives, and that was a report on the dissemination.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any rule existing in the General Staff or in the War Department that required messages received in reply to messages like that which you sent on the 27th should be called to your personal attention?

General MARSHALL. No specific rule. I was supposed to be given the opportunity to see the important messages.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I do not know just what the situation was at that time but at least since they sometimes came in a thousand or more a day and the important ones are brought to my attention; and, of course, specifically anyone that would be as important as this, because the directive went out over my name, presumably from my office.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was there anything in General Short's reply referring to sabotage, being seen by an officer [3016] in the Operations or in the G-2 division, would have identified it as a reply to your message to him which did not mention sabotage but which did specifically mention reconnaissance and "all other measures that you deem necessary to be taken under the circumstances?"

General MARSHALL. I do not know quite whether I understand your question, but in the message there from General Short I think is a word that you said you do not understand, "REURAD", "referring to your radio", which gave the number and which identified the message that was sent to him.

The CHAIRMAN. And that answer gave the number of the message?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. From the reply it would seem that was a reply to your message?

General MARSHALL. Yes. That says directly that is what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, let me ask you this further question in regard to your view in reference to the facilities, men and equipment in the Hawaiian Islands with respect to the ability of those in charge of that operation, charged with the responsibility to have met the attack or have retarded it or have minimized its effects, if what was there in men and material had been reasonably alert and reasonably [3017] active and reasonably ready to meet any such possible attack, what was your conclusion about that—not that every gun had to be in its place and every man had to be in his cockpit, but if under ordinary circumstances, in view of the information which had been sent to them and particularly on the 27th, and the general attitude of alertness that it seems had been invoked, what was your conclusion, that they could have retarded or minimized the effect of the attack or they could have defeated it altogether? I would like to get you to draw the distinction on it.

General MARSHALL. My conclusion is, and I might say was, that the utilization of all the means at hand, means and men, and the deployment of the matériel and the ships, and so forth, to the best advantage under the terms of the alert, that the attack could have been seriously interfered with, its damaging effect greatly limited; and I do not know whether the carriers could have been brought into

a position to operate or not, I am unfamiliar with that, but they were great potentials out in that region at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony of Admiral Inglis and Colonel Thielen shows, I think, that on the 6th day of December there was no reconnaissance whatever in Pearl Harbor or on the Island of Oahu. There was on that day some type of reconnaissance from the carrier *Enterprise* which was some two [3018] hundred miles west of Oahu.

Have you received any information, or have you any information that would offer an explanation as to why there was no reconnaissance of any kind on the 6th day of December, the day before this attack?

General MARSHALL. No, I have not, Senator, and I should explain that I haven't discussed this with anyone. I haven't discussed it with General Short or Admiral Kimmel. I haven't discussed it with my own people. I might say that I haven't discussed it with General Gerow. I haven't seen General Gerow since October 1944. The event occurred and my interest and my obligation brought me to the activities necessary to meet the situation which developed and which continued on, of course, as you know from one serious state to another.

I would also add that in my own mind I never could grasp what had happened between the period when so much was said about air attack, the necessity for anti-aircraft, the necessity for planes, for reconnaissance, the necessity for attack planes for defense and the other requirements which anticipated very definitely and affirmatively an air attack, I could never understand why suddenly it became apparently a side issue. I do not know just what the reason was. I have never inquired of the individuals concerning it.

The CHAIRMAN. Following your directive, or order, or instructions of the 27th of November, did you receive any further information that seemed to you to make it necessary to reiterate those warnings—

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing): Until you received the message on the 7th with reference to the 14-part dispatch and the 1 o'clock dispatch?

General MARSHALL. After I saw the alert message of November 27, which was brought to my attention on the morning of November 28, I recall nothing coming in from the Hawaiian Department or any other matter which required an additional dispatch.

It is very important that you do not confuse a command direction. Better completely cancel it and issue a new one, because the amendments are dangerous things in relation to military operations. Once the commander is alerted, the question then was when did you reduce the alert. Of course, the G-2 functions of the War Department as well as out in the commands were to furnish material as it developed, but the command direction stood unless you dared to amend it, or what would be a better procedure, completely cancel it and issue a new directive.

The CHAIRMAN. Reference has been made all through this examination to Rainbow Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

[3020] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Rainbow No. 5 seeming to be the ultimate plan. Did that mean that Rainbow No. 1 was cancelled or modified or

completely changed when a new Rainbow plan was promulgated, or was it a modification or change?

General MARSHALL. Senator, I will not try to answer that without actually looking at the papers and I would have to get the records of the War Plans Division. The presumption would be absolute that if a new plan was issued the other is cancelled by a certain date.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, probably General Gerow can explain that in greater detail.

General MARSHALL. He can tell you that direct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. Congressman Cooper?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.

When, did you state, General, you were appointed Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff on July 1, 1939, and on the formal occurrence of the vacancy in the position of Chief of Staff by the retirement of General Craig on the 1st of September 1939 I then was nominated and confirmed as Chief of Staff.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you had been Assistant Chief [3021] of Staff while General Craig was Chief of Staff, had you?

General MARSHALL. I came to Washington on the 6th of July 1938 and became the head of the War Plans Division. In October 1938, I think about the middle of the month, I became Deputy Chief of Staff; therefore, the immediate assistant to General Craig.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to state something the other day about General Craig taking the position that the interception of these Japanese messages was illegal. Is that correct?

General MARSHALL. That was his view of the matter.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was his view of the matter?

General MARSHALL. He considered that that was forbidden by the terms of the Federal Communications Act.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see. But the practice continued right on of intercepting all the Japanese messages that could be intercepted?

General MARSHALL. With such secrecy as could be enforced.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Sir?

General MARSHALL. With such secrecy as could be enforced.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My interest was challenged, General, while General Miles was before us with respect to these intercepted messages, especially with respect to the period of time that elapsed between the time the messages were sent—and [3022] of course, I assume they were intercepted at the time they were sent—and the time they were decoded and translated.

Had that attracted your attention at any time?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that that attracted my specific attention because I was aware of the fact that they were short-handed and it was very difficult to obtain people that we could trust and that had the necessary qualities.

I looked up several days ago what the status of that was and, as I recall, on December 7, 1941, there were some 44 officers and about 180 men, women, civilians and soldiers, in Washington in the Army engaged in this work and some 150 out in the field at what they call the monitoring stations, that is, merely intercepting the material.

Now, I compared that to see what the change was with the situation at the end of the war and there were in Washington some 666 officers

and a total of 10,000 individuals here in Washington at this work. The British had 30,000. The Navy of ours here I think had 6,000.

Now, that had to be built up, of course. You had to have the right people, with the qualifications; you had to have them all examined by the FBI. It was a very slow procedure; and, of course, also at that time we had a shortage of personnel in all of our activities, and I recall at an earlier [3023] date they had a small group down at Fort Washington—I think, which is near Mount Vernon just on that side of the river, at least I think that is where it was; if it was not there it was across the river—and some 26 men, I believe; and one man was picked up or checked up endeavoring to sell this information up in Boston, I think, and we had the FBI nab him.

It was very difficult to get trustworthy personnel at that particular time in the state of general disregard of security matters and of interest and of an appreciation of the importance of what was going on in the United States with relation to the possibility of war. So I thought, if I might add, I thought that what they were doing was very unusual that they were able to turn out the critical messages in the manner that they did.

Now, there was always a backlog of messages which did take a long time to reduce. There was always the hazard—I presume that General Miles is the best witness—of some particular message being overlooked. There was always, as far as I was concerned, the possibility that the messages that might seem to me with very sober consideration as most important for me to see, that I might not see them all and there was always the possibility that in going through this mass of information, of which this was only incidental to my desk every day, that I might not absorb the true significance [3024] of each matter.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I just noticed, while General Miles was before us here, that, as shown in exhibit 2, messages received from November 28, that were translated after December 7, 1941, the time varies all the way from 2 days to about 28 days, do they?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I saw that record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you say that during that time we had a hundred and some odd people engaged in this work?

General MARSHALL. We had, I recall rather accurately, we had 44 officers here in Washington at work at it and I think some 180 soldiers and civilians, but the exact numbers can be easily obtained for you by General Miles or others.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And later you say that number—

General MARSHALL. Increased to 10,000 on the Army side.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 10,000. And the British had 30,000?

General MARSHALL. Yes, and our Navy I think—I am not the witness for them—had about 6,000. The growth of that was comparable to the growth of the Army. It was changing every month.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I was just wondering at the time I examined those how this information could be very valuable to you, with the great responsibility that you had resting on you, if it came to you a week or two weeks or [3025] three weeks after the message was intercepted.

General MARSHALL. Well, that is natural, sir, but I was rather impressed with the fact that under the conditions under which they were then operating, which were pretty much unavoidable, they were able to pull out the most critical messages almost immediately.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then another question if I may, General. Were you kept fully advised as to diplomatic developments all through the latter part of November and on up to the first part of December?

General MARSHALL. I, of course, did not know all of the matters, but I would say that I was kept very fully advised; and so far as Mr. Hull personally is concerned, I remember hearing him say with considerable emphasis in those last day apropos of his discussions with the Japanese envoys, "These fellows mean to fight and you will have to watch out."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You heard him say that?

General MARSHALL. I heard him say that and I have a very distinct recollection of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, he stated before the committee that he considered, to use his words, "Japan was hell bent on conquest and aggression."

Did you entertain that view, that they were determined on conquest and aggression?

[3026] General MARSHALL. My appreciation of the situation, as nearly as I can recall it—I am trying to avoid the back sight things—was that they were going to profit in every conceivable way by the opportunities presented on the destruction of Russia by the German Army and the fact that the German submarines had England by the throat, as it were, in the Atlantic, which widely affected the absolutely necessary reinforcement of England by matériel from the United States.

What I could not quite decide in my own mind, because of the peculiar way in which the war had been conducted in the entry into Austria and the entry into the Sudeten lands and later Czechoslovakia, in the movement into China which would have started a state of war, in the occupation of Indochina, in the beginning of the infiltration into Thailand, I could not be quite certain in my mind how far they were going by that method before breaking out into an overt act.

I was certain if given the opportunity, that is, security against Russian attack at their backs, that they would take as much as they could get for nothing and probably would fight for more if their position was a favorable one for it, which the occupation of Thailand would have been. Once they had their air fields, their gasoline, their bombs, and their maintenance established in Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, meaning Singapore, the Kra Isthmus, they were virtually at their [3027] mercy because Great Britain had very little they could send out there, very little in planes they could possibly afford to that theater. They were completely committed to the desperate battle that was going on in the European theater.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then did you consider war with Japan as inevitable?

General MARSHALL. It appeared to me that it would be inevitable if the Russian Army fell, if the Russian Army fell and my own conclusion before the end of the war, 2 years before the end of the war, was that the Japanese thought that Russia was going to be destroyed in December of 1941 with the capture of Moscow and they became committed in the Pacific thinking they were safe from any Russian involvement later in Manchuria.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, about when did you reach the conclusion then that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable?

General MARSHALL. Well, that absolute conclusion would hinge somewhat on what happened to Russia, and Japan launched its overt act against us before the decision of the moment in the Russian campaign.

The anticipation was, if you go back, that Hitler's forces would attack Moscow before the middle of December, that was the announcement at that time. Instead of that they [3028] collapsed due to a terrific cold spell and there began the turning of the struggle in Russia which meant that the Japanese need not expect with a certainty that they would not eventually have a strong Russia at their back door, but they had committed themselves to the war, I think, on the assumption that the collapse of Russia was going to take place in the next 2 weeks. It did not take place. Had they not attacked on December 7, had they waited, for example, until January 1, there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack, I do not know, because it appeared quite a definite possibility that Russia might get to her feet, which she did.

I hope I haven't confused you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. No, that is all right, I am glad to have that.

Well, where did you think the first Japanese attack on the United States would occur?

General MARSHALL. I thought it would occur in the Philippines. I thought the first Japanese attack was going to be directly south towards Singapore, that that would be the main campaign, and the Philippines, of course, would become involved in it. Just when they would strike and their method of striking with landing forces rather than just air, I did not know, but the air strike might occur very early, [3029] which it did.

I assumed that Guam would fall almost immediately and I assumed that Wake would fall almost immediately.

[3030] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you think the first Japanese attack would be at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. I did not anticipate that. I thought they would not hazard that. That, of course, was a raiding attack, to strike a crippling blow, which did not involve any landing, or any possible landing.

Their campaign was headed south through the China Sea. It was to cover their flank with that stroke. Those same carriers appeared quite quickly in the China Sea operations.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I do not want to detain you too long, General, because I know other members of the committee want to ask you questions, but I have one or two questions, if I may, about what occurred immediately before the attack.

I understood you to state that you were out of Washington on November 27.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I was down in North Carolina.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Reviewing maneuvers in North Carolina?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I went down on the afternoon of the 26th, following a Joint Board meeting on the morning of the 26th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the message about which you have been examined here at some length, which was sent over your name on November 27 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the other commanders mentioned—that message [3031] of November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,

was brought to your attention early the next morning, the 28th, when you returned?

General MARSHALL. I saw it about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 28th.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that message an adequate warning to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department?

General MARSHALL. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was there ever any doubt in your mind at any time—

General MARSHALL. There was not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That that was adequate warning?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it was your opinion at that time that there were sufficient forces and sufficient material in Hawaii to defend that fortress?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe General Short, in command of the Hawaiian Department at that time, was a lieutenant general, wasn't he?

General MARSHALL. He was lieutenant general by virtue of that appointment.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was he one of the senior officers of the United States Army?

[3032] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; he was one of the two corps commanders at that time, who had actually had something resembling an Army Corps to command, and had had the benefit of training and maneuvers with the corps that they commanded.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Back at that time we did not have many officers with the rank of lieutenant general, did we?

General MARSHALL. We had none except those who were assigned to their territorial Army commands, of which there were four in the United States, one in Hawaii, and one in the Caribbean.

As long as they held the post, they held the rank. When they left the post, they lost the rank. He proceeded to Hawaii as major general and became lieutenant general on his arrival there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. By reason of the fact that he took command of that post?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Several questions have been asked you about these messages received on the 28th from General MacArthur and General Short. I believe you stated you presumed that you saw the message from General Short at the same time that you saw the message from General MacArthur.

General MARSHALL. Yes, I think that must be presumed.

[3033] The VICE CHAIRMAN. But your attention was not attracted by the message from General Short, as to whether it was responsive to the message of November 27.

General MARSHALL. I said I had no recollection of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I notice in the message of November 27, these three words "Report measures taken."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated, in response to a question by the chairman, that certainly in view of subsequent events, you

recognized that the message from General Short was not an adequate response to the message of November 27.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you do not recall that that was checked on any further, or any further messages sent?

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain there was no further message sent. I might say here, Mr. Congressman, that the people working with him had sent an alert direction which all in the War Department then and now, I think, thought was a sufficient directive, and the comment out there, as far as we knew, from all our communications, had been insistent on measures to meet an air attack and submarine attack.

The thought of merely expecting an alert direction for [3034] sabotage was not in anybody's mind at all, which undoubtedly, in my opinion, may account for the fact that that word did not register, and when they spoke of liaison with the Navy that did register as to the assumption that the reconnaissance was on. That is merely a conjecture.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to state in reply to a question of the chairman that the reply from General Short was not considered as a reply to the message from General Miles, G-2 of the General Staff of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

General MARSHALL. I testified to that purely because that message there says "Re so-and-so," which is the alert message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is true. The message from General Short states, "Re your radio 472," and the message of November 27 bears the number 472.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that was regarded as a reply to your message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall, I would like to ask you just one or two questions.

[3035] What proportion of the fleet in the Pacific, the entire Pacific area, was concentrated at Pearl Harbor? It is a naval question, I know, but I thought perhaps you would be able to answer it.

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that in detail. I happen to know that there were no carriers at Pearl Harbor. Two were at sea, one of them proceeding towards or in the vicinity of Midway and the other one returning to Pearl Harbor, and a third carrier was, I believe, at San Diego. Other than that I could not give you the data.

Senator GEORGE. But the main strength of the Pacific Fleet was at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. I believe that is correct, sir; but of course I am a poor witness on that.

Senator GEORGE. General, reference has been frequently made to a message, one of the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, actually translated, according to the notation at the foot of the message, on October 9, 1941, in which specific

inquiry is made about the waters in Pearl Harbor, and the suggestion of a rough division of the waters into five subareas, and specific inquiry made regarding the fleet.

Presumably that message might have had for its inspiration a submarine or other attack other than air, but is it not [3036] rather strongly suggestive that an air strike must have been contemplated by Japan?

General MARSHALL. In the light of what happened that is quite evident, Senator. But I may say as to that, we were getting messages making very specific inquiries about naval vessels of ours all over the Pacific, and to that extent it dispersed the attention.

However, it is inescapable, looking at this message and knowing what happened, that it must have had a direct relation to the planning of the attack.

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall, Secretary Hull in his testimony before the committee, specifically directed attention to his appearance before the War Council on November 25, 1941, which he described as consisting of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, and further described it as a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which were under current discussion by the State Department and any other Departments of the Government.

I merely wish to inquire if your recollection accords with this statement of Secretary Hull (reading):

At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break [3037] out anywhere at any time at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plan. I felt virtually the last stage had been reached, and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy.

Does your recollection accord with that statement?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember all those details, sir, but I got the general impression from Mr. Hull of his telling me "These fellows mean to fight and we should get ready."

Senator GEORGE. And immediately after that you approved the message of November 27, although it was actually sent on the day when you arrived from Washington?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; it was discussed on the morning of the 26th in the Joint Board by Admiral Stark and myself and the Deputy Chief of Staff and his opposite in the Navy, and General Gerow and his opposite in the Navy.

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall, of course the Fleet in the Pacific, or so much of our Navy as was in the Pacific and based at Pearl Harbor in November and December 1941 and sometime prior to that was of course a long distance from the southward movement of the Japanese forces. Isn't it almost compelling that we must have kept constantly in mind that Japan would make an air strike at the main naval forces [3038] in the Pacific as long as they were sitting out on their flank?

General MARSHALL. I would not put it quite that way, sir. They certainly would if they thought they had the opportunity. They would have to be on their guard against that Fleet. Of course they would know presumably the extent to which the Fleet was prepared

to go to sea for operations a long way from its base. The Japanese would know conclusively we had no means in Manila Bay to shelter the Fleet. We had virtually no antiaircraft at all. There were no guns at Cavite.

The submarines and small groups of ships of the Asiatic Fleet could offer not even one gun of antiaircraft fire in the Cavite naval region. Therefore the Fleet would have to be based at Hawaii, though it might operate a couple of thousand miles west of Hawaii, which is a very difficult procedure.

The Japanese of course would know that. They would know that if our Fleet moved out into the far Pacific it would be in a very tenuous position where any unfavorable action could result very seriously because of the distance of the Fleet from its base.

All of those were considerations in relation to what Japan would probably do. Given the opportunity to strike a crippling blow at the Fleet, it is useless to say she would [3039] probably do it, because she did do it.

Senator GEORGE. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark I believe is absent.

Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you begin, Senator, may I ask General Marshall, for the benefit of the committee and to determine about its sittings a little later today and tomorrow, in an effort to conclude with you, what are your plans, as far as you have made them, to leave for China?

General MARSHALL. All I can do, sir, is have a plane in readiness as soon as you release me.

The CHAIRMAN. So your plans are to go forward at once as soon as we are completed?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be agreeable for the committee to sit a little longer today, in view of General Marshall's situation? Of course, we contemplate tomorrow anyway.

Senator BREWSTER. What is your question?

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be agreeable for the committee to sit a little later than 4 o'clock today to accommodate General Marshall, in the hope we might conclude with him tomorrow?

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, we ought to go on a reasonable length of time. [3040]

Senator BREWSTER. I suggest 4:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will go at least until 4:30.

Go ahead, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, I should like again to direct your attention to exhibit 32, dealing with the message you sent General Short on November 27, 1941. I will ask you if the same message with the same identical language was not sent to the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, San Francisco, Calif?

General MARSHALL. The message is not identical.

Senator LUCAS. Will you point out the difference between the two, sir?

General MARSHALL. As I get it here in reading it, in the latter part of the message it states, "A separate message is being sent to G-2, 9th

Corps Area, re subversive activities in United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5."

That is a repetition of the message to Hawaii.

Calling attention to the "G-2 of the 9th Corps Area re subversive activities" was not included in the message to General Short.

Senator LUCAS. For all alerting purposes, as far as the commands are concerned, they are the same?

[3041] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I think this has already been put in the record a time or two, but I should like to have the record show at this point General Short's reply and General DeWitt's reply to those two respective messages.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be printed in the record again at this point.

(The messages referred to follow:)

NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

Priority

557 AM

From Fort Shafter TH

Secret

To Chief of Staff

No. 959 November 27th

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy Reurad four seven two twenty seventh

SHORT.

Secret

Received: November 28, 1941. 11:18 PM

From HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,

To General George C. Marshall

NOVEMBER 28TH.

Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth [3042] Air Force, Ninth CAD. Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manner. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infy battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under rainbow five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and subsector plans rainbow five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As air forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP five two or the preparatory stage of rainbow five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to [3043] direct operations of air forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

DeWitt, Commanding.

Senator LUCAS. I should like to call your attention also to page 13 of Exhibit 32 which purports to be a message sent out by the Adjutant General Adams, I believe, to the Hawaiian Department on November 28, and directing your attention to the last two lines, the following words (reading): "Telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this

does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions."

In the previous part of that message they have been talking about sabotage, subversive activities. Would you care to explain to the committee what that last portion of that message means, if anything?

General MARSHALL. I am merely hazarding an opinion. I was not aware of the wording of this message at the time [3044] it was sent, or the fact that it was actually sent.

Senator LUCAS. What, in your opinion, did Adams mean?

General MARSHALL. My opinion is he was trying to make certain that this message in no way affects the terms of the command message.

Senator LUCAS. That is the way I construe it.

General MARSHALL. That is undoubtedly what was the intention.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, after Adams talks about subversive activities and he concludes with that statement, which says, "Nothing shall affect your responsibility under existing instructions" you understand that the existing instructions would mean the previous instructions that had been sent out by you in your message of November 27?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that was a definite alert message and they signed my name to it instead of the Adjutant General's, to make it quite clearly a command message.

This message also, as I believe the witnesses will testify, if they haven't already done so, resulted from the Air Corps activities that concerned all over the world and the Chief of the G-2 section became involved in it, and it ended up with a message not with the signature from G-2 but by the Adjutant General's signature.

Senator LUCAS. Then on the following page, page 14 in [3045] this same exhibit, there is a further message to General Short, and that message is signed by both Arnold and Adams, which continues to deal with sabotage and subversive activities.

Now is there any higher or more important message that can be sent to any command than that sent by the Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; unless the Secretary of War personally signed it or the President.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, you were adviser, under the Army rules and regulations, to the Secretary of War as well as the President of the United States upon military matters?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. During your tenure as Chief of Staff it goes without saying that you had many conversations with both of these gentlemen—

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. On the conduct of affairs of this Nation.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did the President of the United States have any information about the Japanese situation that the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations did not have?

General MARSHALL. Did not have?

[3046] Senator LUCAS. Did not have.

General MARSHALL. So far as I know, he did not—meaning the President did not.

Senator LUCAS. That is right. In other words, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations were in close contact with the President of the United States and the Secretary of State?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. There were incidents such as this—I only remember this one: On the return from Argentina the message actually sent by the President to the Japanese Government did not come to my knowledge until several days later at a meeting in the State Department, in Mr. Sumner Welles' office, when I was informed of the message. So there was a period there of several days that I did not know of that message.

I am not citing that as an abnormal thing at all, but just as an incident.

Senator LUCAS. The usual course was in the other direction?

General MARSHALL. The normal course was in the other direction.

Senator LUCAS. After you saw the message that was sent by Mr. Welles, did you approve it later on?

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether I could express [3047] myself in terms of approval or disapproval. I listened to the message and I do not recall my specific reactions.

Senator LUCAS. Did the President of the United States, in your opinion, have a right to assume that the commands at Hawaii and in the Pacific, California, and Philippines, were properly alerted on the morning of December 7?

General MARSHALL. I think he had every right to assume that.

[3048] Senator LUCAS. One question with respect to the letter that has been introduced, or two letters that have been introduced in evidence, that were written by you to Governor Dewey.

Now, what specific information came to you that Governor Dewey knew that we had cracked the Japanese code?

General MARSHALL. I do not know at the moment that I knew at that time that he specifically had information that we cracked the Japanese code. I know that he made a statement of that character, as I recall, to Colonel Clarke.

Senator LUCAS. What was that last?

General MARSHALL. I know that he made a statement of that character to Colonel Clarke, as I recall, in his interview with him, but there have been other references to the matter here in Washington by various people, and I think one speech on the floor of the House that clearly indicated such a condition of affairs.

Senator LUCAS. Did you believe that he was the proper man to give this information so as to be able to stop the flow of this sort of information?

General MARSHALL. I thought he was the only man with whom I could deal.

Senator LUCAS. It was testified to here by General Miles [3049] that this code secret was known only by a very limited few, and I was just wondering how this information got to Governor Dewey, that he knew you were actually cracking the code.

General MARSHALL. I would qualify General Miles' statement by saying it had come to my ears several times that there were various whisperings in Washington, in the gatherings in the hotels and otherwise, dinners, that such things were happening. Specifically, there

was very dangerous whispering regarding the killing of the head of the Japanese Navy, Admiral Yamamoto, who was shot down by a group of Army aviators headed by one Major Lamphier, on the basis of the data we obtained on our intercepts which specified exactly the trip that Yamamoto was going to take.

Senator LUCAS. That was the fellow who said he was going to write the peace in the White House?

General MARSHALL. I haven't the record here, but I believe you are correct. The point there was that the aviators had to be told exactly where to go and what to expect. That, of course, meant to them we must have a means of knowing whether their first discussions came back in the form of mere rumors, but whatever happened, it was so distorted, or so elaborated that it reached Washington [3050] and finally I was called up by a responsible citizen and informed of general statements on the subject based on that particular incident. Other similar things had occurred, so it was well known to me that there had been very careless talk here in Washington.

I might explain now, that I sought the services of the FBI a number of times to check particular Army officers in Washington, in an effort to make an example of somebody.

I might also, for the record, state that Mr. Hoover was very unwilling to do this, because he did not want the FBI investigating Governmental agencies for fear it would be regarded as a Gestapo, so he was always very hesitant about accommodating me, and yet, I felt it was imperative that I have his services. I almost caught the man once or twice, but some little thing intervened, and I was not able to do it.

I might say apropos of that, that the Russians were fearful of telling us anything, because they felt a leak was inevitable, and it reached the point where I was very much afraid that we would be embarrassed with them most seriously because of some leak affecting their campaign. Therefore, I instructed our officers on the mission in Moscow never to ask when an operation was going to be carried out, or when, or where, because I did not want to be responsible [3051] for the possible leaks of that information, and I so informed the Russians.

Senator LUCAS. Well, your only thought in drafting this letter at that particular time was for the sole purpose of winning this war at the earliest possible time and the saving of American lives?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. This would be, of course, a guess upon your part, but without the cracking of the Japanese code in the way that we did, without the knowledge that came to us of their ship movements, and their convoys, would you care to hazard a guess as to how much longer it would have taken us to defeat the Japs?

General MARSHALL. I wouldn't want to involve myself in that estimate except to say that it could be operated in two ways. One, it would have made the operation much more difficult to stage, and also would have made it necessary, probably, at the time for us not to undertake certain things because we did not know enough about the Japanese dispositions, capabilities, and intentions. With positive knowledge, we were then free in our operations.

I tried to give you an illustration in relation to going into Korea where we could not obtain the shipping sufficient for the number of

troops first thought necessary [3052] to a landing in Korea, which was September 28. However, when we picked up the messages from the Japanese commander, who was earnestly hoping that American troops would arrive at the earliest possible date, they sent in a small command with perfect assurance that it would not be complicated by Japanese resistance.

The same considerations permitted our moving into Japan with a little dribble of people at the very start. We had the same information regarding the Japanese forces in China.

To go back into the active operations in the war, we found out what they were aiming to do, and what they had to do it with, and that left us free to make moves that we otherwise would not have attempted.

I might say that, of course, we always had to be very careful to check, because you never could tell at what moment that would boomerang. It would be the inevitable procedure of the other government, if they knew their business, and they suddenly discovered we had cracked their code and were picking up their information, to endeavor to capitalize on that, to lead us into a ruinous situation.

For example, the information which we received which led up to the appropriate disposition of the fleet and the accumulation of aircraft to fight the Battle of Midway, [3053] where our means were very limited, where, I believe, we only had the equivalent of one carrier and a half, and where we knew from magic that the Japanese were coming in with, I believe, five carriers, our relief was profound when planes of ours located the Japanese columns of ships moving to the east of Wake, because it meant the confirmation of what was in magic.

I might say, though it hasn't any importance to this hearing, that we were very much disturbed because one Japanese unit gave Midway as its post office address, and that seemed a little bit too thick, so when the ships actually appeared it was a great relief, because if we had been deceived, and our limited number of vessels were there, and the Japanese approached at some other point, they would have met no opposition whatsoever. And those vessels that went to Midway had to virtually race from the Coral Sea to arrive in the Midway district in time.

I believe one carrier had been damaged at Midway—they made hurried repairs, superficial repairs, and rushed her up into Midway. Admiral Halsey's ships had to steam at top speed in order to reach the Battle of Midway in time. I think he got there the first day or maybe on the day of the battle.

All of that was based on magic.

[3054] Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, no doubt you are familiar with the Army board's report.

General MARSHALL. I haven't read it, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You haven't read it?

General MARSHALL. I have had a hard enough time reading these other papers.

Senator LUCAS. You have something to look forward to.

General MARSHALL. I have been told the general characterization. That is all I know.

Senator LUCAS. Are you acquainted with Gen. George Grunert?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I have known him for years.

Senator LUCAS. What position did he hold when war broke out?

General MARSHALL. When the war broke out?

Senator LUCAS. December 7, 1941.

General MARSHALL. He was in command of the Philippines. When the war broke out?

Senator LUCAS. December 7, 1941, yes.

General MARSHALL. I think he was commanding an Army Corps back here in the United States.

Senator LUCAS. Do you remember what happened to him after that?

General MARSHALL. I believe he was given command of [3055] the corps area in Chicago.

I am not quite certain of that. I know that he became, I think, the head of personnel of the Army Service Forces under General Somervell and finally he was given the Eastern Defense Command with headquarters at Governors Island.

[3056] Senator LUCAS. He did not serve overseas in the war?

General MARSHALL. He was overseas up until the summer of 1941.

Senator LUCAS. Who is Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell?

General MARSHALL. He is the officer of the National Guard from North Carolina who commanded the Thirtieth Division.

Senator LUCAS. Is he retired now?

General MARSHALL. Until recently he was on duty on some board here in Washington, I think.

Senator GEORGE. North Carolina or Georgia, General?

General MARSHALL. Well, Senator George, if you say Georgia, I will say Georgia. It was the Thirtieth Division though, was it not?

Senator GEORGE. Originally he may have been from North Carolina but he has been in Georgia for quite a long time.

Senator LUCAS. Did he command the Thirtieth Division overseas?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. In this country.

Senator LUCAS. General Frank?

General MARSHALL. General Frank is an Air Corps officer.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, in this Army report, in the conclusions, they laid responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster to a lot of folks.

General MARSHALL. General Handy, the Deputy Chief of Staff, told me orally what they had referred to in regard to him.

[3057] Senator LUCAS. After talking about Mr. Hull and its conclusion they then turn to the Chief of the Army, General George Marshall and in this report they say:

He failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

Would you care to expand on that statement, General?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I think I will rest on the evidence that I believe has been submitted here.

Senator LUCAS. I presume that is true with all of these statements that they have made?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall, there has been a great deal of talk throughout the country about the similarity between what happened at Pearl Harbor and what happened at Port Arthur back some years ago when there was an attack on Russia. I am not a student of military history but from what I have read there seems to be quite a difference.

[3058] Are you familiar with the history of the attack on Port Arthur?

General MARSHALL. I remember, as I recall the incident, it seemed that certain statements of the Japanese Government were delivered in St. Petersburg. There was a night attack made by destroyers, I believe, on Port Arthur.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I think from what I have read there is a little difference, and I wanted to put it in the record so that we might have what I have discovered in connection with that for this inquiry.

Mr. KEEFE. Are you going to be a witness?

Mr. MURPHY. I am now reading from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, page 1058, and I am quoting Admiral Pye as follows [reading]:

There are quite a few people who seem to feel that the situation in Honolulu was quite similar to that which existed at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, at Port Arthur. I would just like to point out that there were several differences in the situations.

In the first place, even at Port Arthur, the Japanese had broken off diplomatic relations with the Russians, on February 6, two days before the attack at Port Arthur, and, in the letter breaking off those diplomatic relations, they informed the Russian Government that they [3059] reserved the right to take such independent action as they might deem necessary, or words to that effect. In other words, adequate notice was given, both of the fact that the negotiations were at an end, and that the Japanese Government intended to take independent action.

The second great difference was, that the Japanese, in order to obtain their objective, had to land in Korea, or in the vicinity of Port Arthur. The only forces which could oppose these landings effectively were the Russian ships in Port Arthur and at Chinnampo.

So much for that.

Now, then, there has been reference made, General Marshall, to your trip to the South for maneuvers and I would like to have you for the record, so that we might have the facts on that, refer to your report covering the period from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943.

As I understand it, you reported at page 2 as follows [reading]:

During the summer of 1941, large battle rehearsals continued which included maneuvers in August, September, and November of some 900,000 troops.

And I inquire now whether your visit to the South in the month of November was to attend one of those three maneuvers?

General MARSHALL. That was its purpose. I might add— [3060] I do not know as it is at all pertinent to the investigation—that the maneuvers presented my best opportunity to determine command ability and I had to arrive there at the time of the maneuver because the whole thing was very carefully programmed in relation to other movements in other parts of the country and transportation and so on.

On this particular trip the good roads in North Carolina offered facilities for covering the country, which made it a much more difficult

proposition than in some of the other points that they were having maneuvers and I would see less and the prospects were I would see more.

As a result of that particular trip I made several decisions. One was for the relief of three or four officers, two, I have in mind particularly, from command and assignment to other duties and the other was the decision to advance General Patton to corps command.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

I now would like to read, Mr. Chairman, from page 3 of the same report as follows [reading]:

Since 1935 the Hawaiian Islands, having been given first priority, had been provided with more complete troop garrisons and munitions than any other overseas garrison. It now became imperative that the defenses of the Panama Canal and Alaska be given immediate prior- [[3061] Also, the uncertainty of the European situation involving the peril of the British Isles and the British Fleet made it urgently necessary for us to secure the defenses of the Western Hemisphere by establishing air bases and defensive garrisons throughout the Caribbean and in Newfoundland. With our limited means the situation developed into a problem of priorities in attempting to meet these requirements, and it was not until February 1941 that additional aircraft, antiaircraft, and other items of modern equipment could be shipped to the Hawaiian Islands. A little later the first shipments of modern aircraft were made to the Philippines and the Philippine Scout organization was doubled in strength, drawing the necessary personnel from the trained cadres of the new Philippine Army. The fighter planes secured for these purposes were largely obtained by stripping the limited number of squadrons then in training in the United States.

In July 1941 the development of quantity production made it possible for the first time to assign modern matériel in sizable lots to the Philippines. On August 28 the first flights of Flying Fortresses were started across the Pacific via Midway and Wake Islands and thence south through Rabaul, Port Moresby, or Port Darwin, and [[3062] north to the Philippines. By the first week in November some 35 Fortresses had completed this trip. A gap in airplane deliveries from the factory combined with adverse winds between San Francisco and Hawaii prevented the ferrying of an additional 48 Fortresses prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

At that point, General Marshall, I recall your testimony relative to the difficulties of the ships leaving the west coast in the direction of Hawaii and their problem of having sufficient gas.

Are you prepared to testify, or should we ask General Arnold, whether or not having made the long distance from the west coast to Hawaii the very ships themselves, I mean the planes, would have sufficient gas in order to engage in any kind of combat?

General MARSHALL. I think under the conditions under which they operated then they would not, but General Arnold is the appropriate witness.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I would also like to ask whether or not you received this telegram, General Marshall—and then I will go on—whether or not on August 30 you received a telegram from General MacArthur reading as follows:

I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department [[3063] have given me along every line since the formation of this command. With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid.

General MARSHALL. That is an excerpt from a message to me.

Mr. MURPHY. From General MacArthur.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Would you give the date of that message?

Mr. MURPHY. August 30.

Senator BREWSTER. Nineteen—

Mr. MURPHY. 1941. Page 4 of General Marshall's report.

In questioning you, General Marshall, counsel asked you whether or not you had any information of a Jap implementing message up to December 7. I would like to make it a little bit clearer and ask you whether or not you had any knowledge of the existence of any Jap implementing message to the winds code up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. You also testified that you had an orderly at your home at Fort Myer whose purpose it was to get phone messages and the like. Did you have that orderly on duty before December 7?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, I had him—I speak of him [3064] as one person, it was one of three or four—for about a year before that and continued it about a year after that and as the War Department became more fully organized I had an arrangement whereby all calls were diverted to the office of the Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, do you have any information of any attempt to locate you at your home by telephone or messenger on the evening of December 6 or the morning of December 7 prior to the call which you received while you were taking your shower?

General MARSHALL. I am unaware of any such message to contact me.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, as I understand it, from the time you received that call to the time you actually got to our office was a period of some 20 minutes?

General MARSHALL. I believe I said it generally took me about 10 minutes to bathe and dress. I can only make an assumption in the matter but I think I proceeded directly to the office.

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall, did you at any time ever hear, up to this very day, of any American having any information, specific information that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

General MARSHALL. What do you mean by "specific information"? [3065]

Mr. MURPHY. Well, there is talk—

General MARSHALL. I might intervene to say we had pretty much everything attacked.

Mr. MURPHY. Knowledge to the effect that the Japanese were actually going to make an attack.

General MARSHALL. I am unaware of such.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you any personal knowledge, General, of how much information General MacArthur might have had from Jap intercepts, which knowledge was not available to General Short?

General MARSHALL. I do not know that. I have learned that Admiral Hart had facilities which Admiral Kimmel, I think, did not have.

Mr. MURPHY. And the Admiral Hart who had the facilities and who was then the commander of the Naval forces at Manila is presently a United States Senator from Connecticut, isn't he?

General MARSHALL. That is the same man.

Mr. MURPHY. And in Washington. Well, you wouldn't know whether he was in Washington or not, I mean today.

Now, then, General——

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, would the reporter read the last remark?

[3066] Mr. MURPHY. I said he would not know whether Admiral Hart was in Washington or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if it is of any value, this information, I can tell you he is here today.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it may or may not become pertinent at a later stage of this inquiry.

General, in giving your opinion as to the ability of the force at Hawaii to meet the Japanese attack, did you take into consideration only the Army forces out there or did you also include all the forces the Navy had there, including their PBY's?

General MARSHALL. I was including the naval potential also.

Mr. MURPHY. Had you any warning, General, or any reason to expect on the night of December 6 or on the early morning of December 7 that there was any special urgency requiring you to be at the War Department earlier than the hour you did arrive there on the morning of December 7?

General MARSHALL. I had no such conception or information.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you at any time prior to December 7 ever have anyone tell you that the fleet, the United States Fleet in the Pacific ocean, was not able to take care of itself in the event of an attack?

[3067] General MARSHALL. I do not think I ever did, sir. I had heard a discussion by Admiral Richardson as to the requirements that the fleet had to have to be built up before taking out to sea and be properly supplied.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p. m., December 7, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, December 8, 1945.)

[3068]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[3069] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

The Chairman is detained for a few moments. We will continue.

Does counsel have anything to present at this time before General Marshall resumes his testimony?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Marshall, do you have anything that you want to bring to the attention of the committee before you resume your testimony?

General MARSHALL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to present two items in the record regarding my testimony yesterday which are incorrect statements as recorded. Is that permissible?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

General MARSHALL. On page 2994, the next to the last sentence reads: "I came to the conclusion that the matter was so important that we must make it a matter of record, and I sent Colonel Clarke", and so forth.

I was referring to the discussion I had preliminarily to sending a second letter to Governor Dewey. The first five words on line 24, "it a matter of record" should have read "another effort", so the sentence would read: "I came to [3070] the conclusion that the matter was so important that we must make another effort, and I sent Colonel Clarke".

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That correction will be made.

General MARSHALL. Two pages further on, 2996, line 4, the sentence reads: "Colonel Clarke returned to Washington and reported to me that the Governor had read the letter, had discussed it with Mr. Bell in the presence of Colonel Clarke——." That is not a correct statement.

Line 4 should read, "with Mr. Bell but not in the presence of Colonel Clarke".

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That correction will be made, General. Is there anything further, sir?

General MARSHALL. Nothing further.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee has heard with profound sorrow that Senator Brewster's father passed away last night. Necessarily the Senator is absent this morning. The committee extends him its deepest sympathy in this time of bereavement.

Senator Brewster would next be entitled to recognition, and of course being unable to be present the Chair recognizes Congressman Gearhart of California, who will now inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. General Marshall, I regret the necessity of your being delayed in leaving for the Orient, and I regret especially that I must share a part of the blame for detaining you here, and for that reason I will make my cross-examination [3071] very, very short.

First I would like to inquire, what was the over-all desire of the Army and Navy during the months of October and November and first part of December in reference to delaying or accelerating the commencement of war with any nation?

General MARSHALL. It was our great desire, speaking specifically for the Army, but I am certain with naval agreement, the agreement of Admiral Stark, to delay in every way the possibility of our being involved in war.

Mr. GEARHART. The reason for that was that we were improving our defensive and striking capacity very rapidly under our preparedness program of the moment?

General MARSHALL. That, of course, was a prime factor, Mr. Congressman, but it goes a little further than that. Naturally it was our hope that we could avoid a war, but also, as a purely military proposition, it would be highly undesirable, if involved in war, that it should be on two fronts in widely separated parts of the world, and more specifically, that it should develop in the Pacific, where we knew the British had very little available means to resist aggressive action by the Japanese.

The British situation, or that of the British Empire, was so serious as to deficiency in men and matériel, particularly in planes at that time, and in naval shipping, which [3072] was engaged in the effort to keep the Atlantic lanes open for convoys from this country, carrying lend-lease supplies which were vital to the successful defense they were then laboring under, that if they became involved in war in the Pacific they were almost bound to weaken themselves in the Atlantic, meaning in Great Britain, at a time when the Germans were exceedingly strong.

So a war on two fronts was to be avoided, if it was at all possible to do so. War was to be avoided by us in our own view, if we could manage it, and every effort was to be made to gain us time in case war became inevitable.

Mr. GEARHART. And it was your belief, Admiral Stark concurring, that if the war with Japan could be delayed long enough, that our might and power would grow so great that Japan probably would be dissuaded from attacking us?

General MARSHALL. I have a very distinct recollection of my own reactions at the time. I thought if we once had accumulated approximately 100 4-engine bombers in the Philippines the Japanese could not dare to attempt to move to the south of the Philippines, or to make a naval attack on the Philippines, that is, to support a landing. I had great confidence in the potential threat involved in a large concentration of heavy bombers.

I might add that at that time no such concentration had [3073] ever been made before in the history of war, I think, and although now we think in terms of thousands, at that time 100 was a very large figure.

So we were making every conceivable effort to present in the Philippines to the Japanese a concentration of air power that they would not dare hazard active operations to the south in the China Sea or directly against the Philippine Islands themselves.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark shared those views with you, did he not?

General MARSHALL. That was my understanding, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You and he took advantage of every opportunity to call the necessity for delayed action to the attention of the President and the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, did you not?

General MARSHALL. And the Secretary of State. Admiral Stark, as I believe I testified earlier in my appearance here, which, of course, he can give you authentic evidence on, desired in the discussions with Mr. Hull that, or stated, I believe, that February 1st was the essential date for the Navy in order that they might be able to make the completion of the Fleet's requirements. I hazarded in early September, as I recall, that if we obtained the ships and delivery of planes, that we might or should be ready by December 5 to an extent [3074] that would probably deter the Japanese from making an attack.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, during the month of November large convoys, men and materiel were moving towards the Philippines and you had plans for still larger convoys to be moving in that direction for the month of December?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Of 1941.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, convoys were leaving San Francisco as the bombs began to fall in Hawaii; is that not true?

General MARSHALL. I did not hear the question.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, convoys were moving out of San Francisco at the time the bombs began to fall?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct; I also know that a large slow convoy had been headed south toward Torres Strait and was somewhere between Samoa and Hawaii at the time of the outbreak of war.

Mr. GEARHART. In line with your and Admiral Stark's desire to gain time, you jointly prepared a statement which you sent to the President on November 5?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the gist of that document was an appeal to the President to use his good offices and the good offices [3075] of

our Government to prevent an outbreak of war with Japan for the time being?

General MARSHALL. I think that in general is a correct statement.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you or Admiral Stark, in your presence and hearing, protest at any time to Secretary Hull the sending of his message, the handing of his message of November 26 to the Japanese Envoys?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of such protest.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you know in advance of the handing of that message to the Japanese that Mr. Hull was contemplating the preparation of such a document?

General MARSHALL. I think I knew he was contemplating the preparation of such a document. I did not know the time and actual date of the document.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you, in any words, written or oral, urge him not to take that step?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of such action.

Mr. GEARHART. When did you first hear that he had handed such a note as the one which bears the date of November 26 to the Japanese Envoys?

General MARSHALL. I have not a clear recollection regarding that. I imagine it was on November 27, or 28th for me, because I was absent on the 27th.

[3076] Mr. GEARHART. You were a member of the so-called War Cabinet of the President?

General MARSHALL. I don't believe I could be considered a member of the Cabinet, but I sat in at the meetings of that group on most occasions.

Mr. GEARHART. Wasn't there an organization informally known as the President's War Cabinet consisting of the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Secretary of State and the two Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General MARSHALL. That group met in that form on several occasions. What I mean is that the military, I don't believe, would be considered part of the Cabinet, though we were a part of the meeting.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you if Secretary Hull, prior to the 26th day of November and prior to his handing the note to the Japanese, informed you and the other members of that so-called War Cabinet of his intention to hand a document at that time to the Japanese?

General MARSHALL. May I have the first part of the question?

[the question was read by the reporter]:

General MARSHALL. He made, Mr. Hull, that is, made several general statements in regard to whether or not further diplomatic efforts would be practical, but the actual action [3077] that he took at that time I do not recall he stated in my presence.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not know whether he read the message to you prior to its delivery to the Japanese Envoys?

General MARSHALL. I do not think he did.

Mr. GEARHART. Did he read it to you, or was a copy placed in your hands, immediately after he delivered it to the Japanese?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But nevertheless you and Admiral Stark on November 27, the very next day, addressed a memorandum to the President in which you again urged upon the President, as the most essential thing, the necessity of gaining time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was that joint message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President inspired by the action of the Secretary of State in handing the message of November 26 to the Japanese?

General MARSHALL. I have not a clear recollection on that, Mr. Gearhart. I couldn't tell you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

General MARSHALL. I certainly haven't an affirmative reaction of what the Secretary of State said he was going to do that caused us to take that particular action. We [3078] took it, but possibly Admiral Stark can remember more clearly than I can. I do not recall all the circumstances of it.

Mr. GEARHART. I will read you, for the purpose of refreshing your memory a paragraph from the pamphlet entitled "Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-41,"¹ the paragraph which appears on page 138:

On November 28 at a meeting of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there was no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan, that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force, and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

Are you familiar with that?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is roughly that, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then, the Secretary on the 25th told you and the other members composing this so-called war cabinet that there was no chance of obtaining an agreement, and that the matter was in the hands of the Army and Navy at that time?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Isn't that the reason why you and Admiral Stark immediately devoted your attention to preparing the [3079] memorandum of November 27 for the President?

General MARSHALL. That may be, sir. I don't recall exactly the conditions under which we wrote that memorandum.

Mr. GEARHART. Going on and reading further in the same paragraph:

The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy, and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and coordination.

Do you remember his speaking to you to that effect?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of such detail. I testified yesterday to a very distinct recollection of Mr. Hull saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, "These fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared."

Mr. GEARHART. And to refresh your memory in respect to your having read this pamphlet at some time, or having had conversations

¹ Exhibit No. 27.

in December or November of 1941, let me read one further paragraph from this pamphlet I have in my hands, the succeeding paragraph to that which I just read:

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that "the diplomatic [3080] part of our relations with Japan were virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy."

Have you any comment to make upon that statement of the Secretary of State?

General MARSHALL. I have not, Mr. Gearhart. Incidentally I have never read that pamphlet you are reading from.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it ever called to your attention by anyone who had heard that the Secretary had made that statement?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall anyone bringing it to my attention. I have a vague recollection of it, which I probably obtained from the newspapers.

Mr. GEARHART. Quoting further from the same page:

He said further that it would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly, and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognized that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along [3081] the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risks."

Do you remember having heard that from any one of the Secretary having so expressed himself to the British Ambassador?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. But you did feel from that which he had to say that war was imminent and you felt also in harmony with the Chief of Naval Operations that everything should be done to delay the commencement of hostilities?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. My understanding from the Secretary of State was that the situation was most critical, using the word "most" in its accurate meaning, that these "fellows" meaning the Japanese, intended to fight, and that we must be prepared. That is a pretty complete estimate of the situation.

Mr. GEARHART. In your memorandum to the President of November 27, 1941, written just after you had heard of the President's message which he had handed the Japanese envoys in Washington, you commenced by using these words:

If the current negotiations end without agreement Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

[3082] There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.

As a matter of fact, General, wasn't it your opinion, and wasn't it the opinion of Admiral Stark and all of the high-ranking naval and military officers with whom you were in conversation, that the Japanese attack was going to come to the Far East and that there was no thought of it coming at Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Our thought at the time—my thought specifically—was that the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward

from the China Sea, that that would be their operation. I assumed that Guam would be captured. I assumed that Wake Island would be taken, though there was a little less probability there than there was as regards Guam, because while the fleet was still in full being, the American Fleet, Wake, I would assume, would be a more difficult task for the Japanese.

We had in mind the possibility of an effort on the Panama Canal. We had in mind the possibility of an effort to strike a blow at our air plants in Seattle, at our air plants in San Diego, and we had in mind the possibility of a blow in the Central Pacific, in the Hawaiian district.

[3083] We thought the latter was the most improbable.

Mr. GEARHART. What was the latter?

General MARSHALL. The attack against the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. GEARHART. You thought that was improbable?

General MARSHALL. I said the most improbable.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, in the opinion of the people with whom you were in daily conversation, both naval and military, Pearl Harbor was considered impregnable, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Do you mean by that, Mr. Gearhart, it was impracticable as a naval base, or impracticable as a Japanese objective?

Mr. GEARHART. Why did we build it?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

General MARSHALL. Did you say impracticable?

Mr. GEARHART. Impregnable.

General MARSHALL. I didn't understand.

Mr. GEARHART. We built it as a defense against possible trouble with Japan; isn't that right?

General MARSHALL. Yes. I thought you used the word "impracticable." We thought it was impregnable against a Japanese landing expedition.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, you were so convinced [3084] of that you wrote in 1940 in your aide memoire the following words:

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

General MARSHALL. I didn't write that. It was prepared for me. At the time I think it was a correct statement.

Also in the memorandum the implication is: when we get all the various arrangements there.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, referring to your warning message which was sent in slightly different forms to Manila, Hawaii, Panama, and other places, that warning message required the addressees to report to you, didn't it?

General MARSHALL. Required—

Mr. GEARHART. The addressees to report to you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. What they had done in response to your directions?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. General Short reported that he had taken steps in accordance with your part of your directions against sabotage, in his message of November 28?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3085] Mr. GEARHART. You received that report, did you not?

General MARSHALL. I testified in regard to that, sir. The presumption is I did. The War Department received it and the presumption is that I read it.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you remember whether or not you received such a message of that kind?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember, as I testified, and I did not initial the report.

Mr. GEARHART. What did you say?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember, as I testified, and I did not initial the report.

Mr. GEARHART. You heard, or were you present in this room when General Gerow testified and accepted full responsibility for not having acted on the inadequacy, as he called it, of this report?

General MARSHALL. I was not present in the room and I admire very much his attitude.

Mr. GEARHART. I, too, thought it was very generous, but prior to November 28 you had issued a directive to General Gerow and to General Miles, did you not, directing them to send you not only the reports on the messages that they received but to send you the material itself, had you not?

General MARSHALL. The message reads:

[3086] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

[Signed] MARSHALL.

Mr. GEARHART. That is correct, but that is not an answer to the question, though, that I propounded to you, General.

My question was, did you not, prior to November 28, issue a directive to General Gerow and General Miles—

[3087] General MARSHALL. General Gerow?

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). Where you accepted their evaluations on the messages they intercepted but also to send the material along as well?

General MARSHALL. Oh, I misunderstood you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California yield?

General MARSHALL. That was, I believe, in the month of August, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. You understand the question, don't you?

General MARSHALL. I think so. In the month of August are you referring to?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, in the month of August, that they send the messages and their evaluations, if any, along with them?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Your reason for making that directive to the two generals was because you wanted to see yourself what was being intercepted and what messages were being received?

General MARSHALL. That, quite evidently, was my reason.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, can you give any reason now why you did not take exception yourself to the message of General Short's of November 28?

[3088] General MARSHALL. I can only say, sir, that that was my opportunity to intervene and have a further check made and I did not take it. Just why I do not know.

Mr. GEARHART. You expected immediate attention to be given to your message of November 27 by the various addressess to whom you sent it, didn't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That was a command direction for alert against a state of war.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Did you expect General Short to take immediate action?

General MARSHALL. I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then will you explain how he could have taken immediate action and ordered a No. 3 alert instantly without creating alarm among the people and disclosing the intention of the United States?

General MARSHALL. I think he could have, sir. We had done such things before out there. We had done it the previous summer. There are a good many ways to get at that.

The reconnaissance, for example by air over water—that was a naval directive responsibility—could not in any way have alarmed the population. The other matters in regard to planes and, presumably, ships, it seems to me, would have not alarmed the population.

The issue where the people came most closely in contact [3089] with the military might be as a change of attitude related to sabotage because that required the posting of a great many detachments in order to avoid action being taken.

I would like to say, in regard to this right now, it was necessary, we felt, specifically necessary, to include that particular direction regarding the public, both as to Hawaii and as to the west coast, because it was the strong desire of, I will say, the War Cabinet, certainly of the Army and Navy officials and I am quite certain of the President of the United States, that the Japanese be given no opportunity whatever to claim that we had taken some overt act which forced a state of war upon them.

The feeling was—I am now speaking as Chief of Staff only, from the point of view I could obtain as Chief of Staff—the feeling was at that time that if the Japanese could have created a situation, however unjustified, however illogical, in which they could have led at least a portion of the people to believe that our overt action had forced them into an act of war and we would have had a divided country, which would have been a terrible tragedy in a war situation.

Therefore, each move we made had to be taken carefully into account to avoid the possibility that the Japanese would instantly make a claim that we had forced the issue, that we had really made the overt act and they were forced to fight [3090] us.

Mr. GEARHART. In reply to that I entirely agree with you.

General MARSHALL. May I finish my statement, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. I entirely agree with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the General finish his answer.

General MARSHALL. At that time there was a very—I believe this is correct—divided opinion in this country and of course, the people generally could not know all the inside facts which we had obtained from one source or another about the very aggressive acts that the Japanese were carrying out in the Far East.

So we labored in this state of peace, in this state of normalcy; and, as for example, in Hawaii, in this state of not being able to check them up, for instance, through the phone service and things of that sort, in this state of having to allow them to send any information they wished back to their own country, we labored constantly under the obligation that we must have no act committed by one of our officers that would permit the Japanese to claim that we had started the war, and, therefore, would to that extent for the time being at least have left us with a divided people on a tragic issue.

Therefore, it was necessary to omit, that those messages [3091] to the west coast and the message to the Hawaiian Islands must have a proviso in them of that character.

Mr. GEARHART. I agree with you entirely, General. That was a tremendously important consideration and to further emphasize the arguments that you have made, the Constitution of the United States provides that war shall be declared only by the Congress of the United States. If you took any other steps it would have been in violation of the Constitution which all of us have taken an oath to uphold. I am just as firm in my agreement with you as I possibly could be on that necessity that you speak of.

What I am talking about now is whether or not the message of General Short's was in line with what should have been done under the circumstances and because of the very reasons that you have cited. "We must not alarm the people or give the Japanese the opportunity to say that we started the war."

General MARSHALL. I gathered the impression from your question, sir, that you thought or were implying that the message was impractical of execution.

Mr. GEARHART. No—oh, yes, that may be touched upon, too. I may be touching upon that, too, for the reasons you have outlined so well.

Now, if General Short had placed the Army on a No. 3 [3092] alert immediately upon receiving your message, that would have required him to fill the air with airplanes, it would have required every soldier on the island to put on a steel helmet and side arms, would it not, and appear on the streets in full war regalia?

General MARSHALL. Not necessarily appear on the streets in full war regalia and not necessarily fill the air with planes because deep reconnaissance takes off from the field and goes out over the water. It might be circling over the city, it might be on a training maneuver of any kind. It is not flying all the time; and the pursuit and interceptor planes did not need to take the air; quite the contrary. They needed to be armed and equipped and the pilots ready.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, that is exactly what happened when they had a No. 3 alert, isn't it?

General MARSHALL. I don't know what moment they went on the No. 3 alert and I would also like to say, Mr. Gearhart, that I had never

seen his various alert messages and they did not arrive here in this country until January.

Mr. GEARHART. Wouldn't the No. 3 alert require the men to take up battle positions immediately on the island?

General MARSHALL. It would, yes, sir. I presume that was a No. 3 alert. I have not got the details here before me. General Short can testify about that.

[3093] Mr. GEARHART. That would have required trucks with men with helmets and rifles to ride out to the battle positions from the barracks in which they were then living?

General MARSHALL. Presumably so, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, the sudden ordering of a No. 3 alert would have created a tremendous condition on the island that would have alarmed the civilian population on the island.

General MARSHALL. It seems to me that a No. 3 alert, whatever its exact details were, could have been carried out with certain modifications to attain the general result desired.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. A No. 2 alert would have been a defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks. They did not need a No. 3. A No. 2 would have made it.

Mr. GEARHART. Either 2 or 3.

General MARSHALL. I was not referring to 1, 2, or 3. That was the function of the commanding general in the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, when we have maneuvers over there, and we have had them for 30 or 40 years, the [3094] public mind was always prepared for the event, was it not, by prior announcements and by notices, so that they would not become alarmed at the display of military power?

General MARSHALL. I am not the best witness on that. General Herron and possibly General Short himself can testify as to that, and other commanders.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I—

General MARSHALL. You are asking me, sir, for the details of the condition of a command by the individual responsible for that command?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

General MARSHALL. There were commands all over the Pacific, there were commands in this country and there were commands in the Caribbean.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I was not familiar with the detailed execution of their plans any more than I was familiar with General MacArthur's plans. I had given certain general directives and as general officers in a responsible position in the outpost he was carrying the duties out.

I testified, for example, the other day to an incident illustrative of that, that we only learned through magic his procedure of unloading at night and taking other measures to keep the Japanese in the dark as to what was going on.

[3095] It is impractical and there are no means in Washington to know all the details of the execution of commands by a higher

officer who is given the responsibility of carrying out a defense for air or certain operations.

Mr. GEARHART. At the present time you do not remember that you had or voiced any objections or criticism to General Short's report?

General MARSHALL. I know specifically I did not.

Mr. GEARHART. The evidence shows that the 13 parts and the pilot message were received and decoded on December 6, 1941. All this became available on Saturday night. The President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Navy had it, your subordinates Miles and Bratton had it.

How do you explain the fact that none of it was given to your attention on Saturday, December 6, 1941?

General MARSHALL. As I recall—of course, the message itself will show—the first 13 parts were not of the nature of a vital threat as the 14th part. That was a message of direct importance to the Secretary of State and of related importance, of course, to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy who had been collaborating with him in his relationship in the dealings with Japan. The fact of the matter was it was not brought to my attention.

[3096] Mr. GEARHART. Do you now feel that General Short was not entitled to have information of that character to guide him in setting up the degree of alert that it was essential to have done?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, that was my view. He was issued a command and directed to do something. Now, if the directive was so written that he could not understand it, that is a matter for judgment. Once you issue an order, amendments or, you might say, codicils are very dangerous business when it is an operational order. In most instances it is far better to cancel the entire order and start anew. The transmission of information from the G-2, for example, of the War Department to G-2, for example, under General Short is another matter. That is informational and that is not directional.

Mr. GEARHART. Whenever a higher command, say the command in Washington, is in receipt of information of great importance to a commander in the field, it is the obligation of the command having that information either to transmit the information or issue directives in the light of that information, is that not correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was that always done by G-2 and by your War Plans Division?

General MARSHALL. Are you referring to this incident or [3097] the whole course of the war?

Mr. GEARHART. I am talking about this thick volume of Japanese intercepted messages which throw so much light upon the Japanese attitude toward this country of ours.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Exhibit 2.

General MARSHALL. I presume that in searching through that you will locate messages the sense of which might well have been communicated to General Short. However, the analyses of these messages, particularly as relates to the higher diplomatic operations of the Government, would properly be made here in Washington. It is the only place where all the information was available.

The problem was to keep the commander in the clear, as it were, as to what his action should be and not to confuse it.

I recounted in my testimony, I believe, yesterday and doubted for the moment as to whether the 1 o'clock message of December 7 should be sent out, though it was quickly decided that it was essential that it should go as quickly as possible.

There was another message, for example—no, that does not pertain.

The point, I think, that should be made clear, if possible, is that you must avoid confusing the commander with a [3098] mass of data.

For example, in this particular case, following General Short's assumption of command, as this record shows, there were a series of letters directly between General Short and myself. Those letters gave me the most definite impression of an extreme sensibility to air and submarine attack. They did not give me an impression of a similar sensitivity to sabotage matters.

Now, following that experience I practically never wrote another letter to any commander in the field and confined it purely to the operational directives. I did not write to General Eisenhower, I did not write to General MacArthur, and I did not write to the other commanders virtually at all during the course of the war. I confined myself entirely to the dry directive as to what they were to do.

In this case I gathered the impression from a series of letters which you have in the record, and the directive was issued having that impression, of an essential and understood policy and then the reaction developed, as you have been referring to here, wherein the attention went to sabotage and so on from an air and submarine attack.

Mr. GEARHART. Quite a number of the messages which you caused to be sent and which were sent by subordinates of yours and by Admiral Stark and subordinates of his emphasize [3099] the possibilities of hostilities in Indochina, the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, Thailand, even Guam, but in no message that you sent did you call especial attention to the fact that Hawaii might be threatened.

General MARSHALL. Because at that time the opinion which we had most definitely in our own minds from the data available—in our own minds from the data available—was the Japanese threat south through the China Sea. We had it by magic. We had it by the actual reconnaissance of convoys, we had it by reports from other officials in Indochina and elsewhere, of very positive action which actually did confirm the main, the principal Japanese campaign.

Mr. GEARHART. What effect do you think it had upon the minds of Admiral Kimmel and General Short as these several messages went over their desks warning of impending war, true, but always centering attention upon the Kra Peninsula, the Philippines, Indochina, Borneo, what effect do you think it had on the minds of these two gentlemen warning them as to war and then always directing their attention to another side of the world? Do you think that there was any belief that Washington thought that Hawaii might be attacked?

General MARSHALL. I cannot say, sir. They were both long experienced in the military considerations. They were men of mature judgments and they were men of high rank and [3100] they were in a position of great responsibility. They knew, certainly, why Hawaii was set up in the military way as it was. They knew the capacity of an enemy to do certain things under certain circumstances. We did not have to tell them that.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, going to your letter which you wrote and had delivered to Governor Dewey, on page 2990 of the transcript, Volume 18, you testified as follows—

General MARSHALL. 90?

Mr. GEARHART. 90, yes. Line 21.

General MARSHALL. 90?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, 90.

General MARSHALL. What line, please?

Mr. GEARHART. Line 22 [reading]:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the [3101] State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Is that an entirely correct statement?

General MARSHALL. As to December 8 it was not. It was December 11, apparently, when I saw the messages, I had reference to there. As to the others, after all the files were dug out and the various messages were checked I think it would be proper to say that that was not entirely accurate as to that.

As to my information at the time I dictated this letter—and understand me, Mr. Gearhart, this was dictated in about ten minutes time while I was in the business of conducting the war from the Army side—that was my recollection of an event four years previously without any records of any kind in front of me, so that at that time I thought it was the day after instead of 3 days later that this message was shown to me at my desk. I was unaware of that particular message at any other time.

There were one or two other messages brought to my attention here recently which I was unaware of up to the time they were brought to my attention.

[3102] I would like to say that there is an immense mass of data involved in this and there were an immense number of things going on at this particular time, and at the time of the dictation of this letter we were in the throes of the war. I dictated it, as I say, in about 10 minutes. I had no records before me at the time; it would take quite a while to assemble them.

I think this is reasonably accurate according to my understanding of the facts at the time I dictated the letter.

Mr. GEARHART. You realized that you were assuming a tremendous obligation to convey a true and completely accurate picture of the situation to Governor Dewey when you were assuming to, or when you were asking him to do what was probably very hard for him to consent to do; is that not correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct. I was thoroughly aware of that but I had been in that predicament almost every month through

the war and I just did what seemed to me right and that is the best I could do.

Mr. GEARHART. But now you admit that the statement you made was grossly inadequate in respect to having received no intercept of Japanese messages which pointed directly to Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I wouldn't say this is grossly inaccurate. I should say the statement as made here is in- [3103] accurate, but only in the matter of three days. It would have no bearing, in general, on the main issue. I made this for the protection of the conduct of our operations by our troops. I did not make it with any regard whatever to a Congressional investigation.

Mr. GEARHART. In order that the record may be complete, I will ask you a rather long question now to which I would like to have your very careful attention. I intend to read from page 12 of exhibit 2, a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24th, intercepted and decoded on October 9, 1941. "Secretly Secret." [Reading from Exhibit No. 2:]

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

[3104] Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tried up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

From Honolulu to Tokyo dated 29 September 1941, decoded October 19, 1941. [Reading:]

Honolulu to Tokyo #178.

Re your #083*

(Strictly secret)

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48**): KS.

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT.

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG, (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

[3105] There are some markings on it.

I have another message from Tokyo to—

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I should think there ought to be the complete message read.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, in the lower left hand corner is an asterisk.

Mr. MURPHY. And up above "083" and there is a note at the bottom it is not available.

Mr. GEARHART. "Not available" asterisk "available" and then "dated 21 August." Lower down: "JD-1: 5730 23312." Over in the right hand corner, "(D) Trans, 10-10-41 (X)."

1180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu (Riyoji) 15 November 1941 (reading):

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

In the lower right hand corner: "(Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S.)"
In the lower left hand corner: "JD-1: 6091 25644."

Another message from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo, November 18, 1941, decoded December 6, 1941, reading as follows:

#222.

[3106] 1. The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the *Oklahoma* class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the *Saratoga* was not in the harbor. The carrier, *Enterprise*, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the *Chicago* class, one of the *Pensacola* class were tied up at docks KS. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D^d.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to—.

a.—Available, dated November 14. Code under study.

b.—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

[3107] c.—East Loch.

d.—Middle Loch.

In the lower left-hand corner: "Army 25817." In the lower right-hand corner: "Trans. 12/6/41 (2)."

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941, to Honolulu (reading):

#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels, anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay—"Manila Bay" is circled by a pen and up to one side "Honolulu" is written—and the Areas Adjacent thereto.

(Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

Lower left-hand corner: "a—Probably means Mamala Bay." What is Mamala Bay? Is that in the Hawaiian Islands?

General MARSHALL. I think it is, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Lower right-hand corner: "Trans. 12/5/41 (S)."

Lower left-hand corner: "Army 25773."

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu dated November 20, 1941.

#111 Strictly Secret.

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

[3108] Lower left-hand corner: "Army 25694 JD 7029." Lower right-hand corner: "Trans. 12-4-41 (S)."

One more, from Tokyo to Honolulu, 29 November 1941 (reading):

#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

In the lower left-hand corner: "JD-1: 7086 25823." In the lower right-hand corner "(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)."

Then appear other messages which were translated after the sixth day.

So that it is quite apparent from the reading of those messages that were received, decoded, and placed on your desk, read or not read, that many messages directing the attention of our military and naval authorities to Hawaii had been received, is that not correct?

General MARSHALL. You stated, Mr. Gearhart, as I understand you, that it was quite evident that all those messages were placed on my desk. I have no recollection of that. I have a very definite recollection that the message on page 22 of the same exhibit was the one which I had in mind when I was writing to Governor Dewey. It was from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo and bore the December 4th date and it is that Navy [3109] message which was referred to in my testimony yesterday. I had a definite recollection of that particular message, and I have also a very definite recollection it came to my attention after the event and it shows here it was translated on the 11th of December.

The messages which you have just read I had no recollection of whatever at the time. In fact, I first read them in the 2 days when I was getting ready for this hearing here.

[3110] The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Congressman?

Mr. GEARHART. General, in conclusion, I direct your attention to the report of the Army board. I haven't the official publication, but I have here the publication of the United States News of September 1, 1945. On page 56 of that particular printing, paragraph 2, "The Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

What have you to say to that?

General MARSHALL. Very much what I have said previously in answer to your question, sir, that we had given General Short a directive to do something which was an alert against the possibility or probability of war. He was a responsible commander; he had a definite task; he had indicated the various concerns he had in regard to that task; they were clear in our minds, and this mass of data which poured in here would normally, I think, merely impose an additional burden on him to undertake the analysis of it, which was [3111] going on at the same time back here.

He had a direction to do something; he had a direction to do something, a command direction for an alert. Now, the question of how much additional information should go to him is a matter of judgment. As a command direction, I think only the December 7 message of 1 p. m. applied.

As to the information which would be passed to his G-2 from the G-2 of the War Department, there is a question of judgment as to how much of that would be desirable.

I would say offhand that the messages you just read to me would have been helpful to General Short, but particularly more so to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. GEARHART. Reading further from the report:

(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

What have you to say to that?

General MARSHALL. I have nothing to add to what I have already said to you, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Reading further from the report:

[3112] (c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6 and the early morning of December 7, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.

What have you to say to that?

General MARSHALL. I have nothing to add to what I have already said in regard to that, except possibly this, that the first 13 sections of that message I do not believe had any specific bearing one way or the other on General Short's situation and responsibility with regard to the alert command direction that he had already received.

Mr. GEARHART. Reading further:

(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the immediate threat of war.

What have you to say to that?

General MARSHALL. I have only this to say, sir, that we had no intimation that that command was not ready, and I think we had every reason to believe that it was ready. With the rapidity of investigations that later became possible, or inspections that later became possible through the ease of air flight, some might have gone out there, but at that time it was not as simple a matter as it became later.

[3113] Incidentally, Mr. Gearhart, I went out to the Hawaiian Department myself at an earlier date while General Herron was in command, and I think I know the Chief of Staff who did go out there prior to the war, and I spent about a week going through every phase of their preparations against attack from the air and against attack from the ground.

I did not go into the details of the Naval concerns in Pearl Harbor itself.

I did go out, though, specifically to make certain that on the arrival of the fleet, in a maneuver which was to take place by, I believe, submarine action largely and a few destroyers on the Hawaiian side, and the fleet coming from the west coast on the fleet side, to make certain that our heavy bombers were involved in the program regarding which I was, sir, at some doubt, and that was arranged, and that was carried out in that operation, to make it a joint affair for the better cooperation and organization of the Hawaiian defense.

So I was aware of the plans that were in effect at the time General Herron—who was General Short's predecessor—was in command, by actual personal investigation.

I was aware shortly prior to that, while I was head of the War Plans Division in the summer and early fall of 1938, of the actual war

plans regarding Hawaii. I was only aware [3114] thereafter, with General Short's assumption of command, as indicated by the letters General Short himself sent me and by the discussions that came up, brought up by the Air Corps in relation to General Short's arrangements with the Navy, as to the control of the reconnaissance over water, and I had no reason to believe that that command was anything other than highly efficient and alert.

That is my view of it.

Mr. GEARHART. Thank you, General. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator, before we begin, may I call attention to what I think was an inadvertent mistake made by Congressman Gearhart in one of his questions when he assumed that the 13 parts of the 14-part message and pilot message were all received here on the 6th of December. I refer to page 248 of this pamphlet containing these Pearl Harbor decoded messages,¹ and you will find that the pilot message was translated in Washington on the 7th of December instead of the 6th.

Mr. GEARHART. I may have been mistaken, but I was under the impression that there was a message that came on the 6th which carried information to the effect that there would be a directive at 1:00 o'clock, as it turned out, on the following day.

Mr. GESELL. That is at page 238, No. 901.

[3115] Senator FERGUSON. I show you Exhibit 41, which shows that the pilot message was decoded, translated and typed at the Army SIS the 6th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. I am confused with the message on page 248, which reads as follows:

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the eventual message.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That correction will be made.

Go ahead, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. General, in order that we may clear up some points and in order that we may ascertain what was known in the field, the various fields, and what was known here in Washington, that we may, as a committee, ascertain why our forces at Hawaii were surprised, I want to ask you some questions.

I would like to have you refer to Exhibit 42, on page 2 of that exhibit. I will ask you whether or not you were the Commanding General of the Field Forces?

General MARSHALL. I was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did that include Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. That did, sir.

[3116] Senator FERGUSON. You were directly over General Short then, as I understand it.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the purpose of the Field Force in Hawaii was to defend Hawaii, defend the island where Pearl Harbor was, and the fleet, if the fleet was in?

¹ Exhibit No. 1.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now the second part of that exhibit indicates that if you were absent, then your Deputy Chief of Staff was in charge, is that correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is meant by you being absent?

General MARSHALL. I imagine the best interpretation I can give you on that is "would be available," was I available or not. I say definitely if I am not in Washington I am absent, there is no question whatever about that.

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't any question of availability?

General MARSHALL. I would think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, would you say you were available on the morning of the 7th when you were horseback riding?

General MARSHALL. In one sense, yes; in another sense, no. They could not speak to me until they located me.

Senator FERGUSON. Correct. So under this directive your [3117] Deputy Chief of Staff would be able to act?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I must say there, though, Senator, in fairness to him, that if he knew I was on an hour's absence he would have quite a problem to decide whether he would take action then or wait until the expiration of the hour.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to get it right there. How far were you at any particular time on that morning from your residence?

General MARSHALL. I would say the present site of the Pentagon.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

General MARSHALL. I would say the present site of the Pentagon. That was the most distant point of the horseback trail I took.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not be over 3 miles then from your residence at any time?

General MARSHALL. Approximately that.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would have felt that the Deputy Chief of Staff could have, if he desired, located you because you were within 3 miles of your residence?

General MARSHALL. I presume so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone know your custom of riding [3118] as to where you rode?

General MARSHALL. At the stables they knew. I do not know as General Bryden, my deputy, knew specifically where I rode. I never rode with him, I do not think. The variations from that were limited to following the trail along the Potomac down toward the present National Airport, but that was the only variation.

Senator FERGUSON. You had regular places to ride?

General MARSHALL. Well, you are very much limited, you have to ride there unless you cross the river.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask you, General, you have stated here that Hawaii was alerted, that the Philippines was alerted.

General MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Washington alerted? Was your office alerted?

General MARSHALL. We had an officer on duty at night in the Secretary to the General Staff's office who received any important messages and routed them to the proper person. I am quite certain General Gerow will be able to testify he had a similar officer in the War Plans Division to receive any important messages that might come in.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I want to get to this: Your office was alerted and you had a man there all night that [3119] could have acted, is that correct?

General MARSHALL. You used the expression "alerted," sir. That had been the state of affairs for quite some time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, as we go along, if I use a word that is not correct in Army parlance, will you correct me?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I meant by that we had been doing that all along, just as I had been keeping the telephone open at 10 o'clock in the house.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not this be true that on Sunday morning your office was alerted, or on the alert, the same as Hawaii, and that the Deputy Chief of Staff would be in a position to act?

General MARSHALL. I presume so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was G-2 alerted?

General MARSHALL. You will have to ask General Miles that. I do not know the details. I do know specifically about the War Plans Division; because I had so much business with it I am aware of it.

[3120] Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, he was a deputy under you?

General MARSHALL. He was Assistant Chief of Staff. A deputy operates directly under me.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

General MARSHALL. These others function up to him, or sometimes directly to me.

Senator FERGUSON. He is classed as—

General MARSHALL. He handles the mass of ordinary business and acts for me in my absence.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he get his alert from you?

General MARSHALL. He would have if I had given him a specific alert. He was responsible with the Secretary of the General Staff. The arrangements were such in that section of the War Department that there was a continuity throughout the night.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what I want to get at, if I can, by questions, to find out the facts. All I am trying to ascertain is, what are the facts.

On the 27th, when the message was sent to Hawaii, was G-2, War Plans, and your office alerted so that they knew that war was imminent? As I understand it, Hawaii was notified that war was imminent. Now, were these respective officers of G-2, G-1—War Plans was what? G-1?

[3121] General MARSHALL. Well, it hasn't any number, sir. War Plans is the designation.

Senator FERGUSON. Was G-2, War Plans, and the Chief of Staff organization alerted at the same time?

General MARSHALL. They were all aware of the critical situation and of the issuance of a directive alerting the overseas theaters in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, how do you account for the fact, if they were alerted, that the 13 parts of the 14-part message—and we understand each other on that—

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing)—and the pilot message were not delivered to the Chief of Staff? Who would be the man that was authorized to act on it, on the evening of the 6th as the Navy had done with their 13-part message? Have you ever looked into it? Have you ever looked into that question to ascertain why that was not done?

General MARSHALL. I did not look into it at all, until here about two days ago, or three days ago, at the time General Miles was testifying. That was my first opportunity to go into these records. The question of the delivery to me of the first 13 parts of that message, I think is a matter of judgment. The final, and fourteenth part is quite different, and that I believe did not become [3122] available until the next morning.

I want to get myself straight, Senator. You spoke of a pilot message.

Senator FERGUSON. The pilot message was merely that they would give a time of delivery, not the 1 o'clock message.

General MARSHALL. I understand, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 238 of exhibit 1.

General MARSHALL. Yes; I understand it now.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish, General, that you would always insist on completing your answers. I am sometimes a little fast with the next question.

General MARSHALL. I understand it entirely now.

Senator FERGUSON. General, who was in charge, or who is charged with operations in peacetime?

General MARSHALL. There is a section, or there was a section of the General Staff, called the Operations Section, and that was the section from which maneuvers were directed, from which the simulated war training was operated. However, that was not the section of the General Staff which dealt with actual war measures. Those were dealt with in the War Plans Division, which is now called the Operations Division, and is virtually the GHQ.

Senator FERGUSON. I have in mind in peacetime.

[3123] General MARSHALL. I am speaking of peacetime, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when would you say your regulations were peacetime, and when did they go over to wartime, so the committee can interpret this Exhibit 42?

General MARSHALL. In one sense, they did not go over; they remained in their status quo. What I was trying to explain to the preliminary questions was we had a section of the staff called Operations. That deals, however, with peacetime training operations, maneuvers, things of that sort, and organization, but the war measures were handled in the War Plans Division.

The war plans were in the War Plans Division.

The action of the Chief of Staff in relation to those plans would be prepared, presumably, unless he did it himself directly in the War Plans Division, and not at all in the Operations Section. That is a misnomer, so far as the war situation is concerned. So it is the War

Plans Division which is now the OPD, the operations of the General Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. So that we may be able, when we read these various papers, to know when we were in peace and when we were in war, would you say, the dividing line, the line of demarcation, was the attack, or bombing of Pearl Harbor?

[3124] General MARSHALL. That was the definite subdivision dividing the line between a known status of peace and a known status of war, but so far as the operations of the General Staff are concerned, the war measures, the war plans, the war advice to the Chief of Staff came directly from the War Plans Division.

[3125] Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, we were acting on a war basis.

General MARSHALL. In relation to those matters; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did we go on that basis?

General MARSHALL. When you use the expression "war basis" there, you have me a little bit in difficulty, because always the War Plans Division was concerned with war plans, with discussions of the probability of war as to those plans, and the preparation of any instructions to be issued by the Chief of Staff regarding our war plans. They are not operations, of course, in the sense of actual movements, and deployments until you actually engage in war.

But the directions concerning the matter would be generated as a rule in the War Plans Division, unless the Chief of Staff did that himself.

So from that point of view there was no change in the General Staff between the peacetime operation and the wartime operation, so far as the responsibility and the method of doing business was concerned, between the War Plans Division and the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. General, on page 9 of Exhibit 42, under "b," I wish you would locate the directive, or the duty that would make General Gerow responsible for the reply of Short, where he stated—that is in Short's reply to [3126] your message of the 27th—that he had alerted against sabotage, and liaison with the Navy. Now will you point out where WPD, the War Plans Division, was made responsible, in this exhibit, just which one of these made Gerow responsible for action on the Short message?

General MARSHALL. Before answering that, Senator, I would like to say this: It was General Gerow's section in which the details of those matters would be concerned and would be carried out, but the responsibility was mine as well as General Gerow's.

Now as to this particular paragraph of this section—I will just refer to page 9—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and anything else that you want.

General MARSHALL. I was trying to get the section number. It would be to a large extent under, I think, subparagraph b (3), "The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division)."

Also part of it comes under (2), "Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense."

It does not specifically mention the exact point you are bringing up.

[3127] Senator FERGUSON. That is what I was getting at. There is nothing in the directive here that specifically covers Gerow's responsibility on the Short reply?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir, in this.

Senator FERGUSON. And under the section, as I understand it, as I say it, it was part of your responsibility. You mean the Commanding General of the Field was over Short, and therefore you had a right to command him?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is in Army parlance?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Gerow have any right to issue orders to Short on a command basis?

General MARSHALL. Certainly, normally, no.

Senator FERGUSON. In peacetime. I change my question and add, before you answer, in peacetime did he have any right to issue a command to Short?

General MARSHALL. It would have required quite an assumption of authority on his part to do that without some confirmation from a senior officer.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, that province was in you as a senior officer, or in the case of your absence, it was in your deputy?

General MARSHALL. That is correct. As to mere matters [3128] of detail, of course, we communicated back and forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did Gerow have authority to order Rainbow 5, or any other War Plan into effect?

General MARSHALL. He did not, sir. He would have had to assume it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had authority to order a war plan, talking about Rainbow, or any other order, into effect?

General MARSHALL. The President, the Secretary of War, and myself, and in my absence, the deputy.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I would like to go into how the General Staff is made up.

You went in sometime in 1939, is that correct?

General MARSHALL. I joined the War Department General Staff on July 6, 1938, as head of War Plans Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. In October of 1938 I was relieved from that job and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff. I held that office until I became Chief of Staff on the first of July, 1939.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, do I understand, the first of July, 1939, you became the Chief of Staff, and at that time was General Miles in G-2?

[3129] General MARSHALL. No, sir, he was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was General Gerow in War Plans?

General MARSHALL. He was in War Plans but he was not the Chief of Section.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Chief of Section?

General MARSHALL. General George V. Strong.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a brigadier general?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. He was a brigadier general. Colonel E. R. Warner McCabe was the G-2 of the War Department General Staff at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was at Hawaii? General Herron?

General MARSHALL. General Herron, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, does the Chief of Staff have the right to select his own G-2, his War Plans officer, his deputy?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that done in this particular case? Did you select them?

General MARSHALL. I found Colonel McCabe as G-2 when I became Chief of Staff; and I continued him as such until sometime—until he was relieved by General Miles. I found General Strong as a brigadier general in the War Plans Division when I joined it as Chief of War Plans Division.

When I left the Division to become Deputy Chief of Staff, he automatically became head of War Plans Division. [3130]

When I became Chief of Staff—my first direct appointment was the Deputy Chief of Staff, who had previously been the G-1 Personnel Officer—that was General Gasser.

From time to time I replaced people for various reasons as their tours expired, or as they retired, and General McCabe, Colonel McCabe rather, now General McCabe, was replaced by General Miles, and General Strong was replaced by General Gerow. I think.

General Gerow was replaced by General Eisenhower. General Miles was replaced by General Lee, shortly thereafter by General Strong. But those were my appointments.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles has told us that he was Acting Assistant for the Chief of Staff in G-2.

General MARSHALL. That, I think, Senator, was merely a technicality, because under the law we couldn't detail him directly on the General Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you not able to put him on the General Staff?

General MARSHALL. Well, I can't think of it right offhand but it was merely a technicality.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it one of the qualifications that he didn't have, the term of office?

General MARSHALL. Something of that sort. I think it [3131] pertained to how much duty he had had in Washington; something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that also true of General Gerow?

General MARSHALL. I don't think it was, sir; but my memory is not clear on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any more important deputy during this increasing tension that we were having, than your G-2?

General MARSHALL. Well, I should say that it lay between the G-2 and the head of the War Plans Division.

Senator FERGUSON. So the combination of those two, they were, in your scheme of things, they were very important?

General MARSHALL. Very important, indeed.

Senator FERGUSON. And were you at all times satisfied with the work in G-2?

General MARSHALL. As far as I was aware of the details of the work, I was satisfied.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you also satisfied with the work in War Plans?

General MARSHALL. I was.

Senator FERGUSON. So that up until the 7th day of December, you were entirely satisfied as to the heads of these two offices?

[3132] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, prior to the 27th, or let's say between the 27th of November 1941, and the 7th day of December 1941, that is, the period between the warning message and the attack, was there anyone in the War Department that made a staff survey of the incoming messages, talking about the magic, to see whether the alerts were being carried out in relation to the magic?

General MARSHALL. What were those dates, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. The 27th of November and the 7th of December 1941. That is between the war warning message and the attack.

General MARSHALL. But when was this period that I was to reply to?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the period. Did you make any survey during that period, when you had alerted these men, to see whether or not you were getting them at the moment they were being translated?

General MARSHALL. Not that I am aware of.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us, General, if there was any reason why General Miles left G-2?

General MARSHALL. I don't—he was relieved, I believe, in February. That is my recollection of the thing. I made several changes in the Chief of Staff. These [3133] people had been working very hard. We were reorganizing the whole War Department, and General Gerow was given an opportunity with troops and General Miles an opportunity of territorial command. I think that is about the condition.

Senator FERGUSON. It was then in no way connected with the operation in his office?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. In relation to any of the messages, delivery of them, or not?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. It had nothing to do with that?

General MARSHALL. Nothing to do with that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would the same apply to General Gerow?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the record may be clear on that.

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

As to General Gerow, my difficulty with him was that he conscientiously overworked and stayed at the office late at night, and he was, I thought, exhausting himself, and that the thing couldn't go on. Therefore, I gave him what everybody in the War Department wanted, a troop command, I think the Twenty-ninth Division. I had brought General Eisenhower in [3134] a few days after December 7 and given him more or less direct responsibility over all Pacific affairs.

General Gerow not only had the affairs of the war as it pertained to the Atlantic, and, of course, the responsibility of General Eisenhower in the Pacific, but he also went through a very gruelling experience at the time the British Chiefs of Staff came here in the latter part of December.

So, he was pretty well exhausted, and I therefore gave him a troop command as both an opportunity and as a rest.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, there was no one specifically designated to see that the magic was translated and put into your hands, and that the alerts were properly carried out?

General MARSHALL. You use the expression "specifically designated."

There was an organizational arrangement that had been in existence. For example, you speak of the reply from the theater commanders to the alert. That would be rather directly in the subsection of the War Plans Division, which had immediate charge of all details with reference to the Pacific. That section was headed by Colonel Bundy, who later lost his life when I tried to rush him out to Hawaii shortly after the attack.

[3135] Then the main, the drafting work, the checking work, the filing work, the reference work would be carried out as a matter of procedure in that section for General Gerow. Then General Gerow would either bring it or send it to me as Chief of Staff.

Just as in G-2, my recollection of the status was that Colonel Bratton was in immediate charge of all magic affairs and was responsible, of course, to General Miles. General Miles was responsible for the bringing of these things to my attention, but in many instances Colonel Bratton, or at least, in instances, Colonel Bratton brought them in himself.

But the system and procedure started in the section under Colonel Bratton, just as the Pacific affairs started in the section of War Plans Division under Colonel Bundy.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is true that General Miles should have had access to all intelligences, State Department, Army, Navy, and all intelligence?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. He was the receipt source and the diffusion source of all intelligence matters in relation to the enemy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he also the evaluator of such intelligence?

General MARSHALL. He was responsible for the evaluation which would be done by a group in his section.

[3136] Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that, the evaluation of these various instruments, all sources, ever taken away from General Miles in G-2?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that your office, you as Chief of Staff, depended on General Miles' estimate of the intelligence?

General MARSHALL. You use the word "depend." He submitted his views, probably which in turn had been submitted to him by the section which did the laborious analysis, and with which he might or might not agree, or might or might not modify, and that estimate came to me at such times as he thought it was proper that I should be brought up to date or in response to my definite request, and I accepted it or modified it in my own mind, but I had the benefit of that advice.

Senator FERGUSON. Before they went out would you approve them?

General MARSHALL. In some cases they were sent to the President. There I either approved it and sent it to the President or expressed

myself so it was clear, I think, that I was submitting it as a view. Whether I expressed concurrence or not I couldn't recall in each instance.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any evaluations, first, [3137] between the 1st of November and the 27th of November?

General MARSHALL. I will have to look at the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at that and check.

General MARSHALL. The record shows that on November 1 there was an evaluation to the Chief of Staff from General Miles on the subject of a possible Japanese drive into Yunnan.

Senator FERGUSON. You made a report to the President about the 5th of November on the same subject.

General MARSHALL. I made a report.

On November 2 there was a G-2 estimate on the Far Eastern situation addressed to the Chief of Staff—no, that was addressed to the War Plans Division. Whether or not I got a copy doesn't show.

On November 13 there was an estimate, signed by General Miles, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, again on the subject of a possible Japanese drive into Yunnan. That estimate was distributed to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, the Chief of Staff, Coordinator of Information, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Mr. Lauchlin Currie, who was the President's representative regarding Chinese matters, Division of Defense Aid Reports, Director of Naval Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, that was [3138] General Gerow, GHQ, that would be General McNair, Chief of Air Corps—that would be, I think, General Arnold.

Senator FERGUSON. General Arnold at that time?

General MARSHALL. I don't know whether it was General Arnold or not.

And General Embick.

Senator FERGUSON. At least that one would be approved by you.

Do you think any were delivered to the President without your approval?

General MARSHALL. I would assume that I would—well, certainly would have struck out anything that I thought was entirely wrong in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore if it went through it had your approval insofar as you struck it out?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Any others, General?

General MARSHALL. One dated November 26, on the subject of Japanese naval task force. A memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Its distribution shows the: Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD—that is General Gerow—I. B. file, the Far East Section, and the Record Section. That refers to his own, General Miles' department.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you approve—before it would [3139] go to the Secretary of War, it would come over your desk?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. Normally I would give him the benefit of what I thought and if I thought it was important I would have spoken to the Secretary or written him a note.

Here is one on November 27, a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the subject of recent developments in the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. Might I ask the committee if it is willing to sit a little later today, say 12:30, before recessing?

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you have any objection?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will proceed to 12:30 then.

General MARSHALL. That estimate, in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the recent developments in the Far East, dated November 27, was delivered to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Chief of Army Air Forces, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, Director of Naval Intelligence, and GHQ, which is General McNair.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't been reading that these went to the Director of Naval Intelligence except in this last one. Do you recall whether any went to the Navy?

General MARSHALL. I do not presume they did unless it [3140] shows in this.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were there any between—is that all up to that date into November?

General MARSHALL. No, one more. November 29, memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the subject Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941–March 31, 1942.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The message of November 1 went to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the message of November 13 did, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. We would be glad to have that correction on the record.

General MARSHALL. This memorandum covers operations and the situation throughout the world with the various estimates of probabilities or possibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether any of these reports indicated an air attack on Hawaii or any kind of an attack on Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Just at the moment I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that all between those dates?

General MARSHALL. That is all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were there any, to your knowledge, called to your attention between the 1st of December and the [3141] 7th of December?

General MARSHALL. There was one on December 6, estimate of the Japanese strength in Indochina.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that one reached you, item 29?

General MARSHALL. I presume on December 6. I don't know. I suppose the records of my office in the War Department show that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that one would have no evidence in it whatever of any idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. It is devoted entirely to Indochina.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Then there is another on the 6th of December, estimate of Japanese air and ground forces in Indochina, Thailand,

and Formosa. That was distributed also to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff, General Gerow.

Senator FERGUSON. General, would you say that you had any knowledge over and above those estimates, as far as intelligence was concerned?

General MARSHALL. I think I would say that they reflected the general state of information which I had. Whether or not I had picked up any additional points of view from my own personal reading of magic I couldn't say. I think in general [3142] that is the summation of the information I had at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any case where you ever took up with General Miles magic as to your interpretation of it, that you thought that he may interpret it any other way?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall any, sir. I have had a great many discussions regarding magic along that line, but when they were and what they were I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give to General Miles the intelligence, for instance, that you obtained through the Secretary of War, that he may have obtained from the Secretary of State at the War Cabinet?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How did General Miles get the information of the War Cabinet?

General MARSHALL. That would be presumably only through my giving him the information myself, other than his liaison through his officers with the Department of State, but I don't think that liaison would give him information of that particular character, so he would be more or less dependent, I think, on my personally telling him what I personally had received from Mr. Stimson, or I had gathered by my presence at the conferences.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, take the conference that Secretary Hull talked about, where he was at a Cabinet meeting and he [3143] called it to the attention of all of the imminence of war and Secretary Knox went out and made a speech, Secretary Welles made a speech, but he says here he didn't make it in relation to that Cabinet meeting, would that kind of an intelligence, that kind of information, go to General Miles, specifically?

General MARSHALL. There was not a specific routing for that procedure. It would depend, I think, on my telling him personally. We had a great many meetings at that time. We had discussions before the Joint Board at which, I think, General Miles was present, and a great many in my office. But there was no direct routing routine that would have carried that message from the discussion at the White House to General Miles personally.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, if you eliminate that kind of a matter from these evaluations, what do we have from these evaluations, if we don't take all of the details from the Secretary of State's office, which was a great source of intelligence, how would we get anything from these evaluations?

General MARSHALL. I think, though General Miles can testify directly, I think General Miles had daily contact, through a liaison agreement, with the State Department, they have now and I assume they did then, but even that, Senator, I do not think would give them

the product of our meetings, [3144] personal meetings with the President, such as you just referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. How often did this War Cabinet meet. From the 15th of November to the 1st of December, how often would they meet? I mean, to your knowledge. Was it frequent or not?

General MARSHALL. Well, the actual meetings with the President of the entire group were not frequent in the sense that the meetings between the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Hull were frequent and almost daily, and the attendance of Admiral Stark and I or one other, were.

Senator FERGUSON. How often would you say you saw the President between the 15th of November and the 1st of December?

General MARSHALL. I think the record will show that, but—

Mr. GESELL. They are shown on the exhibit.

General MARSHALL. Can I see that, please? Will you give me the dates again?

Senator FERGUSON. The 15th of November to the 1st of December.

General MARSHALL. I saw the President on the 15th of November, on the 25th of November, on the 28th of November, on the 7th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have no recollection, this sheet does not show any conferences between you and the President [3145] from the 28th to the 7th, 28th of November to the 7th of December?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the conference you had with the President after the attack, at 7 o'clock?

General MARSHALL. That was after the attack. I think the date for that conference was set before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not see him until after the attack?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, General, about when the first matter of the breaking of the Japanese code, which was called magic, was called to your attention?

General MARSHALL. Do you mean, Senator, my first knowledge that there was such a thing as magic?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, yes; let's have that date first, about when.

General MARSHALL. I don't think I was aware of it at all until I became Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. And about the time you became Chief of Staff you had this called to your attention, that we were able to get our intelligence from a certain source?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was under G-2, that was their [3146] job?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as tension grew, were you ever consulted or did you confer with anyone in G-2 about the speed on this intelligence, that it was valuable, there wasn't anything more valuable to the Government than that particular source as far as intelligence was concerned?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is—I will go back a ways, if I may.

[3147] When it first came to my attention, as I recall it, G-2, then Colonel McCabe, not only explained to me that my predecessor

thought it was illegal, but he was always concerned about the maintenance of secrecy and possible carelessness in the handling of the papers.

Of course, at that time there was a great deal of purely diplomatic information and no military information as I recall, at that time.

As the situation changed, of course, the military factor became more predominant at least in our minds, and our concern was, as to secrecy, most definitely that of protecting the source.

There were conversations with Colonel McCabe that I recall over the difficulty of securing the proper people to do the work, and also, I think, with General Miles as to the increasing difficulty and our fear that we were going to lose that source through the, you might say, the subversive action of at least one individual concerned with the work.

We were then discussing, as I recall it, the difficulty of securing people with the proper talents and qualities, and integrity, and also where we could house them so that they could work effectively and at the same time not be unduly conspicuous.

[3148] We continued to have frequent conversations regarding the handling of magic, particularly as to its security, and I recall that I intervened myself very directly and required that it be locked in a pouch and delivered by pouch, the pouch unlocked, and it be read by the recipient and put back in the pouch.

I have no definite recollection of discussing with General Miles their inability to keep abreast of these translations and decipherings. I do recall faintly conversations concerned with the mass of material which presumably had very little import, but which had to be culled away from the general lot, so that the important things came to us.

I might say that I have no definite recollection of pressing General Miles to expedite the deciphering and the distribution of magic.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the fact, as shown by our record here, that this was received and then it would take as high as 20 days to translate, was that called to your attention during the time that you were getting these messages?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection.

I saw, in the main, these messages that I knew, like those of the fateful days of December 7 and 8, were handled at a very high speed, it seemed to me, knowing the diff- [3149] culties involved.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, it was not due to a lack of appropriation that you didn't get these messages fast—or was it due to that?

General MARSHALL. I would say, Senator, taking a long back sight, that it was the general combination of things relating to the entire Army, in the building up that we were going through at that time from very small groups to much larger groups.

This, you might say, is a little bit comparable to radar. We could collect men and engineers for a regiment in a comparatively short time as compared for such a complicated business such as radar. That took a long time, and there was a necessity for high selectivity.

That was very much the case in everything concerned with magic, and also we had the difficulty, at that time, of people not being in a frame of mind such as is common to almost the entire public in time of war, so that you could use them, control them, and get services out of them on quite a very much simpler basis than you could at that time.

There were a great many factors like that involved. I would not say it was lack of appropriations.

Senator FERGUSON. General, did you know when the first magic was distributed to England?

[3150] General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When that was taken up with England?

General MARSHALL. I do not know when that occurred, sir. General Miles would have to give you that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not it was prior to any meeting on the ABC or the ABCD arrangement?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that, sir. I would have to go to the records to get it.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no personal knowledge?

General MARSHALL. No; I have no personal knowledge of that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on whose authority could that be done if it wasn't called to your attention, about that arrangement?

General MARSHALL. Well, I would say that the actual exchange of such information as that prior to a state of war in which Great Britain was an ally would have, I think, undoubtedly been brought to my attention, probably that of the Secretary of War, but certainly, I think, to my attention.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any recollection of this being called to your attention, this matter of giving to the British this magic, or this means of getting the magic?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. It is very hard for me to [3151] put my finger on the point when this took place, when this interchange was a matter of business every day. I don't recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true at first there was a grave question about whether or not it would be given to the British, whether or not we wouldn't keep it and get the information ourselves?

General MARSHALL. That would be a consideration, but I believe, Senator, what we were more concerned about was obtaining from the British the information they had, which was much more extensive than ours.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any arrangement between the British and America in relation to them giving us other intelligence that they didn't get through magic?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that distributed to us?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did they also use magic to get intelligence and give us what they got out of magic?

General MARSHALL. I wouldn't attempt to answer that. I presume they did.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your assumption?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When the intelligence was coming to [3152] you, it was an over-all intelligence as far as you were concerned?

General MARSHALL. It was an over-all intelligence, presumably, as far as I was concerned, but I wish to make this comment, that for quite a long time we only received the British estimates. We did not receive the direct intelligence on which the evaluation was made, as the basis for the estimates.

It was a long period before they gave us the direct material, because they were very fearful of our letting them get out of the basis of secrecy.

Finally, and I think we were well into the war, a long ways into the war, before they were willing to take the hazard of giving us the direct information, which involved, of course, a knowledge of how they acquired it.

[3153] Senator FERGUSON. So at first we received the estimates. Now I will ask counsel, do we have the estimates of the British? We have here given to us the estimates of our Intelligence Department, but do we have the British?

General MARSHALL. They were not formal estimates, I think, as a rule, of the type that I have been reading here from General Miles.

Senator FERGUSON. No; they were memoranda.

General MARSHALL. But they were evaluations of those things that they were getting.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have, General Mitchell, the evaluations?

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain that would not be in your records, sir, because we have been trying to keep that quiet as much as we could.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, General Marshall, do I understand we are not getting every bit, that certain things are being kept quiet that we are not getting?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not mean that at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you explain your answer? I must have misunderstood you.

General MARSHALL. My last answer was that we did not wish to disclose the fact that the British had a capacity and a method of obtaining information which I referred to in that [3154] letter of Governor Dewey's which has now become public, not that they did not give us information.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am wanting to know is——

General MARSHALL. And now, as I understand it, your question is addressed to the fact whether there is some of that information that bears on this question?

Senator FERGUSON. On Pearl Harbor.

General MARSHALL. I know of none such. I know of one——

Senator FERGUSON. How can the committee tell?

General MARSHALL. I know of one message, as I recall, that came through the State Department, I believe, on the afternoon, I think, of December 6, but I think that is in the record and that is a British estimate specifically regarding the movement of Japanese ships in the Gulf of Siam.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, do you know, General, that Admiralty was given direct information by Intelligence. Do you know that to be a fact or not?

General MARSHALL. I knew that they were receiving information, just as we were receiving a certain amount and that a part was coming directly from the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did your department, G-2, get the Admiralty information?

General MARSHALL. You will have to ask General Miles that. I could not testify anything about that.

[3155] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, General, wouldn't it be important when this intelligence came across your desk to know its source?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that called to your attention, that we were getting this intelligence from Admiralty?

General MARSHALL. I have no distinct recollection of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have there been any instructions to G-2 that we were not to get all the files in relation to everything on Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; none whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I do not quite understand that previous answer that that probably would not be given to us.

General MARSHALL. Well, I must have misled you. I was referring specifically to a method, a technique, rather than a record.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would be an evaluation. If it was an evaluation, it would be in writing?

General MARSHALL. Well, Senator, if there is such it is certainly now before your group. I do not know just what the details of that are. I know that there are no instructions in the War Department to hold out any information from you gentlemen; quite the contrary.

[3156] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that prior to August 1941 Admiral Kimmel was getting certain diplomatic information?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I was not aware of that that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not at the time Admiral Kimmel was getting information prior to August or sometime in August that General Short was not getting that information?

General MARSHALL. I was not aware of that fact, that what Admiral Kimmel got was not being made available to General Short. I am aware of what General Short was receiving.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did you know of any rule or regulation that prohibited or delayed or stopped this intelligence going to Admiral Kimmel after some time in August?

General MARSHALL. I am not aware of the circumstances of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any reason, anything that happened in August that would stop that?

General MARSHALL. I am not aware of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not aware of anything that would stop that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get the information [3157] that General MacArthur in the Philippines was getting this magic?

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that, sir. I know now what he was getting and the circumstances under which he was receiving it, and I am not able to cast my mind back to that time to know exactly what I knew then as to the degree of it.

In these headquarters, in some of them they had a basis—there was this which confuses the question in my own mind; I knew that in the Pacific from sources in Hawaii and in the Philippines and presumably, maybe, at the minor stations in Puget Sound, possibly

in Alaska and at other places, we had quite largely, the Navy had groups who were engaged in intercepting Japanese radio messages, but that was done largely for the purpose of locating ship movements, or locating headquarters from which you might deduce what the actual ship movement was.

Now, that was going on throughout the Pacific. That was the naval means of following as closely as they could Japanese shipping, possibly their submarines, certainly their larger naval craft.

There, then, is a confusion in one's mind as to how much of what you knew was that and what you might have known that was the elaboration of the deciphering of these messages which [3158] constituted the basis of magic.

The messages on which the magic is based were collected throughout the Pacific. I should imagine, though I am not the best witness on this, that the largest portion of the collection occurred in the Philippines because of its proximity to Japan and its ease of interception, but it sometimes occurred, as in the instance I believed the record will show on the fateful message which gave the hour 1 p. m., December 7, it was intercepted in the Puget Sound region rather than out in the Philippines or out in Hawaii.

So in my mind, in trying to reconstruct my knowledge of the data, coming to that period just prior to December 7, there is a confusion as to how much I knew that pertained to these radio intercepts that located the movement of vessels, how much that I knew of arrangements to intercept the Japanese messages rather than to decipher them and how much I knew regarding the actual deciphering which I know about now.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but did you know in 1941, in the summer of 1941, that General MacArthur had the means of obtaining the magic as far as the State Department and various other agencies are concerned, the so-called purple matter?

General MARSHALL. I do not know as I knew it then, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That he was able to get it direct [3159] by means of cryptanalysis in the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. I know that now, sir. I do not know to what degree I knew it then.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, can you place yourself back in 1941 to know now whether or not you knew it then? I am trying to find out what you knew here in Washington of what he knew there?

General MARSHALL. Yes. I am unable to say that, sir. I rather think I know now what the naval arrangement was in the Philippines as to deciphering through what they called the purple machine of magic, at that source, but I do not know how much I knew about that then.

Senator FERGUSON. But that would be an important matter and would be called to your attention in 1941, would it not?

General MARSHALL. If it were known by General Miles, and I am not positive whether or not he knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I do not want to pass on the evidence of General Miles.

General MARSHALL. I am telling you——

Senator FERGUSON. As to whether or not he knew that General MacArthur had this means.

General MARSHALL. Well, my reference to General Miles—

Senator FERGUSON. But I would like to have you, or if someone can for you, to get General Miles' testimony on that [3160] point and show it to you, rather than have me pass on it.

General MARSHALL. Well, I have not read it, sir. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. It is 12:30, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 12:30, and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

[3161]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Senator Ferguson will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. At this place, General, I would like to offer the statutory duties of the Chief of Staff into the record. I wonder whether you can read them into the record and answer questions as to what you understand to be the statutory duties?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator, for the purpose of the record, give the source?

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator, in order to have the record correct, give the source?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look on the back of that? This is the United States Code.

Mr. MURPHY. The volume, page, and section?

General MARSHALL. United States Code, 1940 edition, page 491, paragraph 33. Do you wish me to read this into the record, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL (reading):

The Chief of Staff shall preside over the War Department General Staff and, under the direction of [3162] the President, or of the Secretary of War under the direction of the President, shall cause to be made, by the War Department General Staff, the necessary plans for recruiting, organizing, supplying equipment, mobilizing, training, and demobilizing the Army of the United States, and for the use of the military forces for national defense. He shall transmit to the Secretary of War the plans and recommendations prepared for that purpose by the War Department General Staff and advise him in regard thereto; upon the approval of such plans or recommendations by the Secretary of War, he shall act as the agent of the Secretary of War in carrying the same into effect.

Do you wish me to read the various references in parentheses?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you might as well.

General MARSHALL (reading):

(June 3, 1916, ch. 134, par. 5, 39 Stat. 167; June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. I, par. 5, 41 Stat. 764.)

Paragraph 33-a. Further duties of Chief of Staff.

Subject to the provisions of sections 82 and 1193 of this title, the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, shall have supervision of all troops of the line and of the Inspector General's, Judge Advocate General's, Medical, and Ordnance Departments of the Quartermaster Corps, [3167] of the Corps of En-

gineers, and of the Signal Corps, and, in all matters pertaining to the command, discipline, or administration of the existing military establishment, of the Adjutant General's Department, and he shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President.

Those are the two paragraphs I see here on this page 491.

Senator FERGUSON. You were familiar with the statutory duties of the Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3164] Senator FERGUSON. You heard the testimony of General Gerow that he took full responsibility for the action to be taken, and not taken, on General Short's reply to the message of the 27th of November?

General MARSHALL. I read that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you agree that it was his full responsibility?

General MARSHALL. I would not say that was his full responsibility. It was his direct responsibility for each department of the General Staff, of which his was one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you, by virtue of your office, share that responsibility?

General MARSHALL. I think I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the responsibility of the Chief of Staff when he asks for a reply, and the reply takes a certain form, if any further direction is necessary, it is his responsibility to give that direction?

General MARSHALL. That would be his responsibility, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. The Chief of Staff, that is myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I understand. And that is the kind of a message that General Short's reply was?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3165] Senator FERGUSON. I would just like to ask a few questions, going back, on the giving to the British of the breaking of the code. That was a very important matter, was it not, General?

General MARSHALL. Very important.

Senator FERGUSON. To share our secrets with another country?

General MARSHALL. Very important, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Particularly so when we are at peace?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now would General Miles have authority, in his position, to perform that act?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, not of his own initiative.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, can you tell us who did it in this case? As I understand it, the record now shows that it was done sometime in January of 1941.

General MARSHALL. I presume that he did it after consultation with me.

Senator FERGUSON. No one else would be in authority to perform such an act?

General MARSHALL. The Secretary of War would be the only other person.

Senator FERGUSON. You know of no act that the Secretary of War took with relation to this code with Britain?

[3166] General MARSHALL. No, sir; none whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask now from counsel whether or not we have the so-called evaluation of the British? Does the committee have those instruments?

Mr. MITCHELL. What do you mean by "evaluations"?

Senator FERGUSON. What the General has described as evaluations.

Mr. MITCHELL. We examined them. They are under that arrangement, as you know, of nothing received from a foreign country can be divulged without clearing it with that country first.

We looked over those documents, and we did not ourselves see anything pertinent in them, and therefore, we have not, up to date, asked the British Government to clear them. So they are there, and I think they are open to inspection even though they have not been cleared.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any question about their being open to the committee's inspection?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not at all. Nobody has ever asked for them. We have seen thousands of documents that did not seem pertinent to us. We have not dumped material of that kind on you unless you asked for it.

[3167] Senator FERGUSON. I want the record to show what we have and what we do not have.

Do you know, General, whether or not you consulted with anyone in relation to this exchange of information between the British and America?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of that now, sir. I have a very definite recollection of frequent conversations with General Strong, who succeeded or who followed General Miles. I have no recollection of such conversations with General Miles. Those conversations that I happen to recollect were after we were once engaged in war.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not, General, the Japs ever knew that we were breaking their codes?

General MARSHALL. I do not know one way or the other. I assume that they did not, or the procedure would have changed almost instantly.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would refer to exhibit 2, page 122.

General MARSHALL. Is that at the top or the bottom of the page?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have the wrong book, General.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 2. It is the yellow backed book. Now I refer you to the second from the last sentence in paragraph 3.

[3168] General MARSHALL. How does that start, sir?

Senator FERGUSON.

There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.

Do you know whether we had any other information than that particular intercept, which was the 23rd of June, 1941? Were there any other intercepts that indicated that they knew we were breaking their code?

General MARSHALL. I have a vague recollection of another one, but I think it was after we were engaged in the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing before the war?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated yesterday, General, that certain information was kept from the Roberts commission. I believe you

indicated, as I remember the testimony, there were certain parts taken out of the Roberts report.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. The intention that I wanted to convey to Governor Dewey was that the Roberts commission had the magic available to them but it had to be withdrawn out of their records in the report which was released to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. Now who changed the Roberts report? [3169] Who altered it to take those things out?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get your knowledge that there was a change in the Roberts report before it was issued to the public?

General MARSHALL. I could not tell you that, sir. Undoubtedly there were conversations in regard to the delicacy of the exposure of that material, but I do not recall the details of its control, because that would be one thing that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, presumably, and probably even the President, would become involved in.

The board, as I recall, was under the direction of the President.

[3170] Senator FERGUSON. Did you have anything to do with the personnel of that board, the Roberts board, or the Roberts commission?

General MARSHALL. My recollection of the matter is that the Secretary of War consulted with me as to what his recommendation might be as to the Army members of the board, and I had just brought General McNarney back to this country in connection with the proposed reorganization of the War Department, and as he was an air man, and a very able individual, I suggested to the Secretary of War that General McNarney might be a very appropriate Army member.

As to the other Army member, that was General McCoy.

Senator FERGUSON. He was retired, General, was he not?

General MARSHALL. He was retired and an old acquaintance of the Secretary of War, and, as I recall, Mr. Stimson brought up his name as the man he thought would fit the job, and I concurred.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did General McNarney leave the War Plans Division?

General MARSHALL. He never was in the War Plans. Oh, he was in the War Plans Division possibly a while back; I do not recall when, but I can find that in the records; but at the time he appeared on the Roberts board he had been in England almost a year in connection with the Air [3171] Corps.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not he in War Plans sometime the first week in December, about the time some of these things occurred?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; he was not even on duty in the War Department then. As far as my recollection goes, I had just brought him back from a year in England for the purpose of being on the board for the reorganization of the War Department that I was just completing.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not he was familiar with the whole magic set-up?

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that, sir. The probability is that he did not know it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the War Plans know about the magic?

General MARSHALL. The head of War Plans did know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he ever deputy of the War Plans?

General MARSHALL. I will have to check it. I do not recall that he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the President was advised about deleting or taking parts out of the Roberts report?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. All I know about the Roberts [3172] commission and its operation and arrangement is the Secretary of War asking my advice as to what Army officer to put on the board, and I suggested General McNarney, who had just returned from England, and he mentioned General McCoy, retired, and I thought that was a good selection.

Other than that, I knew nothing whatever about the board except as I appeared as a witness before it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand, there was nothing kept out of the Roberts report; that it was all delivered to the public. There was something kept out about the magic, but it was not kept from the members of the board, and it is now delivered to the Senators.

Senator FERGUSON. General, did I understand you correctly that certain parts were deleted from the Roberts report?

General MARSHALL. The Roberts report on Pearl Harbor, reading from my letter to Governor Dewey—

had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete.

I am referring to the public release of the board.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I have in mind.

General MARSHALL. That is it.

Senator FERGUSON. Before that report was issued there [3173] were certain things taken out of it?

General MARSHALL. Before that report was made public there were certain things withdrawn.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was not made public until sometime in January 1942, isn't that right?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir. That is a matter of record.

Senator FERGUSON. We are clear on that, that certain parts were taken out before it was made public?

General MARSHALL. That is correct. I am quite certain, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had that information in September of 1944, because you wrote the letter at that time.

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes; sir.

[3174] Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask counsel now if there is in existence or whether counsel for the committee has that full report?

Mr. MITCHELL. We have had it for about 3 months.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you furnish the part taken out according to the General's statement?

Mr. MITCHELL. There never was anything taken out, if you mean extracted or hidden, or anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Have I indicated that anything was hidden out of that report?

Mr. MITCHELL. I should think your questions were directed to that but if I am mistaken—

Senator FERGUSON. You certainly are mistaken.

The CHAIRMAN. Let counsel finish his answer to the Senator's question.

Mr. MITCHELL. As I understand it now, there is no part of the Roberts report that isn't available. I don't think any question has been raised about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Could counsel get the Roberts report before the deletions? The general has indicated in his letter that to his knowledge there were certain things taken out.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, may I ask you this, when you say "taken out"—

Senator FERGUSON. I am quoting the General.

[3175] The CHAIRMAN. Let's see what really happened. It might mean one thing to say certain things in a report were taken out, that is, they were eliminated altogether. It might mean another thing to say certain parts of a report were not published, but that it went to the President as originally drafted.

Senator FERGUSON. May we have from the witness what his understanding was?

General MARSHALL. My understanding was, and I am speaking on hearsay, because I had no control over the matter, that the complete report went to the President but that the portions that referred to magic were withdrawn from the portion of the report which was released to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. Have I misquoted you, General?

General MARSHALL. There has been so much conversation I am a little confused, but the complete report, as I understand it—and I am not an authority on that—went to the President, and the portions that were considered top secret, which were magic, were pulled out of that before a general release to the public. That is my understanding, but I am not the best authority on that. That is my understanding and it was on that that this part of the letter was based.

Senator FERGUSON. From whom did you get your information?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall. I presume from the Secretary of the War on G-2. That would probably be where I would [3176] get it. Either one or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got the Roberts report before you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would counsel give the General the Roberts report?

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator, you have spoken of the "report." That term has sometimes been used as applied to the findings, opinion, and sometimes the transcript.

Now, as far as the report is concerned it always has been complete. The fact is that the transcript shows that at certain stages of the proceedings they took some evidence about this secret stuff that they never transcribed and we don't know, of course, what it was. Maybe that is what you are referring to.

Senator FERGUSON. My knowledge on this subject has come solely from the General, now the witness.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have had the Roberts transcript, copies of it, for months, and it has been handed around; every now and then you find that transcript shows that they stopped taking evidence on the record and took some evidence off of the record. I think we have had a request to find out what the evidence off the record was and we

have never found it because there isn't any such record, as far as I can ascertain.

[3177] Senator FERGUSON. I will read from the bottom of page 2 of the letter produced by you yesterday, General:

The Roberts report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appears incomplete.

Now, have you and I been talking about the report, is that what we are talking about?

General MARSHALL. I was dictating in regard to the report as I understood its make-up.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MARSHALL. I would like to add that I have never read the report. I made this statement from my general understanding of the matter with the approval of the then G-2 of the War Department. I knew that secret matter had been testified to because I testified to a portion of it myself. I knew that that was not released to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you have the report before you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would someone give him the report?

Mr. MURPHY. Here it is [handing the report to the witness].

General MARSHALL. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 8, reading from the report, [3178] down in the last paragraph:

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the first on December 3, stating that it was believed certain Japanese Consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents.

Wouldn't that indicate that we were breaking the code because that information came through magic and as shown by the testimony of the Navy Board that was the purple code?

General MARSHALL. "Stating that it was believed"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Well, it depends, it seems to me, on the deduction you make regarding this statement "it was believed certain Japanese Consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents."

Senator FERGUSON. (Reading:)

The second one, the 2d of December 1941, instructed addressee to destroy confidential documents,

and so on.

That has nothing to do with it.

On page 9 (reading):

About noon eastern standard time, 8:30 American Honolulu time¹, December 7, an additional warning message—

that is before the attack—

indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan was dispatched to the Chief of Staff after conferences with the Chief of [3179] Naval Operations for the information of the responsible Army and Navy Commanders. Every effort was made to have the message as brief as possible but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

¹ See p. 1235, *infra*, for correction by General Marshall.

Didn't that clearly show, General, that we had intercepted the 14-part and the pilot message prior to the time of its delivery?

General MARSHALL. That might be, Senator. I think that is a matter of opinion. Evidently this was worded very carefully in order to convey an essential fact for the information of those reading the report and at the same time not to disclose the source of the information. That would be my estimate.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never read the report, you say?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I had not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now then, General—were you going to say something else?

General MARSHALL. I might say I anticipated going through all of these documents later this month but I was not given the opportunity.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator from Michigan yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[3180] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Do we have the report, the original report given by the Roberts Board to the President of the United States?

Mr. MITCHELL. We have never had the original. We have got a photostat copy of the transcript and we have got one mimeographed copy.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it a complete report so far as your investigation reveals?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is presumably the transcript of everything that they transcribed. I tried to point out that the transcript, not the findings, does show that there was some evidence taken off the record, and they never did have it transcribed.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it a complete copy of what was given to the President?

Mr. MITCHELL. I so understand. I always so understood. But I will have to check again to make certain.

Senator FERGUSON. Will counsel, because of this testimony, get the original that was delivered to the President, with the signatures?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will get it if we can lay our hands on it. I suppose it is in existence.¹

Senator FERGUSON. You would expect that it would; it [3181] is an important document.

Mr. MITCHELL. It might be in the Archives Building. We will make an effort to see if we can get anything back farther than the copies furnished us 3 months ago by the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you stated yesterday that there was some question of the secrecy of the magic, that you tried to get the FBI to do some work for you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. What I think I said, and what I intended to convey was, that there had been frequent rumors, and in one case direct reports to me, of gossip here in Washington regarding the fact that we had intercepted Japanese codes. Of course, there were always other statements and conversations which were of a highly dangerous nature so far as security was concerned. I sent requests orally through G-2, orally to Mr. Hoover, to assist the War Department in trying to check this matter by the usual methods that they would follow, as related to Army officers.

¹ See correspondence in Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2493-2495.

I was told in each case Mr. Hoover was very reluctant to engage his personnel in investigating any Government agency for the reason that he did not wish to be put in the position of running a sort of Gestapo. I don't know as he used the word "Gestapo." However, my recollection is—but the G-2 officials can corroborate this or give other testimony—the [3182] FBI did assist us in checking conversations going around Washington in the various hotels, dinners, and so forth, in an effort to find out how serious this matter was, and particularly for the purpose of my making an example of somebody which would discourage further indiscretions by Army officers.

We received no conclusive case. I think we had one that we finally could not try under some legal technicality which would have prevented a conviction. That is my recollection of that phase of the matter which I referred to yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that an Army officer?

General MARSHALL. These were all Army officers.

Senator FERGUSON. You had reason to believe that there was a leak in the Army on this magic?

General MARSHALL. I didn't know whether it was in the Army or not, but it was apparently in official Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. In what?

General MARSHALL. Official Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do I understand that you had some evidence on one particular officer and there was something wrong with the jurisdiction?

General MARSHALL. There was some complication in regard to the probability of conviction. I don't know, Senator, as that related specifically to magic. I don't know whether [3183] that occurred a year after this or a year before this. Presumably it would be at this time or at a later time rather than a year before. I am just giving you my recollection of my efforts to stop this indiscreet talk.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the FBI give you full cooperation?

General MARSHALL. So far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you going to make another answer?

General MARSHALL. I was, but I have forgotten it.

Senator FERGUSON. You had full cooperation from the FBI?

General MARSHALL. So far as I know. I merely wanted to make plain their reluctance and the reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any evidence on anyone that you thought was sufficient to convict them of this crime of giving this secret out during war?

General MARSHALL. No case where we thought we had the basis of a conviction. We had rumors, we had conversations reported to me that it was common knowledge of this, or common knowledge of that, particularly in relation to affairs shortly after the first, I think after the first creation of the Pearl Harbor Investigating Board, not the Roberts Board, but the later.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you place whether or not this matter that you took to Mr. Hoover and the FBI was prior to Pearl Harbor or subsequent?

[3184] General MARSHALL. I think it was subsequent, though there may have been some prior. I can't remember, Senator; I am

sorry. There were several times that I asked G-2 to go to Mr. Hoover to help us. We were always in a state of trying to run down some leak out of the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any department to take care of that kind of a matter yourself?

General MARSHALL. G-2 had a number of people engaged in that.

Senator FERGUSON. They had not only espionage but counter-espionage?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; specifically that. I thought, however, that in all probability the FBI was better equipped for the purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was really in charge of magic?

General MARSHALL. In charge of what?

Senator FERGUSON. Magic. Who was designated by you to be in charge of this magic?

General MARSHALL. Up to and including this time I had never changed the original set-up, the reception, deciphering and translation, which, so far as the Army portion was concerned, was carried out by a section of the Signal Corps under General Mauborgne. The material was then passed on to the G-2 of the Army and the circulation of it occurred [3185] Thereafter under his direction.

Senator FERGUSON. Did G-2 have any instructions from you to furnish intercepted information to the Hawaiian Department during November and early December 1941?

General MARSHALL. I recall giving no such specific instructions.

[3186] Senator FERGUSON. Were you aware that information and enemy intelligence was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I was not aware of that, sir. If you mean it was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii——

Senator FERGUSON. Just not being given to them.

General MARSHALL (continuing). By the Naval opposite, I was unaware of that. If it was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii by the G-2 in the War Department, if you mean that, I don't think "withheld" would be quite the word we would use.

Senator FERGUSON. What would we use?

General MARSHALL. It was a question of what portions should be given to G-2 in Hawaii. I was not aware that they were withholding from him information which was considered vital to the proper performance of duty by General Short.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was responsible for the amount of intelligence from G-2 that went to Hawaii.

General MARSHALL. The G-2 of the War Department, General Miles.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him any instructions on it whatever?

General MARSHALL. No specific instructions that I recall.

[3187] Senator FERGUSON. Did you have instructions from any one, for instance, the Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Secretary of State, did you confer with him on what ought to go and what should not go?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that whatever instructions G-2 had, General Miles, was given to him by you and by no one else?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Under your authority as chief of staff?

General MARSHALL. He was operating under my authority.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever conferred with Secretary of War Stimson on the information that was coming to you through magic?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; with great frequency. I often called his attention to portions of it where I thought he might not have had time to read the entire folder. There was quite a mass of this material. It was a question of how much time you had for the purpose, and how quickly you could read. I recall taking my copies to him on several occasions in order to be certain that he saw them.

[3188] Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember making an affidavit before General Clausen?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel have that?

Mr. MURPHY. You mean Colonel Clausen.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Clausen.

The part I would like to have you check is your affidavit of the 28th of August 1945, before Colonel Clausen, where you stated that "prior to the 7th of December"—

General MARSHALL. Which page is that?

Senator FERGUSON. I have taken that out of the affidavit, the part reading:

Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my understanding in the period preceding the 7th of December 1941, that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this information from facilities available in his command.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that your understanding?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but there is a confusion there in connection with what I was explaining this morning. They were receiving information as to intercepts, as to the locations of Japanese vessels at sea and their movements and the headquarters that were concerned in this.

[3189] The actual translation, that is, the deciphering, translation, and transmission of the magic, as such, clearly was not intended to be applied in this.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would correct that now to interpret it so as to make it indicate that you were not inferring that General Short was getting this other kind of magic?

General MARSHALL. I said some of this information. I tried to explain what some of that was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he was getting any of the diplomatic magic?

General MARSHALL. I do not think he was, except to the extent, I recall, that we broke into magic in July 1941, meaning that we took the information from magic which came as diplomatic information. The Japanese instructions regarding shipping as to the Panama Canal. Just as we again moved into the diplomatic channels of magic on December 7 regarding the 1 p. m. message and sent that direct. Those are the two occasions that I think the record shows, and that I can recall between the first of July 1941, and December 7, 1941, that the magic material was directly referred to in so many words in messages to General Short.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we put through some kind of an order restricting the amount of Japanese shipping that could [3190] go through the Panama Canal?

General MARSHALL. We stopped it all but the message I am referring to, from the War Department to General Short, recited the Japanese instructions taken from magic regarding the movement of shipping into the Panama Canal during the period of some days in the middle of July.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever notify General Short that you found it impossible or that you were not furnishing him all available G-2 data for reasons of security?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I have no recollection of that.

Senator FERGUSON. So then he could not have any knowledge as to whether or not he was getting all that G-2 had or had not?

General MARSHALL. Presumably so. Here is the message I was referring to.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

General MARSHALL. It is dated Washington, D. C., July 8, 1941. It is only the later portion I refer to, but I will read it all (reading from Exhibit No. 32:)

Hawallan Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Nine two four seven AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is [3191] supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups Period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia Period Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indochina although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out Period Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated Period. They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August Period Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

Signed "Adams," who was the Adjutant General.

I was referring specifically to the last sentence which is taken almost entirely from magic, other portions were in magic, but—that came to us in various ways—but the last sentence was from magic direct.

[3192] Senator FERGUSON. When you sent the message on the 7th, General, that is, the noon on the 7th, did you consider the question of security?

General MARSHALL. Do you mean, Senator, in relation to the form of the message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; both the form and the means of sending it.

General MARSHALL. I only knew that it would be encoded, which is done very rapidly on a type machine and automatically. My only recollection regarding the security aspect—and it is difficult for me to state this with any assurance that I am being accurate because I am confused in back sights—was we must be sufficiently secure to prevent some claim of overt act on our part and, therefore, the telephone was ruled out.

Now, I am not at all certain that that did rule out the telephone. That might have been an afterthought after the event; I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to talk to you about that for a moment.

General MARSHALL. But I assume that this message—in fact, I had

seen that this message to which you just referred was going to be enciphered in secure code and decoded in that manner.

[3193] Senator FERGUSON. Well, you felt rather sure at that particular moment that you were sending this message that something would happen somewhere at 1 o'clock, or prior to 1 o'clock?

General MARSHALL. Something of some serious nature was going to be synchronized with that 1 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, then, you were thinking about the question of security and as to whether or not you would use the telephone. Now, how could the use of that telephone to Hawaii have been an overt act of war by America against Japan in alerting Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I think, Senator, that the Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act that forced action on their part.

I say again I am not at all clear as to what my reasons were regarding the telephone because 4 years later it is very difficult for me to tell what went on in my mind at the time. I will say this, though: It was in my mind regarding the use of transocean telephone.

Mr. Roosevelt, the President, had been in the frequent habit of talking to the Prime Minister by telephone. He also used to talk to Mr. Bullitt when he was Ambassador in [3194] Paris and my recollection is that that was intercepted by the Germans.

I had a test made of induction from telephone conversations on the Atlantic cable from Gardner's Island. I found that that could be picked up by induction. I talked to the President not once but several times. I also later, after we were in the war, talked with the Prime Minister in an endeavor to have them be more careful in the use of the scrambler. I believe it is understood what that is.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Because in our terminology that is private and not secret. A casual person listening in would not know what we were talking about. The person intent and with the facilities for breaking through in your communications can do it. It was long after we were in the war before we were able to install a scrambler system, which is now in vogue and which is quite elaborate, that was felt to be secret. Therefore, whether or not our overseas communication, overseas telephone communication, was secure or not was a question. I might go—

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain for our benefit now what a scrambler is?

General MARSHALL. A scrambler is a machine which takes your conversation and mixes it up into something that sounds [3195] like Chinese; that is the nearest I can give you.

Senator FERGUSON. Almost like static, isn't it?

General MARSHALL. Well, no; it is not a roar so much as it is just a hash of sounds and if you press a certain button it comes to you in understandable English. Now, a person—

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you unscramble it.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; you unscramble it, anyone at the other end if he has the machine and presses the button.

Senator FERGUSON. All along the line it is scrambled and in that machine it is unscrambled?

General MARSHALL. Until it gets to the other end of the line.

Now, I might illustrate a little further our telephone reactions because I undertook to try one officer for the use of the telephone from Panama, which we found all taken down here and that was furnished to me in writing by a naval intercept, where they were checking on the time and indiscretions of that nature.

I called this commander to get him up here, the officer going to Panama and the commander going the other way and then I found myself in the same difficulty with the commander in his conversation from Hawaii and then we hung up on him.

[3196] I had several conversations with the western defense commander and I hung up the phone because of the indiscretions in the excitement and argument that were being made over the phone. We were always in danger of that and we were quite aware of it, because the telephone is a very easy instrument to tap and the radio telephone, I believe, is even easier, but I want to repeat again that I have no clear recollection whatsoever as to my own reactions as to why I did not attempt to telephone at this time, but I have one conclusion that I think is quite accurate, that I certainly would have called up General MacArthur first.

Senator FERGUSON. You had a scramble telephone to Hawaii and the Philippines at that time?

General MARSHALL. I don't know about the Philippines but I know we had it in to Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever talked to General Short on the scramble telephone?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a line to General MacArthur?

General MARSHALL. We had a means of telephone communication but I do not recall whether or not we had a scrambler.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to General MacArthur the first 7 days of December 1941?

[3197] General MARSHALL. No, sir; and I do not recall I ever did talk to him on the telephone.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall that you ever talked to him?

General MARSHALL. Then or since.

Senator FERGUSON. On the telephone?

General MARSHALL. On the telephone.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned about acquiring balloons and they were to be ready for Pearl Harbor in June.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us why they were not ready?

General MARSHALL. We had not been able to procure them up to that time. I don't know just what the intricacies were in the procedure in getting to the Congress through the Bureau of the Budget with the President's approval to arrange the necessary appropriations. I think that the records of the War Department can be produced before the committee to show when the War Department itself first represented to the Bureau of the Budget the desire for funds for the purpose of barrage balloons.

Senator FERGUSON. Would these things, such as the barrage balloons, be taken up at these council meetings?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

[3198] Senator FERGUSON. Were minutes made of the council meetings?

General MARSHALL. Do you mean those of Mr. Hull and the secretaries?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I mean of the people who attended the War Council meetings?

General MARSHALL. I think the record shows in his office who were there, but there were no formal minutes that I recall ever seeing.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the people authorized to attend the council meetings?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, Senator, as to whether you could express it as authorized. I think it was those asked to sit in. Now, what the arrangement was between Secretary Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Colonel Knox I do not know and I am not the best witness. My dim recollection is and I believe possibly is in Mr. Stimson's testimony there, that he suggested the meetings, but that would be a matter of record.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we have some council meetings here looking like minutes in the Army.

General MARSHALL. Well, that is the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a different council?

General MARSHALL. That is a different council; yes, sir. [3199] I think that is a formal one for which there is a solid basis of regulation.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you keep on holding these council meetings in the Army, as far as these council meetings are concerned, until December 7?

General MARSHALL. We are still holding general council meetings.

Senator FERGUSON. You are still holding them?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And so far as you know there are minutes kept of those meetings?

General MARSHALL. Yes; they are published in a regular book now and I think they were in that form then.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think for the purpose of the record and just to call it to all the committee's attention, there is an important entry on page 67 of the United States News on barrage balloons saying:

Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the activity of U. S. aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing winds would render it ineffective.

[3200] Senator FERGUSON. Did you reject it, General?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. That, I believe, took place out there. I might say, Senator, we had that trouble all the time. I flew out to the west coast personally in regard to that immediately, shortly after the Pearl Harbor affair and took General Doolittle with me just as he returned, to check that, in order to straighten out the barrage balloon problem at San Diego, which was about the only fairly effective defense of that great B-24 plant there.

At that time there was naval objection by the local naval officers to having any barrage balloons any place because of its interference with

the seaplanes coming in for landings and I went there personally on a Sunday morning to the plant, got the naval officers and finally reached an agreement which permitted it in a modified way, which permitted us in a modified way to put up barrage balloons immediately.

There was always a question as to where you could use smoke to advantage or where the smoke might be to your disadvantage and, of course, part of that depended upon the efficiency of the smoke machines.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know about the decision not to use barrage balloons at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. I presume I did, sir. I do not recall, though.

[3201] Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall it now?

General MARSHALL. I presume I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say, General, now that they could have used torpedoes on these ships if we had had barrage balloons?

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that, sir. I would be interested to find out if they did use them afterwards, after they had plenty of balloons and plenty of time to consider it and I do not know now whether or not they did. My recollection is I never saw them there.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned the other day about the building of the radar in the Park Service. Do you know how long it took the Park Service to allow you to put these permanent radar stations up?

General MARSHALL. My recollection, without referring to the record, is that we finally got the general approval about May 15.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they completed at the time?

General MARSHALL. My understanding is that for the fixed stations they were not completed.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not your inability to get from the Park Service the right to build them delayed you in the production of those stations?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I am not the best witness [3202] on that but I am told it had something to do with transportation and matériel and something to do with the engineering officer in that district and so far as I know had no relation to the Park Service, though I am not the best witness on that.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have received some knowledge that you had that delay?

General MARSHALL. I think there was a delay to the point that the fixed stations were not working at all on December 7, or were not workable on December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about the Colonel Wyman case?

General MARSHALL. Well, that is what I had reference to when I said that I did not think it was the Park Service. I was not clear on the details of that case. They did not come to my attention until long afterwards and then only the name and the fact that it was at issue.

Senator FERGUSON. So that really all you know about the Wyman case is the name "Wyman." You have no knowledge of the facts?

General MARSHALL. I have no detailed knowledge of the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no knowledge of the facts?

General MARSHALL. I have no knowledge of the facts; no. [3203] sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In relation to exhibit 13, that is the Martin-Bellinger report—

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). You are familiar with that now?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think it is the Martin report.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; they call it the Martin report.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 13.

General MARSHALL. I know what you are referring to.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact you requested it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why nothing was done in relation to it?

General MARSHALL. I do not know—you say that nothing was done in relation to it, Senator. It was a question when the matériel would be available in which to carry out the desires expressed in the recommendations of that report.

I believe I stated in my testimony yesterday in relation to the principal proposal of the Board, which was for 180 [3204] four-engine bombers, that at that time the Army possessed all over the world, including the continental United States, about 148, of which I think some sixty odd were here for training of personnel, some were in Panama, 35 were in the Philippines, 12 were in Hawaii. It was a question, of course, in the first place of the availability of matériel.

Now, in the memorandum which I directed the secretary of the general staff to issue or, rather, not in the memorandum but part of the thought behind the memorandum was we were not only trying to resurvey with the later information available what appeared to be the full requirements for the proper defense of Hawaii, particularly in case the Fleet was not present there, to what extent we could manage the affair by holding certain planes on the west coast until an emergency seemed to develop, and the reason for that was we in some way had to train the people for the new bombers coming out; and unless we had these bombers for our use we could not develop the crews to handle the new product.

I had discussed with General Arnold the sending of men out to Hawaii to train out there and the question there was the over-use of the bombers they had and the interference in the air with the general activities of the Army and the Navy by training flights to that extent, so we were trying to double in brass as it were; have certain bombers ear- [3205] marked for Hawaii but available for day to day training on the west coast and that was part of the thought behind the memorandum I had issued which brought about the Martin report.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time of Pearl Harbor you knew that the Army did not have long-distance reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. I knew they only had 12 B-17's. I did not know just what the Navy had in their PBY's.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the arrangement was between the Army and the Navy as to who could or could not have long-range reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I was aware of that, as I believe I explained before, for the reason that the Air Corps officials in Washington brought to me an opposition to the arrangement General Short had made and I thought General Short's arrangement was a wise one under the circumstances and therefore did not accept the local War Department Air Corps officials' protest as sound.

Senator FERGUSON. Had any of your reports with their predictions ever taken up the question of attack through the vacant sea as it has been described here to us? That is the part north of Hawaii.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I understand what the vacant sea is. I suppose I am quite certain that I read the [3206] discussions that involved that in going through the plans in the War Plans Division when I was the head of that division and when it was my particular function to read in detail all the plans, which are very voluminous papers, of course, and also to participate in the discussions regarding the continual revisions of those plans.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you know what started the conferences on the ABCD agreement—or, first, the ABC agreement?

General MARSHALL. My recollection on the thing was entirely hazy but Admiral Stark told me over the telephone, I believe, a few days ago when I questioned him in regard to it—and he, of course, is the proper witness to answer this—that he had initiated the proposal after bringing it to me and I had concurred with him, and he arranged through Admiral Ghormley in London for the procedure.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand from counsel that there was an ABCD agreement that was concurred in by this country?

Mr. MITCHELL. The staff speaks of it as an agreement but it was a report by naval and military officers of both countries making certain recommendations. They had an agreement to report on that; that is what you mean.

[3207] General MARSHALL. The Army members and Navy members concurred in the report with the British representatives and the Secretary of War and I believe the Secretary of the Navy also favorably expressed themselves on it, and the President, I think, never expressed himself one way or the other, not to me at least, and not in writing.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the object—if you will just refer, General, to the report marked "American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, in April, 1941"?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And refer to the "Object," on page 7. I read:

Our most important interests in the Far East are:

- (a) The security of sea communications and
- (b) The security of Singapore.

An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands since, so long as submarine and air forces can be operated from Luzon, expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East are out-flanked.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. What is the question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why Hawaii is not included in that? [3208]

General MARSHALL. This is a Far East survey, sir; not a Central Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we will not find the Hawaiian Islands in any way connected with this ABCD agreement?

General MARSHALL. I do not think so, sir. Of course, that was a naval base en route to the Far East, but this conference at Singapore related to Far Eastern conditions.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, General, you were talking there about the Philippines being on the flank if they were going south.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't Pearl Harbor also be on their flank?

General MARSHALL. Not in that sense, sir. Pearl Harbor is a good many thousand miles from the China Sea and the movement of the Japanese would be south through the China Sea. Pearl Harbor, of course, is about 2,400 miles west of the coast of California. It dominates the Central Pacific. It does not dominate the China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with what Mr. Churchill said on the 27th of January 1942 in relation to Pearl Harbor being on the flank?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

[3209] Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall such a statement. You would not consider, then, that the base and the ships that we had would be considered by a military authority as being on the flank of a movement south into Malay, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies?

General MARSHALL. I think not in the sense that we ordinarily use "the flank." San Diego is on the flank in that sense as well as Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Japan ever knew of this ABCD arrangement?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that Admiral Stark—you talked to him recently. Do you know whether he called that conference?

General MARSHALL. My understanding of what Admiral Stark told me was the proposition was brought up by Admiral Ghormley who was on duty in London and he, Admiral Stark, thought it was a wise procedure and discussed it with me and I concurred and the arrangements were then made by Admiral Stark, I believe, through Admiral Ghormley. Admiral Stark, of course, is the authoritative witness in the matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 45 indicates that you had approved the plan. Is that correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

[3210] Senator FERGUSON. And you presented it to the President?

General MARSHALL. I presented it, as I recall, to the Secretary of War and Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the Secretary of War approved it also, did he not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Secretary of the Navy approved it and Admiral Stark approved it?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. To get the record straight, you said, "You approved the plan" without specifying which one. There are three plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. This memo I think relates to British conversations, not to the Singapore. I couldn't tell until I read it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will strike out the exhibit. You did approve the various plans?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that is my recollection, but the record will show, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. The one with China and with the [3211] Netherlands East Indies.

General MARSHALL. I don't know which one you are referring to.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Let General Marshall conclude his answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I don't know just what one you are referring to when you say with China.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. The testimony is that the Chief of Staff approved the original ABC-1 and ABC-2, I believe. He also approved the Canadian but did not approve the Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you let the General see the Singapore, the memo on whether or not he approved it? I do not think the memo applies to Singapore; but I will ask you now, did you ever approve?

Mr. MITCHELL. When you say "memo" you mean that memorandum by General Gerow to General Marshall, that he has in his hand? I would like to know.

Senator FERGUSON. It is dated June 2, 1941, to the President at the White House, "Dear Mr. President," signed [3212] by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy.

Attached to it is a letter, June the 9th by W. P. Scobey, and attached to that is one of August 20, 1941, and to that is one of August 29, 1941, signed "O. K." That is the part on Canada. "O. K., F. D. R." Signed, "W. P. Scobey."

General MARSHALL. You haven't any memorandum here in regard to the Singapore?

Mr. GESELL. No.

General MARSHALL. I will have to get some data on that. I do not recall just the details.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel have any data that he can give to the general?

Mr. MURPHY. You have the testimony of General Gerow on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow says he never approved it. The document he has in his hand involves ABC-1 and 2 and not the British at all and also involves the Canadian. The record memo shows that ABC-1 and 2—that Rainbow 5, I think it was, was put up to the President and he refused to approve them because ABC-1 and 2 had not been approved by the parties that were involved in it and the Canadian was the only one that was approved, as I understand it.

[3213] Mr. MURPHY. The President approved the Canadian one. He did not approve the ABC-1 and 2 and neither Admiral Stark or the Chief of Staff approved the Pacific one.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you have any knowledge as to whether or not you did or did not approve the one made at Singapore?

General MARSHALL. I will have to go into my record, sir, and refresh my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any present knowledge about that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I haven't.

Senator FERGUSON. This letter of June 9th said the President had familiarized himself with the two papers but since the report of the United States-British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been approved by the British Government he would not approve the report at this time, neither would he now give approval to the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow 5 which is based upon the report of ABC-1. However, in case of war the papers would be returned to the President for his approval.

Do you know whether or not Britain ever approved this ABC-1?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any information in the [3214] War Department as to whether or not they ever approved ABC-1?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that. I imagine General Gerow can speak authoritatively from the records.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the President ever approved ABC-1?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did ABC-1 ever go into effect?

General MARSHALL. In general effect it did because it involved the policy of the main fight in the Atlantic and the defensive principle in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. How did it go into effect if not approved? Was it approved in part and not approved in part?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, Senator, just what the proceeding was. Once we got into the war we all had a common understanding of the almost imperative necessity of being on the defensive in the Pacific until we got control of the situation in the Atlantic.

We had a formal meeting of the British and American Chiefs of Staff and with the President and with the Prime Minister which began shortly after Christmas or, in other words, shortly after Pearl Harbor in December 1941, where general agreements for the combined cooperation in the conduct of the war were arrived at. There was no overt action in the way of carrying out a joint plan between December 7 and [3215] that of the date of the British-American meetings that I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. General, this plan depended upon an attack, did it not?

General MARSHALL. You mean ABC-1?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in the Pacific.

General MARSHALL. Well, it meant that we were not going to launch a war in the Pacific but that in the event we became involved in a war in the Pacific we would be on the defensive.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. On page 9 of General Marshall's report is the following (reading):

On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the series of discussions which then followed resulted an agreement, not only regarding the immediate strategy for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of a method for the strategical command and control of British and American military resources.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that, Congressman?

Mr. MURPHY. December 23, 1941. Page 9, report of General [3216] Marshall covering the period July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. General, does that refresh your memory that nothing was done prior to that about approving it?

General MARSHALL. I think that is the case, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it come into effect in the Atlantic?

General MARSHALL. It went into effect in the Atlantic to the extent that we utilized what we then had in the Atlantic to carry out what amounted to the same plan as outlined here in ABC-1. There was no transfer at that time of ships, as I recall, from the Pacific to the Atlantic and I do not know if there were any transferred during that period from the Atlantic to the Pacific, though there may have been.

We did not make any general operational moves except some naval moves by the vessels there in the vicinity of Hawaii based on Pearl Harbor and those of Admiral Hart's contingent of the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines. We were operating there for a few days just under the rules of stern necessity. We met then with the British and reached a formal agreement in regard to the conduct of the war.

Senator FERGUSON. General, that—

General MARSHALL. May I go a little further?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. This plan presented to us a basis for [3217] joint operations, for territories that one or the other would consider himself responsible, so that at the very beginning we had a fair understanding of what we had best do rather than the necessity of engaging in prolonged conversations such as were required to reach this report after we once became involved and engaged in the war.

Senator FERGUSON. General, did it take an attack to put the plan into effect?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your definition of an attack that would put it into effect?

General MARSHALL. Well, Pearl Harbor was an attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; no doubt about that.

General MARSHALL. There was no other at that particular time, though a few hours later there was an attack on the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to read you a definition of an attack.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. (Reading):

Modern warfare has injected a new definition for that word "attack." There was a time when we could afford to say that we would not fight unless attacked and then wait until the physical attack came upon us before starting to shoot. Modern techniques of warfare have changed all that. An attack today is a very different thing. An attack today begins as soon as any base has

been occupied from which our security is threatened. That base may be thousands of miles away from our shores. The American Government must of necessity decide at which point any threat of attack against this hemisphere has begun and to make their stand when that point has been reached.

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair ask the Senator what he is reading from?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I first want to ask the General whether or not he agrees with that definition of "attack"?

General MARSHALL. I do not find myself in any particular disagreement with it but it is a considerable discussion of a certain definition.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot hear you.

General MARSHALL. I say I do not find myself in specific disagreement with any part of that, but it is a considerable generalization.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you say that that kind of an attack, defined in that paragraph that I read you, was such as to put into effect these various plans or any of them?

General MARSHALL. Well, if—

[3219] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the General answer his question.

General MARSHALL. If you are referring, Senator, to some key paragraph in the agreement, in the American-British-Dutch conversations at Singapore—or is it ABC-1 you are talking about?

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about—

General MARSHALL. ABC-1?

Senator FERGUSON (continuing): ABC-1, I will first talk about that.

General MARSHALL. ABC-1 To put that plan into actual effect I would say that that definition would not apply because there would be plenty of time for the Government itself to take care of consideration of whether or not it would commit itself on that basis. When you have an overt, close-striking operation which you must respond to instantly, then you have the sort of attack that compels an instant response with or without plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the ABC-1 apply to the Pacific?

General MARSHALL. Senator, I must apologize for looking at these things.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I want you to look at them.

General MARSHALL. I haven't read them for 4 years.

[3220] Senator FERGUSON. I want to get the record clear on it.

General MARSHALL. And it takes me some time to catch up with it.

Senator FERGUSON. What exhibit have you now, General? Will counsel put in the record what he has?

General MARSHALL. I have Exhibit 49.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 49?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that is the one you say that the definition that I read would not put it into effect?

General MARSHALL. That would be my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, take the other plan, Exhibit 50. That is the American-Dutch-British.

General MARSHALL. What I am trying to do, Senator, before I answer any of your questions—you talk about a paragraph in this plan that is automatic in the event of an attack by an enemy.

Mr. MURPHY. May I, Mr. Chairman, direct the witness' attention to the bottom of the second page?

Purposes of the Staff Conference:

To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be com- [3221] pelled to resort to war.

General MARSHALL. Where are you reading from, please?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 2 of Exhibit 50, General.

General MARSHALL. Of Exhibit 50? Well, I have got Exhibit 49 here. That has to do with the American-Dutch-British conversations.

Mr. MURPHY. The same one that you call 49 I am calling 50, General. I don't know just which. I have mine marked "50."

Mr. GESELL. It is 49.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 2 of 49.

General MARSHALL. Now, where were you reading from, please, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. At the bottom of the page, the purposes of the conference.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What page?

Mr. MURPHY. Second page, under paragraph 3, the purposes of the conference.

General MARSHALL. I have got some other paper.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph No. 3, "Purposes of the Staff Conference."

General MARSHALL (reading):

Purposes of the Staff Conference.

The purposes of the Staff Conference, as set out [3222] in the instructions to the two representative bodies, were as follows:

(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

(b) To coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers.

(c) To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the Military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme Military control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations.

4. The Staff Conference, interpreting the foregoing instructions in the light of the respective national positions of the two powers, has reached agreements, as set forth in this and annexed documents, concerning Military Cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth and its present Allies should [3223] the United States associate itself with them in war against Germany and her Allies. The agreements herewith submitted are subject to confirmation by:

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom.

(b) The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

The Chiefs of Staff will request His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions, the Government of India, and the Governments of Allied Powers to the relevant provisions of the agreements herein recorded. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will similarly request the United States Government to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of the Governments of such other American Powers as may enter the war as associates of the United States.

The High Command of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their [3224] respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

The term "Associated Powers" used herein is to be taken as meaning the United States and British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany, it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In these circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising between Japan and an Association of the United States, the British Commonwealth and its Allies, including the Netherlands East Indies, must be taken into account.

The Conference assumes that the United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but, for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British [3225] joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. It is recognized that the amount and nature of the material aid which the United States affords the British Commonwealth will influence the size and character of the Military forces which will be available to the United States for use in the war.

The broad strategic objective (object) of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

(a) United States.

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military Power.

(b) British Commonwealth.

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities will provide for [3226] the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(c) Sea Communications.

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort.

The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military [3227] strength.

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

(13) Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The prin-

cial United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States efforts being [3228] concentrated in the Northwestern Approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States—

Senator FERGUSON. General, may I interrupt just a moment? Are you answering Congressman Murphy's question now?

General MARSHALL. I am trying to find the exact terms of this agreement to refresh my own memory and read it clear [3229] through to the end. I was reading it out loud. I can read it to myself if you prefer.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no question.

General MARSHALL. I might say, Senator, there are thousands of pages of these and I have had 3 days in which to absorb them.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you and I both have had to do that.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make this clear? I was trying to help the General in finding the answer to the question.

Senator LUCAS. What was the question?

Mr. MURPHY. The Senator asked what was involved in the ABC?

General MARSHALL. No, Mr. Murphy, I understood the Senator to say when was the plan to be put into effect and I was trying to see if it was stipulated that when an attack came this would be automatic.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I refer you to Exhibit 16.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. I realize the help that my colleague from Pennsylvania has been in this proceeding but in this particular [3230] instance his effort to help seems to have muddled the waters to the extent that there isn't anybody that knows what we are talking about and I would like to see if we can get an answer to a question or have a question submitted so that we can follow the proceedings. And I don't wonder that the General is disturbed because I confess as one member of the committee I have difficulty in knowing what is going on or what we are talking about and I would like to have this thing down to some basis so that one member can ask the questions and let the witness give the answers without these constant interjections which have the result of muddying the waters rather than clarifying them.

[3231] The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan will proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. We will pass that question then.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to suggest, in response to the remarks of the Congressman from Wisconsin, that we had an understanding that counsel would be permitted to inquire of the witnesses without interruption, and that the members of the committee in their turn would be permitted to inquire of the witnesses without interruption and, except where it is necessary in order that a member of the committee understands an answer, does not get a word accurately, it would seem, in the interest of order, that that course be pursued.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I interject at this point? General Marshall has indicated from the start that he is perfectly able to take care of himself as a witness before this committee and to understand the questions that are asked without prompting from any other member of this committee.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman will take that remark out of the record. I am not attempting to prompt anybody. I am seeking the truth here. I think the record will show I have been helpful to the Senator from Michigan in getting a clarification here.

I think the remarks of the gentleman from Wisconsin is letting off steam and nothing else.

[3232] The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan will proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. I want the record to show I have not objected to any interruptions, because it is my interest to get the facts. The Chairman has well the right to invoke the rule. It was invoked the first day before I got two words out.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not recall that. If that is true, the record will show it, but the Chair does not happen to remember it. The Chair offers these observations in order to try to discourage unnecessary interruptions of one member of the committee by another during the examination of the witnesses.

Senator FERGUSON. General, if you will now refer to Exhibit 50, I want to call certain things to your attention.

On page 13, the top of the page, it states:

It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counteraction would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorize such action:

Then follow specifications (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I follow that.

Senator FERGUSON. In (b) it states:

The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of [3233] Thailand to the west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We have a map before us, if you will just look at it, which indicates that line, and it ends up by saying:

The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

Do you see the line outlined on the map?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. And you used a very similar description in your letter—it is not a letter, it is a memorandum for the President by you and Admiral Stark, on November 5.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. You recall that?

General MARSHALL. I recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 18 of that same exhibit, if you will refer to it, it says, "Japan's most probable course of action will be to," and then you have (a) and (b), and I will ask you whether or not anything is indicated in there in relation to an attack on Hawaii, or is it left out because Hawaii is not in this plan at all?

General MARSHALL (reading):

It is estimated that Japan's most probable course of action will be to:

[3234] (a) contain the Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay with the object of destroying it by air and torpedo attacks and failing in this, to

(b) locate the Fleet at the earliest possible moment and endeavor to at least draw it by air, submarine or surface vessel attacks.

The question, as I understand it, is whether there is an omission of any reference to Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; was the reason that it was not covered by this plan because it was thought that that was the probable course of Japan?

General MARSHALL. I think, Senator, it is my recollection of the discussions that were going on in Singapore at the time that the problem of the attack on Hawaii was not what they were considering, it was the security of Singapore, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies, generally extending over north of New Guinea to the Admiralty Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. Then this plan did not anticipate an attack on America?

General MARSHALL. This plan was to meet a probable, as we understood it, Japanese operation to the south of the China Sea.

[3235] Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you familiar with the fact that Mr. Churchill made the statement sometime before the war started, as far as America was concerned December 7, that in case Japan attacked America they would be in with us in 1 or 2 hours, or whatever the time was?

General MARSHALL. I have a recollection of some such statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that have been in reply to this plan then?

General MARSHALL. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they to come in if Hawaii alone were to be attacked?

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or was it a one-sided plan?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was one-sided.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to know what your opinion is on it.

General MARSHALL. It says "A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the associated powers." That is a very general statement, and can cover Hawaii also. "It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute 'a direct act of war.' It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be [3236] resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned."

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out whether this plan went into effect prior to December 7.

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain it did not go into effect, because it never was implemented, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 25, it says, at the bottom of the page—will you read that (b), the last paragraph?

General MARSHALL (reading):

The operating of Chinese guerilla forces armed, equipped, and directed by the associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organize such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organize similar guerilla forces.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we ever organize those, to put this plan into effect?

General MARSHALL. So far as I know, prior to December 7, 1941, we did not, as far as I can recollect.

The one action, aside from sending supplies into China, that I do have a very definite recollection of is equipping the air force, the Flying Tigers.

Senator FERGUSON. The Volunteer Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. Yes; because I took the action to get [3237] them the planes personally.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the Volunteer Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. The Volunteer Air Corps was a force of air-men, combat planes, P-40's, I believe, furnished by the United States, and operated by volunteer officers from the United States, I think, of the Army and Navy, and there may have been even civilians in it. I am not quite certain.

Some of them were reserve officers, and they were relieved from active duty, and released so that they might go into the employ of the Chinese Government.

The planes were obtained—is there any interest in that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. The planes were obtained on the basis of an English contract for planes, I think, with the Curtiss Co., and when that contract had been fulfilled, it was possible for the plant to turn out a certain number of planes during the next few months, if they immediately started, within 10 days, using the parts that were then available; otherwise their assembly lines would change.

Under the contract arrangement we had, which controlled the Curtiss Co.'s operations with the British, our Government, meaning the War Department in general, and Air Corps people in particular, could control the question [3237] of whether or not those planes should be manufactured beyond the contract terms.

The problem was to obtain planes immediately for the Chinese.

The planes which would have been fabricated out of this available extra material of course would not have been completed for 3 or 4 months.

We could kill that, so far as the British getting the benefit of those additional planes, or, as I used it, we could, on a trade basis, require them to make immediate delivery of completed planes that were going to them, to the Chinese, and we later would allow them to take these additional planes that were manufactured from the accumulated matériel.

[3239] I saw Mr. Sumner Welles and he took up the adjustment with the British, and they submitted to that condition, and we got 50

in January or February, and 50 more in February or March. They were all for the Flying Tigers; they were sent out to the Far East. The men that were recruited by the Chinese and we released where they happened to be reserve officers, also, proceeded to the Far East.

My next recollection of the matter is while we had obtained the planes on that basis by a twist of the British contract, we now found ourselves in the predicament of having to provide the guns and ammunition, which we did not have available, and we had a hard time arming the planes.

That was the one definite force that I recall, prior to December 7, 1941, we organized to the extent that I have just described.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, was that an activating of this Exhibit 50 plan?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was that. It came actually out of a visit here of T. V. Soong with the head of the Chinese Air. I took them out to my house for lunch and they made an impressive picture of the circumstances and the great good such action would do, and I immediately undertook the obtaining of that matériel. That was without regard to this plan, and what I was referring to here is the [3240] continuation of that.

Senator FERGUSON. What I was trying to find out was whether this was an activating of this particular plan.

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In your memo, exhibit 16, you refer to the same line which I read to you before.

Mr. GESELL. I think that is exhibit 17, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. No; 16 is the one I have reference to. You see at the top of page 4, "The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound."

Now I assume you are referring to Exhibit 50, are you not, General?

General MARSHALL. What page was that you were reading from?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 4. It is the fourth page of this document. They are not numbered. The top of the page, "Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions."

General MARSHALL. I see it. "The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound." Now the question?

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to know whether that referred to exhibit 50.

[3241] General MARSHALL. That was my understanding, sir. However, the use of the word "agreed" is not intended to imply that our Government was committed to it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Senator, the British-American Staff conversations are ABC-1 and 2. I was afraid you are getting a confusion on the record. Exhibit 50 is the American-Dutch-British. That is a memo with reference to what?

General MARSHALL. It is the estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a different document, isn't it?

Senator FERGUSON. Does not that include the Dutch and Singapore? Does not that include Exhibit 50, which you were looking at?

General MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it does. Now in order that there be no misunderstanding about this definition of an attack that I read—do you recall what I had read to you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that kind of an attack as described in the definition that I read to you activate or bring into effect Exhibit 50, that is the one on the Far East?

General MARSHALL. I will say, in the first place, that no attack would have brought into effect this exhibit 50, because—

[3242] Senator FERGUSON (interposing). Well, was it contemplated—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Let him complete his answer.

General MARSHALL. It was contemplated that our Government approve the procedure. Now your exact definition, I am not quite certain about that. But the point I am making now is we, meaning Admiral Stark and myself, as Chief of Staff, and meaning the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, would not be in a position and were not in a position to bring the terms of this argument, so far as they pertained to the United States, into effect, by reason of the document without the formal approval of the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

[3234] General, I want to refer now to Exhibit 40, a dispatch between Admiral Hart and Admiral Stark. Do you have it before you?

General MARSHALL. I have that before me.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just read the message part? It is only one sentence.

General MARSHALL. "Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

That is a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. From the Commander in Chief in the Far East to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you any such knowledge as that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was entirely foreign and not in your mind at all, that we had any such arrangements?

General MARSHALL. In my mind was the clear understanding that this was a planning arrangement which had not been approved, was not to be considered as an approved document until the Government so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. May I ask what the date of that letter is?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Will you give the date? It [3244] has been in the record.

General MARSHALL. It is December 1941. I do not see the day of the month.

Mr. GESELL. After the war started.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait.

General MARSHALL. There is no day of the month on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is counsel testifying here or the witness?

Mr. GESELL. I was speaking to Mr. Mitchell. I would be glad to advise the committee of the information I gave to Mr. Mitchell.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask what the stenographer got.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see anything on that exhibit to show that that was shown to Admiral Hart or Admiral Stark after the war started?

General MARSHALL. I see merely the month, December, and the year, 1941. There may be the day of the month on here, but I do not spot it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that reference on it give you when it was?

General MARSHALL. I presume it would.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at it? Do you know the Navy code there?

[3245] General MARSHALL. I do not know what it is. The way it reads, it is the 645th day of December, but that does not make sense to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anybody here who understands what date that is?

Senator FERGUSON. The first and second numerals of the serial designate the date of the month, the third and fourth numerals, the hour of the day, and the fifth and sixth, the minutes of the hour.

General MARSHALL. This would be the 7th day of December 1941, according to that.

Senator FERGUSON. 1941?

General MARSHALL. The 7th day of December.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and what hour?

General MARSHALL. The sixth hour, and 45 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read the cracking of the code here:

The third and fourth numerals the hour of the day, and the 5th and 6th the minutes of the hour.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Let the Senator finish.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to make a protest before he does.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman will not recognize the member at this time, until the Senator from Michigan finishes.

[3246] Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. No, not at this time. I want to overrule the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is not overruled. The Chair has sustained the Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I was trying to give the General a way to interpret that language. Now I will read it again.

I am reading from a letter of the Navy Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, the 6th of December 1945, and signed by John Ford Baecher, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

The time element involved in the above-mentioned dispatches is computed in the following manner: The first and second numerals of the serial designate the day of the month, the third and fourth numerals the hour of the day, the fifth and sixth the minutes of the hour.

Now, will you give us the date of the month?

General MARSHALL. The 7th day of December.

Senator FERGUSON. The third and fourth numerals, the hour of the day?

General MARSHALL. That is the sixth hour of the day, and that would be 6 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be 6 a. m. The fifth and sixth, minutes of the hour?

[3247] General MARSHALL. That would be December 7, at 6:45 a. m., 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will read you the next

All dispatches are dated Greenwich time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What does that mean?

General MARSHALL. It means just that; it is the Greenwich time. You will have to relate this over to the similar time in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to try to get it in Washington time.

General MARSHALL. I could not tell you just what that is. You want it in Washington time?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I think Greenwich time is about 6 hours difference from Washington time, approximately.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, reading further.

As an example, dispatch #070645 means that the dispatch originates in the Philippines area on the 7th day of the month (and as shown on the face of the dispatch in the month of December, 1941) at 6:45 a. m. Greenwich time.

Now, they are talking about Philippine time, are they not? I mean the day? Is that Greenwich time? I will give you the letter, General, and see if you can figure it [3248] out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose I read it into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he had better look at it. I would like to have you figure out what time it was in Washington, and what day of the month.

General MARSHALL. What time it was where?

Senator FERGUSON. In Washington, when that was sent.

General MARSHALL. This memo states:

"Eastern Standard time is five hours earlier than Greenwich time, therefore the dispatch originated on December 7, at 1:45 a. m. Eastern Standard time. The Philippine area is about eight hours ahead of Greenwich time, therefore the dispatch originated on December 7, 2:45 p. m. Philippine area time."

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, with the time here in Washington that was 1:45 in the morning, was it not, on the 7th? That would be an hour and 45 minutes after midnight on the morning of the 7th?

General MARSHALL. That would be it.

Senator FERGUSON. Had the attack taken place at that time?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; the attack did not take place, I believe, until 1 o'clock in the middle of the day, Washington time.

Senator FERGUSON. In the middle of the day.

[3249] The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair ask at this moment, it is practically 4 o'clock—whether the committee desires to sit longer today? I frankly, was hoping we might conclude with General Marshall today on account of his matters but whether we can is not within my control.

Would the committee feel justified in sitting longer if there is a chance to conclude with General Marshall or not?

Senator FERGUSON. There isn't a chance, unless the committee is willing to sit well into the evening.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would not want to compel the Senator from Michigan to tell how long it will take.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact we cannot conclude with General Marshall, what is the wish of the committee as to recessing now?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire something of General Marshall. I understand he stated yesterday his plane was waiting, ready to take him to his duties in China.

General MARSHAL. It will have to continue to wait. I am to be at your disposal until you have finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Under those circumstances, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Monday, December 10, 1945.)

[3250]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[3251] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Senator FERGUSON, you were examining General Marshall.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a correction in the record.

On page 3178 I read from the Roberts Report. It is in the record on page 3178, the last paragraph. The record reads: "8:30 American Honolulu time." The record I read from, being the Roberts report, says: "6:30 A. M. Honolulu time."

The word "American" is not in there. So there will be two changes. The figure "8:30" is changed to "6:30" and strike out "American."¹

The CHAIRMAN. The correction will be made.

Senator FERGUSON. General Marshall, about the 12th or 13th of August, 1941, you attended the Atlantic Conference meeting, did you not?

General MARSHALL. What sort of meeting, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. The Atlantic Conference.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I was present, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before you went to that meeting had you known there was to be a meeting?

[3252] General MARSHALL. I do not recall, Senator, but purely as a guess I would say maybe a week; I don't recall at all. Maybe some circumstances will come up that will jar my memory, but I don't recall now at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see any agenda before you went to the meeting?

¹ See p. 1207, *supra*.

General MARSHALL. I know specifically there was no agenda for the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conferences with the British Chiefs of Staff or military authorities, in relation to the Far East?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall a specific conference with the three British Chiefs of Staff regarding the Far East.

Might I explain my recollection of what occurred?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Admiral Stark, General Arnold, and myself met with the British Chief of Staff, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the Acting Head of the Air Corps—Air Marshal Portal was not present—and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Our discussions were quite general, somewhat in the nature of getting acquainted and of our learning from them of the course of the war from their point of view, and of [3253] their informing us in general statements of their urgent necessities.

We proceeded thereafter most of the time on the basis of personal conversations between the respective opposite Chiefs of Staff. In my case, that would be Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

My recollection of my conversations with the Field Marshal were that he explained on his own initiative, or on my questioning, what their situation was all over the world, their approaches to the various phases of the campaigns that had then taken place, and particularly the situation in the Middle East.

My recollection is that he and I had not a great deal to say about matériel, because in the category of matériel for the ground forces we had already done for them about as much as it was possible for us to do for some time.

My understanding of the conversations between General Arnold and the First Sea Lord, on which General Arnold is the best witness—I should say with the air representative—he had a great deal of discussion regarding aircraft that the British needed. And I believe somewhat the same was the nature of the conversations between Admiral Stark and the First Sea Lord in regard to naval requirements.

However, I did not sit in on those details.

[3254] At another meeting with the three Chiefs of Staff—

Senator FERGUSON. General, I was only interested in the Far East situation. I didn't care to cover the other.

General MARSHALL. I will confine myself to that by saying, Senator, that we only had a general discussion of the situation all over the world, and I do not remember specifically the Far Eastern part. So far as our discussions with them, I took the lead in pressing them all the time to unify their procedure and to save us from the confusion that was then existent here in Washington regarding their necessities as to matériel.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to going there or at the meeting, did you know what this country's, America's, attitude, our attitude, was in relation to Japan going any further on her aggressive steps, aggression steps in the Far East?

General MARSHALL. My recollection of my understanding of that phase of the matter at that time was that our policy was in every way that seemed possible and suitable to discourage any outbreak in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 14 of exhibit 1, I wonder whether this was ever called to your attention. It was on the 7th of August, 1941, translated the 8th of August—no, translated the 15th of August. So you would be at the meeting [3255] at that time, would you not?

General MARSHALL. I believe so, sir.

[3256] Senator FERGUSON. What I wanted to call to your attention was the second paragraph on that page. It is a message from Washington Japan intercepted:

When Japan occupied French Indochina—

General MARSHALL. Senator, may I interrupt. What page are you on, please?

Senator FERGUSON. I am on page 14.

General MARSHALL. I have it now.

Senator FERGUSON. The second paragraph [reading from exhibit No. 1]:

When Japan occupied French Indochina, the United States retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo; a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand.

Did you know that?

General MARSHALL. I presume that I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there was a conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action by the United States as far as Japan was concerned in case of aggression?

General MARSHALL. I presume that I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you return at the same time as the President?

General MARSHALL. Only part of the way, sir. I left the *Augusta*, which was the cruiser on which we were traveling [3257] at sea, somewhere southeast, I believe, of Nova Scotia, took a seaplane and flew in to the Naval Base near Newport, and there transferred to a plane to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. You came back to the United States?

General MARSHALL. I came back directly to the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you learned before you came back to the United States that there had been a conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action? Was that discussed with you at the conference?

General MARSHALL. That was not discussed with me at the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when you returned to the United States? The President—I relate the day he returned for the record—the 17th. That was on a Sunday morning.

Do you know when you returned?

General MARSHALL. Do I know when the President returned?

Senator FERGUSON. No; when you returned to the United States?

General MARSHALL. I returned quite a few days ahead of him, so I must have been here then.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you learn that on the 17th of August the President—that is on a Sunday morning—the President called the Japanese Ambassador to the White House [3258] and de-

livered to him a statement, an oral statement? In the oral statement this language was used:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

That is the end of the paragraph and the end of the statement.

General MARSHALL. Your question is——

Senator FERGUSON. Whether you knew that, when you learned of it.

General MARSHALL. My recollection is, and I believe the records of liaison meetings show, that at least the sense of that message, if not the actual message, was read in my presence in the office of the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, about 2 days later, which I believe was the 19th.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the first knowledge you had that such action was taken or was to be taken?

[3259] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; as far as I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that England—did you ever learn that England had taken a similar step?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that on August 24, 4 days prior to the Jap answer to that message, which was the 28th, that the Prime Minister made a statement to the effect that in case America went to war with Japan that they, the British, would be in in a short time—2 or 3 hours?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that, sir.

[3260] Senator FERGUSON. What was the discussion you had with the Under Secretary in relation to the paragraph that I just read, the one that you read at the——

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir. I have not seen the minutes or the record of the meeting. I had a vague recollection of knowing something about that message at some time and I was told that it was in the record of the minutes of the liaison meeting. I believe it is a naval record of a Captain Schuirmann that Mr. Welles either told us of the message or actually read the message to us, so that I am not a very good witness on that.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you interpret what was said at that meeting by Mr. Welles? What obligation did it place on you as the head of the Army, if any? How did you interpret it as Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. My interpretation now—I would have to guess at what it was then—was that the situation was growing more difficult and the implications here were largely, I believe, economic; but I do not recall exactly what my reactions were at the time. I knew this throughout the procedure then, as far as I understood the matter of the diplomatic interchanges, that they were endeavoring to find some way to avoid a rupture in the Pacific without the complete sacrifice of American policies.

[3261] Senator FERGUSON. Did you take that as being from that time on the American policy so that you would have to, if necessary, implement it?

General MARSHALL. I would assume that I would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that in any way change the American policy as far as you were concerned, that is, as far as your knowledge?

General MARSHALL. I would assume that it did not. I have no recollection of any state of change in my mind at the time. Our procedure was more or less uniform throughout.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did that indicate that the tension was at least growing and that we had certain commitments and that it may be necessary for you to prepare for those commitments?

General MARSHALL. I presume so, sir. Certainly the tension was growing all the time, and particularly in the months of September, October, and November.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. What is the Senator talking about when he talks about commitments? I would like to know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the General understand my question?

General MARSHALL. I could not hear, Senator.

[3262] Senator LUCAS. I would like to know to what the Senator is referring, what the Senator is inquiring about when he talks about our commitments. I would like to know myself what the Senator is talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask the General, does he understand my question?

General MARSHALL. Well, I was not making any fine interpretation of the word "commitment," Senator. I was talking about our military obligations.

Senator FERGUSON. We were talking about this particular paragraph, were we not, General?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you understood my questions to relate to that paragraph?

General MARSHALL. I thought I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And the fact that the Japanese had received it from the President on Sunday morning?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know, General, whether or not that information of the delivery of this message was sent to General Short or General MacArthur?

General MARSHALL. I have no—there was a message sent to General Short and to General MacArthur sometime, as I recall, during August that referred to the Japanese attitude. [3263] I do not know offhand whether or not this message was sent. My recollection would be that it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Your recollection would be that it was not sent?

General MARSHALL. But the record will show that, of course, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well I have no record that it was and I wondered if you have any knowledge that it had been sent.

Had you any information of a proposed meeting between Konoye and the President of the United States?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir, now. On that you will have to refresh my memory.

Senator FERGUSON. You never prepared any data or had prepared any data anticipating such a meeting?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall it, sir. It may be but I do not recall it at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any information that any meeting like that may be held in Juneau, Alaska? Would that refresh your memory? I am only asking you that to refresh your memory.

General MARSHALL. Well, I am sorry but it does not right now. May I say, Senator, this mass of papers and all I haven't seen for 4 years, whatever part I did see.

[3264] Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

General MARSHALL. And it is very hard for me to recall what I actually had known.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is why at times I ask a question thinking it may refresh your memory on it.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In the intercepts there is considerable information about such a meeting and in the memos from Ambassador Grew to the State Department and to the Secretary of State there is considerable in the early part of October prior to the fall of the cabinet. I think the indication is at least that the Ambassador thought the cabinet would fall, and advised them that it would fall unless such a meeting had taken place. Did you have any information?

General MARSHALL. If it was in magic I presume I did, sir, but just what Mr. Grew's messages were I do not recall whether I know anything about them or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know whether you had any information—

General MARSHALL. Everything of that kind I got through oral statements from Mr. Stimson who was attending these meetings frequently, more frequently than I was in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, there is considerable magic [3265] on that question of the Konoye meeting.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall it now?

General MARSHALL. I have a hazy recollection now of the fact that there was quite a bit.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not know of any particular data that you may have obtained for that meeting?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall it now, sir. They may be able to show me a memorandum signed by me, but I do not recall it now.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I haven't got any memorandum or I would have given it to you first. I was just seeking information as to what you may have.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. We have a memorandum in the record, Senator, if I may be helpful.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, certainly.

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 33, item 17, dated October 2, 1941, has the memorandum to the Chief of Staff from General Miles' deputy, Colonel Kroner, which discussed that problem. The memorandum was also distributed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Under Secretary, and other officials.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of that memorandum, Mr. Gesell? [3266]

Mr. GESELL. Well, I think toward the middle there is a discussion of a meeting of leaders and the Army position is stated by G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. That they will prepare data for it?

Mr. GESELL. No, that they were discussing the meeting. Item 8 at the bottom there starts and discusses the meeting and goes over onto the next page.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am familiar with that, but I wondered whether any data had been prepared.

Mr. GESELL. Oh, I don't know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I had in mind.

General, do you know whether you advised such a meeting or advised against such a meeting? Were you consulted, in other words?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of that.

Senator FERGUSON. General, had you designated anyone to negotiate or at least confer in liaison about it between the State Department and your headquarters of the Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. I think we had two mediums of that sort. One through the G-2 section of the General Staff and one probably through the War Plans Division of the General Staff. However, General Miles and General Gerow can give you an authoritative statement regarding that.

[3267] Senator FERGUSON. But you had not designated any particular individual?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I don't think I ever have. I know that during the greater course of the war I had officers that would see Mr. Hull sometimes almost every day but I do not recall that I ever designated any particular individual unless it was General Hull on one occasion.

Senator FERGUSON. During all of this time of all this negotiation did you understand that the Fleet was at Pearl Harbor, the main part of the Fleet?

General MARSHALL. I knew all the time where the Fleet was based. Its sailings in and out, though, I was not familiar with.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. But I would know absolutely when the Fleet left the West Coast, when it arrived out in Hawaii and so long as it was based in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted any in the year 1940 or conferred with in relation to the Fleet going and basing at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain that I was involved in the discussions regarding that movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what your opinion was on sending it there?

[3268] General MARSHALL. I am sorry, Senator, I do not recall just exactly what my point of view was. I have a clear recollection, still dubious, as to what my own thoughts were regarding quite a discussion as to the reinforcement of the Atlantic Fleet from a portion of the Pacific Fleet and at that time the U. S. Fleet was in the Los Angeles-San Diego region. There was a very considerable discussion on it for quite a while over that phase of the matter and it

was the problem of the maintenance of our convoys across the Atlantic to Great Britain, which Great Britain was vitally dependent upon; and the security in the Pacific and the numbers and questions of the disposition of the vessels of the Fleet was a very important matter.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you would be vitally interested in the moving of the Fleet to Pearl Harbor because that being in Pearl Harbor, based in Pearl Harbor, it became one of your tasks to protect it while it was at anchorage in Pearl Harbor, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, Senator. I had a very vital interest, the Army had a very vital interest, in the Fleet at Pearl Harbor because the obligation to protect Pearl Harbor was an Army obligation.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you have any idea as to its effect on the diplomatic negotiations? Were you consulted on [3269] that?

General MARSHALL. Well, my recollection is that was one of the considerations involved. Now, just whether they asked me personally or not I do not know, but I assume that I was personally involved in the discussions and, therefore, must have expressed an opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know what that opinion was?

General MARSHALL. I cannot recall right now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I see in a memorandum dated the 25th of February 1941, a conference in the office of the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff being present. It is exhibit 55. I will not have to read who was present there. This language is used [reading]:

They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability but they must guard against everything.

That is down about a third of the way down.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that refresh your memory as to what was going on at the time?

[3270] General MARSHALL. Only to the extent that we were having these discussions regarding the fleet and this is a direct statement by me at that time, which is quite evidently what I thought at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when, or did you give any opinion as to when the fleet was actually prepared for war?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, I could not say I had any data on that. I know I have quite a clear recollection that I was very much concerned regarding their obtaining the additional vessels that I believe at that time were characterized as the fleet train. In other words, the fleet itself was very much limited in action unless it had a large supply force to keep it going, not only in oil, gas, but in munitions and in food and in all the other requirements of ships traveling at sea in long voyages.

We greatly lacked, the fleet, I believe, greatly lacked such an equipment and I became personally interested in that and I recall discussing it at the liaison meeting and I believe the record will show, though I have not checked it, that a recommendation was made by the liaison group through the medium of Mr. Sumner Welles regarding the im-

mediate establishment of an adequate fleet train. Now, the record will show that. That is my dim recollection at the time.

[3271] Senator FERGUSON. General Marshall, when you sent the war warning, that would necessitate the fleet preparing for war, would it not?

General MARSHALL. The war warning would put the fleet on the alerted action. It was presumed at that time, at least I should say it was presumed at that time that the fleet, so far as was possible, was in a state of preparation for war but its actual alert for battle conditions was the purpose of the alert message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wouldn't it be necessary for the fleet to go into Harbor—

General MARSHALL. Senator, you are asking me—

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). —to prepare for war? I am just bringing that out, to see what your information was as to the—

General MARSHALL. I am going to ask you to please ask a Naval authority on that because I am just guessing—I don't expect the Navy men to tell you much about tanks—but I do not want to commit myself.

Senator FERGUSON. General, the reason I asked that question was, as I understand it, you had charge of the protection of the fleet.

General MARSHALL. The Army was responsible for the defenses of Hawaii, or the Island of Oahu in particular, [3272] which included Pearl Harbor, and the coordination of all the air and defensible fires in that particular vicinity in the event of aggressive Japanese action.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that would include the actual protection of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; specifically that.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, if it was necessary to take the Fleet into anchorage to have it prepared for war on the war warning you would have to protect it while it was in there, that is, your Army?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been consulted by anyone—well, by the Secretary of War or the President, about whether or not we were prepared for a war with Japan? That is, whether your Army was prepared?

General MARSHALL. I had had a number of discussions with the Secretary of War regarding that consideration and I believe I testified earlier that, along with the Secretary of War, I had notified the Secretary of State at some time in September that I thought that by December 5th that we would be in such a situation as to deter Japanese action. I was referring, of course, specifically to the Philippine Islands because we thought we had done all we could at that time to make additional provisions for the defense of Oahu.

[3273] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you prepared any memorandums outside of the one, Exhibit 16 and Exhibit 17—they are the joint memorandum of November the 5th and November the 27th—as to our preparedness?

General MARSHALL. I will have to go to the record, sir. I do not recall offhand.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you have the records checked on this?¹

¹ See Mr. Gesell's statement in Hearings, Part 5, p. 2074.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The only two that I have seem to bear those dates.

Now, I wish you would take Exhibit 16 and on the second page I ask you whether you were consulted in relation to the second paragraph on that page:

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

Was that question put to you?

General MARSHALL. I don't know whether that specific question was put to me but I do know that Admiral Stark and [3274] I, myself, were called on either by oral direction or otherwise to express ourselves regarding the appeal of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for protection against what he thought were the inevitable offensive intention of the Japanese north towards Kunming, which would cut the Burma Road and this expression, as I recall and as I think itself will show, stated our views in that matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the next sentence:

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. (reading):

In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces.

Do you remember discussing that with Admiral Stark?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I don't remember the exact discussion but I know that must be almost what we discussed. I couldn't help but have discussed it. And, incidentally, I referred to that a little while ago in stating that our problem was the respective strengths of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

[3275] Senator FERGUSON. On top of page 3, at the top of the page it says, "The only existing," and then they say at the bottom of the page, after the word "existing," they say in the footnote "two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word 'current' substituted."

So it would read:

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by the "current plans for war"? Were you at that time anticipating war was inevitable?

General MARSHALL. The date of this memorandum is November 5, 1941, and the threat of war was very evident.

Senator FERGUSON. You were being consulted at that time as the highest ranking military authority on that question?

General MARSHALL. Undoubtedly, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And at that time you anticipated—on the same page—that “The U. S. Army Air Forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942”?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then it states down further:

[3276] By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you of the opinion at that time that if there was a war it would involve not only Britain with Singapore but the United States with the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was not any question in your mind about that, that if war came to one of the countries, war was coming to both countries?

General MARSHALL. That was my impression at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. And isn't it true that one of the things, at least, that Japan was claiming, their claim was they were trying to get oil and various things, which naturally would come from the south, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, and I think she was also getting oil from California.

Senator FERGUSON. As late as——

General MARSHALL. I do not remember the date, but she had been receiving things from California.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think they were getting it as late as——

General MARSHALL. I do not think that, sir, but that is easily determined.

[3277] Mr. KEEFE. As late as what?

General MARSHALL. November 5.

Senator FERGUSON. November 5, I am referring to, 1941.

General MARSHALL. Let me interpolate again. I am not saying they were getting it on November 5, but there were discussions at the time regarding it.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it now, we start out on the premise here, at least as of the 5th day of November 1941, that if there was a war coming as far as Britain was concerned in the Far East in relation to Singapore or anything else, that America would be involved in that war?

General MARSHALL. That was my estimate at the time, because of the situation in the Philippines, our obligations there.

[3278] Senator FERGUSON. That was your opinion at the time.

I did want to take up with you page 4, if you will just turn to page 4:

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as of that time there would not be any doubt in your mind that if the Japs intended to move across the line that had been designated, that would mean a war with Great Britain, and therefore we would be involved in it?

General MARSHALL. I cannot answer that categorically, Senator, because of this: Admiral Stark and I had recommended that if the Japanese did move east of 100 east longitude, or south of 10 degrees north, that that be regarded as an offensive act, or something of that nature.

Whether or not the Government would accept that is another matter.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just getting what your reaction was.

General MARSHALL. I would answer that question, I think [3279] this way:

In my own opinion, the moment the Japanese moved into the Gulf of Siam, that was a definite offensive act which would result in a catastrophe for us in the Philippines, and for the British in Singapore, unless we definitely resisted it.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were of the opinion at that time that military strategy was that if they went in there it would affect Singapore, it would affect the Philippines, and it would naturally affect our interests.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore crossing the so-called line would mean war, not only with the United States, but with Britain?

General MARSHALL. I think that is the statement that I was endeavoring to give.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, when the message came in from Ambassador Winant on the 6th, that they were across this line——

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That meant war, did it not?

General MARSHALL. That meant war, if the two Governments decided to make it war.

Senator FERGUSON. But as far as you were concerned, [3280] as the military man, the Chief of Staff, in your opinion that meant war?

General MARSHALL. In my opinion that meant unless we definitely resisted that, we would be in a catastrophic situation soon thereafter.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were of the opinion that at that time it meant war?

General MARSHALL. I was of the opinion at that time that the Governments would be forced to accept a condition of hostilities, but whether the Governments would do it or not, is another matter.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that.

General MARSHALL. For example, I recall that somewhere near that time, I believe, the British Commander in Singapore wished to move troops north into the Kra Peninsula, which is the narrow neck of the Malay Peninsula, leading down to Singapore, to a place called Singara, and that was not, as I recall, accepted by the British Government. That was a defensive measure that he proposed. Why it was not accepted, I do not know.

It may have been because they thought he did not have sufficient men, or it may have been because they thought that would be seized by the Japanese as a definite war act by the British. I recall something of that kind happen- [3281] ing at that time, and I also recall my own thoughts in regard to it at that time.

Admiral Stark can speak for himself, but I think he concurred with me, that the definition of the latitude and longitude that has

been referred to covering a movement that would turn the southern point there of Thailand, or Siam, and bring the Japanese into the Gulf of Siam, that meant they were on the back door of Singapore, and could have, in our opinion, only a direct hostile motive. It was still possible for them, of course, to have turned north and then east, and establish themselves by shipping on the west coast of Thailand. That was still a possibility.

However, that threat by air would have been a very complete one over the whole Malay Peninsula.

Those were my thoughts at that time; that is my understanding of the records. My own recollection is that our Governments—meaning the United States Government and the Government of Great Britain—neither one notified the Japanese that a movement south and east of the point determined would be considered in effect a hostile act.

Senator FERGUSON. General, what I am trying to get is the thinking of the Chief of Staff, and his staff, the military authorities here, as to what they had in mind, and their knowledge and their information.

[3282] Now, on the 5th of November, when you wrote this message, you had certain things in mind, and that line was one of the things that you had in mind, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because at (b) you say, down on page 4:

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks, or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States—

Now, there would not be any doubt as to that, that in case of any direct act of Japanese forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, it would mean war with the United States; isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it goes further and it says, "The British Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies"; in other words, at that time you had in mind that in case there was an attack, a direct act of war against the British [3283] Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies, that, as far as you were concerned, it would mean war with the United States, that is, as far as you preparing for war was concerned and alerting?

General MARSHALL. You use the expression, Senator Ferguson, that it would mean war with the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about literally.

General MARSHALL. Our statement was that military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one of the following contingencies, and you just read one of the contingencies.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Then, on the next page:

The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand, to the west of 100 degrees east, or south of 10 degrees north, or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

That is the line indicated on the map.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I refer you to Exhibit 37, page 39, and I will ask you to read that.

General MARSHALL. This is headed "Top secret."

2 December, 1941.

[3284] From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF

Info:

Ø12356

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter three small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and one machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. Vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indochina coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by President as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

That is the end of the message.

[3285] Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, I will ask you whether or not you ever knew that message existed?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no recollection of any such message, is that right?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the reading of it does not refresh your memory in any way?

General MARSHALL. It does not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you have the map before you. Would you locate where those three vessels would be, and tell us how far they would be from the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. The first vessel between Hainan and Hue?

Senator FERGUSON. Between Hainan and Hue. Hue is on the China coast across the island of Hainan. Do you see that Hainan?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see Hue just across?

General MARSHALL. Hue is what I am hunting for.

Senator FERGUSON. A little south.

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes, I see it now. That covers the strait between Hainan and North Central French Indochina, which would be the Japanese course for vessels sailing out of [3286] Haiphong, coming down the coast all the way from Hongkong. As to the distance from the Philippines, I would have to guess at that. I should say it was about three or four hundred miles.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

General MARSHALL. Three or four hundred miles.

Senator FERGUSON. Three or four hundred miles?

General MARSHALL. Yes. Now the next point—

Senator FERGUSON. I would just like to ask you a few questions about that. That would be for information?

General MARSHALL. Presumably so.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you attempting to get information of ships going south to Singapore? Would not that be the purpose of such a vessel being placed there?

General MARSHALL. Ships going south anywhere in the China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; ships going anywhere south in the China Sea. They may go around the point, they may go around to the Kra Peninsula?

General MARSHALL. They may be going around the point, they may be going to Borneo, they may be going to New Guinea.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say we were looking for ships going to the Philippines at that point, would you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; unless an expedition against the Philippines, by some strange quirk, would be based on [3287] the coast of Indochina, or near Haiphong. Of course an expedition against the southern Philippines might be quite far south. Presumably an expedition against the Philippines would be based more north, in Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. Now take the next ships.

General MARSHALL. Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques. I am familiar with those two places.

Senator FERGUSON. You are?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is down around——

General MARSHALL. Well, that is on the southeastern coast of French Indochina and I should imagine the distance from Manila, rather, is probably some 600 miles. I am merely guessing.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would the ships be going there? Where would the lookout look for ships there?

General MARSHALL. The normal assumption is they would be headed for the southern tip of Indochina or the Gulf of Siam, or Borneo.

[3288] Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next one is right at the Pointe, Pointe de Camau, and that is right at the most southerly point of the Peninsula. Do you see it there?

General MARSHALL. Yes; I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would that be a lookout for?

General MARSHALL. That would be a lookout specifically for the Gulf of Siam, I should say, and Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. That would cover ships going to the Kra Peninsula, would it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General, would you be of the opinion that this was a lookout to see whether or not there was going to be a movement across the line that had been designated?

General MARSHALL. I would not say it was necessarily that, specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. What would be the purpose of this information to be obtained?

General MARSHALL. A general knowledge of what the Japanese were doing in the China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. And also the Gulf of Siam?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; the China Sea and south into Malaysia. In the light of the various documents and discussions at that time, the most critical move was that [3289] which might go into the Gulf of Siam, and the southern one of these posts would very definitely relate to that. That was somewhat beyond our normal air capability of reconnaissance, although we did send some, I believe, in the general direction toward Camranh Bay at one period for three days.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, do you know why that action was not reported to you? Would not that be very material to your thinking?

General MARSHALL. Well, that would be material to my thinking, yes, sir; but on the other hand, I did not have brought to my attention every detail of Navy reconnaissance.

Senator FERGUSON. The next states:

Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. This was for information of CINCAF, which would be Admiral Hart, would it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, prior to the 7th, get any information on his report as to what reconnaissance was [3290] being carried out, as far as the Army was concerned?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not have any recollection on that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have given, at the end of your memorandum—it is on page 5 of Exhibit 16—you specifically make certain recommendations there.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "That the dispatch of United States Armed Forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that does not concern the voluntary air corps.

General MARSHALL. No, sir, because that was under China's pay, and control.

Senator FERGUSON. That was under the Chinese and not our movement, as you interpreted the other day.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces.

That was your recommendation, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether we were furnishing [3291] and supplies to Borneo or any of the other islands? Did not your first report indicate that we were?

General MARSHALL. In that report I gave a specific example of furnishing ammunition to the Chinese Government which had been reserved for Iceland. I think it involved 7,000 rounds, and we gave them 40,000 of those, or maybe it was 3,000, one or the other. That

was to be sent by General MacArthur from Manila, and we would replace them by shipment at the same time from San Francisco.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that under Lend-Lease?

General MARSHALL. I assume it was, sir. I was getting it out, and the details were being taken care of by someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know what it was under?

General MARSHALL. I think it was under Lend-Lease, but my action was to get them started.

Senator FERGUSON. Your report of 1941, your first report indicates bombs were also furnished.

General MARSHALL. I do not believe that is quite what it was, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain it?

General MARSHALL. It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability to land, and gas, and arm the B-17's to the south of the Philippines, for two reasons: One was in case [3292] we had to fly them in from Hawaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are operating strategical bombing planes of that type, their capacity is greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have some place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from.

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would accommodate the B-17's and that he, General MacArthur, stock those strips with gasoline and bombs.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if we got into any war, we would be using these other bases, and we would be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan?

General MARSHALL. To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is really covered in the ABC-1 and 2 plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. The point here was that the B-17's would be greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had no landing points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore, it was essential, in my opinion—and I think I personally directed this myself—that is my recollection—that these arrangements be made at Rabaul, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Balikpapan [3293] Borneo and Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that material was furnished to those places?

General MARSHALL. The records show, and I know this, the deliveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way at Rabaul, at Port Moresby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show, that the ship with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapan, for Borneo and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back just a moment to page 39 of exhibit 37, if those lookout ships, those men-of-war, saw convoys of Jap troops moving, for instance, in the Gulf of Siam across to Kra——

General MARSHALL. What page, please?

Senator FERGUSON. On page 39 of Exhibit 37.

General MARSHALL. I have it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. If you would have known that Saturday morning, the 6th, that ships were moving across the Gulf of Siam, to

the Kra Peninsula, would that change your thinking, as far as the alert of the Army was concerned, that is, as to what the Army should be doing?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not think it would.

[3294] Senator FERGUSON. You had done then everything up to that point, and that would not have changed your mind at all?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it would have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think it would have?

General MARSHALL. It is more a confirmation than anything else.

Senator FERGUSON. A confirmation. Your next is, of course, the aid to the voluntary corps, and you explained that.

The next sentence is "that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

Had there been any ultimatum, or why did you and Admiral Stark put that terse sentence there, that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan?

General MARSHALL. I would assume that there had been some such discussion. I do not recall now.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whom the discussion was with?

General MARSHALL. My assumption would be that a discussion would be with Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and probably Admiral Stark and myself present.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the President confer with you on that point of whether an ultimatum was to be delivered?

[3295] General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir. I might say here that Admiral Stark and myself were always on the side of trying to gain as much time as we possibly could, while I assume, and I am certain that Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and presumably the President only had the consideration of the great policies for which this Government stood, that were involved, as well as the military status in the way of potential power.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you had any further discussions with Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson, or anyone else after that in relation to an ultimatum? That is very strong language, "that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that specifically.

The only recollection I can go on now is these continued discussions as to what measures might be taken while upholding the dignity of the United States and at the same time fend off hostile action in the Pacific. Now as to the question of ultimatum or not, I do not recall that, although we made specific statements in regard to it, and it must have been a discussion of that specific nature.

[3296] Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that at least you had been consulted as to whether or not an ultimatum should be given?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had given a direct recommendation that no ultimatum should be given?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next is the joint board Washington meeting. "Secret minutes of meeting, November 3, 1941."

Major General William Bryden was there, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Major General Arnold was there. Do you recall getting information at that meeting? It was immediately prior to your memo of the 5th.

General MARSHALL. Allow me to look at it.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you were there.

General MARSHALL. Yes; I was present at the meeting, as it shows there. I am looking at the minutes to see whether I can get any reminder.

On the bottom of page 2 I find this heading: "Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China."

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have you read that and get what your reaction was as of the time that it was given in your presence on the 3d.

[3297] General MARSHALL (reading):

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask you some questions about that. Does that refresh your memory about that being [3298] brought up, about the note of the 17th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any discussion as to whether or not that was an ultimatum or not an ultimatum?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your opinion as to it?

General MARSHALL. I would say, in reading this and thinking while I was reading aloud, that the desire for the ultimatum was coming from China particularly, by General Magruder.

Senator FERGUSON. Going up and reading the sentence, "He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently that was Schuirmann's opinion, and he said he was speaking at the request of Admiral Stark.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was that your opinion?

General MARSHALL. All I can think of at this particular moment, sir, in regard to that is we were probably discussing [3299] largely economic exactions or restrictions in order to influence Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am asking now, General, is, was it your opinion that we had issued an ultimatum on the 17th to Japan? That is just what Schuirmann says, and I will read it again.

General MARSHALL. I am familiar with that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. What I am not familiar with is the terms of the President's message. I do not know what I knew about it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot hear you.

General MARSHALL. What I am not familiar with was the terms of the President's message to the Japanese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read it to you.

General MARSHALL. What I do not know that I knew at the time was the exact expressions in that message. Your question is, did I think that was an ultimatum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I cannot answer that. I do not recall whether I knew exactly what he had said or not. I presume probably I had heard the message, but I have no accurate memory of what I thought at that minute. I received this information, and I think the record will have to speak for [3300] itself.

Senator FERGUSON. In your recollection on what was being said by Schuirmann, Captain Schuirmann, did you or did you not consider that the message of the 17th was an ultimatum?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now the minutes further state:

He further stated—that is Schuirmann—that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department.

What was your answer to that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall what my answer to that was, other than the joint memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. And that ended by saying—

General MARSHALL. That no ultimatum be issued.

Senator FERGUSON. That no ultimatum be issued, be delivered to Japan. Would you say then that you had advised against further warnings by the State Department?

General MARSHALL. I would say that at that particular time our advice was that no ultimatum be issued. Now what you mean by "further warnings" is open to considerable interpretation.

[3301] Senator FERGUSON. I just have the language of the joint board.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what happened at that meeting. Here is what Mr. Hull wanted to know: "Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we cannot back them up." Were we in a position at that time, in your opinion, to back up additional warnings?

General MARSHALL. That meeting was on what date?

Senator FERGUSON. On the 3d day of November 1941.

General MARSHALL. We were not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you express yourself at that time, when this question was brought up, along the same line?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir. The expressions of my views must be those of the memorandum, which followed shortly thereafter.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate at least that you did not want an ultimatum to go to Japan.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I next refer to paragraph a, if you want to read the next sentence. You better look at it, so if there is anything you want to bring out you may do so.

General MARSHALL. You mean the preceding paragraph?

[3302] Senator FERGUSON. I mean the following paragraph.

General MARSHALL. What I was going to read was this in relation to the question of what was generating the ultimatum idea in our minds.

Captain Schulmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder—

our War Department Joint Staff representative in Chungking—

urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan.

That, to my mind, was what had precipitated this discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

General MARSHALL. That is the urging of our representative there as well as the generalissimo that we take more positive measures in our communications with Japan. Do you want me to read that?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to pass over anything that you want to use as an explanation. You did, General, did you not, go further than the mere Chiang Kai-Shek matter? Because warnings to Japan were a different matter from what he was asking. He was asking for military aid, was he not? He wanted military intervention, did he not?

[3303] General MARSHALL. He was asking for military aid and he was asking us to take a stronger stand in our warnings to Japan. He uses the words "to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan."

[3304] Senator FERGUSON. Then the additional warnings were general warnings; is that correct, and you discussed those?

General MARSHALL. Just what do you mean by that?

Senator FERGUSON. I am referring to the statement:

Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up.

General MARSHALL. Well, my conception of this matter that I have at this time, is that Mr. Hull's discussion was based on this urging of the Generalissimo and of General Magruder and he felt for us to say anything further, unless we were fully prepared to back it up, got us nowhere.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were of the opinion at that time, that we were in no position to back up any other warnings?

General MARSHALL. That was my assumption at the time, because of the slow movement of equipment and matériel and personnel to General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, under a it states:

The decision on the Far Eastern situation made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U. S.-British Staff conversations report ABS-1.

[3305] Would you say that was a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the conditions there at that time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Down at the bottom of page 3:

f. Assuming that the Fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless, the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

Was the moving of the fleet from Pearl Harbor considered at that time?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is, and Admiral Stark undoubtedly can give you much more direct testimony, that the British were very desirous of the United States Government basing a considerable number of naval vessels on Singapore, and we were very much opposed to any such procedure.

Their point of view, if I may estimate, was that they had very little to build up their Far Eastern forces, because they were completely employed in trying to protect the western approaches of the North Atlantic, and the movement of the vessels down around the southern end of Africa to get to the Middle East.

They, therefore, were in dire circumstances as to the [3306] availability of shipping, naval shipping specifically. Therefore, if we would station part of our fleet in the Singapore region, necessitating the base at Singapore, that would greatly strengthen the naval situation in the Far East, without a critical reduction in the British power of controlling the western approaches of the North Atlantic, and guarding the numerous convoys taking the long route around the southern tip of Africa to get to the Middle East and Far East.

That was the discussion that I have a fairly clear recollection of at that time; our opposition to such a move, or the British desire of such a move.

[3307] Senator FERGUSON. Was it your duty to defend the fleet in Manila Bay?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; within the means at our disposal, which were almost nonexistent.

Senator FERGUSON. Whatever we had, but that was your province, as Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next paragraph, will you read it?

General MARSHALL (reading):

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you read the next paragraph, that was considered and you would be the man responsible for the antiaircraft there?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was because you could not get it that it was not there?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you considered that at the time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, read the next paragraph.

General MARSHALL (reading):

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of [3308] launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In the case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and Army forces becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the Fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the [3309] impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to ask you some questions about the two paragraphs.

There were two parts as far as we were concerned. In the first paragraph it states:

In the case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack.

That is what you gave us before, that war with one meant war with the other. An attack on one meant an attack on the other.

But not in this case:

In case of a Japanese attack against Siberia.

In that case a different set of facts existed; isn't that correct?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There you said we should not declare war. Then, we should not declare war if they went into Thailand.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consider all parts of Thailand or just east of 100° east?

General MARSHALL. I couldn't tell you at this time, sir.

[3310] Senator FERGUSON. "* * * or China through Yunnan." That is exactly what the generalissimo was asking you about. You said in those three cases we should not declare war.

General MARSHALL. Might I interrupt, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. You are saying "you." This isn't my estimate. This is a naval estimate.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will withdraw the "you."

Was it discussed there that the United States in the one case would declare war or would consider it as an act of war and in the other should not declare war and did you agree with that discussion?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall the terms of discussion, sir. I have stated before that my own feeling was that if the Japanese appeared in the Gulf of Siam that war was inevitable and we would be in a very critical situation if we didn't immediately take some action to try to control it.

Senator FERGUSON. This memorandum went to the President, did it not, General?

General MARSHALL. This I thought we were reading was the minutes of a meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but it is attached, and was delivered to us, attached as a memo for the President.

General MARSHALL. My understanding of this we were [3311] reading from were the minutes of a joint board meeting of discussions which occurred in the Office of the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the minutes were attached to the memo that went to the President? They were attached when handed to us.

General MARSHALL. That is the memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. Attached to those minutes? I will have to check up.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you check up and let us have that information?

General MARSHALL. This should show it, the actual memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not desire to give to the President the information upon which your opinion was based, and part of it is stated in this memorandum, is it not, the joint board minutes?

General MARSHALL. I have got the wrong paper here.

This record copy does not show that that was communicated to the President.

I might say that the purpose of the memorandum such as Admiral Stark and I signed jointly here was to give the [3312] President, in readily readable form, our views. There are many factors that go into our reaching those views. If we recited all those in each instance, and this particular item you refer to may have gone to the President, I do not know that it did, we would merely lengthen the document he would have to read.

All I can say now is that the record handed me of the joint communication from Admiral Stark and myself shows no indication that the minutes of the meeting of the joint board of that date were sent to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Ingersoll or anyone at that meeting on the 3d in relation to the State Department's impression "that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks?"

General MARSHALL. It states on page 4, at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, preceding a discussion of the situation by Admiral Ingersoll:

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the [3313] Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

I would say that that generally is probably the sense of what I said at the meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. Now—

The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5.

What information had you and what did you anticipate would happen?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall, sir. I would have to go back through all the information given me from G-2 to find out what that was. I am not conscious now of the specific thing.

[3314] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that on that date or shortly after they gave a deadline date of the 25th of November?

General MARSHALL. I recall most distinctly that they gave a deadline date of the 25th, which they later changed to the 29th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Did you have intelligence information on the 5th that action was to be taken in relation to this deadline date of the 25th?

General MARSHALL. I would have to check up. I don't recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you check on that and let us have your best information. That would be material to this questioning.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you also spoke again, and I wish you would read what you said. "General Marshall emphasized." I want to get your opinion there.

Just a moment, before you read that I will ask you a question in relation to the other paragraph.

Did we move along as fast as you had anticipated so that by the middle of December the Army Force in the Philippines would have impressive strength or did we fail to get the men there?

[3315] General MARSHALL. We were delayed materially in getting them in, but part of that delay was known at that particular time, I think, in November. The length of the delay on the west coast in flying the planes out we were not aware of at that time.

I think I was probably aware of the delay of the delivery of planes, referring to the Flying Fortresses, from the factory. I was aware of delay in obtaining certain shipping. I was not aware until some time later, as a matter of fact, I think after December 7, of the delay in arranging convoys from Hawaii to the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advise the State Department on those items of delay?

General MARSHALL. I assume that I mentioned these facts in the presence of Mr. Hull because they were very pertinent to our situation.

Senator FERGUSON. The next may refresh your memory. You spoke, apparently. "General Marshall emphasized the point." Do you want to read that?

General MARSHALL. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 5.

General MARSHALL. Does it begin with the words "emphasized the point"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I thought you might want to look [3316] at what you had said.

General MARSHALL. I thought I had just read what I had said.

Senator FERGUSON. But down in the next paragraph you had something to say.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose language, General, is this:

Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation?

General MARSHALL. That is not a direct quotation of my language. That is the officer's notes of the meeting, the sense of my expression.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the sense of your expression?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3317] Senator FERGUSON. You were of the opinion at that time that that was true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And so expressed yourself.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that it doesn't say whether—was the State Department present at that meeting?

General MARSHALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. They would not be present?

General MARSHALL. They would not ordinarily be present.

Senator FERGUSON. Would they get this information?

General MARSHALL. Not necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I notice (reading) :

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines: * * *

Now, did that only cover the Yunnan situation, the China situation, or the whole Far East?

General MARSHALL. I will have to glance through this to see. May I read what the items were?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

The memorandum would take the following lines :

[3318] Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and

were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

Do you wish me to go ahead?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

So it was to be a general memorandum covering the Far East?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3319] Senator FERGUSON. Rather than just the particular movements in China?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; evidently brought to a head by the generalissimo and General Magruder's appeals.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, notwithstanding what happened at this meeting, do I understand that things did grow more tense and you, as Chief of Staff, knew it from that date on?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for why it grew more tense?

General MARSHALL. My recollection on that would be that the continued Japanese movements south in the direction of Malaysia, Indonesia, the general tone of their communications, the tone of the reports that appeared in magic, a large number of details of that nature, which taken all together, gave a very serious and forbidding aspect to the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I want to take you to the November 27, 1941, memorandum for the President, subject Far Eastern Situation, because it relates to the same question. It starts out by saying:

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack.

That would indicate that, going from the 5th to the 27th, [3320] that you saw a different situation, would it not; that it was more tense?

General MARSHALL. Well, as I just said, I thought it continued to grow tense.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that you had expressed it there in writing—had you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the first memo, I notice that the Hawaiian Command, or the Hawaiian Islands are not mentioned.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that?

General MARSHALL. We were discussing here offensive operations.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated "in five directions" and you didn't state any direct moving on Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian Islands.

General MARSHALL. We were discussing general operations, a combination of naval and land aggressive moves, which would maintain themselves in the business of penetrating still further. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a slash, but not a proposed invasion at all. Similarly, we anticipated as I told you, Guam would be in trouble, and probably Wake Island. What we foresaw and what actually happened was [3321] a general offensive move south of the China Sea into Malaysia, Indonesia, and the New Guinea region, and possibly Australia.

The scope at Pearl Harbor was to lessen the possibility of our action against such a general movement. The direction of the campaign was as discussed by G-2 to the effect that the Japanese would not attack in Manchuria, but would strike south.

That is what they actually did.

Senator FERGUSON. General, there you mentioned one thing, that this attack on Pearl Harbor was an attack to avoid our fleet. In effect, that is what I took from what you said.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Avoid our fleet being used against their movement?

General MARSHALL. To the south.

Senator FERGUSON. To the south, which you were anticipating there?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did the General Staff first anticipate that such a move may be made?

General MARSHALL. That is, the move to the south?

Senator FERGUSON. No, to take our fleet off, so as to allow them to go to the south.

[3322] General MARSHALL. I don't know that the General Staff specifically at any moment, figured out a time when they would strike at the fleet. We did feel that if we put any of our vessels out at Singapore, aside from the difficulties of maintenance, that they would be under the hazard of Japanese air in that vicinity.

We had assumed that in Pearl Harbor we had a reasonably secure base for the fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion for writing the memorandum on the 27th?

General MARSHALL. I believe the record will probably show that there was a meeting on it with the President just preceding that. Does the record show that?

Mr. GESELL. On the 24th, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether this memorandum was written after the message to General Short dated the 27th or before?

General MARSHALL. I would assume the record from War Plans Division will show, regarding which General Gerow will testify. It probably was written before because it takes a great deal of care in preparing such a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not this November 27 memorandum for the President was a confirmation of an oral statement that you had given the President?

[3323] General MARSHALL. There is another memorandum from General Gerow to me dated November 27 which may answer the question, if you will give a minute.

In a memorandum to me on November 27, with the stamped notation November 28, when it was noted by the Chief of Staff and noted by the Deputy Chief of Staff, regarding the Far Eastern situation, this appears in the second paragraph, following a number of items relating to the alert messages—possibly I had better read the whole memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you some questions in relation to that.

You believe then that the one of November 27 was brought about by the memorandum signed by General Gerow?

General MARSHALL. No. He is stating what happened here, and I am getting my hint from what he states.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MARSHALL (reading):

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me had telephoned [3324] both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved; (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President.

[3325] I am not reading from the memo now. That was the memorandum you questioned me with regard to, Senator [reading]:

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

That is the memorandum of November 27 signed by Admiral Stark and myself. Just when I signed it I do not recall because I was not here on the 27th.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do I understand that this refreshes your memory so that exhibit 17, which is the memorandum for the President, dated November the 27th, is the same memorandum that is mentioned in the second paragraph of the letter that you have just read?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to ask you some questions on that particular letter. On November the 27th, apparently, this memorandum was prepared, No. 17, was it not, because [3326] it is dated that day?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. The presumption is it was probably prepared on the 26th.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 26th?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently you had not seen that, your letter that you read from, until the 28th. It says:

November 28th: Noted: Chief of Staff.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is when you would see it?

General MARSHALL. Presumably that is when I signed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not that was prepared by someone else for you?

General MARSHALL. It was drafted, I am quite certain, in the War Plans Division following the discussions at the meeting of the Joint Army and Navy Board on the morning of November 26. As I left at about 1 o'clock, left Washington and did not return until the late

evening of the 27th, so the assumption would be, and General Gerow can give you direct testimony, that following our discussions, meaning mine and Admiral Stark's and the other officers, the Deputy Chief's of Staff, the Chief of the Air Corps, General Gerow, and other officers and their opposites on the Navy side, following those discussions General Gerow undertook the preparation of [3327] this memorandum and also at the same time he was preparing the drafts of the alert messages, all of those, presumably that afternoon and night of November 26 and maybe on the early morning of the 27th. As I was not in Washington on the 27th my assumption would be that I signed this message, this memorandum on the morning of the 28th.

Senator FERGUSON. So certain things were taken up when you returned and on the morning of the 28th these matters were taken up with you:

First, the Secretary of War at 9:30 on the 27th—that is the previous day—had called General Gerow. "He sent for me"—meaning he sent for Gerow.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, why would he send for General Gerow and not send for General Bryden? Had you left word as to who would have authority to act while you were away?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. That would be a matter of routine. When I am absent the Deputy Chief of Staff acts.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had you known there was to be a memorandum prepared before you left?

General MARSHALL. My assumption would be that I knew that such a memorandum was to be prepared just as I had discussed the preparation of the alert messages before my departure.

[3328] Senator FERGUSON. Well, it says here that "The Secretary"—that is the Secretary of War—"wanted to know what warning messages had been sent to General MacArthur.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "And what were proposed."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there is no mention there about sending any to General Short?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But the Secretary of War was questioning General Gerow, and your Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, as to what messages were sent to MacArthur.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that at that particular moment he did not know what had been sent to General MacArthur?

General MARSHALL. That would be correct, sir. Nothing had been sent, I do not think.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes [reading]:

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

Now, let us get that message. It is in Exhibit 37, page 32. Now, wouldn't that indicate, General, that the message—

[3329] General MARSHALL. Just a moment, please, Senator.

Mr. GESELL. It is the same one.

General MARSHALL. It is the same one?

Mr. GESELL. It is the same message.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that indicate that at that particular time when they were conferring that the message of the 27th had not been sent yet, because he said:

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November the 24th.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that indicate that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or he would have also presented the other message.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us read this message, We find first that the action and "action" there indicates who is to act on it; "information" means that it is at least for their information but not necessarily action by them, so it is the Chief of Naval Operations [reading]: "ACTION CINCAF"; that is Admiral Stark?

Mr. GESELL. Hart.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Admiral Hart, is it not? That is Admiral Hart, yes.

[3330] General MARSHALL. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Admiral Hart for action?

General MARSHALL. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. "CINCPAC"; that is Admiral Kimmel for action?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "COM11." Where is 11?

General MARSHALL. I don't know, sir. Those are the various naval districts, 11, 12, 13, 15. I presume the naval district in the Philippines, the one in Hawaii, the one on the west coast, and the one in Alaska.

Senator FERGUSON. General, Hawaii is not in there.

General MARSHALL. Well, I—

Senator FERGUSON. Hawaii is 14. How do you account for—

The CHAIRMAN. Let the general answer. He did not finish his answer.

General MARSHALL. I was endeavoring to say what 11, 12, 13, and 15 meant.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MARSHALL. I mentioned Hawaii, and you say 14 is Hawaii?

Senator FERGUSON. I am so informed. I find that out from the record.

[3331] General MARSHALL. Probably you are right, sir. I have not got it memorized.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, would you help us on fourteen? Is that Hawaii?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Fourteenth Naval District is on Oahu, the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the Navy. I am talking about the Army.

Mr. MITCHELL. These are all Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, these are all Navy?

General MARSHALL. These are all Navy; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Fourteen is on Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The "action" is Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Later we get a notice from the Army to the Navy. Now, will you read the message?

General MARSHALL (reading) :

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief [3332] of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their area. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, this "CINCPAC," that would be Admiral Kimmel?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate there that the Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be you?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

Concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior army officers their areas

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, that would indicate that Admiral Kimmel should have notified General Short of this message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Admiral Hart should have notified General MacArthur of the message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3333] **Senator FERGUSON.** That means that it is action for all parties?

General MARSHALL. Within their spheres.

Senator FERGUSON. Within the limitation of action as outlined?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would you know why information was sent to "SPENAVO," meaning the British?

General MARSHALL. Does "SPENAVO" mean the British or mean our representatives over there?

Mr. MITCHELL. The naval attaché, isn't it, in London?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

Mr. MITCHELL. Our naval attaché in London.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what it means?

Mr. MITCHELL. I so understand.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. What does "CINCLANT" mean, do you know?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General Mitchell, have you information on that?

Mr. MITCHELL. I guess it was the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, but I am not sure. Is that right?

General MARSHALL. That is probably right.

Senator FERGUSON. It sounds like that now when you get [3334] the words and the letters lined up with it.

So that would indicate now, reading that message, that a joint message had been sent to the Asiatic Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, to notify the Army tops of those two places, which would mean the Philippines and Hawaii and that would indicate this was written before the twenty-seventh note, would it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for the fact that they are talking about General MacArthur and what was proposed and no mention is made about General Short?

General MARSHALL. My reaction to that would be this, that they felt an attack on the Philippines was a very certain proposition and an attack on Guam was probably a certainty. They do not mention Wake, they do not mention Hawaii, they do not mention the Aleutions and they do not mention the West Coast of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, going back to the message that we read on page 32, Exhibit 37, the one that you had seen. Why was that message sent on the 24th?

General MARSHALL. Will you identify that for me again, please?

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 32.

Mr. MITCHELL. The message appears in two books, General. You have the Army book; and the same message appears in the Navy. The Senator is giving you the Navy page. It is the same one you were looking at.

General MARSHALL. That is the same message you were referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. What was the question, please, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know what was the occasion for sending the message on the 24th? What happened? Why was there a message sent [reading:]

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including—then he specifies two particular places, then he specifies two particular places, Philippines or Guam—

is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas.

Now, what was there that caused you to alert the Army and Navy in the Philippines and not Hawaii, if we consider that an alert?

General MARSHALL. I will have to go back and refresh my memory from the records. I do not recall the meetings that [3336] had occurred on that day or the preceding day. I haven't the data right here.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, General, up to this particular time, on November 24, do you know of any alerts given to either the Philippines or Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Not since the preceding summer.

Senator FERGUSON. Not since 1940, when the alert was given to General Herron?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So is this an alert?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I would consider it such.

Senator FERGUSON. This is considered an alert?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell us what happened immediately preceding, or any time preceding, that caused you to alert the Far East, including Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Well, I assume, Senator, that some information came in about that time and there may have been some meetings about that time and I do not recall that at this time. I will have to check it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator to yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. This is not done for the purpose of interrupting, but I want to help. [3337]

Senator FERGUSON. I want all the help I can get.

Mr. MURPHY. The deadline on page 100 was the 25th, that was the last day the Japanese would wait, and there is a message on page 99.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to put those in later.

Mr. MURPHY. There is a message on page 90. That might be the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will try to refresh the General's memory.

Was it because there had been a deadline set that you alerted these two places?

General MARSHALL. I could not say, sir. I will have to check that up.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you check it over the noon hour, General?

General MARSHALL. I will try to do that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, we will develop next [reading]:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

No [reading further]:

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

[3338] Was there ever an appropriate cablegram prepared to send a message, as wanted by the President, to the Philippines? If so, what is the message?

General MARSHALL. If the reference is to the message to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, there was one sent on the 26th of November, 1941, by the Navy, Admiral Stark's initials and name and presumably the signature is on it, for the High Commissioner of the Philippines reading as follows—

Senator FERGUSON. Before you read it. Were you familiar with the instrument sent on the 26th of November, being Exhibit 45, from the President to the High Commissioner? Did you know about that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir, because I think that was sent—it may have been discussed at the meeting of the Joint Board that morning but it was sent after my departure.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just wondering about that sentence, how that sentence could refer to the High Commissioner's message which was sent on the 26th and this meeting has not taken place until the 27th:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Would you say that Admiral Stark had anything to do with the—yes, he did. It says:

From OPNAV, H. R. [3339] Stark, November 26, 1941.

That appears at the top.

Now, to go ahead a little further with this:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

We know that on the twenty-sixth the message had gone from the President to the High Commissioner. How could that be the same paper?

Mr. GESELL. Do you have it?

General MARSHALL. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you anyone in your office that could aid you to make it clear, to sit here with you and to aid you on some of these things you are being asked?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I will get somebody.

Mr. MITCHELL. We can handle it, Senator, if we know specifically. We can give the General the right documents if we know the particular message you are referring to specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are you referring to the warning sent to MacArthur on the 27th?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I am trying to find this message.

Mr. MITCHELL. What message?

Senator FERGUSON. This memorandum dated November the [3340] 27th from Gerow to the Chief of Staff, at the end of the first paragraph, two sentences:

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I—— meaning, I take it, Gerow—

told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Mr. GESELL. That must be the 27th.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the warning message of the 27th.

Mr. GESELL. That is the warning message of the 27th.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I am trying to get it from the General, what he knows about it.

General MARSHALL. This message——

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give me where it is?

General MARSHALL. It is on page 9 of Exhibit 32.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. A telegraphic message between the War Department and Hawaii. It reads as follows:

PRIORITY NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
MANILA, P. I.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to [3341] continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures

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as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised Rainbow Five which was delivered to you by General Brereton. Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you notify Hart.

(Signed) MARSHALL.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then, General, that you never saw that message before it went out?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. I was engaged in the discussions regarding the preparation of it, I think, on the morning of the 26th before my departure.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess until 2.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[3342]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. The Chairman was detained for a moment or two.

Does counsel have anything at this time before General Marshall resumes his testimony?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything before you resume your testimony, General?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson will continue his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. General, if you will take the letter now before you, of November 27, from General Gerow to you, I want to ask you some questions about that letter.

I notice in the letter, as I asked this morning, Gerow speaking:

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

The next sentence:

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting.

[3343] I will ask counsel, do we have a copy of that draft message?

Mr. MITCHELL. We have never been able to locate it.

Senator FERGUSON. The answer is, General, they say they have never been able to locate it.

General MARSHALL. It would presumably be in the files of the War Plans Division or the present Operations Division. General Gerow will have to testify in regard to that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel, have we ever had the joint board meeting, and that may tell us what was in the message.

Mr. GESELL. Yes. We have the minutes right here, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have those?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They have been distributed?

Mr. GESELL. They don't make any reference to this, so they weren't distributed.

(The paper referred to was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you have the paper before you?

Mr. MITCHELL. No; that is the only copy.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the letter I am speaking of. Would you show him the letter dated November 27 from General [3344] Gerow.

General MARSHALL. I had it here this morning, Senator, but it seems to have disappeared.

Now, I have it.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting.

Do you know when that meeting was held?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is that that meeting was held on the night of November 26, just prior to my departure from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time you left here on the 26th?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember now, sir. I can obtain that data.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what message was he speaking about there, "a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting." What kind of a message was that?

General MARSHALL. My recollection of the matter is that at that Joint Board meeting we discussed the question of an alert message and that that is to what General Gerow is referring.

He should be able to state positively what it is he is talking about, because he committed himself in writing on the subject.

[3345] Senator FERGUSON. Normally, in peacetime, General Gerow would not have charge of this, would he?

General MARSHALL. What do you mean by "have charge"?

Senator FERGUSON. Charge of such a message of action.

General MARSHALL. He would have charge of the preparation of such a message.

Senator FERGUSON. In peacetime?

General MARSHALL. In peacetime.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the Operations Division?

General MARSHALL. The Operations Division of the General Staff, which I tried to explain the other day, labors in peacetime under a misnomer, and it does today also, I think. It is the division charged with the organizational factors in the Army and with matters that pertain to maneuvers, training operations in this country. But it had no direct connection whatsoever with matters of war and the overseas theaters.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you assign any of this work to your deputy?

General MARSHALL. Not specifically, sir. My deputy, General Bryden, attended the meetings of the joint board. He was a member of that by virtue of the fact that he was a deputy. He was kept conversant with the various sessions.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he have access to magic?

[3346] General MARSHALL. I don't know whether he received delivery of magic or not. That will have to be answered by General

Bryden himself. I know magic was discussed in the joint board meetings.

Senator FERGUSON. How could General Bryden operate in your absence if he didn't have access to magic?

General MARSHALL. General Bryden sat in the discussions of what should be done, or why it should be done, or what should not be done in the meetings of the joint board. He was, therefore, aware of those sessions.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going on in this message:

Mr. Hull stated——

I don't want to leave out the next word——

Do you know why, if we have the minutes here of this meeting here, that no mention is made of this message?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an important matter?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. A very important matter.

[3347] Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that, on the 24th, an alert had gone out as an amendment, this joint alert?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So to discuss an amendment to that alert was a very important matter.

General MARSHALL. Very important.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know why that would be left out of the minutes?

General MARSHALL. I don't know, sir, unless the Secretary didn't get it in. He takes longhand notes himself of what is going on. Why it should be omitted, if it was, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. An important matter like this, do you know how the minutes were ever approved later?

General MARSHALL. The minutes were approved at the next meeting of the Board, presumably. Whether or not these particular minutes were approved or not the record will show.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that the minutes are complete? Was that your understanding as you were operating along?

General MARSHALL. If you are referring to this particular set of minutes, and in the light of General Gerow's statement, and assuming that he states what he was referring to was the preparation of an alert message, I would say that those particular minutes were not complete.

[3348] Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything done that was kept off the record of the minutes?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection, sir. I know of no reason why our minutes should have kept things off the record unless it was a definite reference to magic.

Senator FERGUSON. If there was a reference to magic, that may account for it not being in the minutes of the Joint Board?

General MARSHALL. That might account for it, but I don't see why you couldn't refer to an alert message without necessarily commenting on magic.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not it could have been because magic was responsible for the alert that you were anticipating?

General MARSHALL. I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. That that would be left out?

General MARSHALL. I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading on from the letter:

He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning.

That is speaking about the Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption.

[3349] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Now, is it that sentence, about an appropriate cablegram, the message that went to MacArthur on the 27th?

General MARSHALL. I would assume it did. General Gerow is the best witness on that.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be in effect an amendment or supplement to the one of the 24th, because this reads:

I gave him a copy of the joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I am aware of that.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated before that it was always dangerous—I don't think you used the word "dangerous"—

General MARSHALL. I think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you? To send a supplement or amendment to a message.

General MARSHALL. I think I also said it was better to send an entirely new message.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why this amendment was made, the one of the 27th, to the message of the 24th?

[3350] General MARSHALL. The only answer I could give was that the other was a naval message to be communicated to the Army opposite. This message that General Gerow is referring to is a direct Army message, which in its directions to General Short, particularly in Hawaii, had some special reference to which the Navy was not directly concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't they also alert Admiral Kimmel on the 27th?

General MARSHALL. By the action of General Short in apprising his naval opposite of the contents of the alert.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the only reason why you know why there was a new alert sent on the 27th?

General MARSHALL. Is what the only reason?

Senator FERGUSON. The only reason why you felt it had been sent originally to the Navy, therefore this one on the 27th was going to the Army on the 27th?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I think that the events following a meeting with the President dictated a detailed alert to the Army officials.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, later in the morning, going on, the second paragraph—

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator, may I have the record show that you are referring to Exhibit 45, dated November 27, the memorandum to the Chief of Staff by General Gerow; so the [3351] record will show.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that an exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 45. You spoke about a letter.

Senator FERGUSON. So from now on it will be referred to as Exhibit 45.

Later on in the morning—that is on the 27th, and this is Gerow speaking—"I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed.

Now, I have the long letter as Exhibit 45. What is that?

Mr. HANNAFORD. It isn't an exhibit.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the Sayre message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you will permit, Senator, that was read into the record and it wasn't made an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, speaking about the memorandum from the President to the High Commissioner, that is the message that they talk about there and Mr. Sayre was discussed?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when is the first, General, that you knew that the message, the memorandum from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, was discussed?

General MARSHALL. So far as I can tell at the present [3352] time, Senator, I first learned of that on the morning of November 28th.

Senator FERGUSON. When you saw General Gerow?

General MARSHALL. Well, I don't know whether that would be entirely correct, to say when I saw General Gerow. These documents, I think, were brought to my attention as soon as I arrived at the office and I undoubtedly talked to General Gerow then or later regarding them.

Senator FERGUSON. Take the message, the one of Sayre's and we will go over that for a moment. It says:

A copy of dispatches will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart, which, with my approval, the CSO and the SOS addressed to the Senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines.

What are they speaking about there, General? What dispatches would be delivered to the High Commissioner?

It says:

Copy of dispatches will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart, which, with my approval, the CSO and SOS—

that is the Chief of Staff, isn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Addressed to the Senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines.

General MARSHALL. I assume that is the alert, Army alert message to General MacArthur.

[3353] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, this is on the 26th. Is the President anticipating that a new alert message is going to be sent to General MacArthur?

General MARSHALL. When I announced that I thought this was the 27th. I see that it is the 26th.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the 26th.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this anticipate a new message to General MacArthur, because the Exhibit 45 says up there,

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.

General MARSHALL. Well, reading this paragraph again that you have just read to me and looking at the message of November 24, it is possible, though the date is 2 days earlier than the President's message, that he is referring to that particular message.

Senator FERGUSON. But doesn't it indicate in the Exhibit 45 that the President did not know about the message of the 24th, because it says this:

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. General Gerow will have to explain that, or the Secretary of War, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your explanation of it? Do you know about it?

[3354] General MARSHALL. I don't know about it; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then going on in that letter:

In addition, you are advised that the Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrison,

and so forth. Now, getting down to the fifth paragraph from the end:

I desire——

that is the President——

that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outline of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his government and his people. Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding a public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult.

Now, that indicated that the President personally was asking the High Commissioner to confer with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur, is that correct?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And to get the picture from them and then to confer with the High Commissioner?

General MARSHALL. Then confer with——

Senator FERGUSON. With the President?

General MARSHALL. With the President.

[3355] Senator FERGUSON. Of the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. Of the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, when you came back on the 28th you were familiar with that message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was its significance to you? How did it stand in this picture?

General MARSHALL. About all I can say at the present time, Senator, is that it was part and parcel of the general action of the War and the Navy Departments in regard to the situation in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was carrying out what the President felt should go to the High Commissioner and to the President of the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, in particular, because the communications with the High Commissioner would be a matter on the Presidential level, and not on the War Department level.

Senator FERGUSON. But he was to confer with the War Department and the Navy Department through Hart and MacArthur?

General MARSHALL. He was to confer, as I understood it, with those two officials out there.

Senator FERGUSON. So that took them into the picture as well as the State Department?

[3356] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. You see the background of this, as I read it at the moment, is that General MacArthur was endeavoring to bring into the best possible state of organization for mobilization and preparation for possible hostilities a Philippine army.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you think that this would convey to Admiral Hart and General MacArthur that the matter was serious when the President was personally having the High Commissioner take this up with them?

General MARSHALL. I would say it did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't get you.

General MARSHALL. I would say it did.

Senator FERGUSON. It did. Now, take the next sentence:

"The Secretaries were informed"—that means of War and the Navy—"of the proposed memorandum you"—meaning the Chief of Staff—"and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President."

Now, I refer you to exhibit 17 and ask whether or not that is the instrument that was referred to in that sentence?

General MARSHALL. Is this the sentence, "The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. That, I think, is the instrument referred to. [3357]

Senator FERGUSON. That is exhibit 17. Now, General, I will ask you this: Have you been over that recently or would you rather read it before I start to ask you questions about it?

General MARSHALL. No, I think you might start with your questions, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it starts out (reading):

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

Hawaii is not mentioned. Do you know why?

General MARSHALL. Because we did not anticipate a general attack on Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, are we talking only about general attacks here?

General MARSHALL. We are talking about, as I used the expression this morning I think, general operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand then that an attack such as was made on Pearl Harbor was not being considered as part of an attack if current negotiations were to end without agreement?

General MARSHALL. I think from my point of view, Sen- [3358] ator, I can probably explain it best this way: We had made our major commitment of troops and matériel to Hawaii to make it as safe against attack as we possibly could. We thought we had prepared that garrison so that its defensive strength was such that there was little likelihood that the Japanese would undertake the hazardous operation of attacking it.

We thought at the same time that there was every indication of a general campaign by the Japanese south through the China Sea, as I referred to it before, and which actually was the case. We thought that the Japanese would not go into Manchuria under the circumstances because it would be too hazardous for them under the conditions and so far as we were concerned would not be a direct threat against the United States or a serious threat against the British.

We felt that Hawaii, as I have just said, was organized, equipped and prepared for a reasonable defense against an attack. I am using the word "attack" there in the meaning of any overt act of destruction or enemy aggression. I am not meaning it in the terms of a general operation, which was the nature of the Japanese movements we anticipated and which actually did occur down through the China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand that we must read this word "attack" here to have a qualified meaning, one of general operation and not the ordinary attack? [3359] Is that what we must understand?

General MARSHALL. I would say yes, sir, because we anticipated the possibility of attack almost anywhere, in the Aleutians, on the West Coast, as I stated the other day, in Hawaii possibly, Guam, Wake, any of those islands, but that was not the Japanese campaign as we foresaw it. It did not mean, Senator, that if we kept on with our Hawaii we could remove that garrison from there because there was no danger there. The fact that it had a garrison, the fact that it had the equipment to use, would be the best guarantee against attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand then that we may use the word "may" there as "probable," where as Hawaii, West Coast, and so forth, were in a "possible" category?

General MARSHALL. That would be it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that would be the—

General MARSHALL. I think that is a reasonable interpretation.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that would be a reasonable interpretation to do that, that the word "may" is "probable," whereas these were outside of the probable and in the possible?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I mean specifically that we did not mention Alaska and the Aleutians and yet we had a [3360] hazard there of air bases being established there for the threat of the

northwest portion of the United States, but the fact that we did not find Japanese coming in there did not mean that there was not that possibility.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you have any discussions with the President that would allow him to interpret this as we now have interpreted it, that that meant general, over-all attack?

General MARSHALL. I think that would be the impression that we had given the President.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the impression you gave him, so that he would have this language and he would understand what you were talking about?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. As I recall at the time, there was a general unanimity as to what the Japanese principal intentions were.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next that I want to call your attention to is the first large paragraph there:

Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast.

Just what was the purpose of this memorandum and when did you have a meeting with the President and discuss it with him that you were following up by this memorandum?

[3361] Well, first, I will strike out the question as double barreled.

When was the meeting with the President that you discussed this memorandum, that you were going to give the memorandum along this line and that he would understand the language above meant attack?

General MARSHALL. There was a meeting with the President at 12:15 p. m. on November 25 at which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark attended.

Senator FERGUSON. November the 25th at noon?

General MARSHALL. 12:15 p. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long that meeting lasted?

General MARSHALL. No; I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why it was called?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall at the moment, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And this was one of the things that was an outgrowth, that you were to write him a memorandum on certain problems, and the problems are discussed in the memorandum?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I am thinking while you were asking the question. I think it probably had to do— [3362] I think it was undoubtedly brought about by the information that we had received in the preceding 24 hours through magic and otherwise.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that information was?

General MARSHALL. I will have to get the records.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get on the record, General Marshall, is the detail of that so that this record may be complete. There are many things mentioned in these instruments and unless we can interpret the instruments in the light of what was going on we are not going to have the complete history of what was known in Washington, and that is the reason for this detailed examination.

Do you know what that information was that caused the meeting at the White House on the 25th?

General MARSHALL. I think I could probably obtain what it was if I could see Mr. Stimson's testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to help you if I can.

General MARSHALL. Because he has a diary, which assists the memory 4 years back.

Senator FERGUSON. I will take you to the testimony of Mr. Stimson on November 25, 1941, and see whether this will refresh your memory, and so that you may have a copy of it, General, as we go along, it is page 4050, 35; that is, [3363] "Secret 35, Tuesday, September 26, 1944." Turning to the diary of the 25th I will read the sentence before (reading): "On November 24, 1941, I had a talk with General Olmsted"—this is the Secretary of War speaking, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

I had a talk with General Olmsted, whom I recently promoted to be the chief signal officer.

Did the Secretary of War do the promoting?

General MARSHALL. He signed the letters of nomination to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't know what that had to do with the situation. Did it have anything to do with it?

General MARSHALL. I don't think it did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now:

That was important on the subject that I will tell you later of.

Were you having trouble with the signal officer that you were going to get a new one?

General MARSHALL. General Maughborne's term was about to expire. I think it had expired, and we were bringing in General Olmsted as his successor.

[3364] Senator FERGUSON. There is no definite term, is there, General?

General MARSHALL. Four-year details.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that definite?

General MARSHALL. Definite, and the man returns to his grade of colonel if he remains on the active list, from major general.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

in answer to a later question; the use of the air warning service, which, as you know, was a radar operation.

Now I will talk about November 25, 1941, and before I start I would like to ask what is the date, counsel, of the mimeographed copy of the Winant message, received here at 10:40 on the morning of December 6, 1941? Someone told me it was November instead of December, so that we should, maybe, correct this testimony. Do you know what the mimeographed copy shows?

Mr. GESELL. I think there is a misprint on the mimeographed copy but the exhibit in evidence is a photostat and shows December 7.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the record may be accurate, the Winant message in relation to the movement of ships is on the 6th of December 1941, and not the 6th of November.

Now, on November 25, 1941, he is talking, General, about what is in his diary and he says:

This is a long one—

And then from the diary—

"At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow."

I am not reading from the record. I will ask you a question. Was that the so-called *modus vivendi*?

General MARSHALL. I think it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that I may get your knowledge on the record as to what Colonel Stimson is talking about, the Secretary of War (reading):

"It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic."

Now, he is talking about the *modus vivendi*, is he not?

General MARSHALL. I think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Then we had a long talk over the general situation there, which I remember.

"We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department—

He is reading from his [3366] dairy—

and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one."

Now, the "we" in that sentence includes you, does it not, General?

General MARSHALL. Yes; I am following you. I can check that here. Are you able to follow me?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Will you check that and see whether or not the "we" there included you for that hour and a half—nearly half past one—almost an hour and a half?

General MARSHALL. It does include me.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MARSHALL. It includes the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark, and the Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, an hour and a half. (Reading:)

That's an hour and a half.

"At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday."

Do you know what day of the week that was that you were at the White House, that the President had brought up the attack as being perhaps next Monday?

[3367] General MARSHALL. I think Monday was the—

Senator FERGUSON. It would be December 1, wouldn't it? The 7th was on a Sunday.

Senator LUCAS. It was not the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. No; it was not. It would be November 25 that the meeting was.

Senator Lucas wants to know whether it was the 7th of December. It couldn't be, could it, if it as next Monday and he was speaking on the 25th?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. If you will just wait a second, we will get the date.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MARSHALL. This one thing, I think, is a fact.

Mr. GESELL. I figure it to be Thursday.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, we have got a calendar now.

General MARSHALL. I have a calendar here of the month of November. The meeting that the Secretary of War is talking about was on November 25?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. November 25, 1941, was a Tuesday.

Senator FERGUSON. Was on a Tuesday; yes.

General MARSHALL. Monday was November 24.

[3368] Senator FERGUSON. Then it would be by the next Monday.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "Perhaps next Monday," he said, "for the Japs are notorious"—what date was Monday? The 1st?

General MARSHALL. November 30.

Mr. GESELL. The 30th is Sunday, isn't it? Monday is the 1st.

Senator FERGUSON. Monday would be the 1st, would it not?

General MARSHALL. That is correct; December 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading on, "for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning. The question was what we should do."

This is the President talking, as I understand it. Is that correct?

General MARSHALL. I assume that "we" refers to the President's statement. That is not quite clear from this.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that refresh your memory, General, as to what took place in that meeting of November 25 at the White House?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And would you say that was accurate as to what took place?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection to the contrary; [3369] I will put it that way, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Reading on:

"When I got back to the Department, I found news from G-2 that a Japanese expedition had started."

This is all out of his diary. Do you know what that news was?

General MARSHALL. Out of his diary, I see here, "five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships, and had been sighted south of Formosa."

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel have that particular information of G-2?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. That is item 24 of Exhibit 33, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. General, would you look at that and identify it?

General MARSHALL. This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated November 25, 1941, and signed by Sherman Miles, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a part of an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It is part of an exhibit. I just want to get it identified in relation to this testimony.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I identify the document.

[3370] Senator FERGUSON. Would you say, General, that that was the information that they are speaking about here in G-2? See whether you can find anything there about the five divisions.

General MARSHALL. That is what I am looking for. I do not find a direct reference to five divisions.

Senator FERGUSON. Could there be another message? Do you find any place there anything about Shantung or Shanghai or Shansi?

General MARSHALL. He does not use the expression "five divisions," he refers to the number of transports and their character of loading.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you find anything in there about the 30, 40, or 50 ships in the G-2 message?

General MARSHALL. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, could it be that there is another message that we do not have?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir. That may be.

Senator FERGUSON. That could be a very important message, because it may indicate they are going to cross this line that we had talked about this morning?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So it would be an important message, would it not, General?

[3371] General MARSHALL. It would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This one only shows in the back "Distribution: Secretary of War, War Plans Division GHQ."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; and of course the recipient, the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Could the reason we did not get all these in this book be that it was an Admiralty message, from the British Admiralty to the Navy, going to G-2?

General MARSHALL. I do not know about that, sir. I think General Miles could testify undoubtedly in regard to it, and possible General Gerow.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel to see whether they can locate another message that may be the one I am talking about.

Mr. MITCHELL. Those in exhibit 33 are not messages at all. They are estimates.

Senator FERGUSON. This does not appear to be an estimate.

Mr. MITCHELL. What are you referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about this:

"When I got back to the Department, I found news from G-2 that a Japanese expedition had started."

This is the Secretary of War speaking.

Five divisions had come down from Shantung, Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships, and had been sighted south of Formosa. I at [3372] once called up Hull and told him about it, and sent copies to him and to the President of the message.

Now he is speaking about a message and not an estimate. Would not you say that is correct, General?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It would not be an estimate. He is speaking about a message.

General MARSHALL. There is a message of some sort somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, he goes on, "of this message that I am speaking of from G-2 that is the end of the note on November 25."

Now, would you say, General, that that refreshes your memory, that you were at the White House with the President and the two Secretaries, and it was at that time that you were to prepare a memo-

randum, and that memorandum is exhibit 17, which is dated November 27, 1941?

General MARSHALL. I would think that is the probability, sir, and I would think also as the result of that conference, we probably became involved in the discussion at the meeting of the Joint Board on November 26, on that morning, following this meeting with the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we could go on on the 26th to see whether there was anything that happened there that [3373] would be put in this message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we will talk about Secretary Stimson—I ask counsel if he will try to locate that message there.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The message of November 25 refers to Naval intelligence. It was based upon that. That is at the top of the sheet there.

Senator FERGUSON. It says "From G-2." That is the only thing.

Mr. MURPHY. It says:

The following are extracts from cables received in the office of Naval Intelligence together with G-2 comment thereon.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that explain it to you, General? He is talking about an estimate, and you and I, as I understood you, are talking about a message.

General MARSHALL. The Secretary of War is referring to a message here, I think. We have been discussing what was the basis of the preparations of the estimate.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now let us go on to Secretary Stimson's diary of the 26th.

[3374] The following day, November 26—quoting from his diary—Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day.

Now, he would be talking there about the modus vivendi that you were discussing on the 25th at the White House?

General MARSHALL. That would be my assumption, sir.

[3375] Senator FERGUSON. Going further, "That means yesterday," the way the Colonel puts it, which would mean on the 25th, the day we talked about. Now, quoting from the diary—

to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all. A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night, about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down toward Indochina.

Now that refers back to that G-2 message, does it not?

General MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "He told me," that is the President speaking, "that he had not yet seen it. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2, and I at once got another copy of the paper which I had sent him last night and sent it over to him by special messenger. That was on the 26th."

Now that would indicate that on the 26th he had sent to the President this G-2 message, isn't that correct?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; the same one that he had sent the previous afternoon or evening.

Senator FERGUSON. Now does that refresh your memory as to what took place on the morning of the 26th before you went to one of the Carolinas?

[3376] General MARSHALL. It refreshes my memory to the extent that I connected up the meeting of the Joint Board on the morning of the 26th and the probable basis of the discussion that took place there which led, as I understand it and as I believe, to the drafting by General Gerow of the necessary alert messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I show you the minutes again of the morning of the 26th and see whether or not—you have a copy of it there, I believe.

General MARSHALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Take this one.

(The document was handed to General Marshall.)

Senator FERGUSON. See whether or not you find anything about that in the minutes of the meeting.

Do you want to identify that as an exhibit and give it an exhibit number, so we will know what we are talking about on the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you like to have it marked as an exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will call it Exhibit 62, and it is the Minutes of the Joint Board Meeting of November 26th.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 62.")

[3377] General MARSHALL. Minutes of the Meeting of November 26, 1941, of the Joint Board, Washington. There is no mention in the minutes of the meeting of November 26 of the Joint Board of the instructions to General Gerow for the preparation of a draft of an alert message.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for that being left out, if it was taken up?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, is it a fair statement then that as early as the 25th, and on the 26th, from the G-2 message that was mentioned on page 4051 of the record and being mentioned in Secretary Stimson's diary, that there was a possibility of a movement that would take the Japs across the line that had been designated in your previous testimony?

General MARSHALL. Towards the Gulf of Siam?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, there was.

Senator FERGUSON. This would be evidence that as early as this date there was a movement on that would cross those lines?

General MARSHALL. That might cross those lines.

Senator FERGUSON. That might cross those lines.

[3378] Now, reading from the testimony of Colonel Stimson:

November 27. As you know, this was a very important day.

Do you know why he described in his language as being a very important day?

General MARSHALL. I presume it was because of the dispatch of the alert messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Then quoting from his diary:

November 27, 1941. News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force leaving south from Shanghai, evidently headed toward Indochina, with a possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or the Burma Road, or the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.

Was that a fair estimate?

General MARSHALL. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Of what was coming in?

General MARSHALL. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next sentence:

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what is the finale.

General MARSHALL. He corrects that later.

[3379] Senator FERGUSON. (reading):

what is the finale, I put it here but I meant it was his final decision.

He explains what he meant by the "finale"; isn't that correct?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would take it from that that the Secretary of War had gotten from the Secretary of State his final decision?

General MARSHALL. Not quite that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what does it say?

General MARSHALL. You used the past tense. He says he called up to find out what it was. He may say later, I don't know, that he did find out.

Senator FERGUSON. It says, "I put it here, but I meant it was his final decision," quoting from his diary, "what his final decision had been with the Japanese, whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago, or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off."

Now, the "2 or 3 days ago" was the modus vivendi, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. That was my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever gone over with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the President, [3380] or anybody else this modus vivendi?

General MARSHALL. My recollection in regard to that is it was first brought to the attention of the War Department, in General Gerow's presence, at a meeting in Mr. Hull's office where General Gerow and Admiral Stark were present, and were called upon to express an opinion.

As I recall—and this is purely hearsay—they stated it appeared to be all right, but they wished time to think it over.

Then they each prepared a statement in which the general propositions of the modus vivendi were stated by them, not to involve any objectionable military conditions, except that General Gerow said—I do not believe he wrote it—that the reference in Admiral Stark's memorandum which would imply that we would do nothing to further build up the defenses of the Philippines was not an acceptable proposition, from the Army point of view.

Now, my next recollection is—and it is rather vague—that this same document was at least a partial basis of the discussion with the President at the meeting on November 25.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand then that you had approved this memorandum that General Gerow drew up in relation to the *modus vivendi*?

[3381] General MARSHALL. I had not expressed a formal approval of it, but I concurred with him in what he wrote, with the condition that he expressed orally to Admiral Stark, that the naval reply should not imply that we would be barred from the further development of the defenses in the Philippine Islands.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if you had the right to further fortify or, let us say, implement the Army in the Philippines, the *modus vivendi* as drawn was perfectly all right to you?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir; it was perfectly all right to me.

[3382] Senator FERGUSON. Now, quoting again from the diary (reading from the diary):

He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I wash my hands of and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."

That is the end of his quote from his diary.

I will ask you, General Marshall, when that information came to your knowledge, the first time?

General MARSHALL. You mean by "that information" Mr. Hull's statement, "I wash my hands of and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. I would assume that that information came to me for the first time on the morning of November 28, on my return to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. On the morning of November 28. Do you know who gave it to you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to Secretary Stimson?

General MARSHALL. I assume that I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And you assume then that you got it from him?

General MARSHALL. I assume he told me. He kept me pretty well informed of everything that was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, where did that place [3383] the Army, that information? What did it mean to you?

General MARSHALL. It meant to me, certainly now, and I presume then—

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is only fair to try to consider it history, if you might consider it history, in the past rather than in the future, now.

General MARSHALL. That is what I am trying to do, Mr. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I would like you to be able to do.

General MARSHALL. I assume it conveyed to me at that time the necessity for a general alert in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. That would, on the morning of the twenty-eighth, make you feel that a general alert in the Pacific was required?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. And on the morning of the twenty-eighth I was informed, by seeing the documents, that a general alert had been given.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, did you leave town the evening of the twenty-eighth again?

General MARSHALL. I do not think I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go twice to the maneuvers?

General MARSHALL. I will have to check that.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have that checked to see [3384] whether you left on the night of the twenty-eighth?

General MARSHALL. I will.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to the next question, No. 30, on page 4053, so that we will get the continuity (reading):

Mr. Secretary, I do not like to disturb you but I have become a little confused on dates about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th?

Mr. STIMSON. That was on the 27th.

General RUSSELL. Twenty-seventh, the day after the 26th.

Mr. STIMSON. Was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Or whether he would break it off, and on the morning of the 27th by telephone he told me that he had decided to break it off.

That makes the record very clear that the conversation between Secretary Stimson and the Secretary of State was on the morning of the 27th.

Would not you say that is clear now, from that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that your understanding?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To refresh your memory, General, on whether or not you left town on the night, or the afternoon [3385] of the twenty-eighth, the same testimony, taken August 7, 1944, before the Pearl Harbor Board, question No. 50:

General RUSSELL. Do you recall giving instructions for the preparation of that message, or participate in its preparation?

General MARSHALL. I was away on the 27th. I left here on the afternoon of the 26th. I went down to maneuvers in North Carolina and did not return until the night of the 27th. Incidentally, I think I left immediately after that on the 28th and went back again, and I have a rather distinct recollection of comparing the effects of this statement.

Does that in any way refresh your memory?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I will have to try to check up and find out. Incidentally, when I appeared in that hearing I only had about 45 minutes to prepare myself, so I did not have my data.

Senator FERGUSON. Then taking question No. 33:

Mr. STIMSON. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off.

Quoting from his diary:

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it. General Arnold came in—

"This is to my office.

[3386] "General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands, and these planes can fly high over them and beyond the reach of their pursuit planes, and take photographs."

Now I ask you to turn to page No. 6 of Exhibit 32.

General MARSHALL. You wish me to read this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I want you to read that message into the record, and then I will talk to you about it.

General MARSHALL [reading]:

November 26, 1941
RCA 831 US GOVT
Washington DC Nov 26 1941 1149P
Commanding General
Hawaiian Department Ft Shafter TH
Four six five twenty-sixth

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caroline group, Jaluit in the Marshall group stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps stop [3387] Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation stop The two pilots and coplits should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing ponape while enroute Moresby stop Advise Pilots best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu

ADAMS

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, is that the message they are talking about here in the diary?

General MARSHALL. I presume that is the message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was sent out on the 26th of [3388] November 1941?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When is the first that you knew such a message had been sent out?

General MARSHALL. I could not say as to that, sir. I was familiar with what they were going to do, and the directions were being given about it.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you knew before you left on the 26th that such a mission was contemplated and going to be advised?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I had authorized the procedure.

Senator FERGUSON. You had authorized the procedure. Now was that discussed at the meeting of the 25th at the White House?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir. It probably was mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Probably mentioned. Well, it was a very important mission, was it not, General?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; it was important. Or, rather, I would say it was a rather delicate mission, because that was taking us directly over the Japanese islands and we had to consider whether or not they would grasp at that as a hostile threat.

[3389] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now I want to ask you in relation to the use of the telephone as an overt act to Hawaii, compared to this action, as to how you would compare it.

General MARSHALL. I would say the use of a telephone depended on what was being said on the telephone.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, to alert the Hawaiians.

General MARSHALL. That is a matter of judgment, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want your explanation of it.

General MARSHALL. I will go into this first, the question of the air flight. General Arnold discussed that with the Secretary of War, because we regarded it as a very delicate proposition. We could not figure any other way how to obtain this information. We thought it was very important that we should know. We thought it possible that by flying at a high altitude we might get by with the thing without more than a Japanese objection to our coming into their mandated area. However, we had to accept the possibility that they would seize upon this as an overt act.

As to the telephone message, I feel if they knew exactly what we were doing, which they would have ascertained from the telephone message, that there were two factors involved: One was the explanation of why we took that action, which was the receipt of a magic message, the only way we could [3390] obtain that, and the other was the fact we were alerting the garrisons which they could construe as a hostile act.

Now there was brought to my attention in that connection an item of my testimony on page 3109, lines 8 and 9—no, I am wrong. I will strike that all out. It does not apply to this.

That is the best answer I can give you, Senator. I will say this, though, in conclusion, that my comments about the telephone, where I explained my own state of mind in general regarding the serious aspect of the telephone, should not be read in the light of assuming that that was definitely why I did not telephone, because just exactly why I did not telephone I do not undertake to explain right now, because I am too involved in back sights to try to determine definitely what was going on in my head at that particular moment.

There was the question of time involved. The only thing I can say, I am quite certain I am right, is had I telephoned I would have telephoned to the Philippines first.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would alerting our own Army on the Philippines, from a military standpoint, be an overt act against any country?

General MARSHALL. I would not consider it as such.

Senator FERGUSON. Would, from an Army viewpoint, the flying of these planes over this Japanese territory, the [3391] mandated islands, would that be an overt act? I am asking you first as to whether the question—

General MARSHALL. Yes, I understand you are asking me, Senator. It would certainly be assumed as an indiscreet act, because the flight of our planes over any foreign territory was always supposed to be by previous arrangement, and particularly that would apply to military, to combat planes. Therefore, we were doing something quite definitely that the Japanese might seize upon as an overt act. They themselves had been doing it, but that is not the point.

[3392] Senator FERGUSON. General, the last few words of the message indicate that you felt it might be considered an overt act, because we would need guns and ammunition to protect ourselves.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. We were assuming that Japan would treat it as an overt act and that our military authorities felt we should arm our men in these planes, because it says "airplanes are fully equipped with guns and ammunition on departure from Honolulu."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Adams?

General MARSHALL. Adams is the Adjutant General of the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. This was a matter of action?

General MARSHALL. A matter of action?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it was a message for action, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; it is a direction to do something.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; direction, and Adams had that authority.

[3393] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. However, I wish to intervene here a moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I wish you would.

General MARSHALL. You used the expression that we are assuming that that was an overt act. We were taking the chance of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you guarded against it if they had been attacked.

General MARSHALL. We did not leave our crews in a helpless position. The question was whether they should chance it. We would never be able to find anything in regard to the mandated islands, and it had now become imperative, in our view, to learn something of what the state of affairs in the mandated islands was, particularly as it related to the Japanese fleet.

I was asked questions as to whether I was aware of the fact that we had lost track of where certain Japanese vessels were. On November 26, at the meeting of the Joint Board in Washington, there is this paragraph in the minutes in relation to this matter—

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read that.

General MARSHALL (reading):

The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific situation. The Navy had information that Japanese airplanes had been making reconnaissance and photo- [3394] graphic flights over the United States islands in the western Pacific. It was felt that in view of recent developments indicating reinforcements and activity in the construction of defense installations in the Marshall and Caroline Islands, efforts should be made on the part of the United States to photograph the more important of these islands.

General Arnold announced that two planes were already en route from Dayton to the Philippines with photographic equipment and with instructions to photograph Truk, Jaluit and other important Japanese islands as required. With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced that the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the United States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the islands in the Far East, and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged in the stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, without delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired, so that instructions could be given to the pilots engaged on the two photographic missions.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the end of the quote?

[3395] General MARSHALL. That is the end of the quote.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that prior to the 26th these ships were already on their way in this mission?

General MARSHALL. Those ships were equipped and on their way to the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I was wondering if it is not a fact that the record shows the flight was never undertaken?

Senator FERGUSON. I was going to ask the General that in the next question.

You say they were on the way to the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. They were on their way to the Philippines with photographic equipment.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was this message to alert them to carry on that mission, the one I read here?

General MARSHALL. This message was to instruct them to make this photographic mission en route to the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. They were to stop and confer with Admiral Kimmel?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then go on to Truk and make the [3396] various photographs?

General MARSHALL. On their way to the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Now, do you know when it was decided actually to do this photographing? What day?

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether the records will show that. I do not remember it, and I do not know whether the records will show that. I know I discussed it with General Arnold, and also required it to be taken up with the Secretary of War, because of the dangers of involvements.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you take it up with anybody else?

General MARSHALL. I think it came originally from the Navy to the Army in connection with these references here of Admiral Hart.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned in your minutes some message of Admiral Hart.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I have not had the opportunity to see those minutes before. I would ask counsel, do we have that message?

General MARSHALL. It states here:

With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced [3397] that the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the United States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the islands in the Far East and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged in the stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, without delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired so that instructions could be given to the pilots engaged on the two photographic missions.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you know whether it was ever carried out?

General MARSHALL. I believe, sir, the planes never got away from Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. You say they never got away from Hawaii. You mean that they could not get away?

General MARSHALL. I believe they became involved in the attack. However, that is a matter that somebody else can give better testimony on.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I understand.

General, might I suggest here that you attempt to get the Hart proposal mentioned in the minutes?

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you like to get the wire from Hart [3398] if there is one?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Asking that this reconnaissance photographing be made?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will try to get it.

Senator LUCAS. Is Admiral Hart on the list as a witness, Senator Hart?

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't think he has been, up to date.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, going on, General, page 4054, and reading from the diary—he says first:

This is all the 27th.

Now, reading from the diary:

"Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow."

This is a throw-in: He was the Chief of the War Plans Division at that time, corresponding to the present Chief of Operations.

Now, quoting from the diary:

"Marshall is down at the maneuvers today."

That was the maneuvers in North Carolina.

"A draft memorandum"—

These next three lines are not from my own memorandum, but from what appears from another paper:

[3399] "A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed."

Now, General, does that sentence refer to Exhibit 17?

General MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that before you left, this instrument dated November 27, 1941, had been prepared?

General MARSHALL. It may have been, sir, but I don't think that is the necessary deduction because I had not yet signed it, apparently.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it had been drafted.

General MARSHALL. Whether or not we had discussed it and directed the drafting, or whether I had seen the draft and directed the changes I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. This would indicate on the morning of the 27th at this meeting, wherever the meeting was, that Secretary Stimson put in the diary that he had before him,

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed—indicating that that was the instrument that they were examining.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to Exhibit 45—I am [3400] sorry to keep switching—

General MARSHALL. I just lost the paper.

I have it now.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President.

That is the same message, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next:

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.

What is meant by that sentence?

General MARSHALL. Well, I will have to merely read it here and then attempt to construe it, but I am not the best witness.

The Secretary of War and General Gerow, it seems to me, would be. If you want me to read the sentence and then make a guess of what I think they mean, I will do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever discussed with you as to what was its meaning?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall discussing the memorandum with the Secretary of War.

[3401] Senator FERGUSON. Had you any conversation with anyone in relation to that "he request Japan to reopen the conversations"?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what is the explanation of that sentence in that memorandum, Exhibit 45?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to that question. The gentleman has said definitely that it would be his own interpretation, that he wasn't the best witness. Why have the General give an interpretation that might be in contradiction with the witnesses who know?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recalls that the General said that his answer would be only a guess, and that the Secretary of War and General Gerow would be the best witnesses.

Whether the General's guess would be in conflict with the testimony, the positive testimony of the Secretary of War and General Gerow, the Chair can't say. As between a guess on the part of the General and the positive testimony on the part of the Secretary of War and General Gerow, the Chair would assume that the guess would go out of the window if there was any conflict.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your answer, General?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know—and I ask for information—how long are we going to take with [3402] guesses in the course of this proceeding with a witness who tells you directly that he can't answer the question and it would be only a guess and that he is not the best witness. How long are we to continue with this type of delay?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can't answer that question. Of course, in any legal proceeding, in a court, the Chair imagines that a court would instruct the jury to disregard a guess if there was positive testimony on the point, but this is not, strictly speaking, a court procedure, and the Chair can't answer the question propounded by the Senator from Illinois. But it would seem advisable, in order to get at the facts, that the committee devote as little time as possible to guesses, and as much time as possible to positive evidence on the part of those who can testify.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I put upon the record my version on that matter, and reason for asking the question?

Here is a case where a memorandum was to be prepared by this witness, by General Marshall. It was to make sure that certain things would not get into that memorandum. A man who was superior in command, to a certain extent, the Secretary of War, was sending a message to the Chief of Staff that certain things would not go into the memorandum [3403] to the President.

Now, I want to question this witness as to what he understood by that, because he had to have an understanding, and it can't be a guess, as to what was meant by it, so that it could not get into this official record that was going to the President, and it was to be over his signature.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness is the best judge as to whether his answer to any question is a guess.

General MARSHALL. I will attempt to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman is certain General Marshall will answer the question to the best of his ability.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

General MARSHALL. In the preparation of—

Senator FERGUSON. General, if your answer is going to be a guess, I don't want it.

General MARSHALL. I will go up to the point where I introduced the guess and let you decide whether you want it or not.

The preparation of the memorandum from Admiral Stark and myself, as the senior members of the Joint Board, that was not to be the opinion of the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the Navy; that was to be the opinion of the [3404] Joint Board, presumably, as represented by its senior members for the Navy and the Army, Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

Of course, as a matter of fact, in my own mind, if I determined that the Secretary of War, with his vast experience in diplomatic affairs of the world, as well as the War Department, with two terms as Secretary, felt that a certain phase of the thing was highly inadvisable, I would be very much influenced by that view on his part.

The CHAIRMAN. Very much what?

General MARSHALL. I would be very much influenced by that view on his part. Nevertheless, the memorandum had to be Admiral Stark's and mine, representing a Joint Board of which the Secretaries of War and Navy were not members. The reports were sent through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the President. They could approve them, disapprove them, or comment on them.

[3405] Now, as to just what was meant by this statement of General Gerow's, as to the Secretary of War, I can only guess at what was in the mind of the Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put another question.

Up to that point in your answer it is not a guess?

General MARSHALL. That is a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. The next question is: What conversation did you have with General Gerow about that sentence?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that I had any conference with General Gerow regarding that sentence. He is giving me here, dated November 27, which undoubtedly—it shows I noted it on the 28th, and probably the first business of the day, along with the alert messages—the statement of what had happened in the discussion with the Secretary of War. He had reached an understanding with the Secre-

tary of War without the exchange of the memorandum. I doubt if I even spoke to the Secretary of War regarding it, and I doubt if I discussed it with General Gerow. The Secretary of War had apparently been assured that the memorandum, so far as it was written, didn't do violence to his own ideas, and I was prepared to sign it the way it stood.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether you had signed the instrument prior to that discussion with Gerow?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir. It is dated [3406] November 28, and I couldn't have signed it on the 27th because I was not here, unless they brought it to me late at night, and I am quite certain they did not do that.

Senator FERGUSON. So probably at the time that you had the memorandum, Exhibit 45, you had before you Exhibit 17 unsigned and you didn't sign it until after you had your conversation with Gerow about the instrument?

General MARSHALL. Presumably so. I may not have even had any conversation with Gerow if I had Exhibit 45 before me at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have a conversation with Secretary Stimson about that particular point?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection. I had many conversations with the Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I mean on that particular point, about reopening the conversations.

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of a conversation with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, regarding that specific point. I do have a recollection of frequent discussions with Mr. Stimson about the proceedings of the diplomatic interchange with relation to how far they should go.

Senator FERGUSON. The next sentence [reading]:

It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

[3407] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that so that it would make sure it covered that particular point and any other point?

General MARSHALL. I am a little confused about that particular statement, except that he may, Gerow may have, assured the Secretary of War that that memorandum would go to him en route to the President, because the proceedings of the Joint Board were, I thought, invariably sent through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Take the third paragraph:

Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War.

What message are they talking about there?

General MARSHALL. I presume he is referring to the alert message.

Senator FERGUSON. The alert message?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON [reading]:

* * * and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum.

That would be Exhibit 17.

General MARSHALL. I presume so, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached)."

[3408] What were the changes in this memorandum made by the Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir. General Gerow will have to give you that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel, do we have the original so that we can find out here? It says "copy attached." Was any copy attached to Exhibit 45?

Mr. MITCHELL. The memorandum that was attached is already in evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Exhibit 17?

Mr. MITCHELL. As part of Exhibit 17. That doesn't show any alterations. It is a fair copy.

Senator FERGUSON. Has there been any attempt to get the original to show what changes were made?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not at all. I have never known any reason to ask for it.

Senator FERGUSON. General, have you any idea what changes were made?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And—

General MARSHALL. I presume if that shows in the record, it will be shown on one of the draft copies in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. As a rule are they kept?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3409] Senator FERGUSON. Now, reading from the diary, that is, from the testimony on page 4054:

That appears in the memorandum which is already in evidence, by General Gerow, to General Marshall, the memorandum of November 27.

General RUSSELL. The joint statement is in evidence, not where the Secretary suggested, but General Marshall put it in evidence. We are acquainted with the joint statement.

Now, going down to his diary:

36. Mr. STIMSON. Because it governed the—it helped—explains the next sentence. Now I begin with my own record:

. Quoting from the diary:

"I said that I was glad to have time, but I did not want it at the cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing, which would show a weakness on our part."

And I go on:

Quoting from his diary:

"But the main question at this meeting"—The meeting of Knox, Stark, Gerow and myself.

"—was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur."

Now, at that time, were you talking about a message to anyone else but MacArthur?

General MARSHALL. At that time meaning this meeting [3410] that he is referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I don't know, sir. I wasn't present.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you take it from the diary that that is the only one they were talking about. Next he explains the alert to the others. I will read it:

"We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert;"—

What is a quasi-alert?

General MARSHALL. That is a legal term that you gentlemen will have to interpret.

Senator FERGUSON. Well—

General MARSHALL. He says, "or the first signal for an alert."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and now he says—I am reading from his diary:

"We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he"—

Then he says:

That was the recipient.

"—should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was."

[3411] What are they talking about there?

General MARSHALL. It would appear from reading his testimony he is talking at this moment about an alert to General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. You had already given him the 24th alert.

General MARSHALL. That is what he was generally referring to as a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, as Chief of Staff, was that an all-out alert?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that Secretary Stimson had talked with the President as indicated in that paragraph from his diary?

General MARSHALL. I don't know, sir. I assume that I may have been told by the Secretary or by General Gerow on the morning of the 28th on my return to Washington. I don't believe General Gerow tells me that in this memorandum. It must be just a presumption on my part that the Secretary or General Gerow or both of them spoke of it to me. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall now ever getting that information?

General MARSHALL. I do not, sir.

[3412] Senator FERGUSON. That would be at least an amendment to the alert of the 24th, would it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading on):

Now, to understand what I was talking about, an earlier alert, I am not sure which one I meant, but we had sent a message which would meet with the description, on November 24th, a joint Army and Navy message, but we had also sent warnings back as far as July 7, July 25, October 16, and October 20, which contained warnings to the members of the—commanders of the outposts as to the situation that was going on with Japan.

Do you recall those messages, those different alerts that he is talking about—or were they alerts?

General MARSHALL. I don't think they were alerts. They were information bearing on the increasing and critical situation. Just what they were on the specific dates I am not prepared at the moment to testify.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he goes back and says:

Now I go back to my narrative:

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him."

General MARSHALL. He says:

That is, I was talking about MacArthur especially, but [3413] we were sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska.

Senator FERGUSON. But that last part was not in the diary.

General MARSHALL. That is not in the diary.

Senator FERGUSON. The diary only referred to the one to MacArthur; is that correct?

General MARSHALL. So far.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the next page will you read what he says.

General MARSHALL (reading):

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was."

Senator FERGUSON. Talking about this message that would be signed from you to MacArthur?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 27th?

General MARSHALL. That is my assumption.

Senator FERGUSON. Being alert, and the one that had been discussed with the President, up on the top of page 4054; is that correct?

Page 4055:

"* * * on talking with the President this morning [3414] over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely—"

General MARSHALL. I presume that is what it is.

[3415] Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, will you read on from the testimony prepared.

General MARSHALL. This is not the diary (reading):

That is the situation between him and the Japanese envoys.

Now, let me have the message, that message which I have been referring to here.

The thing I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two Governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right. You see that message opens with these sentences:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, just a moment there. The message to MacArthur opened with those particular sentences that you read, with the two messages alike. Take the one to MacArthur and the one to General Short. That language is used in both, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That part of the message.

[3416] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you read on?

General MARSHALL (reading):

The thing I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two Governments—

I read that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL (reading):

That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President was to send a final alert, namely, that the man should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here.

That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I, of course, normally do; to see that the message, as sent, was framed in accordance with the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you go further, General, does [3417] that indicate to you that there had been a message drawn up that had different language in it?

General MARSHALL. I think that is the case, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the language was in the original message?

General MARSHALL. I don't know that. General Gerow would have that, undoubtedly.

[3418] Senator FERGUSON. But that would indicate that the first paragraph, at least the first part, was changed to meet the Secretary of War's conversation with the Secretary of State.

General MARSHALL. My understanding was it was modified by the Secretary of War to be in accord with his conversation with Mr. Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when was that first called to your attention?

General MARSHALL. Unless it is called to my attention in this memorandum of General Gerow's to me dated November 27, which I read for the first time on the morning of the 28th, I do not know that it was ever called to my attention.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, with the message that was being drafted by the Secretary of War, the change being made, you know that he was going from the Secretary of State and his conversation with the President, as he says at the top:

That was why I was in here. While Marshall was away I had had a decision from the President on that subject and I regarded it as my business to do what I, of course, normally do, to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts.

That is, the facts as considered by those two men and by myself.

[3419] Now, what my question is is this: Who could change the language of such a message or who could supplement it?

General MARSHALL. The President, the Secretary of War, and myself. The proposals could be made by the head of the War Plans Division. They might be commented upon and changes proposed by the Deputy Chief of Staff. They might in relation to the references

to the enemy's status be commented on and different proposals made by G-2 of the Army, but in principle I would say that the only people that could directly change the message would be the President, the Secretary of War, or myself.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be true because of the language there, as I quote, from the President "that we should send the final alert, namely, that he"—that was the recipient—"should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him how the situation was."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The others could advise, but the only three that could change were the ones that you have mentioned?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or supplement it.

General MARSHALL. Of course, you must understand that the original proposal would come in in written form, in the [3420] usual circumstances, from the War Plans Division where it might even be prepared by some captain. However, the responsibility for the message in going forward would be General Gerow's, and then beyond them it would be mine; and if I am not present, the Secretary of War's.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, read on, will you please, General?

General MARSHALL (reading).

I speak there in the words of the message to MacArthur, but there were four messages sent out that are in evidence, and you will see the message to Hawaii carries the annotation on the back of it, which is very extraordinary, "Shown to the Secretary of War," and after they had drafted it. And we were covering the situation in the four great outposts of the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that was not in the diary, that last part? It does not show.

General MARSHALL. That is a statement without regard, apparently, to the diary.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. It goes on with a question:

General GRUNERT. Has the Secretary finished regarding that message?

Mr. STIMSON. No. I have been regarding that message, [3421] yes. I am just going over to the next, to the following day.

General GRUNERT. I would like to ask whether you saw the rest of that message and whether you prepared the rest of the message or approved what was in that message.

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, yes; this message that I have just read a portion of to you, I went over very carefully the whole message.

General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Because the part that I read you was merely the part which I have consulted Mr. Hull about.

General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Because the part that I read you was merely the part which I have consulted Mr. Hull about.

General GRUNERT. We have that message in evidence.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

General GRUNERT. And lots of testimony about it.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

General GRUNERT. All I wanted to know was whether you were actually acquainted with the rest of the contents of that message.

Mr. STIMSON. I was.

General GRUNERT. Yes.

[3422] Mr. STIMSON. And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there.

General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, before you go away from that message, which we have considered and are considering rather seriously: When General Gerow came to your office that morning did he have a rough draft of that message?

Mr. STIMSON. I can't remember that, sir.

General RUSSELL. In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he stated, relative to the first sentence of the message, that initially the first sentence was to the effect that negotiations had terminated; that confirming your report now, you called the Secretary of State, who suggested this other language; to all intents and purposes it had been terminated, with only a slight possibility of their being resumed.

This is General Russell's statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Right there is where I want to ask you. Do you recall, or do you know, or do you have knowledge that the original draft of the message to General Short and General MacArthur was, as the sentence indicates, "that initially the first sentence was to the effect that negotiations had terminated"?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that I was aware [3423] of what the original proposal was other than what the form of the final message was. It may be that the record will show that I saw both drafts. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at Exhibit 37, page 36? That is the message by the Navy to CINCAF, CINCPAC, where they use the language:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

That is page 36, Exhibit 37. Do you have that exhibit, General?

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 36 it is, of Exhibit 37.

General MARSHALL. It is page 36?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, page 36: "Have ceased." It is the third line down.

General MARSHALL. I must have some wrong paper here. Where is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 36.

Mr. GESELL. The war warning message.

Senator FERGUSON. The war warning message:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Exhibit 37, page 36.

Mr. GESELL. Here it is.

GENERAL MARSHALL. What is the question, please, Senator? [3424]

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to know whether or not the one from Navy on the same day as the one that went out from the Army did not use the language that the negotiations had ceased, just like it was stated in the testimony that you have just read here. I will read it again:

In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he stated, relative to the first sentence of the message, that initially the first sentence was to the effect that negotiations had terminated.

Then it was changed to the language used by Secretary Stimson:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, and so forth.

Now, take the Navy message that went out on the same day as an alert. There they say that they have ceased.

Would that explain that the two messages were to go out alike as far as the termination of the negotiations and that because of the con-

versation with Secretary Hull by Secretary Stimson there was a change in the one that went to the Army?

General MARSHALL. That would be my assumption of what [3425] had happened, that the original messages had been prepared in conjunction with the Navy, General Gerow and Admiral Turner, and that certain phraseology had been used. The Army message, though, through the intervention of Mr. Stimson had been changed following his conversation with Mr. Hull. The Navy message I am assuming probably had already been dispatched.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. There is an explanation by General Gerow on exactly that at page 2690 of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you want to put it in now?

Mr. MURPHY. No. It is already in on page 2690.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, General, reading those two alerts can you comment on—as a military man and as Chief of Staff—which is the stronger of those two messages as an alert as far as the ceasing of the negotiations, those two sentences?

General MARSHALL. The Navy message reads:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

[3426] Senator FERGUSON. Now, up to that part, "negotiation."

Senator LUCAS. I insist, Mr. Chairman, if you are going to construe a document or compare two documents that the witness ought to have a right to look at all parts of it. You cannot take one paragraph or one sentence of a document in construing it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is correct. The General had just read the pertinent part of the Navy message and I assume he was in the act of reading the comparable part of the Army message. I think that is what Senator Ferguson was after, wasn't it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What I am trying to do is to get the two messages in the first sentence as they relate to termination of negotiations, and I have some other questions about the whole message.

General MARSHALL. The message sent by the Army on November 27 states:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

Then it goes on to say:

Japanese future action unpredictable.

The naval message, of course, is in stronger terms in- [3427]
dicative of the termination of negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, which is the stronger there—the Navy?

General MARSHALL. I just attempted to state that, sir, that the naval message terms are the stronger, indicative of the termination of diplomatic relations—negotiations rather than relations.

Senator LUCAS. Why don't you let the witness answer? Why should you cut him off in the middle of an answer?

Senator FERGUSON. Have you been cut off, General?

Senator LUCAS. You just put words in his mouth that are before you, Senator, when he was trying to answer a simple question.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to make any explanation, General?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I have nothing to say.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us take the two messages, as has been suggested.

Senator LUCAS. He is the Chief of Staff, he is a General and he ought to have the utmost respect shown him.

General MARSHALL. I have them both here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Take the next sentence:

An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese [3428] troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Now, General, that is a sentence which indicates an expedition, a specific expedition against one of three places, is that not correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the possibility of a fourth?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us take the one to the Army, let us take the language in the one to the Army.

General MARSHALL. "Japanese action."

Senator FERGUSON. "Future action unpredictable."

General MARSHALL. "Japanese future action unpredictable."

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

General MARSHALL (continuing):

But hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, we will just read down to what is predicted before we get to the overt sentence. Now, in that one is there any specific expedition set forth?

General MARSHALL. There is not, sir.

[3429] Senator FERGUSON. Now, which is the most specific message as far as that sentence is concerned?

General MARSHALL. The naval message.

Senator FERGUSON. The Navy message because it outlines three specific movements and a possibility of a fourth, and the Army message is only unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

General MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say the Navy message was more specific there. Do you know why the two messages differed in relation to that sentence?

General MARSHALL. I could not say, sir. I imagine it was the possible views of the individuals drafting them either as to where the Japanese were going to strike or as to the desirability of indicating a particular place as against the desirability of indicating a general alert for any place.

Senator FERGUSON. So one is a specific alert, the one of the Navy, and the one of the Army is general.

General MARSHALL. No; they are both alerts in one message, including indications of where it is thought the Japanese action might be.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MARSHALL. The degree of alert is not the point.

Senator FERGUSON. Take the next sentence in the Navy [3430] message, will you read it, after the "Borneo"?

General MARSHALL. Yes [reading]:

Execute an appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X Inform District and Army authorities.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, shouldn't the "X" after the "46" be a period?

General MARSHALL. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a period?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is a sentence. Now, that is a specific order, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. (Reading:)

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

All right. Now let us take the next sentence in the Army one. Would you read it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir [reading]:

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action [3431] you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, let us stop at that part. Is that as specific, is that as strong in the alert as the one in the Navy where he is to take and "execute an appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46"?

General MARSHALL. Possibly as strong except that it has a proviso regarding the overt act.

Senator FERGUSON. It has a proviso in it. Let us take the next sentence:

Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo Inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Now, the "report measures taken" is not in the Navy at all. They are ordered to do certain things, are they not, and you ask in the Army one over your signature that you are to be advised as to what measures were taken. The other one says: "Take appropriate measures against sabotage," is the last part.

Now, which is the stronger of those two, where you ask for "report measures taken" and the other one is a direct order?

[3432] General MARSHALL. I do not know that I would say either one was stronger than the other. It is a different approach to the same problem.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had close coordination between the Army and Navy with these two branches working where they had to work out in the field, would you have had the difference in these messages? They were sent on the same day.

General MARSHALL. I will have to reflect a little bit on that.

Senator FERGUSON. I beg pardon?

General MARSHALL. I will have to reflect a little bit on that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General MARSHALL. I think that if the two agencies were side by side there is less probability of a conflict in messages. We were in the same string of buildings at that time, the Munitions Buildings, so we were not very remote one from the other, but they were separate agencies, of course, with long traditions each of its own. I think if it had been a single group there, naturally, would have been a less possibility of the contradictory messages. I do not imply that these two messages are contradictory. That is my answer, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, General, that is your explanation as to how, or as to why the exhibits are not the same. [3433]

General MARSHALL. I did not state that as an explanation, sir. I was giving you a view as to the possibility of what might have been if there had been a different arrangement of the two sections, the Operations section of the Navy and the War Plans Division, which is the operations section of the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, General, here is what I have in mind. They were to inform the Army, and the Army getting its own messages and informing the Navy. At the field the messages were to go one to the other.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not possible or probable that because of the difference in the language, one designating that it had ceased and the other one that it had terminated for all practical purposes with only the barest possibility, the one being for three specific expeditions and a possible fourth, the other being general in its nature, one calling for a report back, the other one directing that a specific plan be put into effect, that the men who received them in the field would be confused as to the meaning, and that when the report came back as to what action was taken that it then became the duty of those in Washington to catch that there was confusion and to straighten it out as of the 28th?

[3434] General MARSHALL. That might be, Senator, but I don't see how it could create that much of a confusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Four o'clock having arrived, the committee—

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn may I say just one word?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. There was an almanac—not an almanac, but a calendar, a small calendar that was used and I was just wondering whether or not that should not be marked as an exhibit. I would like to have it because we will be referring to that calendar probably 40 or 50 times between now and the time this committee meeting is over. Who has that calendar?

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. We have not recessed.

If anybody can identify that calendar and mark it as exhibit number anything.

Mr. MITCHELL. The court will take judicial notice of it and you will have other copies.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be possible to ascertain from what almanac that sheet of the calendar was taken?

Senator LUCAS. I would like to know whether it is an original document, too.

[3435] The CHAIRMAN. Maybe we can straighten that out by 10 o'clock tomorrow and the committee will stand in recess until that time.

(Whereupon, at 4:03 p. m., December 10, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock a. m., Tuesday, December 11, 1945.)

[3436]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[3437] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a little, Mr. Chairman.

A memorandum from Colonel Duncombe, our chief liaison officer in the War Department, dated today contains this statement:

At Record 3343 and 3408 request was made for drafts of the 27 November 1941 Marshall warning message and the 27 November 1941 memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President. Careful search of War Department files has disclosed no drafts of either of those documents.

By that he means preliminary drafts.

You will be advised if further search discloses any such drafts.

Paragraph 2:

At Record 3311 question was raised as to whether the minutes of the Joint Board meeting of 3 November 1941 were attached to the memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall dated 5 November 1941. The War Department files indicate that the Joint Board minutes were not attached to the memorandum to the President.

Then another request was made with reference to the message of December 3, 1941, sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in Chief of the Asiatic Force, the Pacific Force, and the commanders of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth [3438] Naval Districts which reads as follows:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Request was made that we find out the source of that highly reliable information.

I have been informed that the highly reliable information referred to the contents of intercepted Jap diplomatic messages contained in exhibit 1, which show those instructions to their various ambassadors.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, do you have anything you want to offer at this time before you resume your testimony?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will continue to inquire.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. General, will you refer to page 1 of Exhibit 52? Will you read that message?

[3439] General MARSHALL (reading):

Sent June 17, 1940

Number 428. WE.

JUNE 17, 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

(Signed) ADAMS.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned yesterday that you had sent an alert in 1940.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the alert?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice that the first part of it is that, "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma."

[3440] That is a specific alert, is it not, for a defensive deployment?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is specific. Do you know why such an alert was not sent on the 27th?

General MARSHALL. You mean similarly couched?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. No, sir; except for this particular difference: Here Hawaii was being alerted because of information from some source which aroused in our minds the possibility of a raid specifically against Hawaii. Therefore, Hawaii was alerted for that reason.

[3441] Senator FERGUSON. Well, was not that the purpose of alerting then on the 27th of November?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but the War Department alert of November 27 was directed to all Pacific stations.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 8 of that same exhibit it indicates, from a message of yours, that the Navy had not been alerted.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time did—

General MARSHALL. Just a moment, Senator. You said it appears from a message of mine that the Navy——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Which message are you referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. The message on page 8 of Exhibit 52.

General MARSHALL. That is a message from General Herron.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a message to you instead of from you.

General MARSHALL. Yes; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Indicating that the Navy had not been alerted.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at that time that the Navy had not been alerted?

General MARSHALL. I have no distinct recollection in [3442] regard to that matter. I was under the impression that the Navy was aware of what we were doing, and I believe I heard here a communication from Admiral Richardson which would indicate that the Navy Department did know about it and informed him accordingly.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not that sometime later?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the date, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I notice in this alert of June 17, 1940, you suggest maneuver basis.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why was that?

General MARSHALL. We merely suggested that in relation to that portion of the alert which said, "to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents."

Senator FERGUSON. That was the purpose?

General MARSHALL. That was the suggestion.

Senator FERGUSON. You, at the end of the message, said, "Acknowledge." That is an entirely different matter from "Report action taken."

General MARSHALL. I would say that was different; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. One is merely to acknowledge as to whether or not the message reaches you.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

[3443] Senator FERGUSON. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that when an overseas commander is ordered to take "such measures as he deems necessary and to report measures taken to you," is he correct in assuming that if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would thereafter inform him specifically of the difference?

General MARSHALL. I would assume so.

Senator FERGUSON. You would assume that that is correct Army procedure?

General MARSHALL. I would say so.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the message that you sent on the 27th, signed by you, you have a statement in relation to the first overt act. Would you just read that, please?

General MARSHALL. That is November 27?

Senator FERGUSON. The message of the 27th.

General MARSHALL. The alert message to Hawaii?

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 7 of Exhibit 32.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator, are you referring to the one to Hawaii? You know several were sent that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the one to Hawaii. It reads this way, "If hostilities cannot repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act."

Can you tell us anything about why that was put in the message?

[3444] General MARSHALL. My recollection of that, sir, is that was a direct instruction from the President.

Senator FERGUSON. You received a direct instruction from the President, did you not, on that item?

General Marshall. Meaning that I received it personally?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. My recollection on that is not clear. I think I probably did receive it direct from the President.

Senator FERGUSON. I will try to refresh your memory by referring to your testimony given sometime before in the Navy board.

My recollection, stimulated by this portion of the message "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" I have a clear recollection of that. It was the instruction of the President. I also have a rather clear recollection of the following sentence, "This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense." My dimmer recollection is that I discussed that with General Gerow. He thinks I did not see the message. I might not have, but my recollection is quite clear in relation to the President's instructions because, as I recall that, they came to me personally, therefore I would have had to translate this into the message rather than General Gerow who would not have [3445] known.

Now does that refresh your memory?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but that does not change my statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you some questions now about that.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get the message personally from the President?

General MARSHALL. I stated, Senator, I do not recall. I assume I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you tell us when you got it?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before?

General MARSHALL. I am specific in my recollection that the President gave a direction to this effect. I think he gave it to me. I am not certain in regard to that, but I know that he gave it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you and he discuss the purpose of that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir; and I do not recall his giving me this. I think he did. I know that he gave that direction, I know that it had to be put in a message. It might have been that it came from some other [3446] sources. It might have been it came from Admiral Stark, or it might have been that it came from Mr. Stimson, but my own dim recollection is that he, the President, stated that to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the reason then that you feel you have seen the message, or at least knew that that kind of statement was going into the message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I was trying to reconstruct in my own mind my recollection of the preparation of this message. I knew there was this discussion as to how to include that statement about

the first overt act and not to discount the preparations for defense. I could not get clear in my own mind when those thoughts were going through my head, whether when I first read the complete message on the morning of the 28th on my return to Washington or whether they were in a discussion with General Gerow on the 26th before my departure from Washington at about 1 p. m.

Later, after making that statement, I saw Mr. Stimson's testimony and I also was told of General Gerow's testimony, and I also was reminded still further by being shown General Gerow's memorandum.

Now out of those I began to get a clear picture of what had happened. At the time when I was testifying I had not remembered Gerow's memorandum to me telling me of his meeting with the Secretary of War and the events that transpired in the preparation of this particular message.

[3447] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that sentence was in the original message that was drafted?

General MARSHALL. I do not, sir. I should imagine General Gerow might be able to tell you that.

Senator FERGUSON. He might be able to?

General MARSHALL. Yes. He was handling the papers and making the detailed arrangements.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the original message that you drafted in relation to an alert? I am talking about the one on the 27th that was drafted sometime before you went away. Was that drafted having in mind that a modus vivendi would be sent, the one you had been discussing with Secretary Hull?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You read sometime later the message of the 26th sent by Mr. Hull?

General MARSHALL. I either read it or was told of its contents.

Senator FERGUSON. You were either briefed on it, or told of its contents?

General MARSHALL. I was informed regarding it.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time was it customary for you to be briefed on matters that were going on?

General MARSHALL. It was customary for the Secretary of War to tell me what was going on in his conversations with the President and with Mr. Hull, and with Colonel Knox. It was customary, as is indicated by General Gerow's memorandum for him to brief me as to the occurrences that were important for me to know with which he was related during my absence.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it your opinion that the modus vivendi would have given you some time to prepare?

General MARSHALL. It was my opinion, as nearly as I can reconstruct it now, that the modus vivendi, if accepted by the Japanese, would have given us some time to prepare, but the general impression at that time was that the terms were too stiff and there was slight possibility of their acceptance.

I should have qualified that by saying I do not recall now how much of that thought has now entered my mind from reading these statements from Mr. Stimson's testimony and how much is clear recollection of today.

Senator FERGUSON. After you became acquainted with the message of the 26th, was there discussion between the officials that there was more chance of having the one of the 26th accepted than there was of having the *modus vivendi* accepted?

General MARSHALL. I could not recall my reaction to that, [3449] sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What I am trying to get is if there would be a change in your message of alert.

General MARSHALL. I do not think there would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Between the *modus vivendi* and the one of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. I do not think there would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think there would be a change on that.

General, I would like to have you get Exhibit 1. I want to ask you a few questions on that.

Have you ever read Secretary Knox's statement to the Jap Ambassador and his special aide at the time of the delivery of the message?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall whether I have or not. Maybe I can remind myself from this.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to refer you to page 787 of volume II of Foreign Relations.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a minute. Did you mean Knox in your former question?

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to say Secretary Hull's statement.

Refer to page 787. I just want you to glance at it, because I want to ask you a question as to whether that [3450] would refresh your memory.

General MARSHALL. That is starting at the bottom of the page there, "The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You need not read it aloud.

General MARSHALL. I just wanted to see if I had the right message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It is the one where he goes on to denounce the falsehoods in this 14-part message.

General MARSHALL. Well, I have a recollection of what Mr. Hull says there, but I believe I read it in the press.

Senator FERGUSON. Now would that indicate to you that not only the 14th part of the message, but the whole message contained these falsehoods and he was denouncing the whole message rather than just the mere end of it, the breaking off?

What I am trying to get at is the importance of this message.

General MARSHALL. Yes. He said, "In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was so crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions." That wording would indicate he was referring to the entire message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; he was referring to the entire [3451] message.

Did you have a reaction to the message when you first read it?

General MARSHALL. I did not have very much time, sir; because just as I got to the finish of it I got this 1 o'clock message.

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered if you had any similar reaction to that of Secretary Hull.

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir. I will answer to this effect:

When I reached the 1 o'clock message then it was indicated to my mind that action was needed as quickly as it could be managed, and I proceeded on that basis.

The next event which followed shortly after was the announcement of the attack on Pearl Harbor. I never read the Japanese message again. I had never read it again since then until the other day when I read it through to get some idea as to how long it must have taken me to read it for the first time.

I have to admit, sir, I got three-quarters of the way through, I got somewhere about China and I lost track of what my timing was, and I never got to it again.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 100 of Exhibit 1, message No. 736, will you just read that? That is a short one [3452] General.

General MARSHALL. This is on page 100?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, page 100, the top message No. 736.

General MARSHALL (reading):

SECRET

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

5 November, 1941.

#736.

(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Senator FERGUSON. That was translated on November 5, 1941. How soon would that be delivered to you as magic?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir. It is a Navy translation. The records would show that. I guess I would [3453] get it by the next day, maybe, or that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Once before we found in your testimony, or at least in your evidence now, that you felt something was going to happen along about that time, or did happen that would make the situation very tense. Now, does that message refresh your memory that the placing of that deadline date on the 25th was the item you had in mind?

General MARSHALL. Well that is the item I had in mind and I think my testimony will show, and my recollection is quite clear on this, that we were endeavoring to determine what significance the date of November 25 had. That date is designated here, and the statement is made,

Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving—of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition.

I am quite certain that this was discussed with the G-2, with the head of the War Plans Division. I know there were discussions as to what the significance of November 25 was. The only thing they could put their fingers on at that time as to date was the termination of the anti-Comintern pact. That did not seem to have a significant bearing but that was the only date we could tie to.

There was also this in the message which I have just [3454] read, "saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic

condition." So we tried to determine in our own minds what the significance was of November 25, and the only coincident date—I will put it that way—that we could put our fingers on, our thoughts applied to, was the termination of the anti-Comintern pact.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it expire on the 25th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, go to page 165 of that same Exhibit 1, message No. 812, from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 22, 1941, and translated November 22, 1941. There is this sentence in there:

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you)—twenty-ninth;

General MARSHALL. I am familiar with that message.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with that message. Do you know whether you received that about the 22d, when it was translated?

General MARSHALL. Well, I should assume that I received [3455] it the 22d or the 23d.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what did that mean to you? What was the significance of that message where they extended the time from the 25th, and he even wrote it out, the twenty-ninth?

General MARSHALL. The true significance of the message we did not determine, or we did not arrive at a conclusion as to what that might be. In that connection I refer back to the original message of the 25th, which related to saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. That was stated in the message giving the 25th as the date, and had to be considered in trying to interpret the meaning and purpose, or intent of the message which set November 29 as the limiting date.

Of course, knowing what happened, it is quite clear what the circumstances were which they had in mind in sending this information to their representatives here in Washington. Whether or not at that time they referred to the Russians, referred to the Germans, referred to the British, referred to any other things, diplomatically or otherwise, we could not tell.

[3456] Senator FERGUSON. General, did you discuss this matter of the extension of time with the war council?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that, sir. Maybe the records will show.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about the joint board or the Army board. I am talking about the war council. Do you know what I mean by the war council?

General MARSHALL. One is a meeting with the President. One is a meeting in Mr. Hull's office. Which do you refer to?

Senator FERGUSON. What did you call the one that was in the White House? It is the one that would be in the White House.

General MARSHALL. Frankly, I don't recall any name at the time. I was notified to be there and appeared.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear the name used, war council? In some of the testimony they used the expression "war council."

General MARSHALL. That may be. It was not a statutory arrangement.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, no; not at all.

General MARSHALL. It was a sort of informal procedure which had gradually evolved to the point of these almost stated meetings when Colonel Knox, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Hull, and occasionally I, made these visits to the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the deadline [3457] of the 25th was discussed with the President?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that. I don't doubt that it was. It undoubtedly was.

Senator FERGUSON. The 29th.

General MARSHALL. I would have no doubt in the matter. It must have been.

Senator FERGUSON. These two messages were very important? Very important messages?

General MARSHALL. Very important messages; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to page 173, Exhibit No. 1, a message from Tokyo to Washington, No. 823. That is a very short message:

The time limit set in my message No. 812-a is in Tokyo time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is "For both ambassadors."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Indicating that the 29th was Tokyo time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that that would be the 28th here?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that was a very important message, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That gave greater accuracy [3458] to what the 29th really meant.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consider at that time that that kind of a message would indicate that they were actually planning an attack?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That a deadline was set and they were giving a time and using the right date so there could be no question about it?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. What my reactions of the day were I cannot recall. My assumption would be that they failed to state that in the first message and that they had to state it later.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't consider it a zero day?

General MARSHALL. We didn't know what it was, Senator, for what purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice, if you go back to page 126 in exhibit 1 there is this expression, translated the 26th of November, received November 14:

Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the Cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American [3459] power in China.

Now, if Japan attempted that, would that mean war in your opinion?

General MARSHALL. It did not necessarily mean war. It certainly has the implication of possible war. They were already fighting in

China, they were already completely wrecking British and American trade possibilities in China.

Senator FERGUSON. On the top of page 127 :

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale.

Now, didn't that message indicate that they had in mind an attack on America?

General MARSHALL (reading) :

Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. "A world war."

General MARSHALL. "On a long-time scale."

Senator, I don't know. That might possibly mean exactly the opposite.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall seeing it, General?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall specifically this message. I probably did see it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it have any significance at the present time, that language?

[3460] General MARSHALL. I don't understand right now, in the light of all the events, what they mean by "long-time scale."

Senator FERGUSON. The part about the world war.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale.

As I say, I don't quite understand, in the light of events, what they mean by "on a long-time scale."

Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider there could be a world war as indicated there without the United States being in it?

General MARSHALL. If it is confined to China that was a possibility.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, they had always considered that the war in China, had they not, was merely an incident, and they weren't treating it as a declared war?

General MARSHALL. They were not treating it as a declared war, and I believe we were not, for convenience in supplying China.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to page 195, that is a message from Tokyo to Washington, November 28, 1941, No. 844, translated on the 28th.

General MARSHALL. No. 844. I see the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the part of the message I would like to have you refer to there is the part reading :

[3461] Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.

Do you know whether or not you saw that message?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir. I would assume that I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And the fact that they were going to send a reply in 2 or 3 days—do you know whether that reply was to the note of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. I would be guessing now, sir. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't that indicate that when they sent that reply, in 2 or 3 days, that is, from the 28th, that is the date of the message, that the negotiations would be ruptured?

General MARSHALL (reading) :

the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That means "in fact ruptured."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't there even stronger language back on page 90, under date of November 2:

This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we [3462] reach a decision at once.

That is on November 2, page 90.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that change your opinion, General, the one that was read by the Congressman, that the message here would indicate in 2 or 3 days they would break off the relations? Does that change your opinion on that language?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 209, circular message No. 2444, from Tokyo to Washington, translated the 5th of December 1941.

Now, that is the message, is it not—well, would you just read it, General?

General MARSHALL. It is dated the 1st of December 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Read just the message part.

General MARSHALL (reading):

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my circular message No. 2447, the United States (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico from Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember seeing that message, where they were destroying the codes?

[3463] General MARSHALL. I remember messages regarding the destruction of codes; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What significance did that have, on the 1st of December?

General MARSHALL. It would certainly mean the anticipation of, at least, the rupture of diplomatic relations.

Senator FERGUSON. General, doesn't the destruction of codes mean more than a break in diplomatic relations? Doesn't it mean that they anticipate war? If they only broke diplomatic relations does that necessarily mean that their equipment would be seized by the other governments?

General MARSHALL. Not necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't the destruction of codes indicate that, from an Army point of view, that it means war?

General MARSHALL. In general that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the 3d day of December 1941 were you familiar with the fact that General Miles had sent a message to destroy our code in Tokyo?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had that been taken up with you prior to that time?

General MARSHALL. I presume it had.

Senator FERGUSON. A matter of that importance would be, as that would be a matter of action.

[3464] General MARSHALL. It certainly would be.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what had happened at that particular time or prior, that a message was sent to Tokyo to destroy our code machine?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall the exact discussion which determined that decision, but I would say now these various messages indicate that at the least they were going to sever diplomatic relations and also there was the uncertainty of how the Japanese would react under those circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't it also indicate that there was a tension growing and growing that came to the point where we even destroyed our code in Tokyo?

General MARSHALL. That is exactly correct. The tension had been growing and growing daily.

Senator FERGUSON. These messages that I have asked you about this morning, do they refresh your memory that that tension was growing?

General MARSHALL. I didn't need for my memory to be refreshed regarding the growing tension. It grew steadily from day to day during that period.

Senator FERGUSON. The next message I would like to have you refer to is on page 209, No. 2443, translated 12-5-41. That is a message telling them even how to destroy the machine.

General MARSHALL. Page 2443?

[3465] Senator FERGUSON. Page 209. Circular message No. 2443.

General MARSHALL. I have it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is from Tokyo to London.

General MARSHALL. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator FERGUSON. Just to familiarize yourself with it at the present time. It is telling them how to destroy the code machine?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that they wanted to make sure that the actual machine was destroyed so that the people in London, the Government in London, would not get that code machine?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next message is on page 215 that I would like to have you refer to. That is a message from Tokyo—Tojo. He was Prime Minister at that time, was he not?

General MARSHALL. I believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is to Washington, December 2.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You said Tojo. It is Togo. T-o-g-o. There were two in the Cabinet, one T-o-j-o and the other T-o-g-o.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who this was?

Mr. MURPHY. It reads T-o-g-o. One was Prime Minister, [3466] I think the other War Minister. They are set out in the back of Mr. Grew's book as to which was which. Togo was War Minister and Tojo was Prime Minister. This is Togo.

Senator FERGUSON. This is Togo.

Mr. MURPHY. I think he was War Minister.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, in that message, General, that is the first message, is it not, that speaks about destroying the code here in Washington, the machine, and it is after we had given notice to our—at least the translation is after, it is dated the 2d but the translation is on the 4th, and it is after we gave our message from Miles to the Military Attache in Tokyo to destroy his code; is that correct?

General MARSHALL. As I understand you, this message came to our attention, that is, in the translated form, after the dispatch of General Miles' message to Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the corrected form on the bottom of page 215 indicates "translated 12-4-41."

General MARSHALL. I am not quite familiar with these references but I would say that the message translated on 12-3-41 might have first become available and some correction, possibly a minor correction, was made on the next day.

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator, you said that it was the first one relating to the destruction of the code in Washington.

[3467] Senator FERGUSON. Do you have another? I asked him if it was.

Mr. MITCHELL. You said it was. You didn't ask him. On page 208 I find one of December 1st. It says:

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes get in touch * * *

Senator FERGUSON. Does that contradict what I said?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am not contradicting. I just say there is an earlier message relating to the destruction of codes in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. The first message on page 208—that relates to when it is necessary to destroy codes.

When is the first message about the destruction of codes in Washington?

General MARSHALL. I would have to go through the papers in order to answer with any accuracy. As far as I know, it is the one we have just been talking about; that is, the first one.

[3468] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that at the time the note was given on the 26th that the ambassador said to Mr. Hull that it was tantamount to meaning the end, and he asked whether we were not interested in the modus vivendi? Did you ever know that?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that, sir. In all probability I had left Washington, and I didn't get back until the 28th, and that had all occurred in my absence.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 249, General, we get a message—it is No. 910, from Tokyo to Washington, December 7, 1941. It is marked "Extremely urgent":

After deciphering part 14 of my #902a and also #907b, #908c and #909d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

When did that first come to your attention?

General MARSHALL. I will have to check up here to see if—what is the message that had the 1 o'clock hour in it? How do I find that?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is 907.

General MARSHALL. I see it now.

That message must have come to my attention on the morning of the 7th of December, because in my draft in longhand from which

the message was sent to the overseas theaters in the [3469] Pacific, I mentioned the fact regarding the destruction of codes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when—put it this way: Did you know anything about the system that was kept in the decoding as far as time of decoding was concerned? Was there any way you could learn when a message was actually decoded from the system?

General MARSHALL. I don't believe I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the system in the decoding—was there any method of putting on the instrument the actual hour of decoding, instead of just saying "12/7" or "12/6" was there an hour stamp when the message was decoded and delivered?

General MARSHALL. I can't testify to that right here, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, in your testimony, as I recall it, in reading the Roberts report you spoke about what happened on the 7th, and didn't relate anything about these 13 parts, the pilot message and the other messages coming in on the 6th. Were you familiar at that time with the fact that they did come in on the 6th, the 13 parts?

General MARSHALL. I understand what you are asking. I am just trying to think back. I don't recall just what I knew at the time I appeared before the Roberts board for [3470] the reason that I didn't go into any of that data at all from the time of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor until my appearance before the board, and I had no papers with me, as I recall, except the longhand message that I had used in dispatching the notification of the 1 o'clock and the destruction of the codes to the overseas commanders.

I recall, I think, testifying before one of these boards as to my recollection of the information that I was given on the morning of my arrival at the War Department, which was that this long message of 14 parts had been coming in during the night and that the Navy had been overloaded regarding the translation from the Japanese into English and the Army had been helping out in its section in that translation.

I don't recall that I knew anything about the actual receipt in translated form of the message on the evening of November 6, and its dispatch to the State Department other than what I have just stated. I know that up to my arrival in the War Department on the morning of the 7th, at whatever time I arrived, I knew nothing of the message whatsoever. I am rather inclined to think that I still at the time I appeared before the Roberts board was going on the recollection that they had been occupied throughout the night in translating this message which was my impression [3471] at the time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, I believe you said November 6. You meant December?

General MARSHALL. I should have said December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. General, going to page 238, the message we had been referring to as a pilot message, the first paragraph, No. 844, translated—

General MARSHALL. That is what page?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 238, the bottom of the page.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is translated—the book gives it wrong. "1-26-41." They read that to mean "12-6-41."

That message, General, read the first paragraph.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902b (in English).

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that the message is going to come in English and it is going to be coded, and also that it is an answer to the message of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, "this separate message" will you read further?

[3472] General MARSHALL (reading) :

This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it, I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

Senator FERGUSON. The date of the 6th, that is the 5th here, that is on Friday, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the next sentence.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you, in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Now. General, doesn't that message [indicate] that there is going to be a zero time as far as the delivery of that message to the United States Government is concerned?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that being true, and having all these other messages and all this information, how do you account for the fact that that message when translated, [3473] when decoded on the 6th, was not delivered to you? The importance of that message is clear, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for it not being delivered to you on the 6th?

General MARSHALL. The only way I can account for that, Senator, is that the first thirteen parts, as I have been told, and I read, as I say, hurriedly here, the other day, most of that portion did not have the critical phase of the message included, which showed in the fourteenth part, and, as I have been told, I am not the authoritative witness on this—that fourteenth part didn't come in too available, workable, or readable form, until sometime during the night, possibly was not available until the next morning.

The data will show that. Therefore, I presume the assumption was as it did not include the critical statements, that is, the first to the thirteenth part, it was not thought necessary to bring that to my immediate attention.

Senator FERGUSON. General, this message is not part of the fourteen-part message. This is a separate, short, independent message, giving a zero hour or a zero date, or time of the delivery of a message.

Now, as I recall, going back through these intercepts, I find no other, and I want you to correct me if you know [3474] of any

other, where a message was to be delivered at a particular time, and there was a pilot message before, indicating that there would be a zero time for delivery.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, you said that the message on page 238, #901, has a zero time in it?

Senator FERGUSON. No, it doesn't have the time. It indicates a pilot, that there will be some time set.

Mr. MURPHY. Doesn't it say—

* * * I image you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON.

Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message.

It says "I will wire you in a separate message."

General MARSHALL. That is exactly what the message said.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't that make it an important message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; it is an important message.

[3475] Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that that message was not delivered to you?

General MARSHALL. I can give you nothing further than what I have said.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about on the day it was translated—and we haven't yet received the work sheet so far as time is concerned, except dates.

General MARSHALL. On my copy the translation, in pencil, says 12-6-41.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I mean the actual hour. You were in Washington that entire day on the 6th, were you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anyone alerted that could have received that particular message?

General MARSHALL. Well, there was someone on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff, there was someone on duty in the office of the War Plans Division, there was someone on duty in the office of G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anyone that could have acted?

General MARSHALL. Presumably so, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who could have acted who was there that could have acted on this message if delivery had been made?

General MARSHALL. The delivery of the magic messages was a personal arrangement in the main between the Office of [3476] Signal Corps and this particular section and the Office of G-2. General Miles will have to testify to that. I cannot.

Senator FERGUSON. No. Was there anyone—

General MARSHALL. The point is I did not receive the message.

Senator FERGUSON. But that isn't my question, General. My question is, now, was there anyone in position outside of you in Washington on the 6th that had authority to receive this particular magic message and act?

General MARSHALL. Well, there are two points to your question. One is authority to receive.

Senator FERGUSON. First authority to receive.

General MARSHALL. That has existed all the time in G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had authority to actually receive magic as far as the Chief of Staff was concerned? It had to come to him in a locked pouch.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone have the key to the locked pouch other than you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore the only one in Washington so far as the Chief of Staff was concerned was the Chief of Staff himself who had the authority to receive it?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

[3477] Senator FERGUSON. That is correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there anyone authorized to take the pouch and deliver it to you in your office?

General MARSHALL. In my office?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, in your office, was there anyone actually able to receive the pouch? He didn't have the key to it, but receive the pouch?

General MARSHALL. It would be received in the office of the Secretary of the General Staff and delivered to me. Everything came through there unless it was brought in to me directly by the Assistant Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Secretary on the 6th?

General MARSHALL. General Bedell Smith was the Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a General at that time, wasn't he a Colonel?

General MARSHALL. He may have been a Colonel.

Senator FERGUSON. A Colonel at that time?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He would have authority to take the actual pouch, would he not?

General MARSHALL. He would have authority, or anybody else on duty in his office, of taking the pouch in to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he alerted so that if the pouch [3478] would have come to him on the day of the 6th he would have immediately got to you?

General MARSHALL. I don't know that any special instructions were given Colonel Smith at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you anticipate any messages? The message before said that there would be a reply in 2 or 3 days.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that of sufficient importance, and these other messages, to indicate that someone should have been alerted to receive this message and get it to you?

General MARSHALL. Senator, these were messages to the Secretary of State, these were diplomatic messages, all of which concerned important things. The delivery to Mr. Hull was the important direct requirement of the procedure. We deduced what we could out of the particular messages but the delivery to the Secretary of State of a diplomatic message from the Japanese was the issue at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. General, was there anyone authorized—was General Bryden authorized to act on December 6 on a message?

General MARSHALL. There was no specific instructions that I know of that were given General Bryden regarding a special duty of his on November 6.

[3479] Senator FERGUSON. Had he a picture—

Mr. MURPHY. Did you say November 6?

Senator FERGUSON. December 6.

General MARSHALL. December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he have a picture of the whole situation at that time, had he been receiving magic?

General MARSHALL. I do not think that General Bryden was receiving magic. I think General Bryden was undoubtedly aware of magic because he sat in on the point board meetings.

[3480] Senator FERGUSON. But he personally was not receiving magic?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it went to his office.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there anybody else, under the rules, that was authorized to act if you were absent?

As I read exhibit 42:

Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties—

a. The Deputy Chief of Staff will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his absence.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anyone else authorized besides Bedell Smith?

General MARSHALL. His assistant if he were on duty. I believe at that time it was Colonel Deane. He would be another one. There were other assistants.

Senator FERGUSON. Their only province would be, because they had no key, would be to get the pouch to you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, so that we may understand what that pouch is, or was, it was a brief case with a lock on it, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, are you familiar with [3481] the testimony of Colonel Bratton before the Army Board?

General MARSHALL. I have not read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 239. Does counsel have a copy?

Mr. GESELL. No, we don't have a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. I will give the General the copy I have to read.

Mr. MITCHELL. What page?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 239c, "Top Secret, Colonel Bratton testifying."

Mr. GESELL. Here is another copy, Senator. I did have a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you just read that into the record, the top of page 239.

General MARSHALL (reading):

Colonel TOULMIN. And what is the name of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now Lieutenant General.

Colonel TOULMIN. And after this, you then went over and delivered it to the Secretary of State in the locked pouch for and on his behalf, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, to the Watch Officer in the State Department.

[3482] Colonel TOULMIN. To the Watch Officer about ten or ten-thirty, on that Saturday evening, December 6.

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now, having made these deliveries, Colonel, to these four recipients, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of G-2, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of State, did you get any reaction to that message until the following day?

Colonel BRATTON. What do you mean by "reaction" Colonel?

Colonel TOULMIN. Did they answer it, did they act upon it, did they mention it, did they discuss it, did they call you, did they look at it, to your knowledge?

Colonel BRATTON. I had some discussions of the message as I remember, with General Miles, indicating to him that the final part was yet to come. It did not come in until the following morning. The reaction from General Marshall was a reading and a discussion of the entire communication.

[3483] Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, will you go to page 242 starting out with: "Colonel Bratton: General Marshall's secretary."

General MARSHALL (reading):

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall's secretary.

General RUSSELL. Well, he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's copy; was he not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

General RUSSELL. Do you know what Bedell Smith did with it?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that the Chief of Staff should know about it?

Colonel BRATTON. Should see it right away.

Colonel TOULMIN. What was General Smith's response—that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

Colonel BRATTON. It must have been, because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

[3484] Colonel TOULMIN. And about what time in the evening was it when General Smith was told there was an important document in that locked pouch for General Marshall and that his attention should be called to it?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that was on the evening of December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 307, General, volume D of Bratton's testimony, beginning with the question at the bottom of page 306 so as to get the continuity.

General MARSHALL (reading):

General RUSSELL. As I recall your testimony, you stated that you delivered it to this man Smith on Saturday night; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith, and that I told him that this was a very important paper, and that General Marshall should see it at once. My recollection is that he said he would send it out to the General's quarters by courier. In any event, my mind was at rest about the Chief of Staff, I didn't worry about him any more that night.

General GRUNERT. Had this occurred frequently in the past?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. So it was just a normal thing to say, "Here is a pouch that has got important stuff in it"?

Colonel BRATTON. No. When I thought that the Chief of Staff should see it at once, I made a point of telling Smith so, and he would say, "All right, I will send it out by a special courier."

General GRUNERT. Did that happen very frequently?

Colonel BRATTON. It happened several times; yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Now, about this time, most everything was important?

Colonel BRATTON. Most everything was important; and I was further urged on by the fact that if the Chief of Naval Operations ever got one of these things before General Marshall did and called him up to discuss it on the telephone with him, and the General hadn't gotten his copy, we all caught hell.

[3486] Senator FERGUSON. That is all, General. Do you agree to that last answer?

General MARSHALL. Well, I don't think I give anybody hell much. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least they felt they had to perform their duty efficiently.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that you expected them to perform it efficiently.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the average man when he has that in mind uses the expression that the Colonel used there.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that there was no disrespect or anything else in his remark. I think we understand that, do we?

General MARSHALL. I was not accepting it as disrespect.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is a rather familiar Army expression, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is not limited to the Army.

General MARSHALL. Well, Senator, it usually has trimmings.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever know that the Colonel made any other statements in relation to this de- [3487] livery?

General MARSHALL. I have never read any of his testimony. I was told at the time a Major Clausen came to me just, I think, the day before the Pearl Harbor report was released to the press—incidentally, that was the first time I had ever seen Major Clausen—that testimony had been taken somewhere that had—I believe he said that Colonel Bratton had revised his statement. I don't know but I can have—

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

General MARSHALL. I am not familiar with who the individuals concerned were at all.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I will ask you some questions later on Colonel Clausen.

Now, General, as we get the situation here on the sixth we have the only man authorized, or the only people authorized to get the pouch was Smith or someone under him in your office?

General MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had the key?

General MARSHALL. I had the key.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, whose specific responsibility was it to get it to your office, that is, to Smith or to you or to your office?

[3488] General MARSHALL. That was General Miles' responsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles is responsible for that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that same thing would be true on the day of the seventh?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have gone over the time element on the morning of the seventh as to what time you rode and what time you got back for breakfast and what time you got to the office.

General MARSHALL. I ate breakfast before I rode, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you rode?

General MARSHALL. I ate breakfast on Sunday morning at 8 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General Marshall, is there any way that you can account for the fact that this message was not delivered to you at your residence on that morning? What could cause the delay in the delivery of this message?

General MARSHALL. Senator, as I recall my testimony and as I recall the events a message came to my quarters as I was taking a shower or getting into a shower after [3489] riding that Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house to see me with an important message and I—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then—

Mr. GESELL. Let him finish, please.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. Please go ahead and finish your answer.

General MARSHALL. That Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house, wished to come out to the house with an important message and I sent word that I would be out to the Department and I completed my shower and dressed and I believe I said that would probably take me about 10 minutes and then got in the car and drove down to the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Which, as I understand it, was 7 or 10 more minutes?

General MARSHALL. I imagine about 7 minutes; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that would be 17 minutes—

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. (Continuing.) After you knew that Bratton wanted to get in touch with you—

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. (Continuing.) You received this message?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I will say that is all, I think, that—well, you say "this message" meaning what, [3490] sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the 14 parts.

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the 1 o'clock.

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And the destruction of the codes.

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that 17 minutes after you received notice from Bratton as far as you were concerned you received these messages?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was on the Sunday morning?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; Sunday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. And, now, have you ever made—personally, as I understand it, you conducted no examination or no inquiry as to why the parts were not delivered to you on Saturday that were completed and why the one message, the pilot message, was not delivered to you?

General MARSHALL. I had no investigation of that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you haven't any other knowledge

[3491] than what you have given here?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Bedell Smith get in touch with you Saturday night?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You were at home Saturday night?

General MARSHALL. The presumption is that I was at home.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean you say now that you were?

General MARSHALL. I have not read my testimony through but I think I saw in a paper something that may mean my testimony is not as I intended to give it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you want to change it? Not that you want to change your testimony, but do you want to reiterate what you said?

General MARSHALL. I want to repeat what I said, that I found an engagement book for the family that shows I only had one evening engagement, a dinner, between the 1st of November—the newspaper said the 1st of December—between the 1st of November and the 7th of December and that was on the night of the 3d of December.

Senator FERGUSON. If you left the house, for instance, on the night of the 6th of December was there someone there to answer the telephone?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; there was an orderly there.

[3492] Senator FERGUSON. An orderly?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was in the Army in effect?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I had three orderlies that rotated that duty and at that time and for about a year thereafter they stayed until 10 o'clock, until I returned if I went out to the movies. That is the only place I went to.

Senator FERGUSON. And their rank was sergeant?

General MARSHALL. It varied. They started with private and some were technical sergeants, but they were men competent to answer the 'phone.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; they were competent to answer the 'phone.

General MARSHALL. And they knew where I was.

Senator FERGUSON. And they would know where you were?

General MARSHALL. They would know where I was.

Senator FERGUSON. And do I understand that when you returned the 'phone would not be shut off?

General MARSHALL. It would not be shut off; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that they were answering the 'phone until you came and then who would answer the 'phone? Would you answer the 'phone or Mrs. Marshall?

General MARSHALL. It depends on which 'phone rang. If it was the house phone she would get it and if it was the [3493] War Department 'phone, which I think was installed at that time and was beside my bed I would answer it.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if Bedell Smith desired to get you that night there wasn't any reason why he should not have been able to get you?

General MARSHALL. I could have been obtainable.

Senator FERGUSON. And would that same thing be true with General Miles and Colonel Bratton?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I would say it would.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have no knowledge that you were out of the city, so that—

General MARSHALL. I checked it. I never left after I returned on the 28th until some time, I don't know when, after December 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you knew of the investigation of the Roberts Commission, did you not?

General MARSHALL. I was called as a witness before that Commission.

Senator FERGUSON. Was any part of the Roberts' report submitted to you for your approval? I might refresh your memory if this will help. On page 1793 and page 1794 the Roberts Commission submitted some of their proposed findings to you to correct; that, in terms, as I understood it.

Mr. MITCHELL. What page is that referring to?

[3494] Senator FERGUSON. Page 1793. That would be the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. On what?

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Roberts' testimony.

Mr. MITCHELL. The transcript.

Senator LUCAS. Who makes the statement?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to get the record. Does counsel have that.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have the Roberts' report. The Roberts' transcript is down in the office.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask the question later then. I want to reserve that particular question. We do not have the testimony at this time on that, General.

That was a Presidential commission, was it not, or board?

General MARSHALL. That was my understanding, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you know of any reason why they should not receive all the testimony, all the evidence, all the facts, being a Presidential board?

General MARSHALL. I cannot think of any right now, sir, unless it pertained to "magic," but I think they received "magic." I say "I think" because I did not sit in on their hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever make any statements to Gen. Carter Clarke?

General MARSHALL. General what?

[3495] Senator FERGUSON. Could I have the affidavit of Sherman Miles, please?

Mr. MURPHY. I am looking at it right here but I would like to get it back so that I can clear up some of the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I have got a copy of an affidavit of Sherman Miles and I intend to read that.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to get it back because I want to clear up something.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to keep it to see if my copy is correct?

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Col. Sherman Miles made an affidavit [reading]:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board 8th of August 1944 as corrected by my letter 18th of August 1944 I wish to say that I

avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret source then called "Magic" or any intimation that such source existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board Brigadier General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke of G-2, War Department, transmitted to [3496] me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning radio intelligence mentioned or the existence of that form of information, or intelligence in the period preceding the 7th of December 1941. Accordingly I obeyed that instruction.

I will ask you, General, whether or not you made any or gave any such instructions to Brig. Gen. Russell A. Osmun?

General MARSHALL. To my recollection I did not. May I recite what I understand of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I ask that because most of it is hearsay.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want you to explain in any way any of these answers.

General MARSHALL. All right. I sent for Colonel Clarke, I think it was three mornings ago, saw him for about 5 minutes and asked him what his idea was of these instructions to General Miles that I understood had been given regarding "magic." He told me that at the time these witnesses were coming in several had reported and were preparing themselves as to their data for the investigation.

They wished to know in each instance whether or not they [3497] could refer to "magic." General Clarke, then Colonel Clarke, in the absence of the then G-2, General Bissell, and in my absence from Washington saw General McNarney, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and took up the question with him.

General McNarney, according to Colonel Clarke, discussed the question with Admiral King. They came to an agreement that there would be no reference by the witnesses to "magic." Therefore, the individuals, according to Colonel Clarke, who had come into G-2 to look into the data preliminary or preparatory to their testifying were informed that there would be no reference to "magic."

Then, according to Colonel Clarke, at a later date the naval investigating having gotten under way, it was learned in the War Department that the magic messages were being introduced in the naval board. I do not recall that Colonel—I think the statement was made that this had resulted because of a letter from Colonel Knox to Admiral Kimmel in which he had assured him that the admission of those messages would be permitted. Therefore, instructions were then given that the magic would be made available to the Army board.

Now, further with relation to this, in the first hour of my testimony before the Army board—and I think I was one of the first witnesses—I asked them to go into executive session, and I told them about the existence of magic, what it [3498] was, what its bearing on the conduct of the war was, and its relationship to this particular incident. That was done in executive session, with nobody present except the three members of the board, and that took place in the first hour of my testifying before that group.

Now, Colonel Clarke can give you the particular evidence on that; General McNarney and, I presume, Admiral King.

Senator FERGUSON. So that, as I understand it, then, General, you, as Chief of Staff, did not issue the order. The information was given

out by your Deputy Chief of Staff, General McNarney; is that correct?

General MARSHALL. After a discussion with Admiral King.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is what I mean, as you have explained.

And that instruction was then given by Carter Clarke to General Miles?

General MARSHALL. And the other witnesses who knew about magic.

Senator FERGUSON. And the other witnesses who knew about magic?

General MARSHALL. Presumably Colonel Bratton and I do not know who else was concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. And they went before the board and gave their testimony and entirely eliminated—

[3499] General MARSHALL. Any reference to magic.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Any reference to magic.

General MARSHALL. Yes. Then at a later time magic was introduced.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And at some time later magic was introduced. Now, do you know whether Miles ever went back after they introduced magic—

General MARSHALL. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). To give his testimony in relation to magic?

General MARSHALL. I do not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. This, of course, was a congressional ordered inquiry by the Army and by the Navy?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how it came about that the Army board that was ordered by the statute ceased to function, and then a further inquiry by Colonel Clausen began along the same or similar lines?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

General MARSHALL. I am not aware of that. That was handled by the Secretary of War and by the civilian side of the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

[3500] Senator FERGUSON. Not at the present time.

And not on the military side?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. The military side did not concern itself with the various procedures in this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did the J. A. G. recommend it, do you know?

General MARSHALL. I could not tell you, sir. I would not have recalled it and Mr. Stimson did not consult me with regard to it, and I never knew the name of the man or heard of it until I saw the Pearl Harbor report the day before it was released, and knew nothing of it until he came to get the affidavit from me.

Senator FERGUSON. So that, as far as that situation is concerned, you had no knowledge or information concerning that investigation, the result of that investigation, until the day before the report was made public?

General MARSHALL. That is correct. Brigadier General Handy became Deputy Chief of Staff on the departure of General McNarney for Italy on the day that the Army report was received in the office of the Secretary of War and a copy or the original report went to General Handy and General McNarney, who were both together at the time.

General Handy, after a very brief survey, I imagine, of an hour or two brought the report to me. He did not hand it [3501] to me, held it, told me of the general nature of it, told me of the strictures against me and advised me not to see the report, and he thought that because of my implication in it that the Army side of the War Department should have nothing to do with the thing whatsoever; that it should be entirely handled by the Secretary of War or his civilian assistants or whatever others he desired to call into it. So that from that time on it was entirely handled in the office of the Secretary of War, and so far as General Handy knew—he can testify as to this—nobody on the General Staff knew anything at all regarding the terms of the report or the material.

Senator FERGUSON. And no one on the General Staff ordered Colonel Clausen to proceed?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no knowledge that he did proceed, as far as you were concerned, until the time you gave?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, getting back, General, to General McNarney—just one question as to all his instructions—to Gen. Carter Clarke and General Osmun, and then on down to the other witnesses. Were you consulted in relation to that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had no knowledge of it; is [3502] that correct?

General MARSHALL. I had no knowledge of that. My reaction would have been literally that of Admiral King and General McNarney.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there appears to be another investigation by Carter Clarke known as the Clarke investigation.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Starting some time after the Clausen investigation.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that there was a Carter Clarke investigation?

General MARSHALL. I am not quite clear. General Bissell is the best witness on that. As nearly as I recall the thing, there was nobody left in G-2 at this time who had been on duty at the time of these events in December 1941 or earlier in the fall, and General Bissell recommended that in order to get the data straightened out as to what actually happened he should have an investigation made of all of the procedure and it was so directed, presumably with my acquiescence, but General Bissell can tell you directly.

Senator FERGUSON. General Bissell—

General MARSHALL. Is the present G-2 of the War Department [3503]

Senator FERGUSON. I want to get the Carter Clarke investigation to get the dates. The first page of the No. 1 volume testimony of findings handled on certain top secret documents, CWC Part 1, is dated the 20th of September 1944, and the second volume, the first instrument in it is dated the 17th of August 1945. It is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Do you recall that, General?

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain I saw it. I think I have a memorandum somewhere in it of my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did your order create the Carter Clarke investigation?

General MARSHALL. I think it did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Your order created that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what was the purpose? Why did you want the Carter Clarke investigation after the Clausen investigation, what was there to be investigated, and after the Army Board had made a finding under a statute which ordered them to make an investigation?

General MARSHALL. I asked General Bissell about 2 days ago over the telephone if he could remind me of what this was and my recollection of it is—he can testify direct on this—that there was so much confusion over the handling of [3504] the records and what the records were with regard to the times of receipt, transmission, and so forth, that he thought it was advisable to have an investigation to reduce this down to as exact a statement as they could get and, therefore, was recommended to me and I agreed to the procedure to direct Colonel Clarke to carry it out. Now, he can tell you direct what the conversations were.

[3505] Senator FERGUSON. General, what would cause confusion? Were not the Army records in shape so that they could be obtained and there would not have to be any confusion? Here we have an Army board set up of generals under a statute that went into this matter. Then we had Colonel Clausen making an investigation, and after we get through with those two investigation there is such confusion about the records that a new investigation is started.

How do you account for that?

Mr. MURPHY. I wonder if the Senator will yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MURPHY. It was not a new investigation, it was a continuation, and the report discusses that. The Secretary of War states that he is continuing the investigation. It is right in the report itself.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you know why it took the authority of the investigation from the original Pearl Harbor board, Army board? Why they ceased their functions and created the Carter Clarke and Clausen investigation; why did they take it away from the Army board if the Congressman is correct?

General MARSHALL. It is my recollection—

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have him answer first.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

[3506] General MARSHALL. My recollection, Senator, is it is quite possible that the Secretary of War did not know of Colonel Clarke's investigation. I think it is probable he did, but it is quite possible he did not. The action in the Clausen affair was the Secretary of War's.

Mr. MURPHY. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to get his answer as to Carter Clarke's part of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, General; answer.

General MARSHALL. I told you the best of my recollection regarding the Carter Clarke investigation. General Bissell, who was handling the thing, can give you a definite statement in regard to it, which is much better than mine.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I understand your order, as the Chief of Staff, created the Carter Clarke part of the investigation.

General MARSHALL. Not the investigation, sir. I did not know that I was including that in the—

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know why you went into that part of the investigation. The three members of the board were still living, and it was a statutory board. Why was not this delegated to them to complete their investigation? Why was a new man designated to make this investigation?

General MARSHALL. Well, I suggest you call General Bissell [3507] and find out his recommendation to me, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Was that recommendation put in writing?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was. It may be in writing, but I think it was oral.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us your memory? Did you discuss it with him?

General MARSHALL. I gave you the best of my memory, Senator, after being jogged by a telephone message to General Bissell 2 or 3 days ago. I have not had a chance to talk to him directly. He told me for certain reasons he thought it was desirable this should be done. He can testify directly what that was, or I can go back and talk to him again and come back and relay what he has reminded me of, whichever you prefer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, General, you did not read the Army board?

General MARSHALL. I did not read the Army board, and I did not read, as far as I know, the Pearl Harbor board.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not read the Army board. You, by your order, created a continuation, as I understand it, of this investigation by Carter Clarke.

General MARSHALL. I did not understand that I was creating a continuation of this investigation. I understood [3508] from General Bissell's recommendation that the confusion of incidents up there was such that it was better to have somebody on the magic side go into it. Now that may be held to be a part of the investigation, I don't know.

Mr. MURPHY. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. What did he explain as to the confusion in the magic part?

General MARSHALL. I remember no more than I am telling you now, but General Bissell can testify to that directly.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any question raised at that time, General, about messages not being in the files?

General MARSHALL. The only question I heard—and that did not come through General Bissell, and I do not know whether I heard it officially—oh, I think that Admiral Hewitt, the Navy sent Admiral Hewitt into the Pacific to look into questions of this kind, or Admiral Hewitt told me he had gotten a rumor from somewhere that I had

issued an order destroying the records, what was called the winds message. Then there was an investigation on that. I have not read the report of the investigation, and I believe it was found there was no basis for the statement.

But that, I believe, was a written investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. And there is no basis for that statement?

[3509] General MARSHALL. Are you making the statement or are you asking me?

Senator FERGUSON. I say there is no basis for that statement?

General MARSHALL. That is a question?

Senator FERGUSON. There is no basis for any such statement?

General MARSHALL. So far as I am concerned, there is not.

Mr. MURPHY. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. So the record will be clear on that, did you know—

Senator LUCAS (interposing). I submit it is not a question, it is but a declaratory sentence.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it the General did not answer quite that he made any such order.

General MARSHALL. I had no knowledge of it whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. But the Board also found that there was not anything in that rumor; isn't that correct?

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether it was the Board or the investigator that went into this particular thing.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield so I can throw a little light on this?

[3510] Senator FERGUSON. I will let you lighten it up a little later.

General, on this question now of Carter Clarke's investigation, was that in any way to correct the findings of the original investigation by the Board?

General MARSHALL. I would not say that it was. I think it was to try to determine what the actual details of the handling of the messages were.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did not the Board go into that question of the actual details of the handling of the messages?

General MARSHALL. I assume that they did.

Senator FERGUSON. Why should there be any question about the handling of the messages? Does not the War Department and the other departments of the Government—in the War Department do not they, as a rule, function through written orders?

General MARSHALL. They function according to prescribed methods.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; prescribed methods. One of the prescribed methods is the keeping of proper records?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Why should there be any confusion over [3511] the keeping of these records that the Army board were trying to, or were getting on this question?

General MARSHALL. Senator, I have given you the best answer I can, and I think General Bissell can give you the correct statement on that.

Senator FERGUSON. He would probably be able to clear up the situation.

Senator LUCAS. I think the General ought to be asked that question one more time.

Senator FERGUSON. How is that?

Senator LUCAS. I think the General ought to be asked that question one more time.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will proceed. Senator Ferguson will proceed with his inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. General, is there anything, any question that I have asked that you want to add anything, to any answer or subtract anything from any answer? In other words, is there any change that you want to make?

General MARSHALL. Not that I recall. I have some notes in my pocket. Allow me to look at them [perusing notes]. There is one, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, will you give it to us, [3512] General?

General MARSHALL. You asked me yesterday regarding a statement of the Secretary of War in his diary communicating with the President when he received information regarding five divisions moving down the coast in the China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is the G-2 message that we were talking about.

General MARSHALL. I think that was based probably, most probably, on a statement which appears in paragraph 14 of the estimate of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 dated November 27 which résumés the information we had, and that that particular information was probably available on the 25th, and it was to that that the Secretary referred.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just see that?

General MARSHALL. Paragraph 14 of the estimate of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 on November 27.

Senator FERGUSON. Paragraph 14?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you just read that into the record so we will have the record clear on that? Would there also be a message upon which this is based?

General MARSHALL. I have not located the message, but this is the statement from G-2. It is item 26, and is headed "Recent developments in the Far East." So it covers a period [3513] of time; it is a résumé of developments; and it states in paragraph 14:

From the foregoing it appears evident that the Japanese had completed plans for further aggressive moves in southeastern Asia. These plans will probably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that the Kurusu mission is a definite failure. A task force of about five divisions, supported by appropriate air and naval units, has been assembled for the execution of these plans. This force is now enroute southward to an as yet undetermined rendezvous.

[3514] I think that was the basis of the Secretary of War's statement in his diary of his communication with the President.

Senator FERGUSON. General, that indicates that there is a G-2 message which conveys the specific language, or similar language to what the Secretary of War used, is it not, such as the naming of towns and numbers and so forth? The Secretary of War could not take this estimate and read paragraph 14 and get into his diary the information that we read yesterday, could he?

General MARSHALL. I was assuming there was some message of some sort that recited the information which was included in this message. The message, whatever it was, we have not located.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the message I have had in mind.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything else you wanted to clear up?

General MARSHALL. I have a note here referring to page 3109 of my testimony, line 8 and 9. Beginning at line 7 on page 3109 it reads:

The messages which you have just read I had no recollection of whatever at the time.

[3515] Now, the messages we are talking about there, or I am speaking about there are the various ones that referred to Hawaii, to the Harbor of Pearl Harbor, the magic messages that came in prior to December 7, 1941. I ended with this statement:

In fact, I first read them in the two days when I was getting ready for this hearing here.

It should read, "In fact, as far as I recall, I first read them."

Senator FERGUSON. General, did you get Admiralty reports also? We have not had clearances on the Admiralty report.

Mr. MITCHELL. They were cleared yesterday afternoon with the exception of four, which they wanted to paraphrase so it would not break the British code. And they should be in the room here this morning. We did not get them last night. We just have the ones that were cleared.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask the General: Did you get any information, if we were getting information, from the Admiralty?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is that we were getting occasional information from the Admiralty, but Admiral Stark can tell you about that specifically.

[3516] Senator FERGUSON. And would those messages come directly across your desk as magic?

General MARSHALL. The Admiralty messages would not come across my desk as magic.

Senator FERGUSON. They would not?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not General Miles delivered the messages to you?

General MARSHALL. The Admiralty messages?

Senator FERGUSON. The Admiralty messages, whether you had seen them?

General MARSHALL. I should imagine that those might have come to me through General Miles or might have been delivered personally to me by Admiral Stark. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any Admiralty messages?

General MARSHALL. Not specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any of them in the period from the 25th of November, let us say?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Until the 7th?

General MARSHALL. I have no specific recollection of any Admiralty messages.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you, General, when this [3517] message—there are two of them, one a correction, and will you hand it to him, please—first came to your attention? This is the Winant message, British Admiralty report.

General MARSHALL. I do not know, Senator. I assume that afternoon. I recall the message and I assume that I saw it before December 7th. I have no other recollection on the matter. There may be some record there in the War Department that would show that. I do not know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that convey to you? It reads:

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning, two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 carriers, 10 destroyers.

What did that convey to you? What did it mean to you? How did you evaluate it?

General MARSHALL. The message conveys a very serious item of information of a very definite move by the Japanese presumably toward the Kra Peninsula, and possibly land on the west coast of Thailand. I would say it was a confirmation of our fears regarding their intentions in Malaysia.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion did that mean war?

[3518] General MARSHALL. I am trying now to go back to what I thought at that particular time.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I would have said that in my opinion that did mean war, certainly in that locality and presumably it would spread from there.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be a crossing of the line and therefore would involve us, so it would mean war as far as the United States was concerned?

General MARSHALL. I do not understand your use of the word "involve," Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say?

General MARSHALL. I felt myself that if the Japanese became engaged in hostilities directed toward the Malay Peninsula that our situation demanded that we take action to defend our position. That, however, was my opinion, and that would have to be determined by governmental action.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask or seek any advice on what the governmental action would be when you received this Admiralty message on the 6th?

General MARSHALL. I have no such recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any action was taken by our Government on the 6th, when the Winant message came in?

[3519] General MARSHALL. I have no such recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that mean there would be any further alert in your department; this message?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; this is a confirmation of what we had been following through the various moves.

Senator FERGUSON. A confirmation of the previous alerts. Do you know whether G-2 had the message of the 6th?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir.

[3520] Senator FERGUSON. Would you get it from G-2 or would you get it directly from the State Department?

General MARSHALL. I think at that time I would have gotten it through G-2. I am getting now similar messages through the Operations Division. I do not know how it was at that time, but I think it was probably G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the reporter read that last answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. You were not getting them directly from the State Department at that time?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection. We had a liaison with the State Department through G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to look at this record of the Roberts report, to get the memorandum. Would you just take this and read pages 1793 and 1794 into the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want him to read the two pages?

Senator FERGUSON. Or look at them. I want to find out whether or not the Roberts report, or any part of it, was submitted to him, that is, the Roberts transcript was submitted to him and whether or not he suggested any changes, whether it was submitted to him to correct in terms as he understood it.

General MARSHALL. You wish me to read these two pages?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; to ascertain that information.

[3521] General MARSHALL. You wish me to read them or just look at them?

Senator FERGUSON. It will not take but a minute to read them.

General MARSHALL (reading):

Colonel BROWN. General Marshall is here.

The CHAIRMAN. Have the General come in.

Will you be sworn, sir?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall, we are particularly interested in ascertaining the exact facts with respect to the message you forwarded to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the morning of December 7, 1941. You stated those informally to us when you were with us before, but we took down nothing about it at that time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Mr. Justice, Colonel Howe handed me the other day a draft of a statement—

The CHAIRMAN. Of a finding, yes.

General MARSHALL. Of a finding regarding that particular matter, and asked me, as I understood it, to correct that in terms as I understood them.

[3522] THE CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General MARSHALL. And I have done that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. Unfortunately, I have not been able to go over it personally with Admiral Stark, who was concerned with me in the matter; and we are in agreement, I understand, in our main exchanges of information, and he questioned my wording, I believe, but as he is going to appear here a little later he can take that up. So if it is agreeable to you I will read a re-draft of your finding, in the terms as I understand them, as to fact.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be splendid.

General MARSHALL (reading):

"At about 11:25 a. m., eastern standard time, Sunday, December 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations learned"—

Now, put this in parentheses, if you will, please, because I want to refer to it later.

(Certain matter read by General Marshall is omitted from the transcript at the direction of the chairman.)

General MARSHALL (continuing reading) :

"That what amounted to an ultimatum would be delivered to the United States Government by the Japanese Ambassador at 1 p. m. in Washington that day and that diplomatic relations [3253] between the two nations would probably be severed.

"The Chief of Staff communicated with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone at once, expressed his apprehension of possible attack without warning in any area, and recommended sending an immediate additional warning message to the Commander of the Hawaiian Department (and to the Commanding Generals of the Forces in the Philippines, Panama, and on the Pacific coast). He personally drafted such a message, and at 11:45 a. m., eastern standard time, the Chief of Naval Operations requested that the various Army commanders to receive this message be instructed to communicate its contents to their naval opposites. The Chief of Staff added a sentence to that effect." Because the message had already been finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL (continuing reading) :

"This message, in the longhand of the Chief of Staff, was personally delivered at 11:50 a. m. by a general staff officer, Colonel Bratton, to the Communications Officer stationed in the War Department."

Senator FERGUSON. That covers what I had in mind.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the finding that had been submitted to you?

General MARSHALL. My understanding of the matter, in reading [3524] this, was that they had endeavored to write from memory what I had stated before then on the previous meeting, because it involved this question of magic, so they had written it out and they wanted to know whether it was correct as written.

Senator FERGUSON. You corrected that statement?

General MARSHALL. I corrected it to read the way it reads here. That is my recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. That statement apparently was in writing and you corrected it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General, now in relation to the delivery of these messages—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, it is now 12. We might suspend here to 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed to 2 p. m., of the same day.)

[3525]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The Senator from Michigan may proceed.

The Chair wishes to state that the President has asked General Marshall to come down to the White House at 3:15 for a conference on his mission to China. Therefore, the committee will have to excuse General Marshall at 3 o'clock in order that he may fill that engagement. If he has not concluded his testimony at that time we shall have to excuse the General in order that he may fill that engagement, with the understanding, of course, that he may resume at his convenience,

but in all likelihood not today. The Chair might express the hope that we may conclude with the General by the time he has to fill that engagement. Senator, will you proceed?

Senator FERGUSON. I will try and do all I can to accommodate the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the Chair.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean your hopes that he will be concluded as far as I am concerned. Will you let the General see these paraphrases of messages, please?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

[3526] Senator FERGUSON. Would you read them into the record, General, and then I will ask you about them?

General MARSHALL. The first message (reading):

Top secret dispatch from the Admiralty, dated 7 December 1941.

OPNAV (Personal for C.N.O. from First Sea Lord)

Refer your dispatch of 1710 Oct seven December X Negative, however it is expected momentarily X If you are satisfied about it in any event Admiral Phillips has my complete confidence in any agreements he has made X We can count on our representatives on the spot forcefully to acquit themselves, of this I am confident.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I will ask you a few questions on that one. That is a paraphrase from the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty to C. N. O. here in Washington?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever seen that before, or did you know anything about it?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall this message at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, the next one.

General MARSHALL. This is from the Commander in Chief China [reading]:

Top Secret Dispatch 7 December 1941.

[3527] To CINCCAF, ACNS, CZM, NZNB, ADMIRALTY, CINCEP.

Information Bad Washington

Following reported 6 December at 0316 GCT 10 DD and 6 Cruisers escorting convoy of 25 ships in Lat.—

meaning latitude—

0800N Long.—

meaning longitude I presume—

106-08 East X At 0530 GCT another convoy of ten ships with 10 DD and 2 cruisers as escort in Lat 07-00 North Long 106-20 East X Course of both foregoing convoys 270 True X at 0442 GCT small force consisting of three vessels in Lat 07-51 North Long 105-00 East steering 310 true X Possible indications are that destination of all forces is Kothron X Foregoing all result of aircraft reconnaissance.

Senator FERGUSON. General, that is a paraphrase of an Admiralty message to the Navy here. Had you ever seen or heard of that message?

General MARSHALL. I do not think I have, sir. It says "From the Commander in Chief China."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any information on that, about that force moving prior to the attack on the 7th?

1342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether I knew from this or knew from that message from our embassy in London whether or not I knew this. I do not know where these references are, Senator, whether they are in the Gulf of Siam [3528] or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, here is another message. It is from SPENAVO London to OPNAV. Counsel, will you let the General see that message? Would you read that? It is a very short one.

General MARSHALL. This is from SPENAVO London, 7th of December 1941, paraphrased by Shall. "Addressees OPNAV. Priority. 210"——

Senator FERGUSON. If it is some code word or something don't read it.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

Have been informed by Admiralty that an attempted landing is being made at Kotabharu by a force of 3 to 5 ships.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that place is on the Kra Peninsula. Had you heard of that prior to the attack, that there was a landing by the Japs on the actual peninsula?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall having heard of that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no recollection of that whatever?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or of that message?

[3529] General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General, has there been any action whatever or any disciplinary action against any officer for delay in the delivery of any messages to you or to any of your departments?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection and not to any of my departments to my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there was a message to, I think it is Commander Rochefort in Hawaii? It is on page 20, exhibit 32. Would you let the General see that message from General Miles?

General MARSHALL. Do you wish me to read this?

Senator FERGUSON. It is to contact Rochefort. It is from the G-2 to G-2.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters,
G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that that message was [3530] sent? Did you ever know of that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, did you know at any time that there was talk or conversation between your officers down in G-2 of sending messages to Hawaii because there were certain restrictions at the top?

General MARSHALL. I don't know to what you are referring, sir. I have no recollection of such a matter.

Senator FERGUSON. I will show you page 283-D, Top Secret, Friday, October the 6th, 1944, on page 283, and ask you——

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you identify it as a transcript of what?

Senator FERGUSON. Transcript of the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that answer may refresh your memory. Would you just hand him my copy? Beginning with General Russell's question and reading over to "OPD."

General MARSHALL. (reading):

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I want to ask you why it came to pass that this message was sent from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, and not from some agency of the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

Colonel BRATTON. Upon receipt of the translated [3531] intercept which I have read, S. I. S. No. 25640, I took copies of this intercept to General Miles and to General Gerow and discussed it at some length with both of them. I had a feeling that further warnings or alerts should be sent out to our overseas commands. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had been sent out. General Miles felt that he couldn't go over General Gerow's decision to send no additional warning, because of a policy which was then in effect that War Department G-2 would send out no intelligence to the G-2s of tactical commands or overseas departments which might produce an operational reaction, without the complete concurrence of the War Plans Division.

I still felt uneasy about this thing and went over to the Navy where I had a conference with Commander McCullom, the head of the Far Eastern Section in O. N. I. He felt as I did, that further warnings should be sent out, and said that he was going to write one up and try to get the Chief of Naval Operations to dispatch it.

I discovered from Commander McCullom that their S. I. S. man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese [3532] winds-weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instruct our G-2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew.

I managed to get General Miles to O. K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that we could get that message out without violating any of the policies that were then in effect about getting concurrences from OPD.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I want you to read.

Now, General, did you know there was any feeling in your department there that they could not come to you to get something through that they felt should go through to Hawaii to Short so that he would get knowledge?

General MARSHALL. I was unaware of it up to this moment if that means what it reads.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you take what he said there?

General MARSHALL. Just the way it reads.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. That they must not send anything that would produce an operational reaction.

[3533] Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, to get certain knowledge out there they were going around and sending the Rochefort message which you just read, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. I said that would produce an operational reaction. There was a command direction for definite operational reactions. Now, my understanding of that that I have just read there is they can send out information but if it is of a nature that is going to produce an operational reaction then there must be a concurrence with OPD.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would they be discussing it with the Navy and saying, as they said here, that they wanted to get certain information out there? Why couldn't they come to you and send it out?

General MARSHALL. They could come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why they do it in this roundabout way?

General MARSHALL. I don't know that. Colonel Bratton will have to explain further, General Miles and General Gerow.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, would you mind asking the General to explain what he means by "operational reaction"?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Would you explain "operational reaction"?

General MARSHALL. I mean by an operational reaction [3534] that there have been command directions given which require certain dispositions and action taken by the components of the command for defense or for attack or for both.

Now, we had always to be careful, of course, that there was not a confusion of direction, so there must be a clear distinction between military intelligence as such, called general information, and command directions as such.

[3535] Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that that information in that statement of Bratton indicated that the winds message, activating message was in and they wanted him to get the facts from Rochefort? That is on the second page, page 284.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. That is volume D.

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether this refers to it. The way I read the message here I don't know whether that means with reference to not only the weather but the preparations for monitoring, "for the possible receipt of such message from Tokyo," or whether he is talking about a message he thinks has already been received from Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. What about his language on page 284? Does that help you to clear it up?

General MARSHALL (reading):

I discovered from Commander McCullom that their SIS man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese winds-weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instruct our G-2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew.

I still don't know whether he is talking about the [3536] arrangement for monitoring, for the receipt of that message, or whether he is referring to a supposed receipt of a message from Japan implementing a portion or all of the winds code.

Senator FERGUSON. General, when you left for the maneuvers, did you leave a rough draft of a statement with General Gerow to tell certain things to General Short, or send in certain information, if negotiations broke down while you were away?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of that now. If there is anything on that in the record it may stimulate my memory, but I do not recall such a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. General, this morning, as I understand, you were telling us about General Handy. What report was General Handy talking about when he came to you with the Army Board report?

General MARSHALL. He was talking about the full report of the Army Board headed by General Grunert.

Senator FERGUSON. Both the published part and the top secret part of that report?

General MARSHALL. Nothing was published at that time, sir. It is the day of its receipt by the War Department from the Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it include both the part as later published and the top secret part?

[3537] General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir, because I never looked at it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now at that time is it true that he asked you not to read that report?

General MARSHALL. I asked him, "Have you a copy of that that I can read?" I think he said that is the only copy he had, but he advised me not to read it because I was implicated in the statements of the board for various derelictions and therefore, as that would be a concern of mine and I was Chief of Staff, he thought the whole matter should be handled entirely on the Secretary of War side of the Department, the civil side, and therefore I did not take that, I did not read it.

Senator FERGUSON. At that particular time was anything said about having someone continue the investigation?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; nothing at all of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing was said?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I would have no part in that anyway.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be prior to the time that Clausen was appointed, would it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Major Clausen I assume, I suppose he was assigned by the Secretary of War. At the moment General Handy was talking to me the Secretary never saw [3538] the report of the board, I do not think.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to offer in evidence the top secret Pearl Harbor report, the board of the Army Pearl Harbor investigation top secret report, and top secret memorandum, which would include—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that offered as an exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to be sure that all of it is going in, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I am offering the whole thing.

The CHAIRMAN. What exhibit would that be?

Mr. MITCHELL. 63.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be filed with the committee as Exhibit 63. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 63.")

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like to look it over and see what it is first, so as to be sure that we know. It starts out "Memo to the Secretary of War."

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is described on the flyleaf there, on the first leaf, as to what it is.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want the whole document in, the whole book?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I want the whole book in.

[3539] Mr. MURPHY. Is this the Clarke report?

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. This is the Army board report. We already have the part that was published. Now this is the part that was not published, on the top secret part of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is this the Grunert board, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, this is the Grunert board. This is the Army board, under a mandate from Congress.

Mr. MURPHY. May I make one inquiry, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. As to whether or not the part that the Senator has offered goes into the naming of the different codes, and the method of breaking the codes.

Senator FERGUSON. No, it has nothing to do with the Clarke report.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, is this the unexpurgated report of the Grunert board to the Secretary of War?

Senator FERGUSON. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of which was published later and part of which was not published. Is that what it is?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think any part of this was published; at least not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands that the Grunert board, or the War Department Board of Inquiry, made a complete [3940] report to the Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And that later certain parts of that report were published. So if this is a complete report of the board to the Secretary of War, would it not include that part which was published as well as that part which was not published?

Senator FERGUSON. This is just the part, if the Chairman please, that was not published. As I understand it from the testimony now, General Handy—was it Colonel or General Handy?

General MARSHALL. General Handy.

Senator FERGUSON. General Handy brought to the General the Army report that included this part.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Senator proceed while counsel examines it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I was going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, to save time, that the Senator go ahead and let us hold this in abeyance until the counsel familiarizes himself with it. We can act on it later as to whether or not it be accepted as an exhibit or not.

[3541] Senator FERGUSON. That is all at the present time, outside of this report. I would like to have at least part of the report read, so that if the General does come back he may want to make certain replies to certain parts of that report, in order that he may know what is in this report.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean read into the testimony?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How much?

Senator FERGUSON. Eighteen pages.

The CHAIRMAN. You want that read into the testimony now?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not ask that it be read now. After the General has left at 3 o'clock, we could read it, and then he could see that.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we go ahead with the witness while counsel examines this? You are through, are you, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I suggest then that Congressman Keefe proceed with his inquiries, and the counsel examine this, and then let him submit it to General Marshall so he may be familiar with it in case he returns.

[3542] The CHAIRMAN. That is the idea I had, that counsel be permitted to examine it while we go ahead with the examination of the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask that there be read into the record 18 pages.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not ask that it be done now; do you?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at this particular moment, but when the General leaves, and then we will give him a copy of it so he can have it overnight.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, before the examination proceeds, I would like to make a request, that in view of the report being offered, I would also like to offer the Clausen report which is an essential part of the record in order to understand the parts of the exhibit which were offered. I offer that in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it be offered and held and be examined by counsel before either one of them is made an exhibit.

Go ahead, Congressman Keefe, if you are ready.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, I have listened with a great deal of interest to the presentation of testimony, especially that which you have given, and I have been impressed with the fact that when this committee was set up the Chairman of the committee, on the floor of the United [3543] States Senate, stated that it would be the purpose of the committee to ascertain the cold, unvarnished, indisputable facts, for the purpose of fixing responsibility, among other things.

So, as I have attempted to listen to this mass of documentary detail and testimony that has come before the committee, I have been attempting to piece together the fragmentary pieces of testimony and documentary proof, in an attempt to clarify in my mind, as a member of this committee, the issues that would enable me to carry out the responsibility under which this committee was enjoined when it was set up.

Now, with that in mind, I wonder if it would be fair and a reasonable conclusion for me to state, in the first instances, that for many, many years the defenses of Hawaii and the Pacific area, or rather the defenses of the Pacific area and our west coast were tied into the defense of Hawaii, Oahu specifically? Is that a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. I think it is, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that down through the years this Government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to make of Oahu what some people have heretofore and before December 7, 1941, regarded as an impregnable fortress, to be used as the keystone [3544] to the defenses of the United States and the Pacific area? Is that a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. I think it is, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I gather from the testimony that has been given here that the defenses of our west coast, Panama, Alaska, and other parts of the Pacific were so tied to Hawaii in the various plans adopted over

the years, and the defenses installed, as a specific defense against Japan. Is that correct?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that all of the war plans and all of the Navy plans that have been drawn down through the years had in mind the use of that bastion of defense against any possibility that might arise in the future, involving war with Japan, fundamentally. Is that a fair conclusion for me to draw?

General MARSHALL. I think it is.

Mr. KEEFE. And so down through the years, as we have been shown here, plans were constantly being prepared, revised, and rewritten, involving the possibility at some future time of a conflict with Japan. Is that a true statement?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; at some future time of a possible conflict with Japan.

[3545] Mr. KEEFE. I say "a possible" conflict. Any first rate nation maintaining an army and navy draws such plans long in advance in preparation of possible conflict with other possible nations; is that true?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And is one of the businesses of the War Plans Division and War College, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Of the War Plans Division, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Of the War Plans Division of the General Staff?

General MARSHALL. Of the General Staff.

Mr. KEEFE. So, if I am to gather anything from this mass of detail that has been presented to this committee up to date, it is that we were alerted years ago to the possibility of war with Japan, and made preparations in the Pacific with that thought in mind, and the plans were drawn with that thought in mind. Is that a correct statement?

General MARSHALL. I think it is, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And those plans were integrated with the plans as far out as the Philippines and intervening territory, and all over the Asiatic area, so that those plans integrated action all through that area, but tied to the keystone at Oahu; is that right?

[3546] General MARSHALL. The integration in the Far East, which would imply Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, first made its appearance in an attempt to plan for that in ABC-1, and other conferences at Singapore. Prior to that there had been no discussions with other nations about that.

Mr. KEEFE. I am talking about our own plan.

General MARSHALL. Then your statement is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. My statement is correct that the country has been alerted to our own plan?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And the defense of the Philippines, and the money we spent in developing Corregidor, and so on, in the Philippines were all tied in with this general plan which used Oahu and the Hawaiian Islands as the keystone?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. For either attack or defense?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. We had an attack plan, did we not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As well as the defense plan?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What was the attack plan called?

General MARSHALL. Well, it was one of the yellow plans. [3547] and I have forgotten what the last designation was. We got into the Rainbow estimates.

Mr. KEEFE. We finally had orange, yellow, and what have you?

General MARSHALL. I think orange was correct.

Mr. KEEFE. We finally got them put together in a Rainbow plan?

General MARSHALL. That is right.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right, is it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, those plans had been in effect for years?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And to implement those plans, the Army and Navy conducted maneuvers in that area, did they not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And with the development of aeronautics and the development of the airplane as a possible means of attack, the plans constantly changed to include defenses against air attack?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And against submarine attack?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And against possible landing attack?

[3548] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And so these maneuvers were carried on from time to time up there by the Army and Navy for the purpose of implementing those plans, to see how they worked; isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And there was a grand maneuver there in 1932. Do you recall that?

General MARSHALL. Not specifically. There were a number of maneuvers out there that were part Army and Navy maneuvers, and there may have been some where there was a landing from the west coast.

Mr. KEEFE. Before these maneuvers were carried out, they had to be planned out in Washington?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And every detail is worked out in conjunction with the Army and Navy jointly, where it is a joint maneuver; is that true?

General MARSHALL. Yes. Probably most of the details are worked out there, but with us it is a mere detail.

Mr. KEEFE. I had brought in here several days ago, General Marshall, the plans for the 1932 maneuvers, and of course, not being an experienced technician or military man, I was rather amazed at the voluminous details, the [3549] stack of papers and documents involving the preparations for that 1932 maneuver, about a foot high, stuff worked out here in Washington.

Now, the purpose of those maneuvers was to see if all these plans that had been worked out were workable, is that true?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

[3550] Mr. KEEFE. And in 1932 there was specific emphasis laid upon the possibility of an air attack on Oahu, and judges were

appointed, umpires I believe they called them, and the umpires witnessed the attack and the defense and then made a report, and that report is here.

I don't know whether it is in evidence or not. Is it, counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. We haven't offered it.

Mr. KEEFE. A very voluminous pile of documents. Although I only had the opportunity to look casually through it, it indicated to me that the umpires at that time came to the conclusion that the attacking air forces had succeeded in wiping out Pearl Harbor and the defenders.

A plan was worked out very meticulously for the attack, very similar to the attack that took place on December 7.

Did you ever look over that plan, General?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event, maneuvers continued from time to time, and the relations with Japan began to get pretty tough about 1937.

You recall the incident of the sinking of the *Panay* on December 1, 1937, do you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There were a lot of diplomatic representations [3551] and a lot of stuff in the press and a lot of talk, you remember, at that time?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States became strained—I am speaking from my own recollection of the situation at that time, trying to establish some guide post so as to be able to interpret this mass of detail and testimony that has come in.

Would you say that while they may have been strained more or less part of that time, at least from 1937 on the relationship between this country and Japan gradually disintegrated, there was a continuous gradual deterioration?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Until it finally culminated in the break on December 7, 1941; isn't that correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And as Chief of Staff you could see that gradual deterioration and were making efforts to improve the situation of our defenses and our ability to take offensive measures in the Pacific, were you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, this whole picture, General Marshall, had to be tied in to the European situation, to a certain extent, in order to understand it thoroughly, did it not?

[3552] General MARSHALL. As to matériel, very much so.

Mr. KEEFE. You couldn't completely disassociate the European situation from the Pacific situation during the period of just prior to 1940, we will say?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if I understand this, and I am asking these leading questions from you, General Marshall, to expedite this examination, which is perfectly proper, I understand, under standard rules

of procedure on cross-examination, and if at any time you feel a statement I made is correct will you so state——

The CHAIRMAN. If the Congressman will permit this suggestion, we have not looked upon the inquiry made by individual members as cross-examination but as examination on the same level as examination of counsel.

Mr. KEEFE. Be that as it may, I don't think we are proceeding strictly according to technical legal procedure——

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. KEEFE. But I normally would not ask leading questions of a witness. I am asking them on these matters merely to expedite because I want to get this background tied together in my own mind. I don't see how the public nor the country nor anybody else can get a true picture of this unless we tie certain facts together in some chronology. I confess to [3553] some confusion of thought in the matter up to date because of the isolation of various facts and I want to get a few facts pinned down.

Now, we have come to the conclusion that the relationship diplomatically between this country and Japan were in a steady progress of deterioration; is that not correct?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And steps were being taken by you, as Chief of Staff, to get this country ready for what might come?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As is the duty of any Chief of the Army?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It might not come, but if it did come you wanted to be ready; is that right?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you are confronted with the situation necessitating sending enormous supplies to aid our Allies over in the European war; is that correct?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you found yourself with a rapidly deteriorating set of circumstances in the Pacific, being unable to send there the things which you yourself knew were necessary, especially in the Philippines.

General MARSHALL. To a certain extent, yes, sir.

[3554] Mr. KEEFE. I thought I understood you to say "Poor MacArthur was out there with practically nothing," using that exact language.

General MARSHALL. That is correct. I said that.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were trying to get some stuff out to him?

General MARSHALL. Correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Some planes, trying to reinforce his manpower and trying to get matériel?

General MARSHALL. Correct.

Mr. KEEFE. I think you said he didn't have any anti-aircraft guns.

General MARSHALL. Practically none at all.

Mr. KEEFE. And those he did have were antiquated?

General MARSHALL. Obsolescent.

Mr. KEEFE. As a matter of fact, for a period of years it had been the practice, had it not, to keep most of the first-class fine material at

the forts here in the United States where the people who paid for it and the Congress who had appropriated the money could see it, and as it got obsolescent it went to Hawaii and when it was pretty well obsolescent it was shipped to the Philippines?

General MARSHALL. I don't believe that is quite correct. There wasn't a great deal of very fine material. There was [3555] not a material amount of fine material even to transfer from time to time.

Mr. KEEFE. Most of it was kept here, wasn't it, in the United States?

General MARSHALL. Well, I don't think our coast defenses had such extensive procedures. I found a great part of them even lacking adequate fire-control systems. I mean, I don't quite recall the proposition of moving them to our coast defenses and then transferring them to the Pacific. I think that what they had in Manila had been there a long time and had not been renewed for more modern matériel.

But what they had in Hawaii I think had been direct shipments and not picked up here from one place and shipped out there until we actually began to go through the procedure that I referred to here before the board in getting aircraft and other things away from units in the States.

I think your statement is generally correct but I didn't want to become involved in saying that.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, when we get down to 1940, that was a Presidential election year, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. I believe so.

Mr. KEEFE. There was a lot of talking going on in this country?

[3556] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Here you were faced with the knowledge that the diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were getting quite tense; that is right, isn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In 1940, not 1941, but 1940, and public opinion was at a rather high pitch in this country at that time, as you know, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The question of possible involvement in war was being discussed all over the country, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; discussing the Selective Service Act; calling the National Guard into active service.

Mr. KEEFE. Selective Service didn't come until the fall.

General MARSHALL. I think it became effective in September.

Mr. KEEFE. September 1940.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. My record of it shows that it was approved on September 16, 1940, and October 16 was set aside as registration day, 1940. Do you recall that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And candidates for public office were making speeches over the radio, candidates for Congress and other [3557] positions, and there was continuous talk, and talk was going on in both the House and in the Senate; do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All during that period starting along in May of 1940 and continuing right up until the election. And you couldn't help but have knowledge of that situation as Chief of Staff, could you?

General MARSHALL. I had knowledge of it.

Mr. KEEFE. You were concerned about it, too, were you not?

General MARSHALL. It made things difficult.

Mr. KEEFE. Because you at that time were intercepting the Japanese messages?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had the magic all during 1940, didn't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you knew what their intentions were over in the Pacific, at least you read the cards that were dealt?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. To their Ambassadors and consuls.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you became very much disturbed about the [3558] situation early in 1940, did you not?

General MARSHALL. Early in 1940?

Mr. KEEFE. Strike that question.

When did you go out to the Hawaiian Islands in 1940?

General MARSHALL. I went out in the spring of 1940.

Mr. KEEFE. When in the spring?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall now; the record will show. I can determine that for you. You may have the date there.

Mr. KEEFE. No, I haven't. That is one of the things I wanted to get from you.

Did you go out there during the alert?

General MARSHALL. Which alert?

Mr. KEEFE. I may be able to dig it out.

General MARSHALL. Which alert?

Mr. KEEFE. The Herron alert of 1940.

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I know specifically that I went out before that alert. The alert was in the summer and I went there in the spring.

Mr. KEEFE. The Herron alert order went out to General MacArthur on the 17th of June 1940?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3559] Mr. KEEFE. Now, you have been out there to Hawaii before that, had you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you fix the time when you went there any more definitely than to say it was in the spring sometime?

General MARSHALL. My guess would be March.

Mr. KEEFE. March?

General MARSHALL. March of 1940.

Mr. KEEFE. What was the purpose of your going out there?

General MARSHALL. I went out for several reasons. One was, of course, to familiarize myself with the state of the garrison, the state of the equipment, and the plans for the defenses, and the relationship with the Navy.

Another was that there was going to be a maneuver between a naval force moving from the west coast to Hawaii against a small

naval force then in Hawaii, largely, I believe, submarines and destroyers. I was anxious that our heavy bombardment should participate in that naval operation.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, would you object if I interrupted to ask, to save time, was that the maneuver of 1940 that brought the fleet from its base at San Diego and [3560] San Pedro out to Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I think it was.

Mr. KEEFE. That was the time when Admiral Richardson took the fleet out to Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I think that is what it was.

Mr. KEEFE. So you went out there with the idea of synchronizing the work of the Army in connection with those maneuvers in the spring of 1940?

General MARSHALL. The agreement had already been reached between Admiral Stark and myself for the participation of the Army heavy bombers in a maneuver the Navy was holding in connection with the arrival of the fleet. There seemed to be some complication about the matter. So that was one of the things I had in mind, to make certain that the Army bombers did participate, and they did.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that maneuver set up, the plans for it, sometime prior to March of 1940?

General MARSHALL. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Keefe. That was a naval arrangement, and we interjected the Army bombers into it, I think, after they had laid out the basic maneuvers.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have maneuvers every year out there?

General MARSHALL. They had them at various times. I [3561] don't know the exact routine. This was the first time I personally had a responsibility concerned with them.

Mr. KEEFE. I think the evidence shows that the orders for this maneuver and the plan for it, so far as the Navy was concerned had been made a considerable period of time prior to the fleet leaving its base.

General MARSHALL. Probably so. I went out to make certain they participated.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you go out there at the instruction of the State Department?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I went out there on my own.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it intended that those maneuvers in cooperation with the fleet were to be a show of strength to Japan?

General MARSHALL. If it was, I had no knowledge of it.

Mr. KEEFE. It was just intended to be an ordinary carrying out of maneuvers to implement the plans that were constantly being drawn up for the defense of that area?

General MARSHALL. Presumably so. That would be a naval question. The fleet was going out. It made a normal situation for a maneuver.

Incidentally, I had been concerned prior to that, I think in January 1940, with the largest joint Army-Navy [3562] maneuver we had had.

Mr. KEEFE. At the time the maneuvers were held in March, did you have any idea at that time that conditions were getting pretty critical between this country and Japan?

General MARSHALL. I knew they were not agreeable. I knew that we were having trouble about scrap iron. We were having trouble about oil in connection with the Japanese actions out in the Far East, and I regarded the whole situation as fraught with very dangerous possibilities.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there was a good deal of talk going on at that time here in America intended to get the Government to ban the shipment of gasoline and oil and scrap iron to Japan, and to stop sending them supplies, but there wasn't any formal export ban early in 1940, was there?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that there was.

Mr. KEEFE. My record shows that the ban on export of aviation fuel to Japan didn't come until August 1, 1941.

But at least there was a lot of talk about it, sir, you know that.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That necessarily went back to Japan and created tension; is that right?

General MARSHALL. Presumably it went back to Japan, [3563] yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, General Marshall, you became concerned enough about what you learned from G-2 and Jap intercepts, and so on, that you decided that the time had come to alert the Army forces in Hawaii on the 17th of June 1940?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you sent the message that has been heretofore referred to, signed "Adams," which I shall not burden the record with reading again.

Now, I have listened carefully to the questions that were asked you with reference to that alert and I fail to recall where you have testified as to the specific facts and the specific evidence that you had in your hands at that time which prompted you to issue that alert warning. Will you now state what evidence you had in your hands at that time to indicate the possibility of a trans-Pacific raid on the 17th of June 1940.

General MARSHALL. I think I testified before, and if I didn't I testify now, that the information on which that alert was based came largely through some magic messages. I have not those particular messages here. They were brought to my attention by Gen. George V. Strong, who was then at the head of the War Plans Division, with the [3564] recommendation that the garrison there be alerted against the possibility of such a raid.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood you to give that testimony, General, heretofore, but that doesn't answer my question.

What was the information that came to you?

General MARSHALL. Mr. Keefe, I will have to attempt, through General Strong, to get those messages together. I don't know what they are right now.

Mr. KEEFE. It must have been something of a critical character—

General MARSHALL. Presumably so.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew that any time you took action out at Hawaii, they had a mass of spies out there that were in constant contact with their homeland and that everything that was done was reported back to Japan practically the moment it happened?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is conclusively shown and demonstrated, is it not?

General MARSHALL. I think that is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. So that when you issued this alert, and put Oahu on a practical war footing on the 17th of June 1940, did you consider that to be in the nature of an overt act against Japan?

[3565] General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you have anything that you took from Magic that would indicate that the Japs might have so considered it?

General MARSHALL. I have not the magic message here. I will have to check back and find what it might have been, talk to General Strong and get him to advise me as to the basis of his recommendation to me for that particular message.

Mr. KEEFE. So we can be clear on this, I would like to have the specific information, not the general conclusion that you came to on the 17th of June; not your conclusion, but I would like to have the specific information that General Strong gave you prompted you to issue that alert order on June 17.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As a result of that alert order given to the Army, General Herron in command, he went on an all-out alert, did he?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That meant that a lot of things happened immediately; ammunition was issued for all the guns?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The guns were loaded, ready for action, their crews were at their stations?

[3566] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Reconnaissance was extended inshore and distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Through the cooperation of the Navy?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Searchlights were on at night, and such detection apparatus as they had was on 24 hours a day, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall the details as to searchlights or the detection.

Mr. KEEFE. I recall because I have some pictures showing it here. I would be glad to show them to you.

General MARSHALL. I was speaking about all night.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't know that they were on all night, but searchlights are used for defense, are they not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I was merely commenting on the fact you said searchlights were on all night.

Mr. KEEFE. There was a lot of artillery rumbling over the islands, troops moving from one place to another, patrols out, signal wires stretching over the island, communications systems rapidly laid. just as in wartime; isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. That is true.

[3567] Mr. KEEFE. That continued on out there in Hawaii for some time, did it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; quite a few weeks.

Mr. KEEFE. In fact, on the 18th of June, General Herron in response to your order for an alert, as appears on page 3 of these communications between the War Department and General Herron, said:

All anti-aircraft observations and security of detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas, and in defense of any essential installations. Some local interest in ammunition issues, but no excitement. Navy in-shore and off-shore air patrols in operation.

I suppose that if a Jap plane did come over, they would fire on it, wouldn't they?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would that be an act of war?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If a Jap submarine came near the Harbor and they sunk it, would that be an act of war?

General MARSHALL. I assume it would be; yes, sir. Certainly for the submarine crew.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me?

General MARSHALL. It would be an act of war.

[3568] **Mr. KEEFE.** Well, would it have been considered an act of war?

General MARSHALL. I think it would; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 3 minutes to 3, Mr. Keefe.

General MARSHALL. May I read one paragraph from a letter to me from General Herron on June 24, 1940, in connection with your question?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I won't have time for the whole letter, but I will read one paragraph apropos of what has been said:

This is to report that the Hawaiian portion of your domain is quiet this morning.

I will omit the next there to save time.

I have been highly gratified by the promptness and the precision with which the planes got off the ground every morning promptly at 4:30.

I omit again.

A week ago to-day—

That would be the 17th—

I gave the command for a surprise alert, which went off smoothly and efficiently. In view of the disturbing state of the world, I thought the command might as well get accustomed to having live ammunition, but did not realize how much this would excite the postwar portion of the Army. [3569] However, they are all quieted down now, as is the city which buzzed for a couple of days. Some of the young people thought that M-day had come, and two or three young couples that had intended to get married this month hustled around and did it once, just as in 1918.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the same letter in which General Herron said to you in the last paragraph:

Your crack that "yesterday we had time but no money and that today we have money but no time" is good and has made a great hit in particular with the civilians.

General MARSHALL. I wasn't going to read that, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I will suspend, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We promised to relieve General Marshall at 3 o'clock. The Chair expresses regret that we haven't been able to conclude with the General today. You have been very kind, General, to put yourself at the disposal of the committee. It looks like you will have to come back tomorrow.

General MARSHALL. At 10 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. At 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

General MARSHALL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel, what witness do you want now?

[3750] Mr. MITCHELL. General Miles had better start back where he left off.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, before we question General Miles further, can we get this secret report in?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair feels that inasmuch as General Marshall is not to be back until tomorrow morning, it would give more time to consider that if we waited until tomorrow before putting it in as an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any question about the report, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, I was just looking it over to see what this book contains so as to describe it in the record. I have done that.

The CHAIRMAN. What disadvantage will result in allowing this to await tomorrow?

Senator FERGUSON. The only thing is if we can get it read into the record now, General Marshall will have the record, which apparently he gets, because he made corrections in it, and then he would be able to know about this and we could question him further in the morning. That was my purpose for bringing it up now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman—if you will permit, Senator; the same purpose could be served, if counsel places [3571] the document in General Marshall's hands and so let him be familiar with it when he comes back at 10 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. We can do that.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the objection to having it read into the record?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator: Isn't it a fact that many of the things that are in that report which you are now offering have not been gone into by the committee and are changed by the Clausen report which you do not offer?

Senator FERGUSON. As I view this report, as I stated before, a board was appointed in conformity with a statute passed by Congress. That board's function was to render a report. They rendered a report. They rendered it in two parts. One part was a top secret report. The other was a report. Because the war was on part of that report was published. Part of the report was not published. That is, the 18 pages of the top secret report.

Now, before General Marshall leaves for China, it is essential that the committee be given an opportunity to examine him if they desire, and it, therefore, should become a part of the record. It is an official paper filed by a board in conformity with the statute.

[3572] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation in answer to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman from Michigan this morning talked about this being a statutory board. The fact is that the direction of the Congress was to the Secretary of War personally to make an investigation. That is the way the act reads. I have it here and we had better get it into the record at this time.

It reads:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe.

Now, then, subsequently the Secretary of War, as a medium for obtaining information, named three generales who conducted certain hearings. They had a Major Clausen as an assistant recorder. Then the Secretary of War stated that in order to continue his investigation and in order to cover certain material which was not covered by the board, he would delegate the assistant recorder of the board to go around the world to take this testimony.

That testimony, taken by Major Clausen, was not considered by the Army Pearl Harbor board. The report is here. It explains in great detail, and, as the Senator from Michigan [3573] knows, corrects a great many errors which appear in the Army Pearl Harbor proceedings.

All we want is the ultimate truth and why put part of it in when you are not putting it all in?

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection to the Clausen report going in. In fact, I want the Clausen report in.

The CHAIRMAN. The offering of this particular report raises the question whether all of these reports, regardless of whether they are statutory or otherwise, should be offered as exhibits and become a part of the record.

The Chair sees no harm that could result by awaiting our meeting tomorrow to determine that matter, and in the meantime if counsel can show these 18 pages to General Marshall instead of taking the time to read them into the record now, the same purpose would be accomplished and he could be examined about it.

The Chair hopes that the decision on that may go over to tomorrow, because it may turn out that all of these reports might be filed as exhibits so that we have the benefit of all of them.

Mr. KEEFE. I concur in what the chairman has said; insofar as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing to have all this material go in.

So far as the Clausen report is concerned, that was a [3574] report made to the Secretary of War and consists of a lot of affidavits and some conclusions based thereon. It is a reexamination of witnesses who appeared before the Army board and testified under oath.

Now, I am perfectly willing, so far as I am concerned (and I expect, too, to examine some of these witnesses as to the changes which they made in their testimony when they testified under oath before the Army and Navy Court, and then changed their testimony when they gave an affidavit in various parts of the world to Colonel Clausen.

I am perfectly willing that the Clausen affidavits be submitted, and also that the Navy Court of Inquiry record and all connected with it, be submitted, and any other reports, the Hewitt report and the Hart

report, let it all come in here, because the weight and relevancy of that testimony will ultimately have to be considered by this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the discussion, the Chair feels we should proceed now with the examination of General Miles and let the matter of filing of any of these reports be held in suspense until we meet tomorrow.

In the meantime the Chair will suggest to counsel that he show General Marshall these parts of the report about which he may be examined.

[3575]

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

General MILES. Mr. Chairman, on reading the transcript of my testimony on Tuesday, December 4, I find certain inferences that I think should be clarified. I request the indulgence of the committee for about 5 minutes for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

General MILES. I would like first to review the sequence of our information on December 6 and 7 in the practical light of what we then knew, not with the wisdom which hindsight confers.

On Saturday, December 6, we were at peace with Japan; we—

Mr. KEEFE. Just a moment.

Mr. Chairman, before there is any further reading of this, may I say that I understood when the General started that this was to be a correction of some implication or inferences contained in his testimony. He has gone far enough to convince me that it is a reading of a statement. I am just wondering if it is to be incorporated in the record, whether or not we are conforming to the adopted rule of the committee that statements of that character were to be submitted in advance of their being placed in the record.

[3576] I, of course, don't know all of what is in his statement, but General Miles has been a witness and if he desires to correct specific testimony given under oath I have no objection to it, but I do object to reading at this time into the record a statement which I have not seen, don't know what is in it, and which from the opening statement would appear to be in violation of the rule of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to state, as he undertook to clarify that question the other day, the understanding and agreement was that when witnesses came here to read in their examination formal written statements as to their testimony, which was to be done prior to any examination of them, that those statements would be given to the committee in advance.

The Chair did not understand that rule to mean that during the course of an oral examination of a witness if he had a written memorandum that he desired to read in order that he might be accurate about something, that the rule required him to submit that statement in writing to the committee in advance.

And General Miles has not read enough of this statement yet for the Chair to determine whether it is a correction of some statement or implication or not, but under any circumstances the Chair does not feel that it comes within [3577] the rule that in advance

of the testimony of a witness who intended first to read a manuscript that he should submit it to the committee. The Chair does not understand that this is such a manuscript as was contemplated in that rule.

Therefore, the Chair is compelled to overrule the point made by the Congressman from Wisconsin.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, in this connection it should be borne in mind that the only witness who has appeared here so far with a prepared statement is Secretary Hull and copies of that prepared statement were furnished the members of the committee many days in advance of the reading of the statement.

Now, these other witnesses have not appeared with a prepared manuscript. So I think the Chair is correct in that conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair feels that intermittent statements made during the oral examination of a witness, after days of such oral examination, in order that the witness may be accurate or thinks he is accurate, in putting on paper something about which he has testified, does not come within the rule which we announced that manuscripts which were to be read to the committee in the first instances by witnesses should be submitted to the committee in advance.

Go ahead, General.

[3578] General MILES. On Saturday, December 6, we were at peace with Japan; we were maintaining diplomatic relations with her; we were holding a diplomatic conference with her. We believed that the diplomatic conference would be broken as the result of Japanese refusal to accept our note of November 26. We also had serious reasons to fear, because of code burnings and other indications, that Japan might break diplomatic relations and go to war with the United States. But we had no proof of this.

Obviously, Japan had the option of agreeing to disagree, of breaking up the conference, of going ahead with her plans of conquest and putting it up to us to go to war in defense of the British, the Dutch or the Siamese.

[3579] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I submit, Mr. Chairman, right now, that the witness so far has indicated that his statement is a mere recitation of his conclusions and I as a member of this committee want to base my determination in this matter upon evidence and that is the very function of the committee, to draw conclusions from evidence that is submitted and not to have a witness come up and give a lot of his own conclusions as to what the evidence offered intends to show.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness can be examined by any member of the committee concerning the statement that he is reading in order to lay the basis for the accuracy of any conclusion or any statement that he makes.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have made my position clear. That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair overrules the point of order. Proceed, General.

General MILES. And that would have been a difficult thing to have done in the winter of 1941. That was another reason that we talked to the last about Thailand. That was probably one reason discussions were being held about a line beyond which Japan could not go without war.

In the meanwhile, 9 days before, our Pacific commands had been warned that hostile action by Japan [3580] was possible at any moment. They also knew that the Japanese were burning certain codes. We had nothing definite as to time or place to add to that.

There we stood on the afternoon of the 6th when the pilot message came in. That told us that a 14-part reply to our note of November 26 would come in, that it would be long, that it was to be put in nice shape for delivery but not delivered until further notice. Certainly, no indication here of anything threatening on the next day, Sunday.

Late on the night of the 6th the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply came in. It repeated their well worn arguments that it was all our fault, not theirs, and it concluded only that they could not accept our note of November 26 as a basis of negotiations. So far, so good—nothing unexpected in this. The fourteenth part would tell the story.

Some time between 8:30 and 9 on the morning of the 7th the fourteenth part came in from the Military Intelligence Division. It formally ruptured the conference but it went no further than that. Simultaneously the delivery message came in, 1 p. m. on a Sunday, a startling hour. It meant trouble somewhere, against someone, but still not necessarily against the United States. However, we knew something at [3581] last, not where or against whom, but when.

The action taken by the Chief of Staff, though unfortunately delayed, covered that situation perfectly.

Such was the information received successively on the 6th and 7th, on which decision had to be taken. We could not look into the future as we can now look into the past. We had to deal with what we then had.

It seems to me that magic has been overstressed in one important aspect or respect. It was a priceless asset but its value in bringing to our Pacific garrisons a realization of impending war can be over-emphasized.

It is highly significant that General MacArthur, who had magic, could not identify as having seen any of the most important magic messages and yet stated categorically that the War Department dispatches, which were not magic, were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his command for war. It is also significant that the war warning dispatch of November 27 was not, apparently, based primarily on magic but on our own decision of the previous day as to our position *vis-a-vis* the Japanese Government. Magic need not have been, and indeed was not, necessary to a true comprehension of the situation.

Lastly, I would like to touch on my inadequacy and unsatisfactory answers last Tuesday when questioned on certain [3582] papers, which I had not seen at the time, of the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff.

I would like to repeat that I had no part in the deliberations or decisions of the higher policy-making officials of the State, War, and Navy department as between themselves and with the President and frequently knew nothing of such matters.

I served as an assistant to a great Chief of Staff. He is a man who is quite competent to call on whomever he wishes for whatever pur-

poses he has in mind. I served him as he wanted to be served. I regret, but I make no apologies for, my ignorance of those matters in which I was not concerned.

That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair believes that when we suspended with the examination, General Miles, that Congressman Keefe was asking you questions.

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, was it Senator Ferguson? I thought you had concluded, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I will be glad to yield to Congressman Keefe.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair was not desirous of passing up [3583] the Senator, but thought that the Senator had concluded.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought he had concluded, but if I am in error in that, why, I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if the Senator had not concluded, why he may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I had not concluded.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, we will take them in order.

Senator FERGUSON. General, when did you write the statement that you brought in today and read?

General MILES. Some time between December 4 and today. I do not remember on which particular day, sir, after having read the transcript of my testimony on December 4.

Senator FERGUSON. You read your testimony and then you drew up this statement, is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the purpose of the statement? What do you wish to convey to the committee by it?

General MILES. I wish to convey that the tenor of the questions and my answers as set forth in the transcript of my testimony on December 4 need further clarification, in my judgment, for the sake of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any suggestion that you draw such a statement at the present time to clarify the answers?

[3584] General MILES. No one made any such suggestion to me.

Senator FERGUSON. I noticed that you passed upon the Clausen affidavit in relation to General MacArthur, interpreting that affidavit.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you just read that part again, what General MacArthur said?

General MILES (reading):

It is highly significant that General MacArthur, who had some magic, could not identify as having seen any of the most important magic messages and yet stated categorically that the War Department dispatches which were not magic were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his command for war.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by that, that you cannot understand how he could do that?

General MILES. No, sir. I think it is extremely significant in the relative importance of magic versus the War Department dispatches that General MacArthur should have said that.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, do I understand now that you are conveying to the committee that in your opinion [3585] the messages of the War Department—and you are talking about the messages sent from here to the various commands—were more intelligent, gave more information, than if they would have had the magic, is that what you want to convey to the committee?

General MILES. Senator, I think you are straining what I am trying to say a little bit, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I don't want to.

General MILES. I know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just asking you if that is what you want to convey to the committee, that if a person in command had had magic he would not have had as clear a picture as if he only had your messages; is that what you want to convey?

General MILES. I am not saying that, Senator. I am simply pointing out one instance in which definitely magic was not, according to General MacArthur's testimony, the paramount and definitive factor which brought about his alert of his command.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that this message sent to the High Commissioner, which was considered; it would be from the War Department, would it not? You remember the message sent to the High Commissioner?

General MILES. I think that was a naval message.

[3856] Senator FERGUSON. Beg pardon?

General MILES. I think that was a naval message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, from the President; it was sent by Navy. Would that be considered from the War Department?

General MILES. No, sir. It was from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart, as I remember the message, if I have the right one in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that had been taken up with General MacArthur and discussed with him, apparently, from the message itself.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think that would add anything to his knowledge?

General MILES. I said that it did. I have not said that it did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the message that went out about the three men-of-war boats? Do you think that that message would add to his knowledge?

General MILES. To answer the first question first, I was not familiar with that message. I presume that that added to General MacArthur's knowledge in that it definitely told him that the Navy was sending out that light patrol.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any information that scouting planes from the Japs had flown over the air fields on [3587] the Philippines prior to the date of the attack?

General MILES. Scouting planes had flown over the Philippines?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, reconnaissance of the Japs had flown over the fields.

General MILES. You might refresh my memory, Senator, by telling me what you are referring to.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am asking you if you had that knowledge?

General MILES. I do not recollect that I had that knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if that was a fact would that have added to General MacArthur's knowledge?

General MILES. He presumably would have known it.

Senator FERGUSON. But would it have added to his alert; that he would be alert?

General MILES. I cannot say, sir, whether it would have added or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, General, was your department alerted?

General MILES. We were partially alerted. We were alerted to the extent of realizing the situation was critical and expecting, hourly expecting, the Japanese reply.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you become partially alerted? [3588] will you give us the day that your department became partially alerted?

General MILES. Senator, are you speaking of arrangements that we had made to notify officers, or are you speaking of our mental alertness to a situation?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you used the words "partially alerted." That is your language.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by it?

General MILES. I meant that as the situation developed and became obviously more critical, even in the daily press to say nothing of what we knew, that we were continuously increasing our mental alertness to the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you are talking about mental alertness, is that correct, that you were partially mentally alerted, is that what you say?

General MILES. No, sir, that was not what I meant to say anyway.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you did not mean to say that?

General MILES. I am trying to find out, Senator, what you mean. There is a difference between the actual regulations or orders which enable certain messages to circulate through my department and which enables certain officers to be found when they were needed, and so forth, between physical [3589] arrangements made, and the question of our mental alertness to the situation. If you will tell me what you mean, I can answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, let me ask you this: What did you intend by the messages you sent to Hawaii to do, mentally alert them or alert their department for war? Which did you intend?

General MILES. You refer to the war warning message of November 27, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, take that one.

General MILES. That obviously was intended to alert physically, mentally, morally, and every other way, so I understood it, that command.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it alert your department in the same way?

General MILES. Very definitely, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it alert your department in the same way?

General MILES. Very definitely. As soon as we knew that the alert

orders had been sent over General Marshall's signature the situation became very different.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get an answer to this question: If your department was alerted as you expected Hawaii to be alerted by the same message, how do you account [3590] personally for the pilot message not being delivered to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was the only man under his testimony that could act, he or the President or the Secretary of War, as I understand his testimony? Now, how do you account for that pilot message that came in separately, not part of the 14 parts, that that was not delivered on the day it was translated?

General MILES. Senator, my answer is, first, that I had every reason to believe that General Marshall did receive the locked pouch which contained this message. I heard his testimony this morning. I think he is mistaken in saying that he did not receive that message on the afternoon of the 6th.

I base this largely because, if you will turn back the pages, you will see quite a number of other magic messages which were translated on the 6th. Now we know it was always the custom, always the orders, that those messages as soon as they accumulated, or in the case of any important message, immediately were transmitted by my officers to the Chief of Staff among others. That is the first answer.

In the second place, I heard your questions and General Marshall's answers regarding that pilot message. Now, I cannot concur with you, Senator, in your interpretation of that message. That is a diplomatic message.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute. May I correct you? [3591] Don't take any question that I ask as to my interpretation. What I am trying to do is to get the facts from you witnesses that were there and knew the facts as of that time. What is your interpretation, not what you think mine is, what is your interpretation of that message?

General MILES. Very well, sir. This is a diplomatic message from Tokyo to Washington, to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington. It states that:

A separate message and a very long one in reply to the American note of November 26 will be sent. It is in fourteen parts and it may be received tomorrow—

which means Saturday, because it was sent on the 6th, which is the 5th Tokyo time, which is Friday. It was not received until last Saturday night.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Saturday night?

General MILES. Coming in, it was not received possibly until fairly late on Saturday, the 6th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the first part in, General, and then we will go back to that? As I understand it here, 902, the fourteenth part, came in pilot by the Japanese at 8 a. m., intercepted at Bainbridge Island 8:03 to 8:10 on the 6th. Is that what you have in mind?

General MILES. The first part; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And pilot message 901 came in and [3592] was filed at 6:56 a. m.; came in at Bainbridge Island, and at Washington 7:15 to 7:20 on the 6th.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a. m. on the 6th of December.

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you—

Mr. KEEFE. Is that a. m.?

Senator FERGUSON. That is a. m.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is in the morning. Is that correct, General? That is in the morning, General, is it not?

Mr. KEEFE. These are dates of receipt—hours of receipts?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir. My information, sir, and I have only the information from my own officers, is that it was the—that they began to receive it in Military Intelligence late in the afternoon or early in the evening on the 6th, they began to receive it, the first part of the 14-part message.

Senator FERGUSON. That would mean that it was clearly translated and ready for delivery?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At what time was the earliest message brought in? [3593]

General MILES. I cannot state, sir. I am told by my officers that they received it, it began to come in in the evening of Saturday, December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, go ahead on the pilot message.

General MILES. Very well.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. Evening up in our country means one thing, but I notice here they say "good evening" starting about noon. Now, when you say it came in in the evening, I don't know what you are referring to, 6 o'clock at night or after 12 o'clock noon.

General MILES. I am referring to your evening, sir, about after 6 o'clock at night.

Mr. KEEFE. So that there will be no mistake about that?

General MILES. Or five or six.

Mr. KEEFE. After 6 o'clock at night?

General MILES. 5 o'clock certainly would be the beginning of evening.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

General MILES. Now, sir, this message—the recipient of this message, and I was one of them although it was not [3594] addressed to me, knew that it might be received on Saturday, it would be very long, that it was to be kept secret for the time being, it was to be put into a nicely drafted form and delivered only on receipt of a separate message.

Now, sir, if you will look back, Senator, to all the preceding proceedings of the diplomatic conference, I think you will agree with me, sir, that the Japs had been shifting and shilly shallying time and time again. They notably set November 25 as the deadline. They passed beyond that. They set November 29 as the deadline. They passed over that. All through this magic you can see the exchange of ideas and suggestions as between those negotiators over here and the Japanese government. So I think if you will look at this

message as it stands, not as we know now what happened, you cannot read into it that the pilot message of itself told them that they were going to have what you called this morning, I believe, a zero hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Zero time I think is better than "hour."

General MILES. Zero time. It was to be a zero time for the delivery of the other message, a diplomatic message in connection with diplomatic negotiations, but of itself it did not mean that any other action would be coordinated and made coincident with that time. It was only, Senator, when [3595] we got this 1 p. m. message and only then because of the startling hour of asking an old gentleman who was Secretary of State to receive an Ambassador at 1 p. m. on a Sunday that there was any indication that coincidentally with the delivery of that message something was apt to happen.

The pilot message that we received on Saturday, December 6, gave us no such information as that. It simply told us that this message when received would be locked up, be carefully put in nice shape; there was one message that he could not even use typist to do that, so the poor Ambassadors probably had to do it in longhand, I don't know who else they did use, or their secretaries—no indication then that the hour of delivery of that message, which we then did not know, had any particular significance other than a diplomatic exchange.

Senator FERGUSON. General, had you ever had any magic or information indicating that any other diplomatic message was ever to be delivered at a time, a zero time?

General MILES. No; I think not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't that to you be very significant?

General MILES. May I finish that answer, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I think not but I can suggest to you [3596] if we are not regarding this thing from the point of view of what we know now did happen, many reasons why the Japanese Ambassador in Washington should be told to put that message in a safe and prepare it for delivery but not deliver it until a future message.

There might have been what often happens in our own country, a complete lack of concurrences as to the time of delivery of that message; there might have been other diplomatic reasons why they were not prepared at that time to deliver the message on receipt; they wanted to delay for this, that and the other diplomatic reasons.

Senator FERGUSON. General, as an Army officer in Intelligence and in charge of that branch you were well familiar with the deceit of Japan, were you not?

General MILES. The deceit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I thought them a deceitful people; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Were you familiar with the fact that at Port Arthur they had struck prior to breaking off diplomatic relations?

General MILES. I think that is incorrect, Senator. The actual attack on Port Arthur, I believe, had occurred after the Japanese Ambassador in St. Petersburg had given an ultimatum or otherwise broken diplomatic relations.

[3597] Senator FERGUSON. Were communications as fast at that time as when we were attacked? Could they get messages to Port Arthur from the Russian capital as quickly as we could get them out in 1905?

General MILES. That is a difficult question to answer, sir. They had of course, the telegraph.

Senator FERGUSON. You then did not see, in this zero time delivery, holding it for zero time delivery, this deceit so that they could strike between the delivery and the time that they were sending, you did not see that, did you?

General MILES. I did not see that until it became obvious from the 1 p. m. message. The pilot message itself did not then, and does not now, indicate that any such military action would be coincident with the decision of the Japanese Government as to their particular time, for diplomatic reasons, for the delivery of their reply to us.

Senator FERGUSON. But now there isn't any doubt in your mind that this delay in the delivery was to give them time to make their attack before delivery, there is no doubt in your mind now, is there?

General MILES. Looking at it with hindsight, that seems very clear.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am saying now.

General MILES. Looking at it with hindsight. I still [3598] do not quite know, however, why, if this plan of the Japanese Government to strike Hawaii at 7 o'clock on the 7th of December, which we have heard had been made for some time, the task force having sailed forth sometime before, why the pilot message was sent. Why did not they say, "Deliver this thing at 1 o'clock on Sunday?"

Senator FERGUSON. Do you assume they did not suspect that there was some chance that we may intercept some of these messages? Do you think that the Japanese had absolutely no knowledge that we may get some of these messages?

General MILES. I had no reason to believe the Japanese thought we were breaking the code.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as you were concerned, you had absolutely no knowledge that the Japanese knew we were breaking the code?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember the message that was put in the other day from South America, indicating that they were suspicious that we were breaking the code?

General MILES. I do not recall that, sir. I would like to see it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 122 of exhibit 2.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield there?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[3599] Senator LUCAS. Does the Senator contend that there is anything in the first 13 parts of this message that challenges the position taken by the Japs?

Senator FERGUSON. I was going to ask some questions about that. I have declined, and still decline, to comment on the evidence. I haven't had it all, and I will not make any comment on the evidence until I have it all.

Senator LUCAS. I wanted to make that inquiry, because it seems to me the Senator asked as to the 13 parts of the so-called message, and I wondered if there is any disagreement on the Senator's part with the position that General Miles put in his conclusions.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no disagreement with General Miles. I am just asking the questions.

General MILES. I have that before me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at that?

General MILES. I have that before me.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything in there that would indicate they were suspicious that we were intercepting their code?

General MILES. The message is in regard to the safe delivery of certain plans and maps by official couriers, and so forth. It does contain a sentence, among several others, in a bracket, that "(There are also some suspicions that they [3600] read some of our codes.)" That was in June. Certainly subsequent to June their use of magic gave us no indication whatever that they suspected our breaking their code.

Senator FERGUSON. No messages from any other country to the Tokyo station would indicate that? For instance, no messages from Germany, or any other country, indicated that we had broken their code? You had never heard of that?

General MILES. From Germany or any other country that we were breaking the Japanese code?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that we were breaking the Japanese code.

General MILES. I have no recollection of any messages concerning the diplomatic Japanese code.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember reading the first 13 parts of this message at Admiral Wilkinson's home?

General MILES. I am not sure, sir, whether I read the actual text or whether Commander Kramer brought a summary out. I knew the general contents of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message on the night of Saturday, December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand it was customary to make summaries of these messages?

General MILES. I do not know what the Navy custom was.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that?

General MILES. I do not know what the Navy custom was. [3601]
I am simply saying I cannot remember whether I saw the textual message or was shown or was told a summary.

Senator FERGUSON. Now would you read—have you got the fourteenth part of the message?

General MILES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read the fourteenth part?

General MILES. The whole of the fourteenth part?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; just the fourteenth part.

General MILES. (Reading):

From: Tokyo.

To Washington.

7 December 1941

#902 Part 14 of 14

(NOTE.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT").

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to

adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of [3602] the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, do I understand you contend that it took that last sentence before you could really tell in this message that they were going to break off relations? Do I understand that is true?

General MILES. Before we could really tell; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as an intelligence officer who evaluates things, is that the basis that you evaluate things on, that you must be certain, you must wait until the last word? Is that the way?

General MILES. If you are going to be absolutely positive, yes, that is of course the best way, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have to—

General MILES. May I finish?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. Remember I had already testified that an unfavorable reply from Japan had been confidently expected by practically everybody in the Government whom I knew anything about, including myself. So the first 13 parts told me [3603] nothing that I had not already expected, discounted, and rehashed many times. Only the fourteenth part definitely decided what they were going to do about it. It might have been a declaration of war, for all I knew! Until I read the fourteenth part I did not know what the final purport of the answer was to be.

Senator FERGUSON. That is just it. You say it might have been a declaration of war?

General MILES. It might have been that.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not you—

General MILES. May I finish?

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

General MILES. It might have been that, or on the other extreme, it might have been simply another proposal for a continuation of the discussions.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you have to be certain, like, as you say, it could have been a declaration of war, before you would act on it and see that it got to the man who could actually act on it?

General MILES. I saw no reason, and I see no reason now, Senator, for having alerted. The Chief of Staff was a very busy man. We did not know what was coming, and I took steps to see that we would know as soon as possible when the fourteenth part came in.

[3604] Senator FERGUSON. This sentence out of part No. 2:

While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire,

did that have any significance?

General MILES. It would have if I had not heard the same play before in Japanese correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear what Secretary Hull said about this whole message?

General MILES. I heard that later, when I read it in the papers afterwards, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could he have possibly said that in relation to the last part if it alone had been delivered? Could he have made such a strong statement if only that one part had been delivered? Did not the message before that indicate, as he said, the falsehoods and lies?

General MILES. I think not, sir. I think, Senator, the first 13 parts of that message were full of falsehoods and lies, if you ask me.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am talking about. That is exactly what my question is.

General MILES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could he have said that from the fourteenth [3605] part alone? Do not the previous 13 parts indicate his attitude as to that message?

General MILES. But he had heard the same falsehoods and lies from the Japanese for several months, poor man.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, you heard the statement——

General MILES. May I add to that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I am not clear, of course, in my memory as to just what the Secretary did say in his famous statement to the press.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have you see that. It is on page 787 of part II of Foreign Relations. It has been read in by General Marshall, so I will not ask you to read it in.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, while he is reading that, I want to raise one question before this committee. A moment ago when I merely suggested to Senator Ferguson that he let General Miles answer the question, the gentleman on Senator Ferguson's right got a hearty chuckle out of it.

I would like to know just who the gentleman is and what right he has to sit alongside of the committee table and chuckle at a member of the United States Senate. I merely make an honest suggestion with respect to this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair is not in a position to [3606] answer that question, because he does not know who the gentleman is to whom the Senator from Illinois refers, or in what capacity he acts.

I think it might be stated that he is not an employee of the committee. He has not been authorized by the committee to do anything, so far as the Chair knows.

Senator Ferguson may be able to answer the Senator's question, but the Chair is not.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not care who he is or what his business is, but I do not propose to sit around this table and permit some individual that I do not know anything about, who is constantly in this case and constantly reminding Senators of the type and kind of questions they should ask, to give a hearty chuckle to something I might suggest in connection with this hearing.

I think it is about time that the committee find out just who he is, or what his business is.

Senator FERGUSON. I would be glad to tell the Senator and the committee. His name is Percy Greaves. He is with Senator Brewster and has charge of Senator Brewster's files in this case.

Senator LUCAS. How long has he been with Senator Brewster? Where was he before that?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know. Senator Brewster will [3607] have to speak for that. I understand Senator Brewster will be here tomorrow.

Senator LUCAS. Was he the Republican National Committee research man in the campaign of 1944? Let him answer that.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your position?

Mr. GREAVES. I was with the Republican National Committee up until the end of last year.

Senator LUCAS. This is a nonpartisan hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of that information, would it be out of place to inquire who has compensated Mr. Greaves for the services he has rendered to Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. He is not rendering any services for me.

Senator LUCAS. Not much.

Senator FERGUSON. He is here with papers, but he is with Senator Brewster. You have to confer with Senator Brewster. He will be glad to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. He has been sitting by the Senator from Michigan during these whole hearings and apparently prompting the Senator in the interrogatories he has addressed to the witnesses. Maybe that is not a service to the Senator from Michigan and the Senator will have to be the judge of that, but it has been a matter of common observation that that has [3608] transpired ever since we began the hearing. I do not object to it personally. I do not care how many assistants any member of this committee may have or desire, or need, but it is not at all out of place that the committee know who it is who is compensating anybody who is assisting any Senator, in order that the whole facts may be known.

It is not only the duty of the committee, and the privilege of the committee, but I think the public would be interested in knowing whether there is any partisan compensation being paid to anybody who is employed by a member of this committee to make this investigation, in which we have all said we did not desire any partisanship to enter into it.

If the Senator from Michigan cannot give the information that the Senator from Illinois has requested, the Chair must express the hope that somebody can.

Senator FERGUSON. The Senator cannot. Senator Brewster will certainly be able to, and will.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not appreciate the gratuitous insults that have been made a couple of times by this gentleman, and I do not propose to take it much longer.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go ahead. We have got five more minutes of precious time. It may be that General Miles may be able to clear up something that seems to be cloudy.

[3609] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. The General was about to answer a question, if the gentleman will wait just a second.

Go ahead, General.

General MILES. I was about to answer with regard to Secretary Hull's violent statement, on finishing the reading of the reply of the Japanese, and particularly the reply that went to the 14 parts.

As I read it, it applies to the whole document. It was an outburst of righteous indignation by a man who sat and heard Japanese lies and falsehoods for months and months and now he received a whole package of them coincidental with bombs bursting over Pearl Harbor.

[3610] The CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your answer?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman KEEFE.

Senator FERGUSON. Congressman Keefe, do you want me to yield?

Mr. KEEFE. I was about to suggest, now that we have concluded the political discussion. I thought I would like to get on with the facts in the case.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is attempting to cooperate with the Congressman to that end. The Chair appreciates his suggestion.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I want to speak to you just a few moments on the Rochefort message.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with that Rochefort message?

General MILES. The message sent to G-2 in Hawaii directing him to get in touch with Commander Rochefort, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear the testimony of Colonel Bratton in relations to that message?

General MILES. Read into the testimony this morning? I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that be a fair statement as [3611] far as you are concerned?

General MILES. No, sir, that is not.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your view of that message? How do you vary from that message? Are you familiar with that message?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I am entirely familiar with that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you also familiar with his testimony?

General MILES. I heard his testimony read into the record of the committee this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you differ from it? What is your view of it?

General MILES. At that time, we were anxious awaiting the receipt of the implementing broadcast of the winds code message. Colonel Bratton came to me and told me that he had learned that Commander Rochefort, who, I understood was a naval intelligence officer of the fleet in Hawaii, was familiar with the winds code, and also that they were picking up broadcasts in Hawaii. He suggested a telegram be sent therefore to our G-2 in Hawaii to get in touch with Rochefort, for the sole purpose of getting that winds implementation broadcast, if it were sent, as rapidly as possible, and for no other purpose.

[3612] I would like to repeat that, sir. I did not, as was suggested in the testimony this morning, ever have any idea of either circuiting General Gerow, or any difference with General Gerow as to the need for further alerts in Hawaii. That was not the purpose of the Rochefort message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any conversation between Colonel Bratton and Commander McCullom in relation to similar information going out?

General MILES. I may have, sir. I know that Colonel Bratton was in direct communication with Captain McCullom, or Commander McCullom, as he was then I believe, in Naval Operations, as I was with Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not quite my question. I mean in relation to sending information to the theatres.

General MILES. I remember no such discussion with Colonel Bratton on that point, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any knowledge along that line?

General MILES. Knowledge that Colonel Bratton was discussing with Commander McCullom the advisability of sending further alerts to the overseas command? Is that the question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the question.

General MILES. I have no such knowledge.

[3613] Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that Bratton, Colonel Bratton, had drawn up a paper or a memorandum, along the same line for the Navy?

General MILES. Along the same lines as what, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Along the same line, giving further information to the theaters, that was not being sent from the top?

General MILES. That was being held up by the top? No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not held up, but not being sent. There is a distinction between being held up and not being sent.

General MILES. I know of no message drafted by Colonel Bratton proposing further alerts or warnings to the overseas departments which was not sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Four o'clock having arrived, the committee will take a recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed to 10 a. m., of the following day, Wednesday, December 12, 1945.)

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[3614]

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[3615] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

General Marshall is back, and Congressman Keefe was in process of examining General Marshall. Are you ready to proceed?

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. Yesterday, General Marshall, during the short hearing when I had to stop questioning, we had gotten up to the alert of June 17, 1940, and I asked you to ascertain and produce here, if you would, the specific information that prompted you to issue that alert of June 17, 1940.

General MARSHALL. On my return to the War Department I started an investigation to obtain the data to which you have just referred.

I regret to state to you that it has not yet been completed. We have brought General Strong into the matter. They told me this morning they worked on the various documents throughout the night. It involves a number of different factors, I understand, and will take some little time to get all of them together. They are in the process of doing that, Mr. Keefe, and the report will be brought in as soon as it is obtained, and General Strong also will be available as a witness. In the meantime [3616] what is already in evidence, I believe, pertaining to that specific question of yours—

Mr. KEEFE. Before we get to that, General Marshall, I am quite familiar with page 13.

General MARSHALL. That is what I was going to read an extract from.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to approach that in just a little different way.

General MARSHALL. That is agreeable to me, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You anticipate that some time during the day, at least, you will be able to bring that data to the committee?

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether I can do it today or not, sir, because it involves newspaper articles and involves a great many different factors, they tell me.

They have been engaged in it, it seems, all night, and they have got General Strong, who has been retired from the War Department, and they have brought him in now.

I think they will do the best they can. I cannot promise you it will be here during the day. I, myself, personally, have not had the opportunity of going into it, but I have very capable people doing it.

Mr. KEEFE. Whatever the circumstances were, you were [3617] convinced they were of sufficient importance to justify the issuance of the alert message to General Herron under date of June 17, 1940?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; and in that communication you were going to produce, that is very pertinent to that question—at any rate it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, on the 26th of June, 1940, you wrote a memorandum to General Strong, which reads as follows, and it appears in this exhibit of communications between the War Department and General Herron concerning the 1940 alert, on page 11:

It seems to me I should write to both Van Voorhis and Herron something of what led up to our emergency radios of the other day; that is, if you think we can trust to airmail for such a confidential message. Personally, I think it is reasonably safe.

Will you have somebody make a rough draft of what I should say.

Who is Van Voorhis?

General MARSHALL. He was the then commander in Panama.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, in answer to that letter, or communication, General Strong wrote you on June 27, as appears on page 12 of this [3618] exhibit, and he says:

1. Reference to your memorandum of June 26, with reference to writing General Van Voorhis and General Herron in regard to the background for our emergency radios; I am inclined to think that developments of the last 10 days, as reflected in the press, have given both all the background necessary.

2. Another point to be considered is that air mail may be tampered with, any reference in the matter covered in your secret code might jeopardize that code.

3. However, if you think that you should write them, I suggest that the communication go by registered mail. Drafts of suggested remarks herewith.

[3619] General Strong refers in this letter to certain developments of the last 10 days as reflected in the press. He says that he thinks that that has given to Herron and Van Voorhis all the background necessary.

Is that what you referred to this morning, General Marshall, when you referred to the fact that some search had to be made of the press, and so on?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you did not order this alert by virtue of what appeared in the newspapers, did you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. The second sentence of the letter which you said you would approach later says:

Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differ-

ences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, General Strong wrote a proposed explanation to be sent to Van Voorhis and Herron?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Of what the facts were?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That never was sent, was it?

[3620] General MARSHALL. The records show that was not sent.

Mr. KEEFE. Now in this, as you have just read, appearing on page 13 of the exhibit referred to, it appears that the combination of information from a number of sources "led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii."

Did the Fleet depart from Hawaii in June, 1940?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you not, as Chief of Staff, advised by the Chief of Naval Operations that he had ordered the Fleet away from Pearl Harbor in June, or on June 17, or thereabouts?

General MARSHALL. If that was the fact I am quite certain he would have advised me to that effect. My answer was I do not recall right now what happened then. Whether or not the Fleet was ordered away is a matter of fact, first, which can be easily determined.

Mr. KEEFE. This proposed communication to you from Herron, which was not sent, refers to the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii, does it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I do not think I made myself clear, Mr. Keefe. I am not casting any doubt on whether the Fleet was or was not ordered from Hawaii, I am merely endeavor- [3621] ing to state that I do not recall at the moment just what the Fleet movements were. That, of course, is a matter of record which the Navy and which Admiral Stark can testify to.

I am assuming that I understood thoroughly what those movements were at that particular time. I might go a little further to say, Mr. Keefe, that I have not had an opportunity, since you went into this question, to go into the various factors involved in this particular thing, so it has been beyond my capability to do that. I am giving you the best answers I can as to my recollection at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. I appreciate that, General Marshall. I will reiterate I am simply seeking to get these facts, and it is very difficult at times to get them, as you find it is difficult for you to get the facts.

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. I will ask counsel at this time if they will undertake a search and request the Navy to produce, during the day, the order which was issued by Admiral Stark to the Commanding Officer of the Navy, Admiral Richardson, directing that the Fleet be taken away from Pearl Harbor on or about June 18 or 19, 1940, and proceed to an unknown and secret destination or hide-out.

Will the counsel do that, please?

Mr. MITCHELL. If there was such an order we will find it.

[3622] Mr. KEEFE. We are advised very definitely and reliably that there was such an order issued, and that it is in the Navy Department. Now I will ask if you have that order here now?

Mr. MITCHELL. We have no such order.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Marshall, when that alert order was issued in 1940 you followed, from day to day, what was going on out there, did you not, during the period of that alert, through communications with General Herron?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Not every day, of course.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that the Fleet had left Pearl Harbor at that time?

General MARSHALL. You again have me back on something that I do not recall at the moment, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, I call your attention, if you will, to page 8 of this exhibit. In it General Herron sends you a secret report reading as follows:

In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding alert. Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. Will not modify Army air and anti-air alert before Monday except on further advice from you.

On the next page, in answer to that communication, and [3623] on June 22, you wired Herron as follows:

In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local Navy Forces have not been determined. Continue your alert in accordance with modifications directed in War Department Number 434.

Now, does that refresh your recollection of the fact that the main Fleet, except the local Fleet in Hawaii, had left Hawaiian waters?

General MARSHALL. Mr. Keefe, you have refreshed me more than the message that apparently it had. I don't recall offhand myself. That would indicate some move of that sort but that, I believe, sir, is a matter of fact easily determined.

Mr. KEEFE. I am simply probing, General, to find out what you know. I don't know as much as you do about this.

General MARSHALL. I undoubtedly knew about it at the time. I am trying to tell you what I remember now.

Mr. KEEFE. This telegram would indicate that perhaps you did know about it?

General MARSHALL. I assume that I knew about the movements of the Fleet at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. You would naturally be in communication with your Chief of Naval Operations, wouldn't you?

General MARSHALL. Daily.

[3624] Mr. KEEFE. And it is to be assumed that if the fleet was ordered out you perhaps knew of it at the time?

General MARSHALL. I would say it is almost certain I knew about it.

Mr. KEEFE. All you mean to say is that you do not recollect?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall the incident.

Mr. KEEFE. I am calling your attention to this wire because it impresses me that under those circumstances it clearly indicates that you did have knowledge at that time of the fact that in view of the

present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local forces had not been determined.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The local forces were perhaps kept there but the main body of the Navy was away and you are advising Herron in this telegram that instructions to the Navy other than the local forces has not been determined but he is to continue in accordance with the modifications directed in War Department No. 434.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I don't want to press you, General Marshall, for something that you don't know, and I don't want to get mere hearsay, that sort of thing, in the record. If you don't remember and don't know, why, I shall be not [3625] surprised, with the volume of stuff that has come through your mind since that time.

But I assume that it is a fact, from information that I have at hand, that the Navy was ordered at the time of that 1940 alert, the main body of the Navy was ordered away from Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. It would appear that something of that sort was going on.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Do you presently have any recollection as to the events of that period which would enable you to state why it was that the fleet was ordered away at the time of the 1940 alert?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, I do not. There was almost a continuing discussion if not a debate regarding the placing and the movement of the fleet throughout this period.

I might add this—

Mr. KEEFE. Well, General Marshall—pardon me. Go ahead.

General MARSHALL. I might add this, which has no bearing on the fleet, but it does have a bearing on what my recollection is as to this particular alert. The part I remember quite distinctly is my concern over the continuation of the alert because a long or protracted alert was very apt to result in a gradual laxity on the part of the many individuals concerned in it through fatigue and to the fact that nothing particular [3626] happened. But I had a still more deep concern at the time because the air, as I clearly recall, reported to me that we were wearing out the engines of these planes in these various reconnaissance. So I became quite personally concerned as to the duration of the alert, how long we would be justified in maintaining it and particularly what might be done in order to satisfy the requirements as to security and still not cause our resources, meaning particularly the engines of the reconnaissance airplanes.

Those are the things regarding which I am most clear in my mind and which I think were at the bottom of a great many of the backs and forths which occur in this correspondence.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, I call your attention to the letter from General Herron to you on page 21 of this same exhibit. This follows quite a number of letters back and forth appearing in this exhibit indicating the progress of the alert and what was taking place and what the effect was on the matériel and equipment and tax on the motors and how the public reacted and how the personnel of the Army reacted.

Then comes this letter dated September 6, 1940, in which General Herron says, among other things, the second paragraph:

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or [3627] exhaust the morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that now that the season of individual target practice and instructions is about over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

The presence of the Fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolute secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much.

Now, you knew as a result of that letter on September 6th as it now appears that the Fleet had been putting to sea secretly and for absolutely secret destinations.

Did you know that during this period that that was what was taking place?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I must have known it.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, does that tend to refresh your recollection of the fact that the orders for the Fleet to go out to these secret destinations and leave Pearl Harbor took place about coincident with the issuance of the order for the alert on the 17th of June 1940?

General MARSHALL. It does not stimulate my memory, sir. I assumed that would be going on. I assumed, in any event, the Fleet would be going out and coming back right along in the way of practice if for nothing else.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it considered in your discussions with [3628] Admiral Stark that in the event of a threat to Hawaii that it was the proper thing to get that fleet out to sea?

General MARSHALL. I recall no such discussion, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I will say to counsel I have been searching through these intercept messages and I do not find any intercepts in the file of 1940. Have we got those?

Mr. MITCHELL. We have never printed them.

Mr. KEEFE. Those intercepts ought to show, shouldn't they, the information that came to the War and Navy Departments as to the necessity for this 1940 alert?

Mr. MITCHELL. We have gone through them for that purpose and they do not show anything of the kind. We examined them—not always knowing exactly what the members of the committee might be interested in—but we didn't find anything of that nature. We can produce any intercepts you want for any date, I think.

General MARSHALL. Those are the files that are now being searched in the War Department, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. And is it anticipated that before you leave that material will be available, General Marshall, so that we can make some inquiry in reference to it?

General MARSHALL. I would assume so. I do not know, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the alert of 1940 gradually tapered off, didn't it? [3629]

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Until the fall of 1940.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the situation out there in Hawaii resumed a normal routine?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; but, General Herron can testify to this, but I rather think some of the dispositions thereafter remained a little on the alert basis. But he can tell you that positively.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, during this situation things were getting pretty critical in Europe and in the Atlantic, were they not?

General MARSHALL. Very critical.

Mr. KEEFE. And on September 4, 1940, Congress passed the Selective Service Act, do you remember?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And on September 27, 1940, Germany, Japan, and Italy signed the Tripartite—the treaty of Berlin, at Berlin, the 10-year military treaty, promising to help each other in the event of war with the United States.

You, of course, immediately became aware of that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That did not tend to ease the tension and situation between the United States and Japan, did it?

General MARSHALL. Quite the contrary.

[3630] Mr. KEEFE. It accentuated the difficulties, did it not, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And things gradually were getting more and more critical in the diplomatic situation between the two nations?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You could see in that a distinct threat to the United States?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, we had pretty well determined that, in this country, late in 1940, that we were not going to permit these ruthless aggressors to carry on as they had been, we were going to furnish some aid to those who were fighting, you recall that, do you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And on the 10th of January 1941 the lease-lend bill was introduced in the Congress; on March 11, 1941, that became law and we immediately began to give supplies under that to England and our other later allies, did we not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.
rial aid, if you remember?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the exact figures.

I remember particularly our maneuvering to get the planes for the Air Force out there operated under General Chennault.

Mr. KEEFE. General Chennault was a former officer in the United States Air Corps, was he not?

General MARSHALL. Yes. He had resigned, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. Resigned, and went over and became Air Chief to Chiang Kai-shek.

General MARSHALL. In the service of the Chinese Government.

Mr. KEEFE. He recruited a good many Americans to go over to fly planes under his command?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And planes were furnished to him by the United States Government?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember the arrangements as to financing, but I know that I personally initiated the procedure, and proposed details which were followed out.

Mr. KEEFE. We perhaps loaned money to China and they then bought our planes. Is that what it was?

General MARSHALL. I would prefer not to answer that.

[3632] Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Well, we began shipping lease-lend supplies to Europe.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Japs instituted a submarine war which became very critical?

General MARSHALL. Do you mean the Japanese or the Germans?

Mr. KEEFE. The Germans; and sank a lot of ships?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. We were determined that those supplies were going to get over there to aid England, were we not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in order that the background of this thing can be properly appraised, events leading up to this period, there has been placed in evidence a memorandum of a conversation by the Counselor of the Embassy in Berlin, a Mr. Dooman, which was held or conducted on February 14, 1941, and it appears as an official state document in the volume entitled "Foreign Relations of the United States—Japan, 1931–1941," Volume II, on page 138.

This memorandum was sent to the State Department by Ambassador Grew with his full and complete approval. The State Department incorporated it as an official state paper in the volume just referred to.

[3633] Now, in this report, which Mr. Dooman made to Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, he stated that he had just returned from the United States, having been on furlough, and I quote:

I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time, I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. * * *

I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with regard to the war in Europe as they developed during the election campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion at home with regard to the question of American aid to England, which I attributed in large part, first, to the disclosure on the part of the British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the resources in dollar exchange, and second, to the belief that the effects on Britain's capacity to produce aircraft and other munitions of German bombing raids had been more serious than British communiques would lead one to suppose. * * *

[3634] And he further said, and I quote:

I said that although the large majority of the American people abhorred the idea of American involvement in war, the fact was that an equally large majority of the American people believed that there was one consideration which transcends even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and that is helping England to the limit of our capacity.

I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations between the United States and Japan. I had found that American opinion is pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the United States which would make war with Japan inevitable.

Now, General Marshall, from your broad experience and knowledge of the events that transpired during the summer and fall of 1940, during the period which was covered by Mr. Dooman's furlough visit to the United States, do you think that is a fair appraisal of the situation?

General MARSHALL. It seems to me so.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Dooman further says:

Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand that the American people, being an eminently practical people, are quite aware that an adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only prerequisite [3635] site to a British victory; the supply to England of foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions and colonies and the maintenance of British commerce with the outside world are equally essential to a British Victory.

Did you share that same opinion at that time and is that a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. I think that is a fair and correct statement.

Mr. KEEFE. Then Mr. Dooman further said, and I quote:

It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States.

Did you share that view at that time and is that a fair statement of the United States opinion and position?

General MARSHALL. I would say that is too broad a statement.

[3636] Mr. KEEFE. I beg pardon?

General MARSHALL. I would say that is too broad a statement of the reactions of the American people at that particular time because he is referring to all British communications all over the globe. American opinion as I recall it at that time was centered on the movements of convoys out of the northern part of the United States into the western approaches of the British Isles. I do not recall that at that time there was an American public opinion of the nature he describes as to all portions of the globe in relation to British communications.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, leaving out of consideration the question as to what American public opinion was, was he reflecting the government's opinion, the diplomatic, Army, and Navy opinion?

General MARSHALL. Whether he was reflecting Government opinion or the diplomatic opinion or, in other words, the high level opinion, I am not the person to testify. So far as the Army opinion, the opinion of the War Department, General Staff and myself is concerned, we viewed with great concern the severance of British communications in various portions of the world because we knew their maintenance of an adequate defense to prevent the occupation of the British Isles by the Germans depended in a very important measure [3637] on those communications.

His reference to Japan in relation to American reactions I think are broader than the state of affairs in the public mind, and he speaks of the people here, at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, what concerns me, General Marshall, in reading these matters, this is an official document incorporated in the State Department's list of official documents and apparently has the approval of the State Department. There is nothing in the book that would indicate any disapproval. It certainly had the full and complete approval of our Ambassador Grew because he so states in his communication sending it and the further communications in reference to it which also appear in the same volume.

Now, I am wondering whether or not in view of the fact that this bears the seal of approval, apparently, of the State Department, whether of the higher levels in Washington, Mr. Dooman when he made that statement to Mr. Ohashi was not in fact reflecting the then current opinion of the higher levels of thought in the Government.

General MARSHALL. I would say that Mr. Dooman and Mr. Grew would have to testify as to that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

General MARSHALL. I cannot.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Then he further says [reading]:

[3638] There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debauch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences. I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time: However greatly Japan's security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the [3639] United States at this time, which is to assist England to stand against German assault.

Now, then, General Marshall, at the time this communication was had and this report by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi we had not yet entered into these so-called ABC agreements and ABCD agreements; they came later?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. There was no ABCD agreement, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I beg your pardon?

General MARSHALL. There was no ABCD agreement.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, conversation.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me. There is a distinction.

General MARSHALL. There is quite a difference, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. We want to observe protocol exactly here. There was an ABC agreement which was approved?

General MARSHALL. There was an ABC agreement approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and not by the President. The ABC-2 made with Canada was formally approved by the President.

Mr. KEEFE. The ABCD was merely a conversation or report?

General MARSHALL. They were conversations, the report of the conversations on which Admiral Stark and I in a joint [3640] memorandum distributed.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. And I was asked the other day if I could not recall what my reaction was and I thought it was in the naval memorandum signed by me and signed by Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event, during this time when Mr. Dooman was talking with Mr. Ohashi conversations began to take place between the British and the Dutch and the Canadians and the United States to get ready for something, to lay some plans anyway?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I think this particular month that we had our first—January and February, in which we had our very first conversations with the British and the Canadians.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Certainly with the British.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you as Chief of Staff were besieged and beset by the grave currents of events on both sides of the continent?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did we enter into this hemispheric defense plan?

General MARSHALL. You mean when did we become committed [3641] to boards like the one with Mexico and the one with Canada?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there was such a plan, wasn't there?

General MARSHALL. There was developed an agreement with the Canadians as to certain things that jointly related to us in a defensive way, there was developed an agreement, or at least the conversations, with Mexico of the same nature, and there was brought into Washington on an ascertainable date representatives from many of the Latin-American countries, their military representatives, to discuss matters in relation to our joint security in the Western Hemisphere, and I personally, I think in the fall of 1940, maybe the late summer, brought different chiefs of staff of all the Latin-American countries as my guests, entertained them, talked to them, sent them about the United States.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there was an actual war plan, L-52, was there not, a Western Hemisphere defense plan?

General MARSHALL. There probably was, sir, I do not remember the designation.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not recall that plan specifically?

General MARSHALL. I know there would be a plan but I just do not recall specifically what it was.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, General Marshall, the record appears to be that on March 27, 1941, a proclamation declaring an unlimited emergency was issued. That was in line with the [3642] general current of conditions as they were developing?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And on June 6, 1941, the President approved an act of Congress taking over foreign ships lying idle in United States ports. Do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So it is apparent from these actions, shipments of lease-lend material, the declaration of an unlimited emergency, legislation taking over foreign-owned ships in United States ports, that things were beginning to get more and more critical?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. On both fronts, both the Atlantic and the Pacific?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then in July 1941 we started to improve the Panama Canal defenses, did we not? Do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. You mean the additional series of locks?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Congress appropriated the money to build [3643] another set of locks and that went into action down in Panama and it provided for the installation of other defenses, did it not, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. I think so, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In an attempt to prepare the defenses of Panama. That was in, I believe, as I remember, July 1941. So we in all these actions were looking toward the possibilities that might come in the future with the gradually growing disintegration of the relations on both sides of the hemisphere, is that a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then in July 1941 we seized Japanese assets in the United States and froze their assets, do you recall that?

General MARSHALL. I do.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you in on the conversations that led to that action on the part of this Government?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was tending to further intensify the growing strain on relations, in your opinion, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking these questions to get the background for the actions which you as Chief of Staff were particularly concerned with, General Marshall, during those [3644] very trying times.

Now, these conversations were stated in the summer of 1941, as I recall, between the Japanese ambassador and Mr. Hull looking toward the possibility of some solution of this growing series of difficulties that were being encountered and the gradual disintegration of our diplomatic relations and one of the things they were complaining about was what they called the encirclement of Japan. Do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And they referred to this agreement which specified certain lines of latitude and longitude and certain economic pressures that were being applied to them and they were spouting off about that, weren't they?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then on August 4, 1941, we banned the export of aviation gasoline to them, do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The public were demanding it, weren't they?

General MARSHALL. I believe so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I remember sitting in the halls of congress and hearing day by day almost daily speeches on the subject that were being made; pretty insistent demands.

Following this condition, through the knowledge obtained from these intercepts it indicated that Japan was getting [3645] pretty agitated; isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The public in Japan were being inflamed by the war lords and that was disclosed by these intercepts, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I think also in the press.

Mr. KEEFE. Also in the press, yes. And on the 4th of August 1941 all shipping to the United States was suspended by Japan, do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Trade ceased in August of 1941 so far as commercial trade was concerned; isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. I think that is approximately correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is about the time when you left and went out to join the conference at sea with the President and Winston Churchill?

General MARSHALL. The latter part of August.

Mr. KEEFE. August 3 I believe was the date the President left.

General MARSHALL. August 3? Well, I left the same time.

Mr. KEEFE. You left the same time. Did you accompany the President?

[3646] General MARSHALL. No; I don't think I left at the same time. He went to some other point for the week end, I believe, and I joined him somewhere in the waters around New York, near New York.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, I think the newspapers reported as of a date I have before me, as I gathered together this mass of material to get it chronologically in order.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That is approximately correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That he left New London, Conn.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. On the warship *Potomac* as far as the public was concerned, on a week-end cruise, and you met him some place and you went out to sea?

General MARSHALL. Yes. He boarded the *Augusta*.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I do not intend to go into that situation, but at the time you went out there to attend this Atlantic conference conditions were certainly in a pretty strained condition so far as our relations with Japan were concerned at that time, weren't they?

General MARSHALL. I think they were, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall having any discussions while you were out there about what was liable to happen, what the plans were to be, and so on, and so forth, with anybody?

[3647] General MARSHALL. There were no discussions with the President on the political factors, on what our plans were. There were no instructions, as I recall, of any kind from the President as to the nature of our conversations, that is, Admiral Stark, General Arnold and myself, with the British chiefs of staff. The meeting went right ahead and we were left, so far as I can recall, largely to our own judgment as to what to discuss.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event you came back when about the 14th of August or thereabouts?

General MARSHALL. Well, I do not recall, sir, but I came back on the *Augusta* part way down the coast and then embarked at sea on a seaplane and flew into Newport, R. I.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I note that on the 15th of September 1941 the Secretary of the Navy Knox, speaking to the American Legion convention said, and I quote:

Beginning tomorrow the American Navy will provide protection as adequate as we can make it for ships of every flag carrying these aid supplies between the American continent and the waters adjacent to Iceland. These ships are ordered to capture and destroy by every means at their disposal Axis controlled submarines or surface raiders encountered in those waters. This is [3648] our answer to Hitler's declaration that he will try to sink every ship his vessels encounter on the route leading from the United States to British ports.

No, things were getting pretty critical at that time, were they not?
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I assume, General Marshall, that it is a fair statement that you as Chief of Staff were very worried about the situation in the Pacific and what might happen?

General MARSHALL. Very much so.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew at that time that we were not prepared for a war in the Pacific, didn't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you tried to make that clear, did you not, all along?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You wanted any possibility of a war in the Pacific to be held off and stalled, I believe you used the word "stalled" in your testimony, as long as possible?

General MARSHALL. I probably did.

Mr. KEEFE. That was your attitude, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was the attitude of Admiral Stark, too, was it not?

[3649] General MARSHALL. According to statements I recollect of his, that was his attitude.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you had frequent discussions back and forth and were on terms of intimacy almost daily with him?

General MARSHALL. I am not saying he did not, sir, I said according to statements that he made that I heard that was his attitude.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, you may have had private conversations back and forth that are not reflected in statements. What I am trying to get is the actual state of mind.

General MARSHALL. I think I confused you, Mr. Keefe. I was merely endeavoring not to testify for Admiral Stark. What I said was that according to statements I heard him make that was his attitude.

Mr. KEEFE. He made those statements to you?

General MARSHALL. Either to me or in my presence.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. Well, then, a constant revision of war plans was going on all this time, wasn't there?

General MARSHALL. I would have to qualify that somewhat, sir. The war plans had been formally agreed upon so far as our own government was concerned. What we were concerned with at those times was the means for implementing the war plans.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[3650] General MARSHALL. The distribution of material and the distribution of personnel.

Mr. KEEFE. You had to get supplies and you were faced with the dilemma of the allocation of those supplies, were you not?

General MARSHALL. That was the great dilemma throughout all of this period.

Mr. KEEFE. Where they should go.

General MARSHALL. Where they should go.

Mr. KEEFE. There was an insistent demand for supplies to be sent to the Allies on the European front?

General MARSHALL. Very insistent.

Mr. KEEFE. And likewise you knew that there had to be some supplies, too, at strategic points in the Pacific?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were trying to take whatever available supplies there were and to make the best use of them and see that Panama and Hawaii and MacArthur out there at Manila got whatever it was possible to send them?

General MARSHALL. Those were the critical decisions that I had to make at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did any person influence your decision as to the distribution of these supplies?

General MARSHALL. Well, I could not say that, sir. [3651] Pressure was brought on to me from numerous directions, inside the Government, outside the Government and a little free-handed advice.

Mr. KEEFE. You were being hit from all sides, weren't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That had been going on for about a year and a half and it reached a peak at this time. All the commanders, of course, every commander wants all that he can possibly use for his own interests in carrying out his own mission and, naturally, they were making their pressures as well as the Russian Government and the British Government and the people of the Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese Government. They were to me direct, they were to the State Department I am quite certain, they were to the President, they were to any influence they thought might achieve the results they desired.

Mr. KEEFE. You were convinced, were you not, as early as August 1941 that if the current of events continued as they had up to that time we would inevitably be drawn into a war with Japan as a matter of necessity?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. It was my reaction at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Can you state whether it was the reaction of Admiral Stark?

[3652] General MARSHALL. I could not testify as to that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever discuss that situation with him?

General MARSHALL. That specific factor I do not recall. It is probable that I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Stimson?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I am quite certain I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he of the same opinion from the expressions that he gave to you?

General MARSHALL. I hesitate to try to recall just what his opinions were. He was deeply concerned. He regarded the situation as critical and it was a daily, almost hourly, trouble in his mind as to what was the proper course of this Government.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Marshall, you well knew the character of the Japanese during this whole period?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the double talk that they were engaged in, did you not?

General MARSHALL. I assume that you have to read all diplomatic exchanges of theirs with a grain of salt.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, maybe that is a bad expression, double talk, but as I look at this correspondence I can think of nothing that more aptly describes it. You were getting their [3652A] talk from

their intercepts and then you had what they were telling Mr. Hull openly in these negotiations?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you knew that it was double talk, did you not, at that time?

General MARSHALL. That was my impression except that there is one message there, in their magic, I have forgotten the particular message, it is in the latter part of November, where they go into the matter, I think, of the date, the limiting date of November 25.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, we will get to that.

General MARSHALL. When they use the expression "to make impossible further diplomatic relations."

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, the War Department and the Navy Department, I gained the impression from the conversation up to date, were called upon to implement the diplomatic representations. Did you so understand it?

General MARSHALL. I do not believe I would put it quite that way, sir. We were notified of the diplomatic conversations and it was left to us to find what should be done to back them up. Also, we were consulted as to whether we were prepared to back up the possible consequences of certain diplomatic moves should they be made.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you advise the State Department [3652B] that you were not prepared?

General MARSHALL. I advised Mr. Hull, I think personally, some time in September that December 5 was the earliest date that I could figure when we would be reasonably prepared, particularly in the Philippines.

Mr. KEEFE. And Admiral Stark, I believe you testified the other day, thought some time in February?

General MARSHALL. He mentioned along the 1st of February, I think, from the viewpoint of the Fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. And that the Fleet was not prepared at that time to meet reasonable eventualities in the Pacific?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you figured if things came along as you planned you perhaps could get things out there to reasonably prepare our defenses in the Pacific by the 5th of December?

General MARSHALL. I thought we would have the troops, and particularly the planes.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were very concerned particularly to see that diplomatic negotiations did not cause a break before that time, so that you could be prepared?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all this time this great mass and volume of communications as evidenced by all this mass of exhibits was taking place?

[3652C] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But fundamentally and reduced down to a thing that the man on the street can understand, you were concerned with getting our defenses ready in the Pacific to meet the situation which you were convinced as early as August was inevitable and you thought that if you could stall this thing along until the 5th of December you could get those defenses fairly ready to meet what you could see coming, is that a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. Roughly that, sir, with this addition: I had thought that if we could build up and might have been able to build up by December 5 our defenses in the Philippines it might discourage the Japanese from any hostile action because it would be too hazardous.

Mr. KEEFE. Because from all the indications that you could see they were moving down south?

General MARSHALL. That their purpose was a southern campaign.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Philippines were on their flank?

General MARSHALL. And the Philippines were on their flank.

Mr. KEEFE. And if you could build up the defenses in the Philippines sufficiently you thought it would deter them from proceeding along down the course you thought they had been [3652D] pursuing?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I thought it would deter them from any overt act.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you think that the development of the defenses in the Hawaiian area would deter them?

General MARSHALL. I thought the existing defenses in the Hawaiian Department would deter them from an effort directed at Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it your opinion in the summer of 1941 that the very presence of the Fleet out there at Hawaii would act as a deterrent?

General MARSHALL. I thought that that had a deterrent effect.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, as the events progressed, General Marshall, all through the summer of 1941 and in the fall of 1941 there was no evidence so far as the Japs were concerned that they were being deterred by the presence of the fleet, was there?

General MARSHALL. The Japs continued throughout that period to make moves which were unopposed at that time, of course, due to the inability of the Indochina people and the Eastern Thailand people to oppose them and the Chinese themselves to oppose them, so they continued definitely with their various moves throughout that period. I might add that in [3652E] speaking of building up the defenses of the Philippines sufficient to cause the Japanese to hesitate, if not to give up the idea of an overt act, I still assumed that they would take as much as they could get, you might say, for nothing by their various infiltration moves that were then in progress in Indochina specifically.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know Stanley Hornbeck?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I know him.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew he was counsellor to the State Department?

General MARSHALL. I was aware of that fact, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were in conferences in which he participated, were you not, during this period?

General MARSHALL. I do not specifically recall his presence. He may have been present. I do not recall any discussion with him personally myself.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever get any confidential memorandum from him?

General MARSHALL. I may have. I do not recall right now, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I have before me what appears to be some memoranda prepared by Mr. Hornbeck on December 1 of 1941, which Harmon Duncombe, Lieutenant Colonel, says he understood were addressed to the Army and Navy.

[3652F] Now, I have asked, I will say, of counsel for all those communications. I have been furnished with two. Will the counsel make a further statement now if he can find the communications that passed from Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. GESELL. We are making that search and the State Department has communicated with Mr. Hornbeck in the Netherlands directly. We have furnished the committee so far with the memos that have been located.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for one question so that I may ascertain something from counsel?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it true, counsel, that the Army records show that there are no—or the Navy records show that there are no Hornbeck statements in their records? Is that what you said?

Mr. GESELL. They have so reported.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So that as we now understand it, the committee counsel are unable to get any of the Hornbeck statements from the Navy?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And from the Army other than those that have been distributed?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

[3653] Senator FERGUSON. Have they been distributed generally?

Mr. GESELL. No. We are trying to get all of them together before we distribute them.

Senator FERGUSON. They haven't been distributed then?

Mr. GESELL. I think we gave them to Mr. Keefe when they came in because it was his request and I think Mr. Keefe has the ones that have come from the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. I have them before me.

Senator FERGUSON. I am sorry to interrupt but I wanted to get that on the record.

Mr. KEEFE. I have a letter, photostatic copy of a letter dated December 1, 1941, addressed to the Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, signed by Stanley K. Hornbeck, in which it says (reading):

I send you herewith for your strictly personal and strictly confidential information—but for whatever use you may care to make of the thought contained, without quotation or attribution—a copy of a memorandum of date November 5 which was made immediately after a conference the participants in which were the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the author of this memorandum being present.

Do you recall that conversation?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It was on November 5, 1941, General Marshall, [3654] according to Mr. Hornbeck's letter to the Secretary of War. Now, this memoranda reads as follows, and I quote:

There are two points in particular to which, in my opinion, the War Department and the Navy Department, in their estimate of the Far Eastern situation and its problems do not give *sufficient* consideration.

Now, to interject at this point, who was this man Hornbeck and what was his business?

General MARSHALL. I think you said he was the counsellor of the State Department.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he giving orders to the Army and Navy?

General MARSHALL. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I recall some testimony of Admiral Richardson that he seemed to think that he was being ordered around by Hornbeck instead of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, is that a question?

The CHAIRMAN. The chair does not know.

Mr. KEEFE. If you will keep still a minute you will be able to ascertain from what I say, Mr. Murphy.

Now, General Marshall, I take it that you did not believe that Mr. Hornbeck was giving any orders to the Chief of Staff, did you?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. But he might have been giving advice, we will [3655] put it that way.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He is presently over in the Netherlands, isn't he, the United States Minister at the Netherlands?

General MARSHALL. I heard that said a moment ago.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, being as how you are going to be our new Ambassador to China maybe you will get acquainted with him after a while. I call your attention to him.

Now, this is what he says, continuing this quote:

First: There actually is going on in the Pacific a *war*: Japan and China are *at war*. The Chinese-Japanese war is a part of the world conflict between on the one hand powers which are engaged in aggression and on the other hand powers which are resisting aggression.

Just to interject, this is news and information that he is giving to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. He further said:

Japan is a power which is engaged in aggression in one part of the world and is an ally of powers which are engaged in aggression in another part of the world. The Chinese are resisting Japan in one part of the world and they regard themselves as being morally and in general objective an ally of powers which are actively resisting Japan in another part of the world and are passively resisting Japan in regions adjacent to the theater of Japanese-Chinese hostilities. The Chinese would be shocked at a concept that there is at present "*peace*" in the Pacific and that the problem of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific is that of seeing that there *continues* to be *peace* in that area.

Second: A termination of Japanese-Chinese hostilities in the not distant future and certainly before Germany is defeated is not inconceivable. Suppose that, either by virtue of a break-down in Chinese morale followed by a negotiated peace between Japan and China, or by virtue of a break-down in Chinese capacity to make armed resistance which might come from a closing of the Burma Road and general insufficiency of material aid from outside, Chinese resistance to Japan were to cease. Japan would then be relieved of the entanglement of her "China Incident" and would be in a position to turn her fleet and whatever else she still possesses of capacity for military adventuring into new moves either southward or northward or eastward. Should it not be a constant object of British and American political, economic and military strategy to keep China's moral and material capacity to resist Japan at a high enough point to *ensure* against a termination of Chinese resistance.

Did you ever see that message?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

[3657] Mr. KEEFE. Well, he states that this is the result of the conversations had with the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, at which he was present.

General MARSHALL. I understood that was his reaction following the conversations.

Mr. KEEFE. That was made immediately after the conference of November 5.

Do you remember that conference at all?

General MARSHALL. I know there was a conference on November 5, at which I was present, but the details of it, at the moment, I cannot recall. I did not recall even that Mr. Hornbeck was present.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, this profound memorandum which discloses the existence of a state of war over there between the Japs and Chinese did not impress you very much, did it, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. Throughout all of this period, from the spring of 1940 straight through up to the actual entry of the United States into the war, I always found that the individual who was concerned with the particular theater or area quite naturally put the conditions of that area to the forefront, and our great problem was balancing all these forefronts, if I may put it that way, in obtaining [3658] the general picture of what was the proper thing, or what was the proper attitude for this Government.

In that particular memorandum Mr. Hornbeck is representing the critical situation of China and the effect of the collapse of China on the general situation in the Pacific.

There were many others, as I recall, but not specifically the names, who were intense in their desire to have more done for China and more consideration of the Chinese factors. We were aware of those, and our problem was to balance them against this whole plot, as to what might be the proper thing to do.

Mr. KEEFE. You were perfectly aware of that situation as Chief of Staff, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were just as anxious for the Chinese in this particular war as anybody in the Government?

General MARSHALL. That remained our policy to the end.

Mr. KEEFE. That has been the policy from the start to the finish, has it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It was simply a question of how much supplies you could make available to them, and that you could deliver to them?

[3659] General MARSHALL. Largely that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, General Marshall, the evidence is replete with records of intercepts, conferences between the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the President, and the State Department, all during this period, during September and October of 1941, and we have a mountain of exhibits here dealing with the situation as it existed during that period of time.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Mr. MURPHY. May I inquire—

Mr. KEEFE. No, I do not yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Just as to whether the whole memorandum was read?

The CHAIRMAN. The Congressman did not yield.

Mr. MURPHY. I just made an inquiry as to whether all the memorandum was read.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, of course, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MURPHY. I have never seen it. I was just wondering whether it was all read.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair cannot answer the question.

Mr. KEEFE. Of course, I would not think of reading the letter into the record unless I read it all, as it has been furnished to me.

[3660] The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. KEEFE. It is not a letter to start with. It is a memorandum submitted to the Secretary of War, and I read it all, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Mr. KEEFE. For what it is worth. I did not think it was worth much myself.

Mr. MURPHY. I though there was a part omitted.

Mr. KEEFE. I could not conceive anybody writing such tripe as that to anybody unless there was some conclusion, or unless there was more substance in it than what appears.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us proceed.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may we have a little levity in this proceeding? Otherwise, it is too stale.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. The whole report has been furnished to you and not to the other members of this committee.

Mr. KEEFE. It is right here and you can look at it.

The CHAIRMAN. If we are unable to finish with General Marshall before Mr. Hornbeck's time expires in the Netherlands, we may ask him about it.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Now, General Marshall, these wily Japs finally delivered the note to Mr. Hull, the note of the 20th of November; you remember that, do you not?

[3661] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In which they laid down certain points.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the note that Mr. Hull says was the Japanese ultimatum to America. The record discloses that after that note was delivered, there was a lot of discussion between the 20th and 26th of November between Mr. Hull and the Japanese envoys, and a lot of discussion between all the upper levels in the Government, and as nearly as I can get at it, it was suggested that an answer to that Japanese note of the 20th be prepared, and the Japs in their note of the 20th had asked for some concessions. Do you recall that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Whether they were honest or not in it is beside the question. They asked for certain concessions and they made certain demands, and so the top level got together and talked the thing over, "Now, what are we going to do?"

Now, this is as I see it, and I want you to correct me if I am wrong, because I am not going into all this mass of detail:

As far as you and Admiral Stark were concerned, you were trying to stall these Japs along so there would not [3662] be a final break, weren't you?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So there was a discussion of a *modus vivendi*.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, Mr. Keefe. And that was talked over with Lord Halifax, wasn't it? He came into the discussions, did he not?

General MARSHALL. I believe it was, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Weren't you present at any discussions at which he was present?

General MARSHALL. It would be a matter of record. I do not recall it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think it fairly appears that the matter was discussed by all interested parties. We were working in pretty close association at that time with the Chinese, the British, and Dutch, weren't we?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And any thing that was done, was considered to be a joint action at that late date, was it not?

General MARSHALL. I do not know as that would be the correct way to state it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it would be action taken after joint conversations; put it that way. Did you so understand it?

[3663] General MARSHALL. I would not say even that was a correct statement, sir.

I think there was a very general interchange of views, opinions, and desires among the representatives of these various governments. But to what extent that would have been considered binding on our Government, meaning Mr. Hull, in his dealings, as to whether or not he dared to do this, or dared to do that without a formal consultation or agreement with the British or Dutch, I do not know, sir.

[3664] Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event, there were a lot of discussions and the President participated in them?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And there is evidence when they came to drawing up the reply to the Japs the President wrote some memorandum and made some suggestions as to certain points that should be incorporated in that memorandum. You perhaps have not seen that, but it is here in the evidence.

General MARSHALL. I cannot recall it.

Mr. KEEFE. I cannot put my hand on it immediately, but I think, Mr. Counsel, I am correct in that, that the President made a memorandum. I have forgotten the exhibit number.

Mr. GESELL. There is a memorandum contained in the modus vivendi exhibit. I think it is Exhibit 18.

Mr. KEEFE. Exhibit 18. I have it before me.

As a result of these conversations you were supplied, and so was the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, with a copy of the proposed message as it was finally drafted, or the proposed reply, and you looked it over, did you not?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is—I can refresh my memory here—I was not present at the discussion. General Gerow represented me. Admiral Stark may have been present, I don't know.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought you prepared a joint memorandum, [3665] that you made some suggestions.

(A document was handed to General Marshall.)

General MARSHALL. Are you speaking of the meeting of November 24 or November 21?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am speaking of what took place with respect to your knowledge and what your recommendations were with respect to this message from which the modus vivendi was finally deleted, and sent on the 26th.

General MARSHALL. May I read that?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. This is a memorandum to me, dated November 24, 1941.

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

It is signed by General Gerow. He says:

A conference was held in the State Department at 9:45 a. m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark, and General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy representatives to express their informal views from a military standpoint on a draft of a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan (Tab A). He explained that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted by the State Department.

Is this all right, for me to read this?

[3666] Mr. KEEFE. It is all right if you want to. It identifies it in your mind; does it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. It answers my question.

General MARSHALL. This was handed to me on my return to Washington here on the 24th. Attached to it was a copy of the memorandum which I believe is called the *modus vivendi*.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you go over it at that time?

General MARSHALL. I went over it at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you prepare or help to prepare the *modus vivendi*?

General MARSHALL. I agreed with General Gerow's statements in regard to it, that the comments of Admiral Stark and General Gerow were acceptable, but I felt that General Gerow's statement regarding the portion of Admiral Stark's memorandum that made reference to the Army Forces in provision A-1, as to restrictions that should be placed on the Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure, was not acceptable.

In other words, the *modus vivendi* as drawn up, from a military point of view, we interposed no objections to, except as to a statement that Admiral Stark probably indirectly became involved in in his memorandum, that implied that we could not go ahead with the further strengthening of the garrison in the Philippines, and to that I was not agreeable.

[3667] Mr. KEEFE. Well, so far as the *modus vivendi* was concerned, you were willing to agree to that?

General MARSHALL. Willing to agree to that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You think if that was submitted to the Japs it might have had the effect of stalling the negotiations along a little bit longer?

General MARSHALL. I found a note somewhere here, and I don't know whether I am speaking from the note or speaking from memory, that we thought the terms were too stiff and they would not accept it.

Mr. KEEFE. You personally thought that the terms were too stiff and they would not accept it anyway?

General MARSHALL. I think that is right.

Mr. KEEFE. Even with the *modus vivendi*?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me get that straight. Do I understand after reading this over, after it was submitted to you by General Gerow on,

I believe, the 24th, on your return, you concluded that the message was too stiff even with the modus vivendi in it, and that they would not accept it?

General MARSHALL. That was my guess at it.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk with Admiral Stark about that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But with the suggested changes and modifications [3668] which were contained in General Gerow's letter, from a purely Army situation you were willing that it should be sent?

General MARSHALL. Shall I read General Gerow's memorandum, in which I concurred?

Mr. KEEFE. You do not have to, as far as I am concerned.

General MARSHALL (reading):

War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement Between the United States and Japan," and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives—the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific, would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B-5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia.

I will not read any further on that.

[3669] The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such changes.

The Chief of Staff is out of the city and consequently this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views expressed above.

Which I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, General Marshall, from evidence already in in the statement of Secretary Hull, it appears that this proposed draft which you saw, and subject to the modifications contained in General Gerow's memorandum, which you approved, especially the modus vivendi, that was sent through Lord Halifax over to London to get their reaction.

There appears here a message from the Former Naval Person in exhibit 23 which reads:

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter-project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about [3670] China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

Signed "Winant."

When you went over this did it occur to you that the proposed message would provide a very thin diet for Chiang Kai-shek?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had the same opinion, did you?

General MARSHALL. I had the same opinion, but we could not figure out any other method of handling the matter at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. You were willing to take a chance?

General MARSHALL. We were forced to take a chance.

[3671] Mr. KEEFE. Were you made aware of the protest which followed from Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Ambassador?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. KEEFE. They protested very vigorously against sending this message with the modus vivendi in it, did they not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; they did.

Mr. KEEFE. They were not willing to concede to Japan anything, and virtually said they would get out of the war, and it would create a break-down of the Chinese morale if you sent such a message.

General MARSHALL. Roughly that.

Mr. KEEFE. That is a rough statement. Never having been in the State Department service, General Marshall, I sometimes speak a little roughly. But, generally speaking, that is the situation?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, were you consulted by Mr. Hull, or the President, or anybody else after you got this message from Gerow and expressed your approval of it, with certain reservations, did you have any further conversations about sending this message?

General MARSHALL. I think there was a meeting at the White House about the time of my return. I believe it was [3672] on the 24th. I will check that in just a moment.

I participated in a meeting at the White House at 12:15 p. m. on November 25 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Stark.

Mr. KEEFE. What happened there?

General MARSHALL. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. What happened at that conference?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the details of the meeting. It is possible, and I believe it was brought up the other day, that I can find a reminder and some definite facts from Mr. Stimson's testimony based on his diary at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present recollection as to what that conference was about?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I imagine it was in regard to this message. That might or might not be exact.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you do not, as I understand it, have any present recollection about that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. As to what this conference was on the 25th at the White House?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I merely got the impression, in line with all these other occurrences, that that [3673] must have been the basis of the discussion.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you now have any present recollection as to what the determination was as the result of that conference?

General MARSHALL. I have not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you advised at that time, or at any time later, before this message was finally sent on the 26th, as to the deletion, or proposed deletion, of the modus vivendi?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you first learn that Mr. Hull had sent this message of the 26th, after deleting the modus vivendi proposal?

General MARSHALL. I assume I learned that on the 28th, on my return to Washington.

Mr. KEEFE. After you came back from the maneuvers?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. My assumption is based on the fact of a recollection I think, of Mr. Stimson in his testimony where he said he did not learn until the morning of the 27th regarding exactly what had happened. But that is a matter of fact, and there is not much point in my commenting on it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you were very much concerned when you heard that the message had been sent without the modus [3674] vivendi, weren't you?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall my reaction, sir.

I was busy trying to get things together in every way I could.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not you send a message to the President about the 27th?

General MARSHALL. We sent a joint memorandum, Admiral Stark and myself, to the President on the 27th, in appreciation of the situation in the Far East, and with certain recommendations.

Mr. KEEFE. When you sent that message, did you have knowledge that Secretary Hull had sent his message of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is that Admiral Stark and myself made our comments regarding the preparation of such a message of the 26th. I do not know, but I gather the impression here that the War Department, at least Mr. Stimson, did not know of the dispatch of the State Department message of the 26th until the 27th. That being the case, we would not have known at the time the basis of that memorandum was prepared that the message had or had not been sent.

[3675] Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to get this thing clear in my mind and see if we can pin it down. You had a conference at the White House on the 25th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not recall what that conference was about, but you assume that involved a discussion of this reply to the Jap message of the 20th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But you are unable to give us any of the details of that conversation?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Prior to that time you had discussions as to the message that was proposed embodying the modus vivendi?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not learn from that meeting, as I understand your testimony, that the Secretary of State proposed to delete the modus vivendi from the message?

General MARSHALL. I have no such recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, did you prepare, as a result of that meeting, a joint statement with Admiral Stark?

General MARSHALL. I was trying to find whether in the record of the Joint Board on the morning of the 26th there [3676] was a definite statement on the preparation of this particular memorandum.

There appears to be no reference in it, so I will have to depend on my memory, which is not at all good on this particular memorandum.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Marshall, let's see if we can get this pinned down. You left on the afternoon of the 26th, didn't you, for maneuvers, didn't you?

General MARSHALL. At 1 p. m.

Mr. KEEFE. So, if you had any discussions with Admiral Stark, you must have had them after the meeting at the White House on the 25th or the morning of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Am I correct in assuming that this memorandum for the President, which is dated November 27, 1941, and apparently is signed by Stark and Marshall, was, in fact, prepared before you left for the maneuvers on the afternoon of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. I do not think the expression "was in fact prepared" would be quite correct, because I rather imagine that the preparation was started at that time, the completed memorandum was ready on the 27th, and I must have signed it on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. KEEFE. You signed it on the morning of the 28th?

[3677] General MARSHALL. I must have signed it on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. KEEFE. You signed it on the morning of the 28th?

General MARSHALL. I wasn't here the 27th, and the memorandum is dated the 27th.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, would anybody else sign your name to it?

General MARSHALL. I don't believe so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The memorandum is dated the 27th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. What you were talking about was the proposed reply to the Japanese message of the 25th in this memorandum; isn't that true?

General MARSHALL (reading):

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: The Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; The Philippines; The Russian Maritime Provinces.

Then it goes into a discussion of the various probabilities, and it ends up with the definite recommendations:

Prior to the completion of the Philippines reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens the United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined:

[3678] In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war;

Prior to such warning, no military opposition be undertaken;

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

The memorandum is dated the 27th. I was absent from Washington on the 27th. I returned and was in the office early on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. KEEFE. Where is the original document? Is that here? A photostat of the original, counsel?

Mr. GESELL. The November 27th memorandum?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Yes. That is downstairs in our files.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you get it, please?

Mr. GESELL. Certainly.

Mr. KEEFE. At the time this memorandum was discussed or prepared, did you know that Secretary Hull had deleted the *modus vivendi*, and had sent his message of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. I have no specific recollection. I would rather imagine I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you have told us, General Marshall, [3679] that when you read the proposed message, you were of the opinion that even with the *modus vivendi* in it, it was so stiff that the Japs wouldn't accept it?

General MARSHALL. I thought the terms were too stiff.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you first learn that the message had been sent and the *modus vivendi* proposals were eliminated?

General MARSHALL. I think that must have been on the morning of November 28th, from the Secretary of War.

Mr. KEEFE. That is when you came back?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk with the Secretary of State after that to ascertain why he had sent this message and eliminated the *modus vivendi*?

General MARSHALL. I recall no such discussion.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he ever tell you that the diplomatic negotiations were all over, and from now on, it is up to the Army and the Navy to run the show, or words to that effect?

General MARSHALL. I testified previously, and I have a very clear recollection of this specific statement by Mr. Hull to me, or to Admiral Stark and myself: "These fellows mean to fight."—

[3680] Mr. KEEFE. When was that?

General MARSHALL. I haven't completed the statement.

Mr. KEEFE. I beg pardon.

General MARSHALL. "These fellows mean to fight, you will have to watch out," or words to that effect. "These fellows mean to fight," I have a clear recollection of his using those exact words. Just what was the meeting, when was the meeting, at which he said that, I don't recall, but I think it was one of the last meetings, probably the last meeting before the actual break of December 7.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was that the last meeting? When you say last meeting do you mean the meeting before he sent his message of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. I stated I don't recall at which one of these discussions he stated that. I am quite certain, though, that it was after the Japanese envoys came to Washington.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, I confess that my mind is indistinct—maybe we agree on that, both of us—as to the events of the particular period, and it is very important that we try to get these facts as clearly as possible.

Now, I realize that you left here at 1 o'clock on the 26th of November. You went down to maneuvers—in North Carolina?

[3681] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You came back when?

General MARSHALL. I came back—I think my plane landed sometime after 8 o'clock on the evening of the 27th.

Mr. KEEFE. When you got back to your office on the morning of the 28th you found this Gerow report to you, did you?

General MARSHALL. I think so; yes, sir; that is the probability.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, what concerns me is the fact that here is your memorandum for the President, which is dated November 27, 1941, the time when you were down in North Carolina; you can't give us any clear recollection now as to when this memorandum was prepared?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I cannot, but I imagine General Gerow can tell you specifically, as he prepared it, working with the Naval opposite.

Mr. KEEFE. Did Gerow prepare this memorandum of the 27th?

General MARSHALL. That would be a joint matter between General Gerow and his assistants and the naval opposite and that man's assistants.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I understand you personally didn't discuss this matter with Admiral Stark?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I said the preparation of [3682] the memorandum. I didn't say the discussion.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I will pass that over. Let General Marshall look at it and see if that is his signature. I don't know. Is that your signature on the photostatic copy of this message of November 27?

(A document was handed to General Marshall.)

General MARSHALL. I would say that it was, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then it is apparently signed.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You couldn't have signed it on the 27th?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Because you were in North Carolina. Do you have any recollection now of when you did sign it, after looking at the message?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I was looking for some office mark on here to see the date of delivery but I don't get that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield for a question?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel, does this photo show that it is the original of the White House file?

Mr. GESELL. No. Just the original signed copy. It is from the White House files.

[3683] Senator FERGUSON. Does it show any stamp anywhere of receipt?

Mr. GESELL. No. We have examined it for that very carefully and have not found any. I see nothing on there that shows when it was received by the President.

Mr. KEEFE. What was that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. I see nothing on there that shows when it was received by the President.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that message which has been produced, the photostat copy; is that taken from the White House files?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought it said on the face of it from Navy files.

Mr. GESELL. On the corner it says "Navy folder," which is the folder of the White House files in which it was placed.

Mr. KEEFE. This is the original message that was delivered to the White House?

Mr. GESELL. This document was made available to us by Miss Grace Tully from the files of President Roosevelt. It is the original.

Mr. KEEFE. That clearly identifies it.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to call the Congressman's attention to the fact that it is on the stationery of the Navy Department, which suggests that it was actually typed [3684] at the Navy Department. We had in mind asking Admiral Stark, if he gets on the stand, or Admiral Turner, more concerning it.

Mr. KEEFE. I expect to ask some questions too about it when Admiral Stark gets on the stand, but here is one of the joint signers of the document that is now on the stand. So that we may get as much information as we can as we go along is why I am asking these questions of General Marshall.

General Marshall, am I correct in the assumption that you had a meeting on the 25th of November at the White House?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3685] Mr. KEEFE. What time of day was that meeting?

General MARSHALL. Twelve-fifteen p. m.

Mr. KEEFE. How long did it last?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In any event, you had a meeting at the White House at which Admiral Stark was present?

General MARSHALL. A meeting at which Admiral Stark was present, and also the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and myself.

Mr. KEEFE. That must have been a fairly important meeting, with all those top-flight men there.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Wouldn't you say so?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But you can't tell use of any independent recollection, anything that took place at that meeting?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. I am told by assistant counsel here, that the meeting lasted an hour and a half, according to Mr. Stimson's diary.

[3686] Mr. KEEFE. There is set forth in Mr. Stimson's diary what took place. If you don't have any present recollection as to what took place, I don't care for any guesses about it, General; I would be glad to have you read from Mr. Stimson's diary if that will refresh your recollection.

General MARSHALL (reading):

There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

That does not stimulate my memory other than what I have told you that undoubtedly we were talking about what should be done regarding Japan.

May I say also, Mr. Keefe, at the risk of being unduly repetitious, that you gentlemen are bringing up things to me that have been, to a large extent, rubbed out by 4 years of global war. I have not investigated these things to refresh my memory until the past few days, and so I think it is not unduly remarkable that I would not

remember the detailed conversations and the frequency of conferences at which one we discussed this, and at which one we discussed [3687] that.

At the time, of course, I would have had a lively recollection. But there are some rather great events that have intervened. I think I have a fair memory, and I am giving you the best I can under the circumstances.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, I don't want anything said here, or any questions I have asked to be taken as indicating that I am critical. I appreciate as well as any other citizen of this country the tremendous responsibility that you had at that time and subsequent.

But this is a very important matter to this committee to get this chain of events pinned down, if we can, some place.

Now, is it your recollection—you have no recollection of what took place. There then appears, after this memorandum signed and dated—I don't say signed, but dated the 27th of November, addressed to the President—there must have been some reason for you making that memorandum. I am trying to discover the relationship between that memorandum and the proposal of Mr. Hull to send a reply to the Japanese message without a *modus vivendi*. Can you help this committee on that subject?

General MARSHALL. I think of nothing other than what I have already said, sir.

[3688] Mr. KEEFE. In order that I may not be misled, do I understand your testimony to be that very likely General Gerow actually prepared this memorandum of November 27 during your absence?

General MARSHALL. I said very likely General Gerow and his naval opposite who would have been, in that case, I believe, Admiral Turner, and their assistants, worked on the preparation of a draft to be submitted to Admiral Stark and myself. That was the usual course in such matters.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, because the message delivered to the President actually bears your signature, it is apparent that it wasn't signed by you at least until the morning of the 28th?

General MARSHALL. That would appear to be the case, sir. My guess is that Admiral Stark signed it, it was typed on the Navy side, it was sent over to the War Department—I was not here—and I presume it was left until the morning of the 28th, when I signed it.

Mr. KEEFE. That was some considerable time after Mr. Hull had decided to delete the *modus vivendi* out of his November 26th message and send that message; hand it to the Japanese envoys?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

[3689] Mr. KEEFE. So, up to the time that this message was prepared, or memorandum was prepared, for the President, you cannot state that you had any knowledge that Mr. Hull was going to send his reply to the Japs without the *modus vivendi*?

General MARSHALL. My own knowledge of that would come through what Mr. Stimson told me at the time, and we have read his diary on those statements. He was my informant.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not have an independent recollection?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Stimson will have to speak for himself. Well, in any event, General Marshall, when you got notice that that message had gone out, you were alarmed, weren't you?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that particular reaction, sir. I was in a state of great concern throughout this period, and increasing concern every day.

[3690] Mr. KEEFE. Well, you have already told us that you thought the Japs couldn't possibly accept the message even with the *modus vivendi* in it and it would be rejected. Now, you people got busy with the idea of alerting our overseas theaters right at that time, did you not?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that prompted by the fact that you knew the Japs would turn this proposal down?

General MARSHALL. The alert message was prompted by the feeling that the diplomatic, at least diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, were trembling on the verge of rupture, with the possibility that it would mean actual war.

Mr. KEEFE. So you felt that the overseas departments ought to be immediately alerted on a war basis?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is why you sent that alert message out to MacArthur and to Panama and to the west coast and to Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't want to read that telegram into the record again. It has been read in 17 or 18 times. We are quite familiar with the terms of that message.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 12 o'clock. We will have to recess here until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[3691]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Congressman Keefe, are you ready to proceed?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. General, I understand that you have not been able to get the information which I had previously requested, namely, the reasons for the alert of June 17, 1940.

General MARSHALL. I was in the process of assembling that, Mr. Keefe. I asked them at the noon hour if they have completed, and they said they had not. They are doing the best they can.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, do you want the message we dug up this noon in the Navy Department?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. About the orders to Admiral Richardson to make a movement of the fleet?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; I would like to see it if you have it, please.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am going to read it into the record. There is some material in it that, for secrecy reasons, are not material here. We would rather not read it.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Mitchell refers to some code designation terms that we do not think should go into the public record, [3692] that is all. I will show them to you.

(The document was handed to Mr. Keefe.)

Mr. KEEFE. This morning, General Marshall, I asked you some questions with respect to the June 17, 1940 alert, and I asked you whether you had information as to whether the fleet was maintained at Pearl Harbor during the period of that alert. My recollection is that you did not recall the circumstances with reference to the disposition of the fleet.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. At that period.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I so understand your testimony up to now?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. To refresh your recollection as to the events at that time I want to read into the record a direction from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet, entitled, "Secret. To be acknowledged." That appears in writing in the right-hand corner. It bears no date, but in the letter from the Navy transmitting it to Mr. Mitchell, the counsel, Mr. John Ford Baecher, lieutenant commander, U. S. N. R., states:

1. In response to your request that the Navy Department furnish a copy of the orders issued from Admiral Stark to [3693] Admiral Richardson directing the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor and proceed to an unknown destination there is disclosed a photostatic copy of the dispatch from Opnav to Cincus designated "Secret. To be acknowledged."

2. It is noted that the dispatch is not dated, but by its position on the microfilm roll and the numerals contained in the time group number it is presumed that the dispatch originated on 19 June 1940.

Now this dispatch reads as follows:

Reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal. Army there informed and in alert status. I desire you make test on or about 24 June by having a major portion of Fleet in company put to sea without previous announcement but you arranging for leak to effect that probable destination is Canal, and this not denied by authorities Proceed toward Canal for approximately two days when return Hawaiian ports. Maintain radio silence exercising at your discretion. Anticipate ordering you to Washington for conference on your return.

Then down below on this message, in writing appears this notation:

20 June shown to General Marshall. He sent warning—

I do not know whether that is "warning" or not—well, he [3694] sent what appears to be "meg to Canal Zone."

Then below that in quotation marks:

Fleet may proceed to Atlantic. Possibility of sabotage continue about accordingly.

Now that notation on here indicates that you saw this message, General Marshall. Do you recall it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I do not recall the specific message. I do now recall the movement order of the fleet for that purpose, as indicated in that message.

Mr. KEEFE. What was the purpose of taking the fleet out of Pearl Harbor then at the time of that alert, on June 16, 1940?

General MARSHALL. I think that is explained in the message, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will you look at the message and give what you conceive to be the explanation?

(The document was handed to General Marshall.)

General MARSHALL (reading):

Reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet unit towards Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal.

Mr. KEEFE. Now stop right there. What report does that refer to, if you know?

General MARSHALL. I do not know offhand, sir.

"Army there informed"—that is the Canal—"and in alert [3695] status." We already have that in the record. "I desire you make test"—that was the purpose of the fleet movement, I understand—

on or about 24 June by having a major portion of Fleet in company put to sea without previous announcement but you arranging for leak to effect that probable destination is Canal and this not denied by authorities.

In other words, the Chief of Naval Operations desired Admiral Richardson to make a test on or about the 24th by doing what was directed in this message.

Mr. KEEFE. A test of what?

General MARSHALL. Whether or not the enemy, the Japanese at that time, would attempt sabotage in the Canal. The Army was already alerted in the Canal.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it sabotage, if you know? That the dispatch of this message and the deployment of the Fleet in that manner would encourage the Japs to commit sabotage out in the Canal? Was that the purpose of it?

General MARSHALL (reading):

Reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal.

That is pretty plain, it seems to me. Now the Chief of Naval Operations directed that a test be made of that, knowing at the time that the Army was already alerted in the Canal, and it would seem from this note at the bottom here in quotation marks that [3696] it probably refers to a message sent by me, I assume, to the Canal Commander of the Army at the time in connection with this message, so in addition to the alert he would also be aware of this bluff move.

[3697] Mr. KEEFE. Now, would it be a fair interpretation of that message, General Marshall, to conclude that instructions were given to Admiral Richardson that if he proceeded toward the Atlantic, and that would be toward the Panama Canal, wouldn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He might expect extensive sabotage, and for him to go away from Pearl Harbor, to hide himself where he wouldn't be seen; isn't that what that message tells him to do?

General MARSHALL. Not in my understanding at all, sir.

Reliable sources persistently report a movement in force by major fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, it wouldn't be expected then that he would sail the fleet toward the Canal in the face of those directions; that if he did, extensive sabotage would take place.

General MARSHALL. He is told to proceed toward the Canal for approximately 2 days. That is a very small portion of the distance.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event, General Marshall—I would like, Mr. Counsel, to have that offered as an exhibit.

[3698] General MARSHALL. Shall I turn it over?

Mr. GESELL. We will first have to mimeograph it.

Mr. KEEFE. I have no objection to the deletion of those words which don't have anything to do with it, and are very secret code.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will get a mimeographed copy with those words deleted.

Mr. KEEFE. I would say, Mr. Chairman, so far as I am concerned, I concur with counsel in this matter, and I suppose it is up to the committee to say whether there shall be any deletion from that message or not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will ask if there is any objection to the counsel having this message mimeographed with the omission of the code words, that have no relationship.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done and counsel will prepare mimeographed copies with those symbols eliminated.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, to get back to the events around the 26th and 27th of November 1941, as I understand the testimony, and if I am incorrect up to date, you correct me please—you had no part in the first preparation of the November 28 message—I understood that was prepared by General Gerow, the alert message sent on the 28th?

[3699] General MARSHALL. I had no part other than I may and probably did give instructions for the preparation of this message before my departure at 1 p. m. on November 26.

Mr. KEEFE. I wanted to know whether I am correct in the assumption that when you learned that Mr. Hull had sent his message on the 26th to Japan that you at that time knew that war was inevitable, except as to the time of the actual strike.

General MARSHALL. I did not know on November 26th that Mr. Hull had sent his message.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know on the 28th?

General MARSHALL. I assume that the Secretary of War told me on the 28th what he had learned from Mr. Hull on the 27th.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in Mr. Stimson's testimony, to refresh your recollection, appearing in the report of the Army Board, with respect to the meeting of the 25th of November at the White House——

Mr. GESELL. What page, Congressman, please, so that we can show it to the General.

Mr. KEEFE. Page 51.

Mr. GESELL. Thank you.

[3700] Mr. KEEFE. This is the United States News copy that I am referring to:

The War Council met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November, 1941.

This is the statement of the Board.

The tentative U. S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression of it:

"Hull showed me the proposal for a three-months truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, secured it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic."

You have testified here this morning that you were of the same opinion.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is correct, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the Board says:

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this Government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:

[3701] "We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall."

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.

Do you recall him doing that?

General MARSHALL. Not specifically. He told me of practically every meeting he had. His custom was to come into my room which adjoined his.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present recollection, General Marshall, of Secretary Stimson getting in touch with you after he talked with Hull, and Hull told him that he was going to send this message of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. You would leave that to Mr. Stimson and his diary?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then the Board says:

"Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. His diary describes it:

"Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought [3702] up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

Then the Board says:

Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the entire matter was left for further consideration.

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary continues:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposal at all."

Then the Board says:

Apparently on the 26th, in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "three-months truce."

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter-proposal of the "ten points" which they took as an ultimatum.

Now, General Marshall, you were here the morning of the 26th, you left about 1:00 o'clock that day? [3703]

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk with Secretary Stimson that morning of the 26th with reference to his conversation with Hull?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of it. The probability is I talked to Mr. Stimson that morning. Whether I talked with him before he went to the State Department or whether I talked after his return I don't know, but it is quite a possibility that the Joint Board meeting lasted up until the time I left, nearly 1 o'clock.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present recollection of Mr. Stimson calling you and telling you that Hull was going to send this message on that day, the 26th, or hand it to the Japanese here in Washington?

General MARSHALL. I think I have a recollection of Mr. Stimson using that phrase "to kick the whole thing over." That is confused with the amount I have read about it since and I don't know whether my recollection is hindsight or of the day. I am quite certain Mr. Stimson talked to me because he talked to me every day and frequently each day during this period. I think the notes of the Joint Board will show that it was a rather lengthy meeting and there is a possibility that I left directly from the Joint Board for the plane. In that event it would have meant my seeing Mr. Stimson before [3704] the Joint Board meeting rather than the possibility that I was seeing him after the Joint Board meeting.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Congressman, may I interpose?

Mr. KEEFE. Surely.

Mr. GESELL. We made an inquiry over the lunch hour to see if we could find any telephone record of conversations held on the 26th between Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, anticipating the line of questioning which you were on before the recess.

The White House telephone records show that at 7:07 a. m. on the 26th Secretary Stimson called General Marshall. That is the only call through the White House telephone that is recorded on the 26th between Secretary Stimson and General Marshall. The other two calls involving General Marshall on that day are one at 10:30 when Admiral Stark called him but he was not there and Admiral Stark talked, I believe, to a Miss Thomas, who must have been General Marshall's secretary, and a call at 1:25 p. m. by Admiral Stark where the record shows "M. M." which means "never mind," apparently again Admiral Stark being unable to reach General Marshall.

We have asked for a photostat of those records but couldn't get it over the noon hour.

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you very much for that information, Mr. Gesell.

[3705] Just so that I may be correctly informed, reference has been made repeatedly to the White House telephone.

General Marshall, will you tell me just what is meant by that?

General MARSHALL. The White House maintains a switchboard and I believe—

Mr. KEEFE. That is a switchboard in the White House?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. And I believe the lines leading up to that switchboard went through no other channel. They passed through no other switchboards.

Mr. KEEFE. So if you wanted to get a quick contact with Mr. Stimson or vice versa you would call through this White House switchboard?

General MARSHALL. That and other reasons, too. It was supposed to be more secure because there was only one switchboard and very carefully selected operators were on the switchboard. And also they

were highly efficient and gave you very prompt service. I had one on my desk. I had one at my home. Mr. Stimson had the same.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Marshall, if you are confused about the events of this particular period I wonder what about somebody like myself. I am utterly confused up to date. I want to try as diligently as I can to get these facts pinned down as accurately as possible.

[3706] Now, General Marshall, Secretary Stimson had a better recollection than you have about these events on the 25th and 26th because he kept a diary?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You didn't keep a dairy?

General MARSHALL. I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. But if he made an entry in his diary you would believe the things he wrote about took place?

General MARSHALL. I certainly would, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, what is bothering me is this, you left for the maneuvers at 1 o'clock on the 26th. Evidently you had some conversation over the telephone with Admiral Stark or with somebody—who was it?

Mr. GESELL. Secretary Stimson; 7:07 a. m.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. That morning must have been pretty important. 7:07 he is calling you. Do you recall that telephone conversation?

General MARSHALL. No. He called me several times at 7 or thereabouts.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall him calling you that morning of the 26th?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were getting ready to go on these maneuvers?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I probably was having breakfast at 7.

Mr. KEEFE. You had some business things, I suppose, you wanted to clean up?

General MARSHALL. I was going to occupy myself at the War Department until 1 o'clock. Mr. Stimson called me rather frequently late in the evening or, not too frequently, early in the morning. My guess on this would be that he told me of these things that had been worrying him and that he talked to me about it later in the morning.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, I don't want you to testify to anything except what you recall.

General MARSHALL. I don't recall.

Mr. KEEFE. If you don't recall, that is the best answer, because otherwise it is hearsay.

Then the situation is you must have had some talk with General Gerow the morning of the 26th before you went away on the maneuvers, in order to get ready for him to prepare this message that was going out on the 28th, the alert message.

Mr. GESELL. May we have the Joint Board—

General MARSHALL. I think there was a meeting of the Joint Board on the morning at which General Gerow, Admiral Stark and myself, and others, were present.

Mr. KEEFE. What time was that meeting held?

[3708] General MARSHALL. At 11:35 a. m. Members present: Admiral Stark; myself; Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff; General

Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air; Rear Admiral Turner, Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations; General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division; Captain Ramsey; and Colonel Scobey.

Mr. KEEFE. What did you talk about at this meeting? You have it before you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, I have it before me.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask you first, did you discuss the question of sending an alert message to the overseas commanders?

General MARSHALL. It does not show in this record.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any independent recollection that at this meeting of this Board held after 11 o'clock on the morning of the 26th of November, do you have any independent recollection that the subject of sending an alert was discussed?

General MARSHALL. My recollection is that the subject of sending an alert was discussed and I think General Gerow's memorandum to me later confirms that.

Mr. KEEFE. Then your recollection is based on the fact that General Gerow later wrote a memorandum?

General MARSHALL. On the following day Gerow wrote a memorandum to me in which he stated, "I then showed him"— [3709] that is the Secretary of War—"copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting." "You" being General Marshall.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that message then the alert message which was discussed?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. With that refreshing of your recollection can't you remember what the discussion was or any part of it?

General MARSHALL. My recollection of it is that we decided to send an alert message which Gerow was to draft, and that was where I or Admiral Stark gave, I thought I gave, the directions to the President that that message should include the statement in regard to the overt act not being on our part.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you were pretty well satisfied at this meeting, and the rest of them were, that war was perhaps inevitable at that time, weren't you?

General MARSHALL. We felt at that meeting that there was a great danger of a sudden outbreak of war in the Pacific.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you think that the message Mr. Hull had sent to the Japanese would bring that about?

General MARSHALL. I could not say that I did, sir.

[3710] Mr. KEEFE. Well, evidently Secretary Stimson did not know on the 26th that Hull had sent his message or delivered it to the Japs.

General MARSHALL. That is what I gathered from his record, from his testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. Because, as appears on page 51 of this Army report, the board finds:

Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be a fact.

Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November 1941:

"The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday,

he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy'."

His diary continues:

[3711] "I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

Now, at least on the 27th, from that statement in Mr. Stimson's diary, prior to the 27th he did not know that Hull had sent this final message to the Japs or handed it to them on the 26th and he got the information when he called Hull up on the morning of the 27th and that is when Hull told him that he had "washed his hands of the whole thing and it is now up to Knox and Stimson, to the Army and Navy."

Now, when you came back on the 27th, in the evening, and got to your office on the morning of the 28th, did Stimson contact you?

General MARSHALL. I presume that he did. I am certain that he must have. I do not recall.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he tell you at that time that he had talked with Hull and Hull had told him that he had washed his hands of the whole matter it was now up to the Army and Navy?

General MARSHALL. I assume that he did. I have no direct recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I will ask you, General Marshall, at that time were you of the then opinion, at that time, that that was the end of the negotiations and that war was inevitable, if not imminent?

General MARSHALL. As to the negotiations, I am not so [3712] clear on that because I was thinking in terms of military disposals, preparations, and hazards. I must have known from my previous knowledge of the course of the negotiations and the difficulties of the situation on the side of Mr. Hull in finding a basis of dealing with the Japanese, while representing our interests, that would have some chance of stalling them off. I was aware of all the complications of that. I presume then that at this particular time in view of these statements which Mr. Stimson registers as of that day that I must have been aware of the extremely serious situation and the probability of war breaking out in the very near future in the Pacific.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, nothing but the imminence of an attack would have caused you to send out the alert that was sent on the 28th of November, would it, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. Nothing but the imminence of an attack? I do not believe that would quite express it because we did not see the imminence of an attack in the alert of June 17 of the previous summer.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not?

General MARSHALL. We regarded a hazard of an attack rather than the imminence of an attack. I, for example, went through an alert in the Philippines against the Japanese in 1913. We had, as I recall, no imminence of an attack but [3713] there was the hazard of an attack. So, I believe, was the previous alert in the Philippines in 1937. I believe that that same statement possibly would hold true. There was the hazard of an attack rather than the imminence of attack.

Now, you would issue an alert order, I would feel, if you thought there was the hazard of an attack at that particular time. You would also issue an alert order, certainly, as we did then, if we regarded the imminence of an attack somewhere in the Pacific.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, when you issued the alert on the 17th of June 1940 you used the language, "To deal with possible trans-Pacific raid."

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, now, then, let me put it this way without splitting words: General Marshall, on the morning of the 28th of November you had tremendously more information as to the possibility of an attack by the Japanese than you had in June 1940?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If you had information in June 1940 as to the possibilities of a trans-Pacific raid, you had a mountain of evidence on the 27th of November, did you not, to the same effect?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

[3714] Mr. KEEFE. Now, when I said possibility or imminence of attack I did not limit it to Hawaii, because you have testified that you did not consider at that time that the attack would come on Hawaii.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You thought it might come on the Philippines or it might possibly go on to Panama?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or some other place.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But taking what was in your mind as to the imminence of an attack some place, had you concluded definitely in your mind on the morning of the 28th that we were bound and determined at that time—not bound and determined, but we were of the opinion that negotiations were at an end and that Japan would attack some place?

General MARSHALL. You said the morning of the 28th and you said negotiations were at an end. I have to qualify that with the statements in the message which differed on the Army side from those in the Navy and which followed the Secretary of War's telephone communication with Mr. Hull on the morning of the 27th, where the Army message stated that—I haven't got the message here—that the question in terms of it was probably terminated—you probably have the message in [3715] front of you, I haven't—"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes."

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, but the Navy message, General Marshall—

General MARSHALL. Yes, I referred to that. They said it terminated.

Mr. KEEFE. They interpreted it that it had terminated, do you remember?

General MARSHALL. Yes. This, naturally, followed a telephone conversation between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull while Mr. Stimson was checking the draft of a message for a general alert which General Gerow had brought into his office.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, General Marshall, if the facts are as Mr. Stimson recorded in his diary, that Hull told him on the morning of the 27th of November 1941 he had terminated the whole matter, he had broken the whole matter off, "I have washed my hands of it, it is now in the hands of the Army and Navy," how in the name of conscience in the face of that statement and those are the facts could

anybody come to any other conclusion than the conclusion that was inserted in the Navy telegram, namely, that the negotiations had actually broken off and were finished?

General MARSHALL. The same conclusion was evidently come to by the decision of General Gerow in the preparation of the draft for the Army alert. However, when Mr. Stimson [3716] read it he, to use a slang expression, he double checked. He called up Mr. Hull again. Mr. Hull then qualified his statement of the previous day as I understand it, so that Mr. Stimson changed the wording in the Army message to the form I just read, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated—appear to be terminated to all practical purposes." Gerow had written it, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated." That is the way the Navy wrote it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, without splitting hairs as to this language and all that sort of thing I want to ask you a plain, blunt question: You were Chief of Staff of the United States Army at that time. Whether you have a present recollection of it or not appears problematical.

Mr. MURPHY. You mean that he was Chief of Staff?

Mr. KEEFE. Will you please not interrupt? He was Chief of Staff.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just trying to help you. Go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't think I need your help. It has not been evident up to date.

Will you strike that question and let me start over again?

I am asking you, General Marshall, as to your present recollection, as to your opinion, your opinion, not Stimson's, not anybody's else, but your opinion as Chief of Staff of the [3717] United States Army, on the 28th day of November 1941 were you personally of the opinion that the thing was at an end and that war was imminent?

General MARSHALL. I was personally of the opinion that Japanese hostile action was apt to break out at any moment in the Pacific.

Mr. KEEFE. And that would mean war, wouldn't it?

General MARSHALL. And that would mean war.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that would show the same thing that I said, only putting it in diplomatic language, wouldn't it?

General MARSHALL. Well, you were involving me, Mr. Keefe, in the question of diplomatic negotiations. I was talking from the military angle.

Mr. KEEFE. No, no. I am asking you as Chief of Staff only.

General MARSHALL. Yes. I understood it this time but not before.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand you have to guard your position between the Army position and the diplomatic position and all that.

General MARSHALL. It is a little more than that. I am not in the diplomatic part of it.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking you as Chief of Staff if you thought at that time—

[3718] General MARSHALL. I gave my answer as such.

Mr. KEEFE. And your answer is that you thought the Japs were liable to attack any place, at any moment, and that meant war?

General MARSHALL. That is what I thought, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was the intention of yourself and others associated with you when this message of the 28th was sent out to further implement whatever warning had been given to General Short to make certain that he went out on an all-out alert?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was the purpose of it?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that was your responsibility as Chief of Staff, was it not?

General MARSHALL. That was, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In the line of command it was your responsibility as Chief of Staff to see that these overseas Army outfits were alerted, is that true?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, in order to keep the record straight, you have referred to these warning messages as dated November 28. They are dated November 27.

Mr. KEEFE. I want the record corrected if I did.

[3719] Mr. MITCHELL. That is the day the general was away.

Mr. KEEFE. That is right, the 27th. The answers came back on the 28th from MacArthur and Short, that is how I made my error, but the message was sent the 27th.

So the chronology of the thing is Hull delivers his note on the 26th; you caused your alert message to be sent to the overseas departments on the 27th, dated the 27th at least; I don't know when they were sent. Do you know when they were sent?

General MARSHALL. I think the morning of the 27th.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not get back until the evening of the 27th.

General MARSHALL. They did not hold these messages for me, sir. They used my name but they sent them immediately.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

General MARSHALL. They used my name so that it would not go as a routine Adjutant General message.

Mr. KEEFE. Are those original messages here available? You have got these mimeographed sheets.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am not sure that we have them in the room.

Mr. GESELL. I think we have them here.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. He has them and he will bring them to you.

[3720] Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Well, now, so that I may understand, General Marshall, in a matter as urgent and important as this you did not personally sign the message, did you?

General MARSHALL. I did not.

Mr. KEEFE. The actual photostat of the message that I have before me appears to be signed by—that is, your name is typed on it but it appears to bear the signature of Van Sickler, somebody by that name. D. R. Van Sickler, S-i-c-k-l-e-r, is that what it is? Signed, "Adjutant General." Do you know anybody by that name?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, let me show it to you.

General MARSHALL. There are a great many adjutants general.

Mr. KEEFE. Maybe I have got it wrong. Does that refresh your recollection as to who that is?

General MARSHALL. I do not know the man. He is evidently a member of the Adjutant General's Department in charge of the record of the dispatch of messages.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that is dated November 27, 1941. So this was completed during your absence?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was sent during your absence?

[3721] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I do not find anything on the message which shows what time of day on the 27th it was sent out. Would there normally be—

General MARSHALL. That is all there would be, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I cannot interpret these symbols, General Marshall. Will you interpret them and see if you can tell what time of day that was sent?

General MARSHALL. I see nothing on there indicating the time of day. There must be some other record, maybe in the message center. That is the direction from the Adjutant General's Office to the sending service, which is the message center. Now, there may be another record you can obtain.

Mr. GESELL. We can find that out if you want us to.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, this was a command order?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. With directions to reply?

General MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when you stated, or when it was stated in this message, "Report measures taken," that meant that you were to get a report from the commanding general?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. A similar message went to the other commanders?

[3722] General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. With similar directions?

General MARSHALL. With similar directions.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, with the country on the brink of war, General Marshall, you having the then impression as you have stated it a few moments ago that Japan was liable to precipitate war by attacking any time, any place, it would be highly important to the Chief of Staff to see to it that the orders which he had given were carried out, would it not?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when General Short's message came back the evidence indicates, somewhat inconclusively perhaps, that it was part of three or four papers, the top one being the reply of MacArthur, then Short, then a route sheet, the MacArthur message being on top and that bears your endorsement with your initials.

General MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Your initials do not appear on the Short message but they do show the initials of the Secretary of War and the War Plans Department, General Gerow.

Now, am I correct in the assumption from an understanding of your evidence on that point that you think you must have seen the Short message although you did not initial it, having initialed the top one?

[3723] General MARSHALL. That was my assumption, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, is that a mere assumption or is it a fact?

General MARSHALL. I stated I did not recall, sir; that I must assume that I had seen it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if you saw that Short message, General Marshall, as Chief of Staff it imposed some responsibility upon you, did it not?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It was addressed to you as Chief of Staff, was it not?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the very telegram itself indicates that it is in response to the command order which you had issued to him?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was a message which attempted on the part of Short to convey to you as Chief of Staff the nature of the alert under which he was operating?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was his response to your order?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I have read the various statements, General Marshall, that you have made at various times in connection with this matter. You recall that when you were before the Army board first you were somewhat confused about those things because you thought that at some time in November there had been a change in the alert numbers. Do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, it is perfectly clear now that a reading of this message indicates that there isn't any alert number specified in Short's wire.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that puts that out of the picture, doesn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So we get down to the simple fact that here is a message from your Commanding General in the bastion of defense in the Pacific to which all of our defenses, as you have testified, were tied, in which he tells you that he is alerted to prevent sabotage; liaison with Navy.

Now, in all fairness, General Marshall, in the exercise of ordinary care as Chief of Staff ought you not to have proceeded to investigate further and give further orders to General Short when it appeared that he was only alerted against sabotage?

General Marshall. As I stated earlier, that was my [3725] opportunity to intervene and I did not do it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you say that was your opportunity. That was your responsibility, was it not?

General MARSHALL. You can put it that way, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't want to put it that way. I am asking you. You used the words, "that was your opportunity." I do not want an opportunity to arise in the future discussion of this matter to have a conflict of words and not to be able to understand just what you meant. Do I understand that your use of the word "opportunity" is synonymous with responsibility?

General MARSHALL. Mr. Keefe, I had an immense number of papers going over my desk every day informing me what was happening anywhere in the world. This was a matter of great importance. It had gone into the machine, it had been sent out, the acknowledgments had come back. They passed the important messages over my desk. I noted them and initialed them; those that I thought the Secretary

of War ought specifically to see I put them out for him to see, to be sure that he would see it in case he by any chance did not see the same message.

I was not passing the responsibility on to the Secretary of War. I merely wanted him to know.

Now, the same thing related to these orders of the War [3726] Department. I was responsible. I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff throughout on large matters and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but I am not a bookkeeping machine and it is extremely difficult, it is an extremely difficult thing for me to take each thing in its turn and give it exactly the attention that it had merited.

Now, in this particular case a very tragic thing occurred, there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff, I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed yourself.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, let me put it in another way. You have now stated it was your responsibility as Chief of Staff to see to it that General Short out there in Hawaii, which you have described as being our bastion of defense, to see that he was alerted, and if he misinterpreted your order to see that that order was carried out.

General MARSHALL. That is my responsibility, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I have stated it correctly, haven't I?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, you have.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you cannot classify this—

General MARSHALL. And I had an opportunity to intervene [3727] as I stated and I did not take it.

Mr. KEEFE. You cannot classify this response of Short's as being a trivial matter, can you, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. I do not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The message which was sent on the 27th of November was about as important a message as had been sent to anybody, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. It was, sir, and with reference to that reply you have there, a large number of people saw that and in every case they got the identical reaction.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, a large number of people saw it? General Gerow saw it and General Gerow testified here that when he saw it he thought first that it was in response to a telegram sent out by G-2 relating to sabotage and when his attention was called to the fact—when I asked counsel to ask him some further questions and his attention was called to the fact—that this was a direct response to your telegram No. 472 of the 27th and was addressed to the Chief of Staff, he then changed his position and said, "I as Chief of Operations or Chief of War Plans assume full responsibility."

Now, I think it is only fair, General Marshall, in the conduct of this examination in ascertaining the facts to find out whether or not, just as General Gerow testified here, whether you assume the same responsibility that he did?

[3728] General MARSHALL. I said earlier in this hearing, Mr. Keefe, in relation to the very thing you are talking about, when I was questioned in regard to General Gerow's statement that I thought

there was a difference; that he had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility. Is that an answer to your question?

Mr. KEEFE. He had a direct responsibility?

General MARSHALL. And I had the full responsibility.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had the full responsibility. Well, just what do you mean by that?

General MARSHALL. His was in concern to the handling of the details of the matter and he had a responsibility there. I am responsible for what the General Staff did or did not do.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Well, now, then, the fact remains that on this most important matter, and I consider it to be one of the most, if not the most, important matter in connection with this investigation, all of this preliminary talk and all these discussions and all the conversations and all the plans finally funneled themselves down to the morning when this alert message was sent out to General Short and when you and everybody else in the exercise of ordinary care must have known that war with Japan was imminent and that they might strike any time or any place, as you have said, and yet this important message comes back from Short and [3729] through some misadventure or dereliction some place no further message went to General Short or no further investigation was made.

General MARSHALL. I think I stated, Mr. Keefe, that a number of people saw that and in no case did it make the impression that it is now making in the statements that you are bringing forward.

Mr. KEEFE. Who were the other people that saw it?

General MARSHALL. Well, it was seen by Colonel Bundy who handled it immediately in General Gerow's section; presumably it was seen by General Gerow; presumably it was seen by me. It carries the initials of the Secretary of War.

There is this in regard to that particular message: We had gone through a long period beginning specifically with a letter from me about February 6th or 7th, I believe, to General Short, in which every indication that we had in all communications, our statements to General Short, his replies to us, referred specifically, almost invariably, to the hazard of an air attack and of a submarine attack, and very little at any time was said regarding sabotage because they had been figuring on that all the time there through the years.

Now, that went on continuously. I, I know, was completely imbued with the idea that the great hazard that they [3730] were worried about out there was air attack.

I had been pressed very, very heavily to provide additional planes, additional anti-aircraft when we could only manage it by a very costly procedure in this country and at the expense of not being able to help anybody else. That had gone on all through the spring and into the summer.

The same thing in regard to radar. I was involved in that not only as Chief of Staff in the ordinary way but to the point of myself conducting over the telephone the negotiations with regard to procedure because of General Short's insistence that that be provided. Everything that had occurred directly in the reactions that we had received had been related to air attack and to submarine attack.

So when this message came in in this way I think everyone that had seen it was misled on what it meant or did not mean and that, I think, accounts for the main portion of the misunderstanding in the case. The fact that it was merely sabotage did not register on anybody's mind.

I testified earlier that Colonel Bundy, the officer immediately in charge of all the papers and also immediately in charge of the forwarding of them spoke to me very briefly in regard to this about an hour and a half after the attack was known by me, in which he stated in relation to this sabotage statement—

[3731] Mr. KEEFE. The fellow that is dead, Colonel Bundy?

General MARSHALL. He lost his life shortly after that. A few days after that I sent him out to Hawaii and he was killed. He made the statement to me—he mentioned that at the time that it actually was in his own immediate records and he checked it for General Gerow and incidentally of course, for me—that his impression was that he had read it in his handling of it, of where he spoke of liaison with the Navy and he was going ahead with the general procedure as we understood it.

In other words, what was going on throughout this period had been a long series of backs and forths in relation to protection against a specific thing, which was an air attack and also a submarine attack. Sabotage had practically not been mentioned. Suddenly for some reason that I still do not know because I have never discussed it with the individuals concerned, the idea of air attack appeared to be entirely brief and the idea of sabotage appeared the great and urgent matter.

Our alert did not refer to sabotage. General Gerow testified, I believe, or I was told he did—I haven't read his testimony—of his part in not including in the message any reference to sabotage, which I believe also had been the desire of the G-2 of the Army. So nobody was thinking of [3732] sabotage. All the correspondence, all the understanding that we all had in regard to General Short related to one specific thing in particular and that was an air attack. Now, under those circumstances this message came in. It did not register on Colonel Bundy, it did not register on General Gerow, it did not register on me and it carries Mr. Stimson's initials also.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, I understand that the long statement that you have just made, General Marshall, is not to be considered except as an extenuation of the failure on the part of the General Staff to perform what you have said was your—

General MARSHALL. I stated that I accepted the responsibility; that I thought General Gerow had overstated it when he said he had the full responsibility. That he had a direct responsibility but that I had the full responsibility.

I understood you tossed in some of your remarks, or at least the implication seemed to me clear, that it was completely not understandable to you how such an important message at such a critical time should have been so handled. I endeavored to explain that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you understood me all right, General Marshall, I will say that. That is what I am trying to find out exactly.

[3733] Now, I call your attention to the fact that in this message of November 27th it says: "But these measures should be carried out

so as not, comma repeat not, comma, to alarm civil population or disclose intent."

Now, I call your attention to the situation that transpired at the time of the 1940 alert and ask you whether or not it would have been possible for General Short or anybody else to go onto an all-out alert in response to this message without disclosing intent?

General MARSHALL. He might have used the maneuvers as a device, he might have made other arrangements in the taking up of the deployments for the alert. There were other things that could be done to adjust the thing but he was cautioned, I believe, in the message that he was not to jeopardize his defense by reason of such arrangements.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, General Marshall, just so that we may have the picture before us, will you state for the purpose and benefit of the record what you conceive should have been done by General Short had he gone out on an all-out alert, differentiating between the normal activities in peacetime and his activities under an alert in the face of prospective war.

General MARSHALL. His planes should have been—he should have been in full contact with the Navy; the arrange- [3734] ments should have been made so far as he could manage them through the Navy for the conduct of over water reconnaissance, of which the Navy would have the direction; his own planes, his fighter and interceptor planes in particular, should have been ready for action. They were flying anyway. They should have been armed. Pilots sufficient for the first flight should have been ready; planes, presumably, might have been in the air in the early morning; the radar station should have run 24 hours a day as they did in Panama. The dispositions of the troops for alert would in the usual manner, if not entirely, have been carried out but I see no particular reason why there was any difficulty in relation to the restrictions that you indicate in the message towards the water reconnaissance, overwater reconnaissance, towards radar activity, towards the handling of the fighter planes, towards the manning with the ammunition ready of the antiaircraft guns.

Mr. KEEFE. Would it have been possible to send somebody out there to see that this great bastion of ours was ready for this war?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; somebody could have been sent out there. The same thing would have applied to Panama, Alaska, the West coast, and the Philippines. General Short was a lieutenant general, he was an officer of distinction [3735] and reputation and he was in command out there. Our presumption was that—

Mr. KEEFE. You understand that in asking these questions I am not doing so with the idea of holding any brief for General Short or anybody else.

General MARSHALL. Yes; I understand.

Mr. KEEFE. I am simply asking for the facts.

General MARSHALL. I understand.

Mr. KEEFE. We will get to General Short, I assume, after a while.

General MARSHALL. In the light of the present facilities, where planes are available and speed of transit, we send people very frequently to all of these various places because it is almost as easy to do that as it is to communicate by radio. In those days it was not so simple.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, could you have called him up on the telephone?

General MARSHALL. We avoided telephone conversations as much as we could.

Mr. KEEFE. For security reasons?

General MARSHALL. For security reasons.

Mr. KEEFE. Could you have sent a confirming letter by registered mail?

General MARSHALL. We could have sent it by courier; that is probably what would have happened.

Mr. KEEFE. That was not done either, was it?

General MARSHALL. That was not done.

[3736] Mr. KEEFE. In fact, as between the 27th of November and 7th of December, am I correct in the assumption that nothing was done further than this alert message of the 27th?

General MARSHALL. He received a command direction on the 27th. It was not modified. It was not changed or altered. Between the 27th of November and 7th of December, other information went out in naval channels to the Navy, with whom he was supposed to be in close contact, which related to various things, including the destruction of codes.

Mr. KEEFE. I was just going to get to that, General Marshall. You continued to intercept messages which disclosed the fact that the Japs had issued orders to destroy certain codes, and certain orders went out to destroy some of our codes too, did not there?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You sent the orders?

General MARSHALL. Orders were sent out. G-2 wrote them: I authorized them.

Mr. KEEFE. When was the first order to destroy the military code sent out?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir. The record will undoubtedly show it.

[3737] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I think it was around the 3d or 4th of December. That is my recollection. You sent them out to the Naval Attaché, for instance, or the Military Attaché at Tokyo, did you not?

General MARSHALL. We did.

Mr. KEEFE. And the Navy would have the responsibility of sending such an order to the Naval Attaché at Tokyo and other Naval establishments?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall whether we used the instructions for one to give the other the instructions in that case or not, but that was their responsibility, to see that their men got it.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether any message was sent to Short by the Army, either by you or G-2, advising him that the Japs were destroying their codes on the 3d or 4th of December?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall offhand. I do recall, I think, it was the Navy message to the Commander on the 3d or 4th, maybe the 5th.

Mr. KEEFE. When that word came in to you through magic, you were satisfied that war was inevitable, were you not?

General MARSHALL. It would appear so.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, maybe I do not understand. I want to understand, General Marshall, but you say "it would appear so." [3738]

Is that to be a direct answer to my question? Do I so interpret it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That is a direct answer to your question. There were still things the Japanese could do without completely breaking over.

Mr. KEEFE. But ordinarily that is true?

General MARSHALL. Ordinarily, yes; you are correct.

Mr. KEEFE. The destruction of codes is considered to be the immediate preliminary to war, is it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you so considered it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in view of this situation, what was done to alert the War Department here in Washington? Were any orders issued that changed the existing situation?

General MARSHALL. I know of no particular orders that were issued, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I listened with a good deal of attention, General Marshall, to the testimony of General Miles with respect to the complete necessity for secrecy with respect to magic, and I want to go through that just a moment, in order to ask you a question, and my recollection [3739] of what that testimony was.

As I recall it at the present time there were orders in effect in both the Army and Navy that these magic intercepts were of such tremendous and vital importance, that knowledge of them was limited to a very few people.

General MARSHALL. The source was regarded of such tremendous importance that the knowledge of it was restricted to very few people.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I recall, General Marshall, and I think I am correct, that General Miles testified that when these intercepts came in, when they were decoded, there was a man in the room, Colonel Bratton, and his opposite in the Navy, Commander Kramer, who were designated as couriers, to transmit and deliver these intercepts to certain specified people in locked pouches, and the people who were entitled to receive them alone had the key to those pouches.

Do you recall that being the fact?

General MARSHALL. That is correct on the Army side. So far as the pouch and so far as the key is concerned—I do not know whether Colonel Bratton was the only one that made deliveries. He was the usual one, certainly.

Mr. KEEFE. In any event, it was considered to be so secret that it was necessary to put it into what I believe [3740] the witnesses described as a portmanteau with a lock on it. That is a brief case, as I understand it, locked up.

General MARSHALL. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I will call it a brief case.

Colonel Bratton had a key necessarily to lock it, and you had a key to unlock it, as far as you were concerned?

General MARSHALL. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I understood the testimony to be that under the orders that were issued, this material was considered to be of such extreme importance and secrecy, that it was the duty of Colonel Bratton, for instance, to take this message to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, originally to the White House, and then that was

changed later on, and I believe the Chief of War Plans, and it may have been somebody else.

General MARSHALL. The Secretary of State.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, originally to the Secretary of State. It was his job to take that pouch to the person entitled to receive it, and there have that pouch unlocked, have the individual who was entitled to read it, read it, take the message back, bring it back to some place in the War Department where it was burned up, and only one copy was left, and retained for the files.

Did you so understand that to be the practice?

[3741] General MARSHALL. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I understand that a similar practice obtained in the Navy. In other words, they would not even leave the message in the hands of the Chief of Staff. He could read it while the courier was there, give it back to the courier, take it back to the War Department and burn it up, and file one copy.

Now, am I correct in that assumption?

General MARSHALL. I think you are, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, following the delivery of the note of Mr. Hull, to the Japanese envoys on the 26th of November, you testified you did not believe they would accept it; it was too drastic; that Stimson said so in his diary. That seems to have been quite generally understood. Were you expectantly waiting to see whether the Japs would make any reply?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3742] Mr. KEEFE. And the people in G-2 in the Army, and in Intelligence in the Navy, were waiting for the Jap reply to come in. It would be quite important to see what their reply would be, if they replied at all, wouldn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had alerted the outlying posts, you were ready for war, you thought, ready for any eventuality, getting ready as fast as you could. So you were waiting for this reply to come in. It now appears, rather inconclusively, from the evidence thus far given here but quite conclusively from the evidence given before other hearings, that some time on the afternoon of the 6th of December the pilot message came in—it might have been at 11 o'clock in the morning or it might have been in the afternoon—telling the Japanese emissaries that a long message was going to follow, to watch for it and to do certain things with it, and then the message started coming in, and some time that evening the first 13 parts, together with that pilot message, arrived, were decoded and translated in clean form ready for delivery by the couriers, Colonel Bratton and Commander Kramer.

Now, as a preliminary to the questions I am going to ask you, had you received these courier pouches in the evening at any time prior to December 6?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall any such receipts.

[3743] Mr. KEEFE. You do not recall Bratton ever delivering one to you out at your residence at Fort Meyer?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not recall ever having received one in the evening?

General MARSHALL. I think I might have, but I do not recall. I do not recall Colonel Bratton being out there.

Mr. KEEFE. What were the orders when an important message came in? Were they to be delivered to you immediately, or were they to be delivered at the whim and caprice of the courier?

General MARSHALL. The orders then—and that continued throughout the war—were if anything came up at night on which I could act that night, on which it was necessary I should act that night, it should be brought to my attention immediately.

Mr. KEEFE. I am referring to the specific orders, General Marshall, with respect to the delivery of the magic. Was there a written order given with respect to that?

General MARSHALL. Not referring specifically to magic.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not issue an order to G-2 directing them as to the manner in which this magic was to be delivered around to the respective people?

General MARSHALL. I did in relation to the pouch that [3744] you spoke of, the dispatch case and locked pouch.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that a written order?

General MARSHALL. I do not think that is a written order, but that referred to providing a locked pouch.

Mr. KEEFE. To whom did you give that order?

General MARSHALL. G-2, at that time, I presume.

Mr. KEEFE. General Miles?

General MARSHALL. General Miles.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, that was a command, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. That would be a command; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he commanded and directed to deliver important messages in these locked pouches to you when they came in?

General MARSHALL. I said, Mr. Keefe, that I directed the G-2 to prepare these dispatch cases with a lock for the delivery of magic messages.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you instruct them when and how they were to be delivered?

General MARSHALL. I recall giving no specific instructions of that kind.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you expect that if an important message did come in, it would be delivered promptly?

General MARSHALL. I expected as to magic, and as to any other matter, that if an important matter came in that [3745] required my attention that night, that I could act on, that it was necessary that I should act on that night, that it should come to my attention. That was the rule. It was in force then, and was in force up to the time I ceased to be Chief of Staff.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, at this point in the hearing, General Marshall, we get into the realm of some conflict.

Testimony has been read into the record here of Colonel Bratton given before the Army Board as to the delivery of this 13-part message, and the pilot message in the locked pouch which was very specific, very direct that he delivered it on the evening of the 6th to Col. Bedell Smith, Secretary to the Chief of Staff, and later on in the Clausen investigation, a different situation developed.

I understood General Miles to testify that in view of the fact that there was to be a 14th part to this message, that perhaps that was the reason that Colonel Bratton did not deliver the 13 parts, and the pilot message, that night to you.

Now, I do not know what the fact is. I am simply trying to get the facts. At least, so far as you know, General Marshall, there was no change in the orders to the Chief of G-2 by you?

General MARSHALL. No change by me.

[3746] Mr. KEEFE. And if an important message came in, it was the duty of G-2, and its courier, to see to it that that important message was brought to your attention immediately?

General MARSHALL. I would say so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, the fact is, as I think is undisputed, that you personally did not get this 13-part message on Saturday night.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Nobody called you about it?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection.

Mr. KEEFE. And you think you were home?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I think I was home.

Mr. KEEFE. You are not certain about that?

General MARSHALL. I am not certain about that. I had no formal engagement, and we practically did not go out at all, except to the movies.

Mr. KEEFE. And if you had been away, you had a watch officer at your house?

General MARSHALL. I had an orderly to answer the telephone, to be there until I got back.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was the orderly on duty at your house on the evening of the 6th of December?

[3747] General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir. There were three orderlies, and I do not know which one it was.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you give the names of the three of them?

General MARSHALL. There was Sergeant John Simenko, there was Sergeant William Spearman, and I do not know who the third one was. I will have to go back to try to find out, because they change quite frequently.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, so far as you are concerned, General Marshall, you went to bed that night without any knowledge that the Japs were sending in any reply at all?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you got up in the morning without any such knowledge?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And performed your Sunday morning functions as usual?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In entire ignorance that this message had come in to the final fourteenth part, and instructions to deliver at 1 o'clock?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So you went out for your morning horseback ride?

[3748] General MARSHALL. Correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you have indicated that you got back to your house, and during or right after your shower there was a telephone call.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I think during the shower.

Mr. KEEFE. That was from Colonel Bratton?

General MARSHALL. That was from Colonel Bratton as I recall, wishing to come out to see me there, and I sent in word I would be right out to the War Department.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you fixed the correct time? I have listened to the testimony and I have no recollection of you fixing the correct time.

General MARSHALL. I have not fixed the correct time. The only thing I remember is the delivery of the message to the message center, and you have to reason it out from there. There were the two telephones from Admiral Stark on which we have time. Then, preceding that, the longhand preparation of the message, and preceding that the length of time it would require for me to read the first time the Japanese fourteen-part message, some portions of it, some paragraphs being reread the second time. That would be the only way we could estimate the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the evidence seems to indicate that you got in your office about 11:25.

[3749] General MARSHALL. I think that evidence indicates the time we were preparing this message. Prior to that I had read this fourteen-part message.

Mr. KEEFE. I only go by the testimony of Colonel Bratton, whose testimony I have studied rather carefully, and I think he said 11:25.

General MARSHALL. I do not think that is correct. I think it is more nearly 11.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, at least when you read the message, as has been indicated, it was getting pretty close to noon, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You called up Stark, didn't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And talked with him.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I called him up on the telephone.

Mr. KEEFE. He wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio to send the message out?

General MARSHALL. He asked me if I wanted to use the Navy radio. I first spoke to him about sending the message. I do not think he spoke in that first telephone conversation about the Navy radio. I think it is probable that that came in the second message, the second conversation 10 [3750] minutes later.

Mr. KEEFE. At any event, in one of the conversations before the message was sent to your message center, you talked to Stark and he wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you did not accept it?

General MARSHALL. I did not accept it.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, when you were before the Army Board, General Marshall, there were some questions asked you at that time as to why you did not use the telephone, and you gave quite a long answer, if you recall, and in your answer you referred to the fact that, oh, it

would have required getting those fellows out of bed out there in Hawaii at that hour. Do you remember that?

General MARSHALL. Well, I was talking about the time involved, and I was multiplying it by the number of places involved.

Mr. KEEFE. And was that one of the reasons why you decided not to use the telephone, that perhaps it would take time getting the fellows out of bed in Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I think you are giving a considerable emphasis to the "bed." I was talking about the time required to get the people on the phone and giving them the [3751] communication at the hour that the message would come in.

Mr. KEEFE. If I could put my hands on the testimony——

General MARSHALL. I am not stating I did not say that. I was talking about the emphasis regarding it.

Mr. MURPHY. In all the courts of the country, the usual practice is to read the questions and the answers of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Thank you for that very valuable information. We have now gotten to the point where we are running a court here. I did not think we were proceeding according to the rules of evidence because if we were, there would be lots of this evidence thrown out the window as hearsay evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us proceed with General Marshall and reserve our committee controversies until a later date.

Mr. KEEFE. I rather thought, Mr. Chairman, that the member would be permitted to proceed without interruption.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has ruled two or three times to that effect.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

You recall that testimony, do you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I have a recollection of seeing something like that.

[3752] Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Now, as a matter of fact, what sort of telephone service did you have to Hawaii at that time?

General MARSHALL. We had no special lines, but I think we had a scrambler. I know I had a scrambler on mine, and I think we had a scrambler on the phone.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have to use the ordinary commercial telephone service?

General MARSHALL. I think so, yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Put in a call and ask to get somebody out there?

General MARSHALL. Well, as far as I recall, that was the situation at that particular time.

Mr. KEEFE. You got a call that morning from somebody out there, and they got you out there right when the bombs were dropping?

General MARSHALL. I think I put in that call.

Mr. KEEFE. You may have put in the call later on that morning?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Whom did you call?

General MARSHALL. I called General Short, and I got his Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips.

Mr. KEEFE. How long did it take you to get it?

[3753] General MARSHALL. I do not recall.

Mr. KEEFE. You got it right when the raid was in progress?

General MARSHALL. Yes, when the bombs fell.

Mr. KEEFE. There will be testimony from Mr. Shivers, the chief of the FBI out there, calling Mr. Hoover right when this was in progress without any difficulty at all, and he talked with him a short time on the telephone.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you aware of the fact that the FBI had direct radio communication with Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I was not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not the FBI let you know or tell you they had a radio communication tower over here at Bainbridge connected with San Diego and direct to Honolulu?

General MARSHALL. I have no doubt the War Department knew that, but I individually did not.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not anybody in this conference that morning on the 7th suggest that they could get word out there quickly by using either the Navy or the FBI radio?

General MARSHALL. I think everyone in that conference thought the Army radio would get word out there as quickly as any other, and it did, I believe, everywhere but Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. This message went by Western Union, did it [3754] not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, I am told it went by Western Union, then RCA, and then a boy.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have direct radio communication with Hawaii at that time, that is, the Army?

General MARSHALL. The reason it was sent that way at that time is they could not raise Hawaii on their radio, and they did not turn to anything else but sent it the way I described.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you understand that the Army Signal Corps tried to get into contact with somebody and raise them up there at Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. As I understand it—and that can be testified to directly—they proceeded on the basis of a radio message to each place. They were unable to raise Hawaii. They raised the Philippines and they raised the Caribbean, but they did not raise Hawaii, and then they turned to this other method of sending the message through.

Mr. KEEFE. Did anybody ever try to find out what was the matter out there that they could not raise them?

General MARSHALL. I do not know whether it was static or what it was, but I have been told since that the Navy radio was a more powerful set than the Army radio.

Mr. KEEFE. And the message got there after the raid had [3755] started?

General MARSHALL. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When was General Short removed?

General MARSHALL. I think about ten days later.

Mr. KEEFE. Is the order for removing General Short here before the committee?

General MARSHALL. It is obtainable, of course.

Mr. KEEFE. That was by direction of the Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In the form of a formal written order?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, will you get that please, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

[3756] Mr. KEEFE. As I indicated at the outset of this examination, General Marshall, one of the purposes of this investigation as stated by the distinguished Chairman is to determine responsibility for this tragedy at Pearl Harbor. We have had all these different investigations. The Army Board, subsequently followed by the Clausen investigation, the Navy Court of Inquiry, followed by the Hewitt and the Hart investigations, and now this one.

Do I understand, General Marshall, and is it fair to conclude from your testimony, that you fix responsibility for this disaster upon General Short so far as the Army is concerned?

General MARSHALL. I have never made that statement, sir.

I feel that General Short was given a command instruction to put his command on the alert against a possible hostile attack by the Japanese. The command was not so alerted.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I will ask the same question, from a full and complete knowledge of the situation and the responsibility involved, do you assume any responsibility for this disaster at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. I assume the responsibility, as I already stated, in connection with Short's acknowledgment of the alert message, in not detecting that that did not indicate a full alert but rather merely a sabotage alert.

[3757] Mr. KEEFE. I ask that question, General Marshall, because, if I understand your testimony previously given, and you will correct me if I misstate it, had Hawaii been alerted and the Jap attack had been repulsed in whole or in part, it would have been a disaster for the Japs and might have changed the entire course of the war in the Pacific; is that in substance what you have said?

General MARSHALL. On one occasion I said in relation to surprise, surprise actions if successful usually mean success and if they fail they mean a catastrophe.

I testified, I think, in regard to a Japanese attack of the nature they carried out on Hawaii, assuming the garrison was fully alerted and was utilized to the best effect, the men and matériel available, that they could have so interfered, so disrupted the Japanese effort that it would have been limited in its effect. Rather, limited in the damage done, in the general effect.

Mr. KEEFE. And might have very definitely changed the course of the war, I understood you to say, if they had been unsuccessful at Hawaii, they perhaps wouldn't have continued this move on down through the China Sea?

General MARSHALL. They would be limited in their actions in going out in the China Sea and probably would have proceeded on a much more conservative basis than they did, where they [3758] went all out without any regard to the length and exposure of their communications.

Mr. KEEFE. They wouldn't have dared to do that, exposed on the flank by Hawaii, if it had not been wiped out, in your opinion?

General MARSHALL. They would not have dared to proceed as they did if the major portion of the United States fleet was still in effective condition.

Mr. KEEFE. When was General Miles relieved as Chief of G-2?

General MARSHALL. I think some time in February.

Mr. KEEFE. 1942?

General MARSHALL. 1942, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that the time he actually got his orders for the new command, or is that the time he was relieved?

General MARSHALL. I think he was relieved and assigned to the new command at the same time. I think the record will show that.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I have a few other questions, General Marshall, relating to the deployment or disposition of troops pursuant to any plan that had been made.

I want to ask you when the first troops were sent to Iceland.

General MARSHALL. I will have to go back in the record [3759] to get that, sir. I don't know.

It was a naval and a marine command, incidentally.

Mr. KEEFE. I thought you were —

General MARSHALL. They are looking for it here.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Mr. MITCHELL. We are trying to find it in the State Department book, but I am not sure we can.

(Short pause.)

General MARSHALL. In the State Department document on Peace and War, 1931-41, presumably volume 1, page 686, Document 216, under Department of State Bulletin, volume V, page 15, it reproduces a message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, dated July 7, 1941, in which he states:

I am transmitting herewith for the information of the Congress a message I received from the Prime Minister of Iceland on July 1st and the reply I addressed on the same day to the Prime Minister of Iceland in response to this message.

In accordance with the understanding so reached, forces of the United States Navy have today arrived in Iceland in order to supplement, and eventually to replace, the British Forces which have until now been stationed in Iceland in order to insure the adequate defense of that country.

The date of that is July 7, 1941.

Mr. KEEFE. That refers to sending some ships there to [3760] replace British ships. My question is when troops were sent, I mean Army troops, not Navy men.

General MARSHALL. They first sent Marines and some time later the Army relieved the Marines.

Mr. KEEFE. When did the Army relieve the Marines?

General MARSHALL. I will have to obtain that information from the War Department.¹

Mr. KEEFE. Was it in 1941?

General MARSHALL. I imagine it was, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And was the deployment of troops to Iceland pursuant to the President's agreement with the Premier of Iceland, or was it pursuant to the ABC agreement?

General MARSHALL. I think the movement into Iceland was prior to the ABC agreement.

Mr. KEEFE. You think it was prior to the ABC agreement?

¹ The information appears in Hearings, Part 5, p. 2075.

General MARSHALL. I think it was, sir. I am not certain.

Mr. KEEFE. The ABC agreement was in the spring of 1940, wasn't it? This refers to the summer of 1941.

General MARSHALL. You are correct, sir. That was the first—this first movement was July 7, 1941, and that would mean that all took place after the ABC.

Mr. KEEFE. When you sent troops into Iceland was it pursuant to the ABC agreement, or wasn't it?

[3761] General MARSHALL. I will have to look at the agreement and check up whether that was specifically covered in it.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, in your testimony reference was made to exhibit 57, as I recall it, a memorandum of a conference held on May 19, 1941, and it refers to conversations about a proposed Martinique invasion. I confess to a very hazy recollection as to what those conversations were and what was proposed. Can you explain that?

General MARSHALL. As I recall the matter, the situation at that time was there was in Martinique a French airplane carrier and also I think either a cruiser or a battleship. * * * a first class cruiser ship." So it was a cruiser. And also a carrier.

The question was whether the carrier and the cruiser would become available to the Germans for use in the Atlantic hostile to our interests. The question was what was to be done in regard to the matter. This particular place was a French Colony, with a commander, a French naval officer, Admiral Gaubert, I think. And if it was used in a hostile way—it was in the Caribbean region.

There was also in Martinique certain planes that were then en route, as I recall, to be delivered to the French at the time of the fall of France and they were still in Martinique, as a possibility for use should the Germans [3762] get control of the situation.

This discussion here—I am endeavoring to read it while I am talking—related to what might have to be done in order to meet that situation.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, before you go on, was that in line with this plan that I referred to this morning, the Hemispheric Defense Plan, Plan 57, I think?

General MARSHALL. I would say that that was roughly in line with that.

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask counsel if we have got a copy of that plan in the record, the Hemispheric Defense Plan?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Canadian Plan, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. No, not the Canadian Plan.

General MARSHALL. They never reached a complete plan for hemispheric defense.

Mr. KEEFE. Was there such a plan?

General MARSHALL. We were gradually building it up, first in relation to Canada, next in relation to Mexico, next in relation to the bulge of Brazil and Brazil generally, and later on the points of the west coast of South America.

Mr. KEEFE. Was this proposed invasion of Martinique as a result of that plan that you were building up for hemispheric defense?

General MARSHALL. I don't believe it would be correct [3763] to say the result of that plan. It followed the fact that we had in

Martinique two vessels, one of which in particular could have been very harmful to us if it suddenly passed to the control of Germany, and could be exceedingly harmful to the British, of course. But they were right here in the Caribbean region with an uncertainty as to what their future use might be.

Mr. KEEFE. I recall at the time a great deal of discussion in the public press and in the Congress in which there was a rather insistent demand that we do something about seizing this carrier and the planes that were there which had been tendered under lease-lend for France.

General MARSHALL. I stated in the conference in the office of the Secretary of War on May 19, 1941, at which were present: The Secretary of War; the Under Secretary of War; the Assistant Secretary of War; the Assistant Secretary of War for Air; the Chief of Staff—myself; the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, General Bryden, General Moore, General Arnold; the Secretary, General Staff, Colonel Ward, on the subject of Martinique.

In the light of statements made in the Sunday papers with reference to Dakar and Martinique, I had the plans checked immediately. The plan provides for 2,800 marines, with the necessary landing equipment, to make the initial [3764] landing, followed by the First Division. The Marines have the necessary landing equipment for their troops. They will be opposed by 4,000 to 5,000 50-percent effective troops. * * *

Mr. KEEFE. You don't have to read that for me, General Marshall. I think it has already been read into the record. That plan was not put into effect, of course?

General MARSHALL. It was not.

Mr. KEEFE. Was there a discussion of a possible taking over the Azores at the same time?

General MARSHALL. I don't know about at that particular time, but we had several discussions in regard to the Azores.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I note in examination of the Army report and in the testimony that a Colonel Clausen is mentioned. Is that the same Colonel Clausen—may I ask counsel—do you know, that went out afterwards and took this subsequent examination?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He is the same man that participated in the Army board hearings?

Mr. GESELL. I think, Mr. Congressman, he was Assistant Recorder of the Army Board and was appointed to make this examination.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

You know General McNarney, of course?

[3765] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is he a lieutenant general now?

General MARSHALL. He is a full general.

Mr. KEEFE. A full general?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, he was a member of the Roberts Commission, wasn't he?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. General McNarney, prior to his appointment as a member of the Roberts Commission, was in the office of G-2, wasn't he, of the General Staff?

General MARSHALL. He belonged to the War Plans Division.

Mr. KEEFE. War Plans Division.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So they picked him out of the War Plans Division and put him on the Roberts Commission?

General MARSHALL. Not that, sir. In the previous spring, sometime about April, I think, I sent General McNarney to England as an observer. He continued to be carried on the War Plans Division. He remained in England until December, sometime about the middle of December in 1941. I recalled him to the United States to head the Board for the reorganization of the War Department on which we had been working for about a year.

[3766] We had reached the time where active measures should be put into effect and a small board, of three or four men, with McNarney at the head, was picked for this purpose.

I had selected him because he not only was a very capable administrator, but also an officer of the Air Corps and a great deal of the intricacy of the reorganization was confused by the part of the air. I don't know what the date was that he was recalled back, but I imagine he probably got his notice sometime the latter part of November. Anyway, he arrived here in the middle of December.

Now —

Mr. KEEFE. General, my only purpose, in reference to General —

General MARSHALL. May I carry this to conclusion?

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

General MARSHALL. He was here, as I have said, to be the head of that Board. He was carried, and had been carried, I believe, since 1929, in the War Plans Division, although he had not been in the Division since the previous April.

On his return here, the Secretary requested me to suggest an officer of the Air Corps to be a member of this Roberts Board. I don't recall the names of those I proposed, [3767] but I mentioned McNarney's name. I thought he was probably the most capable one, but it was a very inconvenient thing for me to have him on the Board, because it was imperative that we reorganize the War Department as quickly as possible. So he was loaned for that purpose, went on that Board, and the minute they released him, he was made head of this committee.

As a matter of fact, I think he became active on the committee before he was released from the Roberts Board, and he carried out the final completion of the plan and the implementing of the plan and the minute the plans were completed, he became Deputy Chief of Staff. He did not serve in the Operations Section as such, or the War Plans Division as such at any time after April of that year. He was merely carried there until he became Deputy Chief of Staff.

Mr. KEEFE. April of what year?

General MARSHALL. 1941.

Mr. KEEFE. Then, prior to April of 1941 was General McNarney in the War Plans Division in a position where he had access to magic?

General MARSHALL. I doubt if he saw magic.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, no.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know whether or not he was in a position [3768] to communicate to his colleagues on the Roberts Commission the information obtained by him as to magic when he was in the War Plans Division?

General MARSHALL. I do not know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to suggest that the hour of adjournment has come. Unless we can conclude with General Marshall in a few minutes, we will have to recess.

I don't know what the chances are to conclude.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I confess I am not quite through.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we might as well recess.

I hope I will not be guilty of impropriety in suggesting that tomorrow, when General Marshall returns, that members of the committee make every effort to, consistent with their duty, to expedite the conclusion of General Marshall's testimony for reasons which we all understand.

So we will recess at this time.

Mr. MURPHY. Before we recess, Mr. Chairman, may I make one observation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. On yesterday afternoon the gentleman from Michigan wanted read into the record the first 18 pages of the top secret report. At that time I made a statement that that was qualified subsequently by the Clausen report [3769] and that it would be essential to have the subsequent part in the record in order to understand the first part.

Now, the committee ought to have proper public relations and press relations. Some of the press of the Nation took the first 18 pages without the remainder of the report and part of that went out to the Nation. It resulted in a somewhat garbled presentation of the picture to the Nation and a number of reporters at 10 o'clock last night were still puzzled as to whether they were free to use the material after other reporters had used it.

This afternoon there is more material from the Clausen report and the papers, I think all of the reporters, ought to be treated alike. Either the Clausen report is public material and can be used, or it is not.

Let's not do it for one reporter and have a different rule for another reporter.

It seems to me that as long as some of the reporters have used a part of the Clausen report that all ought to be made available to them.

General MARSHALL. May I be excused, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall, you may be excused.

(Witness temporarily excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that when that document was presented yesterday, and the request made [3770] that the 18 pages referred to be read, there was a discussion as to whether that entire document should be filed as an exhibit in relation to other exhibits and whether the entire record or the reports involved should be filed with the committee as exhibits.

The discussion resulted in suspending the whole matter until today.

Last night, after dinner out at my home various newspaper correspondents, including the Associated Press and the United Press, and the New York Times, the Chicago Daily Times, and other papers called me and stated that the Senator from Michigan had given to two newspapers the 18 pages to which he referred, and wanted to know whether it would not be advisable to release the entire release which

had been given to the papers with the understanding that it would be released today when the matter was again presented, and the Chair took the liberty of authorizing the release of the entire document to those newspapers who called me, but what happened to the others, the Chair does not know.

He felt that if any was going in, it should all go in.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to say now emphatically that I gave no amount of data or any part or parcel of the 18 [3771] pages to any press or to anyone else.

I say emphatically I had this book which the counsel now has, that was the memo that I had, and it is the only memo that I had of that, and he retain it, and I gave no part or parcel of any of this record to any press or to anyone.

[3772] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has no information except what the press associations and newspaper correspondents called him up over the telephone and told him. Based upon that information the Chair felt that all the papers ought to get all that any other papers got, they ought to get the entire record if any was to be used.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, there is just one thing. There are only, as I understand it, two copies of the Clausen report available to the committee, one in the hands of counsel and one in the hands of the Senator from Michigan. I——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. I do not have the Clausen report.

Mr. MURPHY. You do not. Where is the other report?

Senator FERGUSON. I have not had it recently.

Mr. MURPHY. I see. Mr. Greaves has it, and I suppose he has it for some Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. He says he has it for Senator Brewster.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Brewster has it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be possible for any other Senator to get hold of it? The Chair has never had a chance to get hold of that, and very few other reports, because they are always in the hands of somebody else.

Mr. KEEFE. I agree, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GEARHART. That is why, Mr. Chairman, I asked that [3773] the testimony be briefed.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to say, and I think the committee will agree, that, as a matter of fact, these releases concerning the contents of documents ought not to be given out until they have become a part of the record of this committee, and when they are given out they ought to be given to all newspapers and all press associations without discrimination.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, as a matter of information, I would like to see the Clausen report, and this top secret report offered by Senator Ferguson yesterday; I understood that the Chair had made some ruling to the effect that it was to be examined by counsel and there would be a future determination as to whether it would be admitted in evidence. Is it in evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. It is not in evidence yet. The question arose when the Senator from Michigan presented it—apparently counsel desired

to look through it in order to identify it, and that resulted in a discussion which in turn resulted in the whole matter being suspended until today and it has not yet been made a part of the record or identified as an exhibit.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, in order that we may know and be guided accordingly, may that not now be identified as a part of the record? It appears that the newspapers have all [3774] had it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think counsel was about to make some remark.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to make one other observation—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. All I wanted to say was that this Army Pearl Harbor investigation top secret report and top secret memoranda that Senator Ferguson asked to have admitted yesterday, has been mimeographed, every member of the committee has a mimeographed copy, and all the press has it, but the press were instructed not to release it until it was offered; and then there was some question about whether part of the press did not get a release on it and you, Mr. Chairman, ordered the release for all of them.

The document itself has not yet been formally entered in the record and I understand that you want the whole document in.

I just wanted to look at it yesterday to see what it was so that I could identify it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without passing on the question of whether all these reports and all these top secret documents concerning all these reports will be ultimately made a part of our record, is there any objection to the filing of this particular report now in its entirety and its identification as [3775] Exhibit No. 63?

Mr. MITCHELL. It will be identified as Exhibit 63.

The CHAIRMAN. So it may now become a part of the record. It will be so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. If Senator Ferguson would like to have the first 18 pages transcribed into the daily transcript, perhaps that should be done.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I had in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the members of the committee ought to have some information as to what those first 18 pages are in order to determine whether they alone should be printed as a part of the record or the whole report printed as a part of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask first of counsel as to when these 18 pages were released to the press, when you gave copies of it to the press. When were they given to the press?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yesterday afternoon.

Mr. GESELL. 4 o'clock; 4:15.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood the Chairman to say that the press said that I had given them the papers. Now it turns out, as I understand it, that counsel gave it out.

The CHAIRMAN. No. The Chair stated it accurately. The news-men who called me said that you had given it out to two newspapers, but they did not identify the two newspapers.

[3776] Based on that information, from members of the press, and whom I knew personally, I assumed that you probably had.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to state on the record that I did not. I had no knowledge that they had it and I did not give it out.

[3777] The CHAIRMAN. Of course, these telephone calls came in all the way up to 10 o'clock, and it was difficult at that hour to take a census of all the news offices in Washington and members of the committee, and I thought it safe.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the record clear that at 4:15 yesterday, this instrument was given to the press—made public?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. I have said repeatedly, it was given to the press in mimeographed form, copies were handed to the committee yesterday; you had them on your desk as did every other member.

Am I wrong about that?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not see my copy until this morning.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, as I understand it, the press were given copies, mimeographed copies, of this top secret document yesterday, with the instructions that it was not released for publication until the document itself was admitted.

The CHAIRMAN. The newspapermen informed me that they had it with instructions not to use it until 10 o'clock this morning with the understanding that at 10 o'clock it would probably be offered as a part of the record; but in [3778] view of the fact that some of the papers had it, they felt it was a discrimination not to let them all have it and I took the authority to release it last night for publication in this morning's papers.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. In view of the fact that a segment of the press violated the instructions given to them by counsel—

Mr. MITCHELL. I do not say that they did. I am not saying that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not know what newspapers got it, and from whom. All he knows is what reputable members of the press associations and reputable news men told him over the telephone.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, it does seem to me, just as a matter of good practice, that perhaps none of these statements should be issued to the press, notwithstanding the fact that they are told they cannot be used until a release date comes later.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair feels that as a rule the press observe these restrictions in regard to getting advance copies of something to be released at a future date so that they may have it as a base for their articles.

[3779] Senator LUCAS. It goes without saying that certain papers did carry this without any authorization on the part of counsel or any authorization upon the part of this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is difficult now to know which newspapers would have carried it if I had not authorized it to be released to all of them. The Chair does not know about that, but it is the rule that when things are to be offered in evidence, and there is to be a release for the press, that the release be not given out for publication, but will be held for publication until it becomes a part of the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. They have stood by that very well, the press has.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

This was a peculiar circumstance, and the Chair had no reason to doubt, and does not doubt now that the representations made by these newspaper reporters were correct as to the fact that some newspapers had it; and as to who gave it to them, the Chair does not know.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel a question with respect to the document he has in his hands? There has been a question about the first 18 pages, and counsel has examined this document, as I understand. I should like to [3780] have his opinion as to whether or not he thinks the 18 pages should go in separately, or whether the entire document should go in the record.

Mr. MITCHELL. My notion is that the whole document ought to go in.

The first 18 pages is top secret report of Army Pearl Harbor board, discussing certain evidence and documents. That is a part that was withheld by the Army board and it contains a reference to some but not all of the evidence given on certain points.

Then we come to the next part, we have a memorandum of the Judge Advocate General, reviewing it.

The third item is another memorandum of the Judge Advocate General.

And item four is again a top secret memorandum of the Judge Advocate General, and I do not think—discussing additional evidence—I do not think the first 18 pages are really intelligible unless you have the full report of the Judge Advocate General.

The CHAIRMAN. It has already been ordered printed as a part of the transcript, the entire document, as I understand it, and that being so, we will now recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Exhibit No. 63, referred to, follows:)

[3781] ARMY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION—TOP SECRET
REPORT AND TOP SECRET MEMORANDA

1. Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, discussing certain evidence and documents.

2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board, and recommending further investigation.

3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board on the basis of additional evidence.

4. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing in greater detail certain aspects of the Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of additional evidence and modifications of previous testimony.

[3782] Memo: To The Secretary of War:

The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents in the possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which, for reasons of security, should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Secretary of War is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the Board is sure concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top Secret.

1. *General.*—Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army [3783] or Navy gave only a small fraction of this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't" message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert Number 3.

This was not done.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having [3784] selected the right alert.

The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.

The details of this information follow:

2. *Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941.*—The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86)

2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. (R. 87) War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.

3. On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)

As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our [3785] policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months." (R. 243-244)

The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thoughts. (R. 297)

Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War Plans Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by while they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to question him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies:

"I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, [3786] Secretary to the General Staff, how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the Chief of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them." (R. 299)

4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese destroying their codes and code machines, which was construed as certain war, Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles and General Gerow and talked at length with both of them. General Gerow opposed sending out any further warning to the overseas command. General Miles felt he could not go over General Gerow's decision. (R. 283) Colonel Bratton then went to see Commander McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern Section in ONI, and he concurred in Bratton's judgment that further warning should be sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war almost immediately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making arrangements with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander Rochefort, Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him secure from Rochefort the same information which General Gerow would not permit to be sent directly in a war warning message. (R. 283-284)

All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible [§787] exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302) G-2 was prevented as a matter of policy from giving out intelligence information of this sort to G-2 in overseas departments. The Navy also objected to any of this type of intelligence being sent by the Army without its authority.

The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recommendations of G-2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this information. When G-2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of the outer Aleutians ahead of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took no action upon the estimate and recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska. (R. 301-302)

Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division in Naval Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into the Navy during November and December.

Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was the last date they could permit him negotiations. (R. 121) On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. (R. 123-124) Nomura on the 26th said he thought he had failed the Emperor and that his humiliation was complete, evidently referring to the ultimatum delivered to him by the Secretary of State.

[§788] Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as to Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying:

"The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of messages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a 'dud', and on Monday, December 1 if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Counsuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive."

The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to destroy their codes on December 3. (R. 249-250)

3. *The "Winds" Message.* Colonel Sadtler said that about November 20, a message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission, to the effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible war with the United States. The "winds" message was indicated in these instructions, [§789] which would indicate whether the war would be with the United States, Russia, or Great Britain, or any combination of them. The Federal Communications Commission was asked to listen for such information.

On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9:30 saying, "Sadtler, the message is in!" He did not know whether the particular message was the one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with either the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately advised General Miles and Colonel Bratton.

Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler protested that that would

be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back to General Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War Plans Division, and suggested a message to be sent to Hawaii. General Gerow said, "No; that they had plenty of information in Hawaii." He then went to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and made the same suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War Plans Division had been talked to, he declined to discuss it further. It was about the 5th or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes. It was on [3790] December 5 that Sadtler discussed this matter with General Gerow and Colonel Smith, because as Sadtler said, "I was sure war was coming, and coming very quickly." (R. 254)

Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japanese weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commission. These arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler. (R. 57, 103) Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the "winds" message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received any such information. (R. 58-59)

He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The message sent to him by the Federal Communications Commission was not the message he was looking for. (R. 60). Later he learned from the Navy about their monitoring efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and the fact that they would probably secure the "winds" message sooner than he would in Washington. That is the reason why he sent the message of December 5, to Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make contact with Commander Rochefort, to secure orally information of this sort. (R. 62-63) A copy of this message has been produced in the record showing that it was sent. Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler testified to the fact that their records showed that it was sent. (R. 69, 70, 71) But Colonel Fielder said he got no such message. (R. 68) [3791] The Navy now admits having received this "winds" activating message about December 6, but the War Department files show no copy of such a message. (R. 89, 281)

From the Naval point of view Captain Safford recites the story of the "winds" message saying that Japan announced about the 26th of November 1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to war with Russia, England, the Dutch, and the United States, by the "winds" message. On November 28, 1941, the "winds" code was given. On December 3, 1941, the Naval Attaché at Batavia gave another version of the "winds" code. All three of these messages indicated the probability of the breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by Japan against the United States or the other nations mentioned.

On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy Department which was sent to Captain Safford which contained the Japanese "winds" message, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." (R. 132)¹

[3792] This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies were in existence in various places but they all disappeared. (R. 133-135)

[3793] Captain Safford testified:

"General RUSSELL. Have you helped or been active at all in this search which has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original message?

"Captain SAFFORD. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the officer in charge, who was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little harder and see if they couldn't make one more search and discover it. And when Captain Stone discovered it couldn't be found, he called for—required written statements for anybody who might have any notice of that and though the written statements disclosed a lot of destruction of other messages and things—not messages, but the intercepts; not the translations—nothing ever came to light on that message, either the carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been filed with the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the translation

¹ Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no longer using the code employed to transmit the wind messages; that there was no reason now why they should not be discussed openly.

Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that it would be dangerous to acquaint the Japanese with the fact that we intercepted the winds message, as this might result in further code changes by the Japanese.

The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and treat these messages as Top Secret.

should have been filed under JD number, which I think is 7001, because that number is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls very close to the proper date. It actually comes in with the 3rd, but things sometimes got a little bit out as far as putting those numbers on was concerned. And the other should be filed under the date and with the translation. We had a double file.

"The last time I saw that message after the attack on [3794] Pearl Harbor about the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones; and that 'winds' translation, the 'Winds execute,' was included in those. I do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.

"We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could run it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact date of it and the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down and not make the thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory of Kramer or the memory of Murray, who do distinctly recall it.

• • • • •
"General RUSSELL. Well, now, let us talk cases.

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

"General RUSSELL. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other place you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I have discussed.

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

"General RUSSELL. But you had messages over there in the [3795] JD file?

"Captain SAFFORD. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct.

"General RUSSELL. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file?

"Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; but they were in a different order.

"General RUSSELL. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it went to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony, of 7001?

"Captain SAFFORD. It probably was.

"General RUSSELL. You don't know that?

"Captain SAFFORD. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence.

"General RUSSELL. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now?

"Captain SAFFORD. JD 7000 is there, and 7002.

"General RUSSELL. But 7001 just isn't there?

"Captain SAFFORD. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is present or accounted for except 7001.

"General RUSSELL. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place in this office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of those files?

"Captain SAFFORD. That is the only one that we looked for that we couldn't find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we haven't looked for, but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked all through the month to make certain. That is the only one that is missing or unaccounted [3796] for."

The radio station logs, showing the reception of the message have been destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford testified that this message, and everything else they got from November 12 on, was sent to the White House by the Navy. It was a circulated copy that circulated to the White House and to the Admirals of the Navy.

It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never received by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States as early as December 4. The vital nature of this message can be realized.

4. *Account of the Delivery of the Long 14 Part Message: the Short Implementing Message.* The first 13 parts of the long reply of the Japanese finally terminating the relationships with the United States began to come in in translated form from the Navy on the afternoon of December 6, and the 13 parts were completed between 7 and 9 the evening of December 6. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the War Department G-2, was the designated representative for receiving and distributing to the Army and to the Secretary of State copies of messages of this character received from the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the President and to its own organization copies of similar messages.

Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts [3797] between 9 and 10:30 p. m., December 6, as follows:

To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key (R. 238). He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see the contents (R. 307).

To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence (R. 239, 241). He stated that General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knew (R. 241). This record shows no action by General Miles.

Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's executive in the War Plans Division (R. 238).

He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10 and 10:30 p. m. (R. 234, 239).

Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning.

In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford [3798] shows, the following action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts of the message by the Navy which clearly indicates its importance.

Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the afternoon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to the Army to Major Doud by 9 o'clock Saturday night, December 6. This portion of the message was distributed as follows: Commander Kramer consulted with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a copy. He then delivered a copy to Admiral Wilkinson at his house. As the President was engaged, Kramer gave a copy to the White House Aide, Admiral Beardall. When Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson's house he also gave a copy to Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans. He delivered the final copy by midnight to Admiral Ingersoll, who read it and initialed it. Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark, as did also Admiral Turner. Admiral Stark ordered Kramer to be at his office at 9 Sunday morning. Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. to see if part 14 had come in, but it had not.

When part 14 did come in it was ready for delivery to the Army in English by 7:15 a. m., December 7 (R. 158, 160, 164, 166).

The net result was that no one took any action based upon the first 13 parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took [3799] no action on that until between 11:30 and 12 on the morning of December 7, or about 13 hours after the first 13 parts came in which clearly indicated the rupture of relations with the Japanese.

Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first 13 parts of the long message until the following events occurred.

Colonel Bratton received from a naval officer courier between 8:30 and 9:00 a. m. on the Sunday morning of December 7, the English translation of the 14th part of the long message and the short message of the Japanese directing the Ambassador to deliver the long message at 1 p. m. on December 7 and to destroy their codes. Colonel Bratton immediately called General Marshall's quarters at 9 a. m. (R. 85).

General Marshall was out horseback riding and he asked that he be sent for. General Marshall called him back between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m. General Marshall came into his office at 11:25 a. m., of which there is a contemporaneous written record maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the meantime, Colonel Bratton called his Chief, General Miles, and reported what he had done (R. 77). Neither General Miles nor General Gerow were in their office on Sunday morning. General Miles arrived at the same time as General Marshall at 11:25 a. m. The Chief of Staff prepared a message to General Short and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not sending any [3800] further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the Navy in Hawaii through Short.

The answer to the following question on the record has not been supplied this Board:

"Why were not the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough by the Navy to be delivered to the President and everyone of the important Admirals of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it so that he could have taken some sort of action upon it?" (R.—).

The only possible answer lies in the testimony that Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff was told about 9 p. m. December 6 that there was an important document and that General Marshall should see it right away (R. 242). There is no proof that Colonel Smith did so act except that from General Marshall, which shows that he was not advised of this situation until the following morning when he received a message from Colonel Bratton between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m., December 7.

The record shows that subordinate officers who were entrusted with this information were so impressed with it that they strongly recommended that definite action be taken.

When subordinate officers were prevented from sending this information to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement [3801] with their opposite numbers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, upon learning that the Navy had this information in Hawaii, an apparently innocuous telegram was dispatched by G-2 to Colonel Fielder, G-2 in Hawaii, telling him to see his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander Rochefort, to secure information from him of importance.

The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole new aspect when the facts are really known as to the background of knowledge in the War Department of Japanese intentions. At the time the Chief of Staff drafted the message of the 27th on the 26th, he knew everything that the Japanese had been proposing between themselves for a long period of time prior to that day, and knew their intentions with respect to the prospects of war. The message of the 27th which he drafted in rough and which was apparently submitted to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, therefore could have been cast in the clearest sort of language and direction to the Hawaiian Department.

It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the Ten Points on November 26; that course of events had been well pictured by complete information of the conversations between the Japanese Government and its representatives available to the Government of the United States.

5. *Summary.* Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous [3802] pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack.

To clinch this extraordinary situation we have but to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Galley, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.

General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. When the final part 14 came in on the morning of December 7 and with it the short message directing the long message be delivered to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. It was then that this same officer, Colonel Bratton of G-2, took the initiative and went direct to General Marshall, calling him at his quarter at Fort Myer and sending an orderly to find him, where he was out horseback riding. When he finally did reach him on the phone, General Marshall said he was coming to the War Department. He met him at about 11:25 a. m., after which time the message of December 7 was formulated by General Marshall in

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his own handwriting. It failed to reach its destination due to sending it by commercial Western Union—RCA. It arrived several hours after the attack.

This brings us to the "winds" message. The "winds" message was one that was to be inserted in the Japanese news and weather broadcasts and repeated with a definite pattern of words, so as to indicate that war would take place either with Great Britain, Russia, or the United States, or all three.

The Federal Communications Commission was asked to be on the outlook for these key words through their monitoring stations. Such information was picked up by a monitoring station. This information was received and translated on December 3, [5804] 1941, and the contents distributed to the same high authority. The Navy received during the evening of December 3, 1941, this message, which when translated said, "War with the United States, War with Britain, including the NEI, except peace with Russia." Captain Safford said he first saw the "winds" message himself about 8 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. It had been received the previous evening, according to handwriting on it by Commander Kramer, who had been notified by the duty officer, Lt. (jg) Brotherhood, USNR, who was the watch officer on the receipt of this message.

It was based upon the receipt of the message that Captain Safford prepared five messages between 1200 and 1600 December 4, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers on the Asiatic stations. Captain McCullom of the Navy drafted a long message to be sent to all outlying fleets and naval stations. This was disapproved by higher naval authority. This message was confirmation to Naval Intelligence and Navy Department Communications Intelligence Units that war was definitely set.

This "winds execute" message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found despite the extensive search for it. It was last seen by Commander Safford about December 14, 1941, when he collected the papers together with Commander Kramer and turned them over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission.

[5805] There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clearcut and definite.

Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor.

[5806]

5 Nov 1944

Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.

You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944.

Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:

No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information.

Board's Conclusions in General:

The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor [5807] was a surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure of General Short adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the

status of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations.

It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report is to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions later.

Board's Conclusion as to General Short:

Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed in his duties in the following particulars:

"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert [3808] against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

"(d) To replace inefficient staff officers." (Rep. 300) Short's Defenses:

General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked; it is a question of the validity of his defenses.

[3809] Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282, 395)

He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297), 4442)

The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr., Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) His failure to provide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong." (Tr., Short 4440)

Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing [3810] 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 268; Herron 238; King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381)

Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55; Tr., 299, 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286, 287, 308); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 1, p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54-57)

These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him

for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotage, or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the [3811] civilian population, or interference with his training program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible air attack.

Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54-56; Tr., 278-281, 291 4427)

The Board in its conclusion stated:

"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected." (Rep. 300)

General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a *surprise attack* upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor." (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied)

Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid [3812] of the character mentioned * * *." The letter proceeded:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire." (Roberts Report, p. 5)

The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5). Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing Secretary Knox's letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369)

On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter containing the following statement:

"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us *during the first six hours of known hostilities*, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a *surprise raid by Air* and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority." (Tr., Marshall 17) (Italics supplied)

[3813] On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from *air attack*. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of *first priority*." (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied)

Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation at length and stating:

"The most serious situation with reference to an *air attack* is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack." (Tr., Marshall 21) (Italics supplied)

Short further stated:

"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland." (Tr., Marshall 24)

On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark:

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the *anti-aircraft* defense." (Tr., Marshall 27) (Italics supplied)

[3814] General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job." (Tr., Marshall 27)

On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had

determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055)

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of [3815] the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile attack.*" (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics supplied)

On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, that all such data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)

On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grave situation, that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. The radio concluded:

"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute provocative action again Japan." (Tr., Short 279)

[3816] Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278)

Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055)

On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD block "at whatever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers

"* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed." (Tr. 3688)

[3817] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short:

"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent." (Tr., Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 4258, 4264)

Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made

before the latter part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694)

On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that

"* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in February. * * * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty days. * * *" (Tr., Bratton D. 289-291)

[3818] Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that

"* * * from all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring." (Tr., Bicknell 1439-1440)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041)

On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, that

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on [3819] the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAF, COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch." (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf Bloch 1503-C)

This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059) Short said, "I do not think I ever got that message. * * * I might have seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414.)

On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval vessels including submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (Tr., Gerow, 4259)

The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows:

[3820] "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 280-281)

This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 as follows:

"Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possible that hostilities may begin.*" (Tr., Gerow 4260) (Italics supplied)

The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was [3821] through the Navy Department, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spanave informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." (Tr., Gerow 4262)

Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 460)

The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Short 294-296)

[3822] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8) Short also received Admiral Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short's G-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) There were two Navy messages on 4 December 1941, the first an information copy to Kimmel of advice to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1514), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187) Another Navy message of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential papers." (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514)

[3823] In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broadcasts from Tokyo "That you must obtain" and stating categorically "contact him at once." This had reference to the important "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton B. 62, D. 283) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1418) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986)

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-2 based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507) Lieutenant Robert N. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512) The message in question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509) The record does not show whether [3824] Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.

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Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code words). This message evidently had "military significance" as Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416)

Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of "air surprise". (Tr., Short 387-388) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state:

[3825] "(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *

"(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start * * *"

General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388)

General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941 (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929), testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963) Short had at least one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 1941. (Tr., DeLany 1727)

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated [3826] to him that "whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed he full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance * * *." (Tr., Short 4442)

Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these messages.

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 281) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294) As Short testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *". (Tr., Short 437)

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during the attack. (Short, Ex. 1, [3827] p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471)

Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr., Short 453)

The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300)

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared for

the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short would be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows:

[3828] " * * * This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. * * *" (Tr., Short 280-281)

Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert against threats both from within and from without.

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Short, Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286)

As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962) Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."

He testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did [3829] not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it." (Tr., Short 437).

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:

"General SHORT. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.

"General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

"General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff." (Tr., Short 380)

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 [3830] pictured an emergency and called for action under the war plan. The Navy message expressly stated:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. * * *" (Tr., Gerow 4262)

The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)

On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as

they pertain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (1) of the Plan which provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr., Kimmel 1745)

Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy responsibility if and when the [3831] Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:

"* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District." (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)

[3832] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that

"General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic Plan. * * *

(Tr., Gerow 4289)

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect *in toto*.

Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders." (Tr., Bellinger 1584)

It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which [3833] intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his re-examination of his decision.

Reconnaissance: Means Available:

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiving the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469-470) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr. Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour operations of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 470)

Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384). He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like way, just [3834] what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch 1527; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 1,725; Kimmel 1773, 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris 2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and

could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time * * *." (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel stated:

"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, *and this will take about 84 planes*, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * * " (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)

[3835] How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:

"* * * It was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. *The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81*, all told. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service in the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * * ." (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)

According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance, "flying at an interval of five degrees." (Tr., Martin 1872)

"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180." (Tr. Martin 1873) [3836] Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available in Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598; 1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A-20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as General Martin says:

"* * * *They could be used for reconnaissance*, but * * * were always recognized as not being a combat ship." (Tr., Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress.

Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or [3837] a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be taken with some qualifications.

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):

"Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however,

constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles.

"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against [3838] a surprise air attack.

"General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy."

Information Not Received by Short; In General:

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British- [3839] United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr., Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War Department was not informed.

An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of information which indicated war at a time certain [3840] (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G-2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr., Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D-292-293)

[3841] The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of these various messages:

24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose.

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.

16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three-Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the above.

22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in [3842] negotiations and asks to be relieved.

5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.

14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and American power in China.

15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week."

16 November, translated 17 November, Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations with the U. S.

18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of eight destroyers entering harbor.

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off."

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of [3843] Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.

22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

26 November, translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of United States considering the "proposal" *in toto*, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and United States but would be followed by United States and English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating United States will not yield, that he could make no progress.

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of nego [3844] tiations will be cast upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors superhuman efforts, United States has "presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations"; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements."

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29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach.

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that United States on 26th made insulting proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied nations "has decided to [3845] regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured—broken" and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require countermeasures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the most absolute secrecy."

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested, but in Washington only.

[3846] 1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for that purpose.

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders then those lower down.

1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and American Consular rights would not be recognized.

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of 26th. Japs convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American proposals.

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret.) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and destroy all secret documents.

3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great Britain and U. S. with or [3847] without declaration of war was a certainty.

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.

5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine.

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare to present it when directed.

6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap-American war.

7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Japan to U. S. to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents.

7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government [3848] communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th."

The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154.) The Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

[3849] The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: Kitanokaze Kumori (North Wind Cloudy)

"(3) Japan-British relations: Nishino Kaze Hare (West Wind Clear)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S. I. S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 125-126.)

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25432.) The Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251.) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. [3850] of S., G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253.) Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied, "I think they have had plenty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254.)

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252.) According to Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36-38.) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel [3851] Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39.) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37.) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251-252.) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy.

The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of it. "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132.) [3852] According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133.) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr., Gibson D. 273.) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr., Safford C. 133, 136-138, 172.) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138); the same is true as to its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138.)

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr., Safford C. 139-140, 152.) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S. I. S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167.)

[3853] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages to be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of various [3854] witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:

This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent."

Now, this is on the 4th day of December:

"Admiral Wilkinson approved this message"—

which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely,

"and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the

Commander-in-Chief.' [3855] Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man.'

and so forth. (Tr., Russell A. 33-34)

Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows:

[3856] "Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District, has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr. Bratton D. 283)

In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:

"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general *intelligence* broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations

'HAGASHI'

"(2) Japan Russia relations

'KITA'

"(3) Japan British relations: (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) 'NISHI' (Top Secret Ex. "B" S. I. S. 25392)

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr., Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadler D. 250; See also Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this. (Tr. Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4051)

[3857] There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit "B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:

"All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division." (Tr., Bratton D. 297)

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted—replying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions—cannot be regarded as fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall [3858] of any

recollection of having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209-211)

Discussion of Foregoing Information:

It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October, from Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu, requesting that the "ships in harbor" report be made twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December, from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in harbor" report even when there were no movements. The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting 25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29 November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3 December; 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines, and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message clearly suggested an attack [3860] on Pearl Harbor, namely, the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with anti-mine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 27065)

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25850 instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., he sent along a note stating "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." (Tr. Safford C. 167). Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department.

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light of after- [3861] occurring events and read into each message a significance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received as to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia.

As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get.

As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was the testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedel Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr. Miles 127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18-21) [3862] Comment on Short's Defenses:

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect was a surprise air attack, he cannot now be heard to say that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious that General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise air attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount to a communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which excluded a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.

As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short continually stressed the possible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from without. But, as seen, Short's [3863] Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It should be borne in mind that Short's problem was twofold, both to guard against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming the civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities of an experienced commander.

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified except in so far as it holds the information [3864] which Short had was incomplete and confusing.

I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

[3865] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense under

military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones, not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.

Board's Conclusion (d) as the Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers:

The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 360) This conclusion is related to the statement in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep. 74)

A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain witnesses were asked as to their opinion of Phillips as Chief of Staff. Their replies varied [3866] from complete reluctance to answer (Tr., Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified. (Tr. Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips "one of General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to confer with subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise—the average, run-of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he did not "feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-1978)

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this finding is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interference with training, which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, of an [3867] air attack, what Phillips considered to be his duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr. Phillips 1134-1144).

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as a Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November 1941. (Tr. Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having him present at important Navy conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3, or G-4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. [3868] The worst that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese Consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about these matters.

The Board also stated that

"While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short." (Rep. 74)

The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7." Tr. Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not justified.

[3869] *Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:*

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.

"(d) To investigate and determine the state [3870] of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war." (Rep. 298-299.)

Adequacy of General Marshall's 27 November Warning Message:

The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197.)

The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) overlooks the fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pictured the Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared from the information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggest the possibility that they may have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of a peaceful settlement.

Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in carrying out this instruction, please be [3871] careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B".)

Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised, the Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he stated they were doing their best and that negotiations were to continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B".)

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington, suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated:

"Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233." (Top Secret Ex. "B")

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

[3872] Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of war:

"* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when I

believed the Japanese Government was doing its best to prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be the result of war.

* * * Now the question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and, as I said, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war." (Tr., Grew 4213-4214)

When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. Grew replied:

"I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it; and, not being a defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable, up to the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable." (Tr., Grew 4199)

[3873] With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there were "two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister.

"I think it is perfectly possible that the cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is—well, I won't say confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces me personally that he didn't know. * * *" (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated:

"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far East. [3874] They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have relaxed some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it didn't happen." (Tr., Grew 4218.)

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November, General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5.) It was first thought that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti-Comintern pact. When the time was extended to 29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4.) "November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December without anything happening other than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5.)

[3875] In the light of all the information possessed by the War Department at that time and the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the Japanese representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it is my opinion that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" was an accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.

General Marshall's Views on Warning:

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that "very remarkable things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic relations while still evading an actual act of war." (Tr., Marshall A. 45-46.) With respect to other information of the Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and influenced his thinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that while it may have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise. (Tr., Marshall A. 46.) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what has happened, * * * the situation might well have been helped by translating that information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46.) Speaking [3876] of his decision at the time, however, he stated:

"In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later Army alert, (messages to Short from War Department and Navy Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great responsibility; and and in addition to that you must remember that we were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could look at that without realizing that something very critical was in the wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way we were—the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii—without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.

"Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a certain period of time, it would be too late: we would have gained the necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for them to act.

"All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the most critical necessities would have involved [3877] us in taking over all that commercial shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet's resources in providing convoys. Everything was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how—I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don't know what the explanation of it is, and I myself have never discussed it." (Tr., Marshall A. 46-47)

As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 27) He also was under the belief in late November and early December of 1941 that Short had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance. In this regard, he testified:

"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel." (Tr., Marshall A. 27)

[3878] The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A. 26)

The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places on the Japanese front and that "It was by far the best prepared that we had." (Tr., Marshall A. 25) He stated:

"* * * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible." (Tr., Marshall A. 23)

The Chief of Staff continued:

"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken. * * *" (Tr., Marshall A 26)

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the overall supervision which was required of him from a global perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal Department:

"* * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii." (Tr. Marshall A 13-14)

General Marshall's 7 December message:

Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 296) that the Chief of Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December of an almost [3879] immediate break with Japan, the Chief of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated such a break until about 11 o'clock on 7 December. (Tr. Marshall A. 6) He then immediately conferred with appropriate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a message to be transmitted to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew

that the time required for coding was "a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to the procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could be expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr., Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr., Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that moment. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of [3880] Staff as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply confirmed that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall A. 14)

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the non-operation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu it was given to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because, in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) The Chief of Staff testified:

"* * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience, my own experience, [3881] even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * * * we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone." (Tr., Marshall A. 13-14)

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message for delivery to the Message Center:

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, * * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a. m." (Tr., Bratton B. 79-80) (This would be 6:20 a. m., Honolulu time)

Colonel French testified that:

"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination." (Tr., French 186)

[3882] Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff is pertinent:

"General RUSSELL. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders a message which would have told them of these recent developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly as to the substance of this message of December 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines?

"General MARSHALL. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff was here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware of this and of the possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very

lard to answer, because you are inevitably involved in hindsight regarding a great catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way." (Tr., Marshall C. 211-212)

[3883] *Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:*

As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of which information he had an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to Short of 27 November, considered along with the other messages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military commander was required to take the information contained in this radio from his Chief of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further information or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in the position of carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a subordinate what the situation was for his guidance. The Board's conclusion reduces itself to a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length and in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that there was only a bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment.

[3884] So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's Conclusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately pictured the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity that Short be on the alert against threats from within and from without. The most that can be said is that the War Department did not transmit to Short the Top Secret messages, but these were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the messages actually sent Short over a period of months, hereinbefore referred to. While the War Department was possessed of more information than Short received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the qui vive. That Hawaii had already been sufficiently alerted was the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78; Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of General Miles (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253).

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772). The Navy messages of 24 and 27 November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36, D. 306; Short 358, 363.) Captain Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed with General Short in person the message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.)

[3885] Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear instructions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momentarily expected.

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not alerted his command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a *non sequitur*. But, in addition, there was no testimony before the Board that General Marshall ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though "the presumption would be that I had seen it." (Tr., Marshall 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201.) It is significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not initialed by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the corresponding radio from General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39.) The reply itself was indicative that Short had taken precautions against sabotage and in stating "liaison with the Navy" was susceptible of the interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in accordance with the War Plan. [3886] That plan contemplated that distant reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply,

was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." (Tr., Short 380) He also stated that this phrase indicated he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) General Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan. * * *" (Tr., Gerow 4289) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no preparations against an outside threat.

In a consideration of this point it should also be [3887] remembered that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate by a communication to the Chief of Staff.

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would be a most anomalous situation if a theater commander could be heard to say that because he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had replied with a fragmentary report that *ipso facto* he was relieved of his responsibilities and that these responsibilities were then fastened upon the Chief of Staff.

Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall, 35, 36; Kimmel 1772), the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both those from within and those from without.

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander in Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Department, with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which occurred.

[3888] Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concerning the over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to the stated fundamental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in preparation for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid his responsibility in the event his organization is ineffective. There is a distinction. [3889] however, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the performance of duties by members of his staff.

[3890] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusions (b) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt of Short's reply, is not justified.

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan "though there was ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes entirely clear that General Marshall personally did not receive this information until late in the

morning of 7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately but failed because of circumstances beyond his control.

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formulated over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander in accordance with the traditional American military policy. General Marshall had [3891] seen General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29)

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).

Board's Conclusion as to General Gerow:

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements.

"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to take corrective action.

"(d) To take the required steps to implement the [3892] existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two services in the manner contemplated." (Rep 299)

General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy beach-head to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of Staff during the time in question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This division of the General Staff was charged with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff.

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the situation with the Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under no circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in the messages jeopardize his defense. He was also ordered to establish reconnaissance.

But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues that had this additional information been trans- [3893] mitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship movements (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at the heat of the War Plans

Division. If this criticism seems harsh, [3894] it only illustrates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to Short.

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear and concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers to this radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In my opinion this is an erroneous characterization of the message. It fails to take into account the very essence of the situation which then presented itself. Those in authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted at that moment with a most difficult and delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations which had been taking place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese emissaries had practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the Japanese might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month of delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day—27 November 1941—the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United States, urging him to postpone any action that might precipitate war as long as possible because we were not ready. Confronted with this situation, those in authority in the [3895] War Department, including the Secretary of War, participated in the preparation of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express as accurately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of the possibility of an attack at any moment and that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that would precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into the language. There was no other course except to present this problem just as it was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate situation, conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because it requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men supposedly qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning "This is a war warning," which General Gerow knew was being sent. (Tr., Gerow 4261-4262).

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short's reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer ground. General Gerow admitted [3896] that while it was physically impossible for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered the War Department gave Short adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by assuming that the reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant General of 27 November (Tr., Gerow 4290-4291). This being so, it follows that he failed also to follow up on the demand in the radiogram of 27 November signed "Marshall", for a report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified:

"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through." (Tr. Gerow 4290.)

In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that Colonel Bunay, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge of the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291.)

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that would have made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans Division is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although its functions are not comparable to those of a [3897] commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with specific responsibilities.

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440.) General Gerow assumed and had the right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile attack contained in the 27 November message, the two commanders

would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., Gerow 4289) or at least such portions thereof as would assure adequate reconnaissance.

On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by G-2 is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified. (Rep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board's conclusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in failing to check on Short's reply to the November 27 message signed "Marshall." I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General Gerow in approving the [3898] 27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately and adequately pictures the situation as it existed and gave definite instructions. I also disagree with the Board's conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two commanders would themselves put these plans into effect.

Miscellaneous Statements of Board:

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My failure to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating my agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider such irrelevant matters in arriving to my conclusions.

[3899] Unexplored Leads:

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

Recommendations:

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusion of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did, and (c) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking Short's reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the [3900] fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a) above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered the various alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper alert. The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into consideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other factors such as possible alarm of the civil population does not [3901] remove the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. These mistakes simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert. The fact also that he communicated to the War Department

his decision to establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the concept of a neglect of duty.

As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of being a triable offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now of record, this question is answered by what has been said above. Short's failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment on his part.

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such reconnaissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I believe the truer picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly what was apparently the viewpoint [3902] of the Navy, namely, that there was literally no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted messages were sent and that information of great military value continues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous witnesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is out of the question.

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the belief that a court would be [3903] reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p. 21.) There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130.) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand.

As, on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by a trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a recurrent public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.

MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

[3904]

14 September 1945

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classified as top secret and consisted of one volume.

I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel that

as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top Secret Report require modification.

In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on page 16:

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. [3905] Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the 'Do-Don't' message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3.

"This was not done.

"Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable [3906] policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert.

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it." (Pp 1 & 2)

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack." (P 16)

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence. These revisions include the following:

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on page 2:

"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86)"

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document as follows:

"On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that [3908] time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June, 1944, for the

Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter time was the absolute deadline and "after that, things are automatically going to happen."

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian Department.

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of our minds."

The Board further found:

"On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States (R. 87)" (P 2)

[" * * * On November 26th specific information received [3909] from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. (R. 123-124) * * *" (P 5)

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference "(R. 123-124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of the information which he mentioned in his testimony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 25392, which was a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 1941. Reference to additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" message.

[3910] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information reached Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of November 1941.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese "Winds Code." He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the execute message. He further testified that his attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December, 1941, asking that the G-2, Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously refers to the "Winds Code." Colonel Bicknell further testified that he also received information of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message.

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he gave General [3911] Fielder such information as he had received concerning intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties. The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of November, 1941, included the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept.

The Board found:

"* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action." (Pp. 2 & 3)

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far Eastern Documents" which he prepared in the fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as follows:

"G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands." (P 87)

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December 1941.

[3912] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Commander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence attached to Col. Clausen's Report.)

The Board found:

"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)" (P 3)

This, again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford [3913] in the Admiral Hart Examination. General Russell read from this while questioning Colonel Bratton, as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

"Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. * * *"
(P 88)

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code" message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and another message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since 1936."

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States.

[3914] The Board stated:

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) * * *"
(P 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department, dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu had intercepted [3915] a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, also gave this infor-

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mation to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came to his attention.

The Board further stated:

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months." (R. 243-244)" (P 3)

"* * * All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, [3916] Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297)" (P 3)

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen, however, Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying before Colonel Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as [3917] were made, the deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:

"All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders and that [3918] General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of Staff, in a matter of such importance.

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington during November and December 1941. This included the information already mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any possibility of the United States considering the "proposal" *in toto*, and that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, nego-

tations would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be called so, [3919] and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but would be followed by military occupation of the Netherland's Indies by the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the "Winds Code."

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of 29 August 1945, analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the information which the War Department sent to General Short.

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional information was available initially to General Short in the Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and the United States and warnings of war.

[3920] The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. One such dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4 December, 1941, set forth prophetically:

"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese execute message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's report.

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Department G-2 contained much material [3921] gathered from observers, travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are initialed by General Short.

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the probable moves of Japan.

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6.)

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent."

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before Colonel Clausen that this type of information and its source, of necessity, [3922] had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short but also the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the information into too many hands. There has been considerable evidence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified before Colonel Clausen.

"* * * Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the sources of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised."

The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen.

"Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941."

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the War Department, which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of [3923] hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December, were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, Japanese Numbers 258 and 254. The two in question Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of 3.5 days.

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor [3924] would be the attack target in the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial traffic sources shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just what commercial traffic was decrypted and translated by the Navy at Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor.

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony of Colonel Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, [3925] who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel Sadtler testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercept which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.

Captain Stafford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese "Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the British Intelligence

Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from London to Manila and, in turn, from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete [3926] file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report.

[3927] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked General Gerow and General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel Sadtler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

"General Gerow.—I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal [3928] Corps Officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened."

"General Smith.—I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" [3929] officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province." (P. 2—Affidavit of Colonel O. K. Sadtler)

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The Board, also on page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5 December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:

"* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way [3930] the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. * * *"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5 December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds Code."

It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes:

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p. m., [3931] December 6, as follows:

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see the contents. (R. 307)

"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R. 239-241) He stated that General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General Miles.

"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's executive in the War Plans Divisions. (R. 238)

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p. m. (R. 234, 239)

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel [3932] Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning." (Pp. 11, 12)

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of [3933] the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.

"General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows." (P 16)

These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith or General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how [3934] the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any until after 9:00 a. m., on the morning of 7

December. Colonel Dusenbury stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely received.

On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General Miles. From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to General Miles.

The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. the morning of 7 December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages [3935] directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1:00 p. m., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his office until 11:25 a. m.

These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which would be in the office of the Chief of Staff "between 10:30 and 11:30 that morning." Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and 9:30 a. m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office at about 11:00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. 7 December, was not received by Colonel Bratton until "after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a. m."

The Board further found:

"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clear-cut [3936] and definite." P. 15)

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7 December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States, but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6 December of significance, in addition to what had already been transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be delivered at 1:00 p. m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would occur at that time.

The Board further found:

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, [3937] everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor." (P. 18)

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a statement.

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General Short has since testified was information he should have received. General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7 December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall

had given him this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction [3938] of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me.*" [Italics supplied.]

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941 information that the Japanese Government had sent orders to various diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain of its codes and important papers.

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Marshall included in his message which read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

My Conclusion:

The view expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views expressed herein.

MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

[3939]

Memorandum for the Secretary of War

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl Harbor Investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some respects.

The "Winds" Message:

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive, the so-called "Winds Code" message [3940] of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)', a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around 20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds" message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was not entirely satis-

factory. This is likewise true of the [3941] testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division, to the same effect (my Memo. P. 25).

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941, stated:

"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department." (Affid., Col. Harold Doud)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Commander Rochefort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect. (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence Service at the time, stated:

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent." [3942] (Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler)

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms' ", which he discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford.

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, at which meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24) General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were several messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2.)

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 1941, stated that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See Vol. D., Top Secret [3943] testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler). In his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning as follows:

"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) According to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1). Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or any such recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadtler was "purely a Signal [3944] Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination and interpretation of "Magic" messages (Affid., Gen. Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel Sadtler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been impossible

for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him. (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)

[3945] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message (probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the "Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 3)

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into Pearl Harbor matter, denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the information he had received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was instructed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several "false alarm" reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith. Colonel Bratton never brought Colonel Sadtler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December [3946] 1941 did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code." As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but six copies of any such message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several "false alarms" relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the Army according to Captain Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton)

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original "Winds" message, he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft)

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Sadtler's testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from Admiral Noyes has already been discussed (See Affidavits, Gen. Gerow, p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive [3947] Assistant to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic") messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the "Winds Code." He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" message prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 November 1944, pp. 19-23). He never got the "Winds Code" nor any activating or implementing message. He believed he had seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect. (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby, assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)

[3948] Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal Intelligence

Service, War Department, Washington, D. C., at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an activating "Winds" message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett)

My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the "Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25 November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the War Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony will be recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' Code had been received by the Navy." (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., Marshall, p. 38)

The Rochefort Message:

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4 December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas [3949] commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a radiogram he sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram, signed "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather"

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short's G-2 and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2). [3950] As to likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder testified:

[3951] "My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.)

General Fielder further said:

"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local of Territorial problems. I believe the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, [3952] but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of the 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Com-

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mander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the war started." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 8, p. 2.)

General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included the "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23) (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very close liaison with Commander Rochefort [3953] and knew prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on General (then Colonel Field's desk the radiogram from General Miles to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect that "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had" (including the "Winds message"), the source of which was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Commander [3954] Rochefort's crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew).

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently, however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information on the Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal (Affid., Robert L. Shivers).

Mr. Shivers testified:

(Commander Rocheford did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 December." (Affid., Robert L. Shivers.)

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell.

[3955] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:

"I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct." (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort message. Whether Short received equivalent information will not be considered.

Other Information Possessed by General Short:

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before [3956] the Navy Board, testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert, he said:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me.* But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, *the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me.* I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. * * * I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously." (Italics supplied.)

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30), I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was "destroying its codes and burning its secret paper," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention [3957] of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19). Colonel Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944, p. 19).

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 28 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel [3958] Bicknell, who stated they had already received similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers.)

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6 December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendal J. Fielder, p. 3.)

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OpNav No. 031850, dated 3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval District, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents." (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183.)

[3959] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2.)

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2.)

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent information which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect. (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 2864-3865.) Colonel Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11). Their reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 'intelligence conscious' and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

"Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short [3960] while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, 'Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong.' (Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3.)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell, or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people, this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it, judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See Memo, 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel Bick- [3961] nell told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul was burning his "codes and papers." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3.)

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying his codes, as distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese-American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme significance.

The Manila Warning Message:

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies & Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu. Colonel Wilkinson was a member [3962] by marriage of the Davies family and was secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila. The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3 December read as follows:

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

"A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.

"2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).

"B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington No. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

"C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

"You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

[3963] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to Colonel Bickness, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit.)

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2 of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell.)

In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short, in one form or another. (Amend. [3964] affd., Col. George W. Bicknell.) A file of this information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory, but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his attention, according to General Fielder. (Affd., Gen. Fielder, p. 3.)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:

"Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore."

A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend. Affd., Col. George W. Bicknell.)

British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and [3965] Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese Situation, which he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affd., Col. George W. Bicknell.)

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the "Winds Code" message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, he was called to present the intelligence picture to

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them. (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, USN.) [3966] According to Colonel Raley, his contacts with Captain Layton were limited to about six conversations with him over the entire year 1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain Layton and Colonel Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment. This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley.)

Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I said:

" * * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations." (P. 30.)

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on this subject.

Short's SOP Against Attack:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I stated:

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, [3967] dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprising within the Islands 'with no particular threat from without.' It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for 'a surprise hostile attack.'" (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) (Italics supplied.)

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, [3968] Vol. 5) Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5 November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Department until March 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December 1941:

Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by [3969] me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this place.

Conclusion:

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall, General Gerow

and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation. I find nothing in Colonel's Clausen's investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions. The statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present memorandum.

MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Incl.

Copy memo from TJAG
To S/W, "Top Secret
Report, Army Pearl
Harbor Board."

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m. the committee recessed until 10:00 a. m., of the following day, Thursday, December 13, 1945.)

[3970]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[3971] The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe, I believe, was in the process of examining General Marshall. He will now proceed. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, when did you first learn of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th day of December 1941, at what time?

General MARSHALL. I don't remember the exact time, sir. It was very closely after the attack started. The message came in and—

Mr. KEEFE. Were you at your office?

General MARSHALL. I don't know that. General Deane, who was one of the secretaries of the General Staff, states that I was home at lunch, and my orderly states I was at the office. I am in between the two.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand you put in a call for Hawaii then?

General MARSHALL. At some time, yes. My dim recollection of the situation is that some—in the first place, they opened the direct line and kept it open for quite a while and some word came in, that is my dim recollection, that the Japanese were attempting a landing near Barbers Point, I have a recollection of some such assertion at the time, and I think [3972] it was in connection with that that I called up and endeavored to speak to General Short, and I am not certain whether the Barbers Point incident provoked the telephone message or not.

Mr. KEEFE. Would there be a record of that telephone call?

General MARSHALL. I assume there would be. My dim recollection is that the phone was kept open.

Mr. KEEFE. But you cannot associate that call with the actual placing of it?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. It was after we knew about the attack, I think possibly during the second run the Japanese made. I am guessing at that.

Mr. KEEFE. I can well appreciate that in the excitement incident to that moment that that might easily be overlooked, General.

Now, in my examination of you heretofore I discussed the 1940 alert. I wonder if you have this morning the material which you have been seeking which furnishes the basis for that 1940 alert?

General MARSHALL. I have not. I was informed this morning that they had exhausted the search, they think, of the files in the War Department, of magic and other sources, and that did not bring up the papers which, the information which General Strong felt had animated his recommendations for the alert. He, incidentally, is in New York, and they didn't [3973] get a hold of him until after 11:00 o'clock last night. I think that is it. We had the information in the War Department regarding diplomatic affairs and regarding Japanese Army affairs. General Strong thinks that the information pertained to the Japanese Fleet and they are now moving over to go through the naval files and the State Department files to see if they can obtain it.

I might add that there has been a very extensive search of all files and a collation of information regarding Pearl Harbor, but there has been no previous search and collation and quite a number of people are involved.

Mr. KEEFE. I am especially interested in that subject, General Marshall, because of the testimony of Admiral Richardson, which seemed to give credence to the fact that the Navy was not alerted at that time—it was just an Army alert—and I am rather interested to find out, if I can, what there was in the picture that caused an all-out alert on the part of the Army and no corresponding alert on the part of the Navy.

There doesn't appear to be any message from the Navy alerting Admiral Richardson and his fleet. Can you give us any information on that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I cannot. I think some of the data that has come up shows the Navy Department and the Chief of Naval Operations was aware of the matter. I believe [3974] Admiral Richardson's own testimony shows that he received communications from them. I believe also the record shows the naval shore—that is, the shore installations—were cooperating with the Army in the alert. I do not recall the reason why there was not a naval message sent for the alert or there were not some specific instructions to the fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. What aroused my interest was the fact that in 1941 there was a specific order for an alert issued by the Navy and a specific order for an alert ordered by the Army. There were two separate alert messages that went out.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I haven't been able to identify any such procedure as that in the 1940 alert.

General MARSHALL. I do not think in the record there is any Navy alert as such.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in discussing that matter with you the other day, General Marshall, there was read into the record the message from you

to General Herron, which was rather brief and to the point. That message which you sent to Herron in 1940 produced the result which you expected, namely, an all-out alert, did it not?

General MARSHALL. I think it did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There was no other alert ordered at Hawaii prior to the 1940 alert that you know of, was there?

[3975] General MARSHALL. Not during my tenure as Chief of Staff.

Mr. KEEFE. During your tenure as Chief of Staff. So, so far as you know, during your tenure as Chief of Staff the first all-out alert order was the one that was sent on the 17th of June 1940 to General Herron?

General MARSHALL. That is my recollection, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And as a result of that message to General Herron in 1940 an all-out alert resulted promptly and he reported immediately as to what had taken place; was that not true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When the subject of an all-out alert or further alert came up in 1941, why didn't you use the same language that was used to produce the alert on the 17th of June 1940?

Why was all the additional language put in the alert order?

General MARSHALL. Because it was felt necessary—in the first place you had to include instructions of the President regarding overt acts.

[3976] Mr. KEEFE. If you will pardon me just a moment, General. There was in the alert order of June 17, 1940, no such provision?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had no order at that time from the President that the first overt act must be committed by Japan?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But when you came to issue the alert order in November 1941 you were faced with a direction from the President that Japan must commit the first overt act?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So you had to include that in the telegram?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Marshall, I asked you the other day—I have forgotten whether it was yesterday or the day before yesterday—a question which you answered in substance that if an enemy plane, or a foreign plane or a Jap plane had flown over this area, under the alert that was in force on the 17th of June and thereafter, that plane would have been fired upon and shot down, if possible?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3977] Mr. KEEFE. And I asked you the question as to whether or not firing upon a plane of another country under those circumstances would constitute an overt act on our part.

My recollection is that you stated that it would be an overt act.

General MARSHALL. I would say it would be an overt act. The Japanese, of course, had fired on a gunboat of ours, and sank it.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me?

General MARSHALL. Had fired or bombed a gunboat of ours and sank it. That was an overt act.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; that was in 1937.

General MARSHALL. But it did not become an act of war.

Mr. KEEFE. It was an act that might have been considered an act of war?

General MARSHALL. Depending upon the tension and public policy at the time.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. It did not result in war; they paid some indemnity, and it was sort of forgotten for the time being. You are referring to the sinking of the *Panay*?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3978] Mr. KEEFE. But, I want to be certain, if Jap planes had come over in 1940, merely flown over the island under that alert, they would have been subject to being shot down, under the order that was given?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, when you gave this alert order in 1941 which contained the language that Japan was to commit the first overt act, suppose, General Marshall, that your commanders, Naval and Army, out there at Hawaii had had a patrol out and actually found a concentration of four or five carriers, 400 miles away from Hawaii, and they knew they were there. Would you have been able to bomb those carriers under that alert, unless Japan had done something that could be considered to be an overt act?

General MARSHALL. I will read this alert and then try to analyze the situation.

[3979] Mr. KEEFE. I want to get your judgment on that question.

General MARSHALL (reading):

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance, and so forth.

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

If, as you suggest, our reconnaissance had developed the Japanese carriers, then the question is was that an overt act and were those planes under this alert justified and required, in effect, to bomb those carriers?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, General Marshall, right on that point so that there can be no misunderstanding about it. There has been a reference to an order issued by the President creating certain restricted waters. Do you recall how far that ran the line around the Hawaiian Islands?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was it 300 miles, do you remember, Mr. Counsel, so that we may have it in the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. We will get it for you.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[3980] General MARSHALL. I do not recall just what it was.

Mr. KEEFE. But you know that there was an order issued by the President along some time prior to this setting up certain restricted waters?

General MARSHALL. Well, I lost track of it and you have reminded me of it. I recall it now.

Mr. KEEFE. And in my question I intended to locate the rendezvous of these carriers beyond and outside of the area of the so-called restricted waters.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And then I want your opinion as to that.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Well, that is all right. Let us assume that it was beyond but within reach of our particular over-water reconnaissance range of our planes.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. That presents, of course, a very difficult proposition for the officers in command of those planes. My own reaction would be the sudden unannounced appearance of a Japanese carrier group in that portion of the Pacific would have been an overt act and they would have been justified in bombing and they would have been backed up by the country in that bombing.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't think there would have been any question about their being backed by the country, but I was [3981] wondering—

General MARSHALL. That presents a very technical question and it is very difficult for the man in the air at the flash moment to decide. He would have to make the decision right then. I think if he had decided to bomb he would have been doing the right thing.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, supposing a flight of planes just came over the islands, just flew over, did not drop any bombs or anything, would the mere flight of the planes be considered an overt act justifying—

General MARSHALL. I think clearly so, sir, because this states,

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

It certainly, in my opinion, would jeopardize his defense to have Japanese planes fly over that island under the circumstances of this time of this alert message. What they were going to do might still, you say—no, it remains to be determined but it is too late after they have done it. Therefore, they would be fully justified; they would be required to take hostile action against those planes.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then the mere flight of planes, whether they were Jap planes or any other planes other than [3982] our own, under your interpretation without actually implementing beyond flying over the islands that would be a sufficient overt act, in your opinion, to have justified bombing them out of the air?

General MARSHALL. In relation to Japan, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In relation to Japan?

General MARSHALL. Because at that time a German plane appearing in the same place, though this order relates to Japan, would have probably been treated in the same fashion.

Mr. KEEFE. That put a pretty heavy responsibility upon the commander, did it not, to determine at just what point you are going to say that an overt act is committed?

General MARSHALL. He always has that responsibility but in this particular case it would put a very heavy responsibility upon the junior officer.

Mr. KEEFE. The fellow that is out there manning a gun?

General MARSHALL. He has to make the decision on it at the moment. He cannot consult anybody.

Mr. KEEFE. He is on a patrol plane or bomber.

General MARSHALL. Yes. He cannot go to court for his determination. He has got to act.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there was no such situation as that involved in the 1940 alert, was there?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

[3983] Mr. KEEFE. Now, yesterday there was introduced in evidence an order to Admiral Richardson with respect to the disposition of his fleet. You recall that, General Marshall?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I recall that.

Mr. KEEFE. And there was some reference to sabotage in Panama?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, just so that the record may be clear may I say I have tried to make some independent investigation of that situation since yesterday and I am wondering if I am correct in the assumption that at that particular time the Army had Panama alerted?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; this was a simultaneous alert of both Hawaii and Panama.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Panama was already——

General MARSHALL. As a matter of fact—this is hearsay—I understand from General Short, but I have not seen that, that he made the statement that he was more fearful then regarding Panama than he was regarding Hawaii at the time of the 1940 alert.

Mr. KEEFE. The Army through its Intelligence had some information, did it not, that extensive sabotage was threatened of the Canal in the event we tried to move any part of the fleet through the Canal?

[3984] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And this order was sent out to have the fleet moved out of Pearl Harbor at that time and give the Japs the idea that they were going to move through the Canal into the Atlantic.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was then the thought that if these saboteurs or Jap spies down on Panama got that information they might spring into action and Panama being on an all-out alert, looking for them, they could gather them in and arrest them?

General MARSHALL. They would expose their hand and their method, their technique.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, wasn't that the exact reason for the order as you now understand it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; that is my understanding and that is my recollection of it.

Mr. KEEFE. It was merely done for the purpose of confusing the Japs and trying to get the Jap agents and saboteurs to expose their hand?

General MARSHALL. If they had any such plan up to meet that plan at a time we were ready for it, so that we could learn what it was and be able to throw the thing off center.

Mr. KEEFE. That was in 1940?

[3985] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any other questions of General Marshall?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois wants to inquire.

Senator LUCAS. I want to ask a few questions.

General Marshall, in view of a good many conflicting and distorted stories that have been issued by various individuals and printed in certain segments of the press and that are being used by some radio commentators I want to ask just a few direct and simple questions near the close of this hearing.

Did you as Chief of Staff possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge, sir; none that I so construed.

Senator LUCAS. In your opinion did General Miles, your G-2 officer, or General Gerow, or the War Plans Division possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely [3986] pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. In my recollection they made no reports to me which would indicate that they did possess information that convinced them of the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. And it was their duty to so do if they did have such information?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any specific and advance information as to the precise hour or day that Japan would attack this country or the British or the Dutch?

General MARSHALL. Only in so far as the message of December 7th from the Japanese Government directing the delivery of the fourteen-part statement at a specific hour on a Sunday afternoon to the Secretary of State. The implications in that is the only thing we had.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that message, the fourteenth part of that message was an implication that something serious was going to happen at 1 o'clock that day?

General MARSHALL. Somewhere.

Senator LUCAS. Somewhere. But even the fourteenth part of that message did not give you or to any other official of this Government any precise point or any precise place where they were going to attack at 1 o'clock.

[3987] General MARSHALL. I do not think it did, sir. As I testified the other day, I have never read the complete message except on that day. I got about three-fourths of the way through it the other day but I did not get finished, so I am not quite clear on the reaction of the fourteenth part on my mind because immediately thereafter I came to hand with the 1 o'clock message.

Senator LUCAS. Now, General Marshall, all the information that you obtained through G-2 and through the War Plans Division upon any and all important matters dealing with this critical situation at that time was discussed, I take it, with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson?

General MARSHALL. Did you say any and all information?

Senator LUCAS. Well, practically any and all information of importance dealing with this situation I presume you discussed.

General MARSHALL. I think that that would be correct. I know I followed this practice, that in particular in connection with magic, that where I thought a particular paper had some special importance, specially important significance or information of great importance I would bring that myself to the Secretary's attention to make certain that he had read it because there was a great deal of magic and there was always the possibility that he would not read the particular paper that I had in mind, so we had that procedure at that time. I think I discussed with him the important information that came up from time to time, I am quite certain that I did, and I know on his side that he did that with me because we were talking together very frequently during practically each day.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, any important problem that arose during this crisis was mutually discussed between you and the Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, with this qualification, that I did not usually discuss with him the technique of implementing this or that as carried out in a military way.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. Now, what is true with the Secretary of War insofar as these important conversations are concerned I take it is also true with the President of the United States at that time. In other words, he knew—the Secretary of War and the President of the United States knew what you knew so far as any real matters of importance were concerned involving this critical period?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, I desire to ask just a question or two with respect to the much discussed "winds" message. I have had an opportunity over night to take a look at it for the first time and I want to get your interpretation of it, if I may. I take it you have seen the Jap winds message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I have seen it.

Senator LUCAS. The Federal Communications Commission around the 20th of November 1941 intercepted a message from Tokyo to their Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.

East wind rain.

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.

North wind cloudy.

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.

West wind clear.

Now, did you understand that in the event that a winds message of that character had been transmitted from Tokyo to the Ambassador in this country or any other place, that such a message meant war under the interpretation of that language?

General MARSHALL. Not necessarily. It refers to relations. [3990]

Senator LUCAS. It refers definitely to the cutting off of diplomatic relations?

General MARSHALL. We terminated diplomatic relations, as I recall, in the last war with Germany an appreciable period of time before a declaration of war followed.

Senator LUCAS. And in this case diplomatic relations were not broken off until practically at noon December 7, just a short while before the bombs struck, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. I am not aware of just how they were terminated unless it was the presentation—

Senator LUCAS. I guess they were not terminated until afterward probably. In other words, the envoys that were sent here by Japan were discussing peace terms with the Secretary of State at the very time, as I understand it, that the bombs fell.

General MARSHALL. They were having a diplomatic discussion, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. General Marshall, did you ever obtain or see any message following this one that was sent on November the 20th implementing this winds code message which had been received by the Navy?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, if there was a message [3991] of that character did come through and was picked up by the Navy, decoded and translated by them, it was never brought to your attention prior to the attack on December the 7th 1941?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge then or later.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, who was in command of the forces in the Philippines at the time of this attack?

General MARSHALL. General Douglas MacArthur.

[3992] Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, now referring again to exhibit 32 on page 9, which is a copy of the message that was sent by you on November 27 to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, and then on November 28, 1941, you received this reply from General MacArthur, which says:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four Air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy Stop Ground security measures have been taken Stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense Stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

General Marshall, do you know what time the Japs struck the Philippine Islands?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall right now, sir. I know that shortly after the announcement of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a communication by General MacArthur by telephone—and I think this can be testified to by General Gerow—that in that discussion he made some reference to Japanese planes having made reconnaissance. However, General Gerow can give you that.

[3993] Then, at a later time—and I believe in the Philippines, it was afternoon—a very heavy air attack was made on Clark Field.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, immediately following the attack at Pearl Harbor, you had a conversation with General MacArthur over the telephone?

General MARSHALL. I did not, sir; General Gerow did.

Senator LUCAS. General Gerow, and he reported at that time that planes were over the island.

General MARSHALL. I do not remember precisely what he said, but my recollection is that he reported Japanese planes coming in and being fended off—but General Gerow can testify to that directly.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

Do you know how many planes he had in the Philippines at that time?

General MARSHALL. I recall specifically how many four-engine flying fortresses we had, which is 35. I will have to get you the figures on the interceptors, or fighter planes. I have forgotten just what it was. I think it was something toward 100.

Senator LUCAS. And how many air fields did we have there at that time?

General MARSHALL. I cannot tell you how many at the [3994] time. The main field, of course, was Clark Field. I do not know how many subsidiary fields in that particular section had been developed.

The next field to the south was Nichols Field on the outskirts of Manila. There were certain fields in the islands, and particularly on the plateau of Mindanao. That data can be obtained.

The actual situation was we were just coming out of the wet season and the difficulties of building air strips capable of supporting a four-engine bomber were very great during the rainy season. We were just coming out of the rainy season at the time this event occurred. However, the data on that is easily obtainable.

Senator LUCAS. We will get all of that through General Gerow, I take it.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, and he can obtain it from the War Department.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, do you know how many bombers were on Clark Field at the time the Japs struck there the following afternoon?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Can General Gerow give us that information also?

General MARSHALL. He can obtain it, I am quite certain.¹

[3995] Senator LUCAS. Where was Admiral Hart's fleet at the time of the attack, if you know that? I will just withdraw that. It is not important. I will get it from somebody else.

General MARSHALL. I assume a portion of it at least was in Manila Bay, probably in the vicinity of Cavite. I know it had been our endeavor to obtain the antiaircraft guns for the defense of the Cavite anchorages, particularly the accumulation there of long-range submarines which had reinforced Admiral Hart's fleet shortly before this attack.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall, has there ever any report been made to the War Department as to why these bombers that had been destroyed on Clark Field on the following afternoon were still on the ground?

General MARSHALL. I do not think there has been, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to put this question first to counsel. Do we have available page 85 of the Army hearings, the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings?

¹ See information supplied by the War Department in Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2072-2074.

Mr. GESELL. The transcript?

Mr. MURPHY. Page 85.

Mr. GESELL. Do you mean the top secret part?

[3996] Mr. MURPHY. I mean the testimony of Colonel Bratton, the regular Army report.

(The document was handed to Mr. Murphy.)

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall, there is just one thing I want to clear up in the top secret report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. There is a statement on page 13 of exhibit 63, reading as follows:

Colonel Bratton immediately called General Marshall's quarters at 9 a. m.

Do you have any knowledge of any call having been placed at 9 a. m., to your quarters?

General MARSHALL. My only knowledge in the matter is, I think I was taking a shower, or going into a shower at the time I received notification that Colonel Bratton had telephoned, that he wished to come out to Fort Myer and see me, and I told them to reply not to come out, that I was going to the War Department immediately.

[3997] Mr. MURPHY. Do you know, or did you learn from anyone as to whether or not prior to the time that you got the message about Colonel Bratton liking to come out, or wanting to come out, if he had tried to contact you at your home or your quarters before that, that morning?

General MARSHALL. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not Colonel Bratton requested that one of your orderlies be sent out to find you while you were horseback riding?

General MARSHALL. I have not heard of that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall, I would like to ask this one last question. During the month of August or September of 1941 there was before the Congress of the United States the question of continuance of the Selective Service Act and it passed the Congress by but 1 vote—or it passed the House by but 1 vote.

I would like to ask what, in your opinion, would have been the effect on the United States Armed Services if that one vote had been otherwise and that Act was not continued?

General MARSHALL. Existing law at that time was such that the National Guard would have had to have been recalled from its various stations so that it could have been released from active service within 1 year of the time it had been inducted. That varied for the various units. Also the [3998] individuals who had been inducted under Selective Service, who were in various National Guard and Regular Army units, would have had to have been released from those units, from the service at the end of 1 year.

The National Guard, of course, and Selective Service men composed the larger portion of the military forces.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I want to reserve until a later time in the hearing going into this question of what happened on the alert.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all now?

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the statement of General Marshall about the continuance of the Selective Service Act, I am glad that I cast that 1 vote in favor of continuance of the program.

In conclusion, General, I would like to propound to you a supposititious situation and ask your opinion upon it.

Preliminarily, though, to illustrate the importance of the question, I might ask you is it not true that when Washington authorities have in their possession very important information, they should transmit that information to the [3999] commanders in the field that that might affect, if that information can be transmitted without affecting adversely the security of the country?

General MARSHALL. Not necessarily so, sir, unless we undertake to set up in the headquarters of each commander in the field a complete service to evaluate the composition of all these various items of information, diplomatic, military, FBI, we will say, and so on.

Mr. GEARHART. But if you had in your possession specific information which was important for a commander of an outlying force to know, is it not the duty of the Washington authorities, or any others in the Army and Navy, to transmit that information to the commander of an outlying post, information which is important to him, if you can transmit it without affecting adversely the security of the country?

General MARSHALL. That information, as you say, which is important for him to know, the answer is "Yes, sir."

[4000] Mr. GEARHART. And if that kind of information, important to the commander of an outlying post or station cannot be transmitted without endangering the national security, in that event what responsibility devolved on the shoulders of the one having that important information?

General MARSHALL. That he should be given such information as is possible under the circumstances.

Mr. GEARHART. And if it is not possible to transmit any information a directive should be sent; is that not correct?

General MARSHALL. I think that is approximately correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, my supposititious situation is this: If you had informed General Short and Admiral Kimmel immediately after the 9th day of October 1941, the day which the intercept was translated, that Tokyo, in an intercept, had divided Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian waters into five areas and had requested reports in respect to those areas and in accordance with that allocation of the territory and waters of Hawaii into areas, in respect to where ships were docked, where they were anchored, and in respect to other dispositions of our fighting forces, with especial reference with regard to warships and airplane [4001] carriers; if you had advised General Short and Admiral Kimmel on the 10th day of October 1941, which was the date of the translation of an intercept that Honolulu had reported to Tokyo:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard—

That certain codes be used in reporting upon repair docks in Navy Yard, the Navy dock in the Navy Yard, moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island, alongside in Ford Island, and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively, and so on; if you had reported

promptly on December 3, 1941, to General Short and Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese, in a message from Tokyo to Honolulu had directed:

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you are already no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy; assuming further that you have reported on the 6th day of December, 1941, which was the date of translation of an intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo, the following message had been received from Washington:

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

[4002] Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor"; an intercept which also contained this information:

On the 17th the *Saratoga* was not in the harbor. The carrier *Enterprise*, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the *Chicago* class, one of the *Pensacola* class were tied up at docks "KS". Four merchant vessels were at anchor in area D.

At ten a.m., on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the harbor. Their course was as follows: in a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart, at a speed of 3 knots per hour; they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the harbor through area B to the buoys in area C to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

And if you had transmitted the information to General Short and Admiral Kimmel that an intercepted message came from Tokyo which was translated on the 5th day of December, 1941, to Honolulu, as follows:

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay—and [4003] in longhand "Honolulu,"—and the areas adjacent thereto.

Suppose you had reported to General Short and Admiral Kimmel that you had intercepted a message from Tokyo on the fourth day of December, translated on that day which was marked "strictly secret," and read as follows:

Please investigate comprehensively the Fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation.

Suppose you had reported to Admiral Kimmel and to General Short that you had intercepted and translated on December 5, 1941, a message from Tokyo which read as follows:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Now, assuming that promptly upon receipt and translation of those intercepted messages which I have adverted to, that you had promptly advised the commanders in the Hawaiian area, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, of their substance and effect, do you think that the Fleet would have been lined up in the harbor like sitting ducks, with their fighting capacity greatly reduced by various types of inspection, or do you believe they would have been out to sea in fighting trim and order?

General MARSHALL. It may be that if all of the messages [4004] you recited, or a portion of them even, had been communicated to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, that their—or at least General Short's reaction to a command to alert his command might possibly have been different.

All of those messages, and many more of somewhat similar character were coming in regarding American war vessels all over the world. It

certainly must have been evident to both Admiral Kimmel and to General Short that the Japanese, who could see every portion of Pearl Harbor and had the free use of the cable and the telephone, which we were forbidden to tap, and they could have reported every move that was going on, it would have been assumed, I think, by both of them under those circumstances, it would be a normal procedure, something which we would have given a great deal to be able to do regarding the Japanese ships, something which we could not manage at all.

When you consider the messages came from all portions of the world, relating to naval shipping, it is a question of how much involves a check on where our ships are, and how much involves a plan for a specific operation at a certain place. That is a matter of opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. But you, as Chief of Staff, and Admiral Kimmel, as Chief of Naval Operations—

General MARSHALL. Admiral Stark.

[4005] Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations, had this information on your desks, did you not?

General MARSHALL. That is the presumption that I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And don't you think that Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have been better informed in respect to the responsibility that was theirs, if you had transmitted promptly the information which you had, and which Admiral Stark had at the time you received it?

General MARSHALL. I am not at all certain as to that, sir. It depends on the mass of information we gave them. They were given general summaries, and they were given—I say “they”—I mean General Short was given a definite direction.

Mr. GEARHART. He was given a definite direction which was in the nature of a circular letter that was sent to all of our outlying posts, and stations; is that correct?

General MARSHALL. He was given an alert order.

Mr. GEARHART. Exactly the same kind of an alert order that was sent to all of the others, with one exception, that they were cautioned not to do anything which would alarm the people or reveal the intent?

General MARSHALL. I think the same proviso was in the [4006] alert message to the west coast commander, which included Alaska.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. And in all of the messages that were sent from G-2 to Hawaii never was there any special warning of any special interest which the Japanese were displaying in the Hawaiian Islands, was there?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the details of all the messages. I do not remember such a message.

Mr. GEARHART. But you have been reminded, since you have been in this room, by the questions that have been propounded that there were seven or eight specific intercepts which were placed on your desk in accordance with your order by G-2, and by the Planning Division, which pointed directly to Hawaii, and revealed an inordinate interest by the Japanese in the situation which existed in the Hawaiian Islands?

General MARSHALL. That is your view, sir, I take it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well now, do you think that is my view?

General MARSHALL. I say that is your view, sir, I take it.

Mr. GEARHART. I ask you, is that your view?

General MARSHALL. I stated my view, sir, that this information was being collected by the Japanese all over the world, regarding all shipping; that we were aware, and [4007] certainly it was the assumption that every move made by our shipping in Hawaii was under observation by the Japanese, and they had a perfectly free method of communicating that to their own war office, or naval headquarters in Japan. That was the most ordinary assumption of the condition and that was the great embarrassment under which we were working everywhere, in the Philippines, in Hawaii, and in Panama at that time.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, directing your attention to the message you sent on December 7, but which did not arrive there until it was too late, in that message you told Admiral Kimmel and General Short that the Japanese were going to deliver a message at 1 o'clock which amounted to an ultimatum. That was the information that you gave them or sought to give them in that belated message, is that true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I have the message here, if you wish me to read it. "What amounts to an ultimatum."

[4008] Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now that was information that you were conveying in that message, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you also went one step further and conveyed, or sought to convey still more information, and that was in reference to the significance of the 1 o'clock reference in the intercepted Japanese message?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You indicated that that had caused some comment and some speculation among the high authorities in military and naval circles in Washington, and you relayed the situation on and directed them to fasten their attention to what the significance of the 1 o'clock message might mean, did you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did you send that message?

General MARSHALL. Because this, to my mind, was a very significant message of theirs, relating to a specific hour for some specific act somewhere. Apropos of that, we sent another message in early July of somewhat the same nature that related to the Panama Canal, in which we gave specific information from magic regarding shipping in the Panama Canal. It was felt that that was necessary to do at that particular time, to put that into a direct message of this character. [4009] Here the thing came again when it seemed clear to me, and to the others concerned, that this had some very special, definite significance, relating to that hour, and I therefore endeavored to send it, and I did as quickly as I became aware of it.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you think the specific inquiry from Tokyo in reference to ship movements in Honolulu and in Pearl Harbor was not sufficiently important to convey to the commanders in Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. I can only answer that, Mr. Gearhart, by repeating again what I am saying, that this information was coming in regarding many points in the world. It is very significant in the light of the knowledge of what the Japs actually did, it is very significant as to that, but at the time there were a great many messages about a great many places, and there were a great many people involved in

evaluating those messages. Certainly none of them, certainly no one of them, was endeavoring to avoid an evident indication of just where the Japanese were going to strike, if they were going to strike. That did not so register; that did not so register.

Mr. GEARHART. General, you do not justify yourself for not sending specific information to Admiral Kimmel and General Short to which they were entitled simply because you [4009A] failed to send to other commanders and other generals in other areas information to which they were entitled?

General MARSHALL. Will you repeat that, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General MARSHALL. No, sir. I am speaking about the evaluation of that, as to what it meant, what its significance was at the time the messages came in.

[4010] Mr. GEARHART. If there had been a specific inquiry from Tokyo intercepted by us in respect to ship dispositions in Panama, would it not have been your duty, as the possessor of that information to advise the commanders of Panama that the Japanese were showing an inordinate interest in the situation there, and tell them what that interest reflected?

General MARSHALL. If it did not seem to be a portion of their routine inquiries regarding our shipping and our fleet, wherever the shipping was, or wherever the fleet was.

Mr. GEARHART. In the light of the fact that Hawaii had been bombed, with a terrific result, don't you think now, that you should have sent the information in these seven intercepts in respect to Japan's inquiry into the shipping arrangements at Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. That is asking a very definite hindsight. I do not necessarily think so. I am still in the position of feeling that when you give a command to a high officer you expect to have it executed.

Mr. GEARHART. But don't you think that you were withholding vital information from Admiral Kimmel and General Short when you did not advise them of these particular seven messages?

[4011] General MARSHALL. It did not appear vital at that time. It appeared to be a portion of a general resumé by the Japanese doing what we eventually thought they would do all over the world.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you tell us now, General, why, at that time that information did not impress you as vital?

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that, sir. As a matter of fact, I testified that I did not have a definite recollection of these particular messages. I must assume that I saw them. They did not register on my mind according to your reaction as stated here by you.

Just what their reaction was I do not know. There was no evaluation of them brought to me by G-2 of the character that you have indicated.

Mr. GEARHART. But you had already directed G-2 to bring you the original material by direct order, had you not?

General MARSHALL. That was during the summer, from that time on, but that did not in any way cancel the question of the evaluation of the information they obtained, because I never saw all the magic.

Mr. GEARHART. After you had directed, in August, G-2 and War Plans to bring you the original material, that imposed on you by

voluntary assumption of the responsibility, [4012] the duty to read, to understand, to evaluate, and to act upon the messages that were laid before you; is that not true?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. That direction did not terminate at all the evaluation of information for me by G-2, which is the function, one of the main functions of that section of the General Staff. That direction gave me the opportunity to see for myself, so far as I found the opportunity to see what the actual messages were, as a check against what G-2 was doing, and as additional information for me. It was just exactly the same thing as from time to time I inspected the various installations of the Army. They had orders to do certain things and I went there to see, myself, from time to time, when opportunity presented itself.

In this case, these messages were coming in, and I thought it was better that I saw the entire message, in the case of the important ones, and not merely trust the evaluation.

Mr. GEARHART. That is quite correct. That gave you the benefit of other men's views in respect to what the messages indicated, but it did not relieve you of the final responsibility.

General MARSHALL. I am never relieved of that, sir.

[4013] Mr. GEARHART. The responsibility of reading, of understanding, or evaluating and acting upon those messages.

General MARSHALL. I would not say that is correct, Mr. Gearhart. If I am supposed to have the final responsibility of the reading of all magic, I would have ceased to be Chief of Staff in practically every other respect, so that was an absolutely impractical proposition. It was very difficult for me to read magic sufficiently, even at it was. There was a great deal to it. It occupied the entire time of a certain group of officers. I could not give all of my time to one activity.

As I say, if I had complete responsibility for reading all the magic I would have had to cease to function as Chief of Staff, except in that one particular division.

Mr. GEARHART. Let me point out, General, I am not expressing any criticism at all. I am asking you for your opinions.

General MARSHALL. Well, I am giving them, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, is not magic one of the objects of special interest in the office of the Chief of Staff?

General MARSHALL. It was a subject of very special interest.

[4014] Mr. GEARHART. And wasn't it to you?

General MARSHALL. It was to me, and that was the reason that I directed that they bring me the originals of these messages that they were evaluating where they felt they were particularly important.

Mr. GEARHART. Then your answer is as you gave it first, that if these seven messages had been transmitted to General Short and Admiral Kimmel at the time they were received, things might have been different at Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Things might have been different. The same instructions, however, were sent literally to the Philippines, and they were sent also to Panama, and the alerts were executed, and the additional information was not sent.

Mr. GEARHART. And if the alert messages that related to Panama, and related to Manila had been transmitted, and an attack had occurred there first, things might have been different in those areas?

General MARSHALL. What was the first part of the question?

Mr. GEARHART. I am just enlarging the question that I asked you. I am asking you about the other areas.

General MARSHALL. What I was stating was that the alert messages were given to Panama and were given to the [4015] Philip-
pines.

Take Panama, for example. These various communications were not sent there, and the command was alerted.

Mr. GEARHART. Assuming that the first attack came at Panama, and you had a lot of intercepts showing a special interest of the Japanese in Panama, don't you think the commanders in Panama would be in a better position to defend their posts and appreciate the danger they were in, if those intercepts had been transmitted to them for their inspection, for their consideration, and for their evaluation?

General MARSHALL. I assume the lieutenant general in Panama was aware of the Japanese interest in that canal.

Mr. GEARHART. But if you had information, did you have the right to withhold that information from them, assuming that they would know what the substance of that information was?

General MARSHALL. It depends entirely on the circumstances, the information, the evaluation, and the procedure generally.

Mr. GEARHART. Then your answer is you do not think there was any obligation to keep your outlying commanders in the field informed in respect to all of the information you had that was of benefit to them?

General MARSHALL. Well, if you qualify that at the [4016]
end of your question by saying "of benefit to them," of course that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Would you say it would not have been of benefit to Admiral Kimmel, and it would not have been of benefit to General Short to know that the Japanese had charted the area, divided it into areas, and were asking for ship reports, and for every movement that occurred, even for reports where no movement occurred, would you say that was of interest to your outlying commanders?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, I would say it was of interest to them, but the assumption must have been, except for subdivisions of the harbor, that the report of the movement of that fleet was made direct to Japan by ordinary cable, or by radio.

Mr. GEARHART. And yet the fact still remains that that information was not transmitted; that is correct, isn't it?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it my turn?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Senator Lucas?

[4017] Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson will again inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you have had experience as Chief of Staff with investigating boards in the Army?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any conversation you had with anyone about this board—I am talking about the Grunert Board—shortly after it was appointed, about its make-up?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, I do not recall. I recall very distinctly General McNarney, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff, who was handling the matter, I believe, for the Secretary of War, speaking to me about the time limit that had to be imposed upon the Board in order that its report would be available to the Secretary of War with sufficient time for him to survey it and still make his report required, I believe, by Congress, on a certain date. I have a distinct recollection of that.

[4018] Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a recollection that the Secretary of War had to make a report to Congress?

General MARSHALL. That was my impression. There was some limiting date. Whether it was December 7 or not I don't know. But I know General McNarney consulted with me as to how much time there would be, and he was speaking of the length of time required to go out to Hawaii, the number of witnesses. That is a definite recollection. Something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, do you have the order that created the Board?

Mr. MURPHY. It is in the Clausen report. Mr. Greaves has it.

Senator FERGUSON. Can the Congressman tell me about where it is in the Clausen report?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. It is right in the beginning, about the third or fourth page. Right in the front part. You will find it in the index.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read that to you, General.

That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction [4019] of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, 78th Congress.

Now, section 2. That is the statute limitations part. I will read section 2.

SECTION 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

Approved June 13, 1944.

Now, the statute of limitations would expire, the 6-month period, on the 7th of December 1944.

Do you know when the Board completed its findings?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not. That is a matter of record, though.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when they filed their top secret and other report?

[4020] General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not know offhand. I believe I testified, I am sure I did, the other day that General Handy, the day he became Deputy Chief of Staff, received a copy of that on its first delivery, I believe, to the War Department, and came to me in regard to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you recall then only one conversation with General McNarney about the time limit?

General MARSHALL. The Board, I presume, must have received a directive from the War Department by direction of the Secretary of War as to its procedure and as to the time in which it would file its report and that is what I have a definite recollection of General McNarney consulting me in regard to.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any other conversation with anyone in relation to the Board, the make-up of the Board?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall, sir. I have a vague recollection, Senator, now that you have asked me that question, I have a vague recollection of saying something about having them all officers on the active list, but I am not quite certain of that.

Senator FERGUSON. After they were named did you confer with anyone in relation to the make-up of the Board?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall, sir.

[4021] Senator FERGUSON. Where you consulted as to the members on that Board?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is it customary or do you know of any other case where a Board had been appointed and failed to consider all matters pertinent to the investigation, that the matter was taken away from them and given, for instance, to a major like Major Clausen, in this case, to make an investigation, had that ever happened in the War Department before?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall a similar situation to that before. I do recall, however, in connection with this, and this is purely hearsay, hearing the Secretary of War comment, I think at the time of the release of the Pearl Harbor report to the press, whenever that was, I have a recollection, I think, of the Secretary of War stating, either to me directly or to people in his office, of whom I was one, that he was, that he felt that the message of effecting the release was not correct, in that the Congress had imposed upon him an obligation to do a certain thing and it was his report and the Board was his, one of his methods of obtaining the information.

Now I am indulging in pure hearsay.

[4022] Senator FERGUSON. General, here is a board that is appointed in 1944, the statute is passed in 1944, the 6-months statute of limitations is up in December of 1944, and then extended at that time, again extended in 1945, but the report is not made public until August the 28th or 29th, 1945, this year.

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So, there was nothing done, no report made to Congress, or no report to the public within any 6 months period, but made after the close of the war.

You understood that?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I understood that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have this case where the board hasn't filed its report so far as the public is concerned, and a major is sent out to complete the work of the board.

What I want to get from you, as Chief of Staff, did you ever know of a similar position, similar case, let's say?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall such a case, and I think I testified a little earlier in this hearing that I did not know of Major Clausen, I never saw him until, I think the day before the public

release of the report. I believe the affidavit he came to get from me was not, had not been submitted to the Secretary of War at the time the [4023] report of the board was released to the public.

That was my first knowledge of Major Clausen as an individual, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General, is it the custom in the War Department to follow the old idea of a jury of your peers, to have officers of equal rank investigate officers?

General MARSHALL. We generally make an effort, if it is practicable of arrangement, to have a senior officer do it, but in the Inspector General's Department that very often is not practical.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it the old idea of having a jury of their peers, that you have superior officers, or at least of equal rank on the board that is doing the investigation?

General MARSHALL. I do not say specifically just what the basic reason is. My own reaction is that that is very embarrassing for a junior officer to be inspecting a senior officer because he doesn't know what day he will be under the senior officer.

Senator FERGUSON. We have the case of a major completing an investigation against all senior officers; I mean many men who were senior. There isn't any question that your department was being investigated, is there?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

[4024] Senator FERGUSON. And you were a senior officer?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General officer. There isn't any doubt that General Short was a senior officer to a major or a lieutenant colonel?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know of a case where you ever completed an investigation by an officer of this many grades lower in rank, where there had been a board set up of equal or senior officers to make an investigation?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall a similar case.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you mentioned the other day in relation to some material being furnished to Borneo, Port Moresby, and some others. Did we build airports there prior to December 7?

General MARSHALL. We endeavored to have the existing strips sufficiently improved to make them, make it possible to land and take off with a B-17.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that upon your order, or where did that order come from?

General MARSHALL. That was upon my order to General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you conferred with anyone in relation to that prior thereto?

[4025] General MARSHALL. I certainly must have because while that was my desire, to have it done, I would have felt, I am quite certain that I should get the o. k. of the higher government officials because I was involving contacts with other governments.

Senator FERGUSON. And who would those higher government officials be?

General MARSHALL. Oh, it would be the Secretary of State—first the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the President.

Whether one or all, I don't know. I should imagine the most normal thing would have been the Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. And prior to sending any material, that is, I am talking about bombs and ammunition—

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would confer with the Secretary of State or the President, or Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. My assumption would certainly be that I would not have given those instructions to General MacArthur unless I had gotten a clearance at least from the Secretary of War, but more probably from the Secretary of State, and I may have gotten a direction from the President, I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you recall of any report [4026] submitted to the War Department which came to your attention in December of 1940, and revised in April of 1941?

To refresh your memory, I hand you some papers. You needn't read them aloud. I just want you to go through them enough to be able to say whether or not you ever saw such a report.

It involves the oil in the Netherlands Islands.

[4027] Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Is that an exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Senator LUCAS. What report is it in?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking the General about it. Do you want to see it, Senator, first?

Senator LUCAS. No. I was just interested in knowing whether it was an exhibit. Who makes the report?

Senator FERGUSON. The report is not signed.

General MARSHALL. Also has no heading on the paper where it came from.

Senator LUCAS. It seems to me a little unusual to refresh someone's recollection upon an anonymous report.

Senator FERGUSON. If the Senator will look at it, it purports to be a copy of a report filed with restricted offices, and the Army is one of the offices.

General MARSHALL. What was the question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. After looking that over, had that ever been called to your attention?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall specifically that it had. I know that we were very much interested in what the Japanese, what the resources were for Japan in that region, and to what degree they would be destroyed.

[4028] Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that one of the things, at least, that we considered Japan wanted to go into the Netherlands Islands for, was to get oil for war purposes, there had been questions up before you and the various officials about oil, whether an embargo on oil would defeat them?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there anything brought to your attention that there was one way to keep them from moving into these islands to get oil and that was to prepare so that those oil wells should be destroyed either prior to them going down or at the time they were

coming, full preparation being made, and they being advised on that point, did you ever hear of that before?

General MARSHALL. Will you please read the first part of the question?

(First part of the question read.)

General MARSHALL. That is sufficient.

It was brought to my attention a number of times the factor of oil as it affected the Japanese in their capacity to make war, as it might affect the Japanese by our strictures on the supply of oil for the United States, and as it would affect the Japanese in making war if they had available Borneo and other Indonesian fields, and as it would affect them if we were able to destroy those fields so that the oil would [4029] not be usable for a considerable period of time. All those facts were discussed, were brought to my attention, and I think I asked a number of questions regarding them.

Senator FERGUSON. General Bundy was in your department?

General MARSHALL. Mr. Bundy was a special assistant to the Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. A special assistant?

General MARSHALL. He was a civilian and a lawyer from Boston.

Senator FERGUSON. General, were you familiar with the capacity to manufacture refinery equipment machinery by the Japs?

General MARSHALL. I think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that taken up with you?

General MARSHALL. I think I saw some statements of that nature because the whole oil thing was examined fore and aft, the whole oil question was examined fore and aft.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Lt. Col. John H. Levell?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Mr. Bundy a civilian or was he an officer?

General MARSHALL. He was a civilian, as I say, a lawyer from Boston, who had been, I believe, at one time assistant [4030] Secretary of State, when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State, and he came into the War Department, I believe, at the same time Mr. Stimson did, and remained in the War Department until Mr. Stimson resigned as Secretary of War, and then he, Mr. Bundy, left shortly thereafter.

Senator FERGUSON. As of April 29, 1941, would this refresh your memory as to whether or not you have even seen this before:

It is interesting to note that of the \$560,000 worth of drilling equipment which were shipped to Japan all but \$16,000 of this was exported after my report was sent to the Department.

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Had that ever been called to your attention?

General MARSHALL. Not to my specific knowledge. Could you tell me where that paper came from? I mean this, where Mr. Stimson received some report, and that evidently is one to him, he usually initialled it over to me to look at. There is no such initialling there, is there?

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

General MARSHALL. He usually initialled the report over to me to look at. I didn't see any initials of that character on that report. Did this come to his office?

[4031] Senator FERGUSON. I will ask counsel—I thought if you could identify it it could be used—I will give it to counsel and I will ask counsel if he will look up and see whether or not we can locate in any official files this report and as to whether or not he can ascertain to what departments it was delivered.

Mr. GESELL. You mean official files of all Departments of the Government, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I mean first the War Department.

Mr. GESELL. What other Departments of the Government do you want us to search?

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see the paper.

The War Department, Navy Department, State Department, Lend-Lease.¹

They are on the top of the memorandum.

General, you have read, have you, the top secret report of the Army?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I read that night before last.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to make any comments on it whatever?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I have no comments to make.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any contention in the War Department that we were trying to solve our problems by committees and not allowing men who had the responsibility [4032] for decisions to make their decisions, that committees made decisions rather than individuals? I am talking about prior to December 7.

General MARSHALL. I don't recall any such controversy, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no recollection then of any controversy or ideas in the Department that that was interfering with the decisions by particular men because it was necessary to go to committees and not formal committees but merely a group of individuals to decide cases?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall anything specific on that, sir. There was always this, of course, in the War Department, any act you took affected other interests and it was necessary to get clearances, and the individual who was trying to put his particular purpose through the machine was always impatient of the length of time it took to obtain the clearances from the other sections, we will say, of the General Staff, or maybe, though this would not come to my attention, the other groups of subdivisions within a particular activity. That has always been the case. That still remains the case.

Senator FERGUSON. General, isn't it true that in effect these alerts were drawn by committee action, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. The alerts, where they were both Army [4033] and Navy, involved both Army and Navy, were drawn by a committee that might only consist of two men, or it might consist of more, but it would be the Army planning responsible agent or the one designated to represent him and the naval opposite.

I had such a paper this morning where the two had to get together. That comes all the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't it true in relation to the alert to General Short that the President had said that one provision had to be in it, in relation to the first overt act?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Secretary of War had called the Secretary of State and the first provision, about diplomatic relations being broken

¹ See Mr. Masten's statement in Hearings, Part 10, p. 5133.

off or not, had to be changed. So that in effect it was not the idea of one man who was responsible for the alert, which would be you, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. That is true, sir, but there are very few documents that go through the War Department that are——

Senator LUCAS. A little louder, General.

General MARSHALL. That is true, but there are very few documents of importance that come out of the War Department that are wholly and completely the act of one man. It is his responsibility but as a rule a number of different [4034] interests are involved and they are represented and he makes the decision. That is what happens.

I might illustrate in this day. I am asked a question or I have a desire, in either case I see that that goes to the several agencies of the War Department concerned and they give me their views. Then I decide what I am going to do, having heard the various implications that are involved.

In this particular case that alert message—and General Gerow can testify to this—on the Army side was probably first drafted in the section headed by Colonel Bundy, it was then brought, I presume, to General Gerow, and he went over it. He may or may not—he can testify to that—have taken it up with his naval opposite to see if they had any comments in regard to it, to make certain they didn't get off on the wrong foot with regard to the other, and then the Secretary of War, because of conversations with the President, sent for General Gerow, who I think brought him in a draft.

I don't think there is anything abnormal in that procedure, sir.

[4035] Senator FERGUSON. General, up to that date had that been the custom in an alert?

General MARSHALL. There are very few alerts here. The only other alert was the one of the previous year and I do not know what the procedure there was but in all probability the proposal for the alert was either discussed with me first by General Strong of the War Plans Division, or he may have brought me the actual proposal in writing, in which case I would have gone over that to see if it was acceptable in the form in which he had it.

Now, in relation to the actual message that we endeavored to get to General Short regarding the 1 p. m. delivery of the 14-part message, there I wrote the message myself before anyone knew of just what I might say. Then I read it aloud and got their reactions.

Senator FERGUSON. But in this 14-part message, let us say the one that went out at noon on Sunday the 7th of December, you did not confer with the State Department about that alert message?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not confer with the President about it?

General MARSHALL. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. The only one that you conferred with [4036] were the officers of the Army plus Admiral Stark of the Navy Department?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, that was an alert and it did not include the President's directive about the first overt act, did it?

General MARSHALL. You say that was an alert?

Senator FERGUSON. Was it an alert? I will put it that way.

General MARSHALL. It was not a command message except that he was to be——

Senator FERGUSON. This is on page 21, General, of exhibit 32.

General MARSHALL. (reading):

But be on alert accordingly.

That is with relation to 1 p. m.

Now, there, of course, there was no opportunity for ordinary procedure. I recall very distinctly that my writing is not very impressive looking and I did this on rough scratch pad and when I read it aloud General Gerow said, "I will have it typed," and I told him no, there wouldn't be time, it would go in this form to the message center. So there was an informality and an immediacy in procedure that was undoubtedly not the case at all in the alert of the pre- [4037] vious summer. Those were the only two alerts in which, I recall, I participated in the War Department while I was Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. But on the 27th it was necessary to confer with the Secretary of State as to whether or not there was a breaking off of relations, but you personally found on the 7th at noon that an ultimatum was delivered.

Now, how do you account for in the one case you had to confer with the Secretary of State; in the other case you personally determined that what amounts to an ultimatum?

General MARSHALL. Time was the deciding factor here, very much so. This was my interpretation of the moment. There was no opportunity to discuss this with anybody else and it was quite evident if it was to be of any profit it had to be dispatched immediately. Therefore, I took the responsibility of stating that and of sending that message immediately. I checked with Admiral Stark in regard to it and my decision had already been made that I was going to send it.

Senator FERGUSON. General, in the letter of the 27th, exhibit 17, I just want to ask you a few questions about that, the second paragraph from the top. [Reading:]

"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan [4038] should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands."

Now, that is a definite statement, is it not, to the President——

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). That we had agreed that that action would be taken?

General MARSHALL. Your use of the word "we" I do not think is correct, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the United States?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who does it mean, "we"?

General MARSHALL. It says: "After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed."

Senator FERGUSON. United States military authorities?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had agreed?

General MARSHALL. They had no authority to commit the government. [4039]

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the next to the last paragraph (reading):

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand.

Well, going back to the other paragraph. Now, the military authorities having agreed in that particular paragraph that I read, the information that you obtained from Winant at 10:40, it came in to the Secretary of State, on the 7th of December 1941, indicated that there was going to be an invasion similar to the lines stated there because they would go into the Kra Peninsula, would they not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. They would go into the Gulf of Siam.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So that at that time we knew under this agreement that at least the military authorities, that the Japanese were violating that?

General MARSHALL. I do not believe I quite understand the question. I will endeavor to explain my view of this particular matter.

General MacArthur sent an officer at our direction to Singapore. We already had a liaison officer at Singapore. They were directed to confer with the British and the Dutch in regard to the situation in the Far East and what might be a workable basis for the three different countries in the [4040] event that the Japanese broke the peace in the Pacific.

They made their report. They agreed, those individuals, on that report. It was submitted. Now, I stated, I am certain, in the hearing the other day that I could not recall just what my own individual action in regard to that report was. After that I checked it in the War Department and I found what it was. In a joint memorandum signed by Admiral Stark and myself, of which I will read the first three paragraphs to indicate the general tenor of the reaction to this report of these individual Army and Naval officers who among themselves agreed as to what should be the proper course—this memorandum from Admiral Stark and myself is dated July 3, 1941. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army (reading):

To: The Special Naval Observer, London.

The Special Army Observer, London.

Subject: Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941. (Short title "A. D. B.")

References: (a) United States—British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.

1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve [4041] the subject report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor, particulars, it is at variance with reference (a)—which is the United States-British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.

(2) The major differences between the two reports may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Singapore report contains political matters which must be omitted from this military agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond the scope of their authority, such political proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26, 27, and 78. These should be taken up by the political departments of the governments, should these departments deem it possible to arrive at definite agreements.

(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters discussed is too broad. The

Singapore report aims to set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC-1. The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report. Under ABC-1, the United States proposed to commit its naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to [4042] British naval strategic direction only for employment in the Far Eastern area. The United States has not agreed, and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into any commitment for the employment of the naval forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations having a direct relation to those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it become necessary in the future to retire from that area, further plans may then be concerted. This subject is discussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.

It is a rather lengthy memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, General, I will ask you then in the light of that instrument—first, was that delivered to the President?

General MARSHALL. The distribution list on it shows it went to Cincac, Cincpac, Commanding General Philippine Department, the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, to the CNO for dispatch. That is all, sir. It evidently did not go to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. In the light of that statement that you have read, General, why would you put the paragraph in this report to the President on the late date of the 27th?

General MARSHALL. That was a statement of fact. "After [4043] consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed."

In other words, they had a meeting of the minds on that particular day. (Reading):

That joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

That informed the President of what the view was by those joint meetings of British, American, and Dutch officials of the military hierarchy in Singapore. Later on in the document we give our, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, specific recommendations.

Senator FERGUSON. And you disagreed with it?

General MARSHALL. We disagreed with it in part. We agreed with it to this extent. (Reading):

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military [4044] opposition be undertaken.

Now, that is more or less in agreement with the proposals of this group.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a map before you, General?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I know where the places are.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on this map, you said in the next to the last paragraph:

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken.

Now, that was not said in relation to the Kra Peninsula or Singapore or the East Indies, the Netherlands East Indies. That was only said as to part of Thailand, the great part of which was west of the line 100 east, isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, that is true.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if they went into the Kra Peninsula no warning was to be given, action was recommended on that, but if they went into Thailand, a great part of which was west of 100 degrees east—in fact, one of the reports recommended at one time to let them go in there and they would [4045] eat up their resources, and so forth, did it not?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall that?

General MARSHALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But only in the one case was a notice to be given. In the other cases you did not recommend notice, isn't that correct? Isn't that a fair interpretation of that letter to the President?

General MARSHALL. In the other cases, Senator, meaning what?

Senator FERGUSON. Meaning down into the Kra Peninsula and into Singapore, no notice was to be given by the governments in that case?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, do you know whether or not the President ever saw the Winant message about the ships going into the—

General MARSHALL. No, I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never had any discussion with him on that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir, not to my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, General, when Singapore [4046] was alerted as far as the British were concerned?

General MARSHALL. I do not know that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was printed in the papers here, in New York at least, that Singapore on Saturday was alerted, it was announced in the Saturday papers that they were alerted, full alert and they sent trucks out to get them?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recall any information on that?

General MARSHALL. I cannot recall. Your comment on that now is the first time I have heard it mentioned in the last year.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, on a sabotage alert wouldn't the airplanes on the field be in an entirely different position than a full alert for action?

General MARSHALL. I would presume so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On an alert of sabotage?

General MARSHALL. I said I would presume so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't it true that on such an alert the planes would be massed so that the men could guard from action immediately in the vicinity, like the throwing of bombs across the fence?

General MARSHALL. Well, that is what was done. That [4047] varies, of course, according to the place and conditions.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. But that was quite evidently the means taken there to alert against sabotage.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, normally an alert of sabotage would make your air fields, as far as the planes are concerned and ammunition in them and the bombs in them entirely different than you would if you were on a full alert to go out to the enemy?

General MARSHALL. Certainly. If there was no indication of any other form of alert except against sabotage that would be, roughly, the case.

Senator FERGUSON. Because if you put the bombs in and then you had some sabotage you may cause great damage to your own field?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. We have had that accident occur in our experience.

Senator FERGUSON. General, were you consulted by the Secretary of War in relation to the removal of General Short?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was the only officer removed.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, I was consulted by the Secretary of War, I think, after the return of Colonel Knox from Hawaii.

[4048] Senator FERGUSON. Did you confer with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?

General MARSHALL. I don't know whether the Secretary of the Navy was present but I am quite certain, I am absolutely certain that Mr. Stimson discussed the matter with me after Colonel Knox returned.

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of a release was he given?

General MARSHALL. He was relieved from command and ordered to the United States and I do not remember just what the terms of the order were as to his further duties but he was relieved from command in Hawaii on the arrival of his successor, General Emmons, and to report to the United States and, I presume, to the War Department. The order will show that, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice he is here in civilian clothes. When you say removed from command, does that mean that he is out of the Army?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; and I think General Short—

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would explain that on the record.

General MARSHALL. I think General Short's status now is a retired officer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you retire on full pay or half pay, or what is it?

[4049] General MARSHALL. Three-fourths of the base pay.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not he is on full pay, or had been for any length of time?

General MARSHALL. I do not know what his status is here, whether he was ordered in and re-ordered giving him active duty or not, but that is a matter that can be easily determined.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want your knowledge of it.

General MARSHALL. But unless he was ordered on active duty to report to your committee here his pay would continue at three-quarters pay. General Short can tell you that in a moment.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he become a retired officer? What was the Secretary of War's order that you spoke about?

General MARSHALL. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about—

Senator FERGUSON. What did the Secretary of War's order that you spoke about do?

General MARSHALL. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about brought General Short back from Hawaii, relieved him from all responsibility of command in Hawaii, directed him to report to some point in the United States, we will have to look at the order to see just what it was. Thereafter the question was whether he would be given another assignment or, [4050] as actually developed, his retirement, which I believe was at his request; I do not recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted on that, as to whether or not he would be given another assignment?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman?

General MARSHALL. I presume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. Yesterday when I examined General Marshall I requested counsel to present the order with reference to General Short and I wonder whether that is here today, whether we have received it.

Mr. MITCHELL. It has not been handed to us yet by the War Department.

General MARSHALL. The procedure in General Short's case was handled by the Secretary of War.

Mr. MITCHELL. The War Department just handed me some documents.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to see it, General?

Mr. MITCHELL. No, I have no interest in them.

Senator FERGUSON. They have got more than one copy.

Would this refresh your memory, General? [Reading:]

For General Short only. By direction of the President, you will stand relieved from command of the Hawaiian [4051] Department upon the arrival there of Lieutenant General Emmons who has been directed to assume command of the Department. Acknowledge.

MARSHALL.

OFFICIAL: SECRET

(Sgd) R. G. Hersey,
Adjutant General.

It is dated December 16, 1941.

Does that refresh your memory that you signed such an order?

General MARSHALL. Well, I know such an order was sent and I assume also that there is another order which directs his return to the United States, which followed that.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel have any other order?

General MARSHALL. You see, that does not involve any travel in the requirements of that. That is just the notification to him of what is going to happen, that he will stand relieved when General Emmons arrives. Now, there would have to be a formal order bringing him back to the United States and that is what I was referring to.

Senator FERGUSON. This is signed by you?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And it says, "By direction of the President."

[4052] General MARSHALL. Yes.

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2076, for copies of cables relating to Gen. Short's relief of command.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you confer with the President on this action?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other order where a man was removed that you signed an order on the direction of the President to remove a man?

General MARSHALL. I will have to check on that, sir. Using that "By direction of the President" is a technical procedure because of the rank given to the commander in that particular place. I will have to check up on that. You see, the command in Hawaii carried a certain rank with it. The termination of the command terminated that rank. Now, it may be—but that is readily ascertainable—that the expression "By direction of the President" was necessary in order to meet that particular involvement, because that is used very frequently. I think in the promotion of all temporary officers up to the grade of Colonel, that is, where no confirmation is necessary, the technical requirement is it must state "By direction of the President." Now, there may be some such involvement there. If not it would mean that the President himself personally had directed him relieved. I do not know which it is, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you do not recall that [4053] he personally directed you to?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that he personally directed me to, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you tell us as near as possible the conversation that you had with the Secretary of War as to why this was issued, why he was relieved of that command? What was the reason?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the conversation. My recollection of the incident is that on the return of Colonel Knox, who had gone out personally to Pearl Harbor to view the conditions and what had happened and what the existing situation was, that after his return to Washington he and the Secretary of War conferred—the Secretary's testimony will be, certainly, the best evidence on this, and as a result a decision was reached for the relief of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Now, that is just my recollection of the conditions at the time. I think probably Mr. Stimson's diary would tell us more directly just what happened. Now, what conversation they had with the President or if they had a meeting with the President I do not know.

I had directed a Major General of the Air Corps and Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of Far Eastern affairs, to Hawaii by air as rapidly as possible in order to personal- [4054] ly report to me what the conditions were and what in their opinion the requirements were. Those two officers were killed on that flight, so they did not arrive there. Colonel Knox did arrive there and then returned, the first person to come back to Washington who had actually been present after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall then any conversation with Secretary Knox?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall talking to Colonel Knox on the subject at all.

Senator FERGUSON. But you and the Secretary of War did have a conversation?

General MARSHALL. Yes, undoubtedly, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were there any specific reasons stated for his removal? What was the cause of his removal?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the specific statement of the reasons. I will have to enter into almost a guess as to what they probably were. I have no clear recollection at this time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it disobedience to the alert order of the 27th?

General MARSHALL. I could not say that, sir. It was the general status of affairs in Hawaii as viewed, presumably, by Colonel Knox following his trip.

[4055] Senator FERGUSON. You then have reasons to believe that the cause of removal was brought back by Colonel Knox?

General MARSHALL. That is my vague recollection of what occurred, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I had sent two officers to go out and determine for me what they believed was the situation and the requirements of the situation from a number of points of view. They were to get at what we were to do to reconstitute the defenses and all other matters in connection with the future security of Hawaii and they did not reach there.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I understand, General, that you did not base this order upon any of your own findings. You based it upon what somebody else found.

General MARSHALL. I based that order on the direction of the Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right; on his direction rather than on your own findings of facts.

General MARSHALL. Yes. I did not obtain any findings because my people never reached there.

Senator FERGUSON. And did Colonel Stimson at the time that he asked you for this order or directed it, whatever the fact is, did he state his reasons for relieving Short from command?

[4056] General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir. I mean he undoubtedly did, and undoubtedly I gave him an opinion and probably his diary might show exactly what occurred.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you recall that you did give him an opinion?

General MARSHALL. Well, I would assume that he would ask me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, he would tell you, would he not, the facts he had upon which you were basing an opinion?

General MARSHALL. Presumably so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give any of those facts? Can you recall any of those facts—

General MARSHALL. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). As to the reasons for his action?

General MARSHALL. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand the reason that you could send out the alert on sabotage without consultation with anyone, or one of the reasons, at least, was that it was such an emergency but in case that you wanted to amend the order in relation to the alert on the 27th which had the provision in there from the Secretary of State and

the one from the President, that you would have to confer at least with the President and the Secretary of State before [4057] they would be amended?

General MARSHALL. I do not want to confuse the issue, Senator, but I regarded the message that was intercepted from the Japanese regarding the 1 o'clock as of great significance. It was therefore my responsibility, in my opinion, to get that hour into all the various commanders in the Pacific as quickly as possible. I doubt if I even considered questioning anybody else, the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State. The issue in my mind was clear. It was a very important message and time did not admit of any discussion. I took time, however, which absorbed very little time, to make a quick contact by telephone with Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, General, whose language, or the reason for the insertion of the last few words of that message about alerting all essential officers? I want to get the exact words.

General MARSHALL. It is page 21, I think, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." Whose language is that, or whose order? It is your order because you signed it.

General MARSHALL. What page are you on now?

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 7 of Exhibit 32. It [4058] is on that page, General.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the one you are referring to, the 1 o'clock and the warning message?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am not talking about the 1 o'clock.

General MARSHALL. I have got it straight now. It is on page 7.

Senator FERGUSON. "Information to minimum essential officers."

General MARSHALL. Now, the question?

Senator FERGUSON. Whose order is that? That is a directive that he is to only give this to the minimum essential officers. Whose directive was that? Was that on your own or was that in consultation with somebody else?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir. Of course, I was not present during the final form of this message. I think that is on there to maintain the secrecy of the magic. I do not know whether that would have been suggested by—would have been included automatically by General Gerow or his assistants or whether that would have been on the recommendation of General Miles, the G-2, but it is quite evidently for the purpose of protecting the sources of the information.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, that being in the message [4059] and General Short being responsible for some reconnaissance, at least jointly with the Navy, would this information about the overt act go to the pilots in the planes if it was restricted to the minimum essential officers, that no overt act was to be done upon our part but the first one upon the part of the Japanese?

General MARSHALL. Reading the sentence as it is written here, "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers," it may be that that includes the portion of the message which refers to the overt act. I am quite certain the intention was to limit the dissemination of this highly secret information, they are talking about the information and not the protection.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am trying to see what an ordinarily prudent officer under the circumstances, how he would interpret that. Would he interpret it as to the whole instrument and, therefore, only give it to minimum essential officers, and that would not include anyone who had anything to do with the reconnaissance, probably, below General Martin?

General MARSHALL. That is a question, sir. I would say that in sending out the various forces that the senior would have to know this portion of the message that refers to the overt act. He would not necessarily have to know about [4060] "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes."

Senator FERGUSON. But he certainly would have to know about the overt act part?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; he would have to know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you think at the time that it was a restriction upon Short in his command, as far as giving this to all officers in case he was on a real alert?

General MARSHALL. That did not occur to me, sir. I might say in connection with that that when we put out any operation almost invariably we are involved in restricting the knowledge of the operation to a very few people. We have to do that practically every time. That is always an embarrassment to the officers that are carrying out the operation.

I can go clear back to the St. Mihiel operation, for example, to the pleadings of various corps commanders and particularly the chiefs of staff, to permit a wider dissemination of the knowledge preliminary to the launching of the operation, which General Pershing was unwilling to have disseminated. The same thing occurred in the Normandy operation, the same thing occurred in connection with the African operation.

[4061] It would be a much simpler thing from the point of view of the military authorities if everyone knew exactly what was planned, but in almost all those cases it is not a practical procedure or else you will certainly leak information.

So that that restriction would not impress me as imposing any insuperable difficulties as to the carrying out of the order.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we are trying to find out, General, and I would like to have your help on it, one question, of what an ordinarily prudent officer would do under the same or similar circumstances having the knowledge that he had.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how any confusion could be had upon that message and no confusion could be had upon the one that came back that he was alerted only to sabotage. Do you understand what I have in mind? Here.

Well, counsel is shaking his head that you do not understand, that is, Mr. Gessell.

Mr. GESSELL. I am shaking my head that I do not understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I wasn't asking you the question. I want to ask the General the question again.

You have said that there apparently was confusion on [4062] this order, on this one order that went out there. Now, what caused

the confusion, in your opinion? Was it the wording of the order or the information that he had?

General MARSHALL. I do not know, sir. I have testified to this in relation to this apparent confusion, evident confusion, that I have never known just why that up to a certain point the interest was against air attack, against submarine attack, with almost no mentions of sabotage and suddenly that became the significant expression in the light of this particular order which dealt with reconnaissance, which dealt with defensive measures, and which indicated the probability of a state of war.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, how could anyone, any ordinarily prudent officer be confused about his reply?

General MARSHALL. The fact remains a number of people were confused by his reply.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to know the reason why?

General MARSHALL. And I think those individuals are prudent officers.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you anything to say from the instrument itself as to how an ordinarily prudent officer of the rank that would be handling that message could be confused as to Short's interpretation of the alert?

General MARSHALL. The fact remains, Senator, they were [4063] confused and I consider the officers prudent officers.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just asking if you have any reasons that you can state.

General MARSHALL. I thought I had already stated the reasons, sir, in my previous testimony, that nothing had been suggested at all as there being foremost in the mind of the commander of the Army forces in Hawaii the great consideration, the primary consideration of the matter of sabotage. All of his communications had devoted themselves almost exclusively to other matters and in particular to the type of attack which actually occurred and which had been referred to by me in my letters to him and in the previous plan of maneuvers of the Department.

A command directive was sent to him in the form of an alert, which in the opinion of the people who drafted it, responsible individuals, men of considerable reputation, certainly men with considerable experience, was sufficient to alert that command. I have never understood why it did not alert the command to any greater extent in the light of the interchange of all that had taken place before this time, in the light of the character of this particular order and in the light of certain provisions that he had made for liaison with the Navy, that there was the confusion which undoubtedly occurred. Beyond that I cannot explain the circumstances at all.

[4064] Senator FERGUSON. General, my question really was how they could confuse his reply.

General MARSHALL. And that is what I am talking about. I am explaining the state of mind of the officer reading the reply, in the light of all that occurred at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That a man reading the reply, having that in mind, would misinterpret the reply?

General MARSHALL. The fact is he did misinterpret the reply; he and those that dealt with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would you say misinterpreted the reply?

General MARSHALL. I would say Colonel Bundy and whoever his assistants were that handled it, General Gerow, myself, and presumably the Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. General, in one question on the winds message. Were you familiar with the Dutch reply, or the Dutch information that we had about the winds message?

General MARSHALL. I do not know what I was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In volume 5, Top Secret, Navy—

Mr. MURPHY. Is this the one from Batavia?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the one from Batavia.

General MARSHALL. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and then I will ask you later [4065] to refresh your memory.

General MARSHALL. "Addressees for action OPNAV; date CRO 222. From Thorpe, for Miles. War Department.

Code intercept: Japan will notify her Consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcast as weather report at end East Wind rain United States: North Wind cloudy Russia: West Wind clear England with attack on Thailand and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Then there is a paragraph not in the message.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not part of the message, and I understood you have read the whole message, haven't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I have read the whole message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, the Dutch had interpreted the so-called winds message that if it came it was to be a war decision?

General MARSHALL. That is what it states here.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Was that ever called to your attention? It apparently came to Miles. Would you say he was the man in the first sentence?

General MARSHALL. Yes; I presume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that ever called to your attention?

[4066] General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of it?

General MARSHALL. It is "CRO 222." I haven't the key to interpret it, and I do not know what it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything on it indicating that it came in on the 5th?

General MARSHALL. It says "Date time group CRO 222."

Senator FERGUSON. I will try to find that out from another witness, as to the time. If it came on the 5th should it have come to you as information?

General MARSHALL. I presume it probably would have.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel wish to ask any questions?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I wish to ask you just one or two questions. In military circles, and especially in high ranking military circles, is there such identity of meaning between the word "sabotage" and an order to engage in general reconnaissance as would lead an officer to misinterpret or confuse the meaning of those two terms?

General MARSHALL. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. In this photostat that was read yesterday, which seems to be undated, but must have been prior to June 24, [4067] 1940, in which the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Commander in Chief United States Fleet, who was Admiral Richardson at that time, that "reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet unit toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal," that would mean that any movement of large portions of the fleet through the Panama Canal?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And in order to test that Admiral Richardson was ordered to pretend that he was starting towards the Panama Canal and let it be known that he was, and that that leak or rumor would not be denied by high authorities, and presumably he did go on out for 2 days as if he was headed for Panama and then turned back. Do you know whether, as the result of that, there was any sabotage in Panama?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of any sabotage. Incidentally, I do not think it appeared in the record yesterday—

The CHAIRMAN. How is that?

General MARSHALL. Incidentally, with regard to that message, I do not believe it appeared in the record yesterday that the note at the bottom, when carefully translated, dated the 20th of June, states "Shown to General Marshall. He sent msg. to Canal Zone." This is the message from me to [4068] the Canal Zone: "Fleet may proceed to Atlantic possibility sabotage continue alert accordingly."

The CHAIRMAN. In the message intercepted, on page 154 of this Exhibit 1, which is the message from Tojo to Washington, to the Japanese Ambassador, this language is used:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

That is cutting off any sort of communications, private or otherwise, by any means?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of those conditions, this winds message would come, "East Wind rain," and so forth, were the conditions under which that message was to be implemented ever fulfilled by the breaking off of diplomatic relations or severing communications up until the attack?

General MARSHALL. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just a moment, please. I said I had no more questions, but I remember that one of the interested officers has asked to have five questions submitted to the General. I think I ought to take the time to ask them. Have you seen this request?

General MARSHALL. What is that, sir?

[4069] Mr. MITCHELL. I will hand it to you.

General MARSHALL. Do you wish me to proceed with it?

Mr. MITCHELL. Read the first question there, General.

General MARSHALL. This is:

Memo for Mr. Mitchell.

Subject: General Marshall.

In addition to the matters mentioned in my previous memo dated 3 December 1945, I suggest the following questions for General Marshall. I believe that point 1 and 10 of the previous memo have been sufficiently covered.

[4070] 1. The tentative SOP of 14 July, 1941, copy of which I handed you yesterday, to show 3-alert system was known in War Department.

I assume that is a question to me: Was it known in the War Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Before you answer it, I will have marked as "Exhibit 64," the Standing Operating Procedure that General Short had submitted under date of July 14, 1941.

I might shorten the matter by explaining that that was not the one that was in effect on December 7.

General MARSHALL. That particular paper SOP of the 14th of July, came to my attention not through the operations section, and I do not know whether they ever received a copy or not, but from General Arnold, the Chief of the Air Force, who took exception to a portion of the Standing Operating Procedure as to the employment of numbers of the ground forces in the Air Corps in connection with the operating procedure in case the command was put on the alert.

He states:

This memorandum provides, page 4, paragraph 14d (8) and (9) as follows:
"(8) Release to Department Provost Marshal a provisional battalion of four companies totalling 500 men, to [4071] assist Auxiliary Police Force when necessary."

I have knowledge of that, and it is shown in my letters to General Short on the subject. I wrote to him in regard to that, at the request of General Arnold, and got his views as to the use of these men, and then replied as to my final views. That is the extent of my recollection of the alert message, but General Arnold transmitted to me the entire message, the Standing Operating Procedure.

Mr. MITCHELL. That consideration of exhibit 64 came up in connection with the question of using air force men for guard duty that you testified to before?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; and it is covered in my correspondence to General Short.

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to the fact that in that document, on page 3, there is Alert No. 1, which he proposed to establish.

General MARSHALL (reading):

Alert No. 1.

Alert No. 1 requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Alert No. 1 was an all-out alert?

General MARSHALL. That is not quite all.

b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less detachments) attached 298th Infantry will:
(1) defend Oahu;

[4072] (2) be responsible for all military traffic regulations except in the area

and so forth.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is an all-out alert?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was there in that document, Alert No. 1?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you please turn to page 5, I think it is, and find what Alert No. 2 is at the bottom of the page? Maybe I got the page wrong, not having it before me.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

Alert No. 2.

a. Alert No. 2 is applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1, but does require the availability at all times of 50 percent of all troops, either in garrison or in the field, and the guarding of important installations.

[4073] Mr. MITCHELL. Will you stop there, General. Does guarding of port and installations include a sabotage protection?

General MARSHALL. I would assume so.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then turn to the bottom of page 5 and you have Alert No. 3.

General MARSHALL (reading) :

Alert No. 3 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no particular threat from without.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, General Gerow has testified that the operating order that was in force on December 7, 1941, was an order made November 5, 1941, which is in evidence as part of Exhibit 44, and that exhibit has the numbers of the alerts reversed. That is to say, with the No. 1 alert, which is the all-out alert, in the document you saw, becoming No. 3 alert under the new system. And General Gerow has explained that that final order of November 5 never reached the War Department until after the 1st of January 1942.

Does that conform with your recollection as to the second document or have you anything on that?

General MARSHALL. That was what I was told, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. If the report from General Short had said alert No. 1 or No. 3 without having the existing order number of the alert before you, you couldn't have told what he referred to or if you had gone back to exhibit 64 you would [4074] have had the wrong number, would you not?

General MARSHALL. That evidently would have been the case.

Mr. MITCHELL. If the report of November 5, the operating order of November 5, had been in the War Department, had been transmitted to the War Department by General Short, and you had had before you his existing numbers to identify his alerts, and the report had said, "I put in alert No. 1," "Alert No. 3," you would have had a definite way of ascertaining just what he did, would you not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you please read the second question here?

General MARSHALL (reading) :

What were the instructions of the Staff Duty Officer in the Office of the Chief of Staff, 27 November to 6 December 1941, and how much did he know about the alert status overseas and the importance of incoming messages?

Mr. MITCHELL. How would you answer that?

General MARSHALL. I would say that any instructions were to the Secretary of the General Staff to see that there was someone on duty there who could get in touch with the proper people in case of anything of importance and to see that I was informed of anything of sufficient importance to [4075] come to my attention. What the exact arrangements were I never went into because I had confidence in Colonel, now General, Smith and his assistants, particularly Colonel, now General, Deane, who were the secretary and the first

assistant secretary of the general staff. Just what their detailed arrangements were I do not know.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was there a 24-hour service there?

General MARSHALL. There was.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the third question?

General MARSHALL (reading):

Could not a message similar to that of June 17, 1940, have been told to Short over the scrambler phone on December 7, without stating anything that would compromise our crypt analytical system?

Possibly that might have been done. I would have to analyze that. Possibly it could have been done.

Mr. MITCHELL. The fourth question.

General MARSHALL. I might say that the message that we endeavored to send was a very clear statement of the case.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the fourth question, about General McNarney, has already been answered.

General MARSHALL (reading):

Was not General McNarney assigned to War Plans Division on his return to Washington on December 15, 1941, * * *

He was already a member and had been since 1939, though [4076] he had been in England since the previous April.

* * * and during the time that he was sitting with the Roberts Commission supposedly investigating the Pearl Harbor attack and the question of responsibility both in Washington and Hawaii?

And I think I am accurate, did not sit in the War Plans Division after he proceeded to England in April 1941, and on his return he was merely carried that way. There was no change until he was made Deputy Chief of Staff.

I testified he was brought back for a specific purpose, borrowed by the Pearl Harbor board and returned to that service, which was itself an independent agency, directly under me, for the entire reorganization of the War Department.

[4077] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the record shows who is asking those questions.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was the counsel for General Short that asked me to submit those questions to General Marshall. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes, on behalf of the committee, to thank you, General Marshall, for your patient cooperation in attempting, so far as you have been able, to reveal the facts involved in this investigation.

I am sure the committee wishes for you, on your new mission, as high a degree of success as you have received in other fields. We wish for you a safe journey, and as prompt return as possible, and the greatest possible success.

The Chair would like to say personally that if after you get to China, you discover that you cannot successfully cultivate your Leesburg farm from Chungking and need a good farmhand, the Chairman of the committee feels that by spring he will be available. [Laughter.]

General MARSHALL. Thank you very much.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask about two questions of General Marshall, before concluding?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, in the testimony which you [4078] gave in the secret report under date of Monday, August 17, 1944, on page 18, General Russell asked you this question:

In this letter of February 7, General, the statement is made by you to General Short that "the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation."

Did anything that occurred between the date of this letter of February 7, 1941, and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, cause you to change in any way that estimate of the situation in Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. Nothing occurred.

General MARSHALL. That is correct. That is still my view.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, this morning and yesterday, you testified that sabotage was practically never mentioned in regard to Hawaii in 1941, and that the whole emphasis was on air attack. Did I so understand you?

General MARSHALL. You did.

Mr. KEEFE. My question then is, if the whole emphasis was on air attack, would not the reply of General Short to your alert message, where he says "Department alerted against sabotage," certainly tend to challenge the attention of anybody in the department?

[4079] General MARSHALL. It did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you say that sabotage was practically unmentioned during the year 1941, I have read the exchange of letters between Secretary Stimson and Knox, and your letter which I have quoted from of February 7, 1941, Exhibit 53, and then in Exhibit 59, in this paper that is entitled "Aide Memoire,"—

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You stated specifically, or it is stated specifically:

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.

General MARSHALL. I recall that.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you are familiar with the fact that the joint Army-Navy agreement out at Pearl Harbor or at Hawaii had allocated the antisabotage defense to the Army?

General MARSHALL. I am familiar with that.

Mr. KEEFE. That is true, is it not?

General MARSHALL. That is true.

Mr. KEEFE. That was in 1941, wasn't it?

[4080] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that the Army and the Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had made extensive arrangements apportioning the responsibility as to sabotage and subversive activities all through 1941?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you are familiar with the fact that on November 27 and 28, 1941, the War Department, through its various agencies, sent three separate warnings to Hawaii emphasizing the danger from sabotage and subversive activities, all of which came to Short's at-

tention after he had sent his message "Department alerted to prevent sabotage"?

General MARSHALL. I am aware of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then there was a flow of information coming to Short during 1941, and especially in the latter part of November 1941, other than from you as Chief of Staff, advising him as to the necessity for alert against sabotage, was there not?

General MARSHALL. Prior to November 27 or 28, I think the correspondence between myself and General Short gives the emphasis I indicated on air and submarine attacks. He was not appealing to me about sabotage. He was appealing to me to help him in this, and emphasizing the necessity [4081] for assistance relating specifically to the defense against air attack.

Mr. KEEFE. I wanted to get this in the record, and call attention to those specific exhibits.

General MARSHALL. Those are correct.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Just one statement, Mr. Chairman, before we recess.

General, I want to concur in what the able Chairman of this committee has said, with the exception that I hope General Marshall does not take his bid to go on the farm too seriously, because we can ill-afford to lose him here in the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused temporarily.¹)

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)

[4082]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)²

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks that Senator Ferguson was examining General Miles when we suspended with him yesterday and, therefore, the Senator may proceed.

Mr. MITCHELL. I would like, in closing up General Marshall's testimony, to verify the fact that several exhibits are in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MITCHELL. There was a joint memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, to the Special Naval Observer, London, and the Special Army Observer, London, on the subject, "Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British conversations."

General Marshall read a part of it. I suggest handing it to the reporter and letting the whole document be transcribed in the daily transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

¹ Gen. Marshall's testimony is resumed and concluded in Hearings, Part 11.

² Gen. Miles' testimony begins in Hearings, Part 2, p. 777.

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(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 65 and follows:)

[4083] Op-12-VED
(SC) A16-1/RF13-13
Serial 075112
SECRET

SECRET

JULY 3, 1941

From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
To: The Special Naval Observer, London.
The Special Army Observer, London.

Subject: Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April 1941. (Short title "A. D. B.")

Reference: (a) United States-British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.

1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve the subject report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor, particulars, it is at variance with reference (a).

2. The major differences between the two reports may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Singapore report contains political matters which must be omitted from this military agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond the scope of their authority, such political proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26, 27, and 78. These should be taken up by the political departments of the governments, should these departments deem it possible to arrive at definite agreements.

(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters discussed is too broad. The Singapore report aims to set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC-1. The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report. Under ABC-1, the United States proposed to commit its Naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to British naval strategic direction only for employment in the Far Eastern Area. The United States has not agreed, and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into any commitment for the employment of the naval forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations having a direct relation to those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it become necessary in the future to retire from that area, further plans may then be concerted. This subject is discussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.

(c) There is apparent a failure by the Delegates [4085] to appreciate the great strategic importance of holding the Netherlands East Indies, and particularly Sumatra and Java, and preventing enemy use of ----- and Loubok Straits. It will be impossible to hold Singapore and if these Dutch Islands are captured by Japan.

(d) At British insistence during the ABC conversations the following was inserted in paragraph 11 (b) of the Report:

"A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."

In further exchanges during the ABC conversations the British Delegates emphasized repeatedly their view that the retention of the general line of the Malay Barrier was vital to the continued security of the United Kingdom itself. Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff note in Appendix 1 of the ADB Report that, of forty-eight British naval vessels available in the "Eastern Theater," only three British vessels are to operate in the vicinity of the Malay Barrier. No British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval defense of the Barrier against Japanese naval forces advancing southward, nor to offensive operations designed to close the passages of the [4086] Barrier to the passage of Japanese raiders. All British naval forces are assigned to escort and patrol work, most of them at great distances from the position which the British Chiefs of Staff have asserted to be "vital". It may be pointed out that the naval defense of this position is entrusted, by the ADB Report, solely to United States and Dutch forces. Even the British Force II would not be placed in a position to operate offensively. It would only be during Phase II, which con-

templates sending a strong British Fleet to the Far East, that British naval forces would be employed in a manner which might support the defense of the Malay Barrier. Since the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far East is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advise you that, until such time as a plan is evolved whereby British naval forces take a predominant part in the defense of the British position in the Far East Area, they will be constrained to withdraw their agreement to permit the United States Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in that Area.

(e) The ABD Report contravenes the agreement set forth in paragraph 14 (f) of the reference. The Chief of Naval Operations cannot agree to permit aviation forces of the United States Navy to operate for other than naval [4087] purposes, or to be placed under other than naval command. It is particularly important, in the case of a naval force of inferior strength, to have available naval aviation units which are well trained in naval operations.

(f) After conclusion of the ABC conversations the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advised the British Chiefs of Staff of their desire that, as soon as practicable, delegates be assembled in Singapore for the purpose of drawing up a practical operating plan for the Far East Area in accordance with the ABC agreements. Their view was that a plan should be gotten ready for immediate use in case of eventualities. The report of ADB conversations cannot be considered as a practical operating plan. In it, proposed United States operations in the Philippines are clearly outlined. Dutch plans are fairly definite. British plans may be approximately deduced only from the deployment proposed in Appendix 1. There is no strategic operating plan set forth for operations in common by the three Powers involved. The ABD Report cannot take the place of such a plan, and the opinion is entertained that, until such a plan is drawn up, the cooperative effort of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area will be largely ineffective.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff can see no particular advantage in establishing the [4088] "Eastern Theater," and appointing a new British Commander termed the "Commander in Chief, FAR EASTERN FLEET." It is suggested that the same purposes could be served by giving appropriate authority to the British Commander in Chief, China, and have that officer, familiar with the general situation, continue to exercise direction even after the arrival on that station of additional British naval forces. It is agreed that there is no objection to giving this officer general strategic control of the various British naval stations in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, but the establishment of an officer in a superior echelon, in command of all is considered of questionable value. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are disposed to discuss this matter further, if so requested by the British Chiefs of Staff, but question the present utility of such discussion, in view of the length of time before it would be practicable to establish such an office.

4. Details of the subject report which either vary from ABC-1, or appear to be unacceptable for other reasons, are indicated below. The numbers referred to are the paragraph numbers of the report.

3. (a): The operating plan should be confined to the plan for the Far East Area, rather than for the "Eastern Theater."

4: This paragraph does not give sufficient [4089] emphasis to the security of the Dutch position, nor to the necessity for the greatest possible degree of offensive operations. Attention in this connection is invited to the naval task set forth in paragraph 35, Annex 3, ABC-1. It is not agreed that Japanese expeditions against the Netherlands East Indies can be outflanked from Luzon if such expeditions go south via the protected line of the Pelews. This latter remark applies also to paragraph 13.

13: As indicated in previous correspondence, the usefulness of Hong Kong depends on its ability to contain Japanese blockade forces, as that base is unlikely to be usable for naval base purposes.

17: The opinion is held that, if the Pelews line of southward movement is taken by the Japanese, the early capture of Borneo and the northern line of the Dutch Islands is essential to a serious Japanese attempt against Java.

29: With respect to strengthening the defenses of Luzon, the conference apparently failed to give appropriate importance to paragraph 13 (d) of reference (a). Because of the greater needs of other strategic areas, the United States is not now able to provide any considerable additional reinforcement to the Philippines. Under present world conditions, it is not considered possible to hope to launch a strong offensive from the [4090] Philippines.

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The United States is taking steps to strengthen the defenses of the Philippines through improving the quality of native troops, and by providing additional modern material.

32: This subject was discussed during the ABC conversations, and decision reached to forego inclusion of it in the report, as the right is sovereign. Reference to it should be omitted from the ABD Report.

35: (last subparagraph)—The establishment of a combined staff, (presumably for all Services and all Powers), in Singapore is not considered advisable, there being no agreement, nor possibility of agreement, for a single commander of all of the military forces of the Associated Powers. Appropriate liaison should, of course, be established. Existing liaison for the purposes indicated is considered adequate, so far as the United States is concerned.

38 and 39: These paragraphs cannot be accepted as to United States naval aircraft, for the reason given previously.

41: This paragraph should be omitted as it has already been covered by reference (a). It differs in certain respects from that reference. The United States does not agree that the United States Pacific Fleet must under all circumstances be equal in strength to [4091] the Japanese Fleet.

42: The matter of cooperation in the Tasman Sea between the United States Pacific Fleet and the British Naval Forces has been clarified in other correspondence.

45 and 46: This is not in accord with ABC-1, which requires that the Associated Powers, except in an emergency, will exercise command over their own forces. United States Naval Forces would not be "released" to British operation, in the sense in which paragraph 46 is construed, but would be assigned appropriate strategic tasks, derived from those listed in ABC-1, under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief, China.

47: As previously indicated, the small part which is proposed for British Naval Forces in the Far East Area is not acceptable. This and succeeding paragraphs should be clarified.

53, 54 and 55: Since this plan should apply particularly to the Far East Area, the details listed in these three paragraphs cover too wide a scope.

57: This paragraph seems rather indefinite.

61, 62, 63, and 64: It is suggested that reference to Phase II might be omitted from the present consideration, since plans as to operations in that Phase must necessarily be highly speculative at this time.

Appendix II: United States naval aircraft should [4092] be listed under the United States Asiatic Fleet.

Subparagraph (d) is not acceptable as regards United States naval aviation.

5. If further conferences are to be held in Singapore for drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers, it is suggested that the conference would have its work simplified were its deliberations to be guided by an agenda which had been agreed upon in advance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, you will inform the British Chiefs of Staff that, after they have had sufficient opportunity to give further study to this matter, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will be pleased to entertain suggestions which they may have to offer with respect to such an agenda.

(Sgd.) H. R. STARK
Chief of Naval Operations.
Copy to:

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
Jul 25 1941
Out OCS

Cincac To CNO for dispatch }
Cincpac To CNO for dispatch } Room 2055; Serial #261
Comdg. Gen., Philippine Dept. Reg. No. 900051, 7-26-41
British Jt. Staff Mission in Washington

2 Copies to C. N. O.—Rm. 2055

1 Carbon copy accompanied
original to S. P. O. B. (checked him)
7-20-41 acw-rlc

[4093] Mr. MITCHELL. Then we have another document, which the reporter has—I don't have it right now, which we marked "Exhibit 64," and which is a draft of a proposed standing operating procedural order made by General Short and transmitted to the War Department, and which General Marshall saw.

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't that referred to before we recessed?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; just before, and I didn't formally offer it, and would like to have the record show that it is received.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now offered and made Exhibit 64. That will be ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 64.")

Mr. MITCHELL. There is one other thing while we are on it.

Exhibit 13 is General Martin's study on the air defenses in Pearl Harbor dated August 20, 1941. You remember that is the report in which he estimated the manner of the attack as being by carriers coming in to a distance of two-hundred-and-thirty-three-odd miles and making a dawn attack.

As part of this exhibit there should have been added to it the endorsement by General Short, which we didn't get [4094] in and I would like to have this endorsement made part of that exhibit, and I will read it into the record so it won't be lost again [reading]:

CONFIDENTIAL

321.1

Hawaii

8/20/41

Basic: (Ltr. HAF, 20 August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.")
AG 381/264 HDP 1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., August 1941.

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

I concur in this study.

(Signed) Walter C. Short

WALTER C. SHORT

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

3 incls (dup).

[Stamped:] X 381 General & Hawaii.

Sept. 8, 1941 To AWPD.

Jan. 30, 1942. Recvd. back from AWPD for file in Air AGO.

11 March 44. To Classified Files for file

(*)

321.1 Hawaii

(*) (Illegible)

[4095] The CHAIRMAN. It has been read into the transcript and is made a part of exhibit—what exhibit is that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 13.

The CHAIRMAN. Exhibit 13.

All right, Senator Ferguson.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether the minutes of the joint board, about which so many questions were asked, was made an exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What number is it? I can get it later.

Mr. HANNAFORD. Exhibit 62, Mr. Murphy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles, did you hear all of General Marshall's testimony? Were you here during his testimony?

General MILES. I was present during General Marshall's testimony; I heard most of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the fact that the code had been broken in Portugal, it had been deciphered there, and the Japs got on to the idea that we had broken their code, were you familiar with that fact?

General MILES. No, sir. The first time I knew of [4096] that was when I heard it in this room, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, weren't with the services at that time?

General MILES. I was not what?

Senator FERGUSON. Were you with the Intelligence Department?

General MILES. I believe that was after I was relieved of G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consider that the War Department was responsible for breaking the code, that this country was able to get magic—

Mr. KEEFE. Before he answers, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Just so that I might be clear, in response to the question asked with respect to breaking the code in Portugal, I understand the testimony was there had been a raid by the Office of Strategic Services, or somebody under some other Intelligence Service, and that they obtained certain codes over there in Portugal, but that there was no evidence of an actual breaking of the code; am I right?

Senator FERGUSON. That would give us the information by which we could break it.

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

[4097] Senator FERGUSON. That particular code.

Mr. MITCHELL. The record shows, it is in the letter from General Marshall to Governor Dewey, where General Marshall states that the OSS had broken into the Japanese Legation in Portugal and had there gotten hold of the Japanese military attaché's code.

When the Japs found out that we had seized their attaché code, they stopped using it, and the new attaché code hadn't yet been deciphered. That is the exact state of the evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean we were never able, General, to decipher the new code?

Mr. MITCHELL. The letter that General Marshall wrote, which is the only evidence on the subject, is that for at least a year after that incident, the United States was not able to crack the Jap military attaché code. He said so in his letter. There has been no proof as to when we subsequently succeeded.

Senator FERGUSON. At least, General Miles, you have no knowledge on that subject?

General MILES. I had no knowledge on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was responsible and in what department was he for actually breaking the code, the Japanese code?

[4098] General MILES. The Signal Corps, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who should get credit for that?

General MILES. General Mauborgne, chief signal officer, up to, I think, the summer of 1941, was intensely interested in it. He directed all of the operations. His interest stimulated his men. I think he should have great credit for it.

Of course, he was not himself a cryptographic expert.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any cryptographic expert who should get credit for breaking it? Is there any particular individual that should be credited with breaking this code?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether that has anything to do with the inquiry, and whether it should be spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair can't answer that question. He doesn't know the answer.

General MILES. I do not know. I wouldn't be able to give you that information.

Senator FERGUSON. It was the War Department that actually was responsible and should get credit for doing it?

General MILES. It was a joint operation, War and Navy Departments, Senator. I am only speaking for the War Department side.

[4099] Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see the message that came from Batavia in relation to the wind code message?

General MILES. May I see it, sir? I think it was on the table this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mitchell, do you have it?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Greaves has it.

[4100] Senator FERGUSON. It is in secret Navy testimony and I think the date would be on the previous page, General.

General MILES. I do not recall at this time having seen that message, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that is a different interpretation than what you had placed on the original two messages. This was a severance of relations, was it, or what was your interpretation? It is in exhibit 1.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Page 154.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the translator's interpretation. I don't know as it is the General's.

General MILES. I do not know that we put any particular interpretation on it other than the ordinary English language, Senator. We had these two messages which were translated. I had no doubt as to the accuracy of the translations and gave them the interpretation which the English words would convey.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, one of them says, "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous." The other one reads, "In case of emergency", but the interpretation given by the Dutch was, "Decision of War."

General MILES. Yes, sir; I noticed that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they mean the same things, our [4101] translation and theirs?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you look on the page before and see whether that refreshes your memory as to when you got that message? It is addressed to you, is it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir; from Thorpe to Miles.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I cannot find here any indication as to when it was received.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when was it sent?

General MILES. But the time "Group CRO"—

Senator FERGUSON. You do not have to use the words. Just interpret them. When was it received?

General MILES. I cannot interpret that, Senator. I do not know what "CRO 222" means.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you be able to find out when that message was received in your department, when it came to your attention?

General MILES. I will endeavor to find that out, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall whether it came before you sent the message to Rochefort in Hawaii?

General MILES. I do not recall ever seeing this message.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to Rochefort. The message to the [4102] G-2 of Hawaii to see Rochefort. You know who I am talking about.

General MILES. This message from Thorpe, did it reach me before that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I do not recall ever seeing the message from Thorpe, Senator, so, therefore, I cannot place it. I may have seen it but I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a very important message, isn't it? It indicates that war would be declared upon a certain code message?

General MILES. Yes, if accurate; but we had two messages which were of entirely different import to the wind code.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, this message did not impress you at all, I mean to remember it?

General MILES. Senator, I do not recall seeing it.

Senator FERGUSON. It has not impressed you so as to remember it?

General MILES. If I saw it, it has not left a lasting impression on my mind, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the British at Singapore as far as their army was concerned was alerted? Did you get any information on that?

[4103] General MILES. I do not now recall getting that information.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not heard then, or at least your memory is not refreshed now, that they were fully alerted on the 6th?

General MILES. I may have, sir. I very probably did because I was in pretty close communication with the British. I had a special section in my department for interchange of information with the British but I do not now recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you find out whether the British ever notified us so that it came to your attention, that they were fully alerted—

General MILES. I will try to find that out.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Some time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. I will attempt to find that out, sir.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know about when the first bomb was dropped on the Philippines?

General MILES. Did I know at the time?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I thing that I heard of it very shortly afterwards.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after Pearl Harbor was it, after they dropped them on Pearl Harbor?

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2070-2072, for documents relating to the alert of the British at Singapore.

[4104] General MILES. My recollection is now, sir, that it was a matter of 10 or 12 hours.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you understand that the planes at Pearl Harbor were bombed on the ground and had not been up at all, or was it when they came back to re-fuel that they were bombed? Had you ever heard any information on that?

General MILES. I have heard since that the planes were bombed and machine gunned—our planes were bombed and machine gunned by the Japanese while they were on the ground and before they had a chance to take the air.

Senator FERGUSON. Before they even had a chance to take the air?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, they had not been up, came back to refuel, you never heard that, and were then bombed on the ground?

General MILES. There may have been some of them that had been up and came back to refuel but as I understand it, though, the large majority were attacked while they were on the field and before they had been up in the air.

Senator FERGUSON. Before they got up in the air. Now, did you give any message of alert after Pearl Harbor to General MacArthur, after you knew and, as you say, it was about 10 or 12 hours before they attacked the Philippines, did [4105] you give another alert?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was any other alert given?

General MILES. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Other than the one that was sent out about 12 o'clock. There was a message sent, you remember that message, the one that was sent out on Sunday?

General MILES. On the 7th of December?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir; but that was before the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that was before the attack.

General MILES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But no message was sent out after the Pearl Harbor attack again warning General MacArthur that there had been an attack at Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. None was sent out by G-2. I knew at the time, I am pretty sure, that the chief of staff or war plans division were in contact with Hawaii and Philippines and Panama.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. KEEFE. I am very much confused on this examination and I would like to ascertain whether or not the questions [4106] that were directed to General Miles referred to the planes that were on the ground at Manila or the planes that were on the ground at Honolulu.

The answer that he gave would give the impression that he thought you were talking about Honolulu, but your questions might have been interpreted to mean the planes that had been on reconnaissance and came back to refuel, as I understand it, out there at Manila.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I would like to get the record clear as to what he was talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will ask him.

You and I were talking about the Philippines, were we not?

General MILES. I beg your pardon. I thought you were asking me about Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I thought.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us go to the Philippines. Did you get any report on the bombing at the Philippines—away from Hawaii entirely—the bombing of the airplanes in the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes, sir, information came in to the War Department that the Philippines, that Clark Field, I think it was, first was attacked. Now, when that came in I do not [4107] remember, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after the attack at Pearl Harbor was the attack at the Philippines?

General MILES. To the best of my knowledgde now, sir, it was in the neighborhood of 10 or 12 hours.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you know whether or not the planes that were damaged at the Philippines were planes that had not been in the air that morning? Do you know that?

General MILES. I do not know that, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any knowledge on that question? Have you heard that the planes had been up, ran out of fuel and came back and were attacked while they were refueling?

General MILES. I read in the public press descriptions of the attack on our airfields in the Philippines, Senator, but beyond that I have no knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no intelligence information on that?

General MILES. None that I can now recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the question is during this lapse of 10 or 12 hours did G-2 send any messages to General MacArthur after the Pearl Harbor attack, during the next 10 or 12 hours?

General MILES. We sent no messages that I can recall [4108] to the Philippines immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. If your question implies that we had knowledge of how the planes in Hawaii were disposed and, therefore, could have warned General MacArthur, I think I am correct in saying that we did not. I remember very vividly the afternoon and evening of December 7, and it was hours before we could determine what in heaven's name had happened in Hawaii. I do not believe that I knew that those planes were lined up on the fields in Hawaii and were attacked there before they got in the air, for some time after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that an alert against sabotage would place the planes together, bunching them, did you know that? That anyone who wanted to put an alert in against sabotage would naturally put his planes together so they would be able to protect them from sabotage, and they would not have ammunition in them? Did you know that?

General MILES. I did not, sir; and I do not now know that.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

General MILES. There are two schools of thought on that, sir. I agree perfectly that if you want to protect your planes against sabotage alone, you do not arm them because the very presence of ammunition is a danger, but if you line up your planes on a field it is true that you can guard them [4109] with fewer men than if you disperse them and have one man guarding each plane, but it is also

true that on certain forms of sabotage, like, for instance, getting a vehicle in there with gasoline or something like that into the field, you can do a very much handsomer job if you have got the planes all lined up there together.

Senator FERGUSON. I believe you have already testified that you did not see the reply message of the 28th of Short to the General Marshall message alerting?

General MILES. That is correct, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would not come back to you as an Intelligence officer?

General MILES. No, sir; I never saw that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was it your sole responsibility for the distribution of the magic messages, actual distribution?

General MILES. That was my responsibility within the War Department and for the Secretary of State that those messages in their locked boxes were made available to the officers on that list.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your sole responsibility?

General MILES. That was my responsibility. I personally did not carry that out. I carried it out through my officers.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but a superior officer has the [4110] sole responsibility and he delegates the work to be done by another officer?

General MILES. Yes, sir. It was my responsibility and mine alone that that work should be properly done.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, who was the man that had the sole responsibility of the actual delivery of those messages as far as the War Department was concerned?

General MILES. That duty I delegated to Colonel Bratton and his assistant, Colonel Dusenbury. They were sometimes not able to deliver the locked pouch to the actual person who had the key. It very frequently happened with the Secretary of State and by special arrangement a certain secretary or I think two secretaries of the Secretary of State were authorized to receive the pouch for him. It also sometimes happened in the case of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who was the man that was responsible for the delivery? You say Dusenbury and Bratton, both Colonels?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they both responsible for that task?

General MILES. Colonel Bratton was the head of the section.

[4111] Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, he had the responsibility for that?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When the Winant message came in at 10:40 to the Secretary of State about the movement of the ships, do you remember seeing that?

General MILES. Could I see that message, sir, that you are referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. I will try and find it. Does counsel have it? It is the one Winant made on the 6th of December. I am showing it to you. There are two of them.

General MILES. Yes, sir; I have them before me.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you gone over it now, General?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the first of those messages came to you?

General MILES. I do not now recall when they first came to me. According to the stamps, the State Department stamps on them, it would certainly indicate that we did not see them until the 8th or 9th of December. You notice that the first one was received in the office of the Secretary of State on December 6th, and the advisor of political relations on the same day, but not to the Division of Far Eastern Affairs until December 8th.

[4112] Senator FERGUSON. Now, does that mean that you would not get this important message, although it was received at 10:40 a. m. on December the 6th, about the movement of these ships to the Kra Peninsula?

General MILES. I doubt very much if I would, sir. Our liaison with the State Department consisted, as I have already testified, of an officer from the Military Intelligence Division that went there every day to get this information. I have also testified that I finally got through a plan or a policy of interdepartmental liaison so that there was one officer, in the case of the State Department, Mr. Gordon, who was charged with seeing that important messages, important to other departments, got out to them, but these matters all took some time. That dispatch on its face would not be given to us in toto until it had been paraphrased.

If it were in Mr. Gordon's office or in any office to whom my liaison officer, at that time Colonel Montague—no, Colonel Sands—visited, he would probably have been allowed to read that message but not take it with him, but I have no recollection at this moment of when that message reached the Military Intelligence Division.

[4113] Senator FERGUSON. Now, if your colonel in the State Department was allowed to read that message and not take it with him, what would be his duty?

General MILES. He would make a note of it, and bring it back as soon as possible, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Bring it to your department?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would that be the kind of a message that, in the reverse, coming from the State Department to you, that you would just be permitted to read it and then it would be destroyed and sent back?

General MILES. No, sir. If it were sent by the State Department through this interdepartmental liaison that we established, it would be sent over in paraphrase form.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have a system whereby then that paper would be stamped by an hour and day stamp so anyone getting it later would know exactly when it was received in your department?

General MILES. That was the system that was in vogue at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, we should be able to find in your department the paraphrased copy, or the copy delivered to the War Department from the State Department if it has a stamp on it?

[4114] General MILES. If it was sent over to our department it should have a time stamp over it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask counsel if it is possible to get that from the Army so we might tell when it was delivered.

Now, at the time, on the 6th, were you familiar with Exhibit 17? Do you know what Exhibit 17 is? It is the memorandum for the President.

General MILES. At the time was I familiar with it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; on the 6th.

General MILES. On the 6th of December, 1941, I did not know of the existence of this memorandum, as far as I can remember.

Senator FERGUSON. What information had you in your department up until 12 o'clock on the 7th of December, 1941, indicating that there was a movement of the Japs to the south, that the ships were on the move, the troop ships were on the move? What information have you in your office?

General MILES. I had quite a lot of information, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you collect it? I will not take the time now. Will you collect it and bring it back sometime later in a collected form? I want to try to cover the same subject as far as the movement of any [4115] other troop ships is concerned, the information that you had in your office. I am talking about this being the one that Winant wired us.

General MILES. Beginning at what time, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. From the 26th.

General MILES. From the 26th of November to the 7th of December?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, to the 7th of December. You can bring that in sometime later.¹

Do you recall being present with Commander McCollum or anyone else on Saturday morning, that is the day before the 7th, where you discussed a desire—not you personally, but there was discussed a desire to get more information to the theaters, various theaters, or any of the theaters?

General MILES. Get more information?

Senator FERGUSON. More information to the theaters. That means to Hawaii, to the Philippines, Panama, or anywhere. Were you present at any meeting where Colonel McCollum was present where that was discussed?

General MILES. I have no recollection of any such discussion on the 6th of December, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember any discussion at any time on that subject prior to the attack?

General MILES. Only that I knew and thoroughly approved [4116] of the Navy messages going out with regard to our information on the Japs burning codes. They are the only ones. That is the only case in which I can remember of any discussion about further information being sent to the overseas theaters.

[4117] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that someone in your department had prepared a statement to send with information in it?

General MILES. Other than what was sent; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know McCollum, did you ever hear that McCollum had prepared a document or memorandum to send to the theaters?

General MILES. Not at that time; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you learn that? Later?

¹ See a memorandum from the War Department in Hearings, Part 5, p. 2078.

General MILES. I think I read it in top secret Army report, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the first that you recall knowing anything about it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you had close liaison between the two departments, how do you account for the fact that you did not know about that during that period?

General MILES. Well, Senator, I did not know, and I do not know that it is a fact now, sir. I understand Captain McCollum later questioned it. But our liaison was very close personally with Admiral Wilkinson, and my Far Eastern man, Colonel Bratton, with his Far Eastern man, I believe it was Commander, now Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that you, after [4118] seeing the 14-part message and the other messages, that you were responsible for getting them to General Marshall at the time they were actually delivered, sometime on Sunday?

General MILES. I was responsible for getting messages to the Chief of Staff, among others, the magic messages. I used my own discretion and judgment as to what messages had to be sent to him at out-of-office hours.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you exercise that judgment on the night or afternoon of the 6th, so that he did not get these messages, the 13 parts, or the 1:00 o'clock message, or the breaking of the code—there were three messages there, and I think it was Sunday morning that two of them were ready, but I am referring particularly to the 13 parts.

General MILES. The 13-part message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I had a conversation, on my return from Admiral Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton. I take full responsibility for that 13-part not going to the Chief of Staff that night.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew he had an officer on duty that night?

General MILES. He had an officer on duty every night; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And had you read this 13-part message, [4119] or these 13 parts very carefully?

General MILES. I testified, sir, that I am not sure whether I saw the text or a summary, or whether I was told a summary of it.

Senator FERGUSON. And with that much knowledge you decided that that should not be delivered on the night of the 6th?

General MILES. I returned to my house and telephoned Colonel Bratton, and my recollection is that he said the message was not complete. I knew its substance. I did not consider that it was necessary to arouse the Chief of Staff at that time of night for that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what time the Chief of Staff got up the next morning? I mean what time he arose on Sunday morning.

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you do about having it go to him early the next morning, the 13-parts?

General MILES. I refer now to my records only because I want to make my testimony the same as before. I testified, sir, that I therefore contented myself that night, that is the Saturday night, by calling Colonel Bratton at his house about 11:30 p. m. on my return and assur-

ing myself that the full reply would be disseminated the next Sunday morning and [4120] he and I would be in our offices then. Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton called me at my house and told me that important information was in and he was trying to get in touch with General Marshall.

I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come out to Fort Myer to see him if he desired, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you say you had a conversation with Colonel Bratton Sunday morning on the telephone at your home.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew the pilot message—and you know what I mean by the “pilot message”—was in on the 6th?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any reason why that was not delivered to General Marshall?

General MILES. I testified, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief it was in the Saturday afternoon locked pouch among several other messages, which you will find were translated on that day, and that it did go to General Marshall. He does not remember seeing it.

Senator FERGUSON. What messages would you say were in that pouch? Would you identify them for the record from [4121] exhibit 1, the messages that were in the pouch that carried the pilot message?

General MILES. On page 226, the message translated on the 6th of December, the middle of the page.

Senator FERGUSON. What page again, please, General?

General MILES. Page 226, sir. Then also on pages 228 and 229.

Senator FERGUSON. Which one of the messages on page 226? There are two of them there.

General MILES. The small one in the middle of the page, sir, from Tokyo to (circular), 3 December 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. [reading]:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

This message is a precaution.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the one?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the one under it?

General MILES. Well, according to the record, that was not translated until the 24th of December.

Senator FERGUSON. So the one that was translated on [4122] the 6th was received on the 3d went with the pilot message. Any others?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Which one?

General MILES. On pages 228 and 229, the long message from Rome to Tokyo, translated on December 6th.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You said received on the 6th, or translated on the 6th and received on the 3d?

Senator FERGUSON.—That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the page there?

General MILES. Pages 228 and 229, sir. I do not know, Senator, whether you want them one by one, but I have every reason to believe that all of these messages translated on the 6th were in the pouch on the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. Except the 13th part?

General MILES. The last of the 13 parts was not in until late on the night of the 6th.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. We are talking about the 13 parts out of the 14-part message. Is there any doubt in your mind that 13 parts of the 14-part message were in and translated on the day of the 6th?

[4123] General MILES. On the night of the 6th, I think, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. During that day on the 6th?

General MILES. I think, Senator, you asked me about the pilot message and what other messages I would assume were in the pouch with the pilot message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now the pilot message indicated that that there would be 14 parts in this message, did it not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It also indicated that they would get a separate message giving them the time of delivery?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, as I understand it now, you say that all messages except the 13 parts translated on the 6th were delivered to General Marshall, the Secretary of State, General Gerow—who else would get them outside of those three—the Secretary of War?

General MILES. The Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, and G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. And G-2. So they would all have every message translated on the 6th except the 13 parts?

General MILES. That came in on the night of the 6th, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We are talking about the night of the 6th. That is up to midnight, so there can be no question [4124] about it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the gentleman suspends I want to make one suggestion, and he may want to cover it.

It is an angle that has not been developed so far in this case.

On page 33 of General Arnold's report of January 4, 1944, there is a statement at the bottom of the page to this effect:

On Luzon it must be said we had maintained an air alert since November 15

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that, General? Did you know there had been an air alert on Luzon in the Philippines from the 15th of November?

General MILES. I do not recall having any such knowledge at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any information in your intelligence branch that the Japs were scouting over the Philippines prior to the 7th?

General MILES. I do not recall having that information at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any reason why that would be kept from you? That would be essential to your department, would it not?

[4125] General MILES. Yes, and no, Senator. Information coming in about our own troops was not ordinarily sent to the intelligence department, unless it pertained particularly to that.

Senator FERGUSON. This was Jap scouting planes over the Philippines.

General MILES. I thought you were referring to the air alert.

Senator FERGUSON. Jap reconnaissance, photographing planes.

General MILES. Oh, yes, sir; that should have come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And if they went over the Philippines you know of no reason why you should not obtain that information?

General MILES. That should have been sent by the G-2 of the Philippines to me.

[4126] Senator FERGUSON. Now, on whose authority did you send the message to destroy our code in Tokyo?

General MILES. On the authority of the Chief of Staff. Now whether I got that directly from him or from General Bryden, I do not know. I have been trying to remember. General Marshall says he authorized it. I am sure it was authorized in his name, but exactly how it was done, I do not now remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a talk with the general, if you recall? It is an important message, isn't it?

General MILES. Yes, it was important. We were destroying our own military attaché codes in those particular places.

Senator FERGUSON. Did General Bryden have access to magic?

General MILES. Not that I know of, sir. He certainly did not have a locked pouch delivered to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore he would have to read it at the behest of General Marshall, or come to your office to read it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Because the general would open the pouch, read it, and put it back in?

[4127] General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you of equal rank with General Gerow? Were your departments of equal rank?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe is next. Would it be agreeable for Senator Lucas to ask questions, Mr. Keefe?

Senator LUCAS. I do not care to. I thought this was the end of the testimony.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

Mr. KEEFE. General Miles, as a result of the interruption of your testimony, I confess to some confusion of thoughts on what I conceive to be rather material matters in connection with this inquiry, and I want to direct my attention to a few of those things, if I can, to see if I can understand the testimony that you have heretofore given.

Now, you were the chief of G-2?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Am I correct in the assumption that that was at least the top intelligence section in the Army?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Then I also understand that there is another section called SIS, Signal Intelligence [4128] Service; is that right?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was not under your direction?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That was under the direction of whom?

General MILES. The chief signal officer of the Army, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I understand there was another branch called the Signal Corps; is that right?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Which included the SIS, so we have the G-2, and then the Signal Corps, which included the SIS—

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the SIS and Signal Corps were under the direction of one man?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was that man during this period?

General MILES. Colonel, or General Mauborgne was chief signal officer until sometime, I think, in the summer of 1941, and he was relieved by General Olmstead.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

Now, I got the impression from your testimony—and I listened to it very carefully, and took rather extensive notes—that this magic business was considered to be of [4129] extreme secrecy.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So secret, in fact, as I gathered from you, that its dissemination was limited, on the Army side, to certain specific individuals, namely, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the White House in the beginning, General Watson, General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, and yourself as chief of G-2; is that correct?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I gathered from your testimony that efforts were being made to keep these magic messages so secret that when they were delivered the Army had a special, trusted courier in the person of Colonel Bratton to make the deliveries; is that right?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that the custom and orders were to take these magic messages that were to be delivered to the persons I have designated, lock them in a locked pouch, to which only these people designated had the key; is that right?

General MILES. To take them to those individuals, Congressman, if they could be reached. Obviously, if the Secretary of War was in conference and could not be reached, the message had to be delivered to an aide or to some [4130] designed person, and similarly for the Secretary of State.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the point I wanted to get, right there. I understood your testimony to be that it was the order to this courier,

Colonel Bratton, that he was to deliver this magic to the individual entitled to see it, and then to stay there while it was read, and then put the magic message back in the pouch and take it back to the G-2 headquarters where it was burned, and one copy kept for the files.

Did I understand you?

General MILES. I do not think that I testified to all of that, sir. Colonel Bratton, or his assistant, was to take this locked pouch to the office indicated, and if possible see the officer, say the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff and give him the locked pouch.

He was not required to stand over this individual while he read it. It could not be done with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, or the Chief of Staff. He was, however, to see that that locked pouch got back to his office. He was then to unlock it and burn the contents.

Mr. KEEFE. When was he to see that the pouch got back?

General MILES. That day, if possible. Certainly the next day early.

[4131] Mr. KEEFE. Did that practice continue right through until the 7th of December?

General MILES. That practice had been going on for many months before the 7th of December, and continued through until that date.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand then when these raw messages, as they were called, were delivered to General Marshall for his inspection, that that procedure was indulged in, that they would go to him in this locked pouch, with instructions to Colonel Bratton to see to it that those messages, after General Marshall saw them, were returned to G-2 to be burned?

General MILES. Yes, sir. That was the custom, the orders, and they had been carried out both before and after we, on the orders of the Chief of Staff, sent what we called the raw messages.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand your testimony to be to the effect that the decoding of these intercepts took place only at Washington. Is that right?

General MILES. It was my understanding. I now know sir, that there was a very secret Navy cryptographic section in Manila, established there—

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Miles, every time we go along, we get—

[4132] General MILES. May I finish my answer, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Go ahead.

General MILES. Established in Manila. It was put there to serve the Asiatic Fleet. I knew nothing about it. I cannot remember knowing anything about it at that time. It actually operated, so I am told now, in a secret part of the tunnel on Corregidor.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, the testimony which you first gave is subject to correction to the extent that you now find, from some source, or other, that the Navy, in the Asiatic section, had the facilities for decoding these Jap intercepts; is that right?

General MILES. I am still not sure what Japanese code they were able to break in the Philippines.

Mr. KEEFE. Who would know, if you would not?

General MILES. Oh, your naval witnesses will be able to tell you that, undoubtedly, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is on the naval side?

General MILES. That is on the naval side. That is why I did not know anything about it.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

General MILES. It was a secret Navy cryptographic section for the service of their fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. It also appears now, by other testimony [4133] that the ability to decode these intercepts was given to the British.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew that all the time?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that outside of Washington it now develops that the British had the facilities given to them to decode these intercepts, and on the Navy side, the Navy made the facilities available to Admiral Hart out in the Asiatic Fleet at Manila in some recess at Corregidor; is that right?

General MILES. I believe that is correct, sir.

I would like to say, Mr. Congressman, that I am not correcting my testimony, as I understand it, with regard to the British having this facility. I was never asked before directly about the British. I think my previous testimony was solely concerned with our American crypt analysis of the messages.

[4134] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am very happy to have that explanation, General Miles, and accept it as such. There have been so many changes of testimony relative to this matter, produced by the Clausen report, and testimony under oath in the Army and Navy reports, and so on, that I am having difficulty finding out what the fact is.

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman is testifying.

Mr. KEEFE. I ask, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. KEEFE. I would like to go ahead without interruption, please.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. Those are the familiar tactics of a lawyer in the trial of a small police court, to interrupt the counsel who is examining the witness, to throw him off his chain of thought. I had that experience for 35 years. There is nothing new about that.

What record was kept of the burning of these intercepts, if any?

General MILES. Checks were made. I am not able, however, to give you any detailed testimony on that, sir. Colonel Bratton, I understand, will appear as a witness and he had that directly in his charge.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not you have it directly in your charge?

[4135] Were not you the chief of this outfit?

General MILES. Yes, sir; but I did not personally attend to the burning of those intercepts.

Mr. KEEFE. Was not that an important matter, the burning of the messages, and was not it important to see that there was a record kept, so that nobody saw them outside of these few people?

General MILES. I knew at the time that there was available a record which was kept.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know what that was?

General MILES. It can be produced for you. The man who kept the record will appear before you, and I think I am not the proper witness in that case.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you have any present knowledge of the fact that there is such a record?

General MILES. I am sure there was such a record kept.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I will ask the counsel to have that record, if there was such a record, at the time Colonel Bratton appears before us, so when we ask him questions we can have that record before us.

Mr. GESELL. May I understand what we are talking about? Is it the record of the messages that were burned?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; that is it. When they were destroyed, there would be a record made of the destruction.

[4136] That is as I understand you, General Miles.

General MILES. As I understand, they were checked off from a list of the records received.

Mr. KEEFE. Now I am a little confused about the handling of this decoding thing. I do not want to go into any details as to how it was done, or anything of that kind, but I know the testimony shows that Commander Kramer was the opposite in the Navy of Colonel Bratton. Is that right? Did you know Commander Kramer?

General MILES. I know Commander Kramer; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, he was the courier that delivered these messages around on the Navy side, was he not?

General MILES. At Pearl Harbor time I understand that he was the naval officer who did that work.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you understand he was the naval officer that did it prior to Pearl Harbor time?

General MILES. I do not remember how long prior to Pearl Harbor this officer, who was not in any way under my command, did that work, sir.

[4137] Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, am I correct in the assumption that when the Jap message came in for decoding, that that was a sort of a joint action between the Army and Navy?

General MILES. So I understand, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were not separated there. You had a unity of command there that day, did you not?

General MILES. I understand that there was a joint operation of the Navy communication, and Signal Intelligence Service of the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. And you named another officer besides Colonel Bratton; what was that man's name?

General MILES. Colonel Dusenbury.

Mr. KEEFE. So Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury were the two officers that were assigned to this task of watching these intercepts on the Army side?

General MILES. The intercepts were directly under the charge of the Far Eastern section of the military intelligence division, which was under Colonel Bratton. Colonel Dusenbury was one of his assistants. He had others.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was the person, or who were the persons that actually did the decoding? Were they Army men or Navy men?

General MILES. I understand that they were both Army and Navy men, sir, employees of the War and Navy Departments. [4138] I would not say they were enlisted men, or officers of the Army and Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. They must have had a highly secret place in which they worked, did they not?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The Army and Navy people worked in that same place together, did they?

General MILES. I do not know, sir. I believe there was some separation there. I know of no place in the Munitions Building where they could have all been together.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, was one intercept first assigned to the Army to decode and one intercept assigned to the Navy or how did it work?

General MILES. I am told that their operation was joint in the sense that when one got a backlog of work he would transfer it to the other. I am not a good witness on the details of the Signal Intelligence Service, because I deliberately never looked into them. Other officers will come up and you can ask them what questions you want.

Mr. KEEFE. You mean Signal Intelligence Service? Is that their job?

General MILES. The Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. KEEFE. Were they the ones that were doing the decoding?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[4139] Mr. KEEFE. Then, Bratton was with Signal Intelligence Service?

General MILES. No, sir. I think I could explain it to you, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. I wish you would. The further we go the more confused this thing gets to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

General MILES. The decoding, deciphering, translating from Japanese, decoding, deciphering Japanese into English was done by two services of the Army and Navy, the Army Signal Intelligence Service, which is part of the Signal Corps, and the Navy Naval Communications Service.

Now, those were highly specialized services. They served the intelligence of the two services, Army and Navy.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

General MILES. It became our paper only when delivered to us in typed English. We had nothing whatever to do with the deciphering, decoding, or translating of that document.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, where were these messages filed, the ones that were actually filed in your department?

General MILES. The retained messages were filed in the Far Eastern Section of my department.

Mr. KEEFE. What is that?

General MILES. The retained messages were filed in [4140] Colonel Bratton's office, the Far Eastern Section of my department.

Mr. KEEFE. And how were they filed? Were they filed consecutively by number?

General MILES. That is a detail that I do not remember, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. KEEFE. Who would remember that?

General MILES. Colonel Bratton undoubtedly would remember it.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. I am advised by the Chairman that a good deal of this material was gone into on a Monday that I was compelled to be absent, and when you were a witness, General Miles, and that is why I am going through my notes so I will not be covering this ground again.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was my recollection about it.

Mr. KEEFE. I can perhaps read it all, that is, if it has been covered, and you give me that assurance. I will get his full testimony and read it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe General Miles was a witness on Monday, was he not?

Mr. GESELL. Last Monday.

Mr. KEEFE. A week ago?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Monday a week ago.

Mr. MURPHY. He started on the 29th, November 29.

[4141] General MILES. I testified Monday and Tuesday.

Mr. MURPHY. And he testified on November 30.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Monday a week ago?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was my recollection.

General MILES. And Tuesday.

Mr. KEEFE. This is a matter that I want to ask you a few questions about, General Miles, if you can answer them.

From an examination of the intercepts that were coming in, there was an effort being made to keep track of the movement of the Jap fleets, and that had been going on for some time. My reading of the record of the testimony in this case indicates that sometime prior, a short time prior to the 7th of December, there was a certain Jap task force that went into radio silence. Do you recall that?

General MILES. I recall hearing such a report; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And evidence given before the Army and Navy board indicated that there was some concern expressed over the fact that this fleet had gone apparently into radio silence, and wonder was expressed as to where it was. Do you recall that situation?

General MILES. I recall that a certain number of Japanese ships could not be located by our Naval Intelligence.

Mr. KEEFE. Those ships were carriers were they not?

General MILES. I do not remember what class of ships they were, sir.

[4142] Mr. KEEFE. Well, how long did that radio silence continue so far as this fleet was concerned; do you recall?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not recall. You understand, of course—

Mr. KEEFE. That would have been a Navy matter, would it?

General MILES. Pardon me. You understand, of course, that all of this work of tracking the Japanese ships was Naval Intelligence, and I got my information from them.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, we will try and get it from the Navy then.

But I understood that you were working in such close liaison in a matter of this character that you perhaps as head of G-2 would know something about that also.

General MILES. I think I did know at the time the important items, such as the fact that they could not locate certain of the Japanese ships.

Mr. KEEFE. That would be a pretty important matter, wouldn't it, in view of the tension that existed at that time?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. To know where that fleet was and what it was doing, it was a very important matter, wasn't it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you make any report to anybody, in your analysis of those intercepts, or the lack of them, when you [4143] were making your report to the Army Chief of Staff, did you make any comment upon the sudden blackout of these radio messages from this fleet?

General MILES. I do not believe that I made any such report, sir. I do not know, Mr. Congressman, that that was anything extraordinary at the time. I remember that such things occurred but, of course, it was fairly normal that Naval Intelligence, good as they were, were not able to place certain Japanese ships.

Mr. GESELL. May I intervene, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, surely.

Mr. GESELL. On the direct examination by counsel of General Miles item 25 of exhibit 33 was reviewed, a memorandum by him of November 26, 1941 to the Chief of Staff, concerning the location of the Japanese fleet, in which he commented that "present location other units of this task force are not known."

Mr. KEEFE. I had a recollection of that, Mr. Gesell, but in the mountain of things here some of these details are liable to escape, and I can't wonder that some of the witnesses can't recall everything that transpired.

Does that refresh your recollection?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You did comment on it, according to counsel. [4144]
Do you recall that now?

General MILES. I recall it now, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In view of the tension that existed on the 26th of November and the fact that the evidence shows here that almost everybody in the top echelons of command felt that the Japs might strike any place at any time that was an important fact?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The fact they had lost contact with one of the Japanese fleets, that was quite important, wasn't it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Was that followed through from day to day from that time on to try to find out what had happened, so far as radio was concerned, and did this black-out continue right up to the attack?

General MILES. I am sure it was, by Naval Intelligence, and I feel reasonably certain that I kept in touch with it, sir, but, as you see, my memory of what I knew 4 years ago is sometimes quite defective.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, I have observed that.

Well, now, as head of G-2, you were supposed to keep pretty well posted to give information to the Chief of Staff on what was going on, that was your job, in plain English, wasn't it?

[4145] General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, we had the Navy Intelligence, we had the FBI, and other sources, did we not, that were working in more or less close liaison?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And furnishing information back and forth between these various intelligence services; is that true?

General MILES. Yes, sir, that is true.

Mr. KEEFE. And what was going on out in Hawaii was of some importance during 1940 and 1941, wasn't it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was very important because of the fact that after the so-called China incident started in 1937 the overwhelming alien Japanese population and Americanized Japanese population was very tremendous in Hawaii; was it not?

General MILES. It was a very considerable part of the population; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you had means through your G-2 office in Hawaii of getting information as to what was going on there in Hawaii, did you not?

General MILES. Among the Japanese population?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MILES. We were always striving to do that, sir, [4146] and got a good deal of information.

Mr. KEEFE. The threat of possible sabotage was always present there, wasn't it?

General MILES. The threat of possible sabotage was always present, or subversive activity of some sort.

Mr. KEEFE. In fact, that had been so impressed upon your mind as chief of G-2 that you actually sent a message out to Short on the 27th warning him against sabotage?

General MILES. Among other things. I also warned against war itself.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now—

General MILES. But that message was not directed solely to Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have the benefit of the investigation that was conducted by the SEC out in Hawaii as to the illegal sale of Japanese war bonds in Hawaii and on the West Coast of the United States and the prosecution in court of those people responsible for it, did you have, as head of G-2, the benefit of that investigation?

General MILES. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know anything about it?

General MILES. No, sir, I do not now know anything about it.

Mr. KEEFE. You have no present recollection that it ever [4147] came to your attention as head of G-2?

General MILES. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you have any knowledge of the fact that the Navy had tapped a telephone wire of the Japanese consul at Hawaii prior to the 26th day of November, 1941?

General MILES. Mr. Congressman, I presume I did if it were done, if it were known to my naval colleagues, but it was one of those things I would have been very careful to forget as soon as I knew it or shortly thereafter.

Mr. KEEFE. I am asking you a simple question, General Miles. I understand the reasons for your answer, but I am asking you a simple question.

You were the head of G-2. Now, as head of G-2 did you know that the Navy had tapped the telephone wires of the Japanese consul prior to the 27th of November 1941?

General MILES. I am not sure that I knew that, sir. I have not a definite recollection now of knowing that specific item of information.

Mr. KEEFE. Did any information come to you that you now recall, through your liaison with the Navy, as to the contents of any intercepts obtained by the Navy through tapping the wires of the Japanese consul at Hawaii?

General MILES. I do not recall any, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know that the FBI had tapped the [4148] telephone in the house of the Jap consul and maintained that tap right up until the 7th of December, 1941.

General MILES. I may have, sir, but I do not now recall. What I do recall, Mr. Congressman, is many discussions with FBI and ONI regarding the tapping of telephones. You may remember there was a law passed by Congress—

Mr. KEEFE. Yes; they had to get authority to do it.

General MILES. May I finish?

We had weekly meetings, the head of FBI, ONI, and MID, and I remember that that was a very serious question at that time, the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Whether I knew that my colleagues were tapping the wires of the Japanese consul in Hawaii I do not now recall.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the only purpose of it would be to get vital information, isn't that true?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If any vital information was secured through that source, did it come to your attention?

General MILES. I do not now recall any vital information that came to me from that source.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall any information that came from that source, vital or otherwise?

General MILES. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In fact, you have no present recollection of [4149] anything connected with the incident?

General MILES. With the tapping of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul, I do not recall.

Mr. KEEFE. Were you familiar with the fact that the President had issued an order restricting certain areas for defensive purposes around the Hawaiian Islands?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were going to get that, Mr. Gesell. Did you get it?

Mr. GESELL. I did, Congressman. I had it in front of me and the question didn't come up again. It is item 3 of the Navy exhibit which was introduced on the first day of the hearing and the actual demarcations of those various areas are plotted on a chart. Item 3.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you were familiar with this order, whatever it was?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And do you know how extensive it was, as to how many miles of water it included around the Islands?

General MILES. No, sir; I cannot now recall.

Mr. KEEFE. And do you recall its terms at all, as to what it prohibited?

General MILES. It was a defensive sea area, as I remember it, and prohibited, I think, ships without special permission [4150] from passing through those waters.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there were a lot of Japanese fishing boats operating around the Hawaiian Islands in the period of 1941, were there not?

General MILES. There was, sir.

[4151] Mr. KEEFE. You knew about that?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that there were a large number of arrests of Jap operators of boats and convictions had for violation of the terms of this order, in the United States court out there in Hawaii in the year 1941?

General MILES. I don't remember knowing of how many arrests or what arrests were made. I do have a definite recollection of coming here before a committee of Congress in the summer of 1941, advocating very strongly a bill still further limiting the Japanese fishermen, particularly on the west coast, and in Hawaiian waters.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Jap fishermen during 1941 were fishing right in Pearl Harbor itself. That would be a matter of some interest, wouldn't it?

General MILES. It was a matter of great interest. The trouble was they were American citizens, very largely; couldn't get them.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you do know about the incident?

General MILES. I remember well we were very much worried about the Japanese fishermen in Hawaii and on the west coast waters, both the Army and Navy made strong representations to tighten the laws in that regard.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that starting in early 1941 [4152] alien Japs in Hawaii converted their assets, put all assets out of their hands, and it was well known out there. Did you know it?

General MILES. I do not now recall that instance, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would such a matter as that, if it had been called to your attention, have been considered to be of any importance?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, weren't you furnished with that information by your intelligence out there in Hawaii?

General MILES. I presume I was, sir, but I do not now recall it.

Mr. Congressman, there is before this committee exhibit A to the Army Pearl Harbor Board which is a document called Secret Summary of Far Eastern Documents, Military Intelligence Division. It is quite voluminous. It is, as a matter of fact, supported by some 15 or 16 volumes of photostats of documents.

Now, a great many of those things, all of these things of any importance, passed over my desk during during the quite considerable time than I was G-2. I regret to have to say that I do not recall an incident now, but I am trying to tell you, to give you the reason that I do not recall a great many things that undoubtedly I saw or knew at the [4153] time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you know that early in 1941, the civilian community out there in Hawaii formed special antisabotage squads, at the request of the commander of the local National Guard, and set up a complete system in Hawaii among the civilians to aid in the prevention of sabotage. Did you know that?

General MILES. That is one of those things that I do not now recall, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that early in 1941 under the auspices of local people in Hawaii they started a system of blood banks and that it was those blood banks which saved the lives of many, many people in this disaster on December 7? Did you ever hear of that as head of G-2?

General MILES. I may have, sir, but I do not now recall it.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that the Japs were using the radio out there in 1941 to broadcast certain innocent appeals for help or offers to sell this or that, over the radio, which, it later turned out, were coded messages being sent out over the commercial radio?

General MILES. I knew that there was commercial radio in Hawaii, and I knew some of it was in the Japanese language. I had heard it while out there.

[4154] Mr. KEEFE. Did your intelligence services report what I have stated to you?

General MILES. That radio broadcasts were made in Japanese?

Mr. KEEFE. No, not necessarily, but innocent broadcasts of—like a want-ad, in which these people were using a code to get information out over the radio that could be interpreted by the Japs? Did you know that?

General MILES. I do not now recall that any specific case of code being used in radio broadcasts in Hawaii was brought to my attention.

Mr. KEEFE. Who was the head of your G-2 in Hawaii in 1941?

General MILES. Colonel Fielder was G-2 of General Short's command in Hawaii.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know a Colonel George C. Bicknell?

General MILES. He was assistant to Colonel Fielder.

Mr. KEEFE. Where did he come from?

General MILES. Where did he come from, sir?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. What were his qualifications for that job?

General MILES. I don't know, sir. He was selected by the Commanding General, undoubtedly, or by the Commanding General, G-2. The overseas staffs, all the staffs of major [4155] units of the Army, were selected by their own commanding generals, not by the War Department.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. General Miles, a great many questions have been asked you about intercepts and matters of that kind.

As a matter, you had under your jurisdiction the whole case of intelligence, didn't you?

General MILES. Yes, sir, as prescribed by our Army regulations.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the handling of intercepts was just one of your responsibilities?

General MILES. Yes, sir, one of numerous responsibilities.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you, for the purpose of getting clues that might lead to important evidence, cause the newspapers of the country to be followed from day to day?

General MILES. Yes, sir, that was a regular routine duty of the military attachés of the countries to which they were attached, or military observers.

Mr. GEARHART. And if you obtained what you thought was important information from that source, that was reported to [4156]

the Chief of Staff just the same as any other evidence that you thought was—well, the same as the magic evidence?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Whether information was brought to the Chief of Staff depended solely on the value of that information, not its source.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, in the first place, you would evaluate it, and if you reached the conclusion that it was of importance, or might lead to something of importance, you brought it to the attention of the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I notice in the Army report, on page 51 of the United States News printing of that report, there is a quotation from the diary of Secretary Stimson as follows:

Then, at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

[4157] Now, that Monday would have been December 1, wouldn't it?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That was 1 week before Pearl Harbor.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there a rumor or a belief running through naval and military circles to the effect that there probably would be an attack a week ahead of the time that it occurred?

General MILES. I never heard that. I can't remember any rumor running through military and naval circles of a probability of attack on Pearl Harbor or Hawaii at any particular day.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I don't mean at Pearl Harbor, I mean any place an attack upon the United States by the Japanese.

General MILES. On that particular day, no, sir; I do not remember.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you read in the newspapers of December 1 that President Roosevelt rushed back to the Capital from Warm Springs, because of a crisis in the Far East, didn't you read that?

General MILES. I am sure that I read that, sir. I read my papers every day.

[4158] Mr. GEARHART. And did you not observe during that first week in the papers that the Japanese embassy was advertising and selling their automobiles for cash only?

General MILES. I do not now recall that that particular point was brought to my attention.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you remember this headline appearing in the Washington News at page 6 on December 3:

Japanese embassy sells four automobiles, demands cash—sign of the times—Japanese embassy is selling its cars?

General MILES. No, Congressman Gearhart, I am afraid I cannot remember that particular item. It was a week of growing crisis and many, many bits of information came to my attention but I do not recall that particular one.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, in view of the fact that they were demanding cash for their automobiles ought to be significant in view of the fact

that the times were becoming very tense and war was considered to be imminent. Did you follow those kinds of things closely?

General MILES. Yes, sir, but I think we had even better information from their own words in magic.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you observe the article which appeared in the papers on Saturday, November 29, an article [4159] which quoted Prime Minister Tojo of Japan, in which he was quoted as saying that he intended to purge the United States and Britain out of the Orient?

General MILES. I feel very sure that I read that at the time, sir. That speech created, as you know, quite a stir.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. To quote the article or his statement, rather, in order that the significance may appear in the record, it is:

Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of American and British communism because the United States and Britain desire to fish in troubled waters, throwing the Asiatic peoples against each other. This is the stock in trade of Britain and the United States and, therefore, we must purge this sort of action with a vengeance.

Now, did a speech by the Premier of Japan, who is supposed to lead the public in Japan, have any special impression upon your mind or cause you to do anything or to say anything which you would not otherwise have done or said?

General MILES. Congressman Gearhart, that speech made a great stir in this country. It, of course, was well known to the Chief of Staff as well as to me through reading it in the papers. I remember also that the Japanese then began to back water on it and say that it had not been reported accurately from the vernacular, and so forth, and there was a [4160] good deal about it in magic, all of which was known to higher authorities in the United States government.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did you ascertain through your Intelligence system that the Japanese embassy in Washington was writing letters, sending them around the United States, calling upon people to whom the embassy or Japanese nationals were indebted to get their bills in before December 7th at the latest?

General MILES. That is an item that I do not now recall that came to my attention.

Mr. GEARHART. I have here the photostat of a letter that was furnished me by the State Department as long ago as April 9th, which I think ought to be spread upon the record and I will read it. (Reading):

JAPANESE EMBASSY

Washington November 25, 1941.

DEAR SIR:

Referring to the booklet which you were so kind as to send to me at my request, I wish to have the articles of the annexed list delivered to me. I should like to have them before December 7th at the latest. As regards the payment, I will be much obliged if you will designate an agent in Washington, D. C. (or in New York) to whom I [4161] may be able to pay in cash; this may save me from encountering many technical difficulties of transfer of funds under the freezing order.

"I may add that the delivery of the commodities to me will be effected duty free at the American border. I must, however, notify the State Department beforehand and for that purpose I ask you to inform me of the approximate date of the passage of the goods.

Yours sincerely,

KOTO MATSUDAIRA,
First Secretary.

In the lower left hand corner is the name of the addressee:

Mr. Herbert S. Mills

Hamilton (Ontario) Canada.

Did your Intelligence Service encounter any other letters of that type?

General MILES. I do not remember ever to have heard of that instance. May I ask when that letter was intercepted?

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I do not know when it was intercepted but it bears the date of November 25, 1941.

General MILES. That is when it was sent.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the date the letter bears.

Now, did any of your men read the various magazines and try to keep abreast with what was happening which might throw [4162] light on the work which was yours?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I think there was a good deal of magazine reading in the department.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you or any of your men read The New Yorker of November 1941?

General MILES. I subscribe for The New Yorker, sir. I think I read it.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you encounter or did any of your men encounter and report to you an advertisement which appeared on several pages of one of those November issues, I have forgotten the exact date,¹ which contained the word "warning" in German, in English and Italian and a picture of a dice, upon one side of which appeared "12" and on the other side "7"?

General MILES. No sir; I have no recollection of that incident of seeing that advertisement.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it was all right to miss that one because that turned out to be a clever advertising scheme, but what I wanted to ask you about —

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the spelling of the word "dice"? Was it "d-i-e-s" or "d-i-c-e"?

Mr. GEARHART. I am not referring to the Dies Committee. I am referring to dice that you throw to hook that number 7.

Mr. MURPHY. I wondered how you got a 12 on it?

Mr. GEARHART. These were special dice.

[4163] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair hopes the committee will not get too much information on it.

Mr. GEARHART. The gentleman from Pennsylvania indicated a considerable knowledge of such things.

Mr. MURPHY. I heard about it.

Mr. GEARHART. The point is that the advertisement was strikingly conspicuous and strikingly significant, apparently, but it was not observed by your Intelligence Service or reported to you?

General MILES. I do not remember it as having been reported to me, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it threw the FBI into a dither. They sent out a thousand agents to find out what it meant but they finally ascertained that it was just good advertising.

General MILES. That occurred, I presume, after the attack.

Mr. GEARHART. I think so. Now, during the closing moments of the gentleman from Wisconsin's examination of you, or I think it was during the course of the examination by the Senator from Mich-

¹ Issue of Nov. 22, 1941.

igan, it was brought out that there had been an air alert in the Philippines for some time prior to December 7.

I will ask you if anything went over your desk or was brought to your attention which indicated there had been an [4164] air alert just prior to December 7 on Oahu, on Hawaii?

General MILES. I remember no such report, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, wasn't there an air alert ordered at Hickam Field on December 1 and continued throughout the week and called off on the afternoon of December 6, 1941?

General MILES. Not that I remember knowing of at the time, sir, or having heard of since.

Mr. GEARHART. You do not know of any reason why air alerts were called or staged as drills or as actual war exercises prior to December 7?

General MILES. Well, I, like all other officials of the War Department, supposed that they were on the alert. Anyway, it would be perfectly normal to have what I think you mean by air alerts; in other words, unexpected drills or calls on the Air Force as a matter of training and practice.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask counsel to investigate and ascertain for me if in fact there was not an all-out air alert at Hickham Field that began on December 1 and ended on December 6, a full all-out air alert which required the manning of antiaircraft guns constantly for 24 hours a day, the wearing of steel helmets and side arms or rifles.¹ In other words, a complete air alert for that 1 week.

I have a letter on my desk from a boy who went through [4165] it and went through the attack and he tells me that is the case and that is the source of my information. I would like to have it verified. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two questions.

Mr. GEARHART. And my inquiry, of course, would include the orders for the alert and the orders calling off the alert, the inspiration for those orders as far as they can be ascertained.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe has another question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I have one I want to ask some time also.

Mr. KEEFE. All right.

General, I have been making a little research to try to get myself adjusted to conditions out at Hawaii prior to this attack and, among other things, I show you an advertisement taken from the Honolulu Advertiser on August 24, 1941 which reads:

An important announcement concerning war risk and bombardment insurance. It is not too late to secure Lloyd's coverage for your property and home. Our connections are accepting individual commitments not in excess of one-quarter million dollars provided orders are placed on or before August 26th at 12 o'clock noon.

[4166] Did you ever see through your intelligence that type of advertising that was going on out in Hawaii in August of 1941?

General MILES. I do not recall having done so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would it have excited your attention had you seen it, to learn that Lloyd's of London were offering a quick response for the sale of war-risk and bombardment insurance to the people in Honolulu not later than August 26, 1941?

General MILES. I think it would have excited some interest, sir. Lloyd's were pretty sure that they were not going to be bombed.

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2490 et seq.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I agree with you, General Miles; they are pretty smart operators. And would it have excited your interest had you read in the newspaper of August 13, 1944, the same newspaper, a statement of the local manager of Lloyd's as to the reason that they were offering this war-risk and bombardment insurance to the citizens of Honolulu at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I cannot hear the gentleman. The voice is going to the back and I would like to hear the voice so that I can hear the questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair did not think it made any difference which way the Congressman's voice went; it can be heard.

[4167] Mr. KEEFE. Well, I tried to raise it so that there would be no question about it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. KEEFE. I am showing you this, General Miles, so that you can see from what I am about to quote.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, on August 13, 1944, this article appeared in the Honolulu Advertiser. I will read a portion of it [reading]:

Twelve million dollars of war bombardment insurance has been sold in Hawaii, but the insurance was written not because of the fear of war but for possible sabotage, W. P. Brandt, Pacific Coast representative for Lloyd's of London, told the Star Bulletin today.

Would that have indicated to you as Chief of G-2, that action upon the part of Lloyd's of London, that they expected to excite some interest in the sale of their insurance because of the possibility that existed of sabotage out there?

General MILES. Yes, sir; but I would have wondered slightly how they could persuade anybody that that would be sabotage by bombardment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I wondered exactly the same thing, because it is war-risk and bombardment insurance, that is the ad that they put in the paper August 24. If you had seen that [4168] would it have been significant to you at all as to what was going on out in Hawaii at this time?

General MILES. I do not think it would have told me anything that we did not already know, sir. Hawaii was a great outpost in the Pacific, as you have so ably stated before the committee, and in my years out there there were many times that we were fearing that war might come; they were constantly worried, the American population, particularly the military, about the possibilities of Japanese subversive activities of all kinds. I am afraid that it would not have excited very much curiosity on my part to know that Lloyd's was trying to sell some of its goods out there under war risk.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, as head of the G-2 did there ever come to your attention the so-called M-Day plan of the Yokohama Specie Bank on literature that was distributed to all your agents throughout the United States and the Hawaiian Islands?

General MILES. I do not recall that plan, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever hear that?

General MILES. I do not recall now hearing of it.

Mr. KEEFE. As head of G-2 did you ever see the M-Day plan that was circulated throughout the United States to the agents of this Mitsuibushi outfit that was the big purchasing agent for Japan? I

don't know whether that is the right name or not; that is as near as I can get to it, Mitsuibushi, or [4169] words to that effect?

General MILES. I do not recall, Congressman Keefe, having seen that.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that there was such an agency here in the United States, operating here?

General MILES. I have heard that name Mitsuibushi many times, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew that they were purchasing airplanes and machine tools and everything else for Japan?

General MILES. We have all known that Japan was buying everything she could in this country.

Mr. KEEFE. And that this outfit was one of the leading purchasing agents; you knew that, didn't you?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did it ever come to your attention that instructions had come to all of their agents here in the United States setting up a Jap specific M-day plan for the destruction of all of their correspondence, codes, and all material in 1941?

General MILES. No, sir; I have no recollection of ever having seen such a plan.

Mr. KEEFE. And that the same M-day order directed from the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., to all of their agents in America, spoke about a full and complete detailed plan for [4170] the destruction of all their codes and the conversion of everything into cash? Did you ever hear of that as G-2?

General MILES. I have no recollection of ever having heard of that plan, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You never had any such information given to you by the FBI or the SEC or any other agency of Government?

General MILES. I hesitated there because I do so clearly remember many talks with Mr. Hoover in our weekly meetings about the Japanese. I remember all of the joint operations that we went through, particularly in southern California, on the Japanese question, but I do not recall having been told by the FBI of any such plan.

Mr. KEEFE. Very well, we will try to get to it later by another witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper, I believe, has some questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Miles, I would like to ask you one question, if I may, please, with respect to magic or the intercepted Japanese messages.

As I recall, General Marshall testified we had finally reached a point during the war that about 10,000 people in this country and about 30,000 people in England were required in the decrypting, decoding, and translation of these messages. Did you happen to hear General [4171] Marshall's statement on that point?

General MILES. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that about in line with your recollection of that?

General MILES. Well, I had no recollection, Congressman Cooper. He was speaking of what happened at the very end of the war when I was not in any way in contact with the SIS or the naval communications.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You would not have any further information to give us on that point?

General MILES. No, sir. As to the growth of that activity I have no further information to give.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was my recollection, that he stated about 10,000 people in this country and about 30,000 in England were at one time during the war required to handle this decoding and translating process of these intercepted Japanese messages and that is about your understanding?

General MILES. That is my recollection of what the General testified.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 4 o'clock and I don't know how much longer it will require to conclude with General Miles, but if we could stay a few minutes longer and conclude with [4172] him it might be desirable to do so. Is the committee willing?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Lucas has some questions, too.

Senator FERGUSON. I have some, too.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the wish of the committee, to conclude with General Miles? Well, without objection we will go on for a few minutes. Go ahead, Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. General Miles, I became rather curious about that pouch that the Congressman from Wisconsin was talking about a little while ago.

Have you got one of those pouches left down there in the Department where you sealed up these magic messages?

General MILES. I have not seen one for many years, sir, but I think they still have them.

Senator LUCAS. What kind of a pouch was that? I would like to get a little more information on it. There seems to be a very much mooted question around here about the pouch. Just describe it to me if you can.

General MILES. Why, it was a brief case very similar to that, that we had made by Becker & Co., I think, here in Washington.

Senator LUCAS. Becker & Co.

General MILES. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Where do Becker & Co. live, or where [4173] do they produce this, what city?

General MILES. They are a leather shop on Connecticut Avenue.

Senator LUCAS. Right here in Washington?

The CHAIRMAN. They are on F Street.

Senator LUCAS. Are you sure now that we are not on F Street? It is very important to find out just where Becker & Co. is.

The CHAIRMAN. Camalier & Buckley are on Connecticut but Becker is on F Street.

Senator LUCAS. What kind of a key did that pouch have, General Miles?

General MILES. What, sir?

Senator LUCAS. What kind of a key did this pouch have?

General MILES. Well, the point was to get two keys which were quite separate from any other two keys for each pouch. That was the only point about insuring that they had the proper pouches.

Senator LUCAS. Do you still think you could find one of those things, one of those keys and one of those pouches and bring them up here before the committee so that we can inspect them?

General MILES. I will try to do so, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I think it is very important to the de- [4174] termination of this Pearl Harbor hearing and investigation, the type of pouch and the type of key you had at that particular time and as one member of the committee I would like to have you bring it in if you can find it. I want to inspect it thoroughly because it will have a great deal to do with my final judgment, what kind of pouch and key you had at that particular time.

Now, General Miles, one more question or two that I want to ask you. As G-2 you had under your control all of the magic messages that came in and all other information of every type and character, irrespective of where it might come from, with respect to what was going on at that particular time in our relations in the Far East.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I want to ask you this question based upon all of that information that you had: Did you as Chief of Staff possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman described the witness as Chief of Staff.

Senator LUCAS. I mean as G-2.

General MILES. I did not, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any specific and advance information as to the precise hour or day that Japan would [4175] attack this country or the British or the Dutch prior to the time that it happened?

General MILES. Only as what one might infer from the 1 o'clock message that we received on the 7th of December.

Senator LUCAS. I am not asking for your inferences or your implications. I am asking you whether you had any specific and direct information?

General MILES. The answer is no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And what information that you obtained as head of G-2, which was practically all the intelligence information of the country, was transmitted to—not all of it, but the principal parts of it, or anything that you deemed important was transmitted on to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. What is the question, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I say any information that you obtained as head of the Intelligence Department of the War Department at that time, if you believed that it was important enough you saw that the Chief of Staff got that information?

General MILES. I did, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And in turn the Chief of Staff saw that the Secretary of State or the President of the United States obtained that information?

General MILES. Presumably so.

Senator LUCAS. And the Secretary of War as well?

[4176] General MILES. Presumably so.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles, this may refresh your memory about this insurance. You were not able to see the Honolulu papers. Did you take the New York Times?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I personally took the New York Times. It was also taken by my division.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on August the 25th, 1941, on page 8 of the New York Times the headline is:

Lloyd's stop writing Hawaiian bomb insurance policy, by the Associated Press. Honolulu, August 24th. Lloyd's of London has discontinued writing bombing insurance for this outpost of the United States Pacific defense. W. B. Brandt of San Francisco, Lloyd's Pacific Coast representative, said new insurance was being refused "not because of fear of war but because of possible sabotage. Rates on bomb insurance here have risen from 10 to 50 cents for a hundred dollars protection. Policies total more than ten million dollars," Mr. Brandt said.

Now, if you would have seen that and you knew that a note was delivered after the President returned from the Atlantic conference parallel with England's note, would that [4177] have been of any significance, that Lloyd's of London had stopped writing bomb insurance on Hawaii?

General MILES. Well, Senator, I knew, of course, which was common public knowledge, that in those years, particularly after the first blitz of London, there was a lot of insurance business done in war risk and bombing of all sorts.

That Lloyd's had offered bombardment insurance in Hawaii and then had withdrawn the offer would not of itself have been particularly significant, only that they found certain people out there that would take up their bet and then when they recovered enough money they withdrew. I would certainly not have connected it with the rather secret message which the President of the United States had given on his return from Argentia to the Japanese admiral. I would certainly not have assumed that that was known to Lloyd's.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at that time that the British Government was very close to Lloyd's and this was at a time that Mr. Churchill had returned from the conference?

General MILES. I had heard that the British Government was pretty close to Lloyd's, yes, sir; but I did not know of my own knowledge and I do not remember ever suspecting that the British Government turned over their rather important secrets about the results of a meeting with the President of the United States to Lloyd's. I certainly would not have [4178] assumed it without some definite knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as I understand it, you had no knowledge whatever about this Lloyd's stopped writing, as the headline says, Hawaii bomb policies.

General MILES. I do not recall that at all.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you ought to see this. I think it will just refresh your memory if you come and see it, the way it is written, right under the picture.

Does that refresh your memory in any way? It is in right under the picture that has, "Keeping the Soviet soldiers in touch with events."

General MILES. No, sir; I do not now recall either the picture or that particular article.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one more question about the winds message. Was that in the purple code or the secret code messages, or was

that in the so-called embassy code which was, as a remark has been made in the record, "even the Dutch could break." Did you ever hear that expression before, "Even the Dutch could break it"?

General MILES. I think I have, Senator. I do not remember, sir. I would have to look that up, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you do that and find out on that?

[4179] General MILES. That is the wind code message?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. The two of them?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.¹ Do you know whether or not there was any sabotage at all at or after the attack in the Hawaiian Islands?

General MILES. After or before?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I believe that there was very little sabotage. I might note, however, that Senator, from my point of view I was not talking only of sabotage. You will notice that in my G-2 message I spoke of subversive activities which include sabotage and espionage.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all you included under that?

General MILES. Well, propaganda to destroy the loyalty or morale of our troops, any other subversive activity but principally sabotage and espionage.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you spend more time on that than you did on the other magic, and so forth, your department? Did they spend more time on espionage and counterespionage, and so forth, rather than on the magic?

General MILES. Well, magic, Senator, as, of course, you know, was only one part of our intelligence branch, the branch that was charged with getting information and collat- [4180] ing information, analyzing it and distributing it.

The other big branch of the Military Intelligence Division was counterintelligence. I think we spent more time, however, and devoted more effort on the getting of information and its final distribution than on the counterintelligence as we call it; in other words, the prevention of subversive activities of all kinds against the United States.

[4181] Senator FERGUSON. How many people had you in the magic department at the time of Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. I cannot tell you accurately, sir. Colonel Bratton undoubtedly can when he comes to the stand.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have any further questions?

Mr. GESELL. Just a few questions, Mr. Chairman, to straighten one or two matters in the record.

You have been asked, General Miles, whether the reference to sabotage in General Short's reply to General Marshall's message would have resulted if that message had been routed to you as a matter of course.

You recall that message says, "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage." Would not that reply be routed to you?

General MILES. The reply was not routed to me. The reply was routed, undoubtedly, by whoever handled it, which I never knew, by number.

In other words, it was a reply to a numbered telegram of the War

¹ In Hearings, Part 5, p. 2074, Mr. Gesell makes the statement that "both messages—SIS Nos. 25432 and 25392—were sent not in the 'purple' code, but in the code known as 'J-19.'"

Department and the reply was sent to that division of the General Staff, in this case the Chief of Staff, who had signed the original message.

Mr. GESELL. Now with respect to sabotage, do you know of any acts of sabotage that were committed at Hawaii before or during the attack by any Japanese-American or Japanese [4182] aliens on the Island?

General MILES. I do not, sir.

Mr. GESELL. With respect to the question of whether or not you were ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field, there is a contradiction, I believe, in the testimony between you and General Marshall. I understood you to say General Marshall ordered you not to send magic to the field, and I understand General Marshall to say you were authorized to send magic to the field as long as you did not send it in the form of a directive command.

What is the fact in regard to that?

General MILES. I do not think, sir, that I did testify that I was ever ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field. If I did, I was certainly wrong.

Mr. GESELL. I may have misunderstood you.

General MILES. What I did testify to was General Marshall's very keen interest, as well as my own, to preserve the secret of magic, and I felt sure he wanted it limited to as few people as possible, that really had to get the information that magic was conveying.

Mr. GESELL. So that we understand it clearly, there was no order of General Marshall, or anyone superior to you, written or oral, which prevented you from sending the summary or gist of the magic message to the field?

[4183] General MILES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now one other matter I think we should clarify.

You have been questioned at some length as to whether or not you knew of certain messages which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull handed to the Japanese Ambassadors. It is a fact, is it not, that those messages, the formal messages that appeared in the various publications we have here, when they were transmitted by Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese, were in turn submitted by the Japanese to their government through magic?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And that as a result of reading magic you knew at that time of every message that was handed by Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassadors?

General MILES. There again, sir, I question whether I have ever testified that I did not know of diplomatic exchanges between the United States Government and the Japanese Government or the Japanese Ambassadors here. If I have given that impression I certainly regret it.

I did know it through my liason with the State Department in general terms. I did know it on the Japanese side through magic.

What I did testify to, counsel, was that I was not in [4184] the group or called in for consultation or discussion by the group of higher policy-making individuals of the Government as between themselves and with the President of the United States.

Mr. GESELL. I was not referring to that testimony. I recall specifically your testimony in response to a question by Senator Ferguson that you did not know of the oral message handed by President

Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador in August of 1941, referred to sometimes here as the parallel action.

That was reported, was it not, in magic at the time by the Japanese Ambassador to his Government in Tokyo?

General MILES. That was, sir.

Mr. GESELL. And is it not a fact, General Miles, that all persons who were on the list to read magic, through that source saw all of the diplomatic exchanges, the formal diplomatic exchanges between this Government and Japan that were doing on during these negotiations?

General MILES. It is a fact that we saw all the exchanges as viewed in the Japanese eyes. Those messages which the Japanese repeated verbatim to their Government we read verbatim in magic.

Mr. GESELL. That is my point.

General MILES. Exactly.

[4185] Mr. GESELL. In other words, that formal communication was handed to the Japanese by our Government and they sent it verbatim to Tokyo and you, and others who read magic, read that message?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now with respect to the question of intercepting Japanese messages at Manila, do I understand your testimony to be this, that you now know there were, with the Navy at the Philippines, facilities for reading Japanese intercepts, but that at Manila, as far as you now understand it, Manila was able to decode only those messages which Manila itself intercepted. Is that a correct statement?

General MILES. That I do not know, sir, whether they were confined to only the messages which they themselves had intercepted. I testified originally that so far as I know, or perhaps I made it positive because I wanted to be positive whenever I could, the only decoding, decrypting facilities that we, the Army, had, or the Navy had, were in Washington. Then when I was confronted by General MacArthur's affidavit to Colonel Clausen, which I had never seen before, in which he said he was receiving magic, I thereupon asked my ex-naval colleague at that time, the head of Office of Naval Intelligence, "how about this?" He told me that was true, that they had a secret naval cryptographic section for the service of the Fleet and it was [4186] lodged in Corregidor. I did not go into the question of what codes they could break, or what messages they could break.

Mr. GESELL. For the information of the committee, Commander Leitweiler, or Captain Leitweiler—I forget what his rank was—is on our list of witnesses. He was in charge of that unit in the Philippines, and I think he can give the information to the committee that you are seeking on that point.

With respect to the question of Japanese ship movement, I think Congressman Keefe inadvertently referred to the fact that you obtained information concerning Japanese ship movements from magic.

That is not true, is it? The information concerning Japanese ship movements came from special radio direction finders that the Navy had, which was distinct from magic? Is that not a fact?

General MILES. That is true, sir. There may have been some reference to ship movements in magic, but the great mass of information which naval intelligence was accumulating on the Japanese Navy and on Japanese merchant ships came from radio intercepts.

[4187] Mr. GESELL. Now, on page 2470 of the record you were asked a question by Senator Ferguson to this effect:

"You knew that the Navy had a high-powered radio that you could have reached Hawaii with," referring to the event I believe, of the 7th, and you said, "I think I did, yes, sir."

Did you have any knowledge as to whether or not that radio was in fact able to communicate with Hawaii on the morning of the 7th, or did you mean only to testify that you knew the Navy had the radio station?

General MILES. The latter sir. I think that is the question.

Mr. GESELL. Now, at page 2437 of the record, referring to the 14th part, you said, "It has been delivered to the recipients about coincidentally with its delivery to me."

Do you know that as a fact of your own knowledge, that the 14th part was delivered to the recipients at the same time it was delivered to you?

General MILES. Not of my own knowledge, sir, because I did not deliver it to the other recipients, or see it delivered to the other recipients.

Mr. GESELL. When did Colonel Bratton tell you that he had called General Marshall on the morning of the 7th?

General MILES. I cannot place that hour, except it was [4188] fairly early on the morning of the 7th.

Mr. GESELL. Did he tell you when he had called, what time he called?

General MILES. I do not remember that he told me what time he called.

Mr. GESELL. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to clear up something. Would you show us the magic in the book, exhibit 1, that sent the message of the 17th of August?

Mr. GESELL. That is not in the book, Senator Ferguson. You will recall when that exhibit was introduced, we called the committee's attention to the fact that we had not reproduced the formal documents that had been exchanged between the Government, inasmuch as they were printed in the official publications of the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles, did not you say that you got the interpretation of the Ambassador to the message that was delivered to him on the 17th of August 1941, from magic, in the last questions here from Mr. Gesell?

General MILES. I think not, Senator. What I did say was that whenever the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington transmitted notes or conversations or documents received [4189] from the American Government to Japan through magic that I saw it in magic.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, what I want to know is where is that magic that transmitted the message of the 17th? There were two messages on that day, the 17th of August 1941. You were asked here by Mr. Gesell whether or not those messages did not come to your attention, and the interpretation of them, through magic, and you answered "yes."

Now, I show you exhibit 1, and ask you where that information is. General MILES. I would have to look that up. I have just been told by Mr. Gesell that it has not been published in Exhibit No. 1, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how could you answer his question that yiu did get it by magic? Do you have a special recollection that you got those messages by magic?

General MILES. Not at all, sir. I believe I testified, and I believe Mr. Gesell's question was to the effect: Did I receive, from my reading of magic, information that the Japanese were transmitting, as they were being sent by the Japanese ambassadors to the Japanese Government. That was the general question, and not specific as to the message on August 17. Was that not your question?

[4190] Mr. GESELL. That is exactly right.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you bring in tomorrow morning the magic that went out covering those two messages delivered on the 17th of August 1941?

I will ask you this question in relation to Colonel Bratton and the Navy radio. Did you hear General Marshall in a statement saying something to the effect that that radio had been offered on that day, and declined; that the Navy radio was offered and declined?

General MILES. I heard General Marshall's testimony to that effect; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that?

General MILES. I do not remember ever to have known it. I heard one side of the telephone conversation between General Marshall and Admiral Stark. I know nothing of what Admiral Stark said to General Marshall, except what General Marshall told us at the time Admiral Stark had told him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he mention that he had been offered the Navy radio and declined it?

General MILES. I am very sure that he did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you haven't any knowledge as to why the radio station of the Navy, which was a higher-powered station than yours, was not used?

[4191] General MILES. I have no knowledge of that fact, sir, at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything in the Army's record to show why you could not raise the Army radio that morning?

General MILES. I do not know, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look it up and bring in that information?

Mr. GESELL. Colonel French is going to testify to that, Senator. He is with the Communications Office.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know if there are any records. You will look and see and bring that in if there are any?

General MILES. They would be in the Signal Corps, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Cannot we wait until we get some Signal Corps witnesses?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have the magic on the 17th.

Mr. GESELL. We will bring it in for you.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. General, is there any other information in your knowledge pertinent to this inquiry about Pearl Harbor that has not been elicited by the questions asked of you at [4192] this inquiry that you would like to give to the committee?

General MILES. Senator, at the risk of taking up too much of the committee's time, I was asked by a Senator, or a member of the committee, if I had been investigated by any agent of the Secretary of War, or the Chief of Staff. I would like to answer that question very definitely, "no."

Also questions were asked me as to my relief as G-2 in connection with Pearl Harbor. I am perfectly willing to rest that matter on the testimony of the Chief of Staff, adding solely that I did have the honor and pleasure of serving as an assistant chief of staff to General Marshall something between two and three times as long as any other officer served as head of one of the general staff's departments while I was there.

[4193] The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General MILES. Nothing further, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the committee thanks you, General, for your very cooperative effort to bring out the information which the committee seeks, and the committee appreciates it very much.

On behalf of the committee, I thank you.

General MILES. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we recess, the Chair has obtained, through the courtesy of Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, two volumes of information called, "A Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation," consisting of volumes 1 and 2. This narrative was prepared at the suggestion of the Committee on Naval Affairs for its benefit. Senator Walsh has been kind enough to furnish enough of these to provide each member of the committee with one, that is, one set of two volumes each. They are marked "Confidential," but they are not confidential; and therefore they are public property now.

The Chair asks that they be distributed to each member of the committee at this time, so that they may have the benefit of them for their perusal. I think there may be two or three sets in my office that the press might use, if they wish.

[4194] The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 10 o'clock a. m., of the following day, Friday, December 14, 1945.)

Part 4—December 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945—follows.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 4

DECEMBER 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1945

Printed for the use of the
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WASHINGTON : 1946

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Schukraft, Robert E., Col.....								201	4910-4933 4659-4672
Schulz, Lester Robert, Comdr.....									
Settle, F. A.....	1579-1583								
Shaw, C. H., CH/T.....	1138-1146								
Shirley, J. P.....					2354-2360				
Shivers, Robert L.....	1401-1447				3201-3225			88-96	
Shoemaker, James M. Capt., USN.....	1191-1205								
Shoemaker, Thomas B.....					4366-4383				

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 21, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 16, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 10, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
Short, Arthur T.	37-169,		3644-3650	220-270				2921-3231
Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen.	1617-1647		276-541, 4411-4445					
Shortt, Creed, Pvt.	452-455							
Sisson, George A.			3265-3286					
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN							4-9	
Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen.					2	69		
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen.		32-65		528-572		195-197	335-375	3354-3378, 3521-3555
Smith, William W., Rear Adm.								
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN				1077-1081				
Smoot, Perry M., Col.	1738-1742							5009-5027
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr.					2			
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen.	1186-1190							2096-2223, 2244-2477, 5153-5175, 5202-5269, 5543-5555
Stag, W. F. CH/CM.	1805-1808			2-194, 320-324, 774-810				
Stark, Harold R., Adm.								
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR		323-334						
Stiphon, Benjamin L.			1539-1575					5416-5440
Stimson, Henry L.			4037-4094 C					5441-5463
Stone, John F.						203-204	411-413	
Street, George								
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen.						185		

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen.	1311-1329	Pages	Pages	Pages	Vol.	Pages	Pages	Pages
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col.	496-499	2722-2744	3120-3124					
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col.	1830-1842							
White, William R., Brig. Gen.			1989-2007					
Wichiser, Rea B.			2456-2478					
Wilke, Weslie T.	1334-1340	279-288					389-410	1723-1911
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm.						187-189		
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen.								
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen.	247-259		1345-1381					
Wilson, Erle M., Col.			910-931					
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col.			3663-3665					
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm.			1083-1090					
Wong, Ahoon H.			3677-3683					
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR						105-106	376-386	
Woodward, Farnsley C., Lt. (jg), USN							541-553	
							597-602	
Woolley, Ralph E.			3750-3773				442-450	
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr.		379-382						
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col.			3357-3586					
York, Yee Kam	1525-1538							3233-3259
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN	1683-1705							3303-3354
Zucca, Emil Lawrence			2580a-2596					

[4195]¹

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[4196] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, before General Gerow's examination continues I have a statement to present to the committee about the situation of the legal staff, if I may do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the chair will recognize counsel for that purpose.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, the point we have reached in the hearings makes it evident that a complete replacement of the committee's legal staff is necessary.

The committee began its hearings November 15 and has been sitting regularly for a month, including all Saturdays but one. During that period only 8 witnesses have been completely examined and we estimate that as the field of inquiry by committee members has widened out and new witnesses have been added to the list, there remain at least 60 witnesses to be examined. Many of these witnesses are quite as crucial as those who have testified. At the rate of progress during the past month, it seems certain that several more months of hearings will be required.

When I undertook to serve the committee as chief counsel, I believed that my services would not be needed beyond early January. This resulted from several factors:

I had and still have a definite conviction that the real purpose of this committee was to present facts which [4197] would permit a final answer to this basic question: Who was responsible for the failure of our forces at Hawaii to be on the alert and for the admitted failure to use to the best advantage such defense facilities as were available at Pearl Harbor?

The joint resolution of the Congress under which the committee is acting requires a final report of the committee to be made not later than January 3, 1946. I assumed that time limit meant what it said.

¹ Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.

I had every reason to feel that the essential facts bearing on this basic question could be presented thoroughly within the time set. There had already been six inquiries into this question. As a result we had as a starting point the testimony of most of the principal participants and a substantial amount of documentary material previously assembled. At the beginning of my employment, as I then informed the committee, I undertook with my staff to spend approximately 6 weeks in the preparation of evidence and I stated to the committee that commencing on or about November 15 we would be in a position to present in an organized and orderly fashion the evidence which we had assembled.

I have never had the idea, nor do I have it today, that counsel should be the sole judge as to what evidence should be presented to the committee or what avenues of inquiry the committee should follow. I thought that there are cer- [4198] tain essential facts, as to which there could be no doubt as to pertinence or relevance, which counsel should present at the outset in order to lay out the basic groundwork. I thought and so stated to the committee that at the conclusion of this presentation, which we had every reason to feel could be completed well within the time limit set, the committee would then be in a position to appraise the case as a whole and determine what additional evidence was required or whether any other witnesses should be called.

Since the start of the hearing it has become increasingly apparent that some members of the committee have a different view than that entertained by counsel, either as to the scope of the inquiry or as to what is pertinent evidence. This has been reflected in extensive examination by some members of the committee far beyond what the legal staff anticipated.

This unexpected development during the last month has made it clear to me and all of my staff that it is not possible to complete the hearings within anything approximating the time I originally anticipated, and, accordingly, I am certain of my own inability, and that of my staff, to see the job through to the end. All of my staff accepted their places on my expectation and assurances that they would not be held for any considerable time after January 1st. My own obligations and responsibilities put me in the same [4199] position.

This outcome is a source of deep concern and regret to me and to the other members of my staff. I did not want the place as counsel, but under the circumstances I felt I could not refuse it. I had hoped to perform a useful public service in aiding to present publicly all the pertinent facts which would permit the committee, the Congress, and the public to answer the questions in their minds. Our entire staff has worked days, nights, and Sundays for 2 months and a half. We have produced, or prepared for introduction, much pertinent evidence that has never been produced at any previous inquiry about Pearl Harbor. We are all depressed that because of the course of the proceedings we have not been able to present it.

It is necessary for me to ask the committee to arrange for other counsel to carry on. If that is done with reasonable promptness there should be no serious break in the hearings. We have already done a large part of the work in digging out and organizing basic material and documents, and arranging for the witnesses.

I want to make it clear that there has been no restriction placed upon counsel by any member of the committee or by any agency

of the Government as far as presenting pertinent evidence is concerned. We have had access to all pertinent records and have received complete cooperation from [4200] all Government departments concerned. I feel sure that this same condition will continue. We will make every effort to aid the new counsel in preparing for their work and, during that process, we can, if the committee desires, continue, for the rest of December and for a short time in January, presenting evidence to the committee so that the new legal staff can pick up the case and carry on.

[4201] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to state, in connection with that statement of our chief counsel, that in his opinion the development as outlined there is, as far as this committee is concerned and the Congress, the country I think, tragic.

I would like to say for the record that when this committee was appointed—I will go back of that, when the reports that were released of the War Inquiry Board and Navy Board of Inquiry, I think in August, there was a general feeling, in which I shared and so stated on the floor of the Senate, that the confusion growing out of the various investigations and reports was such that, in my judgment, it required a congressional investigation. I felt that it was a responsibility of the majority party in Congress to make that investigation and accept the responsibility and whatever the consequences might be, and believing that I introduced the resolution under which we have been acting since the 6th of September, I think, or since its adoption by the House.

One of the first tasks to be performed was the selection of counsel. That was not an easy task. We had a number of applications for appointment of chief counsel by able lawyers. I think the committee felt we would have to draft somebody, some outstanding man whose character and whose record for ability, integrity, and experience in legal matters, and [4202] especially in the Governmental setups, would insure a thorough and nonpartisan examination into this question.

The first name suggested, or that occurred to me and to other members of the committee, and I think generally, was Hon. William D. Mitchell, who had been Solicitor General 4 years in the Coolidge Administration, and had been Attorney General for 4 years in the Hoover Administration.

I called Mr. Mitchell over the telephone in New York and told him that I had been authorized to consult him as to the availability of his services, and he said that he had a busy law practice and he was not seeking any additional assignments, but if the committee felt that he was the man desired to conduct this investigation from a legal standpoint, he would accept.

I asked him to come down to Washington to sit with the committee and discuss it, which he did. He was unanimously selected, and the press generally, and the country, reacted most favorably to that selection, and I think both Houses of Congress did also.

The committee authorized him to select his own staff, because if he were to be responsible for the conduct of the investigation from the standpoint of the counsel, obviously it was necessary for him to select men with whom he could work and in whom he had confidence, and so he set about to [4203] make the selection of his assistants. No

injunction or suggestion was made to him, as far as I know, certainly not in the committee, and if anybody individually made any such suggestion I am not aware of it, that there should be any politics or any partisanship in the selection of counsel.

The chairman of this committee does not know now and has never inquired whether any member of this legal staff were Democrats or Republicans.

Mr. Mitchell came down and began to organize his staff and to look into the mass of records involved in this investigation. It was a herculean task, involving the State, War and Navy Departments, and other agencies of the Government, and, as Mr. Mitchell has said, they have worked day and night and Sundays in making available to the committee everything that appeared to be pertinent to the inquiry without restriction and immediately.

I, as chairman of the committee, asked all the departments, from the President on down, to make available to the counsel every bit of pertinent record or testimony that might bear upon this investigation.

The chairman of the committee has been, of course, as chairman, in touch with counsel. It was necessary to confer with him day by day over details that it was unnecessary and impossible for the committee to do as a whole. That is one [4204] of the functions of the chairman. The chairman is able to say, without reservation, that Mr. Mitchell, and his entire staff, have devoted themselves conscientiously, without sparing themselves in any way, in undertaking to develop the evidence that the committee might want or might feel that it needed in order to make an investigation available to the public and held in public, so that the people themselves would know every word of testimony produced here and make up their own minds about the responsibility of anybody in the Government for the disaster at Pearl Harbor, regardless of the opinion of any member of the committee, or of the committee as a whole.

The chairman feels like saying to Mr. Mitchell, and to his entire staff, that in his experience as a legislator covering 33 years, and a longer experience in public life and in the practice of law, he does not recall a more diligent, earnest, painstaking, unselfish effort made by a lawyer or group of lawyers to perform their services as a public duty.

When Mr. Mitchell was asked to come down here he insisted that he did not want to consider any question of compensation, that what he did would be a matter of public duty.

One or two members of his staff have insisted likewise, that they were not interested in any compensation that the committee or Congress might pay them. They have sacrificed their time and income in order to serve this committee and, [4205] as they felt, serve the country and do a constructive job in presenting this case, in presenting the evidence and in digging it out, which the committee could not do as a committee.

Late yesterday afternoon Mr. Mitchell called me, as chairman of this committee, into the office where he and his staff had been engaged in work and advised me that they would be compelled, under the circumstances, to take the step which they have now taken. I attempted to dissuade them from that decision and asked them to consider it overnight, in the hope that they might reach a different conclusion. They have not reached a different conclusion.

Now it is a tragedy that we are to lose the services of these gentlemen. To select new counsel at this time, or within the next week or two, involves a difficulty the result and solution of which I cannot now foresee. I do not know to what extent any lawyer, or any group of lawyers, who are engaged in their own practice, who have a reputation and standing as lawyers and as citizens that would justify their selection by this committee, would be available.

The chairman does not know whether it would be possible at all under the circumstances to substitute counsel who would be in a position to undertake the onerous task which would devolve upon such counsel, notwithstanding the groundwork which has been laid by the counsel and his assistants.

[4206] The Chair expresses his profound regret that the situation, as it has developed up to now, has required the action taken by General Mitchell and his assistant counsel. I cannot make any prediction. I have no idea who might be willing to take over the job. I have no idea how much longer these hearings will last.

When I introduced the resolution and fixed the 3d of January as the date for making the report I honestly believed that we could, within 4 months from that date, bring about the development of this evidence publicly and make our report on the 3d day of January. On account of the mass of detailed information and documents that had to be gone into by the counsel, it took some time to arrange all that and to get it available, and there was a little more delay in the beginning of the hearings than I, at the time of the introduction of the resolution, anticipated.

[4207] On the whole, I think that was a timesaver in this respect; that it gathered and selected and made available the information from the standpoint of the presentation of the case, and that that delay which was necessary as it turned out did not in any way cause any undue postponement of the beginning of the hearing.

It is obvious now to all of us that the hearings cannot be concluded and the report made by the 3d of January, and that an extension of time must be requested of the Senate and House. How much more time will be required, the Chair would not even prophesy.

We have had, as General Mitchell has said, 10 witnesses up to now, only 8 of whom have been concluded, as far as the examination is concerned, with 2 more still on the stand and unconcluded, and at the rate of progress made in the examination of these witnesses, it would be difficult to prophesy how many months it would require to conclude this testimony.

The chairman wishes to say that he not only did not seek appointment to this committee, notwithstanding the fact that he introduced the resolution, he did not seek appointment to this committee, but protested against his appointment and argued with the President of the Senate for days, seeking to persuade him not to appoint the chairman as a member of the committee.

[4208] As majority leader of the Senate I had all that any ordinary human being could be expected to do, and I realized that in order to give this position the service and to do the justice to which it was entitled, I would have to abandon my duties temporarily as Majority Leader, and almost as a Senator.

I must, in my own mind, decide whether I have any further duty in regard to this investigation, and whether, if I have any duty, it

outweighs my duty on the floor of the Senate in the capacity in which I have been chosen by that body, and in which I served for more than 8 years.

I must say in good conscience, and say it publicly, and I think the committee is entitled to have me say that during the next few days I will weigh my relative objections as a member of this committee alongside of my obligations as a member of the Senate and as Majority Leader, and if I conclude in my own mind that I must make the decision that my duties in the Senate over the next 3 or 4 or 6 months, whatever the time may be outweigh my duties as a member of this committee I shall thereupon surrender my chairmanship of this committee and resign as a member of the committee.

If I conclude in my own mind—and I must again say [4209] I must reach the decision myself—that I can render any additional service as a member of this committee over a period of months, and that that service and that obligation may outweigh my obligation on the floor of the Senate, I shall decide accordingly. But I feel that, in view of the whole situation as we all understand it here, I must within the next few days reach a conclusion as to what my course will be.

Whatever my course will be, I want chief counsel and all his assistants to know that I have appreciated their contribution to this development in this public hearing, and to the evaluation of the testimony, and the service which all of us have assumed they would and that they have rendered.

I have never in so brief a time been associated with men in the legal profession or in legislation for whom I have a more profound respect and in whom I have greater confidence, and I want them to know that as far as I am concerned, and I think I speak for the committee in that respect.

That is all I feel like saying. I cannot but feel depressed, immeasurably depressed over this development and I don't think I need say anything more at the moment.

Senator GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to [4210] make a very brief statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I think the Chairman of the committee knows, and I know the President of the Senate well understands, I have remained on the committee because I felt we were fortunate in securing the assistance and aid of General Mitchell.

I have been perfectly willing from the outset to allow General Mitchell and his staff, in whom I have complete confidence, to organize and lay out this inquiry. I have believed that there was not but one way to ascertain the truth and answer the question, which, under the Senate resolution we were called upon to consider, and that was to get a complete view of the pertinent, relevant, and material facts that could be developed only through the conscientious work and skill of counsel.

Of course, I recognize the right of all members of the committee to cross-examine witnesses at any length, but I have wondered whether or not we were confusing the issue rather than arriving at any answer in which the public could have any confidence. I still feel that way about it.

I deeply regret General Mitchell's decision and the decision of the other members of his staff. I appreciate [4211] the facts stated by General Mitchell to this committee this morning, and I think it is only fair to say that all members of the committee understood that General Mitchell hoped to conclude the inquiry by or very soon after the turn of the year, as he has already stated to us.

I merely wish to say that I deeply regret the decision which General Mitchell and his staff have been forced to make in the circumstances, in view of the now clearly indicated length of this inquiry, and I know that their separation from service here with this committee is a loss to the committee, to the Congress as a whole, and I think to the country.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word?

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I desire to concur in what the able Senator from Georgia, and the able Senator from Kentucky have said with respect to this announcement of General Mitchell this morning. It is a source of deep regret to me that General Mitchell and his staff feel it necessary to leave this extremely important national assignment, and I say without fear of contradiction that it is a great loss to the American people, in view of the magnificent job that they have done up to date.

I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that General Mitchell [4212] and his staff will continue through this month, and that these hearings may continue from day to day just as we have planned them.

It may be that by January 3, we will have a better opportunity to assess the time necessary to conclude the hearings. Of course, in the meantime we can be arranging for counsel to take over should the contingency arise that it will be necessary to extend this hearing.

I want to say in conclusion, as one member of the committee, I had never met any of these gentlemen before beginning my service with the committee.

I had frequently read and heard about General Mitchell. The first time I ever met him or saw him was when he appeared before our committee for the first time. I was deeply impressed with his frank, opening statement. I concurred in what he wanted to do. That was to bring in every shred of evidence that they could possibly find that would throw any light upon this Pearl Harbor disaster. Counsel selected to aid him in this cause have been more than diligent in the preparation of this case.

I again reiterate that it is a tremendous loss to this committee and to the country that these fine men feel it necessary to remove themselves from their assignment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman would like to say that [4213] General Mitchell and his staff have assured him that they will continue until the committee takes its recess for the Christmas holidays. It has been my thought that we would recess for the Christmas holidays probably Saturday, the 22nd, but it may be more convenient for some members to recess the 21st. Under the circumstances, it doesn't make much difference, apparently. So that we will have the services of General Mitchell and his staff until such time as the committee recesses for the holidays, and in the meantime we may be able to assess the situation more accurately.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to detain the committee longer than to concur with the Chairman, the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Illinois in the remarks they have made.

It had not been my privilege to know General Mitchell or any of the members of his staff prior to the time they were selected for work with this committee.

I have been most favorably impressed by all of them. I think they have done an outstanding job, and have rendered an outstanding public service. As a member of the committee I regret exceedingly that the situation has developed so [4214] that they feel they must not continue longer than the end of this month in the excellent service that they have rendered the committee.

It is a matter of very great regret that the situation could not have developed so that we could have gone on with this investigation as was originally planned, outlined, and understood, and under the able guidance of General Mitchell and his staff.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman —

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to state on the record that in my judgment, Mr. Mitchell has held positions of great honor in this country; he has an outstanding reputation as a lawyer; he and his staff have been able, conscientious, sincere, thorough, and have thus far made a clear presentation of the facts in this inquiry.

I regret that it has been necessary for him and his staff, in view of the developments, to come to the conclusion they have.

[4215] The CHAIRMAN. General Gerow, I believe, is now here and ready to proceed. I have forgotten who was examining.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Counsel was examining.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, I understand you have in mind asking for some corrections in the transcript of your testimony?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you like to present them now?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

In reviewing my testimony given before this committee on 5 December 1945, I have found several statements made by me which for purposes of the record should be clarified:

(a) On page 2643, lines 24 and 25, and page 2644, lines 2 and 3, committee counsel stated as follows:

Go to the third item in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5: please look at that and give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan is, or was?

The bound folder which was handed me contained two documents, i. e., Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and a revision thereof dated November 19, 1941. I apparently read from the revision rather than the original [4216] document. Since

the War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5 was based on the original joint plan and not on the revision thereof and since it is therefore my belief that I should have identified and quoted from the original plan, my statement as it appears on page 2643, lines 24 and 25, and page 2644, lines 2 and 3, should have been as follows:

There are two plans in this folder: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and a revision thereof. The original plan was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 28 May 1941 and by the Secretary of War on 2 June 1941. It was never approved by the President. The revision of the plan was approved by the Joint Board on 19 November 1941.

I can best describe this plan by quoting the general assumptions as stated in the original Rainbow No. 5 plan.

"Section III. General Assumptions. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:

"a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or

"b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

"That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in [4217] accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

"That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

"That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

"That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense."

Again:

(b) On page 2646, lines 11, 12, and 13 in commenting on the fact that the War Department Operations Plan which you handed me bore no date, I stated:

I know it was sent to Hawaii in August, 1941, and the receipt was received back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.

This would have been more accurately stated as follows:

This plan was approved by the Chief of Staff and sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department in August, 1941. [4218] The records of the War Department show that a receipt for this document, dated 3 September 1941, from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was received in the War Department on 15 September 1941.

Again:

(c) On page 2646, lines 14, 15, and 16, the committee counsel stated as follows:

The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Projects, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell me the scope and nature of that document and the date.

My answer to that should have been as follows:

Yes, sir. This document was prepared in Hawaii. It is a local plan or rather defense project based on Joint Army and Navy War Plan (Orange) 1938.

Again:

(d) On page 2647, lines 14 to 17, the committee Chairman stated:

May I ask of the General: You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in August, 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates?

I see that my answer to that question was not quite clear. It would have been better answered as follows:

This defense project was not based on War Department [4219] Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5 approved in August, 1941. This document is a compilation of approved projects for personnel, armament, matériel and funds. It was compiled by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as of December 1, 1940.

This document was referred to the War Department where the separate projects contained therein were reviewed to determine that they were in accordance with approved War Department directives. When new separate projects, submitted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, were approved by the War Department the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was notified by letter or radio that these projects were then included in the next compilation of this document.

The 1940 edition of the Hawaiian Defense Project is based on the Army mission as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, which is substantially the same as that contained in War Department Operations Plan—Rainbow #5, August 1941.

Again:

(e) On page 2647, line 25, and page 2648, line 2, committee counsel asked the following question:

The next item is joint coastal defense plan, Hawaii. What is that?

My answer would have been more clearly stated as follows:

[4220] This is a joint plan that was prepared by the local Commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy. It is based on the joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans and the Army and Navy plans furnished by the War and Navy Departments.

(f) On page 2650, lines 23 and 24, committee counsel in questioning me regarding the "5 November, 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department," asked:

Did you see that document before December 6, 1941?

to which I replied:

I don't recall ever having seen it before December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it came in later in 1942.

I have since had the War Department records checked and find that that document was received in the War Department on March 7, 1942.

The purpose of most of those corrections, sir, is to correct the dates, that I did not have with me at the time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, I want to direct your attention to the events of December 6 and 7, 1941, and particularly in relation to this so-called 14-part message that was intercepted, the message from the Japanese Government to their Ambassadors in Washington, of which 13 parts were translated before midnight and the 14th part and the 1 p. m. part on the morning of the 7th.

[4221] You have that in mind, have you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you tell us, if you remember, what your movements were on the afternoon and the evening of December 6. Have you any recollection of that?

General GEROW. No, sir; I have no clear recollection of where I was on the afternoon of the 6th.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am more interested in the evening of the 6th, after the dinner hour. Do you remember that?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not recall. I believe though, sir, that I was at home.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, if this 13th part of this message had been translated, decoded and translated, by the Signal Corps, Signal Intelligence Service, it was their custom to deliver the decoded message, or exhibit the decoded message, to you in your office, was that the practice?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; that was the practice.

Mr. MITCHELL. In case of your absence from the office, for instance, on the evening of the 6th, was there anybody there in War Plans Division whose function it was to receive the copy of the decoded message or make any effort to reach you?

General GEROW. No, sir; there was no one actually in the office. The procedure, sir, was to designate what we [4222] call a duty officer for each day. The responsibility of that duty officer was to remain—he could go home—but he remained at his telephone so he could be reached at any time by the Adjutant General or the Office of the Chief of Staff. He could get in touch with me and inform me of any important messages that might be intended for me, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. If the Signal Intelligence Service people translated a message of that type on the evening of the 6th, what would be the practice that they would follow in endeavoring to have copies of it delivered to the War Plans Division or to you or to a duty officer, how does that work?

General GEROW. I think, sir, if they had an important message to deliver to me that Colonel Bratton, who usually delivered those messages, would have telephoned me at my home, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In other words, the message would go from the Signal Corps, Signal Intelligence Service, to G-2, would it, and then to you, or would it come direct to your office?

General GEROW. It was delivered to my office by a representative of G-2.

Mr. MITCHELL. G-2. So that in order to reach you personally a decoded copy of such a message would pass first through G-2 and then to your office or your duty officer?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; that would be the procedure, sir.

[4223] Mr. MITCHELL. So that on the evening of the 6th if G-2 wanted to place a copy of such message in your hands, their arrangement would have been that they would have to call your duty officer, locate you through him?

General GEROW. No, sir. My telephone number was on record in the War Department and I believe the representative of G-2 would have called me directly rather than calling the duty officer.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you on the night of the 6th receive any copy or learn of any such message as the 13-part message?

General GEROW. To the best of my knowledge and belief I did not, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There was a pilot message which came in earlier and which was an announcement by the Japs to their Ambassadors to look out for the long message which was to follow. It is found on page 238 of exhibit 1.

Will you look at it and see whether you ever on the 6th were informed of the receipt of that message, or if you have any recollection about it?

General GEROW. I do not recall having received that message, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is your recollection about going to your office or to the War Department on the morning of Sunday, December 7,

1941? Do you remember your movements on that [4224] morning?

General GEROW. I remember, sir, that I went to the office that morning. I believe I arrived there shortly before 10 o'clock. There was some unfinished business that I had to take care of with some of my senior officers and we met there on Sunday morning and were there. I think, prior to 10 o'clock, sir.

[4225] Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see or learn of this fourteenth part and 1 p. m. decoded series of messages on the morning of the 7th at any time?

General GEROW. The first time I saw them, sir, was in the office of the Chief of Staff about 11:30, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state what occurred there?

General GEROW. May I refresh my memory? I submitted a memorandum on that shortly after the event.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you produce that memorandum? It is in evidence as exhibit 39, and it has already been read to the committee, but will you please look at it?

General GEROW. Shall I read it, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; I think it would be well to do so, and bring out the contents again.

General GEROW. It would be much more accurate than my memory, sir, at the present time.

This is a memorandum for record, dated December 15, 1941:

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 a. m., e. s. t., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Govern- [4226] ment instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The penciled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG, Caribbean Defense Command; CG, Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the penciled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes, and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about 30 minutes. The penciled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

Signed, "L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff."

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember anything more about that incident than is stated in your memorandum?

General GEROW. No, sir; I cannot recall anything that is not stated in this memorandum, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Before you went to General Marshall's office at his request, had you heard from anyone of the receipt and decoding of that message?

General GEROW. I had not, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you seen or talked with Colonel [4227] Bratton about it?

General GEROW. To the best of my knowledge and belief I had not, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had General Miles had any conversations with you about it before you went to General Marshall's office?

General GEROW. I do not recall having seen General Miles that morning until I saw him in the office of the Chief of Staff at 11:30, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Referring back to the period from November 27 on, after the so-called alert messages were sent out to the commanders of the overseas stations, do you recall that after that warning of the 27th, which you sent over General Marshall's signature to the commander at Hawaii, and to others, any discussion took place that you participated in, or knew about as to sending any additional warnings?

General GEROW. No, sir. I do not recall any discussions on that point.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think, if the committee please, that that is all I have at the present from General Gerow. I suggest the committee inquire from him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Gerow, you were head of War Plans Division at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, [4228] as you have testified?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You participated in the drafting of the message of November 27 to the commanding general of the Hawaiian department, and the other commanders to whom that message was sent?

General GEROW. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you regard that message to the commanding general of the Hawaiian department as adequate and sufficient as an alert message?

General GEROW. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. I have no questions at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that someone else will ask every question that I could possibly think of, so I defer any questioning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. I have no questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire.

Mr. MURPHY. General Gerow, there has been some testimony in the several hearings, by Colonel Bratton, about some attempt to get in touch with someone in your office, as I [4229] recall it, to deliver the 13-part message. Have you made any inquiry as to whether or not any attempt was made to deliver that by actually making contact with someone on your staff on the night of December 6, 1941?

General GEROW. I have made no such inquiry, sir. I think if any of my officers had been contacted on that important message, they would have informed me, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you did not, as you presently recollect have any notice whatsoever of the 13-part message until you arrived in General Marshall's office on the morning of the 7th?

General GEROW. That is the first time I recall having seen that message.

Mr. MURPHY. There has been some testimony in the previous hearings about a pouch that was delivered on the night of the 6th. There has been some doubt as to what actual papers were in that pouch,

whether it was the 13-part message or the so-called pilot message, and other papers of the afternoon of the 6th. Do you know whether you ever received the pilot message prior to your going to General Marshall's office?

General GEROW. I do not recall having seen this message, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know what the pilot message as [4230] referred to here, is?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, do you recall having been in General Marshall's office when Colonel Bratton was sent to the Signal Corps end of the War Department to inquire as to how long it would take to dispatch the message of December 7 to the Pacific theaters?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I was in his office at the time and I recall that, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. After Colonel Bratton was sent, or directed by General Marshall to make that inquiry, do you recall his returning to General Marshall's office?

General GEROW. I can recall that he came back and reported that it would take about 30 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that to send it to all of the Pacific theaters, the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Department, the Philippine Department, and possibly Alaska?

General GEROW. I don't recall that that question came up at the time, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, the message had been directed to be sent to the several Pacific theaters?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, after the message of the 27th was sent, you said the other day that it was your impression [4231] when the Short reply arrived that it was in answer to the other messages sent as to sabotage, rather than in answer to the command for an alert from General Marshall. At that time the gentleman from Wisconsin suggested that you be asked about the fact that it was signed "Marshall," that is, the message going out. And the answer was directed to "Marshall." Do you recall that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Of course, the Short message did say that it was in reply to 472. You would not know then what 472 was; is that right?

General GEROW. I would not know at that time; no, sir, because that is a number put on to the message by the Signal Corps, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the war plans, in effect at Hawaii between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, called for cooperation and liaison in regard to reconnaissance, and in regard to the use of the equipment there in the event of an emergency, did it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. It was the standing rule over the years for the War Department at Hawaii, and the Navy Department to have liaison, was it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4232] Mr. MURPHY. So that when General Short sent the message in reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th, and said "Liaison with Navy," did you think that General Short would send a message in answer to a war direction or an alert message that would

merely say they had been doing what they had been doing over the years, having ordinary liaison with the Navy? Do you understand my question?

General GEROW. I don't quite understand it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, for years, and always, as I understand it, there was supposed to be liaison at any outlying theater between the Army and the Navy. That is a fact, is it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the message of the 27th was a war alert, as I understand it, and then the reply of General Short was to the effect, "Liaison with the Navy."

Would you, as head of the War Plans Division, expect that a lieutenant general at Hawaii would take the time to send a telegram merely saying to General Marshall that he was maintaining the same liaison with the Navy that he had been over the months prior to receiving an alert message?

General GEROW. No, sir. I think in that case, that [4233] that phrase would have a different meaning.

Mr. MURPHY. Would it not be fair to assume that in view of the message of General Marshall, that the reply of General Short, "Liaison with the Navy," meant that there had been an actual conference with the Navy, a discussion of plans to meet the war warning message from the Navy and the war warning message from General Marshall, and that the necessary steps had been taken to put into effect the plan which they had already prepared to have proper liaison, proper cooperation, and an all-out alert, or the necessary alert to meet the impending danger?

General GEROW. The message was susceptible of the interpretation that you have outlined, sir.

[4234] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate Colonel Bundy saw the message, did he not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And Colonel Bundy was the man on your staff whose duty it was to follow up on messages of that kind and to see whether or not they were responsive to the Marshall message of the 27th; is that right?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, as I understand it, Colonel Bundy unfortunately met his death on the way to Hawaii immediately after Pearl Harbor?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did Colonel Bundy leave any kind of a memorandum in the War Department files which would explain his reaction to the General Short telegram of the 28th?

General GEROW. I have had the records searched very carefully and I can find no such record and I don't recall of my own knowledge having talked to Colonel Bundy about that after December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster is still absent. Therefore Congressman Gearhart may inquire.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I just clarify the record on one point?

[4235] Will you give Colonel Bundy's initials, will you furnish them?¹

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I know his first initial was "C," but I don't know what his middle initial was.

Mr. MURPHY. There has been reference by General Marshall to a Mr. Bundy who was an assistant, as I understand it, a civilian assistant to Secretary of War Stimson.

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was he a separate and distinctly different person from the Colonel Bundy in the War Plans Division?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. Mr. Bundy in the Secretary's office was a civilian. Colonel Bundy was an officer of the Regular Army. His first name was Charles. I don't recall his middle initial.

Mr. MURPHY. If there had been liaison with the Navy in accordance with the war plan already drafted and ready for execution at Hawaii, in your judgment would we have had the same result on December 7 which we actually had?

General GEROW. No, sir. I think if the means on hand had been properly alerted and properly used that the damage that the Japs did at Pearl Harbor would have been considerably less.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel had a message commencing with the words, "This is a war warning." General Short had [4236] a message putting him on warning that hostilities might commence at any moment. If there had been a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and a discussion of the plans necessary to meet that situation and a putting into effect the kind of plan they already had, you say there would have been a different result on December 7?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I believe the damage would not have been so great.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart is now recognized.

Mr. GEARHART. General Gerow, you have been present in the hearing room during the examination of General Marshall, have you not?

General GEROW. Only one afternoon, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you here when I, on two different occasions, referred to the seven intercepted Japanese messages, messages which either asked for information or supplied information with reference to ship movements in the Hawaiian area?

General GEROW. I don't believe, sir, I was present when you asked those questions. May I see the messages, sir?

Mr. GSELL. You are referring to the ones in exhibit 2, are you?

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair ask the photographers not to interfere with the examination of the witness.

[4237] Mr. GEARHART. I am referring to the intercepted messages which appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15, seven messages in all.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I have those; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes. Now, those messages, each one of them, refer specifically, do they not, to the Hawaiian area?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. They are from Tokyo to Honolulu and Honolulu to Tokyo. Now, the first of these messages divides the Hawaiian area, the island with the name of Oahu, they divide this island into seven areas for purposes of subsequent exchanges of intelligence between Honolulu and Tokyo, do they not?

¹ Col. Charles W. Bundy.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the other messages either called for reports of ship movements in that area, or render reports on ship movements in that area, do they not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And there is one of the messages which reveals a little impatience on the part of Tokyo in respect to the information they were getting, asking for reports not only when ship movements occur but when they do not occur, is that not correct?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4238] Mr. GEARHART. Now, in your opinion, after reviewing those seven messages will you not say that they reveal an inordinate interest in our Navy's operations in the Hawaiian area on the part of the Japanese?

General GEROW. They certainly indicate interest in those movements, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, none of those messages were called to the attention of General Short or Admiral Kimmel so far as you know?

General GEROW. No, sir; not so far as I know.

Mr. GEARHART. Why were they not called to their attention?

General GEROW. I believe, sir, that G-2 can testify to that better than I can, sir. They are not messages on which the War Plans Division would normally be called upon to direct special operations.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, the War Plans Division of which you were the head makes plans for warfare and for defense, doesn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then aren't you charged with an interest in plans I have described that are being made—

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). By a nation that might be [4239] an enemy of ours?

General GEROW. I had a very decided interest in it, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do not these seven messages react on your mind as possible evidence of war plans that were being perfected by Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; they do so react but at the moment, sir, these messages were brought to me in a locked despatch case. I cannot recall now whether they all came together or not. I cannot recall whether I saw all of them or not. They were taken out of the despatch case and read by me and handed back to the officer. I did not attempt to evaluate the magic messages that came to me, sir. If there were any that struck me at the moment that they were especially important I would usually contact G-2 and discuss those particular messages with him.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if it is not your precise duty to read the intercepts that are brought to you and very material, to read, to understand, to evaluate and to recommend action, what was your function in reading them? Why were they submitted to you?

General GEROW. They were submitted to me, sir, as a matter of information, to keep me informed as to the general situation. As I stated before, if there had been a message [4240] in the intercepts that conveyed to me the idea that Japan was probably going to attack any place in the globe I would consider that it required action on our part, sir, and to draft a warning message and take it

up to the Chief of Staff. I did not so interpret those messages at that time, sir, as I now recall.

Mr. GEARHART. You knew that relations with Japan were very rapidly deteriorating, did you not?

General GEROW. I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You were being advised of that by other Army and Navy high responsible officers, weren't you, from time to time?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And even though you knew our relations with Japan were rapidly deteriorating, knowing also that, I believe, the American Navy was, ship for ship, very much inferior to the Japanese Navy in the Pacific, the fact that Japan was asking for definite information concerning our Navy over and over again and dividing the Island of Oahu into areas did not impress you as important information?

General GEROW. I do not recall, sir, having seen these particular messages. I presume that I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was your duty not only to see them but to read them, to understand them, to evaluate them and [4241] recommend action upon them, wasn't it?

General GEROW. No, sir; it was not my duty to evaluate all the magic that came to my office, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It ceased to be your duty to evaluate them in August of 1941, did it not?

General GEROW. I did not understand the question, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was your duty to evaluate them, prepare action upon them with recommendations to the Chief of Staff prior to August of 1941, was it?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Didn't you receive a directive from General Marshall in August of 1941 to thereafter not merely evaluate and send your recommendations in but to send the original material itself to his desk, is that not correct?

General GEROW. No, sir; I had no such directive.

Mr. GEARHART. That was not issued to you?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did General Miles ever tell you that he had such a message or directive from General Marshall affecting his department?

General GEROW. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did you not as a matter of practice evaluate intercepts that came to you and to send those intercepts to General Marshall?

[4242] General GEROW. No, sir; I had nothing to do with the distribution of intercepts, sir. He received the same intercepts I did, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, when you read an intercept that struck you as important and calling for action, didn't you take that intercept before you returned it to the courier and discuss it with General Marshall?

General GEROW. No, sir. If I thought that an intercept required action I would prepare a draft of a message, sir, for General Marshall's signature and take it up and suggest that he send it. I did not take the intercepts up to him, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You did not take it because you knew General Marshall had the same intercepts which you read as he was on the list of persons to whom the intercepts were to be delivered, is that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I will ask you as a military expert, asking you for the moment to put yourself in the position of Admiral Kimmel and General Short, I will ask you if you think that the tragic happening of December 7, 1941, would have occurred just as it did if Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been warned of those seven messages to which I have just called your attention?

[4243] General GEROW. Sir, I do not believe I can put myself in the position of the commanders in Hawaii. There was so much background, so many things happening. The mental attitude of those commanders, I cannot translate now, sir, in an expression of opinion.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you were the commander of either the Army or the Navy over there and you received seven definite intercepts called to your attention that the Japanese have divided the area into seven areas and were calling impatiently for reports upon the ship dispositions there, do you think that in the face of the message of November 27, in the face of other circular messages that were being sent around the world, one of which was delivered in Hawaii, do you think that eight of our battleships should be lined up like sitting ducks inside of that harbor, with voids open, with ammunition boxed, in a condition in which they could fight very, very inefficiently if they were called upon to fight at all, do you think that would be the situation in the face of those messages being before the eyes and upon the desks and in the minds of those commanders?

General GEROW. Again, sir, I do not believe that I can state what I would have done under those circumstances without having been in command over there, sir, at the time.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now, in justice to them don't you [4244] think now as you look back that they should have had that information then?

General GEROW. I think when the War Department took the responsibility of sending the message of November 27 and stated that hostile action was possible at any moment, that these messages would not have added anything to the strength of the directive that was contained in the November 27 message.

Mr. GEARHART. Did any of those messages, those circular letters that were sent around, contain any information as to where hostile action was expected?

General GEROW. I did not understand the "circular letter," sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, these messages are circular, aren't they, in nature? They are sent to Hawaii, they are sent to Panama, they are sent to San Francisco, they are sent to San Diego, they are sent to all of the commandants in all of the naval districts. Now, did any of them say where the war was expected to break out?

General GEROW. No, sir. The one of November 27, as I recall, distinctly stated that Japanese action was unpredictable but hostile action—

Mr. GEARHART. There were other messages circulated around that an attack was expected in the Philippines, in the [4245] Kra

Peninsula, in Indochina and possibly at Guam and Borneo, menacing Singapore. That was what was contained in the messages that were being circulated by the Chief of Staff, is that not correct?

General GEROW. I should like to look over those messages, sir, to see specifically what they stated.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. Do you know of the memorandum that General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President on the 27th?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. They discussed that very subject?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Named those very places that I have picked out?

General GEROW. Some of them, yes, sir, I recall.

Mr. GEARHART. And in that message there is not even the slightest suggestion or intimation that any trouble is expected in the Hawaiian area.

General GEROW. No, sir. I think the reason for that was that that memorandum was directed specifically to the Far Eastern area, to a special area, not to the whole area of the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as a matter of fact all you big [4246] ranking Army and Navy officers considered Hawaii as an impregnable fortress, did you not?

General GEROW. No, sir. No fortress is impregnable, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you have seen the characterization of Pearl Harbor that was made by General Herron, didn't you, in his something from memory? It is a French word.

Mr. MURPHY. Aid de memoir.

Mr. GEARHART. I have got to apply to my learned friend Murphy for my French.

You have the document in hand, don't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Read the first paragraph.

General GEROW [reading]:

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortifications, its garrison and its physical characteristics is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

Mr. GEARHART. And you know that General Herron when he was commander of the Hawaiian area issued a similar statement to the press that was given wide circulation everywhere, don't you?

General GEROW. I do not recall that message.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you got the volume of that book on Hawaii?

The CHAIRMAN. Which book is it?

[4247] Mr. GEARHART. The young lady sitting there has it.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is it?

Mr. GEARHART. It is a novel.

The CHAIRMAN. A novel?

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I don't know. It was a book about Hawaii and it had a large circulation. However, I will pass it.

I will ask you do you know of any message of any kind that was ever sent to General Short or Admiral Kimmel in which they were told that Hawaii itself would probably be attacked?

General GEROW. I do not recall such a message.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, how do you account for the fact that there is a warning in that warning notice of November 27 which was not

contained in the one sent to the Philippine Islands, an affirmative direction not to do anything which would alarm the people or reveal intent? Why was that specially put in the Hawaiian and the San Francisco versions and left out of the one sent to Manila?

General GEROW. Well, the conditions in Hawaii and in the Philippines were quite different at that time. In Hawaii we had a big Japanese population. We felt that the installations there were very close to the population; that if the civilian population happened to be alarmed there would prob- [4248] ably be headlines in the press. Those headlines would be quickly transmitted to Japan and would probably precipitate the very thing we were trying to avoid.

Mr. GEARHART. And everything you have said, every reason that you have given is equally true of the Philippines, isn't it?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not believe so, sir. The Philippines did not have the large Japanese population. The Philippines at that time had been more or less, I will not say alerted but we were organizing and training a Philippine army at that time and there was a great deal of military activity going on in the Philippines that was not going on in Hawaii, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as a matter of fact you do not want to stand on the assertion that there wasn't a large Japanese population in the Philippine Islands prior to December 7, 1941? As a matter of fact, the island was full of Japanese and most of them were Japanese agents, were they not?

General GEROW. I do not know that.

Mr. GEARHART. They had probably more observers in percentage to the population of the Philippines than they had in all the rest of the world put together, is that not correct?

General GEROW. I do not know, sir.

[4249] Mr. GEARHART. And if they only had one Japanese spy there an alert in the Philippines would cause the same alarm to be reported to Japanese headquarters in Tokyo as if there were 50,000 there, wouldn't it?

General GEROW. I do not know, sir, how the Japanese would have reacted to it.

I should like to invite the attention, sir, in that message to which you have just referred, however, that it contains this statement: "That this policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense."

Mr. GEARHART. That is correct, but after a message which from beginning to end warns specifically against doing certain things that was put in the message for the purpose of conveying the idea to the commanders in Hawaii, wasn't it?

General GEROW. Which sentence now are you referring to, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Directing them to avoid the doing of anything which might create alarm among the people or reveal intent.

General GEROW. Sir, I do not understand your question.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, now, when you put a specific direction in a letter not to do certain things and then say you can do something else if you have to, you are going to expect [4250] the recipient of that notice to try to avoid doing the things which you say you do not want done, is that not correct?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you would expect the commanders in Hawaii to avoid the doing of anything which would alarm the people or reveal an intent to them, wouldn't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, so long as it did not jeopardize his defense.

Mr. GEARHART. I have the book which I designated a novel to the inquiry of the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it end all right?

Mr. GEARHART. The volume is entitled, "Hawaii—Restless Rampart," and the book was written by Joseph Barber, Jr. I will read you from page 213.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. What did you say?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Senator LUCAS. Who did you say wrote this book?

Mr. GEARHART. Joseph Barber, Jr. I don't know anything about him, about who he is. It is a book which has had quite a large sale, it is a popular edition, but what I am going to read there is in quotation marks so that it will not [4251] rest on the responsibility of Mr. Barber but, rather, on the responsibility of General Herron. This is the author's introduction. (Reading:)

Prior to the maneuvers, however, Major General (now Lieutenant General) Charles D. Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department, issued this statement, intended to reassure nervous residents: "Oahu will never be exposed to a blitzkrieg attack. This is why: We are more than 2,000 miles away from land whichever way you look, which is a long way for an enemy force to steam, and besides it would have to smash through our navy.

"But we plan for the worst possible situation, which means we assume that the navy might be too busy elsewhere to help us.

"So we have developed a potent air defense. Our reconnaissance bombers are going farther and farther to sea. Our air bases here could be reinforced overnight from California bases. The potency of this striking power which would engage an enemy long before he sighted Oahu means that to land on Oahu the enemy must first win mastery of the air above it.

"Assuming that happened, enemy transports then would have to anchor offshore, making them fine targets for our coastal artillery. High speed, mobile forces can [4252] be rushed within an hour to any point on Oahu. They pack devastating power.

"As international tensions increase in the Pacific, the war of nerves comes closer to Hawaii. So we double our vigilance, our intensive training. We don't let up until the future is perfectly safe."

The 1940 war problem assumed that Hawaii was threatened with a sudden thrust by an invading enemy. The enemy fleet had a well-balanced force, with adequate aviation and highly trained personnel. In addition, its merchant marine was capable of transporting an extremely large army for initial overseas operations.

The "war situation" at this point was outlined by headquarters as follows: "It is assumed that an outside enemy has succeeded, by stealth, in landing from boats and dropping by parachutes numerous well-armed nationals at night on the island of Oahu."

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. GEARHART. I would rather wait and yield at the conclusion of this quotation.

Mr. CLARK. I was wondering when it was going to conclude. That is what is troubling me.

Mr. GEARHART. Don't you find it interesting? Every- [4253] body else does.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. You are not very helpful, Mr. Clark.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not a matter upon which the committee has to pass.

Mr. GEARHART. I will proceed [reading]:

"The enemies have mixed with the population as strangers, but are believed to be secretly assembling at various points on the island with the intentions, it is feared, of disrupting both civil and military life by destroying or contaminating water supplies, food, communications, electric power, and other necessities, and democratic institutions with the object of liquidating the present population to eventually make room for their own people.

"These activities are believed to be in preparation for reducing our strength and our military resistance against a hostile landing force assumed to be approaching the island.

"All civil police, national guard, other civil organizations, and the entire civil population, in accordance with a proclamation that it is assumed was issued by the governor, are closely working with the military to apprehend the invaders and to protect our families, homes, and institutions from destruction."

[4254] The CHAIRMAN. Would the Congressman let the Chairman ask him: What does this book show as to where this statement was made, whether it was a newspaper interview or an official statement? What does it say about that?

Mr. GEARHART. That was the document, as I understand, that was issued by General Herron, just prior to the alert of 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the General can testify about it, if he did it.

Mr. GEARHART. That clearly evidences, does it not, that the highest ranking army officers in the Hawaiian Islands had the same opinion in 1940 that General Marshall had, that he reflected in his paper? You had just read the first paragraph of it. Is that not correct?

General GEROW. I think everyone of us in the War Department felt that Oahu was our best prepared outpost.

Mr. GEARHART. And they both, in these two great statements, issued to the people, stated that they considered it in effect an impregnable fortress?

General GEROW. The two statements, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, in each of them.

General GEROW. I did not understand that this Aide Memoire—

Mr. GEARHART. I will read the first paragraph again.

[4255] General GEROW. I did not understand, sir, that that was a public statement to the people, sir. I think that is a paper that I understood he took to the White House with him, or somewhere else, on which he would talk.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it is still more important, isn't it? It is a paper circulated for the eyes of military experts only?

General GEROW. I am not so sure, sir, that this paper was ever circulated. I do not know what General Marshall's testimony was, as to why it was prepared.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you admit, do you not, that it represents General Marshall's viewpoint at that time? He would not put his signature to something he did not believe, for the purpose of deceiving anyone, would he?

General GEROW. No, sir; but he did not sign this paper.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, he admitted that he wrote it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield? That is not so.

Mr. GEARHART. Would that make any difference, that he did not sign it?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

Mr. GEARHART. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. General Marshall said he was called to [4256] the White House, he was going over there immediately, and someone in the Department prepared that memorandum. He did not prepare it, and did not sign it.

Mr. GEARHART. He read it and presented it, with all of the influence and high position behind it of the Chief of Staff of the Armies of the United States. If he did not believe it, he would not have presented it, would he, in your opinion?

General GEROW. General Marshall will have to testify to that, sir. I do not know whether he used this paper or not.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the testimony will speak for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Congressman yield to Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. We would like to find out from counsel where this paper was obtained.

Mr. GESELL. The paper was obtained, as we stated when we introduced it, from the files of President Roosevelt.

Mr. GEARHART. So it was left with President Roosevelt, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United [4257] States, by the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States. That is correct, isn't it?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, how could this gentleman know anything of that kind? I do not understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. If the witness does not know it, he may say so.

General GEROW. I am a bit confused.

Mr. GEARHART. I have more interruptions than anybody else has had on my line of questions up to now.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Congressman does not want to yield, he certainly does not have to.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to proceed a little more orderly and with greater continuity of thought, if I am not constantly interrupted. I am developing a condition of mind that was existing in the high ranking military of the United States as an explanation plainly of why no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii.

You admit that no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii during this long period, during which our relations with Japan were deteriorating, don't you?

General GEROW. No specific warnings were sent to Hawaii, specifically designating that Hawaii was the place that the Japanese were going to attack; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Whenever a specific place was discussed, [4258] it was always an attack on the Kra Peninsula, the Philippines, Siam, possibly Guam, and possibly Borneo; is that correct, that permeated all of the military literature to the commanders of the United States?

General GEROW. I believe it was a belief at that time, sir, that the Japanese would make their main effort in that area, and I believe the

belief was borne out by subsequent events that they did, that their attack on Hawaii was in the nature of a diversionary attack, and put on our flank to lay us back on our heels so they could go ahead with their main effort.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you, General Gerow, if you had thought during those days prior to December 7, 1941, that there was a possibility of attacking Hawaii, and if that were the general opinion of the high ranking military and naval people with whom you were in daily association, would you not have interpreted those seven messages, those seven intercepted Japanese messages, were important, would you not have attached to them greater significance than you did?

General GEROW. I think we all realized, sir, that there was a possibility of an attack on Hawaii.

Mr. GEARHART. Then why did not you send copies of those intercepts to the two commanders that were charged with the [4259] defense of those islands?

General GEROW. Sir, I cannot answer that question. As I say, these messages came to me maybe one at a time, or maybe in a group of 15 or 20, and I had no opportunity to sit down and analyze them. They came in along with other messages from Panama and the Philippines, and many of the messages from Panama were quite significant. They indicated an intense interest in where our air forces were, where the fields were, which would be the very thing that an enemy would want to do, information that he would want in case he intended to attack Panama, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you send any special warning messages to Panama when you saw the Japs were making definite inquiries with reference to the defenses there?

General GEROW. I do not know whether G-2 sent any informational messages to Panama with regard to those particular intercepts or not, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Will you not say, as the head of War Plans that the commanders of Panama were entitled to that information in the event that any such information had reached Washington authorities?

General GEROW. Sir, that is a question of opinion, as to how much information you give commanders in the field.

[4260] Mr. GEARHART. Isn't it the rule that when high authority in Washington obtains information that is important to any particular commander in the field, that Washington should transmit that information, or if reasons of security did not permit it, that they shall issue directives in the light of that information?

General GEROW. If the intercept is one that the War Department feels is important that the commander have, I think it should send it to him. The War Department, in the case of the November 27 message, interpreted all of the facts it had before it, and decided that the Japanese were going to take some action, hostile action, and assumed responsibility for telling the commander that there was a great possibility of an attack.

[4261] Mr. GEARHART. Again directing your attention to the somewhat protracted or extended statement of General Herron that I just read, that statement manifestly was issued to allay any fear that might be aroused because of the alert of 1940 by the activities of the Army and Navy, was it not?

General GEROW. Sir, I do not know whether the statement was made prior to or after that alert. I was not present in Washington at the time the alert was put on, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now it would be necessary, if you were going to take steps not to alarm the people, to issue a warning well in advance of the event, is that not correct?

General GEROW. No, sir, that would not be necessary.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you think that it would have been possible to have alerted Hawaii, both its Naval activities and its Army activities, to a No. 3 Army alert and No. 1 Naval Operations alert, overnight without alarming the people?

General GEROW. A lot would depend on how the commander did it.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the order that he was to alert his island was put up instantly upon the receipt of the November 27 notice, wasn't it? If he was to do anything at all under that order it was to do it right then?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And because you could not do it right now [4262] without alarming the people and revealing the intent General Short reached the right decision which he reported on the 28th day of November, did he not?

General GEROW. That is your conclusion, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEARHART. I am not drawing any conclusion at all, I am asking you questions. I want your conclusions; mine are unimportant.

General GEROW. May I have the question, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. The member asked not to be interrupted and the Chair feels like protecting him in that request. Go ahead.

General GEROW. May I have the question again?

Mr. GEARHART. Will you read the question, Mr. Reporter?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not think he reached the right conclusion.

Mr. GEARHART. In order to reach the conclusion that you have just reached you have to delete then from the November 27 message the positive directive not to alarm the people and not to reveal the intent?

General GEROW. I believe that is correct, sir. He was told he was authorized to take any course of action he might [4263] necessarily have to take to prevent jeopardizing his defense.

Mr. GEARHART. The record speaks for itself. Now yesterday the gentleman from Pennsylvania opened the report of General Hap Arnold and read to us that the Air Forces in the Philippines had been alerted prior to December 7, 1941. Were you here when he read that from his report?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Has the gentleman from Pennsylvania that report?

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have that report from General Arnold?

Senator LUCAS. I do not know where it is.

Mr. GEARHART. Assuming that General Arnold's report does contain that information, can you give us any information about the alerting of the Air Force in the Philippines?

General GEROW. At what period of time?

Mr. GEARHART. Just prior to December 7, 1941.

General GEROW. May I refer to the message from General MacArthur, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

General GEROW. This is a message from General MacArthur to General Marshall, dated November 28:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the navy stop ground security measures [4264] have been taken stop within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between army and navy.
(Signed) MacArthur.

Mr. GEARHART. Does that report indicate to your mind an all-out air alert?

General GEROW. He states, "Reconnaissance has been extended and intensified." I do not know just what he was doing prior to the extending of it.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you in the conference that they had with General Arnold just about the time the November 27 warning messages were sent out, a conference in which General Arnold said that he had information that there was sabotage going on at certain air stations and he wanted a special warning sent to all of his outlying commands?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I was present at one conference on a sabotage message of that kind, I think on the 28th of November, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. General Arnold wanted to send a special message over his own signature to his commands, did he not?

General GEROW. I do not recall that conference, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was not that one of the main things [4265] discussed?

General GEROW. I do not remember, sir, whether that was discussed at that particular conference or not. I remember General Arnold's insistence, or at least the insistence of his G-2, General Scanlon, that warning messages go to all the air stations.

Mr. GEARHART. And wasn't it finally decided in that conference that General Arnold should not send it out over his signature, but that it would go out over General Marshall's signature, with a special reference in the notice to the air services?

General GEROW. I do not recall such a decision, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you have no special information to convey to the committee now as to why the Air Command in the Philippines went on an all-out alert in the Philippine Islands?

General GEROW. The only information I have, sir, as to why they went on the alert is because they received this message from General Marshall directing the alert which was sent out on the 27th of November.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you any information as to what the Air Command did in Hawaii, after receipt in Hawaii of the warning message of November 27, 1941?

General GEROW. No, sir; I have no such information. [4266]

Mr. GEARHART. And if the Air Command in Hawaii went on an all-out alert on December 1 and remained on it until December 6, you know of no special reason from Washington for their having done it,

other than the information that was contained in the warning message of November 27?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Twelve o'clock having arrived, the committee will recess to 2 o'clock p. m.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[4267]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I believe that Congressman Gearhart had concluded his examination of General Gerow and Senator Ferguson will now be recognized.

Senator FERGUSON. General Gerow, you were in what is known as the War Plans Section. Now, at the time was that the operational section?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about prior to the 7th of December.

General GEROW. No, sir. The G-3 section was normally known as the operational section, but the section that I was in was known as the War Plans Division, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we had an exhibit here that gave your duties.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I have a copy of that? Does counsel have it? Do you have your copy?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is the War Department order of the General Staff setup.

General GEROW. I think I have it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 42.

General GEROW. I think I have a copy of the Army regulations here that cover that, sir. [4268]

Senator FERGUSON. I have it; it is Exhibit 42.

Your duties are in paragraph 12?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you give me the specific section in that, during peacetime, that would have you function in writing messages?

General GEROW. I think the first paragraph, sir, paragraph "a" would cover that. I shall read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

General GEROW (reading):

The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for use in the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't that only the formulation of the plans, the actual drafting of the plans, the war plans?

General GEROW. It includes that, sir, but it also states:

is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans.

The writing of an operational order, the operational orders such as was written on November the 27th I think, sir, [4269] would be included in that wording.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that had you ever taken any part in the writing of messages?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The writing of alerts?

General GEROW. Some of the warning messages that were sent, sir, I participated in their preparation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you participate in the one on the 24th, the joint one?

General GEROW. May I refer to that, sir? Either myself, sir, or some of my officers in War Plans Division I believe did participate in this apparently joint message. We worked with the Navy in the preparation of that message.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew General Bryden?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was Deputy Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Under this he was to act, was he not, when the Chief of Staff was absent?

General GEROW. I believe it so states.

Senator FERGUSON (reading).

The Deputy Chief of Staff,

on page 2—

will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his absence.

Would you say that you had been specifically designated [4270] to act for the Chief of Staff during his absence in the sending of the message of the 27th?

General GEROW. No, sir; I had not been specifically designated but as the staff officer concerned with the preparation of plans and the issuance of operational orders in connection therewith I believe, sir, I would have assumed that responsibility if necessary in General Marshall's absence.

Senator FERGUSON. Did General Bryden, who was the duly authorized officer to act in the absence of the General, did he act in relation to that message?

General GEROW. I believe he did, sir. If I recall correctly, the message was taken in to him and he O. K.'d it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, can you show us on the original message that we have here, his O. K.?

General GEROW. I will try to find it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try to find that?

General GEROW. I have, sir, here is a photostatic copy of the message of November the 27th. It shows on the bottom, sir, "Noted: Deputy Chief of Staff," with the initial "B".

Senator FERGUSON. That was for Bryden?

General GEROW. I think it must have been for Bryden; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did he go into this with you and help draft it, or did he just approve it after it was drafted?

[4271] General GEROW. As I recall, sir, he went in with me to the office of the Secretary of War on my first visit in the Secretary of War's office on the morning of the 27th. I do not believe that he was in there at the second conference and I do not believe, sir, that he actually participated in the drafting of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever attend the Army Staff College?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long a time did you spend in the college?

General GEROW. I spent the usual 9 months as a student, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any course or any information as to how to draft plans taken up by you—or I mean messages?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; but that was normally taught at the Commanding General Staff School at Leavenworth. I thought you had reference, sir, to the War College.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was that taught?

General GEROW. That was taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., sir, and also at the infantry school.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you take that course?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4272] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, tell me the elements, the things to be done in the writing of a message as far as the War Department or Army was concerned?

General GEROW. We had a system of writing what we called the five paragraph operational order. The first paragraph contained information of the enemy and information regarding your own forces. The second paragraph contained a general mission.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait until I get this first one. First was what information? The first was all the information that you had about the enemy?

General GEROW. It contained enemy information and information about our own troops.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW. Paragraph 2 contained a general statement of the mission, to attack or defend.

Senator FERGUSON. The mission, yes.

General GEROW. The third paragraph was broken down into a number of subparagraphs and gave specific missions and the major units involved.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW. Paragraph 4—I have been away from that school so long I cannot remember definitely paragraph 4. Paragraph 5 I think prescribed the command post and I believe [4273] pertained to communications. I have forgotten now definitely what paragraph 4 included, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You wouldn't say that the first paragraph was your mission?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That the proper way to draft an order was to put the mission in the first paragraph?

General GEROW. No, sir. Your first paragraph would contain enemy information and the information regarding your own troops.

Senator FERGUSON. And that the second one was to give full information as to the enemy, its strength, its capacity and its intentions?

General GEROW. I am afraid I did not make myself clear, Senator. In the first paragraph it contains the enemy information and information of our own troops. That is ordinarily broken down into two paragraphs, paragraph A and paragraph B.

Paragraph A contains the information concerning the enemy. Paragraph B contains the information concerning our own troops that are pertinent to that particular order.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, should that information, whether it is one or two, should the information be full as to the enemy, that is, as to its strength, its intention, and its [4274] capacity?

General GEROW. No, sir; that is normally included in an entirely separate document which is known as an estimate of the situation, which is prepared sometimes by G-2, and sometimes by G-3.

There are two types of estimates: One is a G-2, which arrives at some conclusions as to what the enemy is going to do. There is a second type of estimate of the situation which covers not only what the enemy's capabilities are and his probable intentions but also includes your own capabilities and the plans that are open to you and from that you decide what the enemy, you think the enemy is going to do and decide what you shall do to counter that action.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you got with you any booklet or paper or information that would tell us what should be in an order and how it should be written, or could you get that for us?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I will be glad to get that for you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When I take up the message of the 27th I will refer further to that and you may have it by that time.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any aide here with you that could go and get it for you?

General GEROW. I think so, sir.

[4275] Senator FERGUSON. Normally in peacetime is the War Plans concerned with the diplomatic messages of the United States?

General GEROW. We are interested in them, yes, sir. Anything that might possibly affect military operations we are interested in, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And how do they come to you? How does that information come to your Department?

General GEROW. It comes through various sources, sir. As far as the War Plans Division is concerned, I would get information from the Chief of Staff, very occasionally from the Secretary of War, and also from the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, and from some of my officers who had contactd their opposite members in the State Department, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was your opposite in the State Department that you would get your information from?

General GEROW. That depended on the type of information you were after, sir. If it happened to be the far eastern situation you would go to the Far Eastern Division. If it was Latin American, you would go to the Latin American section, and if it was European, you would go to the European section.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get the messages that were delivered by the President on the 17th of August, 1941?

[4276] General GEROW. I do not recall, sir, that I ever had copies of those messages, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will describe them as they were described in 1943 by Peace and War, on page 129. It may refresh your memory:

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed, and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression. It was agreed also that the United States should continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.

Does that refresh your memory?

General GEROW. I do not remember, sir, seeing that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I will read the part of the message that gave that, or that gave, as far as America was concerned, its parallel action.

On the bottom of page 556, volume II, Foreign Relations, this was handed to the Jap Ambassador, among others:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy [4277] or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American Nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Now does that refresh your memory as to whether or not you ever saw that or heard of it?

General GEROW. I do not recall having seen it, sir. I believe if the Chief of Staff had known about it he would have informed me, sir, that such a declaration had been made.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was that of concern to the War Plans Department?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; it would have been of concern to the War Plans Division.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact it was vital information to the War Plans Department, was it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now how do you account for never having heard of that?

General GEROW. Sir, I cannot testify at this late date that I never heard of it, sir. I do not believe that I ever actually saw the document. I believe if the Chief of Staff knew about it, sir, that he did inform me of such a declaration.

[4278] Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of that before you heard of it here in this caucus room?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you hear about it?

General GEROW. Since I have been back here, sir, in Washington, to appear before this committee, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So since you have been back and after the 7th of December, you heard about it?

General GEROW. I cannot recall, sir, whether I heard it before or not, sir. I definitely remember since I have been here this time to appear before the committee, of reading that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that kind of information of value to you, and if so, did you act upon it?

General GEROW. It was of value, yes, sir. My instructions to act upon it would probably have come, sir, from the Chief of Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any information or orders upon which you did act upon that information, and if so what action did you take?

General GEROW. Sir, I cannot recall at this time, my conversations with the Chief of Staff, if I had such conversations on that subject, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember receiving word at [4279] all that came from Ambassador Winant on the morning of the 6th, about the movement of troops, that went into the State Department at 10:40 on the 6th of December 1941?

General GEROW. May I see that message, sir, to refresh my memory?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(The document was handed to General Gerow.)

General GEROW. I do not believe, sir, that I ever saw that message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if you had known what I read to you here, what I read from these two books, and you would have seen that message, what would that message have meant to you?

General GEROW. It would have only meant to me, sir, reading this message now that certain troop movements were being made by the Japanese, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it have meant anything more than that?

General GEROW. Not that I know of now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is that troop movement to, according to that message?

General GEROW. That states "sailing slowly westward toward Kra."

Senator FERGUSON. How many hours distant?

[4280] General GEROW. Fourteen hours distant in time.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would they have struck?

General GEROW. The Kra Peninsula, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That 14 hours distant, they would have struck in 14 hours, would they not?

General GEROW. In 14 hours, yes, sir; if they had continued on that course to Kra.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would that mean anything in relation to this parallel action that we had taken about any further aggressive movement? Here is what the message said:

The Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan, that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination or force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Would that not have been a violation of this order, or of this rule?

General GEROW. I do not believe, taking this message [4281] by itself, it says enough to definitely state what the Japs were planning to do, sir, from my interpretation of the message.

Senator FERGUSON. So, if you had received that, it would not have meant a thing to you?

General GEROW. Well, I would like to plot this on a map, sir, and see. There were, in those staff conversations in the Singapore—

Senator FERGUSON. I have got a map here.

General GEROW. I think I have got a copy of that same one, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You have got a copy of it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. This map has no scale on it, Senator, so it is rather difficult for me to say exactly where they would be in 14 hours, but it would indicate—

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate that they were 14 hours from Kra?

General GEROW. Yes, but as to where that would place them on the map, I do not know where their position would be actually on this map. It would indicate, sir, that they were proceeding to go south of the line 10° north, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They would go south of 10° north, and they would also be east of 100° east, [4282] wouldn't they?

General GEROW. They would be east of 100° east, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, were you familiar with the fact that on the 2d of December, the President made a directive in that the President directed three men-of-war to be established in the Pacific. Were you familiar with that?

General GEROW. Not at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of that?

General GEROW. Not until I heard it brought out before this committee, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I have tried to mark on my map with ink there where these ships would be, or the area. It may help you some, because the name are small and hard to see. The first one is between Hainan and Hue. Do you see that one?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the next one is between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques; and the next one is off Ponte de Camau. Do you see those three?

General GEROW. I have those located, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you think those three men-of-war, would be out in a position so they could execute and [4283] see whether or not the Japs were violating what I read to you from the message of the 17th of August—not the message, but the note?

General GEROW. You refer now, sir, to this Admiralty note?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir, and the note from the President. Will you let him see page 39 of exhibit 37?

(The document was handed to General Gerow.)

Senator FERGUSON. Have you looked at it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would they not be in a position to execute, to see whether or not there were violations of the note of the 17th of August 1941?

General GEROW. I would say the one, sir, around Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques, and the one on Pointe de Camau, yes, sir, they would be in a position.

Senator FERGUSON. They would be?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would not it be material to you, being in the War Plans Division where you were going to give, and it was your duty, as you say, to give orders of action to our troops, if you were

going to put the position of the enemy which you said a message should contain, would not it be essential to have the information [4284] in the note of the 17th and also the message of the President to the Asiatic Fleet? Would not it be essential for you to have them?

General GEROW. It would be helpful to me to have them.

Senator FERGUSON. Not only helpful; it would be essential, would it not?

General GEROW. Only in the failure of G-2 to keep me posted, sir, as to any information.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you posted as to that information?

General GEROW. I was not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you have acted on the 6th of December 1941, then, without that information?

General GEROW. With regard to these ships?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, with regard to these ships.

General GEROW. Or with regard to the movements?

Senator FERGUSON. The movement of the troops, movement of those ships; how could you give orders if you did not have the information?

General GEROW. Well, it depended, sir, on whom I wanted to give orders to. There was nothing that the Army could do to stop that movement south. That was a naval matter and only ships or aircraft posted down there could do anything about that, sir.

[4285] Senator FERGUSON. Did it indicate to you, or would it have indicated to you that such a movement meant war with the United States?

General GEROW. Not unless our Government decided to go to war, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What about if they struck the first overt act? Would not it be necessary that you give an order to defend yourself?

General GEROW. Well, sir, if the Japs had attacked some of our positions, then they would automatically defend themselves under the existing war plans, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not I understand you to say, sir, the reason they struck at Hawaii was that that was our strongest fortification and it was on their flank?

General GEROW. I stated, sir, that it was on our flank.

Senator FERGUSON. On whose flank?

General GEROW. On the flank of the Japanese, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW. On the advance to the south.

Senator FERGUSON. But if they struck and it meant war, because of this message and our stand, and let us say that it was a correct stand, was not it then the duty of your department to know those things so that you could give orders, so that we could have a defense to any action they may take [4286] on their flank?

General GEROW. Sir, I believe we would have known very quickly had the Japanese attacked any of our positions.

Senator FERGUSON. They did on the 7th, so what is the use of knowing afterward. That is why we are here today, because in Washington they did not know and did not anticipate. Isn't that true?

General GEROW. No, sir. I think when we sent that message of November 27 out we distinctly stated that we anticipated hostile action against each of our possessions that bordered on the Pacific. We did

not know which one. The Japanese action was unpredictable, and I saw no information that indicated to me at any time at which particular place they would attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand this, that no matter what information you received after the 27th you would not have sent it to the theater in Hawaii?

General GEROW. No, sir, Senator; I do not think I stated that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, isn't that a fair answer?

General GEROW. No, sir. I would like to elaborate a bit on that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we get a recess long enough for me to vote?

[4287] The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you desire it, Senator. We will naturally conform to your wishes.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like, if we could take that long.

Mr. MURPHY. Why not let Mr. Keefe take it up and then have you continue later?

Senator FERGUSON. It will only take me 5 minutes, and then we will not have to break the continuity here.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will take a recess—

Mr. CLARK. I do not object, Senator, but I am calling attention to the fact that the House Members do not get an opportunity to vote. I am not objecting—

Senator FERGUSON. I will continue.

General GEROW. Shall I proceed, Senator?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish my statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. I was going on to say if we are going to be here a good long while I thought we would have to have a definite policy in that respect.

Senator FERGUSON. That is perfectly all right.

Mr. MURPHY. May I state for the record that there is a resolution that was adopted by both Houses excusing the members [4288] of the Pearl Harbor committee from voting during the sessions of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Has the interruption taken you from the question that I have given?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General GEROW. This is an operational message. It contains certain sentences in it that I would like to read:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow 5.

Those are all directives. There was nothing that occurred, subsequent to the sending of that message, no information that I received, that would have influenced me to change the actions directed in that message.

[4289] Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, as a matter of fact really no information came to you between that date on the 27th and at 11:25 when you walked into General Marshall's office on the day of the 7th at noon. You had not had the pilot message, you had not had the destruction of the codes message, you had not had

the 14-part, or the 13th part of the message, you had not had the destruction of the Japanese code messages, you did not have the message coming from Winant, you did not have the President's directive to CINCAF which was the Asiatic Fleet; isn't that correct?

General GEROW. The information that came in with regard to magic between the 27th and the 6th and that was distributed by G-2 I did see and that contained certain information.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you what information you received out of magic between the 27th and the 6th and the 7th?

General GEROW. Sir, I would have to check the documents showing the messages that were received during that time, and I may be able to identify that I saw some of them. I must presume I saw all of these messages that were distributed by G-2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's take the Winant message. You didn't see that?

General GEROW. No, sir.

[4290] Senator FERGUSON. The President's message to CINCAF to put out the three men of war, you didn't see that?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The President's message to the High Commissioner, did you see that one?

General GEROW. I believe I saw that one, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

General GEROW. I am reasonably certain, sir, that I saw it on the morning of the 27th. I think my memorandum to the Chief of Staff states that I saw that.

Senator FERGUSON. That was on the 26th, so you saw it on the 27th?

General GEROW. I saw it on the 27th.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't see the pilot message?

General GEROW. I don't recall having seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't see the 1 o'clock message, that is, giving the day of delivery, and the destruction of the last code?

General GEROW. That is the 1 o'clock message that indicated they were going to deliver something at 1 o'clock. No, sir; I didn't see that until 11:30 on the morning of the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't see any part of the 13-part message?

[4291] General GEROW. Not to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Until you went in there.

General GEROW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you heard, read, or saw the whole message, you saw it laying on General Marshall's desk?

General GEROW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you account for that information not being given to you as a general in War Plans who had the duty to act on it?

General GEROW. Sir, I cannot recall whether General Marshall discussed any of those messages with me or not. If he was informed of them I believe he would have. I don't know what his testimony was with respect to them. I cannot account for why they were not delivered to me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General Gerow, on the 15th you drew up a statement, did you—didn't you have a statement here, exhibit 39?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Drawn up on the 15th of December.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that that doesn't consider any facts except what took place really in the general's office at 11:25, and didn't consider anything that happened on the day of the 6th or up until that time?

[4292] General GEROW. I don't recall the instructions that required me to prepare this memorandum. I rather imagine that the Chief of Staff was not clear in his own mind as to what happened during that period in his office and asked those present to give him our views as to what had happened, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the crucial thing what happened in his office or was it what happened prior? You were only in there a half hour, were you not, between 11:25 and when the message went out, at the latest, 12:17?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the crucial part of this occasion, that short period?

General GEROW. I think that was a very crucial period, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it as crucial as Saturday and early Sunday morning?

General GEROW. Sir, I am not certain how you use "crucial." It was vital, the distribution of magic on the 6th was of vital importance, if that is the point, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of a more serious time in the history of this Nation than between early morning on the 6th and 1 o'clock on the 7th? Have you ever heard, in history, of a more crucial period than that?

General GEROW. Well, sir, I don't know whether I can [4293] compare that period with some of the other crucial highlights in our history and say whether one was more crucial than the other.

I think such things that happened at Gettysburg, I think certain things that happened at Valley Forge, certainly certain things that happened in Germany in the last war, and certain things that happened in the Pacific, probably would be just as crucial in the history of this Nation.

[4294] Senator FERGUSON. Now, General Gerow, as I understand it you prepared a memorandum, and it would be for history's sake, and out of that entire period you took 52 minutes and that was the period between 11:25 and 12:17.

Now, you have no recollection, as I understand it—

Mr. MURPHY. I think that the witness should be allowed to answer. This man is a general who fought in France, on the beaches of Normandy, and he ought to be shown every courtesy. He ought to be given an opportunity to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. I haven't finished the question.

Will you read it?

(The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Of what took place in the other part of the period from Saturday morning. Can you tell us anything as to the other part of the period from Saturday morning up until 11:25?

General GEROW. Senator, I think I stated before, this memorandum was prepared, I believe, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, to cover the period that we were assembled in his office. He did not direct me, as I recall, to prepare a statement covering the period of the days of the 6th and the 7th. I did not prepare such a memorandum, so, consequently, my memory is not as clear as to what [4295] happened on the 6th as it is as to what happened that particular morning in General Marshall's office. I do not recall anything eventful, as far as I am personally concerned that occurred to me on December 6.

Senator FERGUSON. And on the 7th?

General GEROW. On the morning of the 7th, no, sir, until I was called to General Marshall's office, and after that the news of the Pearl Harbor attack came in and other things happened.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you know, or did you know, Major Clausen?

General GEROW. I met Major Clausen when I appeared before the Army Pearl Harbor board, and I saw him later on, sir, in Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. He was making an investigation, was he not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. He approached me with a letter, as I recall, signed by the Secretary of War, directing him to make an investigation concerning certain matters in connection with Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give your full testimony before the Pearl Harbor board?

General GEROW. I tried to answer all the questions they asked me, sir. I don't believe that the magic phase [4296] came into it. And after I appeared before the Pearl Harbor committee, I understand that a number of other witnesses appeared and made certain statements regarding deliveries of certain papers to me, and I had no opportunity to answer those statements.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any instructions when you went to the Army Pearl Harbor board not to bring magic in?

General GEROW. I am under the impression that I did receive some such instructions, because in giving my testimony after reading it, I find I hesitated in the middle of a statement, and I said that I might be disclosing something of ultra secrecy and I said I did not want to state that without the approval of the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who you got that instruction from?

General GEROW. I cannot recall definitely at this time sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would have authority to give it to you?

General GEROW. Any of the officers in the War Department would have the authority to pass it on to me as an order from the Chief of Staff, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It would have to be an order of the [4297] Chief of Staff or his deputy because—you were a Deputy Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. No, sir; I was not. When I appeared before the Board I was not. I came back from Europe to appear before that board.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

General GEROW. I had no status in the War Department at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not in the Chief of Staff at that time?

General GEROW. No, sir; I was not on duty there.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I just want to have the record correct.

Who would have authority to give you that order?

General GEROW. I should say the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, or any officer designated by the Chief of Staff to transmit such an order to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall it at all now?

General GEROW. I am very uncertain in my mind, sir. I think, and this, Senator, is—I cannot testify to this, my memory is not clear on it—I believe it was either Colonel Clarke or General Noyes, and I am not positive as to which one or whether it was either one.

[4298] Senator FERGUSON. Both of those gentlemen would be in a position to have given you that message; as I understand it, you carried it out and didn't give secret magic before the Pearl Harbor board?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When Lieutenant Colonel Clausen came to you did he ask you to make certain statements to contradict other witnesses?

General GEROW. I submitted an affidavit, sir, and I think that affidavit is of record. I believe I have a copy with me. I would prefer to answer from that, if I may.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Let's take your affidavit then.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator FERGUSON. No, I will ask you some questions about it—unless you want to read it first.

General GEROW. I think that gives the whole story, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose you read it into the record and that will save time.

Mr. MURPHY. May I have a copy of the Clausen report. Do you have it, Counsel? May I have it, Mr. Greaves, please.

(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Murphy.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, General.

[4299] General GEROW (reading):

Affidavit of Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow.

Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief, War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C., some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form of intelligence.

Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, designated Top Secret Exhibit "B." I recall the general substance of some of these messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate dates [4300] of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to reports to Tokyo on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to

the Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coordination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

(1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on [4301] 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

(2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC., informed General Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.

(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843.

My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:

(1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was [4302] then available for that purpose.

(2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.

(3) I did not receive or see any parts of the [4303] message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me.

In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by the Axis powers.

I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War [4304] Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle plans and estimates with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for that purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established military practice. [4305] I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two commanders at Hawaii.

So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November 1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my understanding that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B."

Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not [4306] the policy of the War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas commanders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible defeats.

(Signed) L. T. GEROW,
Lieut. Gen. U. S. Army.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
(Signed) HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
at Cannes, France

[4307] Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, do you know what—put it this way: Did Major Clausen at this time, or Lieutenant Colonel—was he Lieutenant Colonel?

General GEROW. Lieutenant Colonel.

Senator FERGUSON. Colonel Clausen, at that time, did he ask you these questions so that you would write out this 3-page affidavit? How did you know at that time what you wanted to put in the affidavit—what he wanted?

General GEROW. He visited me first at my headquarters at Bad Nauheim. We had a short conversation at that time and he told me what the scope of his investigation was going to be. He left, and, as I recall, went up to interview other officers on this Pearl Harbor affair. I then left, I think the day after he was at my headquarters, and went to the Riviera, for the first leave I had had in four years. He followed me down there and came out to my house and questioned me in a very full and very formal way.

I drafted notes. I had no typist or stenographer. He took them to his hotel and typed it and brought it back, the substance of what I told him, and I didn't agree with some of the things he had written, and so I scratched them out and rewrote them myself, and he finally typed them.

Does that cover your question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[4308] Now, what did he tell you he was trying to prove; did he tell you he was trying to prove something?

General GEROW. No, sir. He merely came to me and presented this letter from the Secretary of War authorizing him to make this investigation and he stated, as I recall now, that testimony had been submitted before the Pearl Harbor Board after my testimony and he was trying to clear up that testimony, to see whether the statements made concerning certain acts that I was involved in were correct, what my testimony would be in answer to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, first:

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board to the following effect: * * *

Did he tell you that it was testimony that had been sworn to?

General GEROW. He has it here "on what is stated to have been testimony."

Senator FERGUSON. Was there some doubt about this being testimony?

General GEROW. Well, there wasn't in my mind, sir. I interpreted the statement he made to me that it was testimony given before the Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently he told you Bratton had [4309] testified to this:

On 4 December 1941 Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokyo, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders.

Up to there it would indicate that Bratton wanted to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. The warning then in effect was that of the 27th, was it not? This is on the 4th of December.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. The operational message was sent on November 27, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be the one he was talking about.

He asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders.

You would be the man he would come to, would you not? You have told us you were the authorized officer outside of the Chief of Staff to send this.

General GEROW. That is right. If it was an operational message. If it was an informational message it would be sent out by G-2.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that kind of a message, to send more warnings to the overseas commanders, that would be [4310] operational, would it not?

General GEROW. Not, sir, if you take it in connection with the sentence above, "called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokyo." That would only bear out what the Operational message already said.

Senator FERGUSON. What did the destruction of codes mean to you?

General GEROW. It means that the people destroying were anticipating war, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you didn't disturb or want to disturb, if you got that information you didn't want to disturb your warning of the 27th; is that correct?

General GEROW. No, sir; I don't think the statement in the Operational message, the instructions to the commander out there, needed any changing because of the fact that the Japanese were destroying their codes. We had already stated, the War Department had taken the position that war was imminent, hostilities might occur at any moment. The mere fact that they had destroyed their codes wouldn't change it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the fact that you had received information about the destruction of the Japanese codes subsequent to the 27th wouldn't cause you, would not have [4311] caused you to act?

General GEROW. Would not have caused me to send another Operational action message, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then——

General GEROW. I would like to elaborate, if I may. I think my response to that one should also be read.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to answer fully. I don't want you to feel that you are not given an opportunity to answer fully.

General GEROW. I would like to, since part of that paragraph 1 has been brought into the picture, I think the answer should be given at the same time.

I do not recall the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you said, "I do not recall the incident," but I am trying to ask you questions to see whether or not it would be your duty if you did get the information to act.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4312] Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am trying to say.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, as you remember now, if you had received that information knowing that the warning of the 27th went out, that you would not have thought that the information about breaking the codes would not have led you to give them more warning. Now go ahead and make any further explanation that you want.

Mr. MITCHELL. He did not say that. He said it would not require an operational order. He said it two or three times. This man had operational orders to give and G-2 had warnings to give and I think there ought to be a distinction made between an operational order and information in every question that is asked him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the statement by counsel does that help refresh your memory? Has he enlightened you?

General GEROW. Will you ask your question again, sir, and I will reply to it again, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Here is the language in the affidavit: "And then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders."

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we are talking about warning of action, that is, a directive of action not such as G-2 would [4313] send but such as you would send.

Now, to get this straight, the warning on the 27th was a message that you could send but not G-2, isn't that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General GEROW. And I would only send it in the name of General Marshall if he would approve it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct. Now, you answered my question when I asked you that, that you did not think that the destruction of codes would have caused you to send any further message of action or warning.

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I said that destruction of codes was not—the information was not of such a nature that would have caused me to change the operational instructions, the directives that were contained in the message of November the 27th.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand.

General GEROW. And, sir, the use of that word "warnings" in here I think is a bit confusing. If Colonel Bratton did what he said that he did he was merely telling me that he wanted me to send a message to Hawaii to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes. Now, that is apparently what the paragraph means, sir, and that was a message that was purely informational that could have been sent by G-2 [4314] and not by me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, if he had in mind the other kind of a message, "General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders," not information, warnings—and we have been talking here with the other officers that the message of the 27th was a warning, the one of the 24th was even called a war warning right in it.

General GEROW. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if he had in mind that kind of a message, "General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent." Now, you are

still of the opinion that that would be a correct answer to Bratton, are you not, if you were of the opinion then that sufficient had been sent?

General GEROW. I was of the opinion that a very positive and clear-cut directive had been sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for definite action and that the fact that the Japanese were destroying their code did not indicate to me that I should change that directive that was still in effect on December the 7th.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; all right. Now, on the 5th of December, the next thing: "Colonel Otis E. Sadtler, S. C."—what does the "S. C." mean after that?

General GEROW. Signal Corps.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Informed General Gerow [4315] that the Japanese wind code had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.

Now, at that time, General, taking as of December the 5th, did you know that Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, had notified General Miles by a message that there was a wind code, not an activating of a wind code, but a wind code which it interpreted as a war decision would be sent by weather broadcast? Did you know that?

General GEROW. I would like to see that message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would counsel show him the Batavian message?

Mr. GESELL. You have got it, Senator. It is in volume 5 of the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. Volume 5 of the Navy.

Mr. GESELL. It is the one you had yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the original.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask counsel whether or not the Clausen report has been introduced in evidence as yet?

Mr. GESELL. No; it has not been introduced in evidence [4316] as yet.

Senator LUCAS. How many reports are there, may I ask, Clausen reports? Just one?

Mr. GESELL. Well, the Clausen report is a series of affidavits primarily.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you mean how many copies?

Senator LUCAS. Yes; how many copies.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have 2 copies.

Mr. GESELL. There are 2 copies available to us.

Senator LUCAS. When could the Senator from Illinois get ahold of the Clausen report?

Mr. GESELL. I will be glad to let you have our copy tonight.

Senator LUCAS. No; I am not going to take the copy away from counsel because he needs it. I am asking about the other one. Who has it now?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am not clear whether it is Senator Brewster or who it is.

Mr. GESELL. Congressman Murphy I think has the other. Both of them are out of our hands now.

Senator FERGUSON. I will undertake, Senator, to give you Senator Brewster's copy.

Senator LUCAS. I will be delighted to have it.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, sir.

[4317] Senator LUCAS. Overnight, at least.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not find it. Does counsel recall the page? I have it now. It is on page 726, so the record will show.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of volume 5.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, General.

General GEROW. I think, Senator, when you asked me the question you read what Colonel Sadtler was reported to have said.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW. And I would like to go back to my answer on that for the purpose of the record and state that I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken.

In answer to your question, sir, I have never seen this message.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never seen the Batavia message?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Which indicated it would not be a message on breaking up relations; it would be a war decision message. You see that language in there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I do not recall ever seeing that message.

[4318] Senator FERGUSON. And that is quite an important message, is it not, and you would recall it now?

General GEROW. I think I would; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it you say that you do not remember that incident. It could have happened but you do not remember.

General GEROW. It could have happened, sir, but I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am trying to get what your mental attitude would have been at that time.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. If Sadtler had come to you telling you this, were you of the opinion that they had sufficient information, and, therefore, you would not have sent it?

General GEROW. I think that is a little different message, Senator. If I had been sure that the Japs had announced that war with the United States was going to occur at a certain time, I would have most certainly written a message as quickly as possible and sent it on my own responsibility if General Marshall had not been there. That would have been an operational message.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, an operational message.

General GEROW. And warning them that a certain thing would happen at a certain time.

[4319] Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, as I understand it, if you had seen the Batavia message and knew it was activating, then you would have felt that it was your duty to send a new action message to Hawaii?

General GEROW. Not necessarily a new action message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what would it be?

General GEROW. One quite similar to the one General Marshall sent on the morning of December the 7th. There was something that rather

fixed a date as immediate, that something was going to happen. If they had said, "We have definitely decided to go to war with the United States," I think we most certainly—that is, if I may correct that, that if Japan had decided and had stated that she was going to go to war with the United States definitely on a certain day—would inform our commanders all over the world to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next one:

On the night of the 6th of December 1941 Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese intercept 25843.

That is the 13 parts of the so-called 14-part message. Now, did he give you that information on the 6th, that is, on Saturday?

General GEROW. I do not recall, sir, that he did. I have seen testimony somewhere that he stated that it was given [4320] to my executive officer, Colonel Gailey, and I haven't talked to Colonel Gailey, sir, and I do not know what his answer would be.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have an executive officer by the name of Colonel Gately or Gailey?

General GEROW. Gailey; yes, sir. I had such an executive officer, C. K. Gailey, a colonel.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, at that time on Saturday was your office, the War Plans, alerted to war?

General GEROW. That depends, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. To expect war that day?

General GEROW. It just depends, Senator, on what you mean by the term "alerted." I was, and most of my officers were, working down there quite late every night and practically all day Sunday and on holidays. As I stated, I believe, this morning, we had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated each day for a 24-hour period. That duty officer after the office was closed up was permitted to go to his home. He remained within calling distance of a telephone during his entire period of duty, except when he was at the office. He knew where to reach me, sir, and the Adjutant General and the Secretary of the General Staff knew where to reach him, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would your records show—should [4321] they show what officers were on duty after 6 o'clock Saturday night in your department?

General GEROW. Senator, I have had a search made in the War Department to try to find that duty roster, sir, and I have been unable to locate it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was one at that time, there was a roster?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have made a search and you have been unable to locate it?

General GEROW. I have asked the Operations Division, which took over and superseded the War Plans Division, to make a search of their records and to search the Adjutant General's records and they have been unable, sir, to find the record or the roster for that period, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are unable to tell us who was on duty that night?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I regret to say I am, sir. I think that I was down at the office myself until 6 or 7 or 8 o'clock. Of course, that was a very busy time and we had a lot of unfinished business. As a matter of fact, we went down the next morning, a number of us, Sun-

day morning, in order to clean up some of this business that had accumulated and we could do it better on Sunday morning because [4322] you did not have a lot of people bothering you.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were not going down Sunday—or you were not down Saturday night, I mean your force, because your office was closed. All right.

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say here:

I do not recall the incident.

You were replying back to one. And then you said that—

General Sherman Miles, Assistant of G-2, had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance.

You meant there that if it was only information he could have given it alone, but if he wanted to get any action message then he would have to come to you or General Marshall?

General GEROW. Yes. If he wanted to give out information he could send it without consulting me. He normally did consult me, however, but he had no authority, sir, to direct operations without consulting me, sir. If he felt that operations should be conducted, he was absolutely free to come to me and suggest that such a message be sent and if we did not agree I think the custom would have been for General Miles and myself both to go to the Chief of Staff and express our differing views and have him make the decision.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to go to paragraph 3 on the next page [reading]:

[4323] I did not receive or see any part of the message mentioned until the morning of the 7th of December 1941 when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of the 6th

Now, I assume there that you are talking about the 13 parts that were in.

General GEROW. I think probably I was covering the whole message, sir, at that time because—

Senator FERGUSON. You do not say that in your affidavit do you?

General GEROW. No, sir; but I did not have these messages in front of me at that time, sir, to show when they came into the War Department and the time they were translated.

Senator FERGUSON. But he must have told you that 13 were in because you say, "If I had received parts of the message on the 6th of December 1941." Now, here is what you say in your affidavit that you would have done:

I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff.

In other words, you thought that the 13 parts of the message, plus the pilot message, which I understand you did not see—

General GEROW. No, sir.

[4324] Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Would have been sufficient for you to immediately have realerted or to at least have alerted the commanders across the sea?

General GEROW. I think possibly, Senator, there may not have been a meeting of minds with regard to that particular sentence between myself and Colonel Clausen. I did not have those messages with me, I did not recall all their contents. As a matter of fact, as I have testi-

fied, I saw them first on the morning in the office of the Chief of Staff at 11:30 and I think I read it very casually that morning, sir, and had not seen them since. I did not see them when I testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

General GEROW. I am sure what I meant in that was if they necessitated operational orders to the commanders overseas I would have sent such orders.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is not what it says, is it?

General GEROW. No, sir; and I say now I feel that there must not have been a meeting of minds because I would not have acted on an order that was unimportant, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand that you feel that up until the night of the 6th, which includes the 13 parts, that they were not important?

General GEROW. No, sir.

[4325] Senator FERGUSON. The Winant message, the pilot message, the breaking of the codes message and the 13-part message, the various other messages that were in here that I reviewed with General Marshall the other day, that they were not of such importance that you would have given an alert?

General GEROW. No, sir; I did not mean, sir, to convey that answer. The sentence reads: "If I had received parts of the message." I might have received maybe the first part of 14 parts and there may not have been anything in that one part of that message that would have caused me to send an operational message. Do I make myself clear, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read the 13 parts of that message? Have you ever read it?

General GEROW. I read it, sir, I think on the morning or the afternoon of December the 7th, sir, rather casually. That was something which happened, that was in the past. We were trying to see that nothing like that happened in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as far as you were concerned, General, you really never read those 13 parts or heard it read prior to the 7th, the time of the attack on the 7th?

General GEROW. No, sir; I saw it first at 11:30 in the Chief of Staff's office.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not read it and he did [4326] not read it aloud?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not believe that he did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you hadn't any knowledge of it, I mean what was in it?

General GEROW. Well, sir, the Chief of Staff told me in general what was in it when I went in there, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had he already read it when you got in there?

General GEROW. I think he did, sir. He had the papers on his desk in front of him.

Senator FERGUSON. General, how did you get to the General's office? Did you drive there or were you in the same building?

General GEROW. No, sir; we were in the same building, on the same floor just a very short distance away.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go there by a telephone call?

General GEROW. As I recall, sir, the Chief of Staff had a buzzer on his desk, a telephone buzzer and he buzzed that and said, "Come up to my office at once."

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, how long had you been in your office prior to the buzz from the Chief of Staff to come to his office?

General GEROW. To the best of my recollection and belief I arrived in my office some time before 10 o'clock, sir.

[4327] Senator FERGUSON. Well, have you any nearer idea? 9:30?

General GEROW. No, sir; I cannot testify as to the exact time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you would be an hour and twenty-some minutes in your office.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to going to General Marshall's office.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON. And during that period you had no idea that there was a pilot message, that there was an Admiralty message about the movement of ships, the Winant message, the 13-part message, the 14th part, or the 1 o'clock delivery, and the destruction of the code. You were in your office an hour and twenty-one minutes, and that never came to your attention?

General GEROW. I do not believe, sir, it was ever brought to my office.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I asked you.

General GEROW. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I asked you.

General GEROW. No, sir. I do not recall ever seeing that message until I went to General Marshall's office at 11:30.

[4328] Mr. MITCHELL. He is talking about several messages, not only the 13 parts or 14th part, but the one from Winant.

General GEROW. I think I testified I did not—

Mr. MITCHELL. Your answer only relates to one of them?

General GEROW. I do not recall, as I think I stated before, having seen the Winant message at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I say. You never saw it at all.

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not see the pilot message prior to being with General Marshall in his office on the morning of the 7th?

General GEROW. To the best of my recollection I believe I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not seen the 13th part of the message, or the 14th part, is that right?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not seen the 1 o'clock delivery message and the destruction of their code machine, had you, prior to 11:25?

General GEROW. The destruction of the code machine, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It is in the 1 o'clock delivery message. Would you just let him see that message?

(The document was handed to General Gerow.)

[4329] Mr. MITCHELL. What is the message you asked him about?

Senator FERGUSON. It is the 1 o'clock delivery message. Is not there in that same message a provision about destroying the code?

Mr. GESELL. No; it is a separate message. That is on the other page, right across from it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is across on the other page, the one as to the destruction of the code.

General GEROW. That is the one, sir, No. 910, that you refer to, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Wait until I get my copy.

General GEROW. Page 249, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 248, the one at the top, General, first.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government, if possible to the Secretary of State, our reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th your time." That would be on Sunday at 1 o'clock, would it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. As I recall now, sir, I did not see that message until I went into the office of General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I understand. Now, on page [430] 249, at the top of the page:

After deciphering part 14 of my 902, also my 907, 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining deciphering machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

General GEROW. I do not recall having seen that message until I went into the office of the Chief of Staff at 11:30 on December 7, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand. And you do not recall anyone calling you at your home to give you any of those messages or information on those messages?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not recall any telephone calls, sir, with regard to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Colonel Gailey was in your office on Sunday morning?

General GEROW. I do not recall, sir, specifically that he was there, Senator. I remember the names of several other officers who were there at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there any officer other than you below General Marshall that could have acted on Saturday, or Sunday up until the time you saw General Marshall in his office, on this information and given another alert to Hawaii? Did you understand my question?

General GEROW. No, sir; I am not quite clear, sir.

[431] Senator FERGUSON. Were you the only officer with authority to act under General Marshall—I think he was the Chief of Staff—

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you the only officer that had authority to act, to give a further alert or action message similar—I say "similar" only because it would have an effect—as the one of the 27th, an action message? Were you the only one under General Marshall capable of doing that?

General GEROW. Senator, I had no specific authority to act for General Marshall; I would have assumed that authority if I thought the situation demanded it.

Senator FERGUSON. But, as I understand it then you did not have that authority, but you now say that you would have assumed it; is that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir. I had no specific authority to act in General Marshall's name. I had authority to sign papers with his name, sir, but in a matter of that kind, I would have, if the situation warranted, I would have assumed the responsibility for sending the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, suppose, General, that you had known at 10 o'clock in your office all that you knew [4332] at 12 o'clock after being in General Marshall's office would you have sent a message to Short?

General GEROW. I would have certainly drafted such a message, and if I could have gotten in touch quickly with General Marshall, I would have put the question up to him. If I could not have gotten in touch with him, sir, I would have probably gotten in touch with the Secretary of War and told him what I was doing, and gotten the message on the line as quickly as possible, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you figure that that information was such that it should have had action on it?

General GEROW. You mean the document that I saw at 11:30 in the Chief of Staff's office the next morning?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

General GEROW. Yes, sir; they did warrant action.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, down at the bottom of the page in your affidavit, "General Short,"—so we are talking about the same thing.

General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind that occurred with the means available to him.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want you to look at Exhibit 32, page 10, and ask you when you made that affidavit with [4333] Clausen, whether you are familiar with the message on page 10?

General GEROW. The message on page 10?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 10 of Exhibit 32.

General GEROW. May I read that message to see if we have the same one?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW (reading):

Japanese negotiations have come to a practical stalemate.

Senator FERGUSON. That is wrong.

General GEROW. That is the one on page 10, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is on page 12. The question is when you made the affidavit in Paris—no, in Cannes, France, the 20th of June, 1945, were you familiar with the message on page 12 of Exhibit 32, reading:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh," and signed "Short."

General GEROW. I did not have the message in front of me, sir, at the time I testified. I did know about it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you make that affidavit, the Clausen affidavit and put that sentence in it, and have in mind at the same time Short's reply?

[4334] General GEROW. Well, sir, I think the reply from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is subject to sev-

eral interpretations, sir. I think the phrase "liaison with the Navy" could be interpreted to mean that he was taking steps to conduct reconnaissance, and carry out other defensive measures.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any reason why you would misinterpret the first part, "Report Department alerted"? That was in reply to the 27th, wasn't it? Let me get the language of the one of the 27th.

Report measures taken.

Then his message came in on the 28th:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period.

That is the end of the sentence?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, could that be misconstrued?

General GEROW. It could be construed that he was taking steps to prevent sabotage and also these other things. The entire message could be construed that way.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first see the message on page 12?

General GEROW. I think I saw it first, sir, on the morning of the 28th of November, 1941. I have testified, I believe, sir, to that effect.

[4335] Senator FERGUSON. And the interpretation that you now get from it is to the effect that that sentence "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage" meant to you that he was alerted to the other, and he was also alerted to sabotage?

General GEROW. Senator, I did not testify to that, sir, on my previous testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you now.

General GEROW. I say now, that the message could be interpreted to mean that he was alerted to prevent sabotage and that he was also prepared to conduct reconnaissance and other defensive missions.

Senator FERGUSON. It could be?

General GEROW. It could be.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you interpret it on the 28th when you got it?

General GEROW. Well, sir—

Senator FERGUSON. You acted on it?

General GEROW. No, sir; that is the trouble. I did not act on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Even filing it away is acting on it, or passing it off is acting on it.

General GEROW. I testified, Senator, at considerable length to my part in the affair. I will repeat the testi- [4336] mony, if necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to answer my question first.

General GEROW. Will you repeat the question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. What interpretation, what evaluation did you give it on the 28th?

General GEROW. I stated, sir, that I testified before the Roberts board to the effect that when that message passed over my desk, I thought it was an answer to the G-2 message sent out by General Miles. Consequently if I did have that thought on the morning of the 28th when the message passed over my desk—and I cannot recall now what my thoughts were at that time, but if I did have that thought, then there was no occasion for me to make any interpretation of the rest of the message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you want to say that that was your thought, to the best of your knowledge now?

General GEROW. Senator, I would like my testimony to stand, sir, as I have stated it, that I testified before the Roberts Commission, or Committee, that when that message passed over my desk I assumed it to be an answer to the G-2 message sent by General Miles, and the reason for that assumption was that the G-2 message was discussed greatly at length the evening before.

[4337] Senator FERGUSON. I want to get down to what you said in the affidavit:

General Short did not send at any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack at the time it occurred with the means available to him.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I ask you again, did you have in mind this reply to Short's on page 12 when you made that affidavit?

General GEROW. I told you, sir, that I did not have that message in front of me. I did know, and was familiar with the message, sir, and I did have it in mind at the time I made that affidavit, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not think that at least that message would indicate that he was not fully alerted?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness has answered that question at least a half dozen times in the examination. I just cannot understand the repetition of these questions over and over again. I may be wrong, and I certainly am not attempting to foreclose any member of the committee from asking any questions, but I cannot for the life of me understand the repetitious questions. I may be wrong.

[4338] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would suggest that the members of the committee avoid repetition as much as possible, in order to expedite the hearing, but we will let General Gerow answer this question once more.

Senator LUCAS. I do not object, but I should like to ask this question:

Should I be permitted, and every member of this committee be permitted to go through the same kind of examination and ask the same type and character of questions over and over again?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I did not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair answer that question, or that interrogatory, which he thinks is a proper one. This is not a court procedure in which the presiding judge, or the presiding officer, has any control over the inquiries made by members of the committee.

The Chair does not understand that he can, arbitrarily, or without arbitrary action, control the interrogatories propounded by members of the committee. Even though they repeat over and over again, the Chair, however, cannot control that. If any member of the committee desires to ask the same question or a similar question over and over again, the Chair does not know how he can control that process of inquiry by any member of the committee. But the [4339] Chair would like to caution the members, as far as possible, that there be no repetition of the same question, in view of similar answers that may have been given by the witness in any case.

So the Senator will proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, this affidavit was not covered, as I recall it, by the General, in his testimony. These questions are new. They were not covered. This sentence that I was reading and trying to get an answer to had not been covered.

I want to know how it is possible to have that sentence in the affidavit, having in mind page 12. Now, do you understand my question?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not recall whether General Gerow was asked about that matter when he was on the stand before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you cover that before, General?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair may say also—

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might also as far as the Chair is concerned, as a member of the committee, he understands the General's answer, and if other members do not, then they can pursue that matter, I suppose, until they do understand it.

[4340] General GEROW. My only desire sir, is to explain all I know about the Pearl Harbor affair to the committee. I am willing to answer any questions freely.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I am trying to find out, is what you do know.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, can you answer the question? I wish you would look at that sentence. I want to know how it is possible to write that sentence in an affidavit and at the same time have in mind General Short's reply on page 12 of exhibit 32.

General GEROW. Well, Senator, as I stated before, this affidavit was made, as I believe, in June 1945. That was when this affidavit was made. This message was received on November 28, 1941. A lot had happened between 1941 and 1945. I stated that I had not attempted to interpret this message when it passed over my desk on the morning on November 28, because of the incorrect assumption I had made that it was a reply to the sabotage message sent by General Miles.

If you ask me now, sir, to interpret whether this message could be interpreted as meaning that General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an [4341] attack of the kind which occurred with the means available to him, I think I can state now, sir, that this message could be interpreted as meaning that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had prepared for an attack of the kind that was actually made.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your answer to the question?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 4 o'clock.

It is obvious we cannot finish with General Gerow, so we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 10 o'clock a. m., of the following day, Saturday, December 15, 1945.)

[4342]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[4343] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, if we may do so, there are one or two matters that have come up that may be of aid to the committee in connection with the further examination of General Gerow, and if we could intervene for a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permission.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. GESELL. The first has to do with Exhibit 21, the Winant dispatch of December 6 concerning the movement of Japanese vessels towards the Kra Peninsula. We wish to call the committee's attention to two additional messages on that subject.

The first is a message dated December 6, 1941, from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by R. E. Schuirmann—a memorandum for the State Department, dated December 6, 1941. This memorandum reads as follows:

Following report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet dated December 6:

"British Commander in Chief China reports a 25-ship convoy escorted by 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers in latitude 08-00 North longitude 106-00 East at 0316 Greenwich time today. A convoy of 10 ships with 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers were in latitude 07-40 North longitude 106-20 East 2 hours [4344] later. All on course West. Three additional ships in latitude 07-51 North longitude 105-00 East at 0442 course 310°. This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron in latitude 10-01 North longitude 104 East.

"Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Admiral Hart's scouting force has sighted 30 ships and 1 large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay."

There is also attached to this memorandum which I have just read the text of the message from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic forces dated December 6, 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations,

which forms the basis of the Schuirmann note to the State Department. This is dated December 6, 1941, and contains the same information and shows on its face that the dispatch was also sent for the information of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Com. 16 and Com. 14. The time group on the dispatch indicates that it was sent December 6th Greenwich time, at 12:55 p. m., which would be 7:55 a. m. Eastern Standard time, or 2:55 p. m. Philippine time.

I would like to have these two documents designated Exhibit 66.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 66.")

Mr. GESELL. Now the question also arose I believe in [4345] connection with the examination of General Miles, but it is pertinent perhaps to the examination of General Gerow as well, at page 4190 of the transcript, as to whether the so-called parallel action messages which were delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941 by President Roosevelt were contained in magic.

We have obtained the magic messages which show that the texts of those notes were in magic, as well as the message from Tokyo to Washington dated August 17, 1941, transmitting the messages, and I think that should be marked as an exhibit. I suggest that the next exhibit number be Exhibit 67.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 67.")

[4346] Senator FERGUSON. Could I just see them?

Mr. GESELL. Certainly.

(Exhibits Nos. 66 and 67 were handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Mr. GESELL. We have not reproduced the latter because it is the text of notes which are already in volume 2 of Foreign Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire from counsel whether or not we have all of the intercepts now between the 16th and the 28th of August 1941, in relation to this instrument both ways?

Mr. GESELL. I cannot answer that question. We will inquire and see. I thought the question in the transcript was for the texts of these specific messages.

Senator FERGUSON. What I would like to have now in relation to these is all of the messages in relation to them both ways. This is the one transmitted—

Mr. GESELL. Between what dates, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Between the 16th of August and 29th.¹ The 28th is when the reply came in.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel whether or not we will receive the material which I requested of General Marshall, namely the reasons for the 1940 alert?

[4347] Mr. GESELL. No, Congressman Keefe, we have not received that information. We understand it is expected either later today or Monday.

Mr. KEEFE. Have you received the action report on the log of the U. S. S. *Enterprise* which I asked for some time ago?

Mr. GESELL. The situation with respect to the ship logs is as follows, according to my understanding: A large number of ship logs were requested by the different members of the committee at different times.

¹ Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 124.

The Navy Department has set aside a large room, and filled it with these various logs that had been requested. It is a rather difficult matter to reproduce them all, and the Navy has suggested that those logs will be there for the inspection of anyone authorized by the committee to examine them. We wrote a letter in that connection for Senator Brewster, who had asked for quite a number. We have gotten the log of the *Boise*, which the committee had expressed a special interest in, and we were going to make a report on that, and some of the other requests later on today.

Mr. KEEFE. I was especially interested in the log of the *Enterprise*.

Mr. GESELL. I am sure that will be in the room along [4348] with the other material.

Mr. KEEFE. If I am permitted to go down to this room and see it, in company with somebody, if the committee would authorize me to, I will be glad to go down there and look at it.

Mr. GESELL. We will try to get the *Enterprise* log for you, Mr. Congressman. I am sure it can be made available. I think so many logs were requested, however, that unless there is a special interest in a particular log, it might be more convenient to leave them in this room, which has been especially supplied with them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I recall a special interest has been indicated in the *Enterprise* and *Boise*.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I was wondering if those two could be brought up here, and if any special ones are needed, they can be examined in the room.

Mr. MURPHY. If any members of the committee are going to look at the logs, I want to see them, too. I want to know what they are looking at.

Mr. GESELL. They are being used by the Navy, also. We will get the *Enterprise* and the *Boise* logs.

Mr. KEEFE. Does that also include the action report?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; we will get that also.

[4349] Mr. KEEFE. Now, I also ask for the series of memoranda written by Hornbeck. I have been furnished with what purport to be two. I understand there are quite a series.

Mr. GESELL. We were advised this morning. Congressman Keefe, that the Navy had just located the file of the Hornbeck memoranda, and we expect to be able to meet your request completely, and more, by next week. I think I reported to the committee earlier that the Navy had not been able to find the memoranda, but they reported this morning that they at last were located. We will have them reproduced and make them available to the members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed with the examination of the General.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)

Senator FERGUSON. General Gerow, you heard read this message from Commander Schuirmann to the Secretary of State, a memorandum for the State Department, December 6, 1941, based upon the message from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Had you ever heard of that before? Had that been called to your attention?

General GEROW. I do not recall now, sir, if the Navy [4350] sent a copy over to the War Department, as they usually do, and if they had sent some document of that nature I would have seen it, or one of my subordinates in the War Plans Division would have seen it.

Mr. GESELL. I should have stated the Navy record indicated that the Navy message was sent to the War Department. The War Department, however, has been unable to locate the message as yet, and is still searching for it.

General GEROW. I do not know, Senator, whether it would have come directly to War Plans or to G-2, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that come to G-2 or would it come to you, your department?

General GEROW. I do not know, sir, how that message was sent. It may come directly to War Plans Division, or it may go to G-2 first, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was very important information if it came in on the morning of the 6th?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that now?

General GEROW. I do not recall that particular message, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that information around the 6th?

General GEROW. I have a hazy recollection, Senator, of [4351] a number of troop movements being made by the Japs around the Camranh Bay area, but I do not remember the details of where I received that information, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated yesterday that there was some information put in the original affidavit by Colonel Clausen that you refused to sign and had him take it out and prepare a new affidavit; do you recall that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what was the information that he put in that you had him strike out?

General GEROW. I don't recall that it was information, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

General GEROW. He misunderstood, I think, some of the statements. There was no stenographer there and he tried to take it down in long-hand and he misunderstood, I believe, some of the statements that I made.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall what that information was?

General GEROW. I cannot recall now; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get the regulations, over the evening, as to the drafting of messages?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I have searched two or three regulations and in that connection, sir, I would like to state [4352] that—I believe you asked me about what they taught at our schools with regard to certain operational messages and my reply was directed to the 5-paragraph order which is normally an order issued to, you might say, subordinate units, such as a division.

The type of order that may be issued to a theater commander in one of the larger units does not necessarily follow that detailed form. It may be included in a letter of instructions. It may be a telegram

sent out by the Chief of Staff. It may be very brief or it may be very long, depending on the person that is writing it and the desire or instruction he wishes to convey.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the rule itself, in the book, give an exception when it goes to a theater commander?

General GEROW. I would like to read the Field Service Regulations regarding larger units.

Senator FERGUSON. What are you reading from?

General GEROW. I am reading—

Senator FERGUSON. War Department Staff Officers Field Manual?

General GEROW. No, sir. That is a book that pertains primarily to the details of these subordinate orders rather than to the orders issued to the large units. I shall be very glad to have you look at this or I will read the paragraph.

[4353] Senator FERGUSON. Suppose you read the paragraph.

General GEROW. This document is entitled "Field Manual 100-15, War Department, Field Service Regulations," dated June 29, 1942.

On page 6, paragraph 15 reads:

The mission of the theater commander may be prescribed in an approved war plan or it may be stated in a letter of instructions or other orders from the President or the War Department. The mission assigned will usually be general in character and leave great discretion to the theater commander. Ordinarily, he is consulted prior to the promulgation of the plans. He may be called upon to prepare such plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you claim that your order of the 27th followed that?

General GEROW. I don't believe, sir, that it was necessary that it should follow that manual.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you don't claim it did follow that manual?

General GEROW. No, sir, I didn't make that statement. I would have to analyze the message to see whether it followed it exactly or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Are there any other memoranda in that book?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, the book—

[4354] Senator FERGUSON. I mean in relation to the order.

General GEROW. That is the pertinent paragraph, I believe, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with the Staff Officers' Field Manual? For instance, on page 31, "Command Responsibility":

a. The commander alone is responsible to his superior for all that his unit does or fails to do. He cannot shift this responsibility to his staff or to subordinate commanders.

Then under "Liaison":

Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a representative—usually an officer—of one unit who visits or remains with another unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact.

General GEROW. May I have a reference to the page you are reading from, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't know you had the same book.

General GEROW. I think I have the same book, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 31, paragraph 47.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when General Short used in his message the word "liaison," with the Navy, wouldn't that be what he meant in Army language?

General GEROW. No, sir, I don't think so, sir. The [4355] liaison referred to is when a commander, such as an Army commander, sends an officer from his staff down to a corps commander's headquarters. That officer is his particular representative there at the moment. He keeps him advised of the operations of that corps. He reports back periodically to his higher commander.

This liaison with the Navy, as it is used in, I think in Hawaii, was meant the close association between the two commanders themselves, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what is this definition that I read, where is the definition that you are giving?

General GEROW. May I read the paragraph again, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, read it aloud.

General GEROW (reading):

Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a representative—usually an officer—of one unit who visits or remains with another unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact.

Now, as I understand General Short's relations to Admiral Kimmel, he did not visit at headquarters and remain with that headquarters, but he was in constant touch with that particular command headquarters and exchanged views, they exchanged views between themselves.

[4356] Senator FERGUSON. Does this liaison definition apply only in the Army itself? Have you any definition in any of the books that would show what liaison with another branch, the Navy, would mean?

General GEROW. There may be a definition in some field manual, I don't recall, but it would be customary, and it was customary in my operations, when operating with the Navy, I would send one of my staff officers to the admiral commanding the fleet operating with me. He was my personal representative with that Navy commander, and he reported back to me the information he thought I should have.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get what the manuals or regulations show. Will you look at page 30, at the bottom of the page, under paragraph 46, "Reports."

General GEROW. Subparagraph b.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW. Do you wish me to read that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW (reading):

The merit of a report is not measured by its length. A concise presentation of important points usually is all that is required.

Senator FERGUSON. Would General Short's reply comply with that regulation?

[4357] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 39, number 63, will you read that?

General GEROW. What is the number of the paragraph?

Senator FERGUSON. Number 63, page 39.

General GEROW. (reading):

Supervision of Execution. The responsibilities of the commander and his staff do not end with the issue of the necessary orders. They must insure receipt of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood, and enforce their effective execution.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't there a special provision in there that when the message of the 27th was sent—it says they must “insure,” that would be the General Staff, “receipt of the orders,” that is the first thing, “by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood”—so when they report back isn't the burden on the one giving the order to ascertain if the order was understood by the one that it was sent to?

Isn't that what that provision says?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, that is what it states.

Senator FERGUSON. Then:

* * * and enforce their effective execution.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4358] Senator FERGUSON. That is a clear understanding.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, would the man in the field then be able to rely upon that, that having sent back his order, that it was understood here in Washington, because the burden was, under the rule, on the people in Washington to know what was being done there, how it was understood; isn't that the way the order reads?

General GEROW. Senator, may I have that question again?

Senator FERGUSON. I will reframe it. Strike the last question.

Under this rule, where the burden is on the one who sends the order to make certain that it is understood, wouldn't the field officer, General Short, have a right to rely upon the fact, having sent what he had, that the interpretation was proper, having sent the order?

General GEROW. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct, isn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not having heard anything for the number of days between the 28th and the 7th, he would have a right to rely upon that fact, that they had understood his order, and that he had properly interpreted the order of the 27th?

[4359] General GEROW. I think that is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean understood his report.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Let's go to page—

General GEROW. But, of course—I haven't studied these books—but I think you will find in some of these pamphlets that the commander on the ground that is responsible, if there is any doubt in his mind as to what the commander wants him to do, it is perfectly proper for him to come back to that commander and ask for a clarification of those instructions. If he is in doubt as to whether the action he has taken is proper he is perfectly within his rights to come back and request confirmation on his action.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to ask you, General, when we get through with the ones that I have, if you look over this and find something else that you want to bring to our attention, you may do so.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 49, under paragraph 71, I wish you would read "a", and "b", under that.

General GEROW. "a" and "b" under paragraph 71?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, on page 49.

General GEROW [reading]:

Technique of Orders. a. Purpose. The purpose of a [4360] uniform technique throughout the service in the preparation of orders is to promote clarity and to prevent misunderstanding. The points of technique discussed in the following subparagraphs have been found helpful.

b. Amount of Detail. Orders should be concise. Those giving missions for subordinate units should prescribe only such details or methods of execution as are necessary to insure that the actions of the subordinate unit concerned will conform to the plan of operation for the force as a whole. In many cases, brevity is governed by the state of training of the troops for whom the order is intended; for a newly organized or poorly trained unit, the orders of necessity must be more detailed than for the well-trained organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that in effect at the time, on the 7th?

General GEROW. I will have to check up to see what date this document is, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. August 19, mine is dated.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It shows the date of August 19, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be in effect?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 51, number i on that page, "Affirmative." Will you read that?

[4361] General GEROW. (reading): Paragraph i:

Affirmative. In the interests of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form of expression should be used. Such an order as "The trains will not accompany the regiment" is defective because the gist of the order depends upon the single word "not." A better form is "The trains will remain at Leavenworth." No doubt arises in the latter case.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, down under "k", I think you might read it all.

General GEROW. (reading):

k. Avoidance of Highly Technical Language. The military profession like all other professions has developed a technical vocabulary. This vocabulary is convenient and aids in the clear and rapid transference of ideas between military persons. The use of this vocabulary in texts and instructions is natural. In combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used. With partially trained troops and staffs the use of technical military language may afford opportunities for such misunderstandings. Therefore the use in combat orders of technical expressions should be avoided if there is any danger of misunderstanding. In such cases, words of common understanding should be substituted, even at the sacrifice of brevity.

[4362] Senator FERGUSON. Were you here when General Marshall spoke about the meaning of the first overt act?

General GEROW. No, sir; I was not present at the hearing, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that that was an expression that could be easily interpreted?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you only gave the message to—the message of the 27th, it is on page 7 of exhibit 32—to “minimum essential officers”—who would you say should have gotten that information about the first overt act?

General GEROW. I would have given it to every officer that I thought should have that information in order to carry out his mission. I may have given that information to some second lieutenant if I thought it was necessary. That is left to the commander's discretion, as to the people that he should disseminate that information to.

Senator FERGUSON. It says:

In combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

General FERGUSON. Now, have you got FM-100-5, May 22, 1941, Field Service Regulations, War Department, Operations?

[4363] General GEROW. No, sir; I failed to bring that document with me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am going to pass it to you and ask you to read: On page 30, number 149; on page 31, 149 and 150; on page 31, 154; on page 32, 156; and the first two sentences of 157. I will indicate them for you.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I didn't get all those numbers.

Senator FERGUSON. They are marked.

(The pamphlet referred to was handed to General Gerow.)

[4364] General GEROW. Paragraph 156.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW (reading):

As a rule it is desirable to keep contemplated operations secret as long as possible and to confine knowledge thereof to a few staff officers and senior commanders. However, upon entry into action no unit should be in doubt as to what the commander wants it to do. Whenever knowledge of his intentions is necessary to insure the cooperation of the units engaged, a commander does not hesitate to disclose them to all concerned. Ignorance of his intentions may often lead to inactivity on the part of subordinates.

Paragraph 157. (Reading:)

It is impossible to prescribe detailed forms of orders to fit every tactical situation. To attempt to do so would result in a rigid form and a routine style of expression which would not be in accord with the tactical requirements sent by the diverse situations that arise in war. To the extent practicable, however, it has been found efficient and convenient to classify combat orders according to their purpose and scope and, for some of these, to adopt a standard sequence of composition. This makes for ease of understanding, the [4365] avoidance of omissions, and ready reference. Moreover, experience has shown that an order which can be misunderstood will be misunderstood and that, to obviate this danger, it is necessary to follow certain rules relating to the designations of boundaries, details of time and place, military terminology, abbreviations, designations of units, and the like. For details relating to these matters, see FM 101-5.

Did you have something—

Senator FERGUSON. I gave you a sheet there with the page numbers on it. Then I drew a line down to the paragraph.

General GEROW. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you make it out?

General GEROW. I am trying to find it now. Paragraph 149 on page 30. [Reading:]

The authority to issue orders is an inherent function of command. Orders are normally issued to next subordinate commanders. Bypassing the normal channels of command is resorted to only in urgent situations; in such cases both the commander issuing and the commander receiving the order should notify intermediate commanders of its purport as soon as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that on page 31?

General GEROW. That is page 30, sir.

[4366] Senator FERGUSON. Page 30?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I am reading now paragraph 150 on page 30, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

General GEROW. (reading):

Orders may be either complete or fragmentary.

The order is complete when it covers all essential aspects and phases of the operation. Complete orders include missions to all subordinate units charged with the execution of tactical operations in carrying out the commander's plan.

Fragmentary orders are used when speed in delivery and execution is imperative. Fragmentary orders are issued successively as the situation develops and decisions are made, and consist of separate instructions to one or more subordinate units prescribing the part each is to play in the operation or in the separate phases thereof. This procedure will be usual in divisions and smaller units. Fragmentary orders may be either oral or written. They are concise but not at the expense of clarity and omission of essential information. Instructions issued in fragmentary orders may be repeated in a complete field order or in an annex if considered desirable.

[4367] Senator FERGUSON. Now page 31, paragraph 154.

General GEROW (reading):

Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity; short sentences are easily understood. Clarity is more important than technique. The more urgent the situation, the greater the need for conciseness in the order. Any statement of reasons for measures adopted should be limited to what is necessary to obtain intelligent cooperation from subordinates. Detailed instructions for a variety of contingencies, or prescriptions that are a matter of training, do not inspire confidence and have no place in an order. Trivial and meaningless expressions divide responsibility and lead to the adoption of half measures by subordinates. Exaggerated and bombastic phrases invite ridicule and weaken the force of an order. Expressions such as "attack vigorously," if used in orders, are not only verbose and meaningless, but tend to weaken the force of subsequent orders in which such expressions do not appear.

[4368] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Army Board classified or described the order of November 27 from General Marshall to General Short, on page 7 of Exhibit 32, as a "do-don't" order?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I know they classified it as such, but I do not know the reasons therefor.

Senator FERGUSON. But under the instructions that you have just read would you classify it as a "do-don't" order?

General GEROW. No, sir; I would not, sir. I do not think we find in this message any definite don'ts. May I—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what about the—

Mr. MURPHY. May the witness finish his answer?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let the General finish his answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. Go ahead, General.

General GEROW. The first sentence I would like to read with reference to that is as follows (reading from page 7 of Exhibit 32) :

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is a desire.

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

That sentence gives him the right to do anything that he [4369] considers necessary in his discretion to safeguard the Island of Oahu and carry out his mission.

There is another sentence, sir, which I would also like to read, if I may, sir :

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, isn't that a do-don't, do something at first but don't do the other? Don't you think they were correct when they described it that way?

General GEROW. The message does not state, sir, that "you will definitely not alarm the civil population."

Senator FERGUSON. Under the first one that you read you have got this word "unpredictable." That is not a very definite term, is it?

General GEROW. I did not read that sentence, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. No. I want you to read it.

General GEROW. All right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read it and pick out the word that I want and ask you about the word.

General GEROW. All right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated.

[4370] You helped to draft this order, did you not, General?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get the word "appear" from? You had already sent a message on the 24th, the joint message that they were broken off.

General GEROW. What date is that message you refer, to, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is the 24th.

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 5 of Exhibit 32.

General GEROW. Page 5?

Senator FERGUSON. That does not use the language I had in mind. It was another message. "Chances of favorable outcome" is the language of that.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading) :

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement * * *.

Do you know whether or not this language of "appear"—

General GEROW. I did not understand you.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Was used because the Secretary of War had talked with the Secretary of State?

[4371] General GEROW. Yes, sir. I think I testified previously, as I recall my testimony, I was called to the office of the Secretary of War about 9:30 on the morning of November the 27th. I went up there for a second conference with him later on in the morning. During that conference it is my recollection now that the Secretary of War talked to the Secretary of State on the telephone with regard to the question as to whether or not negotiations with Japan had actually terminated. As a result of that conversation the Secretary of War directed that the sentence as written in this message cover the statement as to the status of negotiations with Japan at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was in your first draft of this message that you had a definite term that they were broken off?

General GEROW. I cannot recall exactly that message, sir, but it is my impression now that I took a message in, sir, which stated "negotiations are terminated."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Instead of doing it—or instead of being in the joint message—it was in your original message?

General GEROW. I believe it was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General GEROW. I have tried to find a copy of that [4372] message, sir, and I cannot locate it and I am relying now on memory 4 years old.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a long time.

General GEROW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the next words are, "barest possibilities." That is pretty indefinite, isn't it?

General GEROW. Well, sir, I would not say it was pretty indefinite. I think it means exactly what it says, that there is the barest possibility of it being resumed. It is perfectly clear to me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the words "Japanese Government might come back."

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then this "unpredictable, but hostile action possible."

General GEROW. But, sir, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

Just what that action would be and where it would be was not clear to any of us at that time, sir, but we felt that hostile action was possible at any moment and particularly against our possessions in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first think or come to the conclusion that hostile action would be directed against Hawaii?

[4373] General GEROW. Senator, I participated in the preparation of this message and I state in that message, sir, or it is stated in the Chief of Staff's message, that "Japanese future action is unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

I do not think I ever came to the conclusion, sir, that the Japs were going to attack Hawaii and no other place. I felt that they would attack any one of our possessions bordering on the Pacific. That was a possibility, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever have a mental conclusion, then, prior to actual notice of the attack that Japan would attack Hawaii? Did you ever think that they would attack Hawaii? Was that within your thoughts?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I considered it as one of the possibilities in the event war occurred with Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, "possibility" is a very weak expression, isn't it, in the possibilities?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not think it is weak under the circumstances, Senator. There were several possibilities there.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not even say it was a probability. You say it was only a possibility.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what I understand?

[4374] General GEROW. It was a possibility that they might attack any one of our possessions in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. But it did not get the dignity of a probability in your opinion?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

General GEROW. Well, I think, Senator, I would say it was probable that they might attack any one of our four major areas bordering on the Pacific, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General, one of your duties, as I understand you, was to send out messages for action, keeping the field informed.

General GEROW. No, sir; Senator. I think I stated, sir; that my responsibility was to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War for their approval. In any emergency, if the Chief of Staff was not there, I would assume the responsibility for sending them and accept the consequences if I made a mistake.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, one of your duties, then, was to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And those messages would be what is known as action messages, not information but action?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

[4375] Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, it would be necessary for you to determine the time when such a message ought to go?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Isn't that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you at any time make up your mind that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor so that you could have determined to prepare a message?

General GEROW. Senator, I think I testified here before, sir, that I never made up my mind that Hawaii was the only place that the Japs might attack. My thinking was that we had certain possessions in the Pacific; that if war with Japan occurred that Japan might attack any one or all of those possessions.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am not including the words "or others." I want to know just about Hawaii, that, Pearl Harbor.

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I concluded that an attack on Pearl Harbor, among others, was possible or probable.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you answer it without "and others"?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know just whether or not—

General GEROW. No, sir; I cannot.

[4376] Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General GEROW. I tried to be as positive as I can on it.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

General GEROW. I tried to picture my thoughts at the time, which was that Japan might attack any one of our possession in the Pacific. I did not pick out any one of them and give it first priority.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. The next question is—

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. No, not at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. The next question is, General Bryden, did he confer with you on any of these messages?

General GEROW. General Bryden accompanied me when I went in to the office of the Secretary of War on the morning of November the 27th. Later on the messages that had been prepared were presented to him for his approval and I think he initialed them, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is General Bryden now? Is he in Washington?

General GEROW. I believe he is retired, sir. I do not know where he is living.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help to prepare the memo to [4377] the President of the 5th of November? I think it is exhibit 16.

General GEROW. As I recall now, sir; the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy cooperated in the preparation of that message, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you personally help to prepare it?

General GEROW. The original drafts were perhaps prepared by the committees that worked under my supervision and these were then presented to me for my approval or change.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there was an ABCD, the basic military policies on strategy agreed to in the United States-British staff conversations, did you know about that?

General GEROW. You are referring now, sir, to the ADB Singapore conference?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I knew about that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you know that there was a certain line fixed as indicated on pages 4 and 5 (reading from Exhibit 16).

Until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more [4378] of the following contingencies.

General GEROW. May I ask, Senator, where you are reading from, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. On the bottom of page 4.

General GEROW. And the paragraph?

Senator FERGUSON. (b)

General GEROW. Paragraph (b). May I take a moment to read that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I want you to take a moment.

General GEROW. May I have the question again, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to know whether you were familiar with the terms of that agreement. It says:

Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies,

not in that agreement, but under those contingencies. Were you familiar with that?

General GEROW. I was familiar, yes, sir; with the staff conversations in Singapore and the recommendations of the members who participated in that conference, as to what they considered should be done in the event the Japanese did certain things, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they in effect on the 5th of November 1941?

[4379] General GEROW. In effect, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General GEROW. They could not be put into——

Senator FERGUSON. So far as you knew.

General GEROW. They could not be put into effect without the approval of our respective governments. They were purely staff conversations between military personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. As far as you knew, then, they were not in effect, is that correct?

General GEROW. They had never been approved by our Government, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted to find out.

General GEROW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you knew.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you at the meeting—in the minutes of the meeting of November 3, 1941, that were attached to that? I do not see your name on it.

General GEROW. I do not know what the document is, what meeting you refer to, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you show him the first page?

General GEROW. What date is that, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. This is on November 3, 1941.

General GEROW. Yes, sir; my name is on the list as being present, sir. [4380]

Senator FERGUSON. Is it? Oh, yes, it is, "Acting Chief of Staff, War Plans Division."

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I think you stated, Senator, that this document was attached to the memorandum that went to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, will you straighten it out?

General GEROW. As far as I know it was not attached, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You know it was not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On the bottom of page 2, then, did you hear Captain Schuirmann give that statement to the board meeting?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, at that time he pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. You heard that?

General GEROW. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand it?

[4381] General GEROW. Yes, sir; I think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you agree with it?

General GEROW. I was not asked to agree with it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

General GEROW. I was not asked to agree with it.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you now did you agree to it?

General GEROW. I cannot recall now that I agreed to it at the time or made any statement regarding it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a fact or not a fact?

General GEROW. I cannot testify as to whether it was a fact or not a fact. Captain Schuirmann is, as I understand, presenting his views as to what happened at a State Department meeting at which I was not present.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am asking you whether or not you were of the same opinion at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question is not a fair question.

General GEROW. I do not quite understand—

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to state my reasons for it.

General GEROW. I cannot quite understand the question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put it this way: Were you of the opinion that when the President returned from a meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill the President had issued an ulti- [4382] matum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression? Now, I have read what Schuirmann said.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you of that opinion?

General GEROW. I have no first-hand knowledge, sir, if the President issued such a statement, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then you did not even know at that time that the President had issued such a statement?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any statement?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General GEROW. I do not say that. I stated I had no first-hand knowledge that came to my memory that the President had issued it. I had seen, I believe, information concerning it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what was your mental reaction on what you had seen? What conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us here what he drew. What did you draw?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. I decline to yield.

[4383] The CHAIRMAN. I think there is a parliamentary question here and the Chair ought to hear it.

Senator LUCAS. Well, I withdraw it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead, if you please.

General GEROW. Will you repeat that question again, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the question, please?

Senator LUCAS. You are trying to trap a great General in these inconsistencies.

(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as follows: "Well, what was your mental reaction on what you had seen? What conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us here what he drew. What did you draw?")

Senator FERGUSON. Do you understand my question?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; but a conclusion as to what, sir—as to whether the President had issued an ultimatum or as to whether we should go to war in case of further aggression?

Senator FERGUSON. Whether or not he had issued an ultimatum.

General GEROW. Well, I have stated, Senator, that to my own knowledge, to my own personal knowledge, I do not know that he issued an ultimatum.

[4384] Senator FERGUSON. All right, that is all I wanted to know. Now, the next question: On the 27th—that is Exhibit 17—did you help to prepare that?

General GEROW. I believe this document was prepared, sir, by the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy working together.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversations in relation to the *modus vivendi*?

General GEROW. As I recall, sir, I attended a conference in the State Department on November the 21st in which a paper setting out tentative proposals to Japan were discussed. I do not know whether that was known as a *modus vivendi* or what name the State Department gave it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether when the State Department had decided to send their message, which changed his meaning of the message to try to get Jap consent, whether you remember that term "*modus vivendi*" in it?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not recall definitely where I received that information or if I did. If the Chief of Staff had it he probably informed me of that fact, sir, but I cannot recall at this time just when he did or if he did.

[4385] Senator FERGUSON. You do not have that in mind?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know upon whose orders the words were put in the message of the 27th about the first overt act? Did you have any knowledge of that?

General GEROW. I think I received instructions from General Marshall to include a statement of that sort in the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he advise you where he had received anything about it?

General GEROW. I do not recall definitely at this time, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you take Exhibit 45? That is a letter or memorandum to General Marshall on the 27th, your memorandum.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say there that: "The Secretary of War sent for me at 9:30" on that morning and "he wanted to know"—the Secretary wanted to know—"what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed."

Do you remember that conversation?

[4386] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there at that time anything said about sending one to General Short?

General GEROW. Not at that particular time. I think later on in my second conference with the Secretary of War that sending messages to all of our overseas possessions in the Pacific were discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, isn't this a memo of your conversation with the Secretary of War?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; and may I go on to paragraph 2? There is a statement in paragraph 2 which reads: "The various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed."

Senator FERGUSON. You recall those?

General GEROW. I wrote this, sir, on the day that it happened. I think this is more accurate than my memory, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And does that refresh your memory, though, as to whether or not any message to General Short was discussed, the fact that a warning message for General MacArthur—no: "The various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed."

General GEROW. Yes, that indicated to me that they were discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. It indicates definitely that there [4387] was something said about sending one to General Short.

General GEROW. To all of our Pacific commanders.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I will come down to the language: "The Secretary of War"—in the same exhibit—"wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations."

Do you remember that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that language? Did the Secretary of War actually tell you that?

General GEROW. I imagine he did, sir, because I wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. You wrote it right in here?

General GEROW. I wrote it on the 27th and that is the only place I could have gotten it was to have the Secretary tell me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of War as to why that was in there?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not recall any such discussion. I might have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what your conversation with General Marshall on that point was?

General GEROW. I do not believe I had a conversation with General Marshall on that. This memorandum went in to him [4385] on the evening of the 27th and I believe that he read it when he returned to the office on the morning of the 28th. I can not recall whether he sent for me on that morning and discussed it with me or not. I was in and out of his office daily, sometimes once, sometimes four or five times during the day, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You prepared the statement on the 27th for General Marshall or did someone else prepare it?

General GEROW. Which statement now are you referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. The one of November 27. It is Exhibit 17. Is that the instrument that they were talking about that was not to contain a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations?

General GEROW. I think I stated, sir, that this document was prepared by the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy working together, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you check it for that item, do you know, as to whether or not it did contain or did not contain any request to Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You checked it for that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General GEROW. And I think the statement in my memorandum is to the effect that I reassured the Secretary on that point, sir. [4389]

Senator FERGUSON. You reassured him later?

General GEROW. That is in the memorandum, sir. There is a sentence which I would like to read from that memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

General GEROW. That said: "He"—meaning the Secretary—"was reassured on that point."

Senator FERGUSON. You reassured him?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. After you had checked the memorandum?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I had the memorandum with me, sir, I believe, at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there were Jap scouting planes over the Philippines, over Clark Field and the other fields, prior to the time of the attack at Pearl Harbor? Did you get any word on that?

General GEROW. I have a very hazy recollection of hearing someone state that the Japanese had sent planes over some of our areas. I cannot recall definitely, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you of the opinion that if a proper alerted condition existed at Pearl Harbor that the Japanese should have been defeated in their attack?

[4390] General GEROW. I think our losses out there, sir, would have been much less had the command been completely alerted.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only answer you want to make?

General GEROW. I cannot quite interpret what you mean, sir, by "defeated." There are all degrees of defeat, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how much of a defeat, or what qualification?

General GEROW. Well, they would have lost some planes. They may have lost some carriers, they may have lost some of their other major vessels.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear what General Marshall had said on that same question?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or similar question?

General GEROW. Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. A question along that same line?

General GEROW. No, sir. I was not here when he testified, only one afternoon, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never came to any conclusion as to what would have happened there if we had been properly alerted?

General GEROW. You say I never came to any conclusion?

Senator FERGUSON. I say, have you?

[4391] General GEROW. Yes, sir. I just stated if we had been properly alerted that our losses there would probably have been much less.

Senator FERGUSON. What about their losses?

General GEROW. Their losses would have been much greater, the Japanese losses.

Senator FERGUSON. But you would not want to classify it as to whether or not they would be defeated in that encounter or not?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question has been answered twice in the last five minutes.

General GEROW. Well, sir, I—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you claim, General, that you have answered that question?

Mr. MURPHY. All right, go ahead.

General GEROW. I think I answered it, Senator. I will be very glad, sir, to have the question repeated and attempt to answer it again, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I just want to know whether or not you feel that you did answer it?

General GEROW. I thought I did, sir, but if I did not make myself clear I would like to have the opportunity of making myself clear, sir.

[4392] Senator FERGUSON. It was not clear to me, General, or I would not be asking the question again.

General GEROW. All right. I am here, sir, to clear up any points that I can. I have no desire to be vague on anything that I am certain of.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that. It has been a long time since this happened.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the reason I have asked you the number of questions that I have, to let you have time to think about them and to see whether or not we could get what was known at that time.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what was not known, that is all.

General GEROW. If I can clarify anything, Senator, if you will ask me the question I will do my best to, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. No, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. General Gerow, I shall not detain you very long.

General GEROW. Thank you, sir. I am very grateful.

Mr. KEEFE. I think you are a great officer, that is all I can say.

General GEROW. Thank you again, sir.

[4393] Mr. KEEFE. There are just one or two things that I am not clear on.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You testified before the Army board under oath?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you told them what you knew about this whole situation?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then Major Clausen came over to France some time in 1945, as I recall, where you were stationed?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And talked to you about the testimony you had given before the Army Board?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I presume before the affidavit that you signed finally was drawn, you had considerable discussions with Major Clausen about your testimony?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the testimony of others that had testified before that Board?

General GEROW. Primarily directed toward two or three [4394] people. I think Colonel Bratton's testimony and Colonel Sadtler's testimony.

I don't think we went into the details of the others, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I presume you had a considerable talk with Colonel Clausen before an affidavit was finally drawn?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He made some longhand notes, did he, and then went some place and prepared an affidavit?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And asked you to sign it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. He took down the penciled notes. I gave him my testimony rather formally. He made the notes and I had no office facilities there, I was living in a sort of villa place and I had no typist or anything, so he took the notes of the testimony, sir, and typed them himself.

Mr. KEEFE. And then when he brought the typed affidavit back you read it over?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You found some things in it that you did not think you had stated, or that he had misunderstood?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you decided that you would draw your own [4395] affidavit?

General GEROW. Yes. I went over it fully, sir, and revised it and cut out things and added things.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you draw the new affidavit yourself or did Colonel Clausen re-draft it under your instructions?

General GEROW. No, sir. I sat there and took the draft that he had there and went through it and changed it and scratched things out and put in in pencil the things that I thought should go in there as presenting the facts.

Mr. KEEFE. And then it was re-drawn?

General GEROW. It was re-typed.

Mr. KEEFE. And you signed it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And he swore you to it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know the purpose for which he was asking you to make this affidavit? Did he disclose that to you?

General GEROW. I think he stated sir, that after I had made my testimony there was other testimony which I did not have an opportunity to reply to and that involved me and that he was trying to get my testimony on those particular points, particularly, as I say, that had reference to Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler's testimony.

[4396] Mr. KEEFE. Did he call your attention to the testimony that Colonel Bratton had given before the Army board?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, I think he gave it to me in a brief summary form. I do not believe, sir, that he had a transcript of the testimony. I do not believe I have ever seen that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did he tell you also what Sadtler testified to before the Army Board?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And did he indicate that their testimony was in conflict with the testimony that you had given before the Board?

General GEROW. No, sir, he did not indicate that. As I recall now, it was testimony that had come out subsequently that was not in conflict, as I now understand, with anything I had stated but I did not cover magic.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

General GEROW. In my first statement before the Army board, or in my only statement before the Army board, because I never had an opportunity to appear before it again.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you were in before the Army board, or after you testified, were you furnished a copy of the transcript of your testimony and given an opportunity to correct it?

[4397] General GEROW. Yes, sir; I was furnished a transcript and I read it over and turned it in to the board, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And whatever corrections you had to make in your testimony that you gave before the Army board were made before it was finally accepted by the board?

General GEROW. I imagine they were, sir. I never saw a copy of that board's report until I came back here for this committee hearing, sir. I was never furnished a copy and I never saw it until I—

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me, but in your testimony before the Army board, of course, you made no reference whatever to magic?

General GEROW. No, sir. In my testimony, I think I stated yesterday, that I began to get on magic and I realized that I should not talk about it and I stopped myself and they allowed me to paraphrase. That is the only time we got into it at all, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, one other thing I would like to get clear in my mind. I will admit some confusion still exists in the face of all you said about his message of the 27th.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall testified that he left at 1 o'clock on the 26th and went down to the maneuvers.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And did you not come back until the evening of the [4398] 27th?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that correct, he was not here on the afternoon of the 26th nor all day of the 27th?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, any conversations that you had with General Marshall in respect to this message of the 27th, therefore, must have been had before 1 o'clock on the 26th?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is true?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And any instructions that General Marshall had given you as to the language in the proposed alert message to go to the Pacific outposts must have been had on the morning of the 26th?

General GEROW. Either on the 25th or the 26th, the morning of the 26th.

Mr. KEEFE. The 25th or the 26th?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4399] Mr. KEEFE. So when it came to actually drafting the message, when was it actually drafted, the first drafting, the afternoon of the 26th or morning of the 27th, or when?

General GEROW. Sir, I tried to remember exactly what happened on that morning. I notice in my memorandum here it stated—I state here, sir, “I then showed him a copy of the draft message discussed at the Joint Board meeting.”

This is a memorandum of November 27, sir, that I sent in to the chief of staff. I think, in making that statement, I was trying to fix in General Marshall's mind he place that he had discussed this message with me. I did not intend to state positively that that message was actually discussed formally at the Joint Board meeting. I have a very hazy recollection, sir, that General Marshall was in a hurry to get away, that the Joint Board meeting had been quite a long one, that he had told me earlier on the morning of the 26th about the message prepared for him, and perhaps to finish up this memorandum that was to go to the President.

I had, I believe, Colonel Bundy and one or two of my best officers working on it. I think when the Joint Board meeting was over, had been formally concluded, General Marshall turned to me and said

with respect to this message and memorandum, we went from the Joint Board room into my office, which was quite close there, and Colonel Bundy came to the door [4400] of the Joint Board room with this message, and General Marshall scanned it very quickly and either told me it was all right, or all wrong, or to do something else with it.

I walked down the hall, as I recall now, and he was in quite a considerable hurry, and I believe he read either the memorandum or the message as I walked down the hall with him to his office and finished it before he got there. That was on the morning of the 26th, sir, before he left at 1 o'clock.

Mr. KEEFE. In that conversation, as he walked down the hall, did he suggest some changes in the message?

General GEROW. I cannot recall that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did the original draft of the message contain the provision as to Japan committing the first overt act?

General GEROW. I have tried to find that message, Mr. Congressman. I cannot locate it, and I cannot say positively that it did. I believe that General Marshall had told me to prepare that message and I think he probably told me about including the overt act at the same time, and that I had prepared with those instructions in that first draft of the message, which I cannot locate, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now on the afternoon of the 26th was it discussed with anybody else, or was it redrafted?

General GEROW. Not to my recollection. I imagine I sat down with Colonel Bundy and these other officers and between [4401] us we worked out the message, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It was dated the 27th, the next day?

General GEROW. The next morning, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It was sent on the 27th?

General GEROW. It was sent on the 27th, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When you sat down with Colonel Bundy, or any of these other people, did you have the Navy message before you as to what they proposed to send?

General GEROW. I tried to remember that, sir. From my memory I cannot definitely say I did, but Admiral Turner, whom I haven't had a chance to talk to, can state whether we did or not. I just cannot say when the Navy message was prepared.

I regret I cannot remember more than that, sir, but I just simply cannot.

Mr. KEEFE. General Gerow, may I say to you, sir, for anybody that has been through the service that you have and rendered the magnificent service that you have during the war, I, for one, can well appreciate that there are a lot of these details that you cannot remember.

I thank you, sir.

[4402] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask one question. In regard to your statement a while ago, General, that it is your opinion that if the forces had been alerted in Hawaii, or at Pearl Harbor, that the degree of success by the Japanese would have been lessened. That is the effect of what you have stated?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You could not, of course, tell what Japanese ship or plane might have been destroyed, if our forces had been alerted, nor what ship or plane we might have saved.

General GEROW. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But taking the whole situation into consideration, your opinion is that if that had happened, if that had been the status of affairs, the degree of Japanese success against our matériel, our forces and men, would have been considerably less; is that correct?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, that is correct, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. General Gerow, as the head of the War Plans Division, I take it you were familiar with the plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4403] Senator LUCAS. Do you know at what time the Japs struck the Philippine Islands?

General GEROW. I should think it was probably 10 or 12 hours after they struck Hawaii. I state that because I telephoned to the Philippines shortly after the attack on Hawaii, and the Philippines had not been attacked at that time, sir.

Senator LUCAS. To whom did you talk in the Philippines?

General GEROW. I talked to General MacArthur, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall what time it was on Sunday, December 7, that you talked to General MacArthur?

General GEROW. No, sir. I think probably the telephone log will show that, sir. It was in the afternoon, sir, and I recall the conversation quite distinctly, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Just briefly, what did you tell General MacArthur.

General GEROW. I told General MacArthur, sir, that Hawaii had been attacked by the Japs, and he asked me what damage had been done, and told him, sir, that the telephone was not secret, and I could not divulge that information to him, and I asked him if anything had happened out in his area, and he said "no," but there were a group of planes approaching the Philippines at that time that had not been identified, and he was sending up his planes [4404] to meet them. Then he asked me to convey to General Marshall the statement that they were on the alert out there, and ready to meet any emergency. That is in substance the conversation as I now recall it, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How many air fields did they have in the Philippines, do you recall?

General GEROW. Sir, I remember Clark Field, and Nichols Field, and I think there was one at a place called Eba. I do not remember how many more they had, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Can you give to the committee the number of airplanes that were in the Philippines at that time?

General GEROW. I do not have those figures with me, sir. The War Department, I am sure, will be very glad to give that to you, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Will you get that for us? ¹

General GEROW. I will see that they are given to the committee.

Senator LUCAS. Do you recall getting any information from the Philippines as to what happened to our bombers on Clark Field the following day, after the war started?

General GEROW. I do not know, sir, whether we ever received an operations report from the Philippines or not, with regard to that, sir. I cannot recall at this time.

¹ See footnote on following page.

[4405] Senator LUCAS. Will you look for that also for me and see whether or not any report was made from the Philippines with respect to the number of bombers that were lost on Clark Field the following day, after the Japs stfuck, or that afternoon? ¹

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. General Gerow, a lot of information has come to this committee during this hearing about the messages that were intercepted and decoded and translated. You are, of course, familiar with all that.

You were one of the high officers in the military branch of the Government who saw these magic messages from day to day?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. General Marshall testified that it was through magic that we really won the Battle of Midway, and the Coral Sea, and he also testified it was magic that caused the damage to Yamamoto, I believe.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Those are just a few examples that he gave to us of what magic had done in the way of security and information to this nation.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with all of those, [4406] of course.

General GEROW. I was not in Washington at that time. I left, you see, in February of 1942. I have heard that statement made, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, I take it that you agree that the keeping of magic secret was a high and top military secret all through that war.

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I think it was vital that we preserve that secrecy, sir.

Senator LUCAS. There were only a few men in Washington that knew anything about magic at that time, isn't that true?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. For the sake of the record, can you give to this committee now, the number of officers in Washington who knew the secret of magic, who knew of the breaking of this Japanese code?

General GEROW. No, sir. I think I can speak only for the War Department, sir, at the time I was here, and G-2 will know better than I know whom they delivered them to, but my recollection is they were given to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, and Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, and I got permission at some time during 1941 from General Marshall [4407] to show it to my No. 1 assistant, Colonel Bundy, so in the event that anything happened to me there would be continuity in the War Department in the War Plans Division, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was Colonel Bundy the only officer in the War Plans Division outside of yourself who knew the secret of magic?

General GEROW. He was the only one, sir, to whom magic was shown. Now, some of the others may have guessed that we were doing something of the kind, sir, but I do not know that fact.

Senator LUCAS. He was the only officer that possessed actual knowledge of it?

General GEROW. Who actually saw the magic; yes, sir.

¹ See information furnished by the War Department, Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2073-2074.

Senator LUCAS. Now, General Gerow, there was quite a little speculation in the autumn of 1944 about a leak in magic from somewhere. Do you recall at that time—Oh, you were not here at that time?

General GEROW. No, sir; I was overseas in 1944, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Well, what would have been the military course that would have been pursued against an individual who knew the secret of magic, had that individual given that secrecy to the public—what would have been the course pursued by the military under those circumstances?

[4408] General GEROW. I think he would have been court martialed, sir, and if the evidence was sufficient, if they found him guilty, he would probably—I do not know what the penalty would have been—dismissal or confinement.

Senator LUCAS. Here is one of the top secrets that involved our national defense and our security. Just assuming now that one of these officers would have given me, for instance, that top secret, and it would have become thereafter a matter of public property, everybody would have known it, do you care to hazard a guess as to the penalty that might have been attached to the officer that had given away the highest top military secret in the Nation?

General GEROW. Well, sir, of course I do not know what the officers of a court would decide. I can give you my own personal opinion, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is what I want, sir. I would like to ask you, before you give your personal opinion, one more question. Can you give to the committee, from your knowledge of military life, what the officer would have been charged with in the first instance had he given away a top secret of that character? Maybe that is a legal question.

[4409] General GEROW. There are quite a lot of articles of war that we operate under, and there are general articles, such as conduct prejudicial to the good order and interest of the United States.

If he deliberately gave it away, he might be tried for treason. There are probably any number of articles of war under which he could be tried, sir. There would be no question about an article of war that would fit it, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You started to answer another question, that was as to what was your opinion.

General GEROW. Well, sir, if the evidence showed that that officer had deliberately given out that information, with full knowledge of what it meant and its effect, I, as a member of the court, would have voted the death penalty, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. General Gerow, in the message of the 27th, there is the language, "Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment."

As I understand you, when you sent that to the Pacific theaters, you wanted to put all of the Pacific theaters on [4410] the alert, because the action of the Japanese was unpredictable. That is correct, isn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. As far as General Short at Hawaii was concerned, when he got that message, he did not have to concern himself with other matters but only with the defense of Hawaii?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have any further questions?

Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, I would like to clear up one thing, and that has to do with the responsibilities and powers of the Commander in the field.

The record shows here that in Washington, on the basis of all of the accumulated information they had, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, and in part, the President, along with officers like yourself, had evaluated the information they had, and their conclusion was that war might come at any moment, that action was unpredictable, but hostile action in any direction might be expected. That was the conclusion.

Then, they put that evaluation in the form of a dispatch to a field commander. Now, there has been a great deal of [4411] inquiry as to whether this and that bit of information was or was not sent out to the commanders in Hawaii to make their own evaluation, and the inference I get from it is the commanders in the field were in a position and were entitled, when they got an evaluation like that from Washington by their superiors, before they accepted it and acted on it, they had a right to demand that the original source of material which had been acted on here, should be given to them, so that they could form their own judgment as to whether the people in Washington knew what they were doing.

Now, is that a permissible practice in the Army?

General GEROW. No, sir. The commanders did not have that right to demand the information on which the Chief of Staff based a decision. I think if the officer insisted on demanding that information, he would have probably been relieved from that command.

Mr. MITCHELL. At the time this warning message was sent on November 27, 1941, did you have any Army posts in areas other than the Pacific?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; we had garrisons on some of our Atlantic bases, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What were they?

General GEROW. I think we had troops in Iceland at [4412] the time. We had some, probably, on Bermuda, and some on the other Caribbean Islands. I do not remember the exact bases we had in the Atlantic at that time.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you formed the judgment about the imminence of war with Japan, did you send warning messages to Iceland and these other posts in the Atlantic that you mentioned?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not believe such messages were sent. Our thinking was about Japan at the time and we did not anticipate that Japan would operate in the Atlantic Ocean right away, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then you did come to the conclusion that Iceland was not a possibility for an attack?

General GEROW. Not for an attack by Japan.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I mean.

General GEROW. No, sir; that was not a possibility.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then do I understand you to say, in sending the message, your state of mind was to send a warning to any post that was within the possibility of an attack from Japan?

General GEROW. That was the purpose, sir, to send warning messages to those areas that Japan would be in a position to attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. Suppose you had been convinced at that [4413] time that there was not a shade of possibility of any Japanese attack on Panama, or call it the Pacific coast command, at Seattle, or wherever it was, if you had been in that state of mind and felt there was no possible chance of anything being done on the Pacific coast, to the bases there, would you have sent them a warning message?

General GEROW. I do not believe, sir, I could quite get in that frame of mind.

Mr. MITCHELL. I know it was something you did not do, but I am trying to get your distinction, your state of mind as to your judgment at the time, as to whether there was a chance or a possibility of an attack, and you told me you did not think there was, in Iceland.

General GEROW. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am asking you if—that is not the case, of course—but if you had supposed that the Pacific coast was totally out of reach of Japan, that it was a waste of time to put them on the alert, would you have sent them a message?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then, the gist of it is, as I understand it, that you picked out the spots that you thought Japan might reach?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

[4414] Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I notice that the alert that you sent to Hawaii was in identical terms with the one you sent to the commander of the Pacific coast.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Not a word of difference. The Pacific coast was 2,000 miles or more further away from Japan than Hawaii?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then I notice that your message to MacArthur, who was right under the main islands of Japan, differs in no respect from the one you sent to Hawaii, except in one or two immaterial respects, about disturbing the population.

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not make any distinction in the nature of your warning to any one of them; did you?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was deliberate on your part?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, because we did not know which one of them would be attacked.

Mr. MITCHELL. There has been something said here and you have been asked about impregnable fortresses, and whether Pearl Harbor was the greatest fortress in the world.

In forming your judgment as to whether a fortress was [4415] supposed to be immune to attack, or completely capable of defense, or impregnable, whatever you want to call it, is that judgment formed on the assumption that the fortress will be attacked when she is asleep, and her command is not alert?

General GEROW. No, sir; it could still be alerted and would not be impregnable, I do not believe, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You haven't got my question. What I meant was, in judging whether a fortress is safe from attack, do you assume, in judging her safety, that her garrison is going to be prepared and ready, alerted to meet an attack that comes to it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is any fort impregnable, or safe from attack, however powerful it is, if the garrison is asleep at the switch?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think Fort Ticonderoga in the American Revolution was considered the next largest or strongest fortress in the country.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. She was captured in the nighttime by a crowd of ragged militiamen without firing a shot.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4416] Mr. MITCHELL. The commander, as I remember it, was caught in bed. Is that an illustration of a case where an impregnable fortress is captured because the garrison is not prepared?

General GEROW. I think that is a very good illustration, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think he even had his trousers in his hands.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he about to put them on, or take them off? [Laughter.]

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, on this question of judgment as to the likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor, you have been asked a good deal about that, as to whether your judgment was that it was possible or likely, and so forth.

Now, there was great risk to the Japs in that expedition. It had considerable hazards, did it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the hazards had to be measured against the importance of the objective?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I assume in measuring the hazards and chances of success, the fact that the Japs knew our state of alertness, or lack of it, would be an important factor, [4417] would it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; that would greatly lessen the hazard.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is a matter of record here that the Japs knew from day to day everything we were doing and not doing in Pearl Harbor and that information was transmitted from day to day by their spies in Honolulu to the Government in Japan, so if we had been on the alert on November 27 to the 7th of December, the Japs would have known it, would they not?

General GEROW. I believe they would have known it, sir.

[4418] Mr. MITCHELL. And although it was an impregnable fortress, if we were not on the alert in that period and the Japs knew that, it would be a great factor in their decision as to whether the attack was worth while?

General GEROW. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You knew here in Washington—I think the record fairly shows—that they did have a spy system, that these reports were going out almost daily from their spies. You were intercepting them, you knew that the Japs had every means open to the public to communicate with their Government, so you were aware here,

at least, that the Japs knew everything that was going on in Hawaii?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next question is whether you had a clear idea as to whether we were alerted out there. The people on the ground had this advantage over you, did they not, that they knew whether they were alerted or not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It never occurred to me that they were not on the alert, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The commander in the field, under those circumstances, at that place, had at least this advantage over the Washington end, that is, they knew the same things you did, but that the Japs knew everything they were doing and not doing—both ends knew that?

[4419] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The people in Hawaii were in a better position to know the extent of their preparations, to know whether or not the Japs knew that they were not taking any steps against an air attack.

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So the judgment of the people here, and it seems rather clear that there is a great deal of evidence here, that at least officers in Washington did not expect an attack, their judgment was necessarily formed with a less and certainly a hazier picture of whether there was a different alert necessary out there than the local commanders had?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, there has been a good deal of discussion about the order in your command of November 27 to Hawaii and other points as to an overt act. It may be irrelevant because nobody was ever called upon to make a decision as to what an overt act was until the Japs appeared over Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop bombs. But as a matter of discussion of the sufficiency of the order, when it says we want the Japs to commit the first overt act but do not let this induce you to fail to take measures or jeopardize your defense, let me ask you, if the Jap carrier fleet had been spotted at sea the night of the 6th or the morning of [4420] the 7th driving toward Honolulu with six carriers in the fleet, and the question had arisen whether that was an overt act under your message or whether it would jeopardize the defense to wait until they got to Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop bombs, what was your idea about that?

General GEROW. I think the commander would have attacked that Japanese force and I think he should have done so, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. If he had seen the Jap carriers 300 miles at sea and had done nothing but sail around in the air until they commenced to drop bombs, what would have happened to him under this order?

General GEROW. It would have jeopardized his defense to permit that outfit to approach any closer.

Mr. MITCHELL. That would amount to a disobedience of the order, would it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; or a failure to obey the order.

Mr. MITCHELL. You draw a distinction there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. Direct disobedience of an order is something that is intentional. Failure to obey may be due to any number of causes, error of judgment, or absence, or something else.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have just one more question. It is submitted by counsel, Captain Ford, for General Short. I am asked to put this question to you:

[4421] How should General Short have worded his reply on the 27th of November 1941, his reply to your message of the 27th, to make clear to you and to your staff that his alert was to prevent sabotage only?

General GEROW. Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply "alerted against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice that in these war plans, exhibit 44, the operational order of November 5 which you have testified did not arrive in the War Department—

General GEROW. May I get the page of that, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. It is tab 9.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Short on November 5 put into effect an operational order out there which had these three alerts. No. 1 alert was this:

This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands with no threat from without.

Now, you never say that in fact until after the 1st of January 1942, you testified?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. But you did see this preliminary draft he had sent in the previous year, did you not?

General GEROW. I don't recall having seen that preliminary [4422] draft either.

Mr. MITCHELL. That had substantially the same alert, the alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no particular threat from without, the way that read that was alert No. 3, according to his then system. This later became alert No. 1.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, if General Short had this on file in the War Department on November 27, this operational order of November 5, so that you could have known what alert No. 1 was, and he reported alerted against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no threat from without, that would have made it clear to you what he was doing?

General GEROW. Yes, it would have made it quite clear.

Mr. MITCHELL. And if he hadn't this on file, as he didn't, and couldn't use the specific reference to alert No. 1, which would have meant nothing to you at that time, if he had used the same expression in his report that he did in phrasing his alert, defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no threat from without, that would have been clear?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Take the message as he put it, if he had said alerted against sabotage and left out the words "liaison [4423] with the Navy," do you think that would have made you aware of his being alerted for sabotage only? It is asking a good deal of you, but it would certainly be likely.

General GEROW. Yes, sir, it would be likely. I didn't have to make the decision, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I know you didn't. If's, and's, and but's aren't worth much.

I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. General, is there any further information within your knowledge which is pertinent to this inquiry which you have that you could submit to the committee that has not been drawn out by the interrogation of you as a witness?

General GEROW. No, sir, I have nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the committee thanks you, General, for your forthright cooperation in trying to develop the facts in this inquiry. You have demeaned yourself before this committee in a manner befitting your record in the Army. You have the grateful appreciation of this committee for your services in that connection.

Thank you very much.

General GEROW. Thank you, sir, and I wish to thank the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused.

(The witness was excused.)

[4424] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands counsel have some documents that they wish at this time to put in which have been received in response to request of various members of the committee.

Mr. GESELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. If the committee will indulge us for a few minutes past 12 o'clock I think we can put into the record with some dispatch the material in response to certain requests and that would permit us to avoid any session this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might announce that Admiral Wilkinson is the next witness, but he will not be before us until 10 o'clock on Monday.

Mr. GESELL. The first item that we wish to present has to do with the United States ship *Boise*.

The committee will recall that Congressman Gearhart at pages 274 and 560 of the record asked for the log of the *Boise* and indicated that he had knowledge or information to the effect that the cruiser had sighted the Japanese task force on its way to attack Pearl Harbor.

I have here in my hand a photostatic copy of the entries in the log of the United States ship *Boise* for the period November 25, 1941 to December 7, 1941, inclusive.

This log shows that on two occasion during that period the *Boise* sighted a strange ship. The first occasion was on [4425] November 27 and I will read into the record the brief entry concerning that. On November 27, 1941, during the 18 to 20 watch, according to an entry of F. G. Dierman, lieutenant (jg), United States Navy, there was the following that occurred:

Steaming as before. 1840 sighted darkened ship, bearing 240° T. estimated range 16,000 yards. Went to general quarters. 1845 set material condition affirm. 1851 challenged ship. Received no reply. 1852 changed speed to 20 knots. 1854 changed speed to 14 knots.

[4426] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. May I inquire what time of day that was?

Mr. GESELL. 18 to 20. That would be between 6 and 8 p. m., I take it, and 1840 was when they sighted the ship. That would be 6:40 p. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire whether the log shows where the *Boise* was at that time?

Mr. GESELL. I am coming to that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me.

Mr. GESELL. I wanted to develop this so that the committee has all of the information.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. On the 28th of November 1941, there is an entry by D. S. Edwards, lieutenant, United States Navy, in the 16 to 20 watch, that is Friday, November 28, 1941:

Steaming as before, on various courses at various speeds. * * * 1733 darkened ship. 1743 sighted ship bearing 325 t. hull down. Changed course to 260 degrees t, changed speed to 15 knots. Manned battle stations. 1750 cut in boilers No. 3 and No. 4 on main steam line. 1752 [4427] set condition affirm. On various courses at various speeds keeping between ship sighted at 1743 and convoy. Ship appeared to be H. I. J. N. S. "ATAGO" type, steaming darkened at 14 knots on various courses toward convoy. 1800 ship turned to course about 090 degrees t. 1804 on various courses closing convoy. 1835 unset condition affirm.

Now, from the information presented by Admiral English, it appears that there were no cruisers of the *Atago* type in the Japanese striking force.

The Navy has plotted on the basis of the log, the positions of the U. S. S. *Boise* at the various times mentioned in the log.

With respect to the entries on November 27, 1941, the *Boise* at 1840 was at latitude 16°46'0.5" N., longitude 153°55' E. 1851 on November 27, 1941, latitude 16°45'0.5" N., longitude 153°52'0.5" E—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel know where that would be on the map?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir, I am coming to that, if I may present this, please, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me.

[4428] Mr. GESELL. (continuing) On November 27, 1941 at 1927, it was latitude 16°43' N., longitude 143°44'0.5" E. 1743 28 November 1941, latitude 14°56'0.5" N., longitude 148°48' E., 1920, 28 November 1941, latitude 14°49' N., longitude 148°26' E.

We asked the Navy to state in simple terms what that meant in terms of the position of the *Boise* in relation to the Japanese force, and were advised as follows:

The position of the U. S. S. *Boise* with relation to the track of the Japanese striking force on the 27th and 28th of November, 1941, from the best information available appears, that the U. S. S. *Boise* on those dates was not less than 1,400 miles from the Japanese striking force.

Now, in this connection the committee has also asked to have the log of the S. S. *American Leader*—

Senator LUCAS. Before you proceed, the S. S. *American Leader* was in the convoy with the *Boise*?

Mr. GESELL. The Navy reports as follows with respect to the *American Leader*:

With further reference to your request dated 17 November 1945 for the log of S. S. *American Leader*, the S. S. *American* [4429] *Leader* was one of the ships in the convoy which the U. S. S. *Boise* escorted to the Philippines November 7, 1941.

The log of the S. S. *American Leader* is not immediately available to the Navy Department since this ship was in the U. S. Maritime Service.

[4430] I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, to conclude this matter on the *Boise* we should ask to have the log for the periods indicated designated as an exhibit. It would be Exhibit 68.

We also would like to accompany it, as part of the same exhibit, a map on which the plot of the Japanese task force appears and the position of the *Boise* on the dates when it sighted the darkened ships also appears.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement about the *Boise* and the *American Leader*?

Mr. GESELL. That concludes the matter on the *Boise*.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Exhibit 68 will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 68.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions about the *Boise* and *American Leader*?

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Does the plot show just about how far the *Boise* was from the Hawaiian Islands when this first ship was sighted?

Mr. GESELL. It was near Guam. It appears on the map just where it was.

Senator LUCAS. I see.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

[4431] Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel know where this convoy had been picked up by the *Boise*? That is not shown on the log.

Mr. GESELL. I don't think on these days, but I believe that was covered by the testimony of Admiral Inglis. My recollection is it was a convoy proceeding to the Philippines. Where it started I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know whether it was from Hawaii or not. What I am trying to find out is whether or not the commanders at Hawaii knew they were convoying.

Mr. GESELL. I guess there is no question about that. My recollection is that Admiral Inglis said this convoy did start in the Hawaiian area, but I am not certain of that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are referring to a United States convoy?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you start to say something, General Mitchell?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Do the records with respect to the *Boise* show the action orders or the action report of what orders they were sailing under? I notice that that says that the ship was cleared for action and battle stations manned, and [4432] so on. Does it disclose what the orders were to this ship escorting this convoy to the Philippines on the 27th of November?

Mr. GESELL. No, sir. The request was based upon a statement by Congressman Gearhart that he had information that the *Boise* had sighted the Japanese task force. We were attempting to answer that question. It appears now that the *Boise* was 1400 miles from the task force. So I guess it didn't sight it.

Now, if the Congressman wants information as to the orders under which the convoy was proceeding, where it started from and where it

was going, that would be a separate request and we would have to get that information separately.

Mr. KEEFE. Could you get that information?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir. We will ask the Navy Department for it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. At the time the request was made for the log of the *Boise*, in order to be prepared to discuss the matter in the event that it were pertinent, I requested that we have present the commanding officer of the *Boise*. I now cancel that request in view of the information supplied.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions about the *Boise*? [4433] All right, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. GESELL. A request was made to show the dates of arrival of the vessels that were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack on the 7th of December 1941.

I have in my hand a schedule showing the arrival of all the vessels, the dates they came in, and I think the most appropriate means of handling this would be to ask the reporter to spread this two-page schedule on the daily transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That may be done. Do you desire to read it?

Mr. GESELL. I don't see any need of that. It shows they came in at different times.

The Vice Chairman. Is there any request that it be read? If not, it will be spread in full in the record at this point.

(The schedule above referred to follows:)

Arrivals of vessels in port (Pearl Harbor) just prior to 7 December 1941

Battleships:		Destroyers—con.	
<i>Pennsylvania</i>	Orydock 1, Dec. 1941.	<i>Breese</i>	4 Dec. 1941.
<i>Arizona</i>	5 Dec. 1941.	<i>Conyngham</i>	Do.
<i>Oklahoma</i>	Do.	<i>Phelps</i>	Prior 1 Dec. 1941.
<i>Nevada</i>	Do.	<i>Farragut</i>	Do.
<i>California</i>	28 Nov. 1941.	<i>Monaghan</i>	Do.
<i>West Virginia</i>	Do.	<i>Alwin</i>	Do.
<i>Maryland</i>	Do.	<i>Hull</i>	Do.
<i>Tennessee</i>	Do.	[4435]	
[4434] Heavy Cruisers:		<i>Dewey</i>	Do.
<i>San Francisco</i>	Prior to 1 Dec. 1941, exact time not known.	<i>Warden</i>	Do.
<i>New Orleans</i>	Do.	<i>McDonough</i>	Do.
Light Cruisers:		<i>Tucker</i>	Do.
<i>Honolulu</i>	28 Nov. 1941.	<i>Cummings</i>	Do.
<i>Detroit</i>	5 Dec. 1941.	<i>Zane</i>	6 Dec. 1941.
<i>Raleigh</i>	28 Nov. 1941.	<i>Selfridge</i>	Do.
<i>Phoenix</i>	28 Nov. 1941.	<i>Reid</i>	Prior 1 Dec. 1941.
<i>Helena</i>	28 Nov. 1941.	<i>Case</i>	Do.
<i>St. Louis</i>	28 Nov. 1941.	<i>Montgomery</i>	4 Dec. 1941.
Destroyers:		<i>Henley</i>	5 Dec. 1941.
<i>Patterson</i>	5 Dec. 1941.	<i>Gamble</i>	Do.
<i>Helm</i>	Do.	<i>Ralph Talbot</i>	Do.
<i>Blue</i>	Do.	<i>Dale</i>	Do.
<i>Bagley</i>	4 Dec. 1941.	<i>Wasmuth</i>	Do.
<i>Jarvis</i>	Do.	<i>Trever</i>	Do.
<i>Mugford</i>	Do.	Auxiliaries:	
<i>Ramsay</i>	Do.	<i>Nesho</i>	6 Dec. 1941.
		<i>Ramapo</i>	5 Dec. 1941.
		<i>Curtiss</i>	Do.

NOTE.—Tenders remained in harbor to carry out repair schedules.

[4436] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. In connection with that, I understand that in the two documents we have been furnished of the Navy story that there is a discussion as to how the fleet got into Pearl Harbor and how the ships got there, and the periodic orders from time to time covering matters of that nature.

Mr. GESELL. This is in response only to the request as to the dates when they entered the Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions on that point? If not, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. GESELL. We have been asked also to furnish information concerning the condition of watertight integrity of the major vessels that were in the Harbor.¹ Under date of December 11, we received from the Navy a table showing scheduled inspection of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November, and December, and I am going to ask that that schedule be inserted in the record.

It will be noted from the table that it does not contain all the ships which were in Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. The explanation for that is that ships which are not shown on this schedule, the Navy advises, were not scheduled for inspection during the period October-December, [4437] 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That will be admitted, and spread on the record.

Mr. GESELL. I think that should be made an exhibit, and perhaps the reporter can arrange to have photostats accompany the transcript for the information of the members of the committee. That will be Exhibit 69.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 69" and follows herewith.)

¹ See also Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347 et seq., for correspondence concerning this subject.

[4439] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. In that connection, I would like to inquire whether or not the exhibit in question shows if voids were open on the ships? The gentleman from California had referred to the voids apparently being open on all the ships. Does the exhibit show whether they were or were not?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the exhibit is not complete enough to satisfy counsel and I called upon the Navy—and Mr. Gesell didn't know that—to supplement this, to give direct information as to each vessel, and if they didn't have it on an inspection record to have officers from the vessels who were on them to give testimony.

We have called for, really, additional material on that.

Mr. MURPHY. I see.

Mr. GESELL. This document goes solely to the limited question as to whether or not there was some major inspection of all vessels scheduled for that week end. It does not describe the condition of the various vessels which were subject to inspection.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. GESELL. Now, a request was also made by one of the [4440] members of the committee for a report of the recall of United States merchant ships on the west coast, after the attack on Pearl Harbor.¹

The Navy has submitted the order issued recalling the merchant vessels after the Pearl Harbor attack, the names of the ships, the dates they sailed, and the dates they returned. I suggest that that information be spread upon the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you going to furnish each member of the committee with copies of these exhibits?

Mr. GESELL. In saying "spread" on the record, Senator Ferguson, it was my thought that in that fashion it would come to all members of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That brings it to us in the daily blue covered copy of the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. This is a memorandum from the Navy to us, and we thought if it were copied into the transcript that would be enough. We can get the actual record.

Senator FERGUSON. No. Does that report show whether those ships were in convoy or not?

[4441] Mr. GESELL. It doesn't relate to the question of convoy. It relates to when merchant ships were recalled.

Senator FERGUSON. It doesn't designate when they were in convoy?

Mr. GESELL. No; it does not.

¹ Hearings, Part 1, p. 78.

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(The memorandum and accompanying copy of dispatch follow:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 13 December 1945.

Memorandum

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

1. In regard to your request for report of the recall of U. S. Merchant ships to the West Coast after the attack on Pearl Harbor, we have the following table:

Name of ship	Sailed from—	Date	Date returned
USAT Tasker H. Bliss.....	San Francisco....	6 Dec.....	10 Dec.
Coast Miller.....	do.....	do.....	8 Dec.
Etolin.....	do.....	5 Dec.....	10 Dec.
Henry D. Whiton.....	Balboa, C. Z.....	5 and 17 Dec.....	(?).
[4442]			
J. A. Moffett.....	do.....	7 and 16 Dec.....	(?).
Paul M. Gregg.....	San Francisco.....	5 Dec.....	10 Dec.
President Garfield.....	do.....	6 Dec.....	8 Dec.
President Johnson.....	do.....	do.....	9 Dec.
Wainio.....	Portland, Oreg.....	do.....	(?).
West Portal.....	Balboa, C. Z.....	8 and 17 Dec.....	(?).

2. These ships apparently put back in compliance with the attached dispatch instructions issued by CinCPac on 7 December 1941. No evidence has been found that other ships in addition to those listed put back to West Coast ports after the Pearl Harbor attack.

(Signed) JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieut. Comdr. USNR.

Naval Message

Navy Department

Phone Extension Number	Addressees	Message
		Precedence
From Radio Honolulu	For Action	Radio San Fran
Released by		Radio Washn
Date 7 December 1941		Urgent
		Priority Routine
		Deferred
For Coderoom.....	Information	
Decoded by		Priority Routine
Paraphrased by.....		Deferred

[4443] Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

972292

9588

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

----- Date ----- Time ----- GCT

Text

War exists between United States and Japan XX Proceed closest U. S. or friendly port immediately.

Distribution:

380 . (*) . ACTION

10A11 . (*) . 388 . (*) . 38W (*) OPDC (*) FILE . .

(*) Initials illegible.

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person. See article 76 (4) Nav Res.

[4444] Mr. GESELL. Congressman Keefe requested various Executive Orders establishing defensive sea areas around Pearl Harbor, and other areas. We have the text of these orders and suggest that they be spread upon the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The Executive orders referred to follow:)

General Order No. 118

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., June 14, 1939.

ESTABLISHING A DEFENSIVE SEA AREA IN AND ABOUT PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

1. The following Executive Order is quoted:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING A DEFENSIVE SEA AREA IN AND ABOUT PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, Sec. 96), the area of water in Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, lying between extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel to said harbor, within an area bounded by the extreme high-water mark, a line bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Puuloa Naval Reservation, a line bearing south true from Ahua Point Lighthouse, and a line bearing west true from a point three nautical miles due south true from Ahua Point Lighthouse, is hereby established as a [4445] defensive sea area for purposes of national defense.

At no time shall any person (other than persons on public vessels of the United States) enter the defensive sea area above defined, nor shall any vessels or other craft (other than public vessels of the United States) be navigated within said defensive sea area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

Any person violating the provisions of this order shall be subject to the penalties provided by law.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 26, 1939.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

General Order No. 144

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., March 29, 1941.

ESTABLISHING KODIAK ISLAND AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AND
SUBIC BAY NAVAL AIRSPACE RESEVATION

1. The following Executive orders are quoted:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING KODIAK ISLAND NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA ALASKA

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), the territorial waters between extreme high-water [4446] mark and the three-mile marine boundary adjacent to the easeern portion of Kodiak Island, Alaska, in and about Women's Bay to the westward within a line bearing true north and south tangent to the eastern extremity of High Island, are hereby set apart and reserved

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as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of the national defense, such area to be known as "Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area."

At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 22, 1941.

[4447]

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING SUBIC BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATION, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 568, 570; U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters within Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, between extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a line bearing true southwest extending three nautical miles from Panibatuhan Point, a line bearing true southwest extending three nautical miles from Sanpalo Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the above two bearing lines, are hereby set apart and reserved as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of the national defense, such area to be known as "Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area"; and the airspace over the said territorial waters and over the Subic Bay Naval Reservation, Olongapo, Philippine Islands, is hereby set apart and reserved as a naval airspace reservation to be known as "Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation."

At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

[4448] At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 22, 1941.

(No. 8718)

(F. R. Doc. 41-2165; Filed, March 24, 1941; 1:14 p. m.)

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

[4449] General Order No. 146

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., April 7, 1941.

NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AND AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS

1. The President, on February 14, 1941, signed Executive Orders Nos. 8680, 8681, 8683, and 8684. They are quoted:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Establishing Naval Defensive Sea Areas Around and Naval Airspace Reservations Over the Islands of Kiska and Unalaska, Alaska.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Kiska and Unalaska, are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Defensive Sea Area", and "Unalaska Island Naval Defensive Area"; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Kiska Island Naval Airspace Reservation", and "Unalaska Island Naval Airspace Reservation."

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public [4450] vessels of the United States, enter either of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into either of said areas, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into either of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

[4451]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

(No. 8680)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1136; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:50 a. m.)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING KANEHOE BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AND KANEHOE BAY NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATION, HAWAII

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters within Kaneohe Bay between extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a line bearing northeast true extending four nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines, are hereby established and reserved as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of national defense, such area to be known as "Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area"; and the airspace over the said territorial waters is hereby set apart and reserved as a naval

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airspace reservation for purposes of national defense, such reservation to be known as "Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace [4452] Reservation."

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into said area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

[4453]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

(No. 8681)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1137; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:50 a. m.)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AROUND AND NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS OVER THE ISLANDS OF PALMYRA, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY, WAKE, AND KINGMAN REEF, PACIFIC OCEAN

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Kingman Reef, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Palmyra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Johnston Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Midway Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Wake Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," and "Kingman Reef Naval Defensive Sea [4454] Area"; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Palmyra Island Naval Airspace Reservation," "Johnston Island Naval Airspace Reservation," "Midway Island Naval Airspace Reservation," "Wake Island Naval Airspace Reservation," and "Kingman Reef Naval Airspace Reservation."

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the

United States and of the Territory of Hawaii; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order [4455] relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

(No. 8682)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1139; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:51 a. m.)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AROUND AND NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS OVER THE ISLANDS OF ROSE, TUTUILA, AND GUAM, PACIFIC OCEAN

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of [4456] Rose, Tutuila, and Guam, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Rose Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Tutuila Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," and "Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area"; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Rose Island Naval Airspace Reservation," "Tutuila Island Naval Airspace Reservation," and "Guam Island Naval Airspace Reservation."

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe [4457] such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

(No. 8683)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1140; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:51 a. m.)

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GENERAL ORDER }
No. 153 }

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., September 8, 1941.

ESTABLISHING MANILA BAY DEFENSIVE SEA AREA

1. The President, on August 16, 1941, signed Executive Order No. 8853, quoted below:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING MANILA BAY DEFENSIVE SEA AREA, [4458] PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

The following-described area is hereby established and reserved, for purposes of national defense, as a naval defensive sea area, to be known as "Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area":

All territorial waters of Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, and its approaches and tributaries from the contour line of extreme high water as shown on the latest U. S. C. and G. S. charts, to:

A line running southwest true from Luzon Point, in approximate position, Latitude 14°27'40" North, Longitude 120°23'13" East to the seaward limit of territorial waters, thence southeasterly along the seaward limit of territorial waters, to the parallel of Latitude 14°10'15" North, thence east along that parallel of Latitude to meet the shore at Hamilo Point in approximate Latitude 14°10'15" North, Longitude 120°34'24" East.

A vessel not proceeding under United States Naval or other United States authorized supervision, shall not enter or navigate the waters of Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area except during daylight, when good visibility conditions prevail, and then only after specific permission has been obtained. Advance arrangements for entry into or navigation through or within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area must be made, preferably by [4459] application at a United States Naval District Headquarters in advance of sailing, or by radio or visual communication on approaching the seaward limits of the area. If radio telegraphy is used, the call "NQO" shall be made on a frequency of 500 kcs. and permission to enter the port shall be requested. The name of the vessel, purpose of entry, and name of the master must be given in the request. If visual communications are used, the procedure shall be essentially the same.

A vessel entering or navigating the waters of Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area does so at its own risk.

Even though permission has been obtained, it is incumbent upon a vessel entering the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area to obey any further instructions received from the United States Navy, or other United States authority.

A vessel may expect supervision of its movements within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area, either through surface craft or aircraft. Such controlling surface craft and aircraft will be identified by a prominent display of the Union Jack.

These regulations are subject to amplification by the local United States Naval authority as necessary to meet local circumstances and conditions.

When a United States Maritime Control Area is established adjacent to or abutting upon the above-established defensive sea area, it shall be assumed that permission to enter, and [4460] other instructions issued by proper authority, shall apply to any one continuous passage through or within both areas.

Any master of a vessel or other person within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area who shall disregard these regulations, or shall fail to obey an order of United States Naval authority to stop or heave to, or shall perform any act threatening the efficiency of mine or other defenses or the safety of navigation, or shall take any action inimical to the interests of the United States, may be detained therein by force of arms and shall be liable to attack by United States armed forces, and liable to prosecution as provided for in section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96).

All United States Government authorities shall place at the disposal of the Naval authorities their facilities for aiding in the enforcement of these regulations.

The Secretary of the Navy will be charged with the publication and enforcement of these regulations.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 16, 1941.

(No. 8853)

(F. R. Doc. 41-6114; Filed, August 18, 1941; 2:31 p. m.)

- FORRESTAL,
The Acting Secretary of War.

[4461] Mr. GESELL. Senator Lucas made a request for detailed information concerning the different types of planes which the Navy had at Pearl Harbor on January 6, 1940, and on February 1, 1941, the period when Admiral Richardson was in command, and information as to the extent and nature of the reconnaissance conducted by those planes during that period.¹

This has been furnished in a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell dated December 13, 1945, to which is attached a detailed breakdown of the number of planes present, the sectors covered by the reconnaissance, and is responsive to that request.

I again suggest that the memorandum and the attached schedules be spread upon the daily transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 13 December 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1. In response to the questions asked on the record by Senator Lucas, I am forwarding as you requested the necessary information in compliance therewith.

2. Exhibits A and B outline in detail the information [4462] concerning the number of Naval planes, and their types, attached to the Pacific Fleet when Admiral Richardson assumed command on 6 January 1940 and when he was relieved of command on 1 February 1941.

3. The number of Naval planes attached to the Pacific Fleet during the period 6 January 1940 and 1 February 1941 that were capable of running a long distance reconnaissance over the sea are indicated on Exhibits A and B as "VPB" planes of "Patwing 2 (Pearl Harbor)" or a total of 67 on 1 January 1940 and 63 on 1 February 1941. It is also possible that some "VJ" planes were capable of such use in case of necessity and in fact such planes were so used on 7 December 1941 after the attack.

4. The number of Naval planes that were assigned and performed daily reconnaissance duty, in pursuance of the order issued by Admiral Richardson on approximately 17 June 1940, is indicated in the attachments to the "Search Plan", (Exhibit E).

5. The exact sectors and distances from Oahu covered in the reconnaissance ordered by Admiral Richardson are also indicated in detail on the "Search Plan" (Exhibit E).

(S) John Ford Baecher,
JOHN FORD BAECHEER,
Lt. Comdr., NSNR.

Encls: (HW) Exhibits A, B, and E.

¹ Hearings, Part 1, p. 66.

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Enclosure (A)

[4463] *Naval aircraft assigned to the U. S. Fleet (Pacific) on 1 January 1940*

	Type	Number	Sub-total	Total
BATTLE FORCE.....	VOS	10		
	VS	8		
	VSO	112		
	VF	95		
	VSB	175		
	VB	47		
	VTB	96		
	VJ	13		
	VN	3		
		559		559
BASE FORCE.....	VB	1		
	VSO	2		
	VPB	8		
	VJ	32		
	VJR	14		
	VN	5		
	VR	1		
	VTB	3		
		66		66
CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE.....	VSO	78		
		78		78
SUBMARINE FORCE.....	VSO	2		
		2		2
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE: COMAIRSCOUTFOR.....	VSB	1		
	VSO	2		
		3	3	
PATWING 1 (San Diego).....	VSO	1		
	VPB	34		
		35	35	
PATWING 2 (Pearl Harbor).....	VSO	2		
	VPB	67		
	VJ	1		
		70	70	
PATWING 4 (Seattle).....	VPB	24		
		24	24	
			132	132
Enclosure (A)				837


Enclosure (B)

[4464] *Naval aircraft assigned to the Pacific Fleet 1 February 1941*

	Type	Number	Sub-total	Total
BATTLE FORCE.....	VS	4	-----	-----
	VSO	137	-----	-----
	VF	88	-----	-----
	VSF	142	-----	-----
	VB	40	-----	-----
	VTB	90	-----	-----
	VJ	11	-----	-----
	VN	5	-----	-----
		517	-----	517
BASE FORCE.....	VSO	17	-----	-----
	VJ	30	-----	-----
	VJR	12	-----	-----
	VB	1	-----	-----
		60	-----	60
CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE.....	VSO	60	-----	60
		60	-----	60
SUBMARINE FORCE.....	VSO	2	-----	-----
		2	-----	2
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE:				
COMAIRSCOUTFOR.....	VSO	2	-----	-----
	VN	1	-----	-----
		3	3	-----
PATWING 1 (San Diego).....	VSO	1	-----	-----
	VPB	34	-----	-----
		35	35	-----
PATWING 2 (Pearl Harbor).....	VSO	4	-----	-----
	VPB	63	-----	-----
	VJ	1	-----	-----
		68	68	-----
PATWING 4 (Seattle).....	VPB	19	-----	-----
		19	19	-----
PATWING 6 (Alameda).....	VPB	7	-----	-----
		7	7	-----
			132	-----
				132
				771

Enclosure (E)

SEARCH PLAN
Security Patrol from Barbers Pt.
(as of 30 June 1940)



[4466]

Fleet security patrol from Barbers Point, Oahu

Plane "A"

Course T.	Distance to Lat. N.		Long. W.
345°.....	75	22-31	58-27
000.....	226	26-15	58-27
265½.....	37	26-12	59-08
175.....	123	24-14	58-55
336.....	1(23) ?	26-01	59-52
248.....	37	25-47	60-30
150.....	226	22-31	58-27
165.....	75	21-18	58-07

Plane "B"

315°.....	75	22-11	59-05
330.....	226	25-21	61-07
232.....	38	25-04	61-39
144.....	123	23-23	60-21
306.....	123	24-35	62-10
218.....	37	24-04	62-36
120.....	226	22-11	59-03
135.....	75	21-18	58-07

Plane "C"

285°.....	75	21-37	59-23
290½.....	226	23-29	62-67
202.....	37	22-55	63-10
115.....	123	22-05	61-10
277.....	123	22-16	63-22
187.....	37	21-38	63-27
90½.....	226	21-37	59-23
105.....	75	21-18	58-07

Plane "D"

255½.....	75	20-58	59-23
270.....	226	20-58	63-23
172.....	37	20-19	63-18
064.....	123	20-32	61-07
246.....	123	19-41	63-07
157.....	37	19-03	62-52
060.....	226	20-59	59-23
074½.....	75	21-18	58-07

[4467]

PLANE "E"

224°.....	75	20-25	59-02
239.....	226	18-30	62-27
142½.....	37	18-01	62-04
054.....	123	19-13	60-12
215.....	123	17-32	61-33
127.....	37	17-09	61-01
030.....	226	20-25	59-02
044.....	75	21-18	58-07

PLANE "F"

194½.....	75	20-05	58-27
200½.....	226	16-50	60-23
113.....	37	16-35	59-47
024½.....	123	18-27	58-54
185.....	123	16-25	59-05
097½.....	37	16-20	58-27
000.....	226	20-05	58-27
015.....	75	21-18	58-07

Total distance for each plane 922 miles.

[4468] Mr. GESELL. Congressman Gearhart made a request for a copy of the order fixing the time of operation of the radar stations in the period immediately before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Pursuant to that request the Army communicated with the Commanding General in Hawaii and a search was made of the files there to find out if there was any written record establishing those times. A negative report has come back stating that an exhaustive search of the files does not disclose the publication of official orders of any kind in connection with the time schedule for training or the operation of the radar stations on Oahu during the period in question. That answer suggests that those orders were orally established and, of course, we will have the responsible officers who were not only in command but particularly concerned with radar before the committee and they can give the information at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you want to put anything in the record on that?

Mr. GESELL. I think there is no need of simply documenting this negative fact. We will have to get the information by witnesses.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

Mr. GESELL. We have a substantial number of requests relating to the Department of State.

[4469] There were placed before the committee this morning two mimeographed documents. These are submitted by counsel. The first is dated November 25, 1941, and represents the Dutch Government's views on the matter of the type of reply which should be given to the Japanese.

This is offered for the purpose of completing the record.

I might say that we had requested it earlier. We were unable to submit it to the committee because we were awaiting the approval of the Dutch Government for its release, which has now been obtained.

I would like to have the text of that document, as well as the text of the other document, the document of November 27, 1941, covering Secretary Hull's negotiations, discussions with the Netherlands Minister on that date, concerning the threatened Japanese invasion of French Indochina, spread upon the record.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask one question of counsel on that point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Does the record contain at this point now all of the so-called tentative proposals by the various governments on this question?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, I think we have now had released all of the documents which we requested be released.

[4470] Senator LUCAS. That was my understanding.

(The documents referred to above, dated November 25, 1941 and November 27, 1941, respectively, follow herewith:)

[4471]

WASHINGTON, 25th November 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to transmit herewith in form of a memorandum the comments of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the tentative proposals of Mr. Kurusu which you were kind enough to communicate to me last Saturday.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours sincerely,

[s] A. LOUDON

The HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D. C.

Memorandum

As it seems impossible to discuss at present a final and general agreement, it is necessary that for the reasons expressed by the Secretary of State, it should be endeavored to arrive at a limited and temporary agreement.

In view of the fact that before the occupation of Indochina by Japan no sanctions were applied against the latter, it seems reasonable that if Japan gradually withdraws from Indochina proportionately sanctions may be lifted to a certain extent, provided, however, that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina goes so far that the remaining [4472] Japanese forces cannot be considered a direct threat of the Netherlands Indies, Malakka, the Philippine Islands and the Burma road.

But even in that event, according to the opinion of the Netherlands Government, sanctions should not be lifted to such an extent that this would constitute an increase of Japan's war potential. For instance no delivery of high octane gasoline should be allowed, but rice and if necessary low grade oils could be furnished.

The Netherlands Government will be glad to follow the same policy concerning oil deliveries to Japan as applied by the United States. It goes without saying that the license system will remain in operation.

The first point at issue of the Japanese proposals is aiming farther than the above. The Netherlands Government wonders whether it might not be possible to give the following reply:

1. If it is the intention of Japan to militarily withdraw from China, then there are no objections; if Japan is not willing to do so, then the right to continue to give assistance to China, should be reserved.
2. It should be proposed that North East Asia (Russia) be also included in the regions enumerated in point 1 of the Japanese proposal in which regions the powers should agree that no armed advance should take place.

[4473] Point 2 of the Japanese proposal has been answered by the above observations.

Add point 3 of the Japanese proposals. The Netherlands are prepared to treat all countries on the same favored footing provided that no foreign power tries to obtain a preponderant position in the Netherlands Indies to the detriment of other nations and provided that defense requirements be taken into account.

Point 4 and 5 of the Japanese proposals have already been dealt with in the above observations.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the above gives at least room for discussions with which we fully entrust the Secretary of State especially now that we have been so fully informed by him and since we have been given the opportunity to inform him of our point of view.

As far as the possible reduction of economic pressure on Japan is concerned, consultations with Governor General Starkenborgh and Economic Warfare will be necessary in view of the fact that deliveries of tin and rubber which were originally destined for Japan are now being shipped to the United States.

In general it will not be possible to go further than the final proposals of the Batavia Conference as proposed before the Netherlands-Japanese discussions had been broken off. Moreover as a result of Russian and American purchases, [4474] the amounts of tin and rubber offered in the final proposals are no more available.

NOVEMBER 25th, 1941.

[4475]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Dated: November 27, 1941.

Subject: Threatened Japanese Invasion of French Indochina area.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon.

Copies to:

The Netherlands Minister called at his request to inquire what reactions I had from the Japanese situation. I proceeded to hand him three cables from

Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with equipment, vessels, transports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very serious situation.

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally in connection with the proposed *modus vivendi* arrangement which I abandoned on Tuesday evening, November twenty-fifth, or practically abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early Wednesday morning, November twenty- [4476] sixth, to present to the Japanese later in the day the document containing a proposed draft of an agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for which this Government stands and has stood for, for many years, especially including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan was the continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working out of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the so-called *modus vivendi* was really a part and parcel of these conversations and their objectives, intended to facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing that in any way could be construed as a departure from the basic principles which were intended to go into the general peace agreement. The Minister said he understood the situation.

C. H.

S CH:MA

[4477] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. GESELL. At page 1265 Senator Ferguson requested the notes made by Mr. Welles regarding conferences with President Roosevelt in connection with the Atlantic Conference, discussions concerning a parallel declaration to Japan.

The State Department advises that to date it has not found any such notes. The State Department has, however, found a draft dated August 16, 1941, which appears to be a revision of a draft dated August 15, 1941. The committee will recall that the August 15 draft was part of Exhibit 22 and was submitted by us in the presentation.

The State Department now has a draft dated August 16, which we are glad to furnish for the record. It has to be photostated and is not yet here.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you make that Exhibit 22-A so it will be with Exhibit 22?

Mr. GESELL. We will make it 22-A.¹

That draft, which is a day later than August 15, I understand already shows the watering down of the crucial paragraph at the end.

[4478] Mr. GESELL. We have also obtained a message dated August 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill advising Prime Minister Churchill of the statement made to the Japs on August 17, 1941. I would like to read that into the record. This is dated August 18, 1941 (reading):

Ambassador,
London (England).
Triple Priority.

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR CHURCHILL

Quote. With reference to our discussions in regard to the situation in the Far East, upon my return to Washington I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had on August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resumption of the informal conversations which the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been holding directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2065.

basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the Secretary of State had in reply confined himself to repeating what he had previously said in regard to the developments in Japan's course of conquest which had led to the cessation of those conversations.

On August 17 I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and the Secretary of State and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this Government with [4479] respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.

The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to the Secretary of State in regard to the resumption of conversations. I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt on the principles of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Government has emphasized and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to readjust its position and embark upon a peaceful program this Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations and that before undertaking the resumption of those conversations we felt that it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the Japanese Government's attitude and plans.

The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communicate what I had told him to his Government.

ROOSEVELT.

I would like to have this marked as Exhibit 70.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

[4480] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 70.")

Mr. GESELL. At page 127 of the transcript a request was made by Senator Ferguson for any record that Great Britain took parallel action in accordance with the Atlantic Conference agreement. That request was also made at page 1804 of the transcript.

No record of any such action has been found by the State Department in its files. However, on August 25, 1941, the State Department telegraphed to Ambassador Grew for his information an extract from Prime Minister Churchill's radio address on August 24, 1941. We have that telegram as No. 535 to Tokyo and I would like to read it into the record since it does indicate information, perhaps, of a kind that Senator Ferguson was inquiring about as to whether it is available.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. GESELL. It is dated August 25, 1941. It is addressed to the Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, via Shanghai, China, and Naval Radio, and it reads as follows [reading]:

There follows for your information extract from the Associated Press text from London of Prime Minister Churchill's radio address of August 24.

This is the quote, I take it, from the press:

But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented [4481] and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indochina from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

I would like to have that telegram marked as Exhibit 71.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[4482] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 71.")

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, that is a quotation from Mr. Churchill's speech in London?

Mr. GESELL. Right, sent by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just inquire as to where counsel obtained exhibits 70 and 71, whether they were both in the State Department files?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; we obtained them from the State Department files.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean, the State Department files.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. GESELL. At transcript page 1285 there is a request by Senator Ferguson for any messages to Ambassador Grew regarding alleged parallel action taken by him in Japan on August 12, 1941, with Sir Robert Craigie relating Thailand.

We would like to point out that at page 1649-1652 of the transcript Ambassador Grew testified that he took no such parallel action.¹

We have some documents from the files of the Department [4483] of State which bear on this subject and I will designate them all as the next exhibit and describe them. That will be Exhibit 72.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 72.")

Mr. GESELL. The first is a telegram, No. 452, from the State Department to Ambassador Grew, reporting statements made by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassador August 1, 1941, and requested Grew to report these statements to the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Second, telegram No. 1153, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department, reporting that he has taken action in accordance with the instructions.

And, third, a State Department radio bulletin of August 6, 1941, reporting a press conference of Secretary Hull on that date at which Secretary Hull commented on Thailand.

We believe this whole document would in the normal course of the State Department procedure have been sent to Ambassador Grew. Perhaps all three of these documents should be spread on the record so that the committee will have it for their information.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that the last one, [4484] there is no knowledge that it was sent to the Ambassador?

¹ Hearings, Part 2, pp. 488-489, 627-629.

Mr. GESELL. Well, it is a Department radio bulletin, which we understand were sent generally to all of our ambassadors and representatives and, therefore, the presumption is very strong that it went to Ambassador Grew.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want to know.

Mr. GESELL. Yes. He had the facilities to receive it and he was one of the logical people to be looking for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(The documents comprising Exhibit 72 follow herewith:)

[4485]

Telegram sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, August 1, 1941. Noon

AMEMBASSY,
Tokyo (Japan)

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL TO THE AMBASSADOR

Reference my 793 94 451 August 1, 11 a. m.

One. After the Japanese Ambassador had delivered his Government's message in regard to the bombing incident at Chungking and I had expressed appreciation, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that we have heard from authoritative sources that the Japanese are bringing or are about to bring pressure on the Government of Thailand similar to that which they have recently exerted against the French Government and the Indochina authorities; that we, of course, regard such reports with very serious apprehension; and that, speaking under instructions from the President, I wished to state that the proposal which the President made recently in relation to Japan's contemplated procedure in and regarding Indochina would also extend to and cover any such contemplated procedure in and regarding Thailand. I requested that the Ambassador immediately inform his Government of this. The Ambassador replied that he would do so.

Two. The President and I desire that you at the earliest possible moment inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the above.

Acting (Signed) WELLES

[4486]

Telegram received

Tokyo.

From: EJ

Dated August 2, 1941
Rec'd 7:47 a. m.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

[Stamped:] Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1941. Noted

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush

1153, August 2. 3 p. m. (Section One)

Confidential for the Acting Secretary.

Department's 452, August 1, noon.

One. In the absence from the Foreign Office today of the Foreign Minister, who is leaving tonight to worship at the Ise Shrines, counselor called this afternoon on the Acting Vice Minister and communicated to him the substance of the first paragraph of the Department's telegram under reference, at the same time conveying my request that the information be transmitted promptly to the Minister. Mr. Yamamoto replied that a report along precisely similar lines had already been received from Ambassador Nomura, but that he would immediately inform the Minister of the information received through us.

1698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TRB

[Telegram received]

[4487] From: Dated August 2, 1941
Rec'd 7:48 a. m.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush.

1153, August 2, 3 p. m. (Section Two).

Two. In reply to my request for an interview with the Foreign Minister on Monday afternoon after his return from Ise, Mr. Yamamoto said that he would of course arrange for the interview if I desired to communicate further views or information with regard to the American Government's proposition, but that if the purpose of the interview were to receive some indication of the Japanese Government's considered views with regard to the proposition he believed that the interview might be usefully deferred for a few days. He said that the proposition was being carefully studied by the Japanese Government with every desire to find a solution. He added that a telegram in the sense of the preceding sentence had already been sent to Ambassador Nomura.

(Signed) GREW.

HPD

[4488]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION,
August 6, 1941.

Radio Bulletin No. 186

NOTE. This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference. Questioned again today whether any credence could be placed in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had said yesterday morning.

A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say what Mr. Duff-Cooper's mission to the United States was about. The Secretary replied that as far as he knew Mr. Duff-Cooper had not as yet landed. He added that he had heard a report, which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. Duff-Cooper might pass through this country on his way to the Far East. Asked if he expected to see him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to call, he supposed he would see him as he did other important and prominent people who come to this country.

A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the [4489] Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related to the Pacific area.

Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the step to which the correspondent referred.

Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have especial application to Thailand and the present situation.

[4490] A correspondent mentioned that the Japanese had also made some demands upon the Ecuadorans, and he asked whether we were going to do anything about that. The Secretary said that we had nothing on that subject except what appeared in the newspapers. He added that he had not heard from Ecuador nor from our representatives.

A correspondent asked whether there had been some indications that Thailand had been offered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as Indochina so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada, of which Canada is a part. The Secretary said that he had not been advised on that subject. He mentioned the multiplicity of rumors and reports coming from that area lately and said that we were observing all of these as closely as possible.

A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Netherlands Indies paper that there was no question that the United States was behind the Netherlands Indies but the question was how far behind, asked whether we had any indications of a weakening of their attitude towards Japan out there. The Secretary said that he had nothing new on that subject.

To a question of whether the United States had had any change in relations with Finland, the Secretary said that there had been nothing especially new on that recently.

Asked whether he had any report or definite assurance from [4491] Vichy on Admiral Leahy's conversations, the Secretary said that he had not yet heard from him.

A correspondent asked whether there was any development on the question of evacuating Americans out of Japan. The Secretary said that there was nothing especially new. He said that we had not had any communications yet from any of the persons who were refugees if we might call them that or from our consuls. He added that at the same time we are giving every attention to the whole problem.

A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group, including several Republican leaders, who issued an appeal last night to Congress (see below) to put a stop to the step-by-step projection of the United States toward an undeclared war and he asked for the Secretary's comment on that. Mr. Hull said that he would repeat his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives in January in support of the Lend-Lease Bill in which he sought to state the issues confronting us in the international situation.

Paraguay. The Department of State today made public a translation of a letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State from the Minister of Paraguay expressing the appreciation of the President of Paraguay and Sonora de Morinigo for the courtesies shown in the United States to Senora de Morinigo and their son. The letter said that the general health of the child has improved notably and that the difficulties have begun to give way with the [4492] treatment applied. (See Radio Bulletin No. 172 of July 21.)

Chile. Senorita Magdalena Petit, distinguished authoress and musician from Chile, will arrive in New York on August 11 on an invitation extended by the Department of State to visit the United States.

Max W. Thornburg. The Department has announced the appointment of Max W. Thornburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to act as consultant to the State Department on international petroleum matters. Mr. Thornburg has been assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

CONGRESS

Defense Seizure. The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to adopt the Property Requisitioning Bill. The House added three amendments to the measure as passed by the Senate, thus necessitating its going to conference to iron out the differences. (See Radio Bulletin No. 173 of July 22.)

Highway Defense Program. The Senate today over-rode by 57 to 19 the President's veto of the \$320,000,000 highway defense bill.

The measure will now go to the House for consideration. (See Radio Bulletin No. 185 of July 5.)

DEFENSE

Naval Bases. The Navy Department will establish six additional section bases for refueling and minor repairs for small ships at Key West, Fla.; Mobile, Ala.; Corpus Christi, Tex.; [4493] Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; Monterey, Calif.; and Neah Bay, Wash., as soon as funds are available. The Department said that additional section bases would also be established in Alaska.

Airplane Deliveries. The OPM reported that its Director General Knudsen, Rear Admiral John H. Towers, and Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal would leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to inspect East Coast Airplane factories with a view to possible speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Navy and the British.

Naval and Aircraft Equipment. Federal Loan Administrator Jones announced that the Defense Plant Corp., at the request of the Navy Department, had authorized a lease agreement with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., N. Y. C., to construct and equip a plant at Baltimore, Md., costing \$3,100,000, to be used for naval equipment production.

The Defense Plant Corporation also authorized a lease agreement with Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, to construct and equip a plant at Niagara Falls Airport.

[4494] Mr. GESELL. At transcript pages 1300, 1305, and 1316 a request was made by Senator Ferguson for messages transmitted by Sumner Welles to Lord Halifax referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram dated December 6, 1941.

We cannot find any further record and call attention to the testimony of Secretary Welles at transcript pages 1337 and 1338 where he gave his explanation of what he thought that information was.¹ We are unable to find any further record.

At transcript page 1399 a request by Congressman Keefe for drafts prior to October 17, 1941, of messages to Emperor Hirohito: There are two State Department drafts of October 16, 1941, prior to the receipt of what is referred to as a draft from the White House, and one State Department draft of October 16, apparently following the receipt of the White House draft. We are not clear. Those drafts we have marked as Exhibit 73 and if the Congressman wishes we can have them spread upon the record.

The so-called White House draft which came between these two drafts has not yet been found. Further search is being conducted for the White House draft.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The exhibit will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 73.")

[4495]

DRAFT TELEGRAM

October 16, 1941.

(Draft No. 2)

His Imperial Majesty HIROHITO,
Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a narrower concept than I had anticipated. The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concepts and endeavor through re-examination

¹ Hearings, Part 2, p. 508.

of those concepts to evolve general lines of action which would be clear manifestations of the high purposes we have in mind and thus might be expected to establish a durable [4496] and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that there be a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Chairman of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. I believe that such a meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE:MMH:HES

(Handwritten note: Tentative draft which was discarded upon receipt of a draft from the White House.)

DRAFT TELEGRAM

OCTOBER 16, 1941.

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY HIROHITO,

Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed through news reports that [4497] the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation to you. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a more narrow concept than I had anticipated (than that conveyed by the Premier's message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concept and endeavor through reexamination of that concept to evolve general lines of action which would be clear manifestations (of the lofty concepts) of our original concepts and thus might be expected to establish a durable and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results [4498] hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest that Your Imperial Majesty signify approval of a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Premier of China. I believe that such a meeting to be held as soon as arrangements therefore can be completed furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek, the Premier of China, in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE:MMH:HES

OCTOBER 16, 1941.

Draft of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan—superseded by a later draft dated October 17, 1941.

This draft was not used.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS,

October 16, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY:

Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed [4499] action. Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any decision on the matter. I feel strongly that this proposed message in the form in which it stands should not at this time be sent.

1702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be exercised to avoid making any too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel that we should avoid anything that implies countenancing of the Japanese operations in China.
PA/H: SKH: BGT

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty. I feel I should again address Your Imperial Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process of formation. As Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two governments for many months for the purpose of keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the real purpose of Your Imperial Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel [4500] thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan or the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great Britain or the Dutch or independent territory in the South, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near East theatres of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy [4501] of peace, would be very seriously concerned.

Mr. GESELL. At pages 1419 and 1420 of the transcript a question was raised by Congressman Keefe as to the time when President Roosevelt's message of December 6, 1941, to Emperor Hirohito was released to the press.¹

The State Department has advised us as follows: That at 7:40 p. m., December 6, correspondents were informed orally at the State Department that the President had sent a personal message direct to Emperor Hirohito of Japan. It is my understanding—

Mr. KEEFE. Was that, do I understand you, at 7:40 p. m.?

Mr. GESELL. At 7:40 p. m., December 6.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. It is my understanding that the text of the message was not released at that time.

We have a release of the State Department dated December 7, 1941, for the press—or rather from the White House, but it comes from the State Department files—releasing the text of the message to the Emperor. We haven't yet been able to ascertain whether this release was handed to the press before the Pearl Harbor attack or after and we are continuing on that matter, but it looks as though the text of the message was released on December 7.

¹ Hearings, Part 2, p. 538.

At page 1410 of the transcript a question by Congressman Keefe was raised as to the issuance by the State Department [4502] of official notices advising American nationals to leave the Orient.¹

Now there are quite a number of those warnings, as the Congressman himself indicated.

The major warnings to Tokyo are three:

No. 381, to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1940;
No. 100 to Tokyo, dated February 11, 1941; and
No. 785 to Tokyo, dated November 19, 1941.

We feel that these, particularly because they refer to prior orders and because they show they also went to other embassies in the Pacific area, will give the Congressman the information he wants and perhaps the three of them should be designated as the next exhibit, No. 74

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They will be received and made an exhibit.

Mr. GESELL. I do not suppose you want those in the record, do you, Congressman, or do you?

Mr. KEEFE. Can they be put into the record some way?

Mr. GESELL. All right, we will have them copied into the transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 74" and follow herewith:)

[4503]

TELEGRAM SENT

AC

OCTOBER 6, 1940—2 P. M.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

AMEMBASSY,

Tokyo (Japan) via Shanghai (China).

Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China)

Amembassy, Peiping (China)

American Consul, Hong Kong

381.

The continuance of an abnormal situation in the Far East which has in widespread areas disturbed and interfered with the legitimate commercial, cultural, and philanthropic activities of American citizens and which has adversely affected conditions of order and general living conditions has impelled the Department to the conclusion that the time has come for it to adopt with reference to China (including Manchuria), to Japan (including Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea, and Formosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina an attitude toward passport control and withdrawal of American citizens therefrom similar to that which has been adopted for some time toward these questions with reference to disturbed areas of Europe. The Department accordingly desires that its diplomatic and consular officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French [4505] Indochina quietly repeat quietly inform American citizens in their respective districts of the substance of the preceding sentence and suggest withdrawals insofar as is practicable from the areas in question to the United States. This applies especially in regard to women and children and to men whose continued presence in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indochina is not repeat not considered urgently or essentially needed. There should be pointed out to American citizens the advisability of their taking advantage of transportation facilities while such facilities are available, as it goes without saying that no one can guarantee that such facilities will remain available indefinitely.

In order that this instruction be not repeat not misconstrued in any quarter, it is desired that effort be made to avoid publicity in regard thereto and that endeavor be made to preclude the reading into it of sensational implications.

The Department would appreciate receiving from you and from Peiping, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, and other interested offices an estimate of the number of Americans who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo should instruct consuls in Japanese territory and Peiping should instruct those in China.

¹ Hearings, Part 2, p. 534.

1704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The Department will expect shortly to issue further [4506] instructions embodying various administrative considerations.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, and Hong Kong. Hong Kong repeat to Saigon.

HULL
S

FE:GA:HES FE PA/H

TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 11, 1941—7 p. m.

This cable was sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

AMEMBASSY,
Tokyo (Japan).

100
URGENT.

Department's 381, October 6, 2 p. m., withdrawal of American citizens.

It is desired that the Embassy at once instruct American consulates in Japanese territory to renew, immediately and quietly and with effort to avoid any sensational publicity, to American citizens, especially to women and children and to men whose continued presence in Japan is not highly essential, this Government's suggestions that they withdraw to the United States. In so doing, the [4507] Embassy and the consulates are to understand and should explain to American inquirers that this Government is making no repeat no assumption that a situation of acute physical danger to American nationals is imminent, but that this Government, in the light of obvious trends in the Far Eastern situation, desires to reduce the risks to which American nationals and their interests are exposed by virtue of uncertainties and, through the process of withdrawal of unessential personnel, to improve its position in relation to problems which may at any time be presented of affording maximum appropriate protection to those persons who are not in position to withdraw, those interests which cannot be abandoned, and those principles and those rights to which it is the duty of the American Government to give all appropriate support at all times. This instruction and the advice to be given under it is not repeat not meant to be alarmist, but is a further and necessary precautionary measure. We do not repeat not wish to impose unnecessary hardships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those whom you address shall realize that there are real risks, that we wish to reduce these risks, and that this advice is being given in the interest both of the safety and convenience of the American nationals addressed and in the interest of national security.

The Department is sending similar instructions [4508] to Peiping, Hong Kong, and Indochina.

The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending a special vessel or special vessels to assist in the withdrawal and American nationals who make inquiry in this particular connection should be advised to take advantage of such transportation facilities as may be currently available.

(HULL)

PA/H:SKH:ZMK/HNS FE PA/H

TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE "Br"

NAVAL RADIO,

Washington, November 19, 1941—3 p. m.

AMEMBASSY,
Tokyo (Japan) via Shanghai (China).

Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China).

Amembassy, Peiping (China).

American Consul, Hong Kong.

Reference Department's 100, February 11, 7 p. m. and previous telegrams in regard to withdrawal of American citizens.

The Department desires that the American diplo- [4509] matic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of American citizens in the

Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the present facilities.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hong Kong. Tokyo please repeat to all consular offices in the Japanese Empire and to Dairen. Peiping please repeat to all consular offices in Japanese-occupied areas of China, and in Manchuria. Hong Kong please repeat to Saigon and Hanoi.

(HULL)

FE: WAA: NHS/MHP FE PA/H SD A-L S

[4510] Mr. GESELL. On transcript page 1436 a question was raised by Senator Ferguson as to whether the State Department has a record of a statement by Senator Pepper on November 24, 1941, which he made in Boston in a speech. The answer from the State Department is that there is no record of any such statement found in the State Department files.

On transcript page 1437 a question was asked by Senator Ferguson as to whether the declaration suggested by Prime Minister Churchill in the message to President Roosevelt on November 30, 1941, was ever made. You will recall that was a message from Prime Minister Churchill in which he asked for a warning to be made by the United States and referred to his appreciation of President Roosevelt's constitutional difficulties. The answer is that no record was found by the State Department in its file that any warning or declaration was ever issued to Japan pursuant to that suggestion. We would like to call attention to volume 2 of the Foreign Relations papers which is in evidence here, to page 771, an inquiry by President Roosevelt which was handed by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassadors, as to their intentions with respect to going into Indochina.

Now, here is a question raised by myself at page 1499 of the transcript, as to whether the Japanese Government gave [4511] any publicity to their proposal of November 20, 1941, which has been referred to as the Japanese ultimatum. The answer was that no answer was found by the State Department in its files that the Japanese ever gave publicity to their note. The further information is furnished that the Japanese proposal was published in the United States on December 15, 1941, as annex 11 to House Document No. 458 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, which was President Roosevelt's message to Congress of December 15, 1941.

At page 1505 of the transcript a question by Senator Barkley as to when Ambassador Grew received word of the delivery of the United States note of November 26. I believe that question was also raised by Senator Ferguson at transcript 1820 and 1821. We have here a series of dispatches to Ambassador Grew from the Department of State, Numbers 783, 784 and 787; the first is dated 8 p. m., November 26, 1941; the second dated 9 p. m., November 26, 1941; and the third dated November 27, 1941. These dispatches show that Ambassador Grew was immediately advised that a proposal had been received and subsequently the actual text of the note was sent there, a summary of it, at 9 p. m. I think all three of those documents should be spread upon the record and designated Exhibit No. 75.

[4512] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 75" and follow herewith.)

1706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[4513]

[Telegram sent]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"SC"

NO DISTRIBUTION

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941, 8 p. m.

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, 783 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in the afternoon of November 26 and gave them two documents—an oral statement and draft outline of a proposed basis for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area.

A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent telegram.

(HULL.)

FE:MWS:MJF FE

[4514]

[Telegram sent]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"SC"

NO DISTRIBUTION

This cable was sent in confidential code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941, 9 p. m.

AmEmbassy, Tokyo. 784 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and Counselor only

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at my request November 26.

I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement substantially as follows:

It is believed that some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which we have been discussing for the past several months in informal and exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settlement of problems of the entire Pacific area. Included among those principles are the principles of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation to improve world conditions through peaceful ways and means and to prevent and solve controversies, inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal [4515] affairs of other nations and the principle of equality. Mention is made of the proposals of the Japanese Government received on November 20 and recent statements of the Japanese Ambassador that his Government desires to continue these conversations and that a modus vivendi would be helpful toward creating a propitious atmosphere.

This Government most earnestly desires to further the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to provide full opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government looking to the working out of a broad program of peace. In the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals of November 20 in some ways conflict with the fundamental principles to which each Government has committed itself and would not be likely to further our ultimate objectives. It is suggested that further efforts toward resolving divergences of views on the practical application of those principles be made. There is therefore offered the Japanese Government a draft plan as one practical manifestation of the sort of program this Government has in mind to be worked out during further discussions. The hope is expressed that there thus may be expedited progress toward a meeting of minds.

The draft proposal for a broad-gage settlement was substantially as follows:

[4516] "The first section contained a draft mutual declaration in which there was embodied an affirmation by both Governments that their national policies have as their objectives extensive and enduring peace throughout the

Pacific area, that both Governments are without territorial designs, that both have no intention to threaten other nations or to use aggressively military force and that accordingly they will give active support and practical application to certain fundamental principles." (There are then listed the four principles which are mentioned above in the oral statement.)

Both Governments agree practically to apply actively support five economic principles in a program to eliminate and to prevent recurrent political instability, economic collapse and to provide a basis for peace. Those principles call for (a) the establishment of international financial institutions and arrangements designed to aid essential enterprises and continuous development of all nations and to utilize processes of trade to permit payments consonant with the welfare of all nations; (b) nondiscrimination in commercial relations between nations; (c) nondiscriminatory access to raw materials; (d) abolition of expressions of extreme nationalism such as excessive trade restrictions and promotion of international economic cooperation; (e) full protection of consuming countries' and populations' interests as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

[4517] The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten steps to be taken:

1. Both Governments to exert their influence toward bring about other governments' adherence to and practical application of the basic political and economic principles set forth.

2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact among Thailand, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union and United States.

3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already concluded by either with any third power or powers will be interpreted so as to conflict with this agreement's fundamental purpose—establishment and preservation of peace in the entire Pacific.

4. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement among the Netherlands, Thai, American, British, Chinese, and Japanese Governments calling for pledges on the part of each Government to respect Indochina's territorial integrity and should a threat to that integrity develop to embark upon immediate consultation with regard to that threat; ~~in order that measures necessary and advisable~~ ^{as may be taken}; such agreement to provide also that each ~~signator~~ ^(y) signatory would not repeat not accept or seek preferential economic or commercial treatment in Indochina and each [4518] signatory would exert its influence toward obtaining for all signatories equality of treatment in those matters.

5. Japan to withdraw from China and Indochina all police, air, naval, and military forces.

6. Both Governments to give up all extraterritorial rights in China and rights and interests in and with regard to concessions, international settlements and rights under the Boxer Protocol; both Governments to seek to obtain from other governments, including the British, an agreement to give up all similar rights in China.

7. Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward conclusion of an American-Japanese trade agreement on the basis of mutual reductions of tariffs, including an American undertaking to bind raw silk on the free list, and of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment.

8. Both Governments to remove their freezing restrictions on each other's funds.

9. Both Governments to agree upon a dollar yen rate stabilization plan, each allocating one-half of the funds adequate for that purpose.

10. Both Governments not repeat not to support—economically, politically, militarily—any government or regime in China except the National Government located temporarily at Chungking.

An account of the conversation will be sent you in a [4519] later telegram.

FE:MWS:MBW FE

HULL.

1708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[4520]

[Telegram sent]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"SC"

NO DISTRIBUTION

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1941, 7 p. m.

AmEmbassy Tokyo (Japan). 787 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

Reference Department's 784, November 26, 9 p. m.

After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under reference Mr. Kurusu asked whether those documents represented the reply of this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that just as Japan had to deal with a domestic political situation this Government also had its internal political problems and that the suggestion contained in the documents he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain international financial arrangements which were not actually outlined in the documents.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrangement suggested in the documents which he had just [4521] received. He mentioned Japan's bitter experience with international organizations as the basis for his objection to the proposed multilateral nonaggression pacts. He added that China had received the wrong impression from the Washington treaties and had used them advantageously to flaunt Japan's rights. He said that if this proposal represented the ideas of the American Government he did not see the possibility of any agreement and added that he did not see how the Japanese Government could consider the proposal that Japan withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and withdraw all support from regimes or governments in China except that of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Secretary inquired whether we could not work out these questions.

Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Government would be likely to throw up its hands at our proposal and as the document was marked tentative and without commitment, it might be the wiser course further to discuss it informally before sending it to the Japanese Government.

The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully to study the documents before further discussion. The Secretary said that with the public having lost its perspective it was necessary to present a complete picture of our position. He mentioned the acute public feeling on the oil question and reminded the Japanese of the great injury being [4522] done to us by Japan's immobilizing large forces of democratic countries in territories near Indochina and indicated that should Japan pour troops into Indochina the American people would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries south and west of Indochina and to our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing arguments on Japan's difficulty in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wei and observed that the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion.

The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our response to their proposal and their feeling that we had reached an end. They asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not possible and whether they could see the President.

The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a modus vivendi and, in response to a further inquiry as to whether our inability to consider a modus vivendi was because of the attitude of other powers, he added that he had done his best. He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged for November 27).

FE: MWS: HNS/HES FE PA/H

HULL

[4523] Mr. GSELL. At page 1510 of the transcript a request was made by Congressman Murphy for a copy of the official German report on discussions between Adolf Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4, 1941, as introduced at the

Nuernberg trial on November 23, 1945.¹ We have the complete text, which we will simply keep in our files, and the full translation of the document relating to this subject, which was introduced in the Nuernberg trial, I suggest be spread on the record at this point.

Perhaps we should also designate that as Exhibit 76.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 76," and follows herewith)

Translation of Document 1881-PS, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel

Notes Fueh 20/41

NOTES regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.

[4524] Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal CASAPARI.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the Pope, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, and the FUEHRER should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-minded as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. [4525] In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that [4526] this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally ranks high above the American.

¹ Hearings, Part 2, p. 573.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper [4527] German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along per present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhine land, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an [4528] anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

[4529] The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to

oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then [4530] the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT.

Certificate of Translation of Document No. 1881-PS

[4531]

4 APRIL 1941.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.

ERNST COHN,
Pfc.

[4532] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. At that point, the papers in this country this week contained a notation to the effect that an entry was made in the trial at Nuernberg of a conversation between Von Ribbentrop and the Japanese representative, asking them in February 1941 to have a surprise attack on the United States. I will get the specific reference.

Mr. GESELL. I am famaliar with that. We have asked for those documents.¹

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Mr. GESELL. I might say to the committee we have also been working this process in reverse and making available to Justice Jackson and Mr. Keenan the intercepted Jap messages, which have proved to be of great interest to them, and we think they will be of value in both of those trials.

On transcript pages 1537, 1586, and 1968 questions were raised by Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew was consulted when the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor in 1940. No record can be found by the State Department, in its files, that such was the case. In other words, there is no documentary evidence found that he was consulted one way or the other, which appears to confirm his own testimony concerning it.

¹ Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 165.

[4533] At transcript pages 1544 and 1586 are questions by Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew ever expressed an opinion regarding the effect of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor. The answer is again the same, that there is no record which can be found in the State Department files, except the statement on page 69 of volume II of Foreign Relations, that the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor did not constitute a threat to Japan.¹

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think that has already been read into the record.

Mr. GESELL. That has already been read so we will not pursue that further.

At transcript 1641, a request by Senator Ferguson for Ambassador Grew's so-called green light telegram dated September 12, 1940, to the State Department.

We simply want to note that that was offered as Exhibit 26 and read into the record by Mr. Grew at pages 1668 to 1679 of the transcript.²

[4534] At transcript 1652, a request by Senator Ferguson for information received by Ambassador Grew from the State Department in August 1941, as to the United States attitude regarding the independence of Thailand. That is covered by the previous discussion of the Thailand documents at transcript page 1285.

At transcript 1669, a request by Senator Ferguson for telegram No. 300 from Peiping to the State Department referred to in Ambassador Grew's so-called green light telegram. We have this, and I will not bother to read it. It is a rather lengthy document. We will offer it as the next exhibit, No. 77, and have it spread on the transcript.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 77" and follows herewith:)

[4535]

Telegram Received

MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.

Dated: August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 9:35 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p. m.

Mr. A. T. Steel, Far Eastern correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steel is an experienced and able observer the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the Department.

(Begin summary) Returning to Japan and Manchuria after an absence of four months I noticed many striking changes. Japan is moving toward totalitarianism at a faster pace than at any time since the commencement of the China hostilities. The Yonai Government which was a neatly balanced arrangement of pro-Anglo-American and pro-Nazi influences has been followed by a regime based on the expectation and hope of an early German victory over Great Britain.

(End of Section One)

SMITH.

¹ Hearings, Part 2, pp. 586 and 603.

² Ibid., p. 634 et seq.

[4536]

Telegram Received

MG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.

Dated: August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 11:59 p. m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Two)

This * has made no secret of its intentions to profit in every possible way from that victory, if it comes. Four months ago Japanese agricultural interests, businessmen and liberals were still acting as a brake against precipitate acts of aggression and opportunism, but these elements have been momentarily submerged under the current wave of pro-Axis enthusiasm. Japan has gone frankly and starkly "realistic".

Germans in Tokyo, and they are numerous, are nevertheless not entirely satisfied with the pace at which Japan is turning toward the Axis, rapid though it seems to outsiders. German newspaper men with whom I have talked complain that the Japanese seem prone to delay decision until they are quite certain of ultimate German success. They claim that German diplomats have pointed out to the Japanese that the quicker they make some kind of a deal, the more generous the Germans will be [4537] in the final reckoning.

I was not able to learn whether the Germans want the Japanese as active allies in the European conflict or whether they are simply seeking some kind of a diplomatic alignment which would give the Japanese a free but independent hand against the British in the Far East.

(End Section Two)

SMYTH.

* Apparent omission.

EMB

[Telegram received]

MG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 1:45 a. m. Sep. 1.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Three)

In any case German newspaper men told me that the most important factors in any possible arrangement between Germany and Japan would be: (one) definite assurances concerning the future German stake in the China market which Germany regards as of great importance; (two) some satisfactory solution of the East Indies and other South Sea problems in which Germany has a deep interest especially economically; and (three) utilization [4538] of the Japanese as a means of keeping the United States constantly worried and preoccupied with Pacific problems so that Germany would have a freer hand in Europe.

Very few of the Germans with whom I have talked are pro-Japanese at heart and some are doubtful of the extent to which the Japanese could help them. Most of them however, recognize that at worst the Japanese would have a certain nuisance value and Germany would therefore like to make allies of them. The Germans foresee of course that Japan's exclusionist policy in the Orient will be applied to all white people including themselves in the long run

(End Section Three)

EMB

SMYTH

1714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Telegram received]

MN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 5:30 a. m. Sept. 1.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

800, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Four.)

I believe that a considerable part of the Japanese army including War Minister Tojo is in favor of a closer [4539] alignment with Germany. They are being stalled off for the moment by other pro-Axis but cautious elements in the Government who wish to be sure that they are on the winning side. The reasons why Japan is hesitant to plunge boldly forward on her policy of southward expansion are in order of importance: (one) she wants to be sure which way the war in Europe will go; (two) she wants to be sure that the United States has no intention of taking up arms against her; (three) she wants to be sure of at least a temporary respite along the Soviet Manchurian frontier which is the Achilles Heel of the Japanese Empire; and (four) failure to wind up the China incident.

Meanwhile as Japan struggles to make up her mind she may be expected to continue the nibbling policy she has pursued ever since the Manchurian outbreak. She has learned from experience that aggression by easy stages is the easier way. She has discovered that many little bites add up to the same thing as one big one and that the victims seem to make much less noise about it.

(End of Section Four)

SMYTH

EMB

[4540]

[Telegram received]

MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 5:50 a. m. Sept. 1

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

800, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section five)

In view of Japan's extremely difficult position I believe that she is in no position at the present time to wage a successful war alone against the United States or Russian although with allies her position would be of course changed. I feel sure, however, that the majority in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding a conflict with the United States. I might add that on my recent visit to the United States I was struck with the number of people who mistakenly believe that any strong show of strength by the United States would automatically plunge the United States into war. The trouble is that the Japanese know we feel this way and are making the most of it by flourishing the war scare in our faces. Actually I believe the Japanese have no intention of fighting us except as a last resort; in the face of this attitude I believe that firmness is the soundest and safest American Naval policy. The risks involved much less than is commonly supposed in the United States. Of [4541] course if Great Britain is defeated then we can expect the Japanese to become more belligerent.

(End section five)

SMYTH

EMB

MG

[Telegram received]

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From : Peiping via N. R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 5:45 a. m. Sept. 1

SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Six)

The Japanese appear to be so confident of a German victory and are so hopeful that such a victory would permit them to realize their ambitions in Asia that it appears quite useless for the United States at the present time to suggest any halfway measures of appeasement or friendship. In fact the reception that has been accorded such ideas recently by the Japanese press shows that the tendency is to interpret them as signs of fear and weakness. No form of appeasement short of American recognition of the Japanese created new order in the Far East would satisfy the Japanese at this time. It is obviously pointless to attempt to reason with the Japanese until [4542] the course of events in Europe becomes clear. If Great Britain holds out against Germany contrary to present Japanese expectations Japan will then have to reconsider her whole policy for Japan today is a nation whose policy is dictated solely to expediency. (End Summary)

(End of message).

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai. Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

SMYTH

EMB

[4543] Mr. GESELL. At transcript pages 1750 and 1751, a request by Senator Ferguson for any information sent by the State Department to Ambassador Grew regarding parallel action with Britain in August 1941. This information was handed to Senator Ferguson at page 1883 of the transcript. At transcript 1752, a request by Senator Ferguson for any information received by Ambassador Grew from the State Department regarding the American Volunteer Group. No record has been found in the State Department files that any such information was ever received from Ambassador Grew, or sent to him.

At transcript 1781, a request by Senator Ferguson for any answer Ambassador Grew may have received from the State Department in reply to Grew's telegram on page 143 of volume II of Foreign Relations. No record of any reply found by the State Department in its files.

Now, the committee understands that this is only a partial report on some of the requests. We have held this group up so that General Marshall could finish his testimony. We did not want to interrupt at that time.

We are just making this interim report, and we will do the best we can in any remaining time on any other [4544] requests pending, so the transcript will tie together.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand counsel has gone through the transcript and got all these requests, and he is now just taking up a part of these requests, and he will reply sometime later on any others.

Mr. GESELL. We are replying to the ones we have ready, and as the other ones come in we will take care of them, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. These only apply to the transcript, so the transcript will be tied together, to see what happens to a request?

Mr. GESELL. That is right.

We felt we should not have a number of loose ends in the transcript on the various questions.

There is one further request that has just been brought to my attention.

Senator Ferguson, on page 2510 of the transcript,¹ requested any Japanese intercepts between the numbers 836 at page 178 of Exhibit 1, and 841 at page 185 of Exhibit 1.

We have the reply of the War Department giving the additional intercepts that fall in those numbers to the extent that they are available, and I would like to ask [4545] that the memorandum from the War Department, and the intercepts be spread upon the record, and with the permission of the committee we will strike from the intercepts the code information, which we have been striking in the past.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

10 DECEMBER 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

At p. 2510 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested the four Japanese messages from Tokyo to Washington between No. 836 (p. 178 of Exhibit 1) and No. 841 (p. 185 of Exhibit 1).

Copies of Nos. 837 and 838 are inclosed herewith.

No. 840 was not intercepted.

The records of Signal Intelligence Service indicate that No. 839, dated 28 November 1941, was not decoded until about 13 December 1941. When it was decoded, the following summary of the message was prepared:

"Representations made to American Embassy here. Your instructions follow. Evacuation from Panama according to #322 from Panama. Please negotiate for assistance from Canal Officials as well as for supplies, water, fuel, oil, and wharf facilities at Balboa. Negotiate for granting of funds to return to Japan as quickly [4546] as possible. Transmit to each office concerned. Sent to U. S. and Panama."

SECRET

From: Panama (Akiyama).

To: Havana.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Circular #34. Message from Tokyo to Washington #837.

Re my message #819^a.

The schedule for the Tatsuta Maru, as given in my #838^b, is to leave Balboa on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of conditions at the time, it may stop at Los Angeles again on the way home, but try to have the passengers from the United States board it on the outward trip. As far as possible, have all those who wish to sail from South America also come on the Tatsuta.

Transmit this message and my caption telegram to all offices in the United States, as well as Canada, Vancouver and Panama. From Panama send it to all Central and South American ministers and—

^a See S. I. S. #26217.

^b See S. I. S. #26218.

Army 26218 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (BR).

¹ Hearings, Part 2, p. 952.

[4547]

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Washington.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

#838

Tatsuta Maru Schedule:

Yokohama December 2.

Los Angeles arrive December 14. Leave December 16.

Balboa arrive December 24.

Army 26216 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (S).

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything further from counsel?

Mr. GESELL. That is all we have today, Mr. Congressman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock Monday morning, at which time Admiral Wilkinson will appear as a witness.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 o'clock p. m., December 16, 1945, the committee recessed until 10 o'clock a. m., Monday, December 17, 1945.)

[4548]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson, Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[4549] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

The Chairman was called to the White House this morning and is detained for a few moments. We will proceed.

Will counsel announce the first witness.

Mr. GESELL. Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to make a brief statement about a matter that came up during my absence in connection with my assistant here, Mr. Greaves.

I am sorry I had to be absent, and am very sorry there was anything which seemed disturbing to the committee. It was not a matter about which there need be any mystery.

Some weeks ago, at what I thought was a full press conference—certainly a dozen or 15 were in my office—I stated that I had secured Mr. Greaves as my assistant and thought it would be very necessary, as far as I was concerned, to have an assistant of this character.

I was sorry that the committee hadn't found it practicable to allow the minority some assistance, but thought that under the circumstances I would do the best I could.

I secured Mr. Greaves. I want to make it clear that he has not had for many months any connection whatsoever with [4550] the Republican National Committee. I think he is a very competent man.

In connection with the episode concerned with Senator Lucas, I have here a memorandum from Mr. Greaves which I would like to put in the record. Mr. Greaves is my assistant and is being paid by me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Being paid by you, did you say, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, sir; being paid by me.

I have this memorandum which I would like to put in the record, in justice to everybody concerned. It is signed by Percy L. Greaves, Jr.:

Regarding the recent unpleasantry during your absence (pp. 3605-3608), I should like to say that there never was any intention on my part to insult or reflect on any Members of the United States Senate by thought, word, or action. I have great respect for Members of both Houses of Congress. I am sure that the Senator from Illinois misconstrued an unconscious and which I thought was a silent smile that went unnoticed by anyone else.

I am a registered Republican, but as you know I receive no compensation from Republican Party sources and had not for many months before I entered your service. My activities with you have not been of a partisan or a political nature.

[4551] I sincerely hope that my conduct has not caused you any embarrassment and that my services meet with your satisfaction.

I want to add my personal word, that if there had been any ground for any feeling, I very much regret it.

I thought the position of Mr. Greaves had been very clear throughout. He has been here as my assistant. I hope he may continue.

I certainly do not want him, or myself to do anything which would in any way impair the proper conduct of this very important investigation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, at the proper time, in executive committee meeting I propose again to raise this question. I am not going to take the valuable time of the committee now to argue this question here this morning.

Not only do I propose in executive session to find out more about Mr. Greaves than has been told by the Senator from Maine, but there are two other gentlemen that I propose to find out something about also, who have sat here constantly at these hearings, and have, according to my [4552] best information, given considerable information to members of this committee.

I think this committee is entitled to know who every individual is, what his background is, what his motives and purposes are, how much he is being paid, and by whom.

If I had two or three people working for me, I would have told the committee all of these things long before this.

This is all that I care to say at this time.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with that comment, if the usual consideration accorded by other committees, particularly by some of the standing committees of the Senate, and the committee which more than any other has established a record for investigation in the past 4 years, if the practice prevailing in those committees has been followed, I am sure the occasion for the comment of the Senator from Illinois would not have occurred.

Under the circumstances, other steps have been necessary.

If there is to be an investigation, as he suggests, there may also be an investigation of the associations and connections of those more actively identified with the committee, but I am sure we will be embarking on something that will carry us a rather long way.

[4553] Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. There are a good many things that have occurred which have not impressed the minority. They are matters of record. If we are going to start on that we will make a complete job of it.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator LUCAS. One more word. There is no precedent from any special committee such as the Senator from Maine suggests. There is precedent on standing committees and those committees are presumed to be composed of Republicans and Democrats who look after partisan matters and look after the principles on which the parties operate.

This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation.

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator LUCAS. Just a moment.

This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation and there is no precedent, according to my informants, where a special committee of this kind has had any minority representation, and that is especially true in view of the fact that everyone in the first instance agreed that General Mitchell should act as counsel here in this case for us all.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. KEEFE. Will the gentleman yield?

[4554] Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I hope we can proceed soon, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

I will be a little more specific in the comment which I made. Aside from the standing committees I did have reference to the special committee investigating the defense establishment which has been functioning throughout the past 4 years and which I thought had accumulated considerable reputation, and which has always had minority assistants as members of its staff.

And, I might add, that it is a very significant, and I think of a very nonpartisan character, in the whole 4 years of its history it has never had a minority report of any character or a divided report, and it never had any such difficulties as this committee has faced. That is what has reinforced my impression that if well-established practices of the Truman Committee had been followed much of the difficulty here would have been avoided. I say that in all kindness.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, we have an admiral of the Navy waiting, have had for 10 minutes, while we have been discussing Mr. Greaves. I hope that we can proceed.

[4555] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe, did you want recognition?

Mr. KEEFE. I was going to make the same suggestion that Mr. Murphy has made, but in view of the statement of the Senator from Illinois as to the purposes of his investigation, I simply wanted to say

that I was very much impressed with the long newspaper account in the newspapers yesterday where the Senator from Illinois proposed to investigate the Dewey incident to its ultimate conclusion.

I wonder if that is prompted by a nonpartisan attitude. I wonder whether we are investigating Pearl Harbor or Mr. Dewey. Are we going to go off on a lot of other matters?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I hope that we don't get into a discussion of every newspaper article.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. The Dewey letters were placed in the record here by General Marshall and they were thought to be pertinent and material to this investigation by counsel, at least certain portions of them were thought to be material and pertinent, and the thing that I want to find out in connection with Mr. Dewey, and the only thing I want to find out, if it can be found out, is who gave him this top secret, if it was given to him, and I think the country and this committee is entitled to know.

[4556] Mr. KEEFE. What has that to do with Pearl Harbor?

Senator LUCAS. It has plenty to do with Pearl Harbor, if somebody is giving away top secrets that are the highest ever considered by this Nation; much more than about 90 percent of the questions that have been asked by the Congressman from Wisconsin have to do with Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Obviously that would not be a proper matter to go into at this time. The Chair hopes that we may proceed with the witness before us.

Anyone else?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to place on the record the comment that my silence does not mean that I agree with what has been said here by Senator Lucas this morning; and I think it would be of interest to go into the past employment of each of the employees of the committee and their present salary on the committee; but that we may proceed with Pearl Harbor I am not going into that this morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, the Chair feels constrained to make this statement in connection with the remarks of the Senator from Michigan. Every employee of this committee, so far as the Chair knows, was selected by unanimous action of the committee.

[4557] Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you do not mean to put that in the record as a fact. The facts are that Senator Barkley and the Congressman now presiding and myself were members of a subcommittee which did have certain alleged powers, but aside from Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, the selection of the other two members of the counsellor staff was not known even to me as a member of the subcommittee.

I do not mean to be intimating a challenge of their capacity but I never knew anything directly regarding their terms of employment, their salary and, as a matter of fact, I know even little at the present time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I think the statement I made is accurate and correct and certainly in no executive session of this committee has

any member of the committee raised any question or intimated any objection to any member of the staff. I am confident that statement is absolutely and technically accurate.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, it was conceded that there was a subcommittee named consisting of Senator Barkley, Congressman Cooper and the Senator from Maine, and the Senator from Maine had the responsibility as one member of that committee with regard to hiring our staff.

I hope we will go on with Pearl Harbor now. There is an Admiral waiting.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, it was the purpose of [4558] the committee to try to conduct a non-partisan, non-political investigation and all employees of the committee are employees of the whole committee and, as far as the Chair is advised and knows, every employee of the committee has endeavored to fully cooperate with every member of the committee.

It is my privilege to be a member of several joint committees. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. There is no minority or majority employees. The staff is for the whole Joint Committee.

I am a member of the Joint Committee of the Reduction of non-essential Federal expenditures headed by Senator Byrd. So far as I know there has never been any minority or majority employees. They are employees of the Joint Committee.

I am a member of the committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning of the House and there has never been any minority or majority employees. All employees serve the full committee.

Now, Admiral, will you please be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON, UNITED STATES NAVY¹

Mr. GESELL. At the outset I think perhaps we can direct attention to the principal exhibits which will be covered in Admiral Wilkinson's testimony.

The first, of course, is Exhibit 37, which is already [4559] in evidence, the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches.

I would like to call attention to two matters in connection with that exhibit at this time. When the exhibit was prepared, for reasons of security as to which the committee is fully informed the word "purple" was eliminated from two dispatches. In view of developments since that date the word "purple" no longer has any security significance and for that reason we would like to amend the dispatches merely to put that word in at the appropriate place. It first appears at page 12 of the exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This is exhibit number what?

Mr. GESELL. 37, basic Navy dispatches. At page 12, the first line of the dispatch should read, "Tokyo to Vichy No. 295." Insert "purple" before "of 19th." So the word "purple" will appear in that dispatch.

More important, perhaps, from the point of view of the hearing is the insertion of the word "purple" in two places on the dispatch which appears at page 41. That is the dispatch of December 2nd from OPNAV to CINCAF and others concerning code destruction. The

¹ See p. 2485, infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Wilkinson.

word "purple" should appear after the word "destroy" in the second line and again after the word "destroy" in the fourth line.

Also at page 10 the first word of the dispatch should be "purple."
[4560] We would like to introduce other exhibits at this time which have been in the hands of the committee now for several weeks.

The first, as Exhibit 78, a folder designated "Dispatches on Kra Peninsula alert."

As Exhibit 79, a folder designated, "Dispatches on Dutch alert."

As Exhibit 80, a series of photostated documents designated "Fortnightly Summaries on Current National Situations."

And as Exhibit 81, a folder containing various special estimates made by the Office of Naval Intelligence on the Far Eastern situation in the period preceding Pearl Harbor attack, commencing with a special estimate dated February 15, 1941, and going up to December 6, 1941.

I might say these latter two exhibits, 80 and 81, comprise data comparable to that contained in the basic exhibit of estimates which was introduced in connection with General Miles' testimony as Exhibit 33.

Senator BREWSTER. Do I understand whether we have been given copies of these yet?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, I think several weeks ago, Senator.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The exhibits will be admitted as indicated by counsel.

[4561] (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 78, 79, 80 and 81", respectively)

Mr. GESELL. Admiral, will you please state your name, your rank and present duty for the record, please, sir?

Admiral WILKINSON. Theodore Stark Wilkinson, Vice-Admiral U. S. Navy, recently commander of the Third Amphibious Force of the Pacific Fleet and now awaiting the pleasure of the committee, subsequently to join the Navy Department for duty.

Mr. GESELL. During what period of time were you Chief of the ONI?

Admiral WILKINSON. From October the 15th, 1941, until, as I recall, July the 20th, 1942. I will, of course, however, be glad to speak of anything within my knowledge of events before October 15th.

Mr. GESELL. What had been your duty immediately prior to your connection with ONI?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had been commanding officer of the battleship Mississippi for some 9 months and before that a year and a half Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Andrews, commander of the scouting force and of the Hawaiian detachment.

Mr. GESELL. How long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?

[4562] Admiral WILKINSON. Forty years and a half.

Mr. GESELL. During that time you have had duty at Hawaii, have you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Intermittently. My last and only tour of some length was with Admiral Andrews for about a year and a half in Hawaii and then subsequently on the Mississippi for 6 months additional.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, that would leave you at Hawaii during what period of time?

Admiral WILKINSON. From October 1939 until May 1941.

Mr. GESELL. Were you stationed at Hawaii your whole time from October 1939 on, or did you go out there when the fleet went out there?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was with the so-called Hawaiian detachment, which was a force of vessels, and my duties were entirely at sea. We operated off Hawaii and from time to time went in port. At no time was I on shore duty there, nor have been.

Mr. GESELL. Prior to joining the ONI on October 15, 1941 had you had any experience in the field of naval intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. None other than attendance at two international conferences for limitation of armaments in 1933 and 1934.

[4563] Mr. GESELL. Had you ever had any experience in the Navy's field of activities comparable to what the Army calls their War Plans Division?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. At sea, as Chief of Staff to Admiral Andrews and again as gunnery officer and assistant officer to Admiral Willard some 10 years before, but not on shore.

Mr. GESELL. The precise title which you held in ONI was Director of Naval Intelligence, is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Do I understand that that was in the nature of a position comparable to that occupied by General Miles of the Army? That is to say, that you were a member of the immediate staff of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral WILKINSON. Comparable but not entirely similar in that the Chief of Naval Operations had under him not a general staff but an office composed of a number of divisions. His responsibilities were somewhat different from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the responsibilities of his several divisions were quite different from those of the General Staff of the Army.

Mr. GESELL. But the immediate advisers to the Chief of Naval Operations would be the various directors of the principal divisions?

[4564] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Now, can you indicate for us what the other principal divisions of the Navy organization are in addition to the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. The Chief of Operations was by law charged with the operations of the fleet and the preparation and readiness of plans for use in war. By regulations he was charged with the coordination of efforts of all bureaus of the Department to maintain and make ready the fleet. He had to assist him in these duties several divisions, as you asked: The War Plans Division, the Central Division, the Communications Division, Ship Movements, Fleet Maintenance, Fleet Training, Naval Intelligence, and possibly one or two others.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us who were during the period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor responsible as directors of those respective divisions?

Admiral WILKINSON. War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner; Central Division, Captain Schuirman; Communications, Rear Admiral Noyes; Ship Movements, Rear Admiral Brainard; Fleet Maintenance, I believe Rear Admiral Farber; Fleet Training I forget at the moment; and Naval Intelligence myself.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, will you give us some idea of what the responsibilities and functions and organization of [4565] Naval Intelligence were?

Admiral WILKINSON. Naval Intelligence had three principal branches, the administrative, Domestic Intelligence, and Foreign Intelligence.

The Administrative carried out its routine duties with regard to personnel, and procurement and assignment of duty of personnel, finances, mail, the issue and forwarding of all reports, reproduction, printing, and general files, a normal administrative office.

The Domestic division carried on the investigation of espionage and conspiratorial organizations and individuals, looked after coastal intelligence along the coast of the United States with respect to information that could be picked up from boats and otherwise, plant inspections to make sure that the plants in which the Navy was involved were safe both from a mechanical viewpoint as to fire and other hazards and safe from a security viewpoint as to national secrets; that is the plants, I am speaking of, in which confidential work was going on. This Domestic branch also investigated candidates for confidential Navy Department employment and candidates for employment with the Naval Intelligence Service itself. It organized and conducted, in general, schools for officers and men to be assigned to intelligence. Its principal duties were those I first mentioned, the investigation of [4566] espionage and conspiratorial or subversive organizations and individuals. They conducted a survey of the country in connection with FBI and Military Intelligence and marked down such suspects as were known by the contacts, by the large number of contacts we had. It was this work that enabled us to run in, as you might say, to get taken into custody immediately after the war, some 8,000 suspects of various Axis nations and I think in large part contributed to the fact that at no time during the last war was there any serious sabotage in this country.

The Foreign Intelligence comprised a number of geographic sections, such as the British Empire, the Far East, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Near East, American Republics, and then certain other sections such as foreign trade in merchant vessels, statistics in connection with foreign navies and matters of trade and two sections known as Special Intelligence and Strategic Information.

The duties of the office as a whole and of the foreign branch in particular and of each geographic section was to collect, evaluate and forward to interested agencies intelligence received from abroad or picked up from newspapers or otherwise with relation to the several foreign countries under each geographic section. The evaluation would consist of considering the source, considering the reliability of the information which we had obtained and its consistency with other proven information that we had.

[4567] In addition to those main sections there was a small section of Records and Library, Historical Section, and one of Censorship, which was held in the nucleus, ready to go into action when the national censorship was declared. That, of course, could not be declared before the war situation and there was no censorship in the United States prior to that time. That was the main office.

Mr. GESELL. Before you leave the main office, was there also a branch known as Fleet Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. Upon the institution of Admiral King's Commander in Chief Office, he set up a Fleet Intelligence which was directly under his office and was related to the Office of Naval Intelligence, but at the time that we were operating before Admiral King came in—in I believe January or February of 1942—there was no specific office of Fleet Intelligence, as I recall.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence do the work with respect to keeping track of the movements of the Japanese and other potential enemy nation vessels?

Admiral WILKINSON. Very definitely.

Mr. GESELL. Where was that work done in this organizational scheme?

Admiral WILKINSON. In each of the foreign sections.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, the Far Eastern branch of [4568] the Foreign Intelligence Section would keep track of the movements of the Japanese vessels?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. May I continue with the field?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

Admiral WILKINSON. That was the office. The personnel at the time of December 1 were 230 officers and 175 enlisted men and 300 civilians in the main office, including the branches I have spoken of, and the school which took a number. In the naval districts there were about 1,000. I have the figures for November 15 and December 15, and I am interpolating between the two. There were about 135 agents who were civilian employees of considerable detective and analytical skill; 900 enlisted men and 100 civilians. These were the naval districts throughout the country and in Hawaii, Panama, and the Philippines.

In the foreign posts there were 133 officers and 200 enlisted men, and no civilians. In the foreign posts there were naval attachés and naval observers throughout the world. The naval attachés were at the capitals, and naval observers, a naval equivalent of a consul, at a number of ports. We were obtaining our information in large part from these naval attachés in the foreign nations, from the naval attachés and observers in these ports, and in part from the State Department. [4569] officials and in part radio intercepts which we received from the Radio Communications Office.

Mr. GESELL. Going back to your organization for a moment more, there was an assistant director of the division, was there not?

Admiral WILKINSON. There was an assistant director who at the time was awaiting relief, as the Director of the Domestic Branch. He was doubling at the time and subsequently became relieved, and became full-time assistant director.

Mr. GESELL. What was his name?

Admiral WILKINSON. That was Captain, now Rear Admiral Howard Kingman.

Mr. GESELL. Who was in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Branch?

Admiral WILKINSON. Capt. W. A. Heard.

Mr. GESELL. Who was specifically responsible for the Far Eastern section of that branch?

Admiral WILKINSON. Commander, now Captain McCollum.

[4570] Mr. GESELL. Admiral; I have in my hand a three-sheet mimeographed document entitled "Intelligence Division (OP 16). Duties:"

Does that document correctly summarize the duties of the Intelligence Division as it was set up and operating immediately prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. In general, yes. You will note on page 2, subparagraph (c), they speak of duties of the public relations branch. That had been a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence, but in the middle of the year 1941, I believe, it was detached and placed directly under the Secretary's office, and in consequence that entire subparagraph was no longer effective.

Mr. GESELL. Does that document correctly state the duties of the Foreign Intelligence Branch?

Admiral WILKINSON. In general, yes. In item (a) (2), thereof, "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable," the definition of "evaluation" which has been advanced in connection with General Miles' testimony is somewhat in conflict with that in the Navy in that in G-2 evaluation of information included the determination of the probable or prospective intentions of the enemy.

That, however, was not one of the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

[4571] Mr. GESELL. I want to return to that in a moment.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to offer this three-page statement of the duties of the Intelligence Division as the next exhibit, Exhibit 82.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82.")

Mr. GESELL. I ask you, Admiral, to read the duties of the Foreign Intelligence Branch.

Admiral WILKINSON (reading):

The Foreign Intelligence Branch will:

- (1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.
- (2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.
- (3) Direct the activities of U. S. Naval Attachés.
- (4) Maintain liaison with naval missions.

Naval missions were special bodies sent to various countries on their request in order to train their navy.

[4572] (5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attachés accredited to the United States.

(6) Maintain liaison with other Government departments for the exchange of foreign information.

Mr. GESELL. Now, under item (a) (1), it is clear that one of the duties of the ONI was to secure or collect information concerning the disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces, was it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. We were to secure everything we could which was factual, and which would be of value in determining those intentions.

Mr. GESELL. Now, is it also clear that under item (2) ONI had the responsibility of disseminating such information to all concerned?

Admiral WILKINSON. You will note that term "as advisable," which means as may have been directed from time to time. There were directions which we had received in that connection.

Mr. GESELL. I want to be sure I understand you. I understand you to testify on that point thus far, as follows, that it was the responsibility of ONI to assemble the information as to the disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.

Admiral WILKINSON. Entirely.

[4573] Mr. GESELL. That the responsibility of evaluating such information was not the responsibility of ONI.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. With respect to its accuracy, very definitely. With respect to the determination of probable intentions of itself, it was not.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, ONI simply indicated, when it had collected the information, whether it considered it reliable or not, and if so, what degree of reliability it attached to the information.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, and to the best of our guess we would advise the Office of Chief of Naval Operations what we thought it meant.

Mr. GESELL. But you did not have, as one of your functions, the responsibility of determining what the probable intentions of the foreign naval forces would be?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. I was advised by my predecessor that he had been told by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief, and Director of War Plans, that the Office of Naval Intelligence would not prepare the estimate or probable intentions of the enemy, as had been done in the War Department, but that War Plans would assume that duty.

I have subsequently consulted Admiral Ingersoll on that same subject, and I stated that I felt we had considerable [4574] talent in the office that might be prepared to do that, but that I understood this from my predecessor, and Admiral Ingersoll confirmed it.

Mr. GESELL. These duties that I have just introduced as Exhibit 82, were established by the order of the Chief of Naval Operations on October 23, 1940, were they not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe so.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know of any formal written amendment of those duties, Admiral?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. For instance, I know of no amendment that removed the Public Relations Branch from that office, but perhaps that has been overlooked in the general corrections.

Mr. GESELL. So that by word of mouth, and discussion, the responsibilities of ONI under this general statement of its duties were qualified and amended; is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would not say amended. I would say, qualified, because there is nothing in the specific text that would require us to disseminate the probable intentions of the enemy, as I read it.

Mr. GESELL. Are we clear thus far, that it was your duty to assemble the information; it was your duty to determine its degree of reliability; and it was the duty of someone else to determine what the probable intentions of [4575] the enemy would be?

Admiral WILKINSON. That was my understanding, except, of course. I was willing and anxious that the efforts and abilities of our office should contribute our view of the enemy intention to the Office of Naval Operations.

Mr. GESELL. I am talking, you understand, though, Admiral, as to your duties, as to your responsibilities.

Admiral WILKINSON. Quite right.

Mr. GESELL. It was not your responsibility or duty to determine the probable intentions of the enemy?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not so understand, and I have the information, as I said, from my predecessor, my discussion with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor.

Mr. GESELL. You recall a conversation with Admiral Kirk to that effect?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I understand he talked about the matter with Admiral Ingersoll and he also advised you.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you ever discuss the matter with Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

[4576] Mr. GESELL. Now, with respect to the responsibility for dissemination, I understood you to testify that your responsibility for dissemination was qualified by the words "as advisable," and that you had orders instructing you as to what type of information should be disseminated. Is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON.¹ I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval forces.

In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague; Chief of War Plans, in order that this information which I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situa- [4577] tion, and the operations for which he was responsible.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some specific action to the recipient, then you felt you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral WILKINSON. Exactly.

[4578] Mr. GESELL. I have just been handed, at the opening of this hearing, Admiral Wilkinson, a memorandum which I wanted to read to you and ask you if you are familiar with this memorandum or have ever seen it. It is:

¹ See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5361 et seq. for material in connection with the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, now deceased, included in the record at the request of Mrs. Wilkinson.

Confidential Memorandum, December 12, 1940.

From the Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Director, Naval Intelligence Division.

Subject: Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations.

Enclosure: (A) Distribution List.

1. In view of present world conditions, the Chief of Naval Operations believes that there is a need for keeping responsible Fleet and Force Commanders, and important Navy Department executive agencies, in closer touch with important aspects of the situation which may affect decisions on the nature and direction of initial war operations of the Naval Forces. It is, therefore, requested, that the Director of Naval Intelligence prepare fortnightly for limited distribution a confidential and condensed summary of the current situation under headings as follows:

A. The diplomatic situation.

Japanese, German, Italian, French, Russian, Latin American.

B. The Japanese military situation.

[4579] C. The Japanese naval situation.

D. The Chinese military situation.

E. The German military, naval, and air situations.

F. The Italian naval and air situations.

2. Under each general heading a condensed and broad view of the situation should be summarized, with paragraphs following in necessary detail to give recent diplomatic, military, or naval trends.

3. It is desired that no information be included pertaining to the United States, British or Dutch military or naval disposition and strengths; nor should reference be made to United States war plans or secret diplomatic conversations.

Signed, "H. R. Stark."

The distribution list shows substantial distribution both in the field and within the Navy Department, including the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Do you remember having seen that memorandum of December 12, 1940?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not see it until this morning, but I was fully aware of its terms as conveyed to me, and I was issuing, or my office was issuing such a fortnightly bulletin throughout my tenure of office.

As you will note, the operations of the anti-Axis nations [4580] were not to be included in it, and when Russia came into the war that was also added to the list of operations we should not discuss, and also our own operations were not included.

The distribution was materially expanded. The original sheet there shows distribution of something less than 20, I believe. Eventually, at the time of the first of December, that distribution list was up around 120, going to all flag officers, or the commands of all flag officers in the field, in the naval districts and in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. GESELL. Now we have introduced some of these fortnightly summaries, the ones immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, and they are contained in Exhibit 80.

What I am particularly concerned with now, Admiral, is the instruction from Admiral Stark that these fortnightly summaries should not contain information concerning secret diplomatic conversations.

Did you understand that you were, under orders from Admiral Stark, not authorized to send to the field information concerning secret diplomatic conversations?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, because of the general security attached to the code-breaking activities.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know whether the recipients of these fortnightly summaries had ever been apprised or advised that you were not going to submit to them information concerning [4581] secret diplomatic conversations?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know. Of course in each bulletin there was a diplomatic section, and everything that could be obtained outside of the secret material was in there, and possibly some reflection, in guarded terms, on the secret material and its bearing in the diplomatic sections of this bulletin.

Mr. GESELL. That is just what concerns me. You have a diplomatic section in your fortnightly summary and you have instructions limiting the nature of the information you can place in that section.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Just what is secret diplomatic information or what are secret diplomatic conversations? What did you understand that to exclude.

Admiral WILKINSON. As I say, I had not seen the text of that bulletin, but I found it a going concern and my general instructions were I was not to put anything in there, anything derived from what was known as "ultra" or "magic." We thought the general trend of the diplomatic conversations which might be indicated in magic as being adverse would be so indicated in the bulletin, but specific quotations, or specific facts known only to the diplomatic magic were not to be placed in there.

[4582] Mr. GESELL. In other words, it referred to conversations at least in which our Government was participating, did it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Information which we might obtain from our naval attachés or other sources, so long as it was not the product of code-breaking activity. We got a great deal of information from State Department dispatches which we were privileged to examine, and we got quite a little from our attachés and naval observers from abroad.

Mr. GESELL. Your functions with respect to the dissemination of information, which we have been discussing here, remained the same under the various war plans, did they not? That is, the Naval Intelligence had, under the different war plans, the similar responsibility of collecting and disseminating information, if advisable?

Admiral WILKINSON. I should say so. I do not recall any mention of Naval Intelligence specifically in any of the war plans.

Mr. GESELL. I notice in War Plan 46, and in War Plan 52, in each instance a chapter and section under the Assignment of Tasks, which specifies that the Office of Naval Intelligence, either alone or in co-operation with the other participating governments, would secure and disseminate as advisable whatever information was necessary in carrying out the plan.

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall that specifically. [4583] but I take it as a routine entry.

Mr. GESELL. I want to turn to a discussion of Japanese intercepts with you at this point, Admiral, and see if we can get a clear understanding of what the functions of O. N. I. were in respect of the Japanese intercepts.

Who, or what department in the Navy, was responsible for intercepting the Japanese messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. The Division of Naval Communications arranged for interception and for decryption.

Mr. GESELL. Now the Division of Naval Communications you stated was under Admiral Noyes, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. That was not a division which went through your chain of command?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, it was a parallel division in our operations.

Mr. GESELL. Did that division also have the responsibility for decoding and translating messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, except we furnished them, as best we could, translators whom we had scoured the country for, and in finding an inadequate number we had actually started, on the first of October, two schools for Japanese translators, one in California and one in Harvard.

Mr. GESELL. But the responsibility for interception, re- [4584]
sponsibility for decoding and responsibility for translation all rested in the Division of Communications?

Admiral WILKINSON. Certainly intercepting and certainly decoding. I am not quite clear in my mind about translation. I think the translation was done under that same central office by translators who were assigned to that duty and who had been found by us and in part were paid by us but were told to report to that office.

Mr. GESELL. You understand I am again talking now in terms of chain of command—

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Rather than whether or not you had cooperated by helping them through the loan of personnel, and so forth.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think the translation itself was in that chain of command, but of course the cooperation between Admiral Noyes and myself and our officers was, I think, quite complete, and certainly very friendly.

Mr. GESELL. Did you then receive the message for the first time, any particular message, after it had been intercepted, decoded and translated and was in an English text form?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Now who in the Navy received the intercepted Japanese messages during the period that you were director of [4585]
O. N. E. preceding Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. In the finished form that you just mentioned?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. They were sent according to their application to the foreign section to which attributable. Speaking specifically of the Far Eastern matters which we are now concerned with, they went to the Far Eastern section, Captain McCollum.

Mr. GESELL. Now was it his responsibility to distribute them to certain officers in the Navy Department?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, it was his responsibility only to arrange for such distribution, but it was my over-all responsibility to see that it was done, and we had Commander, now Captain Kramer, who was charged with the distribution.

[4586] Mr. GESELL. With the physical distribution?

Admiral WILKINSON. The physical distribution.

Mr. GESELL. Now who, in the Navy Department, was on the distribution list?

Admiral WILKINSON. The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War Plans, and myself.

Mr. GESELL. Can you give us the names of those officers at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself.

Mr. GESELL. Did Admiral Noyes, the Chief of the Division which was intercepting, decoding, and translating them, get them?

Admiral WILKINSON. He got them before they came to me, or to my secretary.

Mr. GESELL. Then he was on the list, was he not?

Admiral WILKINSON. He was not on the formal distribution list, but he passed on them before they were sent to me.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, he passed on them as part of his administrative responsibilities?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. He may or may not have actually seen each one. He may have delegated that [4587] authority at times when he was not in his office, but in general he sighted them all, I believe.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Navy make any distribution outside of the Navy Department of the texts of these intercepted messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, to the White House.

Mr. GESELL. To any place else?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my knowledge. Some months before it had gone to the State Department intermittently with the Army, but more recently the Navy took the White House direct and the Army took the State Department direct.

Mr. GESELL. Now, as I understand it, the interception and translation and decoding of these messages was worked out between the Army and Navy, so if the Navy intercepted and translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Army, and if the Army intercepted and translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Navy?

Admiral WILKINSON. Both services were supposed to have a full file of the intercepts made by either or both together.

Mr. GESELL. Did you personally see all of the messages intercepted?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. A number of them were excluded in the Office of Communications from further transmission, [4588] if they were purely trivial, such as ordering a dozen pair of trousers, or something of that sort, for instance, but those which were of any importance were sent to the Naval Intelligence, and were then placed in a book, and I saw all of those.

I might not have read those to which my attention was not called, because sometimes they were very bulky, but they were available there for me to see.

Mr. GESELL. Did anyone in the Office of Naval Intelligence make any selection from that complete file of the messages which were to be sent to the other officers on the distribution list?

Admiral WILKINSON. Captain Kramer, who was primarily in our chain of command, but had additional duties with Communications, usually I believe saw them all, even those of the trivial nature which he excluded.

Those which were then placed in the book and brought to us, he usually marked them as more important, with clips or otherwise. That marking was checked afterwards by Captain McCullom and myself, and we both scanned through the book.

Mr. GESELL. By the time it had gotten to you, the book had on it, by a clip or other designation, some means of calling particular attention to the more important messages?

[4589] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. Furthermore, when matters were particularly interesting, or the messages were particularly interesting, Captain Kramer would point out to the recipient by his finger, or by turning to the page, particularly what he thought they would be interested in.

Mr. GESELL. I gather you used a system of a book rather than a locked pouch, such as they had in the Army, is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Will you explain just how that was done? Was there one book which contained these messages which went to the various people on the list, or did each receive a list of the messages that he should examine?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure which went to the White House. I am sure they had a separate copy which went to the naval aide, and he used that, and prepared his own brief of that for the President, but as to the addressees in the Navy Department, it was all in the same book.

Mr. GESELL. And when that book had been distributed around through the various Navy Department recipients, it went back to the officers who originally initiated and prepared the book, did it not?

[4590] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, except one copy, I believe, was retained in the geographical section concerned, and in this case it was the Far Eastern section. In fact, the book would have in there matters concerning the German or whatever foreign intercept was broken down, and proved to be interesting.

Upon its return those appertaining to those other geographic sections would be taken out and filed in their respective sections, and the Far Eastern intercepts filed in the Far Eastern section.

Mr. GESELL. But you, or Admiral Stark, or Admiral Ingersoll, and the other recipients did not have any means of keeping your own files of those intercepts?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. You examined the book and returned it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. What opportunity was given to those officers to study and appraise, and read over more than once, if you will, the various messages in the book?

Admiral WILKINSON. They might hold the book as long as they wished, or send for it to come back again, but in the interest of security, we did not like to send out individual copies for retention.

Mr. GESELL. Under your system, if one of the officers [4591] chose to hold the book he delayed the other officers from receiving this important information?

Admiral WILKINSON. They did, but the bearer of the book was waiting outside and might remind them to return it.

Mr. GESELL. So as a matter of general practice, I take it, the book went rapidly to the officers permitted to read it, who then leafed through the pages, reading matters of particular interest?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would not say so. I know Captain Kramer often said he was busy pretty nearly all day long carrying the book around at times. So they took time to read the messages, they did not scan them too hastily.

[4592] Mr. GESELL. Are you familiar with Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military Japanese intercepts?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us whether or not you personally saw all of the messages contained in those two exhibits?

Admiral WILKINSON. I naturally cannot, of my own recollection, speak for all of them and of course those sent just before October 15 I had an opportunity to see, but I should say roughly that presumably I did see them all.

Mr. GESELL. All translated subsequent to the 15th of October?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I was going to ask you whether you made any effort to examine any intercepts which were in the file for the period prior to your becoming Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not, except as occasion to refer to them might come up, in which case I would ask Captain Kramer to please give me the references.

Mr. GESELL. Of course, as the evidence here shows, the situation was becoming quite tense by October 15, 1941, when you took over the job, and I was wondering what means were taken to acquaint you with what had been taking place?

[4593] Admiral WILKINSON. I spent several hours, perhaps a whole day, in the Far Eastern section before I took over the office, getting the picture from their point of view, and talking to the officers there, and Captain McCullom particularly, and then Admiral Kirk as well told me something of it. So I was informed by word of mouth rather than the examination of many documents.

Mr. GESELL. Well, when you became Director of Naval Intelligence did you give instructions to send the texts of these messages, or the gist of the messages to the various commanders in the field?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my knowledge. I carried out the existing system, and I know there was every emphasis on the importance of security because of the value of this method of intelligence.

Mr. GESELL. What do you mean by the "existing system"? In this Exhibit 37, which the committee has before it, there are a substantial number of dispatches sent to Hawaii prior to October 15, 1941, which are directly based upon magic, and in fact some of the dispatches actually quote the text of the intercepted message verbatim, and as I think we pointed out in the beginning this morning, some of them refer even to the purple code. I have in mind particularly the messages on pages 4 to 12 which were sent out almost [4594] in the month of July 1941 to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Forces, and to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific forces.

Now what do you mean by "practice"? It looks as though there had been a practice of sending out these messages to the theaters concerned.

Admiral WILKINSON. I was told, and understood, that such messages were not to be sent. I believe, although I am not at all sure, that the messages you speak of as examples were in July and none subsequent until we come to that critical message with respect to burning the codes.

Mr. GESELL. I think that is a fair statement, Admiral, that most of them were in July, until the code burning messages which you sent out in the very last days.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think it is a question, too, of the overlapping responsibilities of Naval Intelligence and Communications. If I may dwell on that a moment, the Navy had established in Pearl Harbor and in Corregidor subunits for the collection of radio information and for the breaking of such codes as, with the limited personnel and limited facilities they had, they might be able to do.

In connection with the work back and forth between those agencies and the Washington Office of Communications there were certain messages sometimes interchanged with relation [4595] to codes, and I believe, although this again is information that was told me, that these messages of July were more or less of that nature. They had a trick name known as "Jonab." I think that those were more a discussion of that, in a way, and then again they were messages or information of what they had learned from the codes.

Mr. GESELL. You say that you were told not to send such messages to the field. Who told you that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall the specific informant. I think it was my predecessor. It may have been Captain McCullom.

Mr. GESELL. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom?

Admiral WILKINSON. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom.

Mr. GESELL. Now I have been talking about the actual texts of the intercepted messages.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. What was the situation with respect to sending out a gist or summary of the intercepted messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. There was always the danger that the action that we took might have come from no other source than code-breaking, and in consequence—if I might diverge a little, in the South Pacific we received one time, when Admiral Halsey was in Australia and I was his deputy commander, we received a message from Admiral [4596] Nimitz that Admiral Yamamoto would be coming down to Buin and would be following a very definite schedule, and in Admiral Halsey's stead I arranged for an interception. Of course that story is now well-known. There being 2 days to spare, I sent word back to Admiral Nimitz that we were doing this, but I invited attention to the fact that this would give suspicion that we had broken the code and we knew what the schedule was. In this instance Admiral Nimitz sent down his best wishes and said, "Go to it," that he would take a chance on the inferences to be drawn from that. That is an example of acting upon a code-breaking activity even without repeating the text of the message.

Mr. GESELL. Well, then, from what you have said so far, you were concerned about the question of security, which we have discussed in the hearings. My question was, however, first, whether or not you were under any instructions which in any way limited your sending out to the commanders in the field gists or summaries of the messages; not why you didn't do it.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, I don't recall any specific instructions to that effect.

Mr. GESELL. When you took over you didn't get from Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom, or from the Chief of Naval [4597] Operations, or anybody else, instructions that you were not to summarize this information from the intercepts and send it to the theater commanders?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall any specific instructions except the general preservation of security.

Mr. GESELL. You came to the conclusion, I gather, that you would not do so for reasons of security?

Admiral WILKINSON. I either came to that conclusion myself or found that that was the practice in other divisions of operation.

Mr. GESELL. You see, I am anxious to know which it was. Was it because you found there were some orders in effect and you complied with them, or because you yourself made the decision, for the reasons you have indicated, not to do it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, I think it was, as I think I earlier said, an existing practice, and that I continued it in the interest of security. I do not know that I had any specific instructions. I would have acted similarly with or without instructions.

Mr. GESELL. Did you know these messages had gone out in July, for example?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Did you ever discuss this matter with any other officers, Admiral Stark or the chiefs of other divisions [4598] concerned, as to whether you should or should not send out summaries or gists of intercepted messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, I don't recall specifically any instances.

Mr. GESELL. You don't recall any discussion of that matter with anyone?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. Not with respect to my own sending out. I may have had, and I think I did have from time to time, discussions as to information we had, as to whether that information should be further sent out. I remember a discussion on the first of December with respect to the evident Japanese moves in the South China Sea. I do not believe, however, that that was concerned largely with code breaking activities.

Mr. GESELL. I am limiting my questions now to the sending out of information obtained from the intercepted messages.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I understand you to say that you don't recall any discussions with any officers concerning whether or not summaries or gists of the messages should be sent out?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not so recall, no.

Mr. GESELL. Had you ever heard that any particular commander in the field, at Hawaii or any other place, had requested such information be sent him?

[4599] Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I now know, but I did not know then.

Mr. GESELL. What do you mean you now know?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I have seen a transcript of a letter from the commanding chief, Pacific Fleet, requesting that he be kept advised of diplomatic activities.

Mr. GESELL. You are referring to Admiral Kimmel's request to Admiral Stark that he be advised concerning diplomatic matters?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I did not know of it then and only recently in connection with this hearing have I seen it.

Mr. GESELL. You recall no discussion concerning that letter with anyone?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall ever having discussed the matter with Admiral Kirk at the time you took over your duties?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I am not sure he was aware of it.

Mr. GESELL. I have in my hand, Admiral, a memorandum by Admiral Kirk dated March 11, 1941, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, written on the stationery of the Office of Naval Intelligence, referring to Admiral Kimmel's [4600] letter, which contains this paragraph, paragraph 4:

The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States.

I want to show you that memorandum and ask you if you have ever seen it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Very recently I have seen it, but I think that is a general statement of the duties of the Naval Intelligence and it does not refer specifically to the inquiry which you asked me, which was diplomatic activities, as I recall.

[4601] Mr. GESELL. So far as you were aware, you had no specific responsibilities toward Admiral Kimmel or any or any other commander in the field to apprise him or them of diplomatic material obtained from intercepted Japanese messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, and my understanding was that the material from intercepted messages would in general be kept highly secret.

Mr. GESELL. Well now, whose responsibility was it in the Navy Department to advise Admiral Kimmel or other commanders of information which came from the intercepted messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. If it was purely a question of diplomatic activities, I am not sure that there was any responsibility to so advise him.

Mr. GESELL. On the part of anyone, you mean?

Admiral WILKINSON. On the part of anyone. When it came to the question of enemy intentions, derived from diplomatic activities, I would say that it was that of the Office of War Plans, but I do not know whose responsibility it was to keep him advised of diplomatic negotiations of themselves.

Mr. GESELL. I understand you to say that as far as sending out such information as a matter of information, to Admiral Kimmel and others, you recall no discussion of [4602] it, you recall no instructions concerning it, and you recall no requests from him concerning it?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not know of the requests. I don't recall as to the discussion. I do know that in our foreign fortnightly summary that we had a section on diplomatic activities, and we endeavored to place in there everything that we could without compromising the intercepted messages, and to that extent it was the

the responsibility of my office to place in there everything with regard to diplomatic activities.

With regard to the intercepted messages, there was a conflict of security versus the dissemination and I would say that there was no responsibility to furnish the intercepted messages unless they were directly related, or from them could be derived intentions of the enemy with respect to activities prejudicial to our fleet.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, if the intercepted messages reached the point that it was apparent that some directive or order was necessary, then there was a responsibility, and you say that responsibility, in your opinion, rested in the War Plans Division under Admiral Turner?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was my responsibility to call his attention to it, but his responsibility to send it out because of the directive phase of it as you mention.

[4603] I am not attempting to say I had no interest, but I didn't have the authority to do it.

Mr. GESELL. Did you ever have any discussions with the Army concerning their practice in sending out summaries or gists of those intercepted messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was in very close touch with General Miles, and had frequent conferences and meetings with him informally in his office and mine; we had weekly meetings with the FBI, Mr. Hoover, and General Miles and myself, on the Presidentially inspired committee set up by the President, we talked over secret matters of this sort, and both General Miles and I, I believe, were very anxious to guard the code-breaking activities to the greatest degree.

I do not recall specifically any conversation with him specifically on the question of sending out messages, except that we, from time to time discussed the matters that had turned up in magic.

Mr. GESELL. You mean as to what the information meant, but not what should be done with it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, I would like to take up with you the question of what the commanders in the field may have known concerning the interception of those messages.

[4604] Let's take first of all Admiral Hart at Manila.

General Miles testified, and I believe there has been some other reference to it, perhaps in your testimony, that there were certain facilities at some point in the Philippines, under naval command and direction, which permitted the interception, translation, and the decoding of those Japanese messages; is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. There were two radio intelligence stations, one at Pearl Harbor and one at Corregidor. They were primarily set up to intercept all of the information they could get and to study out from the ship calls that were used by the Japanese, and the types of messages and the frequency of the traffic, and so on, to figure out what they could from those rather than the code breaking proper.

It became desirable, however, that Admiral Hart—it apparently became desirable—I am speaking from hearsay—that Admiral Hart be able to do his own breaking down without the necessity of referring back to Washington and so on, and his section was enlarged somewhat and some of the facilities, which I would prefer not to describe, with

relation to code breaking, were sent to him. So that he had out there facilities for breaking some codes, including, I believe, the diplomatic code.

[4605] Mr. GESELL. If I may interrupt—

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. That meant that Admiral Hart had at Corregidor facilities for intercepting, translating, and decoding messages of the type which appear in exhibit 1, and exhibit 2 here?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say partial facilities. I don't think he was as well equipped as we were here.

Mr. GESELL. You mean he wasn't as well equipped in terms of manpower?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, and experienced manpower.

Mr. GESELL. Experienced manpower, or, I suppose, the ability to intercept as many messages, because he hadn't so many intercepting-stations under his control, fewer of these stations?

Admiral WILKINSON. He had a very limited number.

Mr. GESELL. But he was in a position to translate and decode any messages which he himself intercepted; is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. In many codes, he couldn't touch them, but in the so-called purple code he was to a degree enabled to translate. In fact, there were many codes we never got into ourselves here in Washington.

Mr. GESELL. But the purple code was the code in which [4606] many of these messages which we have in exhibits 1 and 2 were sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think practically all of exhibit 1 and some few in exhibit 2. I am not certain.

Mr. GESELL. Was he in a position to decode messages sent in other codes of the type contained in exhibit 2?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure. Again, I have been speaking entirely from hearsay and would prefer that the specific degree of his ability be answered by a communications officer.

Mr. GESELL. You were about to discuss the situation at Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I am sorry I interrupted.

Admiral WILKINSON. Similarly in May of 1941, an agency of the same type was set up in Hawaii. Captain Rochefort, then Commander, was sent out, and half a dozen former language students who had recently been evacuated from Japan because of the growing crisis were sent to join him, and he had perhaps 20 or 30 enlisted men. They were working mainly on the radio intelligence proper. That is, the calls and the traffic analysis that I have just described.

Mr. GESELL. Ship locations?

[4607] Admiral WILKINSON. Ship locations, and so on. And he did not have the facilities for the purple code, nor originally facilities for any code. Later he was asked by the department to specialize on one or two codes, and what success he had, I am not sure.

Mr. GESELL. He was in a position at Hawaii to intercept but he was not in a position to decode and hence to translate messages that were sent in the purple code?

Admiral WILKINSON. Correct. There was a certain amount of interchange between Corregidor, Hawaii, and Washington, particularly on ship movements. In fact Corregidor became our control and authority

on ship movements, but there was not much, as I understand, and I again defer to the Communications witness, there was not much transfer through Hawaii of the purple code messages translated in Washington and at Manila.

Mr. GESELL. Well, as far as you were aware, they had not then facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating, and decoding those messages there through which Admiral Kimmel or any other officer could have gotten the information?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Were summaries prepared in the Navy Department of the intercepted messages, daily summaries of [4608] [that] kind?

Admiral WILKINSON. In the morning, I forget whether it was 9 or 9:30, the Secretary of the Navy had a conference at which the Director of Naval Intelligence would discuss the news from all over the world, chiefly, of course, the naval activity, the progress of the war. At that time special items in connection with it which might have been dug out of a code word were sometimes mentioned. But in view of the size of that conference, there were about 20 officers in it, the references to the intercepted messages were rather few and far between.

Mr. Baecher has just invited my attention to this—

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, while we are waiting, I might direct counsel's attention to the fact that on page 31 of the volume 1, of the Naval Narrative, there is a difference between that and the admiral's testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I can't hear the Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. I might direct counsel's attention that on page 31 of the Naval Narrative, there is a difference. It may be that it could be cleared up now and we would save time later.

[4609] Mr. GESELL. I don't even have a copy of that narrative.

Admiral WILKINSON. Here you are.

(Document handed to counsel.)

Admiral WILKINSON. My attention has been invited to a summary as of the 10th of October listing the number of approximately 12 dispatches which are briefed, but I don't recall ever having made any of those in my time or seeing them, and I am not sure who made this particular one. I did have, initially, a little summary, daily summary of the Japanese situation, which contained information as to what activities were apparent as to Japan, from all sources, including intercepts, and I thought that was continued through Pearl Harbor Day, but I have since been informed that it was discontinued on the 24th of October, 9 days after I came in. I don't recall why it was discontinued. In fact, my recollection was that I had continued it.

Mr. GESELL. We had been addressing our inquiries to those summaries and the daily analysis to the Navy Department, Admiral, particularly from the point of view of seeing whether either the daily summary or the daily situation reports, as they were sometimes called, were continued after you became Director of Naval Intelligence, and we could find none beyond October 24.

Admiral WILKINSON. The 24th is what I have been informed. [4610] I don't recall having stopped them or why they were stopped. In fact, my recollection, when I was at sea and somebody asked about it, was that we had continued to use them.

Mr. GESELL. Is it your present information that those summaries were not used beyond October?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, and Captain McCullom so advises me, as well as the information you have.

Mr. GESELL. Those summaries did contain information from Japanese intercepts, as I understand it.

Admiral WILKINSON. Not in the form of quoting the intercept, I don't think, but just mentioning the fact that the negotiations are continuing, and that some objection, apparently, was made by Tokyo to some terms, or something of that sort.

Mr. GESELL. Were those daily summaries prior to October sent out to the field at all, to the theater commanders?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe not. They were purely for internal consumption. Very small. Only two or three paragraphs a day.

Mr. GESELL. Do you feel that the information that was available to Commander Rochefort and others concerned with Naval Intelligence at Hawaii was sufficient for them to know at least in a general way that we were in a position not only to intercept but to translate and decode these Japanese [4611] messages in the purple and other high codes?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say so, particularly as Captain Rochefort was an expert in that line, and was familiar with the latest developments up to the time that he left in May. Then also we had three intelligence agencies out there—we had two. Captain Rochefort, who belonged to the Communications Division of operations, and was assigned to duty with the 14th Naval District, but was available to the Commander in Chief, and we had directly under Naval Intelligence the District Intelligence Officer at Honolulu, and he was given information at times with respect to individuals that might have appeared in codes intercepted in South America, or even in these codes here, but it was carefully guarded at the time.

Mr. GESELL. Was either the District Intelligence Officer or Commander Rochefort under any restriction or inhibition which would have prevented them from advising Admiral Kimmel that these messages in these high codes were in fact being decoded and translated in Washington?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't think so. They were in close contact with his Intelligence Officer, which was the third agency I spoke of, Captain Layton, who was Intelligence Officer on his staff. He was in full contact continually with Captain Rochefort and frequently, I believe, with Captain Mayfield of the District Intelligence Office.

[4612] Mr. GESELL. Did Captain Layton himself have the information that we were decoding and translating these messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know. I think probably he did.

Mr. GESELL. What precisely was the relationship that existed between the Office of Naval Intelligence here in Washington and these various Naval Intelligence agencies in Hawaii? Could you describe the organization to us so we understand?

[4613] Admiral WILKINSON. The Navy Department does not deal in general with any subordinate forces in the fleet or a unit. In other words, there was no relation between the fleet intelligence officer and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The matters went direct

to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and were handled there or he could handle it with his intelligence officer or his gunnery officer or whoever he saw fit, but we did not have the direct chain between fleet and office that was existent in the Army between the head of G-2 and the G-2 of the division. So much for the fleet.

Mr. GESELL. That means that ONI communicated directly with the commander of the fleet on all intelligence matters?

Admiral WILKINSON. Either with our division of communications or in more important matters either directly with Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant.

Mr. GESELL. And always directly to the commander of the fleet?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. With respect to all of the other agencies the intelligence officer was under the command of the district officer, Admiral Bloch. Administratively he checked in with us, or we would send him such information as we had and such requests that we might have to make, but we had [4614] no authority to order him to do anything and he was directly on the staff of the commandant of the district.

The same thing I would say would apply to Captain Rochefort except that his administrative parent in Washington was not ourselves, ONI, but rather the Communications Division, but he likewise was on the staff of Admiral Bloch and primarily his officer and under his command and only related to communications, as Mayfield was to use for matters of administration, finance, general technique; technical matters largely.

Mr. GESELL. But matters of intelligence and information of importance to Admiral Bloch in his command, that went in through either Mayfield or Rochefort through to Admiral Bloch himself?

Admiral WILKINSON. Most any—

Mr. GESELL. I say from you or from Admiral Stark. I am talking about nonadministrative matters.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I was just thinking. The District Intelligence Officer, as you recall, was a member of the Domestic Intelligence side, which had to do with suspects and there was an unending chain of information being exchanged about Jim Smith or Hashihaha Tadikama or whatever you like. That sort of information, that intelligence went directly from the District Intelligence Officer to our domestic branch. [4615] For any major matters we would be likely to communicate direct to the fleet rather than to the district fellow, because the district fellow's activities were on the domestic side and not on the foreign side. He had nothing to do with Japan as a nation or with the Japanese Fleet.

Mr. GESELL. So that means, in effect, to wind it all up, that all communications concerning diplomatic matters or major Japanese developments would be communicated to Hawaii directly through the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, you referred a moment ago to this question of the translation of the intercepted messages. I understood you to testify that you made available certain of the personnel and may have paid part of their salaries, to assist in the translation.

You were aware, were you not, that there was a very substantial delay, sometimes as much as 28 days, sometimes quite a bit less than

that, between the date of interception and the date of translation of these Japanese messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall the specific delays but I knew that for various reasons there were at times delays of some periods. Those reasons might, of course, be [4616] transmission times, they might be due to the necessity of breaking a new code, they might be the difficulties in breaking the cipher. I am not too familiar with the mechanics, but I think most of us understand that you have to have certain material, a certain amount of material in the code before you can begin to break it. Now, if somebody sends in a ten-word message, that might lay aside for some time before a longer message and two or three others would come in to give you enough material to attack it, but—coming back to your question—yes, I was aware that there were delays.

Mr. GESELL. Precisely. Looking at these messages, just as any of us from day to day, you can see that the translation date was frequently later than the date the message was sent.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I just wanted to mention what I did because I think General Miles has emphasized the delays in translation and transmission of the intercept to the head office, but he has not mentioned the mechanical delays which were inherent there even if there had been as much personnel as we would have liked. There wasn't much we could do about it. Both Admiral Noyes and I were concerned about it because I think we were trying to pick up all the Japanese- and English-speaking people we could find in the country.

Mr. GESELL. That is what I wanted to get at. Conscious [4617] as you must have been, of some of these delays, some of which might have been of a nature which you could cure by manpower and steps of that nature, what did you do to encourage or speed up translation, if anything?

Admiral WILKINSON. Admiral Noyes and I were both concerned about it. His primary difficulty was in getting people actually to work on the mechanics of it, and I endeavored to assist him by procuring translators, and we found, I think, some half a dozen translators that we could produce and we scoured the country for more and finally started a school to make more, because there were none in the country that either could or would take the job with us.

Then, also, we endeavored to expedite and speed our investigations of the personnel that Admiral Noyes wanted to have employed because, obviously, we could not go blind and have somebody in there without knowledge of who he was because the whole thing might be blown sky-high, so we investigated all the applicants for the code-breaking work and part of my efforts, as you asked, was to expedite those investigations. That was done through the domestic branch.

Mr. GESELL. Now, there is one question that was asked of the Army side in that connection and perhaps we ought to have the corresponding Navy figure if we can. How many people, if you know, were actually engaged at this time in the [4618] business of intercepting and translating and decoding these messages and messages of a similar type?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have no real knowledge about that. I know it grew into very large numbers and I would say offhand at that time it was somewhere between three and five hundred, but I would defer to the testimony of the communicator.

Mr. GESELL. Well, perhaps before you leave the stand you can get some check made and get that figure for us, Admiral.

Admiral WILKINSON. Surely.

Mr. GESELL. I am sure, also, I did not ask you one other question concerning the transmission of these intercepted messages or their text to the theaters. I have been discussing with you Hawaii. Did you send information concerning the intercepted messages to Admiral Hart, or to any other commander overseas, which was more detailed in any respect than the information you sent Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my knowledge. There may have been some interchange between the communication officers in attempting to straighten out their respective translations of certain intercepts, but there was nothing from my office.

Mr. GESELL. You did not undertake, for example, to supply Admiral Hart with the text of intercepted messages which he had not himself intercepted but which you had picked [4619] up here through your facilities in Washington?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not from my office. That might have been done in the communications office in an endeavor to straighten out their code work.

Mr. GESELL. Would you know whether or not that was done? Do you have any information on that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Admiral, we have had a great deal of discussion here concerning some of these messages which are contained in exhibit 2. They are the so-called military installations and ship movement intercepts. I first want to get straight concerning the message that appears at page 12, which sometimes has been referred to here as the bombing plot message, or something of that sort.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Now, that was sent prior to your becoming Director of Naval Intelligence, since it is dated September 24, 1941 and it was translated October 9, 1941. I understood you to testify that you assumed your post on October 15, 1941.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. But I gather that you had been at least around the Division a bit beforehand before you formally took over the job to find out what it was all about?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[4620] Mr. GESELL. I want to ask you when this message first came to your attention?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall whether it came to my attention before or on my taking over, or when a later message may have come in referring back to it, but I was aware of it at some time during the fall.

Mr. GESELL. You were aware of it prior to the attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. And were you similarly aware of various messages which other witnesses have had called specifically to their attention, I think sometimes when you have been sitting here in the room, you might say implementing this message, i. e., giving reports of ships broken down by areas and asking for later detailed reports or asking for reports when ships were not moving, were not making any movements and other messages of that concern?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was aware of most but not all of them. I couldn't say positively all.

Mr. GESELL. What evaluation did you give to those messages at the time as far as their tending to indicate in any way the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. The Japanese for many years had the reputation, and the facts bore out that reputation, of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of information, whether by [4621] photography or by written report or otherwise.

We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think three Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations of Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports that we had gotten from them there had been indications of movements and locations of ships; in the papers that they had there were instructions for them to find out the movements and locations of ships except in Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these fellows that were planted in America, these naval officers, were not to be responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philippines because there were agencies finding that information there.

My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact and these data together was that these dispatches were part of the general information system established by the Japanese. We knew also that certain information had been sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the bombing target significance which now appears.

Mr. GESELL. These officers of the Japanese Navy who were apprehended on the west coast you said were getting information concerning the movement and location of ships?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[4622] Mr. GESELL. Do you mean to tell us that those officers had instructions to break down the harbors at Seattle and other points on the coast by areas and to designate the location of ships in those areas with particular reference to which were at wharves and which were tied to buoys?

Admiral WILKINSON. No; because there are no wharves, as I recall, in San Pedro except for one or two used by naval vessels, at San Diego, and Bremerton to a limited extent. I do recall, or have been informed, that one of the reports of Lieutenant Commander Racarda with reference to Bremerton specified what ships were at anchor and which ships were alongside of a dock.

Mr. GESELL. Could we see that report?

Admiral WILKINSON. I will endeavor to find it.

Mr. GESELL. Generally, those fellows were simply getting ship movement reports, weren't they, what ships came into the harbor and which ones went out and what their destination was and whether or not they were moving in convoy and the type of general ship movement information that is spread throughout this exhibit 2?

Admiral WILKINSON. In general, yes, but the location of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or elsewhere, did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would be of value to the question of when she might be moved, what [4623] her state of readiness was and the inference that we drew from this was that they wanted

to know everything they could not only about the movement of the ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and not a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to those that were present where they were located with reference to state of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in Pearl Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas those at anchor in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short notice. Those at double-banked piers might not be, particularly the inside one might take some time to go out.

Mr. GESELL. Well, you recognize, don't you, that that is not the type of information that this message was designed to get. Looking at the message now in the cold light of the hearing room it is apparent that they were trying to spot the vessels there so as to determine their state of repair or readiness for battle at sea.

Admiral WILKINSON. It would seem so now since the locations might be of value not only as a bombing target but also for submarine attack or midjet submarine attack.

Mr. GESELL. In an attack made from either above or under the water.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. And it is quite apparent that this message [4624] was not designed to get information concerning the likelihood of certain vessels departing from the harbor or the state of their repair or ordinary ship movement information. It is just what we have been calling it, is it not, Admiral?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. A bombing plot message.

Admiral WILKINSON. In general, yes. There are other things of conceivable technical matters and interest. The ships that are in various harbors at the time might be an indication of what the capacity of this section of the harbor was with respect to taking a large fleet in, but those are technical interpretations which are hardly germane to the purposes as we now see it.

Mr. GESELL. Well, they are not the technical interpretations that you gave the message at the time either, are they?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know that we did.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall discussing this message with anyone in the Navy Department at the time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; I think I mentioned to one or more officers that the Japs seemed quite curious as to the lay-out in Pearl Harbor and at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their nicety of intelligence.

[4625] Mr. GESELL. Now, who do you recall discussing that with?

Admiral WILKINSON. Captain McCollum particularly, possibly with Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner. I cannot say specifically who.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[4626]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON
(Resumed)

Mr. GESELL. Just as we were recessing, Admiral Wilkinson, you said you had talked to Admiral Turner, you thought, and to Captain McCullom, concerning this plat dispatch of September 24 we have been discussing. Do you recall your conversation with them?

Admiral WILKINSON. Only, as I think I said, that I mentioned it showed as an illustration of the nicety of detail of intelligence the Japanese were capable of seeking and getting.

Mr. GESELL. What did they say to you?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall—

Mr. GESELL. Did they agree with you?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall an agreement of that sort. Of course, it must be remembered that all during this year, 1941, there was some exchange of letters to and from Pearl Harbor and Hawaii on both the Army and Navy side emphasizing the fact that the first priority of risk or hazard to Pearl Harbor was a bombing attack, next an air torpedo attack and third a submarine attack. This information they were getting there, while substantiating that fear, was being obtained, in some degree at least, everywhere that we [4627] knew of—Panama, the West Coast, Manila.

Mr. GESELL. You are in agreement with General Miles that there is not another message like this one that appears in this document or which was intercepted prior to Pearl Harbor, is there?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection. I explained that the other harbors were, perhaps, smaller and need not have so much of a differentiation.

Mr. GESELL. When you pointed this out to Admiral Turner and Captain McCullom as an example of the nicety of Japanese espionage, you don't recall what they said?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall except, perhaps, to agree with me. I am not even sure in recollection that I pointed it out to Admiral Turner.

Mr. GESELL. What evaluation did you place upon the document? Did you think it had some significance that required your bringing it to their attention?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not particularly.

Mr. GESELL. Did you recommend that it be sent to the field?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Was there a discussion of whether it should or should not be sent to the field?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

[4628] Mr. GESELL. So that your testimony amounts to, if I understand it, a statement that you somewhat casually pointed this out and said this was an example of the nicety of their espionage?

Admiral WILKINSON. Exactly.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to discuss with you now, Admiral, for a few moments some of the alert or warning messages which were sent by the Navy Department, at the first at page 18 of Exhibit 37, the basic dispatch, dated October 16, 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What page?

Mr. GESELL. Page 18.

I will read it:

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments [4629] as will not disclose strategic intentions nor constitute provocative actions against Japan. Second and third aides inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities. Acknowledge.

That is addressed to the Commander in Chief in the Atlantic and the Pacific and the Asiatic Fleet. That appears to have been sent the day after you took over as Director of Intelligence.

Were you consulted concerning it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. Purely an operational matter.

Mr. GESELL. You do not recall having participated in any discussions concerning it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have knowledge that it was sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not until after it was sent.

Mr. GESELL. How soon after?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall. Perhaps the next day.

Mr. GESELL. Was it the practice for messages, when you were not in on their drafting and transmission, for them to be sent to you afterwards for your information?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not as a frequent practice. Occasionally, yes. Occasionally I would hear of them in conversation and look them up.

Mr. GESELL. If they weren't sent to you, how would you [4630] be in a position to know whether the information you had been obtaining as Director of Naval Intelligence was being properly evaluated?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had confidence in the officers comprising the War Plans Divisions. But there was no back check in their consultation with me to see if I thought it was properly evaluated.

Mr. GESELL. That confidence, I can see, might give you a degree of personal assurance, but it didn't give you any information, did it, as to precisely what evaluation was being made. Without having that information, how could you properly conduct your office?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know that it affected the conduct of my office, because I would give the information that we collected, and frequently advised on what my own inferences were from it, but what action was taken as a result, I do not think was necessarily involved in the conduct of my office.

Mr. GESELL. I understand your testimony to be that you recommended evaluations from time to time in transmitting this information to War Plans and to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral WILKINSON. In discussion, yes. Sometimes in writing, but seldom.

Mr. GESELL. But they didn't inform you of what action they took?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not as a matter of routine, no.

Mr. GESELL. You might find it out from talking to somebody, and then you would look it up?

Admiral WILKINSON. They might tell me, as a matter of interest, but I was not an information addressee, as it [4632] were. It was not a matter of established routine.

Mr. GESELL. How did you know what information to send out to the theater commanders if you didn't know what evaluation had been placed upon the information you had already transmitted?

Admiral WILKINSON. The information I sent to the theater commanders was of a static nature. There was a fortnightly summary, of which you speak, which was partly action, partly static. There were in the course of the year 1941, for instance, some 62 or 70 so-called Far Eastern serials, two- and three-page discussions of specific items, which might range from a new type of torpedo to Japanese aircraft production, things of that matter.

We also supplied to the fleet a so-called Japanese monograph, O. N. I. 49, a full description of all the information we had been able to obtain concerning Japan.

Mr. GESELL. My question was whether it would not have aided you in pointing up the information to know what evaluation was being placed on the information you were sending.

Admiral WILKINSON. I am mentioning the types of information I sent which, of itself, was not the type that was involved with the evaluation of the current situation. As I have earlier mentioned, the matters concerning operations [4633] I did not send to the fleet except on reference to the Operations Office or War Plans of themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Will counsel suspend for a moment?

I am compelled to leave because since last Saturday I have been suffering with a very high temperature, and with what looks like a severe case of the flu, and I am out against the advice of the doctor, and am compelled to leave now and do what he told me to do.

I had intended to have an executive session this afternoon, but that is impossible. Therefore, I ask to be excused for the rest of the day. I hope to be back tomorrow.

Mr. GESELL. We are sorry you are ill, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Vice Chairman will preside.

Mr. GESELL. The next warning message which I wish to inquire concerning is that appearing at page 32, the message of November 24, 1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic, Pacific and certain other districts, 11, 12, 13, and 15, reading as follows:

CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS OF THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON [4634] PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION. ADDRESSES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UT-MOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY.

Did you have anything to do with the sending of that message?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What page is that?

Mr. GESELL. Page 32. Did you know it was sent at the time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not until after it was sent.

[4635] Mr. GESELL. How long after did you know about it?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure; a day or two.

Mr. GESELL. You were not consulted concerning this, concerning its wording or whether or not it should be sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. The next message of a warning nature appears on page 36 and is the message of November 27, 1941. It is the message sent at the same time as the Army warning message of that date, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, reading as follows:

This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased on an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures [4636] against sabotage.

Were you consulted in connection with the sending of that message?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. When did you first know it had been sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think two, days later, perhaps three. I might explain, of course, that these were highly secret messages and the Chief of Naval Operations was anxious to confine the knowledge of them to the minimum and since I was not directly concerned in them, once I had proffered the information upon which they were based, that he thought that neither he nor his instructions carried the necessity of advising me about it. I do not feel, in other words, that I was neglected by not being consulted because I had proffered the giving of the information and I am sure that it was well used.

Mr. GESELL. And when you say you learned of these messages you meant that you learned it informally by hearing of them rather than hearing of them in a direct way as a matter of office organization?

Admiral WILKINSON. As I recall them.

Mr. GESELL. Is that your testimony with respect to the message on page 38 transmitting the Army warning message of November 27 and containing instructions concerning overt [4637] acts?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. That takes us up to November 27, Admiral. Now, from the period from November 27, 1941 to December 7, 1941 the only other messages of a warning nature that one finds here directed to Hawaii were the messages concerning the destruction of codes. Did you have anything to do with those messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, we initiated those after a conference with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. GESELL. You are referring to the messages that appear at 40 and 41?

Admiral WILKINSON. Forty particularly. Forty-one I believe was initiated by the communications officer.

Mr. GESELL. You initiated the message on page 40?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. Will you read that, please, sir?
Admiral WILKINSON (reading) :

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

[4638] Mr. GESELL. That was addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleet, to Com 14 and to Com 16?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. You say you initiated that dispatch. Will you tell us—

Admiral WILKINSON. That is, to my recollection. Let me check one moment, sir. Yes, I believe that to be the case.

Mr. GESELL. Well, will you state for the committee, please, what the circumstances were as you recall them under which that message was sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think Captain McCollum advised me that intelligence had been received through the magic source as to this and I think there had been other confirmatory evidences by reports by cable as to signs of burning. I am not sure of that last. I know there were such reports but whether they occurred before this dispatch was sent or not I do not know, but the primary basis I think was the magic. Captain McCollum recommended its being sent and I agreed, of course, and after consultation with either the Chief or the Assistant Chief of Operations it was so sent.

Mr. GESELL. Did you approve the dispatch then? I mean did you draft the plan then?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe Captain McCollum drafted [4639] it.

Mr. GESELL. And then after it was drafted you approved it or initialed it before it went out?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I probably presented that in person to Admiral Ingersoll. I may have actually released it. The record may show.

Mr. GESELL. I have here what purports to be a photostatic copy of the original message, which shows it was released by you and an initial which appears to be Admiral Ingersoll's initials after your name.

Admiral WILKINSON. That would seem to bear out my statement.

Mr. GESELL. You have seen that photostatic copy of the dispatch, have you?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. I want to show it to you and call your attention to the following words which appear on the dispatch as stricken following the words at the end of the message, "Secret document":

From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia.

Do you recall that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not but if it occurs in the original dispatch it was doubtless so drafted by Captain [4640] McCollum and approved by me. Whether I struck it out or whether Admiral Ingersoll struck it out, I cannot recall.

Mr. GESELL. You cannot recall which of you struck it out?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have no recollection which.

Mr. GESELL. I would like to have this dispatch marked as an exhibit. It will be Exhibit 83, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83.")

Admiral WILKINSON. I may state that we had every inference and evidence for the preceding two weeks that Orange was contemplating action in southeast Asia and did in fact so act.

Mr. GESELL. Well, will you state to us at this time, Admiral, what was the considered conclusion and evaluation reached by you and your staff in the Office of Naval Intelligence, prior to the receipt of the one o'clock message, as to where and when the Japanese would attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think our conclusion was that every evidence indicated an attack in the South China Sea on either Siam or the Kra Peninsula. Those evidences were almost indisputable. There were possibilities of attack elsewhere ranging, in fact, from Panama on the Pacific Coast [4641] to Hawaii, Guam, Wake and the Philippines. The nearer each of these objectives was to Japan, to our mind the greater the probability of their attack. As it happened we all know that they attacked all of those on the far side of the Pacific Coast, Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines.

Mr. GESELL. Well, did you have any information, written or oral, prior to the actual attack which specified Hawaii as a point of attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not the slightest.

Mr. GESELL. You say there were indications that they might attack Hawaii and other points in the Pacific. What were those indications?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't think I said "indications." I said possibilities.

Mr. GESELL. I beg your pardon.

Admiral WILKINSON. That was within the range of practicability that they should so attack.

Mr. GESELL. Well, my question was directed as to what information and evidence you had on that point. Did you have any evidence or information to show that Hawaii was a possible point of attack or a probable point of attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not that it was a probable point. There was every possibility that it was a possible point of attack in that the Japanese Navy's steaming radius and their [4642] capabilities, as the Intelligence people say, and I am learning to say, and their probable capabilities indicated that they could come there. It was possible. So in fact was Seattle possible.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, I would like to review with you for a moment some of the information you had of a naval nature to see whether we can get, perhaps, a more specific understanding of what you had before you.

You knew, did you not, for example, on the 25th of September that the combined home fleet of the Japanese had undergone extensive personnel changes and that that personnel reorganization, which was not normal for that time of year, was interpreted by your people to mean that preparations were being made for an emergency?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. You also knew, did you not, on the 1st of November that the Japanese Navy, according to statements made by its own people, was ready for any immediate eventuality; that mobilization plans had been carried out, including not only changes in commands but increase in ship crews to full war complement?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; the ships had been docked as well.

Mr. KEEFE. Right there may I ask what was the date of [4643] the first statement?

Mr. MURPHY. September 25.

Senator FERGUSON. A little louder, please.

Mr. MURPHY. September 25, that was the first and the second one was November 1.

Mr. GESELL. September 25 was the first. The second I have given as November 1.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. I wanted to get those dates in mind.

Mr. GESELL. Now, on November 15—

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I could not hear the first part of the Congressman's remark.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He just wanted a repetition of those dates. One was September 25 and the other one was November 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you. That is 1941?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; I am talking about 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. GESELL. You knew on November 15 that the Japanese had requisitioned an increasing number of merchant ships and armed those ships, many of them, with antiaircraft guns, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have full knowledge and recollection of these various events that you are speaking of. I [4644] cannot from my own recollection check those particular dates.

Mr. GESELL. This is coming from those exhibits that we have put in this morning.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. Those were dates that we registered that those happened on the preceding 2 weeks because this was a fortnightly review.

Mr. GESELL. You knew on or about December 1, similarly, that Japanese ships had been recalled for quick docking and repair, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. You also knew, and this is specifically on December 1, that on that date the Japanese had changed all of the service calls for their forces afloat at 0000 on December 1, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know that I knew specifically it was a change of service calls. I knew that there had been a change in certain of their codes which resulted in difficulty in our radio intelligence analysis at that time.

Mr. GESELL. On that date?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Well, I have here a file of ship location reports and on page 30-d of that file—and this comes as an intelligence report from your office, it states:

All orange service radio calls for units afloat were [4645] changed at 0000, 1 December 1941.

Does that refresh your recollection on that point?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. It is a fact, is it not, that the Japanese had changed their service calls previously on the 1st of November?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe so.

Mr. GESELL. And by changing them again so formally within a period of 30 days that was further indication that an emergency situation had arisen?

Admiral WILKINSON. There was every indication from many of those and many others that there was an emergency situation arising.

Mr. GESELL. Now, when did you first learn that the ship location and direction finding people in the Office of Naval Intelligence had lost track of the Japanese carriers?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall particularly. I know that our ship locations were often incomplete. I know it began to be apparent toward the end of November that there were a large number of ships that we could not locate specifically for both battleships and carriers.

Mr. GESELL. Well, it was specifically notable, was it not, that the carriers could not be located and you knew that at the time?

[4646] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Now, you were also aware, were you not, that shipping had been routed to the south through Torres Straits?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe I was aware. It was not of my initiation but I believe I was aware of it.

Mr. GESELL. You were aware of the dispatches that directed all shipping to proceed through Torres Straits?

Admiral WILKINSON. I presume so. I do not recall that specifically.

Mr. GESELL. And you were familiar, were you not, with the general term that I think General Miles referred to here, of there being a vacant sea to the north and west of Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Through which there would be no shipping?

Senator BREWSTER. Will you answer that?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. While you were at Hawaii I presume you had engaged in war games and other maneuvers in which you had anticipated and prepared against an air attack launched against that point from an attacking force coming from the north?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall the maneuvers of an air attack specifically, but I know that we had a large fleet maneuver there in which there were carriers on both sides and the endeavor of the defending fleet was to inter- [4647] cept the attacking fleet before it would have got the air attack launched.

Mr. GESELL. You knew as a naval expert that the Japanese Navy had the striking power and the strength and the fleet to approach Hawaii and execute an attack, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. If not protected, yes, or, for that matter, any point in the Pacific, including the Canal.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, would the factors which I have just—perhaps we should call them facts—which I have just reviewed with you, did it ever occur to you prior to the 6th of December that it would be appropriate and advisable to send some specific direction to Pearl Harbor warning against a surprise air attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. It never occurred to me, first, because from my service out there and from these letters that had been interchanged

throughout the year it was my belief that Hawaii knew the possibility of an air attack. Second, it did not occur to me because it was not within my province to conclude or derive the enemy functions although naturally I was interested in such matters. And, third, it was my own belief that an approaching force would be detected before it could get into attack range.

Mr. GESELL. Well, did you have any information as to whether or not the Army and Navy at Hawaii were in fact conducting [4648] long-range reconnaissance?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not. They had done so while I had been there at intervals.

Mr. GESELL. But you had no information in the months or weeks immediately preceding Pearl Harbor as to whether, in fact, the commanders there were or were not taking action which would permit them to pick up the Japanese fleet before it attacked?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had not.

Mr. GESELL. You were fully aware, were you not, as an Intelligence officer that Japan had men and facilities at Hawaii which permitted them to know the state of our garrisons and preparations there and the steps we were taking?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. All the anchorages at Pearl Harbor and Honolulu port and other anchorages in Hawaii were readily susceptible of observation by any elements of the large Japanese population; our communications going out of Honolulu were not censored; and there were other possibilities of espionage and that had been recognized by the three Intelligence agencies there, the agents of the FBI, the Military Intelligence, and our own.

[4649] Mr. GESELL. Had there been any discussion of the fact that the fleet, stationed at Hawaii, on the flank of a Japanese movement to the south, constituted a threat unless, by some device or means, the Japanese could knock it out of action temporarily?

Admiral WILKINSON. No discussion like that to which I was a party.

Mr. GESELL. Were you aware of that consideration as a naval expert?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, and furthermore, I would anticipate that any Navy anxious to strike a blow or to win a war would naturally be in search of the enemy's navy, irrespective of the strategic considerations of being on the flank.

Mr. GESELL. You have said that your division considered it a possibility, I believe that Pearl Harbor, among other points, might be attacked.

Admiral WILKINSON. Sure.

Mr. GESELL. Did you, yourself, personally expect that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. I thought that the Japanese would proceed to the southward, would carry out their campaign, and I felt, insofar as my own guess was concerned, which was not a very good one, obviously, that they would [4650] not make a direct attack on the Anglo-Saxon nations, but they would attempt to see, as they had already for so many years, how far they could go with infiltration methods without precipitating a full-scale war.

Every evidence indicated their movement was down toward those areas. The question of whether the Philippines would be attacked or not, in my own case, I was not certain about it.

Admiral Turner, I know, was not confident it would be attacked. I thought myself, possibly for political reasons, they would avoid the Philippines. I did not think they would attack Hawaii, because I thought, in so attacking, they would expose themselves to great danger to whatever force they brought there, and, furthermore, they would be precipitating a war with the United States, which theretofore they had given every indication of attempting to avoid.

Mr. GESELL. Admiral, in the period from November 27 to the time of the attack, do you recall discussing with anyone the advisability of sending any additional warnings to the theater commanders in the Pacific?

Admiral WILKINSON. On December 1, Captain McCollum prepared a suggested memorandum for me with regard to the situation in the Far East.

[4651] Mr. GESELL. May I interrupt there? Is that the memorandum dated December 1, captioned "Memorandum for the Director," signed by McCollum, which appears toward the front of Exhibit 81, a memorandum of approximately five pages long, with a covering memorandum to you as Director?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; except that the particular memorandum is only two and one-half pages long. You are confusing the following memorandum with it.

Mr. GESELL. It goes from page 24 to page 27, does it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; 24 is the covering page.

[4652] Mr. GESELL. Right. That is the memorandum you were referring to?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. On receipt of that I went with Captain McCollum to Admiral Stark's office, to discuss it with him, and he called in—if they were not already there—Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner, and I think I read the memorandum, or Captain McCollum did.

Mr. GESELL. Out loud, do you mean?

Admiral WILKINSON. Out loud. There was some discussion about the indications there, and a general agreement that there was a very definite advance by Japan into the South China Sea areas, and that the extent of that advance was not as yet apparent, as to the geographic extent, but the numerical extent of the advance was apparent as a very strong movement.

Mr. GESELL. You say that Captain McCollum brought this memorandum to you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall what your conversation was with him at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Only that I thought it was very interesting and important, and that Admiral Stark and his people should see it.

Mr. GESELL. Did Captain McCollum give any indication in the memorandum as to what should be done?

[4653] Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. It was you who initiated the proposal of a conversation with Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was Captain McCollum who said that Admiral Stark should see it.

Mr. GESELL. Did you think that the memorandum required some additional warning message to be sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any views one way or the other when you went to see Admiral Stark as to whether a warning message should be sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. No warning message had been sent and this was information as to the movement of the fleet in the South China Sea. There was no indication on the face of this evidence that an attack was to be made upon Hawaii, or, for that matter, upon the Philippines.

Mr. GESELL. Captain McCollum concluded, did he not, in his covering memorandum, an eventual control or occupation of Thailand, followed almost immediately by an attack against the British possessions, possibly Burma and Singapore?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. That was his estimate of what the information in the memorandum pointed to?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, and it was subsequently proved.

[4654] Mr. GESELL. You concurred in his recommendation?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, and it was subsequently borne out.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion by you, in the presence of Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, and Ingersoll, as to the desirability or appropriateness of sending any further warning message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall any.

Mr. GESELL. Your discussion with those gentlemen, then, had something to do with the contents of the memorandum?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. This was not the type of memorandum which was sent to the field, was it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, except a large part of it, if not all, was embodied in the fortnightly summary of that day.

Mr. GESELL. That summary appears in Exhibit 80, does it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure. On page 9 of that memorandum, or page 12, as it has been surcharged in ink later on, you will find the discussion on the Japanese military situation and naval situation, which is very similar, although it does not exist over the whole 2 months, as this particular memorandum does.

Mr. GESELL. I gather from what you have testified that there was no discussion of Hawaii at this time between you [4655] and Captain McCollum, or between you and Admiral Stark and his associates.

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall any other instance where you recommended, in the period from November 27 to December 7, that a message be sent or discussed the possibility of sending a message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall specifically. Captain McCollum has since told me, and it has aided my recollection vaguely, that he brought a message in to me, that I was concerned about it, in connection with the so-called winds message, and after the discussion with me he took it, by my direction, to Admiral Turner and Admiral Turner showed him the warning message which had gone out and asked him if

he did not think that had covered the situation, and Captain McCollum said it did, I believe.

I have no clear recollection on that.

Mr. GESELL. I want to ask you, Admiral Wilkinson, whether you have any recollection of it yourself?

Admiral WILKINSON. I cannot say I have.

Mr. GESELL. You are simply repeating then what Captain McCollum told you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. You yourself have no recollection of that [4656] incident?

Admiral WILKINSON. I cannot say I do.

Mr. GESELL. You of course saw the code setting up the winds message, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Did you at any time ever see or hear any message which implemented that code?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is I did after the actual attack.

Mr. GESELL. After the actual attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. You are referring there to the message that was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission stating about war with Great Britain?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, I do not recall specifically which message it was, but I understood after the attack, within 24 hours or perhaps 36, that there was a message that was intercepted and translated. You will recall—it is my recollection, at least—in the winds message it was not a question of war, it was a question of strained relations, in the interpretation of it.

Mr. GESELL. Do you have any recollection at all of having heard of or seen any message prior to the attack that implemented that code in any respect?

[4657] Admiral WILKINSON. No; and we were very keenly on the lookout for it, and I do not believe, to the best of my knowledge, there was such a message before.

[4658] Mr. GESELL. Was your department or division the one responsible for picking up that message, or was that a function of communications?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was a function of communications and such outside agencies, outside the Navy, as they had maybe talked with, the F. C. C. and others.

Mr. GESELL. The Office of Naval Intelligence was not the office concerned with the interception or any implementation that might have been seen?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. We were very much interested in the receipt of such a message if it were sent, and I know of no such implementing message having been sent.

Mr. GESELL. I next want to turn to or to check up with you the question of the events of December 6, and December 7.

Testimony before the committee appears to establish that on December 6 there was available, sometime during the day, a so-called pilot message, in which the Japanese advised from Tokyo that a

reply in 14 parts, to be delivered at a time later specified, was to come in.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. It also appears that 13 parts of that message were intercepted, decoded, and translated on the 6th.

[4659] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Were you at your office on December 6?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was out in my office, I think, until late before dinner, and before I left the office I saw the pilot message, and that night at home I saw the other.

Mr. GESELL. Did you see any message other than the pilot message before you left the office?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not, none of the 13 parts.

Mr. GESELL. That is what I refer to.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Under what circumstances did you see the pilot message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think it was brought to me in the normal course of events in connection with the magic book.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any discussion with anyone concerning it, after you saw it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, except I said, "We will be on the lookout for the message." I think I told Captain Kramer, "We will be on the lookout for the message when it comes through."

Mr. GESELL. What kind of set-up did you have in your [4660] office at the time that you could keep in touch immediately with developments when important messages such as this were coming in?

Admiral WILKINSON. We had normally a 24-hour watch in the domestic branch, and in the foreign branch. Within the last few days of the crisis developing, I had set up a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section alone. I think the day before, when it appeared that the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and more critical, I had set up, I believe, a watch of the senior officers of the Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant Director, to be in the Department.

Captain Kramer was on call, and I myself was on call. As it happened in this particular instance, Captain Kramer received the 13-part about 9 o'clock.

Mr. GESELL. I want to come that in a moment.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. You say you had a 24-hour watch set up in the Far Eastern Section?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Do you mean you had someone in the Navy Department on duty 24 hours a day?

Admiral WILKINSON. No one person, but in rotation, yes.

[4661] Mr. GESELL. Representing the specific interests of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch?

Admiral WILKINSON. Precisely. There were three officers in there, and they stood watch there in rotation.

Mr. GESELL. Would you mind indicating who these officers were who stood that watch?

Admiral WILKINSON. Captain McCullom, Colonel Boone, and Lieutenant Commander Watts.

Mr. GESELL. They were the three officers standing that watch during the specific time we are talking about?

Admiral WILKINSON. There were three. There may have been two or three more. As I recall, there was Lieutenant Siebold. I cannot remember whether he was on the watch or not.

Mr. GESELL. You had no discussion with anyone other than Captain Kramer concerning the pilot message before you left your office?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not particularly.

Mr. GESELL. What do you mean "not particularly"?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall. I think I told him we would be on the lookout for the other. I may have told the watch officer in the Far Eastern Section to be sure it did not get away from us when it came.

I may have told, and probably did tell, Captain Kramer [4662] to be sure they saw it in the front office.

Mr. GESELL. That is what I was getting at.

Admiral WILKINSON. I cannot say that I recall specifically that I did, but I feel sure I did.

Mr. GESELL. You don't recall about having given instructions to Admiral Stark or other key officers?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not at this long range.

Mr. GESELL. What time did you leave your office on the evening of the 6th?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have no specific recollection. I would say about 6 o'clock.

Mr. GESELL. You were at home and had a dinner party at your house that night, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. A small dinner with General Miles, Captain Beardall, and two French officers, whom, in my duties as Director of Intelligence, and taking care of the attachés, I had asked in.

Mr. GESELL. Now, at what time during that evening, did you learn that the 13 parts came in?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say roughly 9 o'clock. Commander, or Captain, Kramer called me up and said he was going to take this on the rounds and would come out to me later. I told him to go ahead.

Mr. GESELL. Did he discuss with you what deliveries [4663] he was going to make and to whom he was going to deliver the 13 parts?

Admiral WILKINSON. He was going to make the normal rounds. I will not say "normal" because it was after office hours, but in view of the importance of it, he was going to leave a copy at the White House, to see the Secretary of the Navy—to see Secretary Knox, and Admiral Stark, and Admiral Turner. He subsequently told me he was unable to reach Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark by telephone because they were out.

Mr. GESELL. Did Captain Kramer at that time discuss with you on the telephone the contents of the message?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. How did he refer to it, if you recall?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think he said, "The message we were waiting for has come in in part." He obviously could not speak of it on the telephone in detail. It would have been a gross breach of security.

Mr. GESELL. Did he subsequently come to your home?

Admiral WILKINSON. He did.

Mr. GESELL. What happened at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. He brought the message in, and General Miles and I read it over with him, and I think Captain, or Admiral, Beardall read it likewise.

[4664] Mr. GESELL. Now, what time was that?

Admiral WILKINSON. About 11 o'clock.

Mr. GESELL. You had other guests at your home, Admiral Wilkinson. Did you withdraw to another room to read it?

Admiral WILKINSON. We did.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have all 13 parts?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. You did not have the 14th part, or the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Now you went to another room with General Miles and Admiral Beardall and Captain Kramer, and read through the message?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Then what happened?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure of my own recollection. Captain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up, apparently, Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I asked Kramer whom he had shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White House, and had shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, made some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary of State the next morning.

[4665] While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left—again my recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear—he said I made some telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner again, on the basis of his information that they were not there. However, both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic white papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.

The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the next morning.

Mr. GESELL. You are discussing what was said at that time, are you, or are you telling what you thought?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am discussing what was said between General Miles and myself, as I recall.

Mr. GESELL. In the presence of Captain Kramer?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think so.

Mr. GESELL. Did Captain Kramer tell you at that time that he had been unable to reach Admiral Stark or Admiral Turner—

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe he did. I do not recall now, but he informs me he did, and I accept his statement.

[4666] Mr. GESELL. I am very anxious, Admiral, not only to get the full story, but I am very anxious to get your own recollection of what happened.

Admiral WILKINSON. I would like to have it myself, sir, but it is not complete.

Mr. GESELL. When you cannot recollect something I wish you would just say so, and then give us your best judgment, if you want to, as to what you think happened, or from what somebody told you.

Admiral WILKINSON. That is what I just said, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Right. Did Captain Kramer give you any information as to what had occurred at Secretary Knox's home?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; he said the Secretary had withdrawn with him and had gone over it with him carefully, and had then made some telephone calls and had directed him to bring the message to the State Department the next morning, from which Kramer inferred that he had called the Secretary of State, and possibly someone else.

Mr. GESELL. Did he say to you that Secretary Knox had called the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall it independently.

Mr. GESELL. He told you that he was instructed to deliver the message to the State Department the next morning?

[4667] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; and his assumption was that the Secretary's telephone calls may have been to those people. He did not hear them specifically.

Mr. GESELL. Did he tell you to whom he had delivered the message at the White House?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall. Obviously it was not to Captain Beardall, who was at my house.

Mr. GESELL. Did Captain Beardall read the message that evening?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is he did.

Mr. GESELL. You stated that General Miles and Captain or Admiral Beardall discussed the message and referred to it as more or less a white paper.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Or a diplomatic communication.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; a justification for the Japanese position.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion of this sentence, which appears as the last sentence in paragraph 5, which is the first paragraph of the thirteenth part, appearing at page 244 of Exhibit 1:

Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I do not recall any specific [4668] instruction on that one paragraph, or I do not recall any discussion of that one paragraph. I believe there had been exchanges in almost the same words in the past, however, when a proposal was being made and turned down and then brought up again.

Mr. GESELL. That sentence would indicate that negotiations were going to be broken off, would it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. If taken out of its text, yes.

Mr. GESELL. You did not think negotiations were going to be broken off in the first 13 parts of this message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was not sure they would be, and I did not think diplomatic relations would be broken. It is one thing to break off current negotiations and another thing to break off diplomatic relations. The same negotiations, I believe, had been broken off earlier and then resumed.

Mr. GESELL. So I gather the impression that you and the others arrived at at your home that evening was that negotiations were going to be broken off?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, not necessarily. That this was a rejoinder on the part of Japan that the last message we sent to them was not acceptable, which, in fact, we had not expected it to be.

Mr. GESELL. Now you said you believed on the basis of what Captain Kramer has told you that you tried to reach [4669] Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner by telephone. Is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; that would be my natural reaction, when he told me had not been able earlier to reach them, that I called them then.

Mr. GESELL. Did you do that, Admiral?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall. I do not know, except that I would have that natural reaction.

Mr. GESELL. I take it you are quite clear, however, in your recollection that you did not talk to either of those gentlemen on the phone that night, is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall having talked to them, no.

Mr. GESELL. What time did you go to your office the next morning?

Admiral WILKINSON. At about 8:30. Between 8:30 and 9.

Mr. GESELL. Had you received any additional information, by telephone or otherwise, during the night?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. It was Sunday morning, but I came down reasonably early in order to be on hand when the 14th part was received.

Mr. GESELL. You had no telephone call concerning it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. You do not recall whether anyone told you [4670] to come down?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, I came down anyway.

Mr. GESELL. You were on call, I understood you to say, in case anyone wanted to reach you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Ever since I had taken the job.

Mr. GESELL. What happened when you got to your office that morning?

Admiral WILKINSON. I sent for Captain McCollum, who had himself relieved the last man on the night watch shortly before 8 o'clock, and he came in and we talked over this matter, and my recollection is after he came in the fourteenth part was brought up to us.

Mr. GESELL. To you and McCollum?

Admiral WILKINSON. To me and McCollum. It may be he came in with it, I am not sure, or that shortly after he arrived the fourteenth part came in.

Mr. GESELL. About what time was that?

Admiral WILKINSON. About 9 o'clock.

Mr. GESELL. At that same time was there brought to your desk the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any other message brought to you at that time except the fourteenth part?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not believe so. If so, it was [4671] of relatively minor importance and I do not recall it.

Mr. GESELL. So at 9 o'clock on the morning of December 7 you had the fourteenth part in your hand, and do I understand the only other person in your office at that time was Captain McCollum?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe so. There were other people in the office; yes; but not in my room. I mean the Office of Naval Intelligence has a number of people in it.

Mr. GESELL. I mean the office in the sense of it being in your room.

Admiral WILKINSON. My room; yes.

Mr. GESELL. After having read the fourteenth part your mind was clear as to the breaking off of negotiations, was it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, it was not only clear about that, which was the last clause in the last paragraph, "it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations," but what was more striking to me was the language in which this last part was couched:

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war.

[4672] In other words, they were fighting words, so to speak, and I was more impressed by that language than by the breaking off of negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations could be resumed.

Mr. GESELL. They were really doing this in a big way, so you thought it was very serious?

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought it was very serious.

Mr. GESELL. What did you do?

Admiral WILKINSON. I talked to McCollum and we went to see Admiral Stark.

Mr. GESELL. Where was Admiral Stark when you saw him?

Admiral WILKINSON. He was in his office. I think we arrived there about 9:15.

Mr. GESELL. You think you arrived there at 9:15?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. Using "his office" in the sense of "room"?

Admiral WILKINSON. His room.

Mr. GESELL. Who else was in his room with him at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall. Ultimately Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner were there, but at that moment I do not recall who was there besides himself.

Mr. GESELL. Did you show Admiral Stark the 14th part?

[4673] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. That would be about 9:15?

Admiral WILKINSON. Somewhere around there, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. What discussions did you have with him concerning the fourteenth part at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I pointed out to him the seriousness of that language that I just mentioned, and I believe that I advised that the Fleet should be notified, not with any question of an attack on Hawaii in mind, but with the question of imminence of hostilities in the South China Sea. My recollection is that Admiral Stark at that time attempted to call General Marshall on the phone.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, did Admiral Stark have in front of him the 13 parts?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure whether he had them there or whether I brought them all down to him. Either as the result of my coming in or of the earlier receipt, he did have the fourteenth part, I am sure.

[4674] Mr. GESELL. So by 9:15 or 9:30, you are quite clear that Admiral Stark had read the 14-part message?

Admiral WILKINSON. To my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. In its entirety?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Now, when you discussed with him the sending of this message to the fleet, do I understand correctly that you still did not have the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. You say that you believe Admiral Stark tried to call General Marshall at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is that he did, to consult with him about a message of warning.

Mr. GESELL. The telephone calls made from the outside through the White House switchboard on those dates, as set forth in exhibit 58, show that Secretary Knox called Admiral Stark at 10:44 a. m. Do you remember that call?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. They show no calls by Admiral Stark to General Marshall until 12:10.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. They show but two calls by General Marshall to Admiral Stark, one at 11:30 and one at 11:40.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[4675] Mr. GESELL. Do you believe that sometime around 9:30—

Admiral WILKINSON. It is my impression that Admiral Stark either called General Marshall, or told me he would talk with General Marshall on the subject, and I had thought he actually tried to make the call while I was there.

Mr. GESELL. You think he picked up the phone and tried to make the call?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think so.

Mr. GESELL. Do you remember his talking to General Marshall?

Admiral WILKINSON. No; I am quite sure he did not.

Mr. GESELL. When did the 1 o'clock message turn up?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say roughly about 10:30 or 10:40.

Mr. GESELL. There had been no decision up to 10:30 or 10:40 to send any message to the fleet?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know. I had not been in there all the time.

Mr. GESELL. I want you to straighten me out on that. When did you leave the office?

Admiral WILKINSON. I suppose after Admiral Stark had [4676] read the message.

Mr. GESELL. And you had made your recommendation to him?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. When did you go back to his office?

Admiral WILKINSON. An hour later.

Mr. GESELL. And what was the occasion of your going back to his office?

Admiral WILKINSON. I may have gone back—I am not sure—I may have gone back to give him the 1 o'clock message, or I may have gone back to receive any further information.

Mr. GESELL. The best you can now recall is you went back?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. When, to the best of your recollection, was it that you received the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral WILKINSON. About that time, 10:30 or 10:40. Of course, these intervals of time are just relative. I had no intention of checking the clock at each moment. It was well after the fourteenth part, in other words.

Mr. GESELL. You think it was an hour later?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Or an hour and 15 minutes later?

[4677] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, nearly two hours later from the time I first saw the fourteenth part.

Mr. GESELL. You had seen that at 8:30?

Admiral WILKINSON. Between 8:30 and 9:00, yes.

[4678] Mr. GESELL. You are aware that there is quite a conflict of testimony, are you not, Admiral Wilkinson, as to when the 1 o'clock message was delivered to Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I did not know there was a conflict in when it was delivered to Admiral Stark. I knew there was a conflict as to when it was received in the Department.

Mr. GESELL. Your recollection as to when it was delivered to Admiral Stark is that it was about 10:30?

Admiral WILKINSON. Or 10:40, yes.

Mr. GESELL. Either you brought it there or you arrived at the time it got there?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. At that same time was there available the message concerning the destruction of codes, which appears in exhibit 1 at page 249, the first message at the top of the page, which gave the instructions to destroy the remaining cipher machine, the machine codes, immediately after deciphering the fourteenth part?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not believe so. I do not recall its being available at that time.

Mr. GESELL. What discussions took place in Admiral Stark's office when you arrived there about 10:30?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not remember a discussion [4679] particularly. I think it was noted that this was the presentation period that we were looking for. It was 1:00 o'clock on that day. It was a little sooner than we had expected, because the pilot message said it would be several days, perhaps. That 1:00 o'clock in Washington represented varying times throughout the Pacific and the Philippines.

I do not recall, as I have stated, that any special mention was made that it was daylight, or shortly after daylight, in Hawaii.

Mr. GESELL. You knew that it was, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Oh, yes. It was about two hours after actual daylight. I think you will get the first daylight about 5:30 there this time of the year.

Mr. GESELL. It was 7:30?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was 7:30 actual time, about two hours after daylight.

Mr. GESELL. Do you remember the various times that were discussed throughout the testimony?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think some mention was made, as often occurs among naval officers who are familiar with geographic time figures.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion had as to the fact that the Japanese had been directed to present, on a Sunday, to the Secretary of State, at 1:00 o'clock, this [4680] message? That was unusual as to time and unusual as to the day, was it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I do not recall any discussion except that it was sooner than we had expected from the pilot.

Mr. GESELL. Who else was in Admiral Stark's office at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, and I believe Captain McCollum.

Mr. GESELL. Anybody else?

Admiral WILKINSON. There may have been. I do not recall.

Mr. GESELL. And what happened after that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have no recollection. I think I left the office.

Mr. GESELL. When do you think you left the office?

Admiral WILKINSON. Within 10 or 15 minutes.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion of sending any warning message to the various outposts in the Pacific?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall it at the moment.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion of the fact that the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of War were meeting at the State Department at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall any conversations that [4681] Admiral Stark or anyone else in the room had by telephone with any of those Cabinet officers at that meeting?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Or any calls that they received from those Cabinet officers?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall.

[4682] Mr. GESELL. Or whether there was any call from the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall that specifically.

Mr. GESELL. Were there any telephone conversations had either way between Admiral Stark and anyone else in the office and the White House, President Roosevelt, or anyone else there?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall. There were several of us in the room. Admiral Stark may have picked up the phone and talked with someone. At any rate, I do not recall it now.

Mr. GESELL. When you left the office you had no indication that any warning message of any kind was going to be sent; is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, except that in my earlier discussion with Admiral Stark, I had the definite impression that after discussion with General Marshall, he was going to advise the fleet that the crisis was about to break. That was my impression. Just what caused that, I cannot tell you, except, as I say, I thought I recalled our mentioning it, that he picked upon the phone to call General Marshall, or at least he told me he was going to call General Marshall.

Mr. GESELL. When you saw him the second time, and [4683] he had the 1 o'clock message, he had much more specific information than when you saw him the first time, as to when things were going to happen, did he not?

Admiral WILKINSON. He had the specific information about when the message was to be delivered. He had no indication that anything else was going to happen. It would be inference.

Mr. GESELL. Was there any discussion that it was likely that the Japanese would time some action with the delivery of that note?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall any. It would be possible that they would strike before or after, and at the very moment of delivery it was not too significant. It really looked as though they wanted the thing delivered as soon as they could. They sent it over the wire one day and the next day said, "Turn it over at 1 o'clock."

Mr. GESELL. I understand your testimony to be: when you left, after you had been there the second time, you had no specific statement from Admiral Stark that he was going to send a message to the fleet.

Admiral WILKINSON. I recall an impression. Whether that impression was born in a specific statement, or born because of the atmosphere of the room, or recommendations of other officers, I do not know. I just have an impression [4684] he was going to consult with General Marshall, and advise the fleet, not that an attack was coming on Hawaii, but that something was about to break in the Japanese situation, and that the fleet should be prepared to steam, or whatever would be brought out by the action which, in fact, did result.

[4685] Mr. GESELL. There was no drafting of any message at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; not in my sight.

Mr. GESELL. On the second occasion was there any mention made of Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, except that it might have been mentioned, and I am not sure that it was, that 1 o'clock here was 7:30 there, or something of that sort.

Mr. GESELL. What was your reference to the fleet being prepared to steam?

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, what I meant was that if there was an indication that something was going to break it would be the natural desire of the Chief of Operations to advise the fleet it was about to break so that if there was any immediate departure from port necessary to fend off an attack, to start for some distant position, either to defend it or to intercept some attacking force—at any rate, he should beforwarned so that he could complete any last-needed stores in order to have the fleet immediately ready instead of generally ready.

Mr. GESELL. Now, it is your recollection that you did not have at that time the message telling the Japanese to destroy their codes upon

the completion of the translation of the fourteenth part? When did you get that message?

[4686] Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall. I imagine I got it subsequently because it brings no recollection to me; and, obviously, after the attack became known we wouldn't be interested in the destruction of the machine.

Mr. GESELL. When did you next go back to the office of Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I was at my office until some time past noon, went to lunch at home, and while at lunch got a telephone call and hurried back.

Mr. GESELL. After you left, that second occasion you were there, you had no further conversations with him by telephone or otherwise?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not until after the attack.

Admiral GESELL. You had no information then that a message was being sent by the Army or what the terms of it were?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GESELL. The officers were to be advised.

Admiral WILKINSON. Never heard of it for hours if not days.

Mr. GESELL. During this period that we have been talking about, the last month or 6 weeks or 2 months before the attack, Admiral, did you have any means in the Office of Naval Intelligence of keeping posted on diplomatic developments?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. There were several channels by [4687] which we had contact with the State Department. I, myself, rarely, if ever, was called to the State Department for a conference, but the Director of the Central Division, Captain Schuirmann, was the Chief of Naval Operations' direct representative with the State Department and he advised me usually of what transpired on the occasions that he was called in conference.

Mr. GESELL. He was not attached to your office?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, he was on the same level, as the head of the Central Division.

Also we had a lieutenant commander, Delaney Hunter, of the Naval Reserve, who was our liaison officer on the lower level, so to speak, and he went over to the State Department daily and searched through the dispatches there, and was shown dispatches from all parts of the world, and made copies of a number of them and extracts of them which because of code security could not be copied direct, and brought those back and gave me every day a list of State Department dispatches which were of interest to us.

Those dispatches, that little paper, usually a dozen pages, was circulated daily within the office of Naval Intelligence and within the office of the Chief of Operations.

Mr. GESELL. Those were diplomatic dispatches?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[4688] Mr. GESELL. Well, now, did you have any means of knowing what was taking place in the discussions between Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassadors?

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, in the first place, I saw the incoming magic, and usually I saw the outgoing magic, wherein the Ambassador was telling Tokyo what he had been doing. If something, on the other hand, was sent from the State Department to Mr. Grew to pre-

sent over there. I would not see it unless I was told it by Captain Schuirmann.

Mr. GESELL. Or your man went over and read the dispatches?

Admiral WILKINSON. He read only the incoming dispatches. I don't think he read the outgoing dispatches.

Mr. GESELL. So you knew what Ambassador Grew was reporting?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; in general, yes.

Mr. GESELL. You also knew in a general way what progress was being made and what recommendations were being made in the negotiations with the Japanese Ambassadors here?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. By the way, did you know that Ambassador Grew in February, 1941 had said that he picked up a rumor that there was a likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

Senator BREWSTER. Wasn't it January?

Mr. GESELL. I see the press nodding their heads, so I am sure you are right, Senator.

[4689] Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure whether I knew that at that time or not. I have heard it since, of course.

Mr. GESELL. Of course, that was—

Admiral WILKINSON. It was in line with the fears, the apprehensions of the whole Island, that the primary thing was an air attack.

Mr. GESELL. Of course, that was a message prior to your becoming Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted with respect to the placing of embargoes and freezing orders on the Japanese?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was not consulted and I don't think Admiral Kirk was.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have anything to do, Admiral, with the joint memoranda which General Marshall and Admiral Stark presented to the President, of November 5 and November 27?

Admiral WILKINSON. No; I wasn't aware of their existence until quite recently.

Mr. GESELL. Did you receive information from Admiral Stark and Captain Schuirmann, and others who were dealing with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, as to what was taking place at the War Council meetings and at meetings in Secretary Hull's office?

[4690] Admiral WILKINSON. Occasionally from Captain Schuirmann. Not as a matter of routine.

Mr. GESELL. There was no regular way of your being briefed on what was taking place in those, you might call, policy conferences?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. You see, that links up with that other question, whether I was consulted on the warning messages and so on. Our office was an incoming and receiving office of information from abroad and from the domestic areas. We were not concerned with the outgoing directives for the Fleet nor in fact told of the movements and operations of our own forces. When we got into the war I arranged for the setting up of a war room and thereupon we did to a large degree get the movements of our forces laid out so that we might have a better understanding and interpretation of the information from abroad.

But prior to getting into the war we did not know the United States side of an argument that was going on.

Mr. GESELL. I asked you whether you had anything to do with the joint memorandum to the President of November 5.

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. There is attached to that document some supporting papers, it is exhibit 16 here, a memorandum dated November 1 from Captain Boone of the Far Eastern Section. Have [4691] you ever seen that dispatch? I will show it to you.

Admiral WILKINSON. I am sure I did.

Mr. GESELL. That would suggest that perhaps you had some contact with that joint memorandum of the 5th.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, only that this is part of the information that they had at hand.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, that would be written to estimate the specific situation but without regard to the basic matters being discussed in the memorandum?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. This was some of the data upon which they based their decision.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any detailed knowledge of the Singapore staff conferences and other conferences which had been taking place between the Americans, the British and the Dutch?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, only that they had been held.

Mr. GESELL. Did you know that the Army—rather, did you know that a reconnaissance had been ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations, an air reconnaissance, for the purpose of picking up movements around the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I think I was aware of that.

Mr. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with the ordering of that reconnaissance?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

[4692] Mr. GESELL. Did you see the various reports that came in, as are included in Exhibit 78?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think so.

Mr. GESELL. But you had nothing to do with the decision to make the reconnaissance?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. That was a reconnaissance to confirm the evidences which we were getting of a movement south and to determine the precise locations of the Japanese ships and the degree and intensity of the movement. It confirmed the reports which we had received from our various coastal observers.

Mr. GESELL. Did you see a dispatch of December 2 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart expressing the President's desire to set up a so-called defensive information patrol by stationing three vessels in that area for reconnaissance purposes?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall having seen it.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know whether or not any such patrol was ever in fact established.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, I don't know.

Mr. GESELL. Do you ever recall seeing the dispatch from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations dated December 6 concerning the movement of Japanese vessels toward the Kra Peninsula, which is part of Exhibit 66, which I now [4693] show you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I think I saw that. I note that it has been signed for in my office. Although it does not bear my initials, I presume it was called to my attention.

[4694] Mr. GESELL. Do you recall a discussion of that piece of information on the 6th with anyone?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall the discussion. It had been sent to War Plans and Chief of Operations. So it seems no discussion was necessary. It was an indication that the movement was progressing as anticipated.

Mr. GESELL. You don't recall having any discussion with anyone concerning it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall having any discussion with anyone concerning the dispatches contained in exhibit 79 relating to the so-called Dutch alert?

Admiral WILKINSON. I recall some of them. I can't say specifically which.

Mr. GESELL. What is your recollection of the incident covered by those dispatches?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection of both the dispatches and of the contact with the Dutch naval attaché at the time was that the Dutch were seriously worried about the implied threat to the Dutch East Indies possessions by the Japanese movement down through the South China Sea, and that these dispatches had to do with such concern of theirs. It was more confirmatory evidence of the movement which eventually took place.

[4695] Mr. GESELL. That refers to the belief of the Dutch that there were fleet dispositions by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands. I gather from the dispatches that it was not the view of the Office of Naval Intelligence that the forces there were as strong as the Dutch had believed?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe that was the case, although we had some indications that the Marshall Islands further to the westward Palaus, that there was a force building up there, and the Pearl Harbor unit and the Corregidor unit were both watching for such radio intelligence indications as they could get as to the location of the Japanese ships, and there was a difference between them.

Corregidor, which we believed to be slightly more accurate, felt that there was no pronounced indications of a strong task force in the Marshalls, while the Pearl Harbor unit felt there was, but we didn't believe that there was a large force in the Palaus, as I recall.

Mr. GESELL. Did you ever receive any information from the Dutch, British, or any other friendly nation, which indicated that the Japanese were moving toward Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. That there was likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

[4696] Mr. GESELL. Did you know that the Naval Intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor had discontinued the tapping of a certain telephone of the Japanese consul on the 2d of December?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. I think we were getting information in the last part of that period prior to the attack by such methods, but I didn't know whether it was the district intelligence officer, or the FBI that was getting that.

Mr. GESELL. Did you have any information of the discontinuance of the tapping of the phones by the Naval Intelligence officer?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

Mr. GESELL. Did you ever receive, prior to the attack, any knowledge of the so-called Mori telephone tap?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure what that is. If that is the one about the flowers—

Mr. GESELL. I will show it to you.

Admiral WILKINSON. About poinsettias—

Mr. GESELL. Yes. You did not know of that in the Office of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. I think perhaps if the committee please, we might designate that conversation Exhibit 84, because [4697] there will be other questions concerning it with other witnesses, and I will introduce it at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Exhibit 84?

Mr. GESELL. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84.")

Mr. GESELL. One final question, which has to do with these messages involving code burning; I neglected to ask you whether you had had any conversations with General Miles concerning the sending of those messages, particularly the message to Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall any. I think it very probable I did.

Mr. GESELL. He stated, at page 2103, that he had conversations with you concerning that.

Admiral WILKINSON. No doubt we did.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall ever having discussed with him the question of that message sent in such terms that it would also go to the Army as well as the Navy?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions we have at this time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I would like to ask you [4698] a few questions, if I may please, sir.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you say you became Chief of ONI—when was it?

Admiral WILKINSON. October 15.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. October 15, 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you continued how long?

Admiral WILKINSON. Until July 20, 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. That was possible, but improbable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How is that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought it was possible, but improbable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever at any time prior to December 7, 1941, reach the conclusion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever think such an attack would be made?

[4699] Admiral WILKINSON. I had been out there, Mr. Chairman, for nearly 2 years, up until the spring of 1941.

The entire time I was there, I thought it was possible that if any war arose, or should any war be in progress, that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible; but neither then nor on my—after my departure in May of 1941—nor when I was in Naval Intelligence, did I think it was probable. I always thought it was possible. Almost anything is possible in war, given the tools that can reach the objective.

The Japanese had those tools.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But on up until December 1941, you did not think such an attack would be made?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not think it was probable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Even though you had examined and were familiar with the 14-part message, the so-called pilot message, or the 1 o'clock message, you still did not think an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable?

Admiral WILKINSON. All of those indicated, Mr. Chairman, that Japan was breaking off the negotiations for the adjustment of affairs in the Pacific.

On the evidences indicated, that she was expanding down through the South China Sea, going into Indochina, Siam, possibly the Kra Peninsula, on the basis of the physical [4700] evidences before us and on the basis of the breaking off of the negotiations—and those negotiations, you will remember, were designed to stop the infiltration or the movement of the Japs into Indochina and into those southern areas—on the basis of that, I figured that they were going to stop the negotiations and go on with their nefarious designs down there.

None of those messages gave me any cause to guess—and it would have been a guess only, and I am sorry I didn't guess it—but none of them gave me any suspicion or cause to guess that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor any more than on any other United States objective. In fact, I did not think an attack would be made on any United States objective, but I thought that the Japanese would pursue a course of successive movements, infiltration, trying the patience and temper of the Anglo-Saxon nations without actually urging them into war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you, during that time, Admiral, think that an attack on any other point of the United States positions was more probable than the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought that as one went westward of Pearl Harbor, the probabilities increased. In other words, the Philippines was the most probable, Guam the next, [4701] Wake the next, Midway the last, the last before Hawaii.

I did not think an attack on any of those was probable because I did not think there was a probability of an attack on any United States possession to thrust us, invite us, as it were, into war.

I, perhaps, gave the Japanese credit for less boldness and more political canniness—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or common sense?

Admiral WILKINSON. Than they possessed.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or common sense?

Admiral WILKINSON. Or common sense, to my mind, yes, sir.

In other words, I thought an attack on any United States possession was not probable but that the degree of probability increased, rather decreased, as you went from the Philippines eastward.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were familiar and, of course, kept posted with the progress of the negotiations that were then being carried on by our State Department with the Japanese representatives?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

[4702] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And still, in view of all of that, and the situation that appeared to be developing, more tense, on reaching a critical stage, you still did not think that war between the United States and Japan was probable?

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought it was probable but not inevitable, and I thought that—in my ill advised opinion—that it would come by easy stages, and that the Japs would try our patience as far as they could to avoid getting into war. They had been successful in Manchuria, China, and Indochina. I had heard of this imaginary line of 100° east longitude and 10° north latitude and I had some doubt as to whether we would be able, in the light of the temper of the country, to back that conclusion up.

As I understand it, the conclusion was, there was actually no promise that we would go to war, but that we would think it was a serious matter if they crossed that line. I had some doubt whether the country would be seriously concerned as to matters in that part of the world, and I thought the Japanese were going to push their luck in that part of the world as far as they could.

[4703] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, did you ever at any time prior to December 7, 1941, reach the conclusion that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I thought that war was becoming increasingly probable, but from all the angles that I saw it from, I did not think it was inevitable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, as I understood you to say, you did not know that the warning message of November 27, 1941, was sent to the commander of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander of the Pacific Fleet for some days after it was sent.

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure whether it was hours or days. I think about 2 days.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was about 2 days after the sending of that message before you found out that it had been sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to state that it was not a part of the responsibility of the position that you held to be familiar with messages going from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders of the fleets?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, unless I had had some share in the initiation of them, myself, when, of course, I would want to know whether they had been sent or not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Am I correct in my understanding that [4704] you also state that it was not a part of your responsibility to even keep up with the various locations of the fleets of the United States throughout the world?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. That was another Office of Operations, the so-called Ship Movements office, that had care of that, that took care of that, and we were privileged to inspect their records and their boards but we had no record of that of our own and we were not kept informed of it. Our activities were one-sided in that we were responsible for the information on the foreign navies and the foreign elements but not for our own.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is what caused me to wonder how you could operate intelligently as the word "intelligence" would imply without knowing where our Fleet units were?

Admiral WILKINSON. It did cause some difficulties at times and ultimately, as I explained, after the war started I got at the information and was able to keep our own boards posted with where our own forces were.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But I believe you had stated that it was a part of your responsibility to keep informed as to the location and movements of potential enemy fleets?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or the fleets of other countries of the world? [4704A] Admiral WILKINSON. Not only of potential enemies but of all countries, yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The fleets of all other countries?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you state, I believe, that at various times you were not prepared to give information as to the location of various units of the fleets of some of the other countries of the world?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. There were many ways in which we could detect them. First, of course, by actually sighting, whether by our own merchant ships or whether by our naval attachés or naval observers or consuls at the various points.

Then, second, we could detect them by radio bearings. If we got so-called radio direction finders it would indicate that this radio message was coming from such and such a spot or if we could obtain by the call that the ship was using and the message she was sending, whether we could translate it or not, we could identify the call, then we knew that ship was there and perhaps we would add up some other ships that we knew were usually in company with it, but when the actual sightings failed us and when the radio direction finders failed us and when radio indications were no longer of avail, as when a ship went into complete radio silence and they even [4705] stopped sending messages to her, why, then she disappeared into the void and we might not pick her up for some little time, that ship or a number of them with her.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You say there was a part of the Japanese fleet that was lost, or not accounted for, for some period of time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, for some 3 weeks prior to the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. For some 3 weeks?

Admiral WILKINSON. Several battleships and several carriers.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How is that?

Admiral WILKINSON. Several battleships and several carriers were lost for some 3 weeks prior to the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any information or gain any intelligence from any source about the Japanese task force leaving Japan on about, I believe, November 25th, which was the task force that finally resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. Our only indication was that she was not in other waters, that they were in home waters either close to Japan or somewhere in the sea off Japan where we had no means of detecting them. We did not know that they had actually sailed from Japan. When we knew that [4706] they were not down to the south from all we could pick up, they were either based on or leaving Japan proper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As the situation appeared to grow more critical did you increase your efforts to locate or ascertain the location of the units of the Japanese fleet?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. The Corregidor station, the Pearl Harbor station and ourselves were all anxious to get all the information we could. The commander in chief of the fleet in Pearl Harbor was aware that they were unlocated and he was trying to find them but there were simply no evidences except the negative evidence that nothing could be learned.

We have had similar experiences, of course, in this last war. Admiral Halsey's fleet has popped up frequently in a very annoying position for the Japanese when they had not been able to locate him.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you. Senator George would be next but he is not able to be present at the moment. Mr. Clark. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire.

Admiral WILKINSON. How do you do, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Admiral, there are just two or three questions in my mind that I would like to have your opinions on. I hope you will not consider this in the nature of cross-examination and I appreciate the difficulty of forming questions [4707] and probable replies after the event without being influenced by the event itself.

I want to go back prior to December the 7th and look at the things that are in my mind from that angle, sir, and I want to ask your opinion as to the strength of our military establishment in Hawaii prior to December the 7th, from the standpoint of an attacking force, whether it would be possible to take it, what would be the size of that undertaking and the likelihood of its success, including landing and taking the island?

Admiral WILKINSON. To land and take it I would say it would take a very large force, a force probably larger than the Japanese could muster, of shipping and troops, in view, particularly, of the shipping and troops that they were using in the South China Sea.

Mr. CLARK. Well, now, with the expansion going on to the south as it was and did, would there be any slight likelihood of such an attack on the Hawaiian Islands by the Japanese?

Admiral WILKINSON. Very slight, if at all, because of the known limitations of the Japanese shipping to carry the expeditionary force that would be necessary to land and take the island.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. Now, aside from that kind of an attack. [4708] how would the Hawaiian area be vulnerable?

Admiral WILKINSON. How would it be vulnerable?

Mr. CLARK. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. It would be vulnerable, of course, to a hit-and-run raid, which is precisely what it got. The Japanese were very fortunate, I think, that they were able to get in and out without detection.

Mr. CLARK. But what they did does demonstrate that that kind of a raid was possible.

Admiral WILKINSON. Was possible and without warning, and even with warning our carrier task forces have made the same raids on the Philippines and on Japan throughout this war.

Mr. CLARK. I assume that is why our forces had from time to time gone through what you call war games, in which a surprise attack by air was practiced?

Admiral WILKINSON. I presume so, sir, yes.

Mr. CLARK. Now, what about subversive activities?

Admiral WILKINSON. What, sir?

Mr. CLARK. It would be vulnerable also from the standpoint of subversive activities?

Admiral WILKINSON. We had always been apprehensive about that because of the large Japanese population. As it happened, that population was in the main very friendly and to the best of my knowledge there was no large-scale sabotage at all.

[4709] Mr. CLARK. Now, did you know of the telegram or radio-gram, whatever it was, that General Miles in G-2 sent warning against subversive activities?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure that I did. I think I probably did, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Did the Navy send any similar communications?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, because it was the Army's responsibility to control the civilian population.

Mr. CLARK. I beg your pardon?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, because it was the Army's responsibility to control the civilian population.

Mr. CLARK. I think it was General Marshall who first suggested here that the Hawaiian Islands and our military establishment there was on the flank of this Japanese movement to the south. What would be the importance of that militarily?

Admiral WILKINSON. Simply this, sir, that if your life line to an objective is longer in time or in distance from your home bases than the enemy is distant from that life line at any point, then you may be subjected to attack and to a severance of that life line.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. Now, if our establishment in Hawaii had not been attacked and we had remained in the full control of the whole establishment, naval and air and army, would that [4710] have constituted a serious threat to Japanese movement south?

Admiral WILKINSON. No doubt they would have been much concerned. I do not know whether our forces advancing from that line would have had to pass through the danger of air attack from the mandated islands, the Japanese islands, and it may have been that the damage we would receive from those islands might have beaten off the attack we might have been in the process of making, in other words, defeated the threat, but I can well understand the Japanese might be apprehensive about it.

Mr. CLARK. You do not understand the Japanese would be apprehensive about an attack by our entire Hawaiian establishment in this long movement they were making south?

Admiral WILKINSON. I should think they would, yes.

Mr. CLARK. Well, wouldn't that be of very great concern to them as a military matter?

Admiral WILKINSON. I should think so.

Mr. CLARK. Now, did the Hawaiian Islands in that respect occupy a position any different from the Philippines or the Canal Zone?

Admiral WILKINSON. Only as the geographic distances are involved. They were much less important, much less threatening than the Philippines.

Mr. CLARK. I beg your pardon?

[4711] Admiral WILKINSON. They were much less threatening to the Japanese than the Philippines. They were more threatening to the Japs than the Panama Canal military establishment. The Panama Canal was a means of uniting the oceans, of course, but the greatest military and naval threat, I think, to the southern advance, to the southern extension of the Japanese, was the Philippines. Next after that, because the intervening bases of Guam and Wake were inconsequential, and Midway, next after that was Hawaii.

Mr. CLARK. Well, now, am I to understand—and my own ignorance of military matters is perfectly complete, sir, so you will have to excuse me if I appear not to understand—

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not profess to know too much, sir.

Mr. CLARK. But do I understand from the military viewpoint the threat of the Hawaiian establishment to this Japanese movement south was not serious?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think if the Hawaiian establishment had not been largely depleted that the Japanese would in normal military precautions have had to feel their way to the southward much less rapidly than they did advance. I think they could still have advanced into Indochina and the Kra Peninsula. I assume that they could have gone much more rapidly into Java and into Borneo. It is a question of whether [4712] they could have gone into the Philippines and maintained themselves there. It would doubtless have brought on a fleet battle and our forces, had they advanced across the Pacific, would have been subjected to attacks by air from the Japanese air bases on the islands and they would have been doubtless subjected to attack by the Japanese Fleet. What the outcome of that would have been I do not know. Our navy was much smaller then than it was ultimately, and, in fact, at that time it was smaller than the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I am sorry to consume so much time. What is rolling over in my mind is whether Hawaii as it stood before the attack constituted such a threat to the Japanese movement south that an attack or some effort to remove that threat might reasonably have been anticipated on our side of the fence?

Admiral WILKINSON. I see what you mean, sir, and I think that it is a very sound presumption. Against it, perhaps, are the two facts: First, it would require extreme boldness, which they did actually show, because of the risk involved; and, second, it would be a presumption that the Japanese were prepared to attack the United States in a spot which would be certain to plunge them immediately into the war.

[4713] If, as I was mentioning to the chairman, they had determined to feel their way to the southward, to gain as much ground as possible without antagonizing and bringing on their heads the Anglo-

Saxon nations, they would not, of course, have been tempted to dispose of this threat because the threat would not have been operating against them.

Mr. CLARK. An attack in force with an attempt to take the islands being pretty inconsistent with their rapid extension south, and they having been warned specifically in Hawaii, our people, against subversive activities, a surprise air attack was the only thing, the only possibility left open, was it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. With respect to Hawaii, yes, sir, and submarines.

Mr. CLARK. I am talking about with respect to Hawaii.

Admiral WILKINSON. And submarine attack.

Mr. CLARK. Yes. Now, did you or anybody in all of the discussions that you ever heard of this whole situation, ever suggest the likelihood or the probability of a surprise air attack on the Hawaiian Islands and that there should be a specific warning against that, just as there was against subversive activities?

Admiral WILKINSON. For the entire year, sir, there had been discussion in various correspondence and plans laid out [4714] about air attack and I think that was in the mind of everyone there, the very possibility of a surprise air attack.

Mr. CLARK. Will you pardon me, sir? I am thoroughly familiar with some correspondence which General Marshall, and perhaps others, had back a good many months prior to that and the message from the Ambassador to Japan which has been referred to.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. What I had in mind in asking you that question was the two or three weeks preceding Pearl Harbor and particularly from the 27th of November to the 7th of December.

Admiral WILKINSON. May I have the concluding part of the question before this interpolation?

Mr. CLARK. I do not mind just asking the question again, sir. If you will allow me, I will repeat the question.

Admiral WILKINSON. I wish you would, sir. I was a little confused.

Mr. CLARK. As to whether or not, it being pretty generally conceded that Hawaii was right impregnable against an all-out assault for the purpose of taking the islands, and the command at Hawaii having been specifically warned against subversive activities, did anyone in the Navy or the Army or any other person in military life to whom you talked between [4715] the 27th of November and the 7th of December ever suggest specifically the possibility of an air attack and specific warning against that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think not, sir. The subversive warning, you will recall, was to the Army only and there was a general war warning sent to the Fleet as a whole, but I heard no specific mention as you suggest.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 4 o'clock and, Admiral Wilkinson, I will ask you to please return at 10 o'clock in the morning and Senator Lucas will be recognized.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., December 17, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, December 18, 1945.)

[4716]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[4717] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. GESELL. Mr. Chairman, one or two small matters.

From time to time we wish to place in the record evidence that has come along that has been gotten in response to requests. We have three highly significant documents here which I would simply like to have spread on the record. They relate to the meeting at Argentina.

The State Department has delivered to us three memoranda prepared by Mr. Sumner Welles covering his conversations with the President and Prime Minister Churchill at sea on August 10 and August 11. These relate to the so-called parallel action matter and I, simply, without taking the time of the committee to read these memoranda, would like to suggest that they be spread upon the record. They were made available to us yesterday. We had them immediately mimeographed and in view of their importance I wish to place them in the record immediately.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered. Each member of the committee has been furnished a copy?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. And they may, I think for convenience, following the suggestion of Senator Ferguson made the other day, be designated 22-B, so that they will run along with Exhibit 22 which contains the other documents relating to this subject.

[4718] The VICE CHAIRMAN. These will be designated exhibit 22-B, is that correct?

Senator BREWSTER. There are several of them. Shouldn't they be B, C, D, and so forth?

Mr. GESELL. Very well. We'll designate the one of August 10, 22-B, the one covering the morning conference of August 22-C and the one covering the afternoon conference of August 11, 22-D.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

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(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 22-B, 22-C and 22-D, and follow:)

[4719]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Sunday, August 10, 1941 At Sea.

Subject: British-American Cooperation.

Participants:

Sir Alexander Cadogan.

The Under Secretary of State.

Copies to:

I accompanied the President this morning to attend the religious services and the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the PRINCE OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance with the conversation which was had between the President, the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific and of a proposed joint declaration to be made by the President and the Prime Minister when their present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read as follows:

"Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government.

[4720] "Declaration by the United States Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power."

"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, His Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

"Declaration by the Netherlands Government:

[4721] "1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the Netherlands and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, Her Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

The draft of the proposed joint declaration reads as follows:

"The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of [4722] their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of speech and of thought without which such choosing must be illusory;

"Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of

essential produce not only within their territorial jurisdiction but between the nations of the world.

"Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting burdensome armaments."

As I was leaving the ship to accompany the President back to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declaration of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large number of cruisers to seize or to destroy all of the British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States herself entered the war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands and possibly the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were not done, the blow to the British Government might be almost decisive.

SUMNER WELLES.

U SW. GAM

[4724]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: MONDAY, AUGUST 11, 1941. AT SEA.

Subject: British-American Cooperation.

Participants:

The President.

The British Prime Minister.

Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Honorably Harry Hopkins.

The Under Secretary of State.

Copies to:

The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the *Augusta* at 11:00 a. m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins and myself.

I

The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prime Minister of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the contents of the letter were highly satisfactory and made possible without any difficulty the carrying out of arrangements for the occupation of the Azores as a means of assurance that the islands would not be occupied by Germany.

[Handwritten note:] Card for Atlantic Charter.

[4725] Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation had been decided upon by the British Government, namely, the occupation of the Canary Islands during the days immediately after the September full moon. This date, as Mr. Churchill remembered it, would be about the 15th of September. The British Government were undertaking this operation with full knowledge that the islands had been recently heavily fortified and that a very large number of German officers were engaged there in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops. It was undertaken with the further realization that this step would almost inevitably involve a Spanish attack either in conjunction with or upon the instigation of German military forces and that such attack would render untenable by the British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar. The British Government, however, had decided upon the step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain from the

British standpoint was going from bad to worse and that Hitler almost inevitably would undertake the occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent penetration of North Africa if any collapse took place on the part of the Russian Army or even if a winter stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated Gibraltar would be isolated anyway and the occupation by Great Britain of the Canary Islands was of the utmost [4726] importance in guarding a southern Atlantic convoy route into the British Isles.

In view of this operation, the British Government would not be in a position conveniently to carry out the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Government to assist in the defense of the Azores.

In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to the President, it was therefore agreed that the British Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British Government could not conveniently undertake to assist in the defense of the Azores and would further inform Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request the United States for such assistance. It was agreed on the part of the President that immediately upon the receipt of such notification from Dr. Salazar the United States would send the necessary forces of occupation to the Azores and that the Brazilian Government would be simultaneously requested to send at least a token force to take part in the expedition.

The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view of our present military situation if the United States undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a position in the near future at least to undertake the protection of the Cape Verde Islands. Mr. Churchill [4727] stated that the British Government would be in a position to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the understanding that it would later turn over the protection of those islands to the United States at such time as the United States was in a position to take those measures. Mr. Churchill further stated that during the time that the United States was landing the necessary forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a large force between the Azores and the mainland of Portugal in order to render impossible the sending of any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that time be already occupied by Germany.

II

The Prime Minister then said that he desired to discuss the situation in the Far East. He had with him a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had already given the President a copy and which suggested that the United States, British and Dutch Governments simultaneously warn Japan that further military expansion by Japan in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter measures by the countries named even though such counter measures might result in hostilities between them and Japan, and, second, provided that the United States declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the assistance of the Netherlands East Indies as a result [4728] of aggression against the latter on the part of Japan the President would request from the Congress of the United States authority to assist the British and Dutch Governments in their defense against Japanese aggression.

The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable.

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, that he felt very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do was to request Secretary Hull by radio to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see the Ambassador immediately upon his return. The President stated that in that interview he would inform [4729] the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese Government would give the commitment contained in the first paragraph of the proposal of the Japanese Government of August 6, namely, that the Japanese Government "will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will be withdrawn", specifically and not contingently, the United States Government, while making it clear that the other conditions

set forth by the Japanese Government were in general unacceptable, the United States would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to explore the possibilities inherent in the various proposals made by Japan for the reaching of a friendly understanding between the two Governments. The President would further state that should Japan refuse to consider this procedure and undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, the President desired the Japanese Government to know that in such event in his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking of such further measures might result in war between the United States and Japan.

Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the procedure suggested appeared to him to cover the situation [4730] very well. He said it had in it an element of "face-saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would constitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the consequences involved in a continuation by Japan of her present course.

There was then discussed the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union.

I stated that in my judgment the real issue which was involved was the continuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area. I said it seemed to me that the statement which the President intended to make to the Japanese Government might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific area.

The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this and it was decided that the step to be taken by the President would be taken in that sense.

[4731] The question then arose as to the desirability of the President's making reference in his proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador to British policy in the southern Pacific region and specifically with regard to Thailand. The President said that he thought it would be advantageous for him to be in a position at that time to state that he had been informed by the British Government that Great Britain had no aggressive intentions whatever upon Thailand. Mr. Churchill said that in this he heartily concurred.

I asked whether it would not be better for the President to be in a position to state not only that Great Britain had no intentions of an aggressive character with regard to Thailand, but also that the British Government had informed the United States Government that it supported wholeheartedly the President's proposal for the neutralization of Indochina and of Thailand.

Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would be well to make an all-inclusive statement of that character with respect to British policy, that he trusted that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese Ambassador that he had consulted the British Government, and that the British Government was in complete accord with the neutralization proposal, and that it had likewise informed the President that it would in no event [4732] undertake any initiative in the occupation of Thailand.

It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after further consultation with Mr. Churchill, would give me in writing a statement which the British Government was prepared to make with regard to this issue.

The President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be held off for at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if negotiations or conversations actually took place between the United States and Japan on the basis which had been formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific might be averted.

III

Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring up for discussion the proposed joint declaration by the President and himself.

The President said that he believed the best solution of this problem was for an identic statement to be made in London and in the United States, probably on Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime Minister and the President had met at sea, accompanied by the various members of their respective staffs;

that these members of the two Governments had discussed the [4733] question of aid under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act to nations resisting aggression, and that these military and naval conversations had in no way involved any future commitments between the two Governments, except as authorized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act; that the Prime Minister and the President had between them discussed certain principles relating to a better future for the world and had agreed upon a joint declaration which would then be quoted verbatim.

Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form in which the President had desired to make it clear that no future commitments had been entered into. The President stated that that portion of the proposed statement was of extreme importance from his standpoint inasmuch as a statement of that character would make it impossible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United States to allege that every kind of secret agreement had been entered into during the course of these conversations.

Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side of the question, but that he believed that any categorical statement of that character would prove deeply discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries and would have a very serious effect upon their morale. He likewise made it clear that a similar effect would [4734] be created by British public opinion. He asked if the statement could not be worded in such a way as to make it positive rather than negative, namely, that the members of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of the President had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act. The President replied that he believed that the statement could be drawn up in that way and that if he then were queried in the United States he need merely reply that nothing had been discussed or agreed upon other than that which had already been indicated in his public statement.

I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan copies of a redraft which I had made this morning of the proposed joint declaration before Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of going over it with the President, and the latter had approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to read it. He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the third point before the word "self-government" the words "sovereign rights and". This was agreed upon.

Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read as follows: "Fourth, they will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to [4735] the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

He immediately inquired whether this was meant to apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied that, of course, it did, since the policy which the United States Government had been pursuing for the better part of nine years had been addressed primarily towards the removal of all of those artificial restrictions and controls upon international trade which had created such tragic havoc to world economy during the past generation. I said I understood fully the immediate difficulties which this occasioned him, but I pointed out that the phraseology was "they will endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on the part of his Government. The President stated that he believed the point was of very great importance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and equal opportunity of an economic character.

The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was without any power himself to agree upon this point. He set forth in considerable detail the position of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the Dominions and emphasized [4736] his inability, without the agreement of the Dominions, to enter into the proposed declaration insofar as this point was concerned. He said that insofar as he himself was concerned the issue was one with which his own personal life history was connected. He referred to the days at the outset of the century when Joseph Chamberlain first brought up the proposal for Empire preferences and the predominant part which this issue had played in the political history of Great Britain during the past forty years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now phrased would have the enthusiastic support of all the liberals everywhere. He said that he himself was heartily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa agreements. He said, however, that it would be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to this question.

Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander Cadogan and I be requested to draft new phraseology which would take care of these difficulties and prevent the delay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was inconceivable that the issuance of the joint declaration should be held up by a matter of this kind.

I said that in my own judgment further modification [4737] of that article would destroy completely any value in that portion of the proposed declaration. I said that it was not a question of phraseology, that it was a question of a vital principle which was involved. I said that if the British and the United States Governments could not agree to do everything within their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war world. I said that the trade policies of the British Empire during the latter portion of the nineteenth century had, I felt, contributed enormously to the sane and prosperous condition of the world at that time, and that, of course, I realized that the tariff policies pursued by the United States and many other countries during that period had played an important part in the creation of the evils which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however, that it seemed to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new and better world and that except through an agreement upon such a policy by our two governments there would be no hindrance whatever to a continuation later [4738] to the present German practices of utilizing their trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends.

Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this policy. He and Sir Alexander Cadogan both agreed that it was not a question of phraseology, but that they were up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had already indicated. The Dominions would have to be consulted. It might well be that an agreement could not be had from the Dominions and that consequently the proposed joint declaration could only be issued some time after news of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill suggested that the inclusion before the phrase "they will endeavor to further" of the phrase which would read "with due regard for our present obligations" might ease the situation.

The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed, that the latter would try and draft some phraseology which would make that situation easier, and it was arranged that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime Minister and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them such redraft as they might have in mind.

Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points five and six.

He then read point seven and after discussion at the [4739] meeting of this point it was agreed that the phrase "to use force" be replaced by the word "aggression" in the second sentence of the seventh point.

Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily and enthusiastically in favor of this point seven, which had been initiated by the President. He inquired, however, whether the President would not agree to support some kind of "effective international organization" as suggested by the Prime Minister in his original draft of the proposed joint declaration.

The President replied that he did not feel that he could agree to this because of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favor of the creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time had transpired and during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr. Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express the President his feeling that point seven would create a great deal of opposition from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized that, but that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that [4740] in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr. Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and shared the President's view.

The meeting then broke up and I arranged with the President that I would drop by to see him after my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able to leave until at least 5:00 p. m., tomorrow, August 12 and that as he felt it of importance to reach a complete meeting of minds with the President upon all of the issues involved,

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that he would be willing to spend an additional twenty-four hours should that be necessary.

SUMNER WELLS.

U SW, GAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: MONDAY, August 11, 1941. AT SEA.

Subject: British-American Cooperation.

Participants:

Sir Alexander Cadogan.

The Under Secretary.

Copies to:

[4741] I went by arrangement to see Sir Alexander Cadogan on the PRINCE OF WALES this afternoon. He gave me to read memoranda which he had already completed on the conference between the Prime Minister and the President this morning and, with a few changes which I indicated, they appeared to be a correct presentation of the discussion and of the agreements reached.

With regard to the draft of the joint declaration, Sir Alexander told me that the Prime Minister had already radioed to London the text of the proposed joint declaration incorporating therein modifications of points four and seven. Sir Alexander gave me the revised text to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's draft of point four was far broader and more satisfactory than the minimum which the President had instructed me, after our conference of the morning, to accept, I raised no objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change in point seven I stated that while it was completely satisfactory to me and entirely in accord with my own way of thinking I had no idea what the President's decision might be. I said that I would have to submit it to him.

Sir Alexander stated that the Prime Minister felt very strongly—perhaps exaggeratedly—the opposition which would be created on the part of a certain pro-League-of- [4742] Nations group in England to the contents of point seven declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say that while he believed there would not be the amount of opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he nevertheless thought that it would be a tragic thing to concentrate solely upon the transition period after the war was ended when some kind of joint police power would have to be exercised by the British and by the United States Governments and omit any reference to the need of the creation of some effective and practicable international organization which would function after the transition period was concluded. I said that as I had already indicated while I was in full agreement with his own views the matter would have to be determined by the President.

We discussed the desirability of informing the Chinese Government of the steps which the United States Government in the person of the President was taking with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very definitely that every effort should be made to keep China closely informed of what was being done in her interests by Great Britain and by the United States I wondered whether telling China of what the President intended to state to the Japanese Government at this [4743] particular moment would not mean that the Government at Chungking for its own interests would make public the information so received. If publicity resulted, I stated I feared that the extreme militaristic element in Tokio and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled by Germany would immediately take advantage of the situation so created to inflame sentiment in Japan to such an extent as to make any possibility remote, as it might anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through negotiation with Japan. Sir Alexander said he was entirely in accord and would be governed by those views. He said, of course, I realized how terribly persistent the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in London, Dr. Wellington Koo, would undoubtedly press him day in and day out to know what had transpired at the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President with regard to China. He said that he felt that the best solution was for him merely to say in general terms that the two governments had agreed that every step should be taken that was practicable at this time for China and its defense and avoid going into any details.

I subsequently went to see the President. The President said that he was entirely in accord with the redraft of point four which was better than he had [4744] thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He also accepted without question the amendment made by Mr. Churchill to point seven and the President said that it seemed to him entirely desirable since the amendment made it clear that once the war was over a transition period would have to take place and that the permanent international organization would only be set up after that experimental period had passed. He had jotted down certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint declaration, most of which were merely verbal changes for the purpose of clarification.

I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him whether he did not believe that a very considerable opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the United States would result from that portion of point seven which declares in the judgment of the United States that it is essential that aggressor nations be disarmed. I said that if a great Power like the United States publicly declares that something is essential, the inference is that the Power is going to do something itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than likely that the isolationists will insist that this public statement by the President meant that the United States would go to war in order to disarm not only Germany but even possibly Japan and theoretically, at [4745] least, even the Soviet Union if that country should later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors. The President replied that the whole intent of point seven, as he saw it, was to make clear what the objective would be if the war was won and that be believed people in the United States would take that point of view. He further said he felt the realism inherent in article seven was one which would be apparent to the enormous majority of the American people and that they would enthusiastically support the need for the disarmament of aggressor nations.

I said I also had been surprised and somewhat discouraged by a remark that the President had casually made in our morning's conference—if I had understood him correctly—which was that nothing could be more futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of the need for a transition period upon the termination of the war during which period Great Britain and the United States would undertake the policing of the world, it seemed to me that it would be enormously desirable for the smaller Powers to have available to them an Assembly in which they would all be represented and in which they could make their complaints known and join in [4746] recommendations as to the policy to be pursued by the major Powers who were doing the police work. I said it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the most effective safety valve that could be devised.

The President said that he agreed fully with what I said and that all that he had intended by the remark he made this morning was to make clear his belief that a transition period was necessary and that during that transition period no organizations such as the Council or the Assembly of the League could undertake the powers and prerogatives with which they had been entrusted during the existence of the League of Nations.

I further said that while from the practical standpoint I was in agreement that the United States and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or would exercise the police trusteeship and that it seemed to me that it would be impossible if such a trusteeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other American republics or for that matter the countries at present occupied such as Norway, the Netherlands, and even Belgium. The President said that he felt that a solution for this difficulty could probably be found through the ostensible joining with Great Britain and the United States of those Powers, but it would have to be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of [4747] the nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or, at least, considerable part in the task involved.

I said that it seemed to me that now that the text of the joint declaration had been agreed upon, since I assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that the British Government would support his recommendations with regard thereto, all that was left to do in the way of drafting was the preparation of the brief statement which would be issued simultaneously in London and at Washington announcing that the President and the Prime Minister had met, referring to the discussions under the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination thereof of the text of the joint declaration. I said that Mr. Churchill had told me that

he had cabled his Government that he was not leaving Argentina until Wednesday afternoon and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely agreed upon and cleared up by 1:00 p. m. tomorrow, and I could see no practical reason for waiting another twenty-four hours. The President agreed and said that he would try and get a decision reached in that sense when he saw Mr. Churchill this evening.

SUMNER WELLES.

U SW . GAM

[4748] Mr. GESELL. Also, we would like to have just to make the record complete, designated Exhibit 8-A, three additional reports received from General MacArthur concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. These simply supplement the information already available but we want to furnish to the committee everything we have received. Perhaps, following Senator Brewster's suggestion, these should be designated 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is, the 4 December 1945, exhibit 8-A; 29 November 1945, 8-B; and 12 November 1945, 8-C, is that correct?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is, the 4 December 1945, Exhibit 8-A; 8-B, and 8-C.")

Mr. GESELL. Now, my attention was also called to the fact that while in the questioning of Admiral Wilkinson, reference was made to the letters from Admiral Kimmel concerning the transmission of information, that I failed to read into the record Admiral Kimmel's request for information and the replies that he received, and with the committee's permission, I would like to get those into the record now.

Some time ago the committee was handed this correspondence between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark and we do not feel it should be offered at this time, since it relates to [4749] the testimony of those officers when they appear, but I will simply read the pertinent portions relating to this matter of information.

The first is a postscript appearing to a letter of February 18, 1941, addressed to Admiral Stark by Admiral Kimmel which reads as follows:

P. S. We receive through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

To that letter there is a reply of Admiral Stark's [4750] dated March 22, 1941, and I will read the portion relating to the postscript I have just read from Admiral Kimmel's letter. [Reading:]

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINcUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently,

or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI-49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moved over each route.

There is then a further memorandum or letter of Admiral Kimmel dated May 26, 1941, which it is my understanding he delivered to Admiral Stark with respect to information. That memorandum under paragraph VII reads as follows:

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change [4751] of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action, so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by [4752] strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

I am sorry for that long interruption.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is alright. Does that complete counsel's request?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

[4753] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just as a matter of information, I notice in addition to the six documents which have already been admitted for the record under the exhibit numbers given there, is a one-sheet statement here, "War Plans Division (OP-12)." Is that to be included now, or just for the information of the committee?

Mr. GESELL. No, sir; that is in anticipation of the questioning of Admiral Turner. It relates to the functions of the War Plans Division. We can insert it now, but we thought perhaps the members of the committee wished to see it, for possible use in the examination of Admiral Wilkinson.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Counsel?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you have any statements that you desire to make regarding your testimony?

Admiral WILKINSON. There are one or two questions, Mr. Chairman, that were asked me yesterday to which I have, at least, partial information.

One was the number of personnel engaged in the radio intelligence work, including the decrypting, in the fall of 1941. I inquired about that. Although the best witnesses, of course, are the communications authorities, the information [4754] they gave me was that the total radio establishment was 700, including about 80 officers. That embraced the entire world, as far as our radio intelligence activities were concerned. Of this total nearly two-thirds were engaged in direction finding or intercept work, or training for that work, and the remainder, some over one-third of the 700, and including most of the officers, was engaged in the crypt analysis and translation, which was the primary question.

The second question was to locate, if practicable, the incident which I spoke of wherein Lieutenant Commander Okada, the Japanese naval officer, engaged in espionage on the west coast, and had reported the precise location of the ships in the Bremerton Navy Yard. That information I have not found. It is not in the local file, apparently. We have sent a dispatch to the west coast to find the documents that were seized there, and I have an intelligence report from Los Angeles to Tokyo, an intercepted, decrypted, and translated code message, speaking of the movements of several ships, and included in there, that a 55-destroyer squadron was moved from San Deigo to presumably San Pedro. The translation is inadequate on the 25 and 2 vessels which were tied up at the Bethlehem and Los Angeles shipyards and repair work was begun.

Then there are further notes as to the movement and prospective movements of other ships.

[4755] In checking my testimony with respect to the distribution of the intercepts in the locked pouches, and in the bags, I find I was in error in my recollection in that the locked pouch was left for the Chief of Naval Operations and separately for the Secretary of the Navy, and a sealed pouch was left at the White House.

I said I thought there was a separate copy there, and one for the War Plans officer. The copy that came to the Far Eastern Section and myself was a folder, and I had erroneously thought that was the same copy that went elsewhere. There were separate copies.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas from Illinois will inquire.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday you gave to the committee certain information about the location of the various fleets of potential enemies throughout the world during the month of November and the first week of December, and you advised the committee that there were many ways in which the Navy could detect these fleets; first by actual sight by our own merchant ships, and second by our own attachés, or the consuls at the various ports.

[4756] Now, let me ask you, insofar as information coming from the Far East is concerned, from whom did you receive such information as to the location of the Jap ships during the months of November and December, 1941.

Admiral WILKINSON. We had reports from the State Department, the consuls, we had reports from our naval attaché in Tokyo, and I do not know whether he was able to detect anything at that particular period.

We had several very pertinent reports from our assistant naval attaché at Shanghai, and our observers in the Chinese ports, one or two, and they also got further reports.

Senator LUCAS. Now, are you familiar with the memorandum entitled "Japanese Fleet Locations" from November 4 up to December 1, inclusive?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I should like to have you, Admiral, look at this document. The document is dated December 1, 1941. I would like to have you tell the committee what the letters "Op-16-F-2" mean at the top there?

Admiral WILKINSON. Operation 16 is the Office of Naval Intelligence, and F-2 is the Far Eastern Section. That is the office that originated the paper, Captain McCullom's office.

Senator LUCAS. That memorandum purports to advise [4757] Naval Intelligence in Washington as to the Japanese Fleet locations as of December 1, 1941; is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. To the best of the knowledge that we could deduct and infer, and actually have from our various stations, they were not only the sightings, but also radio intelligence analyses, the traffic analyses of ship calls, and so on, conducted primarily at Honolulu and Corregidor, and adjusted between the two.

On November 24, we had sent out a message saying we would not expect many more sightings in the open seas because of the ocean traffic falling off, and in consequence we would be more and more reliant on the radio intelligence, and would Com 14, which was Honolulu, and Com 16, which was Corregidor, please make complete analyses of everything that came, and Com 16 would be the record coordinator, because they had more intercepts and larger scouting work.

Senator LUCAS. This is the last account received from the Far East in answer to that query?

Admiral WILKINSON. It is the result of what they had had, and what we could pick from our other reports as well, although we had instructed our naval attaches and observers to send reports also to the commander in chief, Asiatic, and commander in chief, Pearl Harbor, so those fellows, in addition to ours, had the benefit of the naval attachés [4758] and observers report. All three officers had the same sources.

Senator LUCAS. In answer to the query you also received from Hawaii their best judgment as to the Japanese Fleet location at that particular time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; and all three officers were aware even before the printing of the data which went into the preparation of this paper.

Senator LUCAS. I presume you have made an examination of both of these reports, one received from the Far East and one received from Hawaii at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not quite understand you.

Senator LUCAS. I presume you have examined, I presume you did examine at the time, the memorandum that came from the Far East as well as the memorandum that came from Hawaii, with respect to the fleet locations of the Japs?

Admiral WILKINSON. I understand, sir. There was not a specific memorandum as such. There were a series of messages indicating factual data, and they were compiled in the Far Eastern Section.

I myself did not examine the memorandum coming it.

Senator LUCAS. Who did examine it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Captain McCollum's section, and I think Lieutenant Commander Watts.

[4759] Senator LUCAS. Were they under your direct supervision?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. It was the duty of those two officers to examine these memoranda as they came in, and give to you their evaluation, or their best judgment, as to what they meant?

Admiral WILKINSON. To prepare this paper which we have before us, which was not only for me, but after I approved it, was for the benefit of all officers who received it.

Senator LUCAS. It is my understanding that the report that came from the Hawaiian Department indicated definitely that they had lost the fleet completely as of December 1, 1941, that is the fleet that finally struck the Hawaiian Islands, they reported that they knew nothing about that fleet from their own intelligence work that they were doing at that time; is that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall it specifically, but I think it is not quite correct, because all of us had lost it.

[4760] Senator LUCAS. That is the point I wanted to make, insofar as the memorandum from the Far East is concerned. You will notice on the first page it states definitely that the battleship *Hiyei* was located near Sasebo, and the battleship *Kirishima* was located near Kure.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Then on the next page, insofar as the carrier fleet is concerned, you find that the *Akagi* was located near Kyushu, and the *Kaga* near Kyushu, the *Soryu* near Kure, the *Hiryu* near Kure, the *Ryujo* near Kure, the *Zuikaku* near Kure and the *Shogaku* near Kure. It is my understanding that those two battleships and those vessels in the carrier fleet that I have just mentioned, were in the Pacific force that attacked Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I am just wondering whether or not that was ever called to your attention as being in direct conflict with the report that was made from Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. It is obviously an error. That was the last indication we had gotten on those ships. We had reported in other papers, as I recall, and certainly in conversations to the recipients of this memorandum that some battleships and a number of carriers were unlocated and were believed to be in home waters. Home waters, of course, is an [4761] indefinite term, signifying waters near the Japanese coast.

Senator LUCAS. Now how would the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Division locate, for instance, the battleship *Hiyei* as being near Sasebo? How would he get that information?

Admiral WILKINSON. Possibly from radio direction finding on a ship which was sending out a radio message and which was identified, correctly or wrongly, as that particular battleship; possibly from the fact that the radio station at Sasebo was issuing messages apparently directed to that ship and hence she would be in the vicinity of Sasebo to receive those messages.

I am not sure of the other features of radio intelligence, because that is outside my scope, but that is my general naval knowledge as to how one would detect it.

Senator LUCAS. Obviously, though, the battleship we are talking about was not near Sasebo at that time.

Admiral WILKINSON. Quite right, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And the point occurred to me as to how an intelligence officer could be mistaken about two battleships and a number of carriers in the carrier fleet.

Admiral WILKINSON. They had not been located recently, sir. The statement should have been more correctly made, "Unlocated" instead of which the statement was apparently [4762] made as of the last location in which they had been found and where, pending evidence to the contrary, they were still presumed to be.

Senator LUCAS. Which report did the Navy follow, if you remember, with respect to the Japanese Fleet being lost?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not quite understand, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Which report did the Naval Intelligence in Washington follow with respect to these ships being lost or being located? One report says they were located and another report says they were lost.

Admiral WILKINSON. We followed the report that we were not at the moment able to locate them, sir.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, you did not give any consideration to the Far Eastern report then?

Admiral WILKINSON. We should have checked it and corrected it, but we checked that by our knowledge of unlocated ships. The two are obviously in conflict.

Senator LUCAS. Obviously if these two battleships and this great group of ships in the carrier fleet were near Kure on December 1, it would be rather difficult for them to get to Hawaii by December 7.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I was just wondering whether that was not taken into consideration by those here in the Naval Intelligence [4763] Department, insofar as we assumed there was a failure of a proper warning at the time in Hawaii.

Admiral WILKINSON. There might have been, sir; but I do not think so, because the recipients of this material who, you will note, on the last page were the Chief of Naval Operations OP-12, which was the War Plans, OP-38-W, which was the so-called War Room where the tracks of ships were maintained, and all of them were aware that certain ships had not been located. So that this report erroneously entering the last location where they had been found rather than their present location I do not think was deceptive to the Navy Department,

nor did it go out as such anywhere excepting those officers that I mentioned, as shown on page 4.

It is true, of course, that this data from which this was compiled was also available at Manila and at Pearl Harbor, and the wrong inferences might have been drawn there as to the location of these ships, even though this paper itself did not go there, but I think that all hands were aware that certain ships had not been located, because we have had statements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer that he knew that they were not located, and I believe the same thing is true in Manila.

Senator LUCAS. Do I understand from your last statement that the memorandum of Japanese fleet locations that came [4764] from the Far East was also available to the Hawaiian Department on December 1, 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. This memorandum was furnished only to those recipients that are listed on page 4, the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of War Plans Division, the Chief of the office where the tracking of the fleet was carried on, and the head of the Foreign Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The data, however, from which this was compiled was available in both Manila and in Pearl Harbor. It was possible that erroneous deductions might have been made from it, but I do not believe such to be the case, since we have evidence indicating that it was known that those ships were unlocated at both those stations.

[4765] Senator LUCAS. Well, the Hawaiian Department definitely informed the Intelligence Department here in Washington, D. C., that they had completely lost the Japanese fleet at that particular time and gave no report to your department such as was found in the Far Eastern report of December 1, with respect to these particular battleships and carriers, the ships in the carrier fleet that I have pointed out?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, they made no such report. This is, I think, erroneous. This is obviously erroneous. I think it was compiled from the last locations at which they had been sighted, and they were by no means certain that they were still there, but that was the last one they had.

Senator LUCAS. Was the Japanese fleet ever lost for a period of three weeks before, insofar as the Intelligence Department of the Navy was concerned?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure that the entire Jap fleet had been. I am not sure of any particular large force, but I know that it was impossible to keep track of all the ships and all the forces in any fleet continuously.

I think it probable that large elements were lost from time to time and subsequently recovered in harmless positions. This time it was in a harmful position when it was [4766] found.

Senator LUCAS. Do you remember ever losing track of a task force of the size that struck Pearl Harbor at any time previous to December 1?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would not know of my own recollection, and I do not recall having been so told.

Senator LUCAS. Was there any reason why this task force should go into hiding if it was going into the China Sea and was on its way to Singapore, we will say, or the Australian section?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; every nation is always desirous of concealing its full plans, and although it was obvious that some strength was going down to the south China Sea, there would be good reasons to hide the fact that their main strength was going there.

Again, they might have been proceeding into the Marshalls, for an attack on New Guinea or on Borneo. They might have been working down to the Marshalls for an attack toward Samoa. It would be desirous of concealing the movements of its main strength forces wherever they were.

Senator LUCAS. The only real reason for the concealing of their force was the United States battleships and the fleet at Pearl Harbor; isn't that true?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say no; no, sir. They [4767] would not want the British at Singapore to know. They would not want the American planes in the Philippines to be ready to attack in case there should be a breach. I think they would not want to disclose their plans no matter where they were.

Senator LUCAS. Well, they had not been very secretive about their movements up to the last three or four weeks before Pearl Harbor, had they?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think they were usually pretty secretive, sir. They would start out, as I recall, for maneuvers, and, just as we did, go into radio silence, and they had sent a lot of amphibious vessels and cargo vessels down to the south China Sea, which, since they were loaded in China, could not be hidden, but the movement of their combatant vessels had been pretty carefully screened.

Senator LUCAS. England did not have much of a fleet around Singapore at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, not much. She had several ships on the way. I think it was the 5th or 6th of December that the *Repulse* and the *Prince of Wales*, that was subsequently ill-fated, that they arrived in Singapore, and, of course, they were on the way.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, passing from that subject—

Mr. GESELL. Senator, may I interpose?

[4768] Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I have not offered these fleet location summaries as an exhibit, and in view of your questioning I think perhaps we should designate this entire folder as an exhibit, which would be exhibit 85, so that it will be easier to follow the examination.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 85.")

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, on yesterday you were discussing with counsel and members of the committee the conversations that you had on the morning of December 7, 1941, when you received the 14th part of the message, 13 of which were sent on December 6. You stated you immediately went to Admiral Stark. You also stated that as you construed the message:

* * * They were fighting words. I was more impressed by that language than with the breaking off of negotiations which, of itself, might be only temporary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations could be resumed.

There seems to be some conflict in the testimony, according to counsel, as to when this message was delivered [4769] to Admiral

Stark, but according to your testimony, to the best of your recollection, it was somewhere around 9:15 to 9:30?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, did you tell Admiral Stark at the time, that you believed that a proper construction of that message was more than the breaking off of negotiations and that they were really fighting words in your opinion? Do you recall that?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is that I told him that that was a very strong final part to that message and that I thought that they were going to press on in the direction of the advance which they were then following in the South Sea and that something might be expected in that or other directions, but I think particularly I said that, and I thought the fleet should be advised of the latest development in the nature of this strong language.

Senator LUCAS. And what was his reply, if you recall?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think he agreed with me at the time, sir, and my recollection is that I said he made an effort to reach General Marshall, or said that he would make such an effort.

Senator LUCAS. Did you have any further conversation with him, with respect to sending a message to Hawaii, to [4770] the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet there?

Admiral WILKINSON. When I said the fleet, I meant the Pacific Fleet. No further conversation.

Senator LUCAS. No further conversation?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. But he did not send a message immediately after that conversation?

Admiral WILKINSON. So I understand. He did not while I was there, the few minutes I was there.

Senator LUCAS. He had the authority so to do, as Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. If he had seen fit to do so?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The message that was sent, as I recall, was around 11:30 that morning?

Admiral WILKINSON. So I understand.

Senator LUCAS. So there was at least an hour and a half difference between the time the message could have been sent by Admiral Stark, and the time that one was actually sent to the War Department?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Now, you have been to Hawaii, Admiral?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have been where?

[4771] Senator LUCAS. I say, you have served in Hawaii with the Fleet in the Pacific, as I understand it.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Do you know how many ships were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not of my own knowledge.

Senator LUCAS. Well, from what you have read, and what you know about the situation, do you know the number that were in there?

It is not so material.

Admiral WILKINSON. I couldn't say. My recollection is about six battleships, six cruisers, and a dozen destroyers, but there may have been more.

Senator LUCAS. I was wondering how many battleships and how many destroyers could leave the harbor say in an hour and a half?

Admiral WILKINSON. The usual time of sortie, as I recall, was 10 minutes for a major ship. In other words, one battleship or cruiser per 10 minutes. They would be able to put out one destroyer in between each of the larger ships. If they were pressed, they might be able to get two destroyers between each of the larger ships, but it would not be very desirable as there would be some danger of collision.

[4772] Senator LUCAS. They would be pressed on the morning of December 7, if the message had gone?

Admiral WILKINSON. They undoubtedly would have made every effort, but if they tried to put too many ships out, they might have had a collision with the result of the blocking of everyone which would be another story.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, any ship that got out of the harbor would be better able to protect itself?

Admiral WILKINSON. It would have been able to maneuver to avoid the bombs or the torpedoes and would have been probably able to man the guns with the entire ship's company immediately, but little sooner, in fact, than they did in port, because the call to general quarters that all battle stations be manned was carried out immediately on every ship, I understand.

Senator LUCAS. I think that is correct, Admiral.

Now, Admiral, how long did you serve in the Navy Intelligence after December 6, 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. After December 6?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. Seven months.

Senator LUCAS. From there, where did you go, sir?

Admiral WILKINSON. I went to command of battleship division 2 in the Pacific for 5 months, and then to [4773] the South Pacific as deputy commander of the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey. A vacancy occurred some 6 months later in the Amphibious Forces of the South Pacific, and I was made the amphibious commander of the Third Amphibious Force, and remained such.

Senator LUCAS. In what sea battles did you participate?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know that I participated in any sea battles, as such.

I ran the amphibious campaign in the South Pacific for a year, and then I was in command of the operations against Palau and Yap. Yap was substituted for Leyte. I went in command of one of the two amphibious forces at Leyte, and then again in command of one of the two amphibious forces at Lingayen and again at the landing on Luzon. In the South Pacific campaign I had perhaps a dozen landings.

[4774] Senator LUCAS. Let me ask you, Admiral, as a matter of curiosity, what class did you graduate from at Annapolis?

Admiral WILKINSON. 1909.

Senator LUCAS. And what State are you from?

Admiral WILKINSON. Louisiana.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Wilkinson, I have a few questions.

I notice from a study of the messages forwarded by the Navy and received by the Navy, that apparently notice had come into Washington that the Japanese had ordered the various offices throughout the world to destroy their code, but I see no notice whatever from Tokyo to Hawaii to destroy the code there.

Do you know whether or not there was any such message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I presume there was, sir. I don't recall the message proper, but I know the Hawaiian consul burned his code I think the day before the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. There have been questions asked here of witnesses and some witnesses have concluded that when word comes about destroying a code that that is a very strong indication of war, and I notice in the messages here word from Admiral Kimmel on December 6, 1941, that the local consul [4775] at Hawaii had commenced destroying his code or was in the actual process of doing so.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In Navy parlance, what is the significance of that, from the standpoint of expectation of war or trouble?

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, obviously any nation is desirous of protecting its code. Ordinarily, through international courtesy, diplomatic missions and consular missions are proof against search and seizure, and any action of that sort would be a grave international offense.

Now, if any country feared that relations would become so strained with another that the other country would incur the risk of an international offense and would invade the diplomatic mission and seize the codes it would be obviously best to burn them up first.

The significance, in other words, is that they thought relations were going to be pretty tricky and sensitive, even though there might not be actual war.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice in Exhibit 37 at page 40 there is a message from Washington to Pacific commanders in which the following is contained:

Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore [4776] Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents period

Now, Hawaii is not contained in that message, is it? That is exhibit 37.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. Apparently a separate dispatch was sent to Hawaii, which we did not have at hand at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. Then I notice on page 41 there is a message as follows:

"Circular 2444 from Tokyo 1 December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine period Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo period December second Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents period British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied period"

Still no message to Hawaii.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, none apparently.

Mr. MURPHY. Apparently.

Then I notice on page 42 a discussion of some points throughout the world from the United States to Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai, telling our agents there to destroy their machines and codes, but no message to Hawaii.

[4777] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I think, as I recall, I initiated that message.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice on page 43 a message to Peiping and Tientsin.

Admiral WILKINSON. Those were to the marine detachments there.

Mr. MURPHY. No message to Hawaii.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. Both of those last two were our messages out to exposed positions to destroy their codes and obviously Hawaii was not in danger of capture.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt Hawaii was fairly safe at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Certainly not subject to capture.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

Now, then I notice—

Admiral WILKINSON. Without sufficient notice to destroy the codes.

Mr. MURPHY. Right.

I notice on page 44 notice being sent to Guam.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. Guam was exposed and they were told to destroy everything except what they needed urgently and be ready to destroy that.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, going to page 46, down to page 46, there is no intercept whatsoever obtained, apparently, by our forces, which would indicate that the Japanese had told [4778] Hawaii to destroy its code or ciphers; isn't that right?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then the message that we do get on December 6th comes from Admiral Kimmel himself.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, it comes from Admiral Bloch. Information derived from our district intelligence official and his contacts through Japanese personnel, indicate that he was informed by underground channels that the Consul was burning his stuff.

Mr. MURPHY. In that case there would be no need of Washington telling Hawaii because Washington is telling Hawaii about the incident?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, in the Pearl Harbor story as contained in the United States News of September 1, 1945 at page 34 I see a statement under the heading of:

The Navy account of the Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor. Sources of information are Japanese.

The statement is as follows:

The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Takan Bay was about November 22nd and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 27-28 of November, 1941.

Where is Takan Bay?

Admiral WILKINSON. It is on one of the islands of the [4779] southern Kuriles just north of Hokkaido.

Mr. MURPHY. That is not connected with the Gulf of Tonkins, it is an entirely separate place?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. The Gulf of Tonkin is in the South China Sea.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. In no way connected.

Mr. MURPHY. Takan Bay is up in the Kuriles?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; southern Kuriles.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you familiar with the testimony of Admiral Inglis?

Admiral WILKINSON. Only roughly.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the place he testified the fleet left from was the southern part of the Kuriles.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; southern Kuriles.

Mr. GESELL. Etorofu Jima.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Where would that be in connection with Takan Bay?

Admiral WILKINSON. Takan Bay is a bay on the Island of Etorofu Jima. Jima means island.

Mr. MURPHY. Would you have any special knowledge as to the conflict which apparently existed between the Navy and the Army officials at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7 as to whether or not there was a Jap force in the Marshalls?

[4780] Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know that there was a conflict, sir. I know that from radio intelligence, which at the best is analytical and scientific guessing, that the Pearl Harbor Radio Intelligence Center thought that there was a large force in the Marshalls and the Corregidor unit could not confirm that. I understand later that there was a force there of reasonable size.

[4781] Mr. MURPHY. I think "conflict" is the wrong word. There was some difference of opinion between the Naval Intelligence and the Army, as I understand it, as to whether there was a force there and as to the size of it.

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall a difference of opinion between the Army and the Navy. All I recall is a difference between the radio intelligence center of the Navy at Corregidor and at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. That may be.

Admiral WILKINSON. I know there was an airplane reconnaissance ordered to go over the Marshalls to try to photograph the situation, but I do not believe it was ever carried out.

Mr. MURPHY. You say you learned about the message of the 27th from Washington to Pearl Harbor either hours or days afterward. Did you ever see a reply from Admiral Kimmel to that message?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was that unusual?

Admiral WILKINSON. I wouldn't know, sir; and if there had been a reply there was no reason that I should assuredly have seen it.

Mr. MURPHY. Was it usual naval practice in a case of [4782] that kind?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not unless requested to report at once. Often, in an important message, the word "acknowledge" is added. I forget whether it was on that one or not. And that is simply an indication that you have received and understand it.

Mr. MURPHY. In the message of November 27 some of the language is as follows:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

That would be the first part of it.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY (reading) :

* * * an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46X.

Now, at this point, an appropriate defensive deployment, what would that be in regard to the fleet generally?

Admiral WILKINSON. Speaking purely as a naval officer and without connection with this plan, it would be to make such disposition of his air forces and his submarines and [4783] his surface vessels, as he would consider necessary in carrying out the tasks assigned in War Plan 46. I do not recall whether that was the so-called Rainbow Plan or not. I suppose it was Rainbow-5.

Mr. MURPHY. I think it was, but it would mean necessarily a change in the status quo until you were prepared to meet that situation, wouldn't it?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not familiar with the status quo. It would require him at least to review his present situation and see whether it was consistent with the war plans. He might find it was consistent, or he might find that changes were necessary.

Mr. MURPHY. After that, I find the following:

Inform district and Army authorities.

Admiral WILKINSON. That is Admiral Bloch and General Short.

Mr. MURPHY. That would mean that he discussed this message, wouldn't it, with Admiral Bloch and General Short?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. If not discussed, at least informed them of the message.

Mr. MURPHY. Of the fact that he received it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. "A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts [4784] Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

Now, you say you know of no reply from either Admiral Block or Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall any, no sir. As I say, there may have been a reply which I never saw.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you feel particularly concerned about sabotage at Hawaii? Would you consider it one of the major problems out there?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, I think so. We had a very large Jap population, and we knew from our intelligence reports that there were a number of very strongly patriotic Japanese there as well as the general run of Japanese of whom we could not be certain.

Subsequently, a large majority of them were found to be very loyal, and an excellent regiment came from there, as I understand. Our suspect records showed from 300 to 500 Japanese that we regarded as definitely dangerous, and 500 as potentially dangerous.

Then we knew that there were a number of consular agents in the employ of the Japanese Government.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you think that the situation at Hawaii was such that the efforts of the authorities there should be concentrated on sabotage to the neglect of [4785] avoiding the danger from air attack and from submarine attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. My judgment would be that nothing should be neglected, that sabotage should be guarded against, but should not be guarded against as the sole objective, although it was the most immediately probable one.

The potential forces were actually present for that.

Mr. MURPHY. I have one last question, Admiral.

Did you ever, within a year prior to December 7, 1941, ever hear anyone in the Navy say that the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. That the fleet was what?

Mr. MURPHY. That the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral WILKINSON. I was there until May. I saw some of the maneuvers. I myself was not convinced that the antiaircraft defenses provided on the islands would stop a large raid. I was not convinced that they would be adequate. I think there was always the possibility in all of our minds that an attack could be made. I do not know that we could say definitely the fleet was insecure, but that a full and adequate protection, which would, of course, be difficult to achieve to 100 percent was not available to the extent that we would like, either in air [4786] craft to defend the place by counter-attack against air or antiaircraft guns.

Mr. MURPHY. Would the fleet have been more secure at Lahaina Roads than it was in the harbor itself?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I would say less secure.

Mr. MURPHY. If the fleet had been taken out of the harbor and taken to Lahaina Roads, and we had the same experience in the amount of damage that we had at Pearl Harbor, we would have had more ships at the bottom of the ocean, wouldn't we?

Admiral WILKINSON. We would have had that and also we would have the exposure to submarine attacks. Pearl Harbor was fairly secure against submarines. Quite secure, in fact.

Mr. MURPHY. We would have had the same danger from air attack and less danger from submarine attack by being in the harbor as compared to Lahaina Roads?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say so. The only advantage of Lahaina Roads would be that the ships could get under way and stand out together, whereas they had to do so separately in Pearl Harbor.

On the other hand there would be more exposure to submarines and less protection from antiaircraft guns.

Mr. MURPHY. Assuming that the Japanese had been able [4787] to have the same number of carriers and other equipment, the same number of planes, and that the Fleet were at Puget Sound or at San Pedro, and the Japs succeeded in making a sneak attack, would the fleet have been any more secure at either of those places than it was at Pearl Harbor, assuming a sneak attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say rather less so. I don't think the antiaircraft protection, assuming it was in action, was as complete at either of those places.

Of course, the Japanese fleet would have further to go to get there, and at Long Beach the ships would have moved out more readily. Puget Sound, certainly, in Bremerton, they could not.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster of Maine will inquire.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral, how long had Admiral Kirk been in the Intelligence Division before you came in, do you recall?

Admiral WILKINSON. Admiral Kirk?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think from March 1 to October 15, of 1941.

Senator BREWSTER. He was just there for practically [4788] 6 months?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Who was there before him?

Admiral WILKINSON. Admiral Anderson had been there and left about the first of January. Captain James, the former assistant director was acting director for 2 months.

Senator BREWSTER. How long was Admiral Anderson there?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think about 2 years.

Senator BREWSTER. Had there been any established tour of duty in that position?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not specifically. Usually officers on a shore duty tour will remain in fixed positions from 2 to 3 years. Captain Kirk went to sea before the expiration of his tour in order to obtain an opportunity for a command which was open at the time, and I did not remain similarly. It was wartime, and I had a very promising job.

[4789] Senator BREWSTER. You much preferred to get to sea?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I think that is what most of us would like to do.

Senator BREWSTER. Officers do not welcome shore duty?

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, I think we are interested in them, but we like to practice our profession at sea.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would you mind a word, there, Senator? I believe while the Senator had to be away General Marshall testified that everybody in the War Department wanted to get assigned to duty with troops. So I imagine that applied to the Navy, too.

Senator BREWSTER. I can quite understand that.

Admiral, could you give your estimate of the importance of Naval Intelligence as a function of the Navy?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think it is quite important, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I think so, too. I think that all events have demonstrated it. And what impresses one is the change here in this most critical period in our history. Men remained for less than a year and had had, as I understand it, no previous experience in this field.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know whether any steps had been taken to see that more trained personnel in the higher echelons were made available in this field?

[4790] Admiral WILKINSON. Usually, Senator, officers with considerable previous experience in intelligence were placed there.

Senator BREWSTER. But that was not true.

Admiral WILKINSON. I cannot account for my having been appointed to it, although I was pleased at the appointment, despite the fact that it took me from my battleship, because I considered it a responsible position, and felt complimented to be chosen for it.

But in general the officers who have been there have had duty abroad and in intelligence work. Captain Kirk had been naval attaché in

London, and Admiral Anderson in London and I think somewhere else. And other officers in that position have normally had experience under that office before they became the head of it.

Senator BREWSTER. But you welcomed the release from those duties yourself, as you have indicated, in your transfer back to your battleship assignment.

Admiral WILKINSON. I was interested in both jobs, sir. I was very much interested in the work but I wanted to have a command at sea.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know what became of Captain Zacharias?

Admiral WILKINSON. He is—I saw him in Washington a [4791] few days ago.

Senator BREWSTER. I mean at that time, where was he?

Admiral WILKINSON. He was in command of a cruiser, I think, in the Pacific.

Senator BREWSTER. He had had rather extensive experience in appraising Japanese psychology, did he not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I understand Admiral Kirk made every effort to get him back into Naval Intelligence after Admiral King came to Washington, and he was shortly so ordered.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Had he been at one time Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Never had been?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. He had been on duty in the office, however.

Senator BREWSTER. He spent a great deal of time studying the Japanese situation and was a Japanese language student of rather extraordinary attainment?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure but I think he had been a language student and became naval attaché.

Senator BREWSTER. And he was used for the Japanese language broadcasts as a result of his familiarity with the language?

Admiral WILKINSON. I understand quite effectively.

[4792] Senator BREWSTER. Now, in the situation at Honolulu there was a great deal of construction work going on during 1940 to 1941, was there not, in the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral WILKINSON. Quite a little, sir. The navy yard, building of drydocks, and building of quarters.

Senator BREWSTER. So there were a good many thousands of civilian employees in the Pearl Harbor base day by day, were there not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And who was responsible for screening them to determine as to their reliability?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure of the precise direct responsibility. The commandant of the navy yard and his industrial manager were interested. Our Naval Intelligence, the district of Captain Mayfield, in conjunction with the FBI, were very much interested. And, I fancy, it was those two that were consulted or who checked on the employment of civilian employees.

[4793] Senator BREWSTER. I would rather not have your fancy, but I would rather have what you know as to who was responsible and what steps were taken, if any.

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know. I do know that the FBI and the District Intelligence officer were screening everyone out there.

Senator BREWSTER. But you do not know who was specifically responsible in the naval establishment or the FBI for that screening?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I speak of this from personal experience in visiting there in December 1940 when I was impressed and somewhat amazed at the thousands of Orientals circulating there, particularly in the Pearl Harbor naval base, at which time I asked the contractors what they knew about these people and they said, "Nothing, except that they were supposed to be American citizens."

It was obvious that unless they had a very considerable staff that it would be difficult to know about this considerable number of people who had complete access to all the Pearl Harbor facilities so far as my observation was concerned. You were serving there during some of that period?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was serving there on ships. I was not detached to shore. It is my recollection that no [4794] employees of Japanese blood were out there in the latter days prior to the attack, were allowed to be employed. I think, however, Chinese were.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, at what time, if you know, was the ban on people of Japanese extraction imposed?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know. I would recollect it was 6 months to a year prior to the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you were not there, were you, after May of 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And would not know whether or not it was in effect then?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think it was in effect before May.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you verify that in the records if possible?

Admiral WILKINSON. If I can, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And I would like also to have this information about who was responsible for that screening.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, when did you first see the report of General Martin regarding the air defenses of Hawaii, and which I think was concurred in by Admiral Bellinger, that was issued under date of August 20, 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. Very recently.

[4795] Senator BREWSTER. You never saw that while you were Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Wasn't that rather unusual that it did not come to your attention?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. As I said, the activities relating to our own war plans and our own movements of forces and preparations were not under my division and they were not brought to my attention. There was a good deal of insistence in the department upon the value of security and the knowledge of war plans was closely held and there was no necessity, it was felt, and I agreed, that my division in a large number of people or in a small number should know, and I was sometimes told in conversation, but there was no system set up whereby any documents were sent to my office or even to myself.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, in a correlation of naval intelligence as to a possible attack wouldn't it be rather essential that there should be pretty complete collaboration between your agency of Naval Intelligence and the other preparations for defense?

Admiral WILKINSON. There would be a desirability that we should know what they were doing or planning to do but the balance between the possible loss of security by extending [4796] the knowledge as against the necessity of our knowing, was inclined toward not telling us.

You recall Admiral King's favorite maxim that "only those who need to know," and while it would have been desirable, I cannot say that it was necessary.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, the most valuable possession which we had in the Pacific was the fleet, was it not? You perhaps agree with that as a naval officer.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; because it was not static.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Because the military establishments were primarily for the purpose of defense of the fleet based in the port for security. That is what we got Pearl Harbor for, as a naval defense.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And the defense of Pearl Harbor, it has already been pointed out, was in order to make it possible for the fleet effectively to function in that vast ocean, was it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say certainly 75 to 90 percent of its purpose was that, but it was also, of course, a defensive feature for our own territory. It belonged to us and we would naturally defend it.

Senator BREWSTER. You knew, in the latter part of November and early December, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, that [4797] you had lost contact with important elements of the Japanese fleet?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And yet you had no knowledge as to what steps were being taken by your reconnaissance in the vicinity of this fleet, of the American fleet, to see that these carriers might not be approaching for a strike?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, doesn't that impress—it impresses, perhaps I should say, a layman, as a lack of correlation that, here, you as Navy Intelligence, knew you had lost some Jap carriers and yet you had no knowledge as to whether other parts of our services, military or naval, were taking necessary steps to see that our fleet was not exposed to a sneak attack.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. We would have received the information of any discoveries made by searches from any of our operating forces but we were not told of the searches which of themselves were made. In other words, we did not know whether a search was being made from Midway or Johnston or Hawaii, but we would have received information of any discoveries that such searches had made.

Senator BREWSTER. And in your function to protect the security of this fleet it was not within your function or scope [4798] to recommend to anyone that it might be wise to carry out aerial reconnaissance to protect the fleet?

Admiral WILKINSON. My function was to utilize the material which was received. I should have desired to have received more material and I might well have been well advised to urge actual operations to

secure the information although, as a matter of fact, those operations would not be within my province to order, but I might well have urged their being made.

Senator BREWSTER. That is, you could have——

Admiral WILKINSON. It was not my function, however, to do so but I might well have done it.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. You could have volunteered the suggestion but it was not a part of your responsibility or function?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know whether as a result of this experience any steps have been taken to change that system of functioning, as to whether or not Naval Intelligence today would recognize that as part of its responsibility?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not believe they have, sir. I do not know that specifically, I do not know that.

Senator BREWSTER. Wouldn't Pearl Harbor argue rather persuasively that it might be a good idea and that when they [4799] lose track of an enemy fleet that it might be well to be sure that our fleet was not going to be approached without warning so far as the aerial reconnaissance might disclose?

Admiral WILKINSON. Surely, yes, sir; but you see there is a distinction between the operations of the forces in the field, that is to say, the fleets, and the operations of the officers in Washington. Now, the fleet collects and is normally responsible for what we term combat intelligence; that is to say, sending out a scouting line or sending out a reconnaissance fleet of planes. They collect that information and that is sent to Washington.

Senator BREWSTER. Let me interrupt you. Would that be true in time of peace?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think that would be true in time of peace, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you.

Admiral WILKINSON. And the fleet collects the combat information, or in the absence of combat, the operational intelligence we might call it, and the office at home would not prescribe to the fleet the precise measures to be taken to get that. I think we have sent, not the intelligence of itself, but operations on the recommendations of intelligence have sent information out saying, "Please find out what you can about such a thing," and, in fact, you will recall that operations [4800] told Admiral Hart to please send the scouting fleets over the South China Sea for several days to give us the information.

Now, that is the operational intelligence which is conducted by the forces in the fleet and might be initiated by them or might be initiated by the operational side rather than the intelligence side of the department proper. In that particular instance of the force of planes over the South China Sea, I do not believe I made such a recommendation but I would have been prepared to join in it. I think Admiral Turner probably initiated that.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, then, as I gather, that would be the responsibility of someone higher up in correlating your reports as to the missing fleet and the protection of our fleet, to see to it that these operational surveys were carried out?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say so, yes, sir, except that I might say, of course, at any time I was free to recommend.

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Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now, what about the submarine that it has been alleged circulated in Pearl Harbor in the early morning before the attack? What knowledge have you regarding that?

Admiral WILKINSON. None before the attack. I have the information afterward.

[4801] Senator BREWSTER. I am not asking you before. I am asking you now. What is your information as to what happened there?

Admiral WILKINSON. It is my understanding that submarine contact was made several hours before the attack and that it was in the restricted waters, and that two of our vessels attacked it, and believed that from the absence of subsequent sound indications, believed that they sank it.

Senator BREWSTER. When you speak of the restricted area, how extensive was that?

Admiral WILKINSON. Oh, very limited; I think 5 or not more than 10 miles, at least, off the entrance to Pearl Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. I am asking more particularly about another submarine beside the one that you speak of which you think was sunk off the entrance to Pearl Harbor, about one that was supposed to have circulated through Pearl Harbor and gone out, and an officer from which submarine they captured near one of the points in Oahu.

Admiral WILKINSON. I have asked about that, sir, and I think the best opinion now is that that map, that was supposed to indicate that the submarine had been in and come out, was an indication of the chart, of the track that it proposed to follow, and that there was no definite confirmation [4802] in any way that it ever had been in.

Senator BREWSTER. What became of that Jap officer?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you ever examine him?

Admiral WILKINSON. The chart?

Senator BREWSTER. No, the Jap officer who was captured?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not examine him.

Senator BREWSTER. The Jap officer, as I understood you, that had the chart.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not examine him.

Senator BREWSTER. Did anyone from Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think he was examined in Hawaii. I am not sure.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you have a copy of the report on that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall. I think we did.

Senator BREWSTER. What did you base your opinion on that this was not an actual chart of an operation?

Admiral WILKINSON. Oh, on recent discussion with Captain McCollum, who examined the chart carefully and who had been familiar with the testimony of the officer, I believe.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Counsel, was there a request ever made for a copy of the examination of that Japanese officer?

Mr. MURPHY. I believe the record—

[4803] Mr. GESELL. None has been made.

Mr. MITCHELL. None has been made that I remember.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe the record will show there was a question asked as to whether or not he was available and Admiral Inglis said he would look into it, into the whole matter.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you mention the examining data?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't remember.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that would be most significant. I would like to have it. I am not prepared to say at this time that we should examine the Jap officer and have him testify, but I think the examination by the Army and Navy Intelligence would be very pertinent.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't mean to say that there was a request for him to testify. I asked if he was still alive or what happened to him and I don't know whether I requested the report, but if it is available we should have it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you will permit me, I think the Admiral stated that his opinion about it came from Captain McCollum, and I believe Captain McCollum is listed as a witness. Is that right, counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, hasn't counsel furnished us with some information on this point? I have made a request and I think they furnished us with information that was very [4804] meager.

Mr. MITCHELL. There have been so many discussions that my memory fails me. I have no recollection of that at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I think they reported to me that it was very meager, they had no definite information. Isn't that right?

Mr. GESELL. I think that is correct, Senator. We will check it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And isn't it correct that Captain McCollum is listed as a witness?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; it is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, if he gave the Admiral that information he might be in a position to help us.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think he can tell you on what he based his interpretation that he discussed with me.

Senator BREWSTER. Is that a matter in which there is complete concurrence between the Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI as far as you know?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you know who captured this fellow? That is, was it the Army, or the Navy, or the FBI?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know. My recollection is he landed at Bellows Field, and if that is the same one, he was [4805] captured there by the Army.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you have occasion to look into the communication from the destroyers who sank the submarine outside of Pearl Harbor and communicated this to the shore, did you have occasion to look into that at all to know how long it took?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. I have seen a good many since, subsequently, but I have no direct knowledge.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you have any contract with any of the fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor there through your Naval Intelligence? Did you have operators in that field?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not understand, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. The fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor were very extensive.

Admiral WILKINSON. Oh, yes. Our District Intelligence officer was very much—was very directly concerned in that fishing fleet and we had laid down a number of restrictions which were carried out by the local Coast Guard, but inspired by us, as to the removal of all Japanese aliens from the boats, the registration of the boats, limiting them to certain hours and certain areas and the removal of radio apparatus. They were under thorough control and restriction for some time prior to the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. Have you testified as to how many operators you had in Naval Intelligence in Hawaii? Have you given us those figures?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not, specifically. I can readily obtain it. I gave the figures for the fleet as a whole.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Will you give us those that were in Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. And did I make it clear, that I would like that report of the examination of the Jap submarine officer, if there were any examination, and if it is available.

Did I understand you to say, Admiral, that the Grew message of January 1941, regarding a possible Jap attack on Pearl Harbor, did not come to your attention prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall it, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. That was not a matter of any discussion or concern in the Intelligence Department during the period that you served from October to December?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall it. It might have been mentioned.

Senator BREWSTER. You spoke about the number of consular agents in Hawaii by the Japanese. There were a rather unusual number, were there not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

[4807] Senator BREWSTER. Do you remember how many?

Admiral WILKINSON. There had been quite a discussion about that. There was, of course, a law in effect that all agents in the employ of foreign nations should register and they had not been required to register, and the commandant of the District and our Intelligence officer were very anxious to get them under control, and there had been some correspondence back and forth about it.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you remember how many there were?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I would say in the order of about 50, perhaps more.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you sure it was not 150?

Admiral WILKINSON. No; I am not sure; at least 50 of them.

Senator BREWSTER. I think counsel can inform you that it was more. I think it ran up to an amazing number for so comparatively small an area.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. We were trying to make them comply with the law but there was some instruction put in about any rigid steps conflicting with the efforts made to assure the loyalty of the

remaining Japanese. On December the 6th we said we hoped to get some decision in a month, I believe.

Senator BREWSTER. Did you have any reason to suspect, [4808] during the period between October and December 7, 1941 when you were functioning as Director of Naval Intelligence, that the Japs suspected that we were breaking any of their codes?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. I do not know specifically in that period but there had been a message which I recall somewhere around October, I think, that the Germans had informed the Japs that there were indications that we were breaking some of their codes. Several messages that were sent from Japan indicated that they wished their agents to be particularly careful in their reports to protect their codes.

Senator BREWSTER. Have you located the messages which contained those references to the German warning?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I can find one, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I would like to ask counsel whether they have located those.

Mr. GESELL. No; we have not, the ones I believe the Senator refers to.

Senator BREWSTER. What steps have you taken?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I refresh Mr. Gesell's memory? I had a request in for such information and I am sure that my letter states definitely that there were no such codes—I mean no such messages. Do you recall that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. GESELL. No; I do not.

[4809] Mr. MITCHELL. I think there were one or two messages such as the Admiral speaks of in Exhibit 1.

Mr. MURPHY. And there is also a reference in Matsuoka's message to Hitler that might lead to such an inference.

Mr. GESELL. I thought the Senator was referring to ones other than in the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. I am. The letter maybe might refresh you.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I have a letter from Mr. Mitchell saying that there was no evidence that the Japanese had any knowledge that we were breaking their codes or suspected it, and that the evidence was all to the contrary. Do you recall that letter, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. That is based on a report from the department of whom we made inquiry.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I did not know it, personally. I forwarded to you their report.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. But I think there are one or two messages in exhibit 1 that makes the same report, that the Japs were at one time fearful of certain ones of their codes being broken.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I have one here, and it is [4810] dated the 23d day of June 1941, from Tokyo to Mexico. It appears on page 122 of the intercepts, concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth and it says:

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62* from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.)

Now, that, of course, is squarely in conflict with the report which apparently the Navy Department gave you, is it not, indicating that at least the Japanese suspected that we were breaking their code.

Mr. MITCHELL. I assume the Navy kept right on cracking them, so we can assume the Japs did not know that. I suppose that is why they made that statement. Obviously that one message contains a suspicion that we might be.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELLS But we kept right on breaking them, and I assume that, if the Japs had known we had broken them they would have fixed them up.

[4811] Senator BREWSTER. I am asking for information.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you asked me if they were not in conflict?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, and you agreed that it is. Now, the intercepts run from July 1 to December 7 and I asked some time ago for the earlier intercepts, after I was refused permission to examine the files, as I was reliably informed that there were five cablegrams which made very specific reference to this matter of which the admiral now speaks, that the Germans had apparently discovered something of this kind and communicated it to the Japanese in this interchange of messages between Berlin and Tokyo regarding this and in this matter—I am simply citing reports which the admiral confirms now, or at least intimates in his reference to the Germans, I say I am at least surprised that the Navy would give you the information that there was nothing to indicate this, if there are four or five messages of this character in their files.

Mr. MITCHELL. To be specific, do I understand you would like to have any intercepts back to January 1, 1941 of this type that indicate the suspicion, is that what you are interested in?

[4812] Senator BREWSTER. Well, I certainly am, but I also call attention to my letter of November 15, in which I acknowledge the receipt of these intercepts from July 1, to December 8, and added I would greatly appreciate if you would send me another copy of this material, as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941.

To that, I, as far as I know, have received no reply. That was a month ago.

I think you will remember, Mr. Mitchell, 10 days ago, in executive session, I spoke of this matter as a matter that I thought was of considerable interest, in view of the very great emphasis which had been placed on the complete ignorance of the Japanese of the fact that we were breaking their code.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand what you are especially interested in is the messages that have to do with the question of whether the Japs suspected our cracking the code. It is so much easier to get results if we know what we are after. I am just asking you the question, to get an indication as to what you are really interested in.

Senator BREWSTER. I think my interest has been made manifest also in a letter to you in which I asked specifically whether there was anything to indicate the Japs had [4813] either knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and your reply, based on the Navy Department's information, was that there was nothing to indicate either, and your reply was that all the evidence was to the contrary.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is exactly the report as it was given to us. I never asked them what their evidence was, but I assumed it was a fact because we kept on breaking the code, indicating that the Japs were not aware of it. I will get from the Navy just what the basis of that report is. I do not know.

Senator BREWSTER. You just heard Admiral Wilkinson testify that he understood there were indications that Berlin had given the Japanese a tip on this. I think it is unfortunate that the Navy should have given you a report of this character, if what Admiral Wilkinson says now is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. That is two or three times that the statement is in the record.

Senator BREWSTER. I can quite understand the concern of the gentleman over anything which seems in any way to be in conflict here, but I think it is a rather important point, on which great emphasis has been laid, and I would like to know whether or not these messages exist. It is [4814] very significant to me that the intercepts were given us back to July 1 when these messages apparently occurred, in May and June. I have been trying for more than a month to get them. I spoke to counsel about this in the executive session 10 days ago, and now I am advised that they would like to know just what it is I am after.

Mr. MURPHY. You are using that microphone rather loudly. This is three times that that statement is in the record now.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think counsel understand, Senator. I am sure they will continue to cooperate in every way possible.

Are there any other questions of Admiral Wilkinson?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have further questions of Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a memo that I would like to refer to the counsel, and might refresh their memory. It is dated the 17th of November, and signed by Mr. Mitchell. It was received by me November 17 at 3 p. m.

(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Mitchell.)

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the same thing, I think, to which Senator Brewster just referred.

Senator BREWSTER. You gave me the same answer?

[4815] Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Has this been put in the record?

Mr. MITCHELL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put this in the record. It is dated November 17, 1945.

Memorandum to Senator Ferguson:

With reference to your letter of November 16th, requesting "all information that any of the Services or the Government had that Japan knew that we had broken their code", there is no information or indication that Japan ever knew it. All information would indicate the contrary.

Now, Mr. Chairman, that indicates that Mr. Mitchell signed it, and the initials in the lower left-hand corner are "WDM/CBN."

That would indicate, Mr. Chairman, it was answered the day following the request for that information. I requested it on the 16th, and the letter came on the 17th.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have been sitting here wondering just what the special significance and the importance in this inquiry is the question

of whether prior to June 1941, or at any time, the Japs suspected that we were cracking their code. I confess it would help me a bit to work this thing out, if I knew just what bearing it has on the case.

I am probably dumb about it, but I do not quite grasp it. [4816] I have an idea that maybe that attitude may have had something to do with the fact that maybe I did not follow up your request as diligently as I otherwise would.

Senator BREWSTER. I should be very happy to give you what is in my apparently simple mentality. The first thing which has interested me a great deal on this particular episode, Mr. Mitchell, is if what Admiral Wilkinson now says is correct, then the Navy has not been giving you complete or accurate information when they tell you there was nothing to indicate that the Japs knew or suspected that we were breaking their codes.

That has been, as you know, a matter in which I had some concern about your previous willingness to submit the data.

As I said to you and others, that was the first point of my interest in this episode.

Mr. MITCHELL. You made that request before the Admiral made that statement. I am trying to get back to your point of view as to the materiality of that in this hearing.

Senator BREWSTER. I am coming to that.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

Senator BREWSTER. The second point, I had thought that one of the very outstanding matters that had been [4817] emphasized here, and in fact you yourself examined General Marshall at great length regarding this very matter in connection with the Dewey episode, that a great state secret existing here was magic, and that the Japs had no knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and apparently very great importance has been attached to that throughout this hearing.

If there is anything to indicate that is not so, we must all, to some extent, revise our estimate of the situation in the light of that possibility or probability. At least that is my observation in all this evidence. I cannot otherwise reconcile the whole Dewey episode.

Now, if, back in May or June 1941, there were messages indicating that the Japs suspected that this was happening, if it was of great importance, I cannot understand why this has not been developed. I cannot understand why the Navy will tell you there was nothing to indicate it. If it is not of any importance, why do not they just simply give us the facts and the messages, and if it is of importance, and there is any suggestion of concealment, that is something we must take into account.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I might say, the gentleman from Maine has been absent for some days. Yesterday we spent 20 minutes on tirades in connection with the Republican [4818] National Committee, and now we have spent 20 minutes in trying counsel, talking about the Dewey episode. I suggest that we talk about Pearl Harbor; I suggest that we proceed to inquire as to what happened at Pearl Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure the counsel understand the gentleman's request now, and I hope we can move along.

Senator BREWSTER. I certainly will be most pleased to. I am not at all surprised that the gentleman from Pennsylvania is considerably concerned over the necessity of my replying to the question of counsel. I have been rather patient myself, and perhaps it is just as well, and this will clarify it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think it does, Senator. I have heard every witness who has testified, and my clear impression is that the remark just made by Admiral Wilkinson is the first intimation that has come out in the course of this hearing that the Japanese had ever suspected that their code might have been broken. I know other witnesses have been asked the question whether there was anything to indicate that Japan had ever suspected that the code had been broken, and their testimony was that there was nothing to indicate it, until just at this moment when Admiral Wilkinson had made the remark in response to the question, and I think that is the first intimation that has come to the committee [4819] that anybody thought Japan might have had any knowledge that the code had been broken.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for that observation, and I hope you agree with me that this does have a distinct relevance in establishing it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, if the Senator wants information, I am sure counsel will cooperate in every possible way to secure it, and to give it to the Senator when it is secured.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I just say I do not think we have wasted time this morning on this question as to whether or not counsel is able to obtain for us immediately upon our request information material to the matter that we have before us. I think as to whether or not the services are obtaining the information for us is very vital to this hearing. Now, if we have a request in on the 16th day of November for certain material and that is material that is in the files, and then the fact that we get a reply immediately on the 17th of November, and we wait until the 18th day of December and do not have that information, that question is very vital to the thing that we are trying. Are we getting the cooperation of the services or are we merely here taking what the services desire to give us?

[4820] That is the question.

I raised it on the floor and I raise it again here.

That is very vital to this case. Are we getting what they want to give us, when they want to give it to us, or are they going to give it to us because it is material to this issue as we request it?

[4821] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose for a moment?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator yield?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, I will yield.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster yields.

Mr. KEEFE. About the request for information and the speed with which it has returned, I have asked time and again for information and some of those requests were propounded in the first 2 or 3 days of this hearing.

In one instance it was promised to me in 2 days in respect to one request, and to date I have only received one or two responses of any kind to any request I have made.

You will recall that on the second or third day of these hearings I asked Admiral Inglis in respect to the condition of the fleet, in respect to her fighting ability, on the 7th day of December when it was in the harbor. He told me that the *California* was practically hors de combat because of an inspection and because of boxed ammunition. The noon hour intervened, and when he came back he said they were investigating it and he would report to me immediately, and to date I have received no report on the ships, except what has come to me from letters from men on the ships, and who know, who were in a position to know, whether their fighting condition was reduced because of open voids and the boxing of ammunition, and the type of inspection that was carried [4822] on. That is one thing.

While we were quizzing the Admiral, Admiral Inglis in this room, I made a request on Friday and the material was promised me for Monday, and that request has not been complied with.

I can go on and read the list from my notes—I haven't got my notes here—but I have made at least 25 requests and I am sure only 2 or 3 of which have been complied with. I wanted the information for the purpose of interrogation of witnesses at the proper time.

I have been told that they have liaison committees in the State Department, in the War Department and Navy Department who are standing by all the time to get the information just as rapidly as it is humanly possible to get it. Now one month goes by and although you have made an important request there is no intimation from counsel at all as to whether or not that request had been looked into.

We cannot help but wonder as to what is the cause of this great delay. That has caused me great exasperation and I can only say we have been receiving spoon-fed evidence. If we have the information certainly we will be in a better position to conduct an intelligent cross-examination.

That is all I want to say at this time.

Mr. MITCHELL. May I be permitted to say something?

[4823] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. In regard to your request for the condition of the ships on Pearl Harbor Day, when they were inspected and open and all that sort of thing, I think we have already brought in some data on that. I think it was during your absence within the last few days.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Last Saturday.

Mr. GEARHART. I was sick in bed one day. The report came to the committee when I was absent one day. I wonder why that was done.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was done on Saturday when, unfortunately, the gentleman from California was unavoidably absent, and we regret that. The counsel made a report to the committee, which sat for about an hour longer than we had expected, for counsel to make a report to the committee on various requests that had been made during the hearing by the different members of the committee.

During the course of that report to the committee I recall that quite a number of the things requested by the gentleman from California were presented and included in the record. If the gentleman will examine the record of last Saturday, the day on which he was unable to be here, I think he will find at least responses to many of his requests, and the counsel made the statement that the information that [4824] was not being submitted at that time and that had been requested would be submitted as quickly as it could be secured.

The counsel gave us a rather exhaustive report along that line last Saturday. I am sure that many of the requests made by the gentleman from California were complied with in the course of that report.

Mr. GEARHART. May I inquire as to whether or not the chart I requested showing the numerical readiness of the fleet in the Pacific, that I asked of Admiral Inglis, was mentioned?

Mr. MITCHELL. There are so many of these that I cannot pick from memory the generality. We have been engaged in the last week checking up from the transcript to be sure that everything that was asked for orally here in the past will be submitted.

Mr. GEARHART. I requested a chart showing the number of ships that were in the Pacific on May 1 and the transfers from that fleet to the Atlantic, and the augmentations from ship construction, and then I also asked for that information for the Atlantic Ocean as well, in chart form, and Admiral Inglis said he would have it 2 days later.

I have been told—information has come to me from reliable sources—that that report has already been submitted to counsel. Can counsel verify it?

[4825] Mr. MITCHELL. I have no recollection of seeing it. I will find out during the noon hour if it is in our files.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I do recall, Mr. Gearhart, you made the request about the *Boise*. That was included in the record last Saturday, and I am sure counsel will have the gentleman's request checked and every effort will be made to comply with his request.

Senator BREWSTER. May I just ask that Admiral Wilkinson will check on those cablegrams, the intercepts during the noon hour so we can get this thing clarified?

Admiral WILKINSON. My only recollection was a dispatch from Berlin, I think to Tokyo, indicating that the Germans thought we might be reading the Japanese codes and warning them about it.

Senator BREWSTER. I understood there were five messages on this subject between Tokyo and Washington. I would like to have a complete file.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you understand the Senator's request?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You will make every effort to comply with it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record [4826] note that not one question was asked the witness in the last half hour.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[4827]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Senator Brewster will resume his inquiry.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral, were you able to secure those wires during the recess? I think they were radiograms.

Admiral WILKINSON. I have not been able to locate it to date. The liaison officer for the Navy Department has made the specific inquiry for that dispatch. I have talked to my predecessor, Admiral Kirk, who says he recalls it as a message from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the home office in Tokyo, that the German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had advised him that there were indications that the Americans were breaking Japanese codes.

I may state, of course, that there were a number of codes, some of which are relatively simple and can be readily broken, others are more complex, and the very reading of one code would not be any assurance that others or the entire bulk of them were being broken. The only indication would be with respect to such a message that we were at least attacking their codes.

I do know that in the late fall, in the early fall and the late fall, we had some worries about the Japanese finding [4828] that out and the Japanese suspicions, although we did not believe from the tenor of their dispatches that they were convinced at all that we were breaking them, and those worries occasioned our tightening up of security concerning intercepts and occasioned our being particularly careful about broadening in any degree the text or even knowledge obtained from the text of such messages.

Senator BREWSTER. When you say there are different codes, how frequently are they changed ordinarily?

Admiral WILKINSON. Again it is a matter for a communicator to give expert knowledge, but there is in general, I understand, two types of concealed message. One is a code and the other is a cipher applicable to that code. The code is contained in a book and to change it you have to issue another book. The cipher may be changed from day to day and often is.

You must first break the cipher on any message before you can tell what the concealed message is and then you must have the code to know what the words which have now been derived, or the groups which have now been derived, mean under that code.

Answering your question directly then, the ciphers were very frequently changed, sometimes from day to day, and the codes would not be changed so often, perhaps once a month or even a year or more.

[4829] Senator BREWSTER. How many are they likely to have in use at any one time? How many would they be likely to have in use at any one time, of codes as distinct from the ciphers?

Admiral WILKINSON. Oh, perhaps 10 or 12: A diplomatic code, a naval attaché's code, a military, a consular, some very secret codes for each of those and some day to day codes.

Senator BREWSTER. And the interpretation of any one was dependent either upon breaking it as you did or upon having the code book to enable you to easily translate it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. And the knowledge that we were attacking a code would not be particularly significant as it is more or less of an international practice. The knowledge that we had succeeded in breaking some of the simpler codes would not be particularly significant. If they knew definitely we had broken their most secret codes it would be a matter of great concern.

Senator BREWSTER. It is not considered that there is anything particularly reprehensible in this practice, is it? Isn't it a rather well-

recognized practice in the international code of morality that that is done by all governments in the interest of their national security?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think so. I do not think that governments are particularly desirous to admit it, but I think it has been done in the past, sir.

[4830] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. Whether it is being continued today in all countries I do not know.

Senator BREWSTER. Wasn't there a rather conspicuous case in our own history during and after the last war about certain translations that were made in time of peace?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is not authentic at all but I know that in the last war we did have a so-called Black Chamber.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. And that sometime after the last war I believe the then Secretary of State decided that he would abolish it completely and all such activities on our part were then discontinued for a time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If you will permit me, Senator, you and the Senator were both referring to the last war. You are talking about World War I?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, World War I. This one is too recent to be known as the last war.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, both of them are last wars now.

Senator BREWSTER. Was that discontinued at that time when Henry L. Stimson was Secretary of State?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know.

[4831] Senator BREWSTER. I think it was.

Now, have counsel been able to secure any further information about these messages? Have they made any inquiries from the Navy Department about it?

Mr. MITCHELL. They are hard at work, and so is the Army.

Admiral WILKINSON. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest a change in the stenographic record of yesterday at this point?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead. That won't disturb you, will it, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral WILKINSON. On page 4575, referring to the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding probable intentions of the enemy, in the middle of the page, the record shows that my answer to a question was:

I did not so understand, and I have the information, as I said, from my predecessor, my discussion with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor.

That last phrase should read, "and just this morning I have received a dispatch from Admiral James who was a predecessor in turn of my predecessor, Admiral Kirk, to that effect."

[4832] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your correction?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with the discussion of the answering of the questions, I believe, of Judge Clark, about the threat of

the American Navy on the flank of the Japanese operations, in replying to that you pointed out on page 4712 of your testimony:

Our navy was much smaller then than it was ultimately, and, in fact, at that time, it was smaller than the Japanese fleet in the Pacific.

How long had that condition prevailed so far as you know and on what were the comparisons made?

Admiral WILKINSON. Sir, our navy was smaller than the Japanese fleet in the Pacific. I meant, of course, our force in the Pacific itself.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, I understand that.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think that had in general prevailed throughout the year of 1941 and the disparity had been somewhat increased by the necessity of sending ships to the Atlantic, one of which, in fact, was my ship, the battleship *Mississippi*, in May of 1941.

Senator BREWSTER. You brought that from Pearl Harbor to New York, or thereabouts?

[4833] Admiral WILKINSON. From Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic, and then I was operating on the Atlantic patrol until I came ashore to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator BREWSTER. Were there other battleships moved at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. What were they?

Admiral WILKINSON. The *Idaho* and *New Mexico*, as I remember it, one carrier and three or four cruisers and some eight destroyers.

Senator BREWSTER. And what was the relative rank of the two navies before that transfer, approximately?

Admiral WILKINSON. Of the navies as a whole or of the forces in the Pacific?

Senator BREWSTER. No; the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese Fleet.

Admiral WILKINSON. I would prefer to refer to Admiral Inglis' testimony on that subject. My impression is that there was a slight disparity against the United States force.

Senator BREWSTER. Even before that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Even before that time.

[4834] Mr. GESELL. May I interpose, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. Congressman Gearhart raised before the recess the question of whether we had received a response to his request for a statement showing the relative strength of naval combatant units of various kinds in the Atlantic and Pacific on May 1, 1941, and December 7, 1941, including a comparison between the strength of our Navy, and, I believe, the Navies of Allied and potential enemy powers.

We have gotten that material. I handed a copy to Congressman Gearhart, and we have one copy for every member of the committee.

I interpose with it now because it relates directly to your question.

Senator BREWSTER. Would you want to put that in the record now so it may be available?

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to have it included in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you offer it as an exhibit then?

Mr. GESELL. We will then offer this material as Exhibit 86, and perhaps we better have it spread upon the transcript so it will be available to every member of the committee.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes. So ordered.

Senator BREWSTER. That will appear in the transcript [4835] tomorrow morning.

Mr. GESSELL. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 86.")

(Exhibit 86 follows:)

Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941

AXIS

	Germany	Italy	Vichy France	Other augmentations	Total
Battleships.....	a 6	b 6	c 5	-----	17
Aircraft carriers.....			b 1	-----	1
Heavy cruisers.....	4	c 4	4	-----	12
Light cruisers.....	4	d 11	19	e 2	26
Destroyers.....	f 15	g 84	h 52	i 9	160
Submarines.....	j 150	k 77	58	m 9	294

- Includes 2 over-age battleships, *Schlesien* and *Schleswig-Holstein*.
- Includes damaged *Duilio* and *Carour*, heavily damaged, resting on bottom.
- Includes damaged *Bolzano*.
- Includes 5 ineffective light cruisers.
- Includes 2 ineffective destroyers.
- Includes 8 ineffective submarines.
- Includes 4 damaged or incomplete battleships.
- Interned in Martinique.
- Includes 2 interned in Martinique.
- Includes 4 damaged or incomplete destroyers.
- Includes Yugoslavian *Dalmacia* and Dutch *Gelderland*.
- Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 1 Greek, and 5 Norwegian destroyers.
- Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 6 Dutch submarines.
- Estimated.

Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941

[4836]

ALLIED

	United States	Great Britain	Free France	Other augmentations	Total
Battleships.....	6	a b 16	c 3	-----	25
Aircraft carriers.....	3	d 7	-----	-----	10
Heavy cruisers.....	5	e 13	h 3	i 1	22
Light cruisers.....	8	j 20	k 1	l 2	41
Destroyers.....	85	m 191	n 12	o 11	299
Submarines.....	53	p 65	q 8	r 15	141

- Includes 3 battle cruisers.
- Includes 6 battleships damaged and under repair.
- Includes 1 escort carrier.
- Includes 1 large carrier damaged and under repair.
- Includes 5 heavy cruisers damaged and under repair.
- Estimated, no accurate figures available at this time.
- Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- Interned at Alexandria.
- Includes 4 incomplete and 3 interned at Alexandria.
- Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- Includes Greek *Georgios Averoe*.
- Includes Dutch *Heemskerck* and *Sumatra*.
- Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
- Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.

1826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[4837] *Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of May 1, 1941*

AXIS

	Japan	Vichy France	Total
Battleships.....	10	-----	10
Aircraft carriers.....	7	-----	7
Heavy cruisers.....	18	-----	18
Light cruisers.....	17	1	18
Destroyers.....	100	-----	100
Submarines.....	68	2	70

ALLIES

	United States		Great Britain	Dutch	Total
	Pacific	Asiatic			
Battleships.....	9	-----	1	-----	10
Aircraft carriers.....	3	-----	1	-----	4
Heavy cruisers.....	12	1	a 4	-----	17
Light cruisers.....	9	2	b 13	3	27
Destroyers.....	67	13	b 6	7	93
Submarines.....	27	28	(*)	15	70

- * Includes 1 unit damaged and under repair.
- b Estimated, no accurate figures available.
- Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.

[4838] *Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 7, 1941*

AXIS

	Germany	Italy	Vichy France	Other augmentations	Total
Battleships.....	a 5	b 6	a 5	-----	16
Aircraft carriers.....	-----	-----	b 1	-----	1
Heavy cruisers.....	4	a 4	4	-----	12
Light cruisers.....	4	d 12	9	k 2	27
Destroyers.....	1 20	e 77	1 53	1 9	189
Submarines.....	1 155	f 67	60	m 9	291

- * Includes 2 over-age battleships *Schlesien* and *Schleswig-Holstein*.
- b Includes *Carour* heavily damaged but afloat.
- Includes damaged *Bolzano* and *Gorizia*.
- d Includes damaged *D'Aosta*, *Bande Nere*, and *Montecuccoli*.
- Includes 34 damaged destroyers.
- f Includes 26 damaged submarines.
- Includes 3 damaged or incomplete battleships.
- b Interned at Martinique.
- Includes 2 interned at Martinique.
- Includes 7 damaged or incomplete.
- Includes Yugoslavian *Dalmacia* and Dutch *Gelderland*.
- Includes 1 Greek, 5 Norwegian, and 3 Yugoslavian destroyers.
- m Includes 6 Dutch, and 3 Yugoslavian submarines.
- Estimated.

ALLIED

	United States	Great Britain	Free France	Other augmentations	Total
Battleships.....	a 6	e f 12	h 3	-----	21
Aircraft carriers.....	b c 4	g h 8	-----	-----	12
Heavy cruisers.....	5	i 12	j 3	k 1	21
Light cruisers.....	d 8	l 28	m 1	n 2	39
Destroyers.....	92	o 225	p 11	q 11	339
Submarines.....	58	r 80	s 8	t 15	161

- Does not include *North Carolina* and *Washington* both on trials.
- Does not include *Hornet* on trials.
- Includes *Long Island* (escort carrier).
- *Juneau, Atlanta, San Diego* and *San Juan* carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but were not completed or commissioned and are not included.
- Includes 1 battle cruiser.
- Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair.
- Includes 2 escort carriers.
- Includes 2 damaged aircraft carriers under repair.
- Includes 5 damaged heavy cruisers under repair.
- Estimated. No accurate figures available.
- Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- Interned at Alexandria.
- Includes 4 incomplete, 2 interned and 1 repairing.
- Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- Includes Greek *Georgios Averof*.
- Includes Dutch *Heemskerk* and *Sumatra*.
- Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
- Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.

Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of Dec. 7, 1941

[4840]

AXIS

	Japan	Vichy France	Total
Battleships.....	10	-----	10
Aircraft carriers.....	9	-----	9
Heavy cruisers.....	18	-----	18
Light cruisers.....	17	1	18
Destroyers.....	103	-----	103
Submarines.....	74	1	75

ALLIES

	United States		Great Britain	Free France	Dutch	Total
	Pacific	Asiatic				
Battleships.....	9	-----	e f 4	-----	-----	13
Aircraft carriers.....	3	-----	g 1	-----	-----	4
Heavy cruisers.....	12	1	h 4	-----	-----	17
Light cruisers.....	a 10	1	i 17	-----	3	31
Destroyers.....	b c 64	13	j 13	1	7	88
Submarines.....	d 25	28	-----	-----	15	68

- Includes *Boise* which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
- Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District.
- Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts.
- Status of 2 submarines not clear.
- Includes 1 battle cruiser.
- Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair.
- This aircraft carrier damaged and under repair.
- Estimated, no accurate figures available.
- Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.

[4841] Senator BREWSTER. I notice the date is May 1, 1941. Was that before or after you were detached?

Admiral WILKINSON. Immediately before. I left about 2 weeks later.

Senator BREWSTER. About the middle of May?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. So that as of May 1 it would show the three battleships and the other units you mentioned in the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral WILKINSON. It should so show.

Senator BREWSTER. There has been a good deal of discussion about the information which was available to Admiral Kimmel. I think it has appeared rather clearly that under the limitations under which you were operating there was a substantial amount of material bearing on the diplomatic communications which you did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel.

Is that the way I understood your testimony?

Admiral WILKINSON. There was a substantial amount of diplomatic interchange of messages that was not sent verbatim, or even in gist of themselves outside of Washington, either to Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, or to the Atlantic Fleet, for instance. The summary of those with respect to the status of the diplomatic negotiations was, however, contained in the fortnightly situation wherein it was stated what the general [4842] progress of the negotiations was.

Senator BREWSTER. I think in Mr. Gesell's question yesterday, which was gone into rather clearly, whether it was not proper to convey that information, and there was a substantial amount of information bearing on the situation which was not communicated to Admiral Kimmel. I think perhaps you answered that "yes," and you agreed it was a substantial amount but you kind of qualified it somewhat.

Admiral WILKINSON. There was certainly a substantial amount that was not forwarded in detail.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. With respect to the summary, for instance, of the fortnightly summary of November 15, on the first page we find the diplomatic situation, paragraph 1:

(1) Japan.

The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese relations overshadowed all developments in the Far East during the period.

Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, is flying to Washington with compromise Japanese proposals. No one apparently expects his mission to succeed, the Envoy himself reportedly expressing extreme pessimism. American spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indicated that the United States will not budge from her position. Prime [4843] Minister Churchill warned that if war breaks out between Japan and America, Britain will declare war on Japan "within the hour". The United States is preparing to withdraw the Marine detachments from China. The Japanese press continued to rail at Britain and the United States.

Now, on December 1, a similar first paragraph:

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere. The press also is criticizing Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a 5-year extension of the anticomintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.

Those were the diplomatic advices that were furnished to Admiral Kimmel, which are a brief summary of the status of negotiations.

Senator BREWSTER. You would recognize, would you not, Admiral, that there are very substantial gaps in those summaries, necessarily perhaps, as compared to the information available here in Washington?

Admiral WILKINSON. Certainly. I mean the fact of the [4844] dispatch of the 10-point note from us and the receipt of the Japanese reply was not in it.

Senator FERGUSON. There was the conspicuous incident of the charting of the waters of Pearl Harbor, which was the dispatch of September 24, translated on October 9, and which I believe they indicated was not communicated to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor.

Is that your recollection?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is my recollection.

Senator BREWSTER. With those things in mind, Admiral, I am somewhat puzzled by this statement in your report of December 19, 1941, which was, of course, very near to the event, and I quote from that report—I do not know whether this has been put in evidence as an exhibit or not. It is a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations from Admiral Wilkinson on December 19, 1941.

Do you know whether that is in evidence?

Mr. GESELL. It is not, Senator. I think, if that is the memorandum given to us, it summarizes a report or reports on his testimony before the Roberts Board.

Senator BREWSTER. That is right.

Mr. GESELL. That is not in evidence.

Senator BREWSTER. The subject is the proceedings of the President's Investigating Committee, December 19, 1941. [4845] This was a report from Admiral Wilkinson, reporting his testimony before the so-called Roberts Commission, to whom he stated on page 3, "The Commander in Chief, Pacific, had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information."

That would not be a correct statement of the situation, would it, Admiral?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think if you will read the preceding two sentences, sir, it will make it clearer.

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information.

Perhaps that is not correct in that the earlier dispatches had not been relayed to him specifically.

Senator BREWSTER. Would not it be a matter of concern, and a matter of considerable interest or significance to the [4846] entire Fleet at Pearl Harbor, to know that the enemy were mapping the location of the fleet day by day, by five sectors in Pearl Harbor? Would not it mean more to the commander in Pearl Harbor than to anyone here in Washington who was less immediately concerned?

Admiral WILKINSON. Certainly it would be of more immediate application to him.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. He was well aware that the fleet was under constant observation from the surrounding hills.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. And that the reports were being made as to them. Whether the geographical designation of the areas by sectors would mean more to him or not I cannot say. Probably it would, yes.

Senator BREWSTER. If you had been in command of that fleet you would probably lie awake at night trying to figure out just what the significance of that was, would you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Might well have.

Senator BREWSTER. Now here in Washington you had reports from all over, you had the whole world view, you had Manila, you had all the other departments coming in here, and while you were naturally concerned, you were not immediately responsible for the safety of that fleet, so it might well take [4847] up less of your thought and attention and consideration, I can well understand, than it would in the hands of Admiral Kimmel. That is probably a fair statement, is it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. So that in the light of what we now know it certainly proved unfortunate that it did not prove practical to send in some more information regarding the developments that were going on?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. That again was a question of the security of the code, of which we were becoming increasingly concerned.

[4848] Senator BREWSTER. In future situations of this character the lessons which we have learned from this will undoubtedly have a substantial bearing on the conduct of our armed services, our intelligence, and our entire arrangements, I assume.

Admiral WILKINSON. I hope so, sir. I hope we profit by all the lessons of the war.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is the only justification of this investigation, as a matter of fact.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. One other thing which I did not follow quite through is the matter of the fleet.

Speaking to you now as a naval officer of long experience, when you spoke of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, the American Fleet as being inferior to the Japanese, you meant in the relative strength of battle-ships, destroyers, carriers, the entire component of the fleet?

Admiral WILKINSON. Including the Naval Air Force; yes sir. That is discounting any superiority of training and matériel, in which we hoped we were a little better off.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Is it not also true that the power of the fleet increased proportionately to its moving from its base?

[4849] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER: As I remember Admiral Leahy, his testimony before us in 1938, when we were considering expanding the Navy, he estimated we would need a superiority of approximately 2 to 1 in

order to move into the Western Pacific, and take up the Japanese on equal terms.

That involved communication lines and everything else.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think that is more than a fair statement, and when we did finally move into the Western Pacific in this war, we were more than 2 to 1.

Senator BREWSTER. So when you speak of the fleet as being inferior, our fleet being inferior, you compared the values side by side, rather than the fact that there was four or five thousand miles of water that we had to cover.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; a direct comparison.

Senator BREWSTER. It is probably useless to contemplate, except as it assists us in this lesson, but the price at Pearl Harbor was not only the price we paid at Pearl Harbor that day, but all the way on from Guadalcanal to Leyte, and even Okinawa, was it not, in the matter of the depletion of our naval strength?

Perhaps I should confine it now to Guadalcanal, where we went to fight on a shoestring, to stop the Japs because we had to stop them right then.

[4850] Admiral WILKINSON. I was thinking, Senator, that, of course, we could not say what the course of the war might have been. We might have gone out of Pearl Harbor with what we had in an attempt to relieve the Philippines, which might well have been disastrous in view of the Japanese islands and air fields, and the challenge we would have met from the Japanese Fleet.

The temporary losses at Pearl Harbor, and, of course, the actually complete losses of two battleships, undoubtedly reduced for a time the ratio and we had to wait until that ratio was restored and increased before we could successfully conduct the campaign in the Western Pacific. It is possible, if our losses had not been incurred in Pearl Harbor, other losses might have resulted subsequently, and that those losses might have been more permanent, not readily restored.

I cannot say what it may have been in the course of the war.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, after this initial upset, we did demonstrate a capacity to beat the Japanese on almost any terms from then on. We had no serious surprises, no serious upsets in our procedure, from then on.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. The first campaign in the South Pacific, in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, was [4851] pretty tough fighting. Our losses were heavy, and so were the Japs' losses, we hope, but thereafter we began to have disproportionate losses, comparing the Jap losses with ours.

Senator BREWSTER. I think it is proper to speak of it now. It is my understanding that in the Naval Affairs Committee I think Admiral Stark, or Admiral King—Admiral King, I think, testified that we had to go into Guadalcanal to stop it; we could not let the Japs go any further, so it was a calculated risk that we felt obliged to take.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Not because we felt it was necessarily easy or feasible, but it just had to be done with insufficient forces because of the losses at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Is that right?

Admiral WILKINSON. In part. The ships that were disabled at Pearl Harbor, the older battleships, would have been strong units in the South Pacific, but they would not have been particularly well adapted to some of the fighting there which required faster vessels.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. Our greatest difficulty, as I recall, in the earlier days of the war, was the lack of [4852] carriers, and, of course, there were no carriers affected at Pearl Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. The estimated losses—I recall getting this at that time from Admiral Stark—the losses incident at Pearl Harbor, it was estimated at that time had set us back a year. Did you hear such estimates at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. I defer to his judgment. I made no such estimate.

Senator BREWSTER. It would be true that if the fleet had remained in being, with the augmentations in the ensuing 12 months, our progress both in the South Pacific and in West Pacific could have been that much more rapid, because of the strength which we would have had if we did not encounter these losses, don't you think so?

Admiral WILKINSON. I should say so, unless we had undertaken an expedition for the relief of the Philippines in the crisis that was developing there before we were prepared for it, in which case, of course, we might have had heavy losses there, and then been worse off than we were to begin with.

Senator BREWSTER. I quite appreciate that. That is, if the Japs had not sunk these ships at Pearl Harbor, public opinion might have been for a relief expedition, although [4853] when I was at Pearl Harbor in 1940, the standing joke between the Army and Navy at that time was that the fellows in the Philippines were just out of luck, that we were not going to relieve them. There seemed to be a rather jovial aspect to it. The poor fellows were supposed to hold out for 6 months when they knew the fleet, very well, was not coming, because it did not have the strength to go into the western Pacific until it had the 2 to 1 superiority to the Japs, which it did not have. Did you ever hear such discussions?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. Not authoritatively, not in the sense that they were definitely doomed, but that it was difficult to relieve them.

Senator BREWSTER. I refer to the captains, not the top command. I refer to the boys down the line who felt they were up against it.

I think that is all that I have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.

[4854] Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Wilkinson, during the course of your examination by the gentleman from Pennsylvania you pointed out certain advantages that the fleet had in the harbor at the time of the surprise attack. One of them was that it was practically protected from submarine attack. And, I think you also pointed out, that when the ships were sunk they were sunk in shallow water and you were able to later raise them.

You did not mean to imply that that was a good place to have the fleet if we had been under any impression that an attack was to occur, did you?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I think I was asked in fact whether, as to the contrast between Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Roads, whether

the fact that the water was shallow in Pearl Harbor, and ships were recovered, would not have made Lahaina a worse place to be, if a similar attack with similar effects had taken place, and I think my answer was "yes."

I did not, of myself, I believe, say I would prefer the ships stay in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, as they were lashed together in pairs and in line, that very arrangement of things reduced their fighting capacity, didn't it?

Admiral WILKINSON. It reduced their ability to get out and reduced the arc of fire of the guns of the inner [4855] ship.

Mr. GEARHART. Prevented all maneuverability?

Admiral WILKINSON. The single ship would be unmaneuverable as long as it was tied up. The effect of tying them together was to delay the exit from the harbor in case of necessity of the inner ship and also it massed the guns, the inboard guns, the guns toward each other of the two ships lying side by side.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

In event that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had received information that an attack was imminent, within the range of possibility, those ships wouldn't have been in the harbor at all, would they?

Admiral WILKINSON. Depending on the time of advance notice he got.

Mr. GEARHART. If he had gotten advance notice he would have gotten them out of the harbor as fast as he could?

Admiral WILKINSON. My impression is that he would. I can't speak for his mind.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact they presented a very, very enticing target to the Japanese in the position in which they were moored, did they not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Very much so. That, of course, was a characteristic of the limited mooring in the harbor for [4856] deep-draft vessels. There were not many places we could put them.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, you were a witness before the Hewitt inquiry?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That occurred in Washington sometime subsequent to the 2d of May of 1945 and the month of August 1945, did it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. It occurred, I think, in June, early June 1945.

Mr. GEARHART. I will ask you if in that hearing, during the course of that hearing, the following questions were not asked you and to which you gave the following answers—question by Mr. Sonnett:

As to the dissemination of information, Admiral, outside of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then, that it was the responsibility of the ONI to disseminate information on the Japanese situation to the Pacific Fleet?

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

That point was never fully determined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the situation but I was told that the deductions of future movements were the function of the War Plans, rather than of Intelligence, and this understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of [4856a] Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, when, at one time, I said that I thought it was our responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of the enemy's prospective movements, but in the Navy system the War Plans did that.

I told him then that I would prepare that analysis myself, in my office, in order that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit, and in consequence, such analyses as I made weren't transmitted to the Fleet but were given to the Chief of Operations and to the War Plans.

The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My understanding at the time was, and still is, that I would report to the War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced from all sources and that they would forward to the Fleet such items as they felt should be forwarded.

Mr. SONNET. Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning the Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation of the Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from these movements would be the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

[4857] The latter part of your question, yes. The first part, the day by day information of Japanese movements would not, according to my then and present understanding, be sent out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their evaluation.

I will ask you if those questions were asked and if those answers constituted the answers you gave to those questions at that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. To my recollection, yes.

Mr. GEARHART. At the time you gave those answers in 1945, in June 1945, did you recall or did you have in mind the provisions of Schedule of Organizations, a schedule which bears the date of 23 October 1940, a schedule which I understand was in effect in 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had those in mind as modified by the instructions that had been turned over to me by my predecessor and that had been confirmed by my conversation with Admiral Ingersoll to which I testified, I believe, yesterday.

Mr. GEARHART. The document, Schedule of Organizations, is in the nature of a regulational order, is it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, your understanding is quite contrary to what the schedule of Organizations required and [4858] recited; is that not correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. The Schedule of Organizations was prepared and issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. It was subject to change by him orally or otherwise. It had been changed orally by him to Admiral Kirk. It had been changed orally by Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant, and speaking for him, to me.

I considered that the change had been made orally and did not require the textual change in writing.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, are you giving hearsay evidence in reference to verbal changes by Admiral Stark, or are you reciting your own information received from the lips of Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am giving the hearsay information received officially from my predecessor, and I am giving you information received from Admiral Stark's first assistant, Admiral Ingersoll, who spoke for him.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, regardless of that, the Schedule of Organizations provides that, in respect to both foreign and domestic intelligence, that the ONI should "evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable"?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[4859] Mr. GEARHART. All right.

I find in the correspondence a letter dated February 18, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, to which there is appended a postscript, which I will read:

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with the information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers it responsible for furnishing the same type of information to that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

I also find Admiral Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, dated March 22, 1941, in which he says:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that [4860] information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant ships is forwarded by air mail weekly to you, and that if you wish this information can be issued more directly or sent by dispatch.

I also find a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, dated March 11, 1941, signed A. G. Kirk, from the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is apparently the basis for Admiral Stark's answer to the postscript of Admiral Kimmel's letter in which it is stated:

4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

Now, with those letters in mind, I will ask you, first, the A. G. Kirk that signed the memorandum of March 11, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, was then Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the position you later held?

Admiral WILKINSON. I relieved him directly.

Mr. GEARHART. When you became Chief of Naval Operations, did Admiral Kirk inform you of that correspondence between Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel and of his memorandum [4861] which was sent around?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not specifically.

Mr. GEARHART. When you talked with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, as you testified in the Hewitt inquiry, and told Admiral Ingersoll in effect that you thought it was your function to evaluate and disseminate the intelligence, did you find and give him these precedents to support your position?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you every discuss the subject with your senior subordinates in the office?

Admiral WILKINSON. Frequently.

Mr. GEARHART. Some of them had been on duty much longer than you had; had they not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did any of them recall to you the memorandum of Admiral Kirk?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall that they did, and do not believe they did, sir. I think it was generally understood that we had the responsibility and I accepted it, of keeping the forces afloat, including the commander in chief, Pacific, of all information, informed of all information except that which through our instructions, was specifically excepted, and if I may, I will read my answer [4862-3] of yesterday:

I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy's probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet or by our naval forces.

In the latter case, before dissemination, I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information that I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was responsible.

That is the end of my answer, sir.

I will explain further that it would obviously be [4864] undesirable for me to send out information which on its receipt would cause the commander in chief to take such action as would be in conflict with the action which was desired by the responsible officer in the Department for War Plans.

Mr. GEARHART. And still Admiral Kirk issues a memorandum in which he says that it is his responsibility, and we have also in the record that Admiral Stark says it was the responsibility of ONI.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think that last sentence of Admiral Kirk's is not as all-embracing as you would have it be, if you would mind reading it again, sir, the last part of Admiral Kirk's letter.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, Admiral Kirk says [reading]:

The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is pretty definite, isn't it?

Let's pursue it a little further. It is an interesting subject.

Admiral WILKINSON. All right.

[4865] Mr. GEARHART. I find among the correspondence a letter from Admiral Kimmel, Chief of Naval Operations, dated 26 May, 1941, entitled "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet."

In this letter there appears under title VII, "Information:"

Information.

(a) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is as a rule not informed as to the policy or change of policy reflected in current events and naval movements, and as a result is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in some course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that on occasion the rapid development in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and perhaps even the lack of knowledge of the Military authorities themselves, may militate against the [4866] furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his possible course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessity for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against the debility of this training by strategic dispositions or otherwise to meet impending eventualities.

Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island developments, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principal that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur, and by the quickest secure means available.

Did you see this letter after you arrived and assumed [4867] the duties as Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I am not sure that Admiral Kirk saw it.

[4868] Mr. GEARHART. I find that Admiral Stark testified before the naval court of inquiry, and I quote his testimony:

You considered the letter, Exhibit 33, so good, did you not, Admiral Stark, that you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in a restricted area upon its receipt among important offices in the Navy Department?

Answer:

Yes. It was our general custom to do that and I mimeographed this, sent it to all hands who were concerned, followed it up and, as I recall, assembled all concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself in my office.

Did you see the mimeographed copy that Admiral Stark, according to his testimony, had prepared and distributed to the Navy Department?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Admiral Stark mention this letter to you after you assumed your duties?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I find that Admiral Stark testified further before the naval court of inquiry in respect to this letter, and I quote:

Have you any comment on the last sentence in the last paragraph of 7?

Answer:

[4869] About being guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions? I have just covered that. You mean the next paragraph?

Yes.

Answer:

(Reading) "It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." I was in complete concurrence with him on that and that was one of my objectives, yes.

You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet should be, insofar as you were able, immediately informed of all important developments as they occurred, and by the quickest secure means available?

Yes.

Did Admiral Stark tell you after you became Director of Naval Intelligence that one of his objectives was that the commander in chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest secure means?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my recollection.

Mr. GEARHART. I find in the correspondence a letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark dated July 26, 1941— [4870] by the way, when did you become Director?

Admiral WILKINSON. October 15, 1941.

Mr. GEARHART. This is a quotation of Admiral Stark—pardon me, it is a quotation from Admiral Kimmel's letter to Admiral Stark of July 26, 1941:

1. The importance of keeping the Commander in Chief advised of department policies and decisions and the changes in policy and decisions to meet the changes in the international situation.

Subparagraph (a):

We have as yet received no official information as to the United States attitude toward Russia's participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of operation, if any, in the Pacific between the United States and Russia, if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communications systems, and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which may be fully explored * * *

(and so on.)

Then Admiral Kimmel asked a number of questions:

Will England declare war on Japan.

The answer to 1 is in the affirmative—and so on.

He asked all the questions possible about the situation which might develop in the Pacific.

[4871] Did you know anything about that long letter that he wrote to Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know, sir. I think normally that would be prepared in the Division of War Plans which has cognizance of the plans you speak of, whether there was coordination between Russia and America, and so on. Anything with regard to our own participation or the participation of other nations in conjunction with us.

Mr. GEARHART. Your answer is interesting in view of Admiral Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, from which I will quote. His letter was dated August 19, 1941. That is getting pretty close up to your tenure, is it not? I will quote a portion:

I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed as to the department policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get the answer probably is that the situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

Evidently Admiral Stark thought that that responsibility was ONI's, didn't he?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I should say that a [4872] situation which has not jelled is a matter for the State Department, a matter of international relations. As I heard you, and I may not have understood it, that was a question of a fluid situation, an international situation.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I understand that you still believe that the organizational order of ONI didn't mean what it said during your tenure as Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. It meant, as I interpreted it, and as it had been amended to me verbally, and as I mentioned yesterday, there was one whole paragraph with regard to the Division of Public Relations which viewed as it stood would give us authority and instructions as to what to do with public relations, they had been completely lifted out of my office, but the order of over a year's standing had not been amended, but there was no order, and I don't know that one was required to show textual changes in each order every time a directive of any sort was issued in modification of it, whether that directive was in text or orally.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Admiral Stark ever call you in and tell you that you should disregard the schedule of organizations in respect to the evaluation of information collected and of disseminating it as was deemed advisable?

Admiral WILKINSON. I never asked Admiral Stark that. [4873] I had the word from my predecessor, and I confirmed it by instructions from Admiral Stark's responsible assistant.

Mr. GEARHART. Did Admiral Kirk tell you to disregard his memorandum which he had issued just a short time before to the contrary effect?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't consider the memorandum is to the contrary effect, sir, if you speak of that letter which you read to me, because that is a broad and all-embracing program, and what he told me was specific orders he had received from Admiral Stark which he stated had been received in the presence of Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner.

Mr. GEARHART. Well now, to quote his memorandum again—there is no use disregarding its import—

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, except it is very broad.

Mr. GEARHART (reading):

Naval Intelligence is fully aware it is the responsibility of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

Did Admiral Kirk ever tell you to disregard that memorandum?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is a very broad statement. There were limitations and modifications to it such as I mentioned. Admiral Kirk never told me of the memorandum itself [4874] and, as I mentioned, I never saw the memorandum, but I do recognize that in the broad sense, that is the responsibility of the office, as it may have been amended by instructions received from higher authority, which I mentioned, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I will ask you, Admiral Wilkinson, why didn't you transmit the information that was contained in the intercepts to Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, when the information pointed directly to Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. The information contained in those intercepts pointed to many sources.

Mr. GEARHART. I am not talking about the ones that pointed to Panama or the ones that pointed to any other place, but the ones that

pointed directly to Hawaii. Was not it your duty to transmit the information contained in intercepts that reached your desk which did point directly to Hawaii and did evidence an inordinate interest by the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander

Admiral WILKINSON. We did not, perhaps erroneously, recognize that that was an inordinate interest in Hawaii. We had found inquiries and reports of similar investigations in many ports. We considered that those were part, as I have said, of the degree of nicety of the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander-in-Chief, partly in [4875] error, perhaps, we didn't recognize it pointed specifically to an attack on Hawaii, and partly also because we were very jealous at that time of the security of the code and the fact that we were breaking the code, as Senator Brewster has mentioned they were already suspicious that we were attacking the code, and we continued to discourage that suspicion.

[4876] Mr. GEARHART. There were some intercepts which reached your desk which indicated on the part of the Japanese an inordinate interest in conditions existing in Panama?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you inform the Commanding General and the Commanding Admiral at Panama?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Of those messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, they were of a special concern to the commanders at Panama?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did you not give them that specific information which pointed their way?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was well known that a great deal of espionage activity was going on throughout all of our coastal areas, and our island possessions. That information as to those espionage activities was known and sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence to the district intelligence officers located in those various ports. That information which they received, plus that which we collected on the spot, was conveyed to the local commander in every instance. The commander in chief of Hawaii, the naval commander in Panama, the commander in chief of Manila, [4877] were all aware that their forces were under constant espionage. They were so aware because of the activities of the intelligence agencies, and our own representatives there.

These messages that you speak of, which pointed to the desire for information in those various ports, were of themselves but confirmatory of the espionage activities which were already known and which were constantly being kept before the commanders.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, the situation still remains that you had information, very much definite information, which you did not transmit to the commanders in the field, that were in command in the areas, that the information you had related to.

Admiral WILKINSON. That information was little more than what they had through their own intelligence agencies, Mr. Congressman. They were aware that they were the subject of constant espionage, that the result of that espionage was being transmitted back to Japan. We knew that photographs were being taken of the fleet in Hawaii.

In fact, we endeavored to secure a law to prevent the taking of photographs and were unsuccessful, and the commanders of the fleet were aware of that, all of that.

The specific inquiry as to the division of Pearl Harbor [4878] into several areas and the location of ships in those areas was another refinement on that intelligence, a refinement which we perhaps should have recognized as indicating a possible attack.

It would also be indicated similarly elsewhere, but the fact that a comprehensive espionage was being carried on was, I think, known through the district intelligence officers to the naval commanders in all of these ports, and I know that the time I was in Hawaii, that we were cognizant of that fact, and we were helpless to stop it.

We could not censor the mails. We could not censor the dispatches. We could not prevent the taking of photographs. We could not arrest Japanese suspects. There was nothing we could do to stop it, and all hands knew that espionage was going on all along, and reports were going back to Japan.

Mr. GEARHART. My dear sir, don't you think that you were assuming a tremendous responsibility in deciding in your mind what Admiral Kimmel knew, and what the Admiral in command at Panama knew?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I think that from the reports that we had sent to our district intelligence officers and those returned by them, we knew they were acquainted with the espionage. But these particular messages, indicating [4879] as it has been said, a bombing plan, were not sent out in view of the attempts at security of the code breaking apparatus, code breaking process that we were then maintaining.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that Admiral Kimmel was writing to Admiral Stark for information, begging for information almost monthly or weekly, don't you think he was entitled to know that a Japanese intercept had disclosed that the Japanese had divided Oahu into five areas, and that the Japanese were demanding, and their confederates on that island were reporting day by day, on the movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor—don't you think that that was information Admiral Kimmel was entitled to have?

Admiral WILKINSON. With the exception of a division of Pearl Harbor into these areas, I think Admiral Kimmel was aware that some such process of survey, espionage, and reports was under way; I think he was aware of that by virtue of his contacts with the district intelligence officer.

Mr. GEARHART. But the point remains you had definite information to the effect that I have just described, and you thought you were fulfilling your full responsibility when you left Admiral Kimmel to guess that they were exercising espionage over his command?

[4880] Admiral WILKINSON. I did not leave him to guess. Our district intelligence officer and his fleet intelligence officer was aware of the espionage. The only thing he was not aware of was the message dividing the harbor into five parts, which might have been for convenience in locating it on a map, and which probably was, as we now appreciate, information convenient in establishing an attack.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; and that would indicate to any man that they were dividing that harbor into parts for the purpose of making more convenient a possible attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Very possible.

Mr. GEARHART. Wouldn't that have been mighty important information for Admiral Kimmel to have?

Admiral WILKINSON. It would have been useful. He had been writing himself of the dangers of an air attack. He had been drawing up plans for protection against an air attack. He was convinced that there was a possibility and a threat of an air attack. It would have been a confirmation of his suspicions.

Mr. GEARHART. And being a confirmation of his suspicions, he probably would have acted, would he not, in the light of that confirmation?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure. The message that arrived was translated on October 9. If he had had the [4881] message on October 10, what action he would have taken, I don't know. He couldn't keep the fleet at sea for 2 or 3 months.

Mr. GEARHART. He didn't have to bring them all in at one time, did he?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, he didn't. Ordinarily he had them operating in three sections, as I recall, of which two were at sea at one time.

Mr. GEARHART. Two, less three battleships.

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, that was a particular incident, as you recall, in that period, but the normal schedule called for their operating in three sections, of dividing the battleships, I believe, among two, if not three, and having them at sea, only one in port at any time.

[4882] Mr. GEARHART. Now, that information of the division of Hawaii into five areas, supported by six other intercepts, each one reporting in respect to those areas and with respect to the set-up in the harbor, taken all together probably would have a very decided effect upon the mind of the commander in Hawaii, the commander charged with the defense of the fleet and of our military and naval establishments there, would it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I should think so. What effect it would have I do not know, sir, in view of the relatively protracted length of time that was affected, nearly 2 months, whether he would have kept the fleet at sea continually or would have pursued a rotational plan he had in effect.

Mr. GEARHART. If Admiral Kimmel had been informed by furnishing him either copies of the intercepts or the substance thereof, that the Japanese were constantly calling for further information with respect to ship movements, that would probably have had an effect upon the commander of the island, would it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; further information with respect to the ship movements might well have been desirable for him to know, but I do not think it would have affected the status of the fleet if he had known of these things.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you are giving us an expression of [4883] your thoughts now, aren't you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; that is what you asked me.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you a right to assume that Admiral Kimmel would have thought the same way you do now, or then?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not at all, except as a naval officer, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As commanding officer he had a right to make those decisions and make whatever conclusions he pleased from the information that you should have supplied him with, is that not correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. He had a right to make any conclusion which he pleased. I am not quite, as yet, in agreement with the fact I should have supplied it to him.

Mr. GEARHART. And by withholding from him that information you withheld from him the right to decide what importance should be attached to those messages, you denied to him the right to evaluate those messages in that way, didn't you, and you denied him the right to act in the light of what information those messages conveyed, didn't you?

Admiral WILKINSON. I denied—in the first place, I am not convinced that it was I who was withholding them. In the second place, whoever withheld them was not denying him these facilities, but not furnishing him the opportunity to work upon them.

[4884] Mr. GEARHART. Yes; now, I have been referring specifically to the messages which appear—

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield at this point because I wanted to complete what I had which bears on this particular point you are discussing, which you just concluded. Are you through with that phase of it?

Mr. GEARHART. I was just going to conclude that phase of it by calling attention to him that I am referring to the messages that appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2 in this proceeding. Now do you want me to yield?

Senator BREWSTER. If you will, at that point.

I did not perhaps make it clear. Admiral, as to the purport of my questioning on your testimony before the Roberts Commission which bears, I think, very directly on this point that Mr. Gearhart has been stressing, and I think that in justice to you it ought to be clear.

As I understand now, I did not realize that your testimony was not taken down before the Roberts Commission; that you appeared before them and testified off the record.

Admiral WILKINSON. My testimony was not intentionally off the record, but it was not recorded and reduced except as a summary of the statement, I believe.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes; so that this record which you made immediately thereafter for Admiral Stark was the only [4885] record, apparently, of your testimony?

Admiral WILKINSON. Apparently and which, of course, was my recollection after the fact.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, the Roberts Commission, after the preliminaries on the first page, apparently thought it was important—they apparently did attach great importance to this question of information that Admiral Kimmel had received, because at the bottom of the first page you state [reading]:

They then asked me what information and communications had been sent during the months preceding the attack.

And you turned in a full page there of information you furnished and then you say at the bottom of page 2:

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves that all of this information had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department.

Then came the next paragraph which I have quoted.

The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had.

I think you have now agreed in both the colloquies with Congressman Gearhart and myself that that was not strictly accurate, that they did not have all of the information which you had here, either in connection with this particular inter- [4886] cept and some of those that followed it and also as to the broader diplomatic phases of it, which might be more arguable, but, at any rate, was information which you had which he did not have.

Now, the point which I was bringing out was this, that the Roberts committee, which made the reports bearing on the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel, apparently did that on the basis of your statement that Kimmel had all of the "information which we had"; that is, the Department here had. If that is not so it would be possible that their conclusions might have been very different as to the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel and any others concerned, if they had had a more accurate picture of what had been furnished to Kimmel; would that not be so?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, and thank you for the suggestion. I had not appreciated that when I was answering Mr. Gearhart, and in the middle of page you will find, just above that, this statement [reading]:

We had, on the first of December, drafted a summary of information available to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese land forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval preparations, including:

- (a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;
- [4887] (b) Readyng for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc.;
- (c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area;
- (d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts;
- (e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) in South China and the Mandates;
- (f) The taking over of many merchant vessels by the Japanese Navy and the equipment of several antiaircraft ships;
- (g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups under the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet—Group One operating in the South China area, and Group Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however, that nothing in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as Hawaii—whereupon Mr. Roberts asked the distance from Hawaii to the Mandates, and I told him the easternmost—Jaluit—was about 2,300 miles, and the remainder extended to the westward about 2,700 miles. Actually the figures are 2,100 and 2,400.)

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had [4888] assured ourselves that all of this information—

this information I just mentioned—

had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on December 3rd we had ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to burn all their confidential codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts, and had also directed our representatives in the Far East (attaches and observers) to burn their codes and papers.

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much information as we had.

I think in speaking of that and bringing it back, I might well have been—I think I was, in fact, referring to the fact that he had as much information as we had on all of that subject I have just read.

[4889] Senator BREWSTER. Certainly the statement is somewhat broader than that. I think it is. We can now see here that it is perhaps unfortunate that you did not have a complete transcript of your evidence because it might do you more justice than this somewhat sweeping summary by yourself would when you perhaps might not have been thinking of all that was involved.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. Obviously this was prepared by me for the private and personal information for Admiral Stark, which I had made, telling him what I and other officers had told the Roberts Commission.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. That was entirely dependent on my recollection, it had nothing to do with the transcript. I thought notes had been taken. In fact, I thought there was a recorder or stenographer present and I was later to have a record of that but I understand none were taken, I understand none appeared in the record except a two-paragraph statement.

Senator BREWSTER. This does have the value of having been made contemporaneously.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. This was made——

Admiral WILKINSON. It is my recollection immediately after the event.

[4890] Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. But I know, for instance, I did not tell them about magic, I did not let them know—I did not tell them about all the diplomatic messages.

Senator BREWSTER. So that magic, you say, was freely discussed, as you say later on in the memorandum. You mention that on the next page.

Admiral WILKINSON. My hearing was very brief. They were interested in the actual movements of forces and I did not go at any length into the discussion of the diplomatic magic.

Senator BREWSTER. On page 4 at the bottom you say:

The meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most careful that no mention of it would be made.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. So that was apparently one of the topics that was gone into to a material extent.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think the discussion I had with them as to the "magic" was simply as to the 14-part message.

Mr. GESELL. Senator, would it be helpful to put the entire text of the memorandum in the record? We have read different portions, at different times, and to show the relationship of the excerpts wouldn't it be a good idea to put it all in?

[4891] Senator BREWSTER. I think it would be helpful to put it all in.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You want it included at this point in the record?

Mr. GESELL. Yes. I think it would be a good idea.

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The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

Mr. GESELL. If it is so ordered I think it would be helpful.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The memorandum above referred to is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:)

Op-16
Secret

Copy No. 5 of 5.

December 19, 1941

S-E-C-R-E-T

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Proceedings of President's Investigating Committee, 1000 to 1200, December 19, 1941.

On notification from Admiral Reeves, received at 0915, I reported to Justice Roberts' Commission at ten o'clock in the Munitions Building. General Miles was also there, accompanied by the chief of his Far Eastern Division, Colonel R. S. Bratton; Commander McCollum accompanied me. The Commission stated they wished the Army and Navy Intelligence to [4892] cooperate in their answers; that they would hear General Miles first but might ask me any questions that might arise during his discussion.

General Miles was then questioned, and in the main his testimony was not interrupted by any side questions to me; so that despite the statement of Joint questioning the actual effect was complete testimony by General Miles, followed by mine. In fact, General Miles was excused, because of preparations for departure from the city this afternoon on an inspection trip, immediately after his testimony, although Colonel Bratton remained.

They asked General Miles mainly what reports and instructions his office and the command in Hawaii had exchanged for a period of approximately one month prior to the actual attack. He mentioned communications regarding possibilities of sabotage and described at some length the events in General Marshall's office, including the sending of the subsequently delayed dispatch to General Short on the morning of Sunday, December 7th. He mentioned his experience in service in the Islands and said that in the past the concern of G-2 of the Army had been rather in sabotage than in a military raid. He said his studies as war plans officer there had, however, envisaged the possibility of a raid and that he had reached the conclusion that a successful raid was possible against a garrison [4893] which had not been warned, but was not possible against a garrison which had been warned.

They then asked me what information and communications had been sent during the months preceding the attack. I said that, for an understanding of the picture, I would like to describe our avenues of intelligence, and then mentioned the Naval Attaches we had maintained in the Far East, and the seventeen additional observers and consular shipping advisers we had established in the past year. These informants reported matters which they ascertained either by their own observation or by contacts which they might make. We had in the past had secret agents in Japan but we had none recently since those we had had not survived. Also a source of information was the radio net and the intercepted dispatches, utilizing the facilities of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts. Information dispatches were received by us and the forces in the field kept informed, and the Chief of Naval Operations had testified as to actual warning dispatches which he had sent in the period immediately prior to the attack. As to the actual interchange of messages with reference to intelligence, in general the sources reported their information to us via the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and in forwarding it the Commander-in-Chief Pacific was usually advised. We had, on the first of December, drafted a summary of information [4894] available to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese land forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval preparations, including:

- (a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;
- (b) Readyng for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc.;
- (c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area;
- (d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts;
- (e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) in South China and the Mandates;

(f) The taking over of many merchant vessels by the Japanese Navy and the equipment of several anti-aircraft ships;

(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups under the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet—Group One operating in the South China area, and Group Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however, that nothing in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as Hawaii—whereupon Mr. Roberts asked the distance from Hawaii to the Mandates, and I told him the easternmost—Jaluit—was about 2,300 miles, and the remainder extended to the west— [4895] ward about 2,700 miles. Actually the figures are 2,100 and 2,400.)

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves that all of this information had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on December 3 we had ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to burn all their confidential codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts, and had also directed our representatives in the Far East (attachés and observers) to burn their codes and papers.

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1 that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information. I believed the raid had been aside from the main effort, and to my belief the Japanese striking force [4896] had retired to the westward immediately afterwards. We had no conclusive evidence of any Japanese surface vessels operating thereafter to the eastward of Hawaii, although it was probable that some submarines had come into the eastern Pacific and possibly were still there.

The Commission asked as to the control of fishing boats in the vicinity of Hawaii. I said that I knew that even before I left there in May there had been measures to effectuate control of these boats—first, by denying noncitizens the right to own and use them; and second, by either removing or, in some way I thought, controlling their radio. These efforts were made principally by the Coast Guard as their proper province, although guided by the advice of the Commandant's office. Such measures as have been taken since the Coast Guard was incorporated into the Navy would, of course, be more directly under his command.

Under the Delimitation Agreement, regarding the special investigatory services, the actual investigations of all civilian population in Hawaii were in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I knew the military and naval counterintelligence services were closely allied with the FBI, and that I felt sure that with the fishing boats Captain Mayfield and Naval Intelligence gave actual assistance where possible. Mr. Roberts said that they would find out more of [4897] that exact situation when they got out there.

They asked what arrangements we had in the Intelligence branch of the Navy Department as to information during Saturday night (December 6). I said

that responsible officers were on telephone call, but that in addition there was an officer watch in our Foreign Branch, in our Administrative Branch, in our Domestic Intelligence Branch, and that, beginning on Friday night I had set a watch over the week-end in the Far Eastern section itself. I said that Commander McCollum had relieved Lt. Comdr. Watts at 0800 Sunday, that I had arrived at the office at about 0900, and that only then had the last part of the Magic (the meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most careful that no mention of it would be made) arrived containing the final instructions to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington to break off negotiations, whereas the previous parts which had been available to us the preceding night had been more argumentative in sense and rather of the type of a "White Paper" designed subsequently for publication.

Sometime after 0900 Sunday the information came that the presentation of the complete message, which was to be withheld until a later dispatch announcing the hour, was not directed to be made at 1300, Washington time. I said I understood by hearsay that the actual call requesting the appointment [4898] was not made until 1300 and that the appointment was granted for 1345—but that the State Department was, of course, aware of these times.

I said that we had reported this information to you, and that while we were discussing it you had talked over the phone with General Marshall, and that I understood you and General Marshall had mentioned (to the Commission) your conversation and the dispatch he sent.

The Commission asked about the RADAR installations on the ships and in Hawaii. I understood that the Army had RADAR on shore, and I knew we had it installed on a few ships. However, it only works on a direct line such as the eye does, and in consequence, the RADAR on the ships so fitted which were in Pearl Harbor could not be effective because of the interposition of the mountains and the hills and the land in general. Some of the ships which were out of port were equipped with RADAR but, as far as I knew, they had not picked up anything on them—again because of the limitations of the device—the curvature of the earth limiting its range.

With regard to the general question of the readiness of the Intelligence Service, I said that on the recommendation of my predecessor, Captain Kirk, as early as last April the Chief of Naval Operations had sent out a dispatch that, because of past experience with reference to the Axis beginning activities [4899] on Saturdays or Sundays or on national holidays, the personnel of the naval intelligence service should be particularly careful on those days. Again in March the Chief of Naval Operations had directed an advanced state of readiness of the District Intelligence organization, had directed the placing of coastal information sections in active status in May, the further expansion of District Intelligence organizations in May; and a complete state of readiness had been directed in July.

After my testimony Lieutenant-General C. D. Herron, who relinquished command in early February in Hawaii, testified mainly about his preparations and his general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter he had had them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently modified that in some degree although he had maintained guns at their field stations. He said his primary plan was to use anti-aircraft for the defense of Pearl Harbor, to use fighting planes to control the air, and to have infantry support covering landing beaches. He said that he considered the most dangerous time to be dawn, particularly because of the possibility of approach during the night of enemy vessels, whether aircraft carriers or an actual raiding expedition.

The Commission asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time in the defenses, and consequently the most advantageous time [4900] for an attack. He said that with regard to the reserves, Yes, because they were more likely to be on leave or other privileges, but with regard to the actual stations in the field he considered that they should be as efficient and as fully manned on Sundays as on any other morning. He personally made many dawn inspections on Sundays to check on and insure their readiness.

T. S. WILKINSON.

Copies

- No. 1—CNO
- No. 2—ACNO
- No. 3—Op-12
- No. 4—Op-16-F-2
- No. 5—Op-16.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral, did you ever give any attention or consideration to the possibility of transmitting the substance or the copies of those intercepts that I have directed your attention to?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. As I have stated, my responsibility was limited to sending out, or included what was a limitation, the sending out of all information except that respecting enemy communications and that which might require or involve operational plans and movements. This message was [4901] of that character. I am not convinced that I would have been authorized or permitted to send that out, or whether I should have given it or suggested to another agency that it should send it out, but in any respect, answering your question, I did not consider sending it out because I did not evaluate it, as I had not, as an indication of the detailed intelligence they desired.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, did you consider Hawaii to be beyond possibility of attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you think it was beyond probability of attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that the reason why you did not adequately evaluate those messages concerning ship movements—

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART (continuing). In and around Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; it had nothing to do with the possibility versus the probability of them.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you refrain from transmitting copies of intercepts for any particular reason?

Admiral WILKINSON. If I considered sending them, which I doubt, I would have refrained from sending copies of them because of danger to the code, the code-breaking activities.

[4902] Mr. GEARHART. What was the practice of your division?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to send copies outside the Navy Department and to limit those very carefully.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you ever send any copies of intercepts?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my knowledge and only at the last moment did I send the gist of such an intercept, when we said that the diplomatic agencies have been told to burn their codes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, by transmitting that information any Japanese who cracked our code would know that we had cracked theirs, wouldn't they?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not only that, but if any widespread conversation or discussion had come to the ears of any Japanese agents, they would have known we had cracked it. I think our code was fairly secure. What we were attempting to avoid was the spread of knowledge that we were engaged in code breaking and had succeeded in breaking their code.

I think I recall that General Marshall testified that he had heard rumors that that knowledge was beginning to leak out.

Mr. GEARHART. You were present when General Marshall wrote out the message on the 7th of December, the one that arrived in Hawaii too late?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

[4903] Mr. GEARHART. You were not among those in that group?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, in that message he tells them that "Tomorrow the Japanese are going to deliver an ultimatum to the State Department" and also that they were going to deliver it at 1 o'clock. He did not hesitate to tell what he had learned through reading the intercepts, did he?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; nor did we in sending out the message about breaking the codes.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, your office had been sending out the substance of intercepts all during the year of 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe not, sir. I think those messages you spoke of were sent out by the communications office.

Mr. GEARHART. What does "OPNAV" stand for?

Admiral WILKINSON. OPNAV? That is Chief of Naval Operations office as a whole. Is there any number, small number on it afterward, Op-13, Op-20, something like that?

Mr. GEARHART. "OPNAV" is the way this reads.

Admiral WILKINSON. That is general operations of the Navy; yes.

Mr. GEARHART. That means the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral WILKINSON. Or someone in his office. The actual [4904] office number if it is prepared in a subordinate office would be indicated by a number such as OP-200 which would be Communications, or Op-16, which would be Intelligence.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you have looked through these messages that have been sent them by OPNAV, have you not, during the year of 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have seen this book. I am not sure that I recall which were sent out by OPNAV and which were otherwise indicated.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, here is one that was sent out on the 7th day of July 1941 to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and for the information of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. This reads:

Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329:

Japan directs eight Marus on east coast United States rush cargo handling and proceed Colon pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on following schedule: 16th Tokai; 17th—

and so forth, naming a lot of dates.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. You have that before you, do you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Page 6 of Exhibit 37.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[4905] Mr. GEARHART. That is transmittal of information that was received from intercepts, is it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Turn over to page 7 and you will find another message.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is a transmittal by OPNAV or whatever you call it of information received from intercepts, isn't it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Likewise the next, on page 8?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And page 9?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Page 10?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. Those were all sent out by the Communications Office and all sent out in July. I am informed that that practice was discontinued after July. In any event, it was not under the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. GEARHART. That was sent out because someone who then had the say-so believed that it was necessary to advise American commanders in the field of information that was received in intercepts?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. There was a balance between the information going out and the security of the code- [4906] breaking processes.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. As we have heard a few moments ago, sir, there were rumors of the suspicions as to code breaking and during the summer and fall every attempt was made to tighten up the security. This practice was apparently discontinued and we were constantly being warned by all hands to be careful about how the code breaking was threatened, the knowledge of code breaking was possible of suspicion.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Now in a lot of those messages that I called your attention to, the ones relating to ship movements and inquiries concerning ship movements, did they take on any greater importance in your mind when the Navy translated this message from Tokyo to Washington, November 5, 1941, translated on November 5, 1941:

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

[4907] This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Now, when you read that message of a deadline being fixed by Japan for the doing of something, didn't the previous Japanese ship-movement intercepts take on a new and a more important aspect in your estimation?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would not say that it did, sir. That was in the character of prospective diplomatic negotiations that they were anxious to reach a conclusion on. Our war plans people were fully cognizant of it. They were aware of the diplomatic negotiations and, in fact, on October 16 they had sent out a warning message, on November 24 they sent another and on November 27 still another. These messages were in a class affecting the operations of the fleet, which I did not feel was in my province to relay.

Mr. GEARHART. When you read the intercept from Tokyo to Hong Kong dated November 14, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, in which the following is said:

Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American [4908] power in China.

b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government should it become necessary.

When you read that warlike intercept didn't the interest in our ship movements in Hawaii take on an added importance in your estimation?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say the interest in our ship movements everywhere did. The interest of the enemy espionage in the movement of our ships and the information they dispatched in conjunction with the messages hitherto were all matters considered by the question of how the fleet would operate and what it would do and were measures under the jurisdiction of the War Plans Section.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, in the light of these last two intercepts that I have called your attention to, intercepts having to do with a dead line and Japan's martial intentions, after you read them and you say the shipping movement intercepts took on a more important aspect and a greater importance, did you at that time give any considerations to whether or not you should transmit to Admiral Kimmel the substance of the ship- [4909] movement intercepts or send him copies thereof?

Admiral WILKINSON. Whether we informed him of the fact that these detailed inquiries as to the locations in Pearl Harbor had come in in addition to the regular—I mean aside from the regular espionage that was going on, is that your question?

Mr. GEARHART. I want the question answered.

Admiral WILKINSON. He knew there was a regular espionage.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as you have testified that the ship-movement intercepts took on greater importance in your mind in the light of the dead-line message I have read you, did you at that time give some consideration to the proposition that you should send Admiral Kimmel the substance of the ship-movement intercepts, or copies thereof?

Admiral WILKINSON. May I ask you, sir, if you meant, should I tell him than in addition to the regular espionage with which he and we were familiar, that there were special messages inquiring as to special information desired from the spies?

Mr. GEARHART. That is right.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, did you give any consideration to the question as to whether or not you should give to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had?

[4910] Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then when you encountered this intercept, directing your attention to page 165 of Exhibit No. 1 in this proceeding from Tokyo to Washington, November 22, 1941. [Reading:]

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an under-

standing with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

[4911] Now when you read this intercepted message that the Japanese had fixed a positively unalterable deadline of November 29 at which things are automatically going to happen, after you read that did it not occur to you, Admiral Wilkinson, that you should give to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. If that was information of the character that would influence the operations of the Fleet, whether to move in or out of port, I am not sure that it was within the responsibility or the authority of my office to send that. If, however, it was within that authority and responsibility, I did not consider sending it to him.

Mr. GEARHART. You were charged with evaluating all information that came to you, domestic and foreign. You were charged with the responsibility of disseminating that information. You had the information. Did you go and talk to Admiral Stark about it, or to any other higher officer than yourself?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was charged with evaluating the information, but I had been ordered not to develop the enemy intentions. I was charged with the dissemination of this information "as desirable." I had been restricted as to the dissemination of information of this character. I should perhaps have talked to Admiral Stark, or to Admiral Turner, [4912] about it. I did not. The information, however, was available to all hands, including myself.

Mr. GEARHART. So much for that. Now I want to ask you some more questions about a few intercepts which were not translated until after the 7th.

I notice, by making a rough count of Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2, that on December 6, 36 or 37 Japanese intercepts were decoded. Without counting them carefully, I notice in these two exhibits that very, very few were decoded on the 5th and very few on the preceding day.

How do you account for the fact that on the 6th day of December our decoders were decoding like lightning and on previous days they decoded very, very few in comparison?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not account for it, sir. That was being done by the War Department Signal Intelligence Service and by the Navy Communications Service. It is possible that the completion of the transcripts were in part done on the 5th and finished on the 6th. It is possible that the key to the code was obtained on the 5th and applied on the 6th, but I haven't any information as to why.

Mr. GEARHART. Do you not consider it regrettable that a message containing this phrase remained undecoded until the 8th of December, a message which was received on December 6, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo, "I imagine that in all [4913] probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places," referring to Pearl Harbor? That appears on page 27 of Exhibit No. 2.

Admiral WILKINSON. You ask me if it was not unfortunate that it was not decoded before?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. It was tragic that that was not decoded before?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How do you account for the fact that was not decoded, when the decoders were decoding very rapidly and decoding messages in great number on that day, the 6th?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not account for it, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How do you account for them picking out the 13-part message to decode on the 6th and ignore this surprise attack message that arrived on the same day?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not account for it. It is possible it came in another code which they could not so readily translate; it is possible that they were primed to get that 14-part message because the pilot message had come before it and they were on the lookout for it and wanted to [4914] tackle it first.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there any special organization of decoders on the 6th day of December 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know, sir. It was not under my knowledge of cognizance. That was in the communications office.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you heard anyone account for the tremendous output of decoding that occurred on that day?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Has it been subject to conversational discussion?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I think I heard Captain Kramer remark that there was a heavy demand for translators that day, but that was, of course, after the decoding work had been done.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, from Michigan, will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, Admiral, have any conversation with Admiral Kirk about why he had been replaced in a few months?

Admiral WILKINSON. I feel quite sure I did, sir. I know he was not replaced. He went to sea at his own request, in order to take advantage of an opportunity for command.

[4915] Senator FERGUSON. Whom would he have to make a request to?

Admiral WILKINSON. The Chief of Naval Operations, I presume, would release him, and the Bureau of Personnel would give him the orders as to his duty.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you requested the assignment in there?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. It was a surprise to me. I was in command of a battleship at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. You were called from the fleet then?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To come into Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you briefed on any subject when you came in?

Admiral WILKINSON. I spent some little time going through the Office of Naval Intelligence, spending a few hours in each section and division in order to see what subject they handled and how they han-

dled them. I had intermittent conversations with Admiral Kirk and finally a fairly complete turn-over personally from him orally. I was not briefed by any officer outside of Admiral Kirk and his subordinate divisions.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you briefed by Admiral Kirk?

Admiral WILKINSON. In the sense of the usual turn-over, [4916] yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you briefed on the diplomatic messages up to that day?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not specifically. I was in the Far Eastern Division and discussed the general tenor of them; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now who in the Far Eastern Division did you discuss the general tenor with?

Admiral WILKINSON. Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain McCollum?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, the head of the Division. He was a continuing source of knowledge in there, had been in there some little time, and would subsequently find me there as well, and he told me the status up to the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. You think you came there the 15th of October?

Admiral WILKINSON. I took over the duties on the 15th of October. This period of briefing I spoke of, I had gone through the various offices, that took perhaps 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. Before that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Before the 15th of October.

Senator FERGUSON. So you really came into the Department about the 1st of October?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I spent a time in the [4917] individual offices seeing what they did. I had a fairly complete and informative turn-over.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean when you say that the mechanical end of the office you were looking over for 2 weeks?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes. Not the mechanical, I mean each one of the sections, I mean the Domestic Branch, the Foreign Branch, or the Geographic Section, or the methods of counterespionage, suspicion, and so on, in each one of the several offices, of which there were perhaps 20, I spent a few hours.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be the administrative end then, that part of it?

Admiral WILKINSON. The operating end entirely. Not purely administrative, the operating end of the office; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time you knew, on the 16th, that there was a change of Cabinet in Japan?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Intelligence Branch figure in any way that that was a changing point in our negotiations?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, and I think we so reported it [4918] in our fortnightly situation, or fortnightly summaries, as our general understanding of the picture. The Far Eastern Section had considerable information on the make-up of the new Cabinet, that is on the military and naval members of it. We were all cognizant of the

fact that this made a more military tenor in the Japanese Government than had existed before.

[4979] Senator FERGUSON. From a diplomatic viewpoint, when you went in, effective on the 15th of October, where did we stand in relation to the negotiations with Japan, as far as you are concerned; what was the diplomatic situation as of that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is that the negotiations, which had been begun the preceding spring, interrupted in the summer, had been resumed, were now being carried on with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, as the senior Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, had yet to arrive.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, were you familiar with what had taken place about the 17th of August 1941 in relation to our diplomatic situation?

Admiral WILKINSON. With relation to the Argentina Conference, you mean, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, only by newspaper accounts.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you tell me what the newspaper accounts were at that time, on that question? Tell me what you got from the newspapers.

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not think I got very much more than the "four freedoms," and I think there was a communique there, I forget it now.

[4920] Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think there was a communique issued, but I forget it now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you learned about the "four freedoms" from the newspapers?

Admiral WILKINSON. To my recollection; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all you knew about that conference?

Admiral WILKINSON. I knew our naval and military staffs had attended, and I knew, in all probability, they had discussed measures of supply of England. The lease-lend, I am not sure whether it was in effect at that moment, but it soon was, and I knew they had probably discussed that and discussed the safety of the Atlantic lanes. I knew nothing of any discussions whatsoever regarding the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn about the discussions that had taken place there with relation to the Far East?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know that I ever learned, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were going to make a summary or appraisal of the intelligence that was coming through, isn't that correct?

[4921] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever learned about the parallel action of the two countries?

Admiral WILKINSON. Only recently.

Senator FERGUSON. Just recently?

Admiral WILKINSON. As I think I have explained, Senator, our interest, responsibilities, and authority were confined to the action of foreign countries, and particularly prospective enemies. Matters on arrangement within our own country and diplomatic, military, and naval plans or arrangements or understandings for cooperation were not given to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the question, as I understand it, as far as Intelligence was concerned, of what our diplomatic negotiations were, did not concern you; you did not use that in any way to evaluate what the enemy might be going to do?

Admiral WILKINSON. As I could learn and find out matters of that degree, yes, of course, they would be reflected in our interest. There was no machinery set up that I was definitely informed of. I learned a good deal through the translation of these intercepts as to what proposals our State Department had made to Japan which otherwise I would not have known through the machinery [4922] existing.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall getting the Winant message in relation to the movement of ships on the 6th of December 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall it specifically, sir, but if I did see it, and I presume I did because it came through the information channels, it was confirmatory of the evidences that we had already had of this advance through the South China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you received Admiralty messages on the same point?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had been informed of them, yes, sir, and I think I had seen them.

Senator FERGUSON. What did those two messages mean to you?

Admiral WILKINSON. They meant an attack was coming in the South China Sea area.

Senator FERGUSON. It meant an attack was coming on the south? I did not get that?

Admiral WILKINSON. The South China Sea area, if we are speaking of the same message. You are speaking of the Winant message regarding the movement of ships?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. That is the attack which [4923] we had foreseen.

Senator FERGUSON. What did that mean to the United States?

Admiral WILKINSON. I have my doubts, sir. It might mean we would come into the war in support of Siam, if that country were attacked, or Singapore, if that were attacked; it might mean we would not come into the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would we possibly come in if Singapore was attacked, in your opinion, as of that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Only because of two things: First because of our possible relations with England, as had been evidenced by the arrangements for the transfer of food and ammunition to England, the lend-lease, ocean convoys; the second thing, because that was an encroachment, a further advance of Japan, and the policy of our country apparently was directed toward preventing the aggressive moves of Japan extending beyond certain limits.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, I want to get what information you had in relation to the United States policy as far as Japan was concerned, if they moved beyond certain limits, as you now say in your last answer.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

[4924] Senator FERGUSON. What was your information along that line?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had the information—I cannot say whether I saw the document, or was told about it—that an advance of the Japanese forces to the westward of the one hundredth meridian or the southward of the tenth parallel of latitude would be a matter of grave concern to both England and America.

Whether that policy, as so indicated, of our State Department would be translated by the Congress and people into not only grave concern, but a resistance by war, I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say someone showed it to you, or someone told you about it. Is that true?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure which, sir, whether I had heard of it, or I had seen some message to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall what kind of message you may have seen along that same line?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I think I have seen some exhibit to that effect now. It may be that that I have seen it.

If the counsel will show me, I can perhaps speak of it.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to try and take you back [4925] as of the date, rather than what you saw here or heard at the hearing.

Admiral WILKINSON. What I am speaking of now, is what I have seen which embodied those same parallels, those same geographical limits.

As to the time I knew of the geographical limits, I cannot remember whether I knew of them by someone telling me, or whether I knew of them by seeing a paper. You ask me what paper I saw. I saw, if I saw a paper, it was probably this paper you speak of now. I think more probably I was told that by Captain Schuirmann, who was the Director of the Central Division and liaison officer with the State Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 4 o'clock. You will require some further time, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You will return then please, Admiral.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., the following day, Wednesday, December 19, 1945.)

[4926]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[4927] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Yesterday we had up an inquiry made of counsel by Senator Ferguson, I think, under date of November 16, in which he said, "Please obtain for me all information that any of the services or the Government had that Japan knew we had broken their code."

There was a response from me immediately on the 17th, which said:

With reference to your letter of November 16 requesting "all information that any of the services or the Government had that Japan knew we had broken their code," there is no indication that Japan ever knew it. All information would indicate the contrary.

Now, yesterday I made the mistake, without checking up on the fact, of saying or thinking that I had submitted that request to the Navy or the Army, and they had reported and it was on the basis of their report that I made that statement, and as the result of that there were some imputations made on the good faith of the Army and Navy in not producing what we asked for.

I want to say that imputation is not justified because I now find I never did ask for that material, and that this [4928] answer that I made was made based on my own impression of what they were asking, and what the evidence was at that time. I am quite willing to be open to criticism for not having followed it up, although at that time we were pretty busy just getting started, and possibly I might be forgiven for that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I am sure we all recognize that.

Mr. MITCHELL. At any rate, we had the inquiry made. Bear in mind that this inquiry, as I interpret it, I am quite sure referred to what the Japs knew about our breaking the code prior to Pearl Harbor.

I was not thinking of any information about that in 1944 when Marshall wrote his letter, because we had not asked that they produce any of these intercepts at that day, so I was referring to what the conditions were prior to Pearl Harbor, and I also feel quite sure, although the request is not limited to that—

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I was referring to, Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is no misunderstanding about that.

I also want to say at that time this was in the singular, and I was thinking of the diplomatic code, the magic or the purple stuff, so I wrote and told him I did not know of any evidence of that kind. I should have asked [4929] the Departments for it, but I am glad to make it clear or to get straightened out on it.

Senator BREWSTER. I think I had some correspondence also. Did you check that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Our file clerk was not able to get in from Virginia this morning. She has been ill for a week. She went away yesterday. We will have to let that go, a little.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We will take judicial knowledge of the weather conditions today. All of us had a hard time getting here.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is a communication from you, I am quite certain.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, along the same line.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have not heard from the Navy this morning on this, but the Army comes in, having worked hard on this subject with a number of intercepts during the months of April and May 1941. intercepts of Jap messages between Berlin and Tokyo, Tokyo and Washington is one of them, two, three, four of them. They all indicate a suspicion on the part of Japan that we were cracking one or more of their codes.

Senator BREWSTER. Can we have those read into the record?

[4930] Mr. MITCHELL. I will be glad to read them. It is not always clear what code they are talking about. There are a number of them. The first one is from Tokyo to Berlin.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Pardon me a minute. Senator Brewster and Senator Ferguson had requested some information about whether Japan had suspected or knew we were breaking their code, and had requested some information from counsel, and counsel is giving a report on that now.¹

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. MITCHELL. At the request of counsel, a search was made with reference to the intercepts prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. We have not made any attempt to find out what they suspected later on. It was Marshall's letter. They say they were still cracking. I suppose that is all I know about that.

This message is as follows:

From: Tokyo (Konoe)

To: Berlin

April 16, 1941

Purple

#329 Secret.

Re your #407 *

We suspect that the several codes P, 80c and [4931] OITE^d are being cryptanalyzed by foreign powers and today we have none too many code books to spare. Therefore, when it is necessary to send a message, and at

¹ See also Hearings, Part 5, p. 2069 et seq. for additional messages indicating suspicion or knowledge by the Japanese that their codes were being broken.

the same time insure its secrecy, please dispatch them by machine or by TSU* code. In case revelation of the contents are made to foreign powers, take care to paraphrase them from beginning to end. I want you to use OITE⁴ for messages of relatively slight importance.

Relay to Italy and Turkey.

*—S. I. S. #16312—Berlin tells Tokyo that intelligence wires emanating from Japanese offices in the Near East and Egypt to offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before transmitting their contents to the Germans and Italians in order to avoid giving them clues in decoding Japanese codes. Berlin recommends use of certain codes in this connection.

^b—An auxiliary code.

^c—P-1.

^d—PA-K2.

*—J series codes (J18-K7 now under study).

ARMY 16407

Trans 4/19/41 (5)

The next dispatch is from Berlin to Tokyo, May 3, 1941, marked "Purple No. 482".

From: Berlin (Oshima)

To: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

3 May 1941

(Purple-CA)

#482

STAMMAA STAHER called on me this day (evening?) and stating that this request was to be kept strictly secret, he said that Germany maintains a fairly reliable intelligence organization abroad (or—"In the U. S."?), and according to information obtained from the above mentioned organization it is quite (or—"fairly"?) reliably established that the U. S. government is reading Ambassador Nomura's code messages, and then asked that drastic steps should be taken regarding this matter.

There are at least two circumstances substantiating the above (suspicion). One circumstance is that Germany is reading our code messages * * *. Regarding this, during my previous residency here, they were known to have a large scale cryptanalytic organization—

(unfinished—last two-thirds not available)

JD-1 2369

(M-A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941

[4933] Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Counsel, you spoke of two circumstances. Did they give two?

Mr. MITCHELL. No. It is a garbled message and there are some dashes after the words "two circumstances," so we don't know what it was; and then the message breaks off entirely. They didn't seem to get it all.

The next one is from Tokyo to Berlin, May 5, 1941:

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

To: Berlin (Oshima)

5 May 1941

(Purple-CA)

#370

Please express our appreciation to STAMMAA STAHER for the information in question and ask him if it is not possible to give us the authority for the statement that it has been fairly reliably established that the U. S. government is reading our code messages, so that we might take appropriate action.

Reply requested.

JD-1: 2368

(M*A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941

The next one is from Tokyo to Washington, May 5, 1941, No. 192:

From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister).

To: Washington (Koshi).

[4934] 5 May, 1941

(Purple)

#192

According to a fairly reliable source of information it appears almost certain that the United States government is reading your code messages.

Please let me know whether you have any suspicion of the above.

JD-1: 2346

(A) Navy Trans. 5-5-41 (S-TT)

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The next is from Washington to Tokyo, May 5, 1941, No. 267:

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).

5 May, 1941

(Purple)

#267

(Most guarded secrecy).

(Foreign Office secret).

Re your #192*.

For our part, the most stringent precautions are taken by all custodians of codes and ciphers, as well as of other documents.

On this particular matter I have nothing in mind, but pending investigation please wire back any concrete instances or details which may turn up.

*JD-1: 2346

(M) Navy Trans. 5-6-41 (7)

JD-1: 2367

[4935] The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941:

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

To: Washington (Nomura)

7 May 1941

(Purple—CA)

#198 Regarding your #267:*

This matter was told very confidentially to Ambassador Oshima** by the Germans as having been reported to them by a fairly reliable intelligence medium; but to our inquiry they are said to have refused to divulge the basis on which they deemed it to be practically certain.

JD-1:2367 Nomura requests further details of the basis for the report that his code msgs are being read by the U. S. government.

**General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin.

JD*-1:2388

(F) Navy trans. 7 May 1941 (S-TT)

The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941, No. 1015:

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington, Bangkok, Rome.

7 May, 1941

(Purple)

#1015 (Circular)

Immediately upon receipt of this message, [4936] use 1941 regulations for A and B code machines until further notice.

16974

JD-1: 2372

(A) Navy Trans. 5-7-41 (S-TT)

I think that refers expressly to the machine type.

The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 8, 1941, no number:

From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

May 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

No number.

From Vice Chief OHASI to Minister WAKASUGI.

I want you to leave the custody of the government code in the hands of IGUCHI. No matter how long the communications are or how hurriedly the code must be used, there should be no occasion to call upon the services of telegraphic clerks. Please impress upon all of your secretaries that this is a special regulation.

In view of the importance of the details of our recent exchange of wires, please (burn?) them immediately.

ARMY 2446

Trans. 5/9/41 (S)

Then there is one from Washington to Tokyo, May 9, 1941, unnumbered:

[4937] From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

9 May 1941

(Purple-CA)

Unnumbered

To the Vice Minister*, from Wakasugi.**

I respectfully acknowledge receipt of your telegram.***

Because of various duties at this office it requires a long time for a secretary alone to handle long messages and the increased volume of traffic in connection with this matter.****

(My message #272***** required 6 men working for 6 hours.)

With the opening of negotiations, the volume of telegraphic traffic is bound to increase tremendously. As time is at a premium in handling these communications, you can well appreciate the inadvisability of having only the secretary handle this work. Furthermore, it goes without saying that the increased traffic will interfere greatly with other duties of this office.

However, fortunately, our communication clerks have been constantly reminded of the necessity of maintaining security, and they have faithfully adhered to this policy in their work.

[4938] Although I appreciate the intent of your telegram *** from the standpoint of security, I, nevertheless request your authorization to enlist the aid of Horiuchi, Hori, and Kazuwara to handle communication duties under strict supervision.

Also please authorize me to have Kawabata of Chicago come here temporarily to assist us in our communication work. (Bring all codes and do his work in this office).

*Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi.

**Japanese Minister to Washington, under Ambassador Nomura.

***S e JD-1: 2446, unnumbered, dated 8 May (Purple-CA), in which Tokyo issues Washington special regulations for custody of the Chief of Mission private code (CA).

****Japanese-American negotiations, being conducted in great secrecy.

JD-1: 2494

(A-M) Navy Trans. 12 May 1941 (7)

The next one is from Washington to Tokyo, May 20, 1941, No. 327:

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

May 20, 1941

Purple (CA)

No. 327.

INTELLIGENCE:

Though I do not know which ones I have [4939] discovered the United States is reading some of our codes.

As for how I got the intelligence, I will inform you by courier or another safe way.

ARMY

Trans. 5/21/41 (7)"

The next is from Tokyo to all Japanese merchant vessels:

From: Tokyo.

To: All Japanese Merchant Vessels.

30 May 1941

(NL)

No. 1

The Navy "S" code was seized from one of our merchant ships in a certain foreign port, together with other secret documents in custody of the captain.

The use of the Navy "S" code shall be discontinued except when absolutely necessary for training purposes.

And, as previously instructed, when there is a possibility that official inspection may be made, all secret documents should be promptly burned.

JN-1: 69

(C) Navy Trans. 5-31-41 (M)

That is the last one. The Army reports that they are continuing their search and the Navy reports that it has found some messages which are now being photostated. Whether they are the same or others I do not know yet.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Counsel?

[4940] Mr. MITCHELL. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. THEODORE STARK WILKINSON

(Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you have any statement you want to make before you resume your testimony?

Admiral WILKINSON. With regard to some of the inquiries made of me yesterday to bring information when available:

Counsel has just read the dispatches which I was requested to look up, the second one of which referred particularly to the one I spoke of where Berlin had advised Tokyo that they had information as to breaking the codes.

With respect to the personnel in the district intelligence office in Honolulu at Pearl Harbor time, the nearest date for which we have figures is December 16, at which time there were 41 officers, 60 enlisted men, and 3 civilian agents in that office.

Inquiries are being made as to the surveillance, screening, and general security of the civilian laborers and workmen in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, as requested by Senator Brewster. I have not the answer on that at present.

Thes VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

[4941] Senator FERGUSON. Yesterday, Admiral Wilkinson, I was asking you about the knowledge that was given to you at the time you went in in relation to diplomatic negotiations with Japan and also the military and naval knowledge, because you went into the department on the 15th of October.

Now, can you recall that you were briefed on the military situation as far as our forces were concerned, and their forces, so that you would be able to take the knowledge that you were getting and analyze it, so it would be of value to those that you were to give it to?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had general information of our own forces from my previous work at sea and I had a professional interest in where they were acquired before I took over and afterward from the ship movements office and from the War Plans as to the disposition of our forces. I was not formally briefed nor formally informed as to it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When Admiral Ingersoll talked to you—as I understand it, he did talk to you—he told you that your duties would be varied from those that were in writing?

Admiral WILKINSON. I asked him to confirm that specific point only, sir, that I mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did he give you any reasons why there was to be a change?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. He said that was a naval [4942] practice as opposed to the Army practice, that the Army practice was that the so-called G-2 office, which was not only the Military Intelligence Division but also an Assistant Chief of Staff, that that office was charged with preparing the enemy side of the Estimate of the Situation, so-called, which is to say, what can the enemy do, what will he do, and what are his possibilities, that that was assigned to the Army G-2, but that that was not a part of the duties or within the scope of the activities of the Naval Intelligence, that that estimate of

the situation, both the enemy side and our own side was prepared in War Plans.

That was the only point I asked him about, sir, and that was how he explained it.

[4943] Senator FERGUSON. And he explained it in that way?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You asked him because the instructions in the manual were direct that you had other duties than what you were then performing?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I don't think the instructions in the manual conflicted directly. They said I should get all the facts and information bearing on the enemy's intentions. They did not tell me to estimate them, and the instructions in the manual said, "Disseminate information as desirable," and "desirable" would be such instructions, or otherwise, as I might receive.

I thought, in other words, that his word to me was consistent with the manual.

Senator FERGUSON. And it made a direct limitation?

Admiral WILKINSON. A direct limitation and an order from an officer, a responsible officer in the chain of command.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know or did you hear after you came in that there had been a change in the sending of messages to Admiral Kimmel in August of that year?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't recall that I did, sir. I was informed as to the present status and continued that. I don't know that I was informed of a prior status [4944] which had been changed.

Senator FERGUSON. You just had the present status?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I didn't go into the history of it.

[4945] Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Admiral Hart had his own means on the Philippines of getting his information in the CINCAP?

Admiral WILKINSON. I knew that both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel had agencies wherein they could get the radio intelligence with regard to the movement of the enemy ships. I knew both of them had agencies which had some facilities, however slight, for attacking codes. I do not know that I knew that Admiral Hart was able actually to solve the purple code.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that Admiral Hart did have means of getting diplomatic messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall that I did; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that Admiral Kimmel did not have any such means at all?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I do not recall that I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall that you knew that?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. I knew that they both had certain facilities but the extent of them I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Ambassador Grew's messages come to you?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

[4946] Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not know—

Admiral WILKINSON. My error, sir. The messages he sent to the State Department during my tenure of office, my liaison officer over

there picked those up, but not the—I thought for the moment you were speaking of the first message of January.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Admiral WILKINSON. The more recent messages did, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with his message on the third where he said that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness?

Admiral WILKINSON. The message of what date, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. November the 3d.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I probably saw it, sir. I think I did see it because my liaison officer obtained these messages from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that change your thinking at that time as to whether or not war was near or not near?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes and no, sir. It crecked so closely with the movements that they were making into the South China Sea, which were already beginning then and were intensified later, that it probably directed my attention there rather than the possibility of their making a sudden strike against the United States at some other place.

[4947] Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you were before the Roberts committee was there a stenographer present?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is there was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is there was, yes, sir; and I had expected to see it and, in fact, when I came here I looked for that record and found there was no record, only a summary.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he took stenographic notes of what you said?

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought so.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought so at the time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not know why, then, they were not transcribed?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard?

Admiral WILKINSON. I never heard.

Senator FERGUSON. This paper——

Admiral WILKINSON. I found a precis but not a brief, not a transcription.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not prepare this paper then that you brought in yesterday?

Admiral WILKINSON. I prepared that as a memorandum to [4948] Admiral Stark after the event of what my testimony had been according to my recollection, but it was in no sense a stenographic record of my testimony. It was just for Admiral Stark's information of what they had asked me and what I had said.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Roberts committee draw up an instrument similar to this?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not to my knowledge. That was my memorandum to Admiral Stark. It was entirely within the office and had no connection with the Commission. Now, the Commission may have made, and I thought they did, an actual transcript by a stenographer, but when their report came in it was only what they called a precis of

testimony of those witnesses they heard before they left Washington to go to Pearl Harbor, among them myself, and the precis with respect to my testimony was about two paragraphs long as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Has the counsel got that copy of those two paragraphs?

Mr. MITCHELL. I think Senator Brewster has that. I would not be able to check it without looking at our files.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I think in the Roberts' report itself you will find a discussion of the procedure they followed. They [4949] did not take notes, apparently, in this country on that part of their hearings and later on they went on into a stenographic record, but there is the discussion you want in the report itself.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to clear this up this morning as to what took place in that hearing.

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection was that they had a confidential secretary or ship's clerk or someone present taking notes but it may be that he was only taking an abstract rather than taking stenographic notes.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to try and take you back to the morning of the 6th.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About a certain meeting with Admiral Turner and there was also a meeting with, as I understand it, McCollum and Bratton. Do you recall that meeting?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I have seen some mention of it. I do not recall it. I saw McCollum constantly and occasionally Bratton; not so often Bratton.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on page 998 of the Navy Top Secret Admiral Turner talks about the meeting; at least it relates to the instrument that was drawn.

Do you remember a long document, some 500 words, being drawn up?

Admiral WILKINSON. By whom, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. By McCollum.

Admiral WILKINSON. Not as of that date. I remember a December the 1st memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me read this. I will change it. It was not on the morning of the 6th as I see here. There is another meeting that I had in mind on that.

Question No. 48 on page 998 [reading]:

There is evidence before this court that Commander McCollum in the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a summary of information on the Japanese-United States relationship over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December 1941 which was for the information of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Did you have any knowledge of the preparation of such a dispatch?

Answer. Yes. We had discussed the advisability of making such a summary and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum the details of the various points and the detail of the relationship and their negotiations and so on. We had spent a great deal of time talking the thing over. Then Commander McCollum, I will say we found ourselves in very close agreement, prepared the dispatch, I have forgotten its terms, and brought [4951] it to me to check over it, which I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and made suggestions on a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I do not remember just what happened with the dispatch.

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Question. Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it ever transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet?

Answer. I do not know. We do not know at this time.

Question. To your knowledge did it ever reach the Chief of Naval Operations?

Answer. I do not know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to McCollum so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Office of Naval Intelligence with my own concurrence. That is my memory of it. It was presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson.

Admiral WILKINSON. Is that Colonel Bratton's testimony or whose, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That is Admiral Turner's testimony in the Top Secret of the Navy. I read the direct quote. Have you got it?

Mr. GESELL. No; that is our only copy.

[4952] Senator FERGUSON. Have you seen it?

Mr. GESELL. I haven't checked that testimony. You are quite right, it is in the Top Secret but I did not recall at this time that that was the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Extracted testimony of Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. Navy, pages 994 to 1008, inclusive.

Admiral WILKINSON. And that is reported as of December 6th, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, he has not given the date there but he has got in the dates over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December.

Admiral WILKINSON. Preceding the third or fourth?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December, which was for the information of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you recall that message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall that as of the morning of the 6th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, any other time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Or the messages there preceding the third or the fourth. At one time in that interval between the first and the seventh Captain McCollum came to me with a message and I went to see Admiral Turner with him. Now, more [4953] recently we have discussed that to endeavor to clear our mutual recollections and the latest recollection which resulted from that discussion that I recall is that Captain McCollum took the message to Admiral Turner and Admiral Turner referred back to the war warning message and discussed with McCollum whether that of itself was not sufficient or whether it was necessary to send any further message, and the result, as I now recall, as I say, of their discussion through this mutual recollection and mutual endeavor to clear our memories, was that Turner and McCollum agreed that it was not necessary to send further information of that sort because it had been covered by the war warning message, but I would like very much, of course, to have Admiral Turner testify to that as well and he, I believe, will be a witness shortly, but I do not believe that there was any such message actually sent. The message may have been in our thought, the message may have been one that we were contemplating with respect to the winds message when there was a false interpretation but that was proved to be false before anything was sent out.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, whether or not the message was sent—let us pass that for the moment —

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing): You recall the discussion of getting further information to Kimmel. That is what they are talking about in this, are they not? [4954]

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I remember McCollum discussing with me whether there was anything further that should be sent out on the basis of the information which we had discussed up to the date of the 1st of December with regard to the South China Sea incidents.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it would certainly be after the 27th?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was after the 27th.

Senator FERGUSON. So it was information received after the 27th that you had discussed with McCollum?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you discussed as to whether or not that should be sent to the CINCPAC?

Admiral WILKINSON. To the fleet as a whole.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; to the fleet as a whole.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Which would go to the Commander in Chief.

Admiral WILKINSON. And as I recall that discussion it was factual evidence that we had of the further movements in [4955] the South China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you give us, as near as you can, the substance of what this message was that you now recall was taken up with Admiral Turner, that you say was not sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. My recollection is very hazy but I think it was information with respect to the further developments that had actually been discovered in the South China Sea which were brought up to date by the 1st of December memorandum which is in evidence and which may have occurred in the 2 or 3 days since the 1st of December memorandum and the time we were discussing that message. It wasn't anything to do with a threatened attack on Hawaii because we had no intimation of that whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to Admiral Turner as to whether or not he thought of an attack upon Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you had no thought of an attack upon Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that continued on until after the attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you recall a meeting with any [4956] one, particularly with Colonel Bratton, on Saturday morning about further information to be sent to the Army or the Navy at Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no recollection at all of that?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. As I say, Captain McCollum was in my office frequently all the time I was on duty there and as the relations became strained and the movements of the Japanese forces to the

south were more and more apparent, he was in my office I would say three and four times a day, sometimes, but rarely, Colonel Bratton would be with him and I recall from time to time in that way seeing Colonel Bratton but I do not recall specifically seeing him on the morning of the 6th. I do recall seeing Captain McCollum several times that morning. It may well be he brought Colonel Bratton in with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any conversation with officers in the Army and/or the Navy in relation to trying to get more information to Hawaii? Would that refresh your memory, whether it was with Bratton specifically on a specific date or just a general conversation with him, or information from him or any of the other officers?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, not specifically, except [4957] the 1st of December in Admiral Stark's office we were discussing the general movements of the Japanese, the preparation of this message I just mentioned. The information as to the movements of the Japanese Fleet was being picked up and in fact more or less originated in Pearl Harbor and in Corregidor and was known to both of them. Except for information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, which I did not have, there was nothing particularly for me to send to the fleet.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the message of—if you will take Exhibit 37, page 32. Counsel, could you give the Admiral Exhibit 37?

Admiral WILKINSON. I qualify my last reports, of course, Senator, with respect to the sending of the code messages. I did confer with Admiral Ingersoll about that—first with Captain McCollum and then with Admiral Ingersoll and sent the code message.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the code message, were you familiar with the message being sent to Tokyo to destroy our code?

Admiral WILKINSON. I originated, in fact, a message to Tokyo and several other naval attachés' offices to destroy our codes, yes, sir. I think it was Tokyo as well.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the one that went to Tokyo?

[4958] Admiral WILKINSON. As I recall, it was the same one that went to the other agencies. I was familiar with that and, in fact, originated it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you tell us just what caused you to send that message to destroy the code?

Admiral WILKINSON. Because the Japanese had issued instructions to their offices to destroy codes, and we feared that if they anticipated that conditions would be such that their offices would be raided, that certainly they themselves would not hesitate to raid our offices, war or no war, and we did not want to be in a position to have our codes seized by a raid.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you believe that war was imminent?

Admiral WILKINSON. Imminent but not inevitable.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the message on page 32, November 24; do you have that before you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted at all about the sending of that message or its wording?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then your only knowledge came after it had been sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And would you say how long after it had been sent? [4959]

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say a day or two, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then did you get any instructions on it as to its meaning or effect or why it was sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, except I was familiar with the negotiations in process by reason of the broken codes so that I knew the obvious reason for it; similarly with the message of the 27th.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in any way informed that that message was to take care of a surprise attack? For instance, I will read you question 40 on page 996 of Admiral Turner's testimony before the top secret. It may refresh your memory.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I understand that reference now. I did not understand before what you were reading from.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

This dispatch, exhibit 15, states "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is indicated."

And that Exhibit 15 is this same message that I am reading to you.

Admiral WILKINSON. Except the text of the message reads, "is a possibility."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. [Reading:]

This language is omitted from the dispatch of the [4960] 27th of November, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of November 27th done intentionally?

This is the answer of Admiral Turner:

I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th it says "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is indicated." Now, that "in any direction" could be by naval force, air force, amphibious force or anything else. In this other dispatch we said, "an amphibious expedition is en route."

That is the one of the 27th. I am inserting that in my own language.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, to quote further:

It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those two are quite different. They do not cover the same kind of a subject and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of an amphibious force but the movement of any force.

[4961] Now, does that refresh your memory?

Admiral WILKINSON. As to what, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. As to these two messages, what you were told about.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, I am familiar with both of the messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that your understanding of the messages that I just read you, what Admiral Turner said about them?

Admiral WILKINSON. Why, I do not know that I developed any particular understanding. My understanding of the first message was a statement that the negotiations were breaking down and that any-

thing might happen anywhere. My understanding of the second message was, so far as I was interested in it—I was not directly affected by it, the second message—that it was a war warning sent to both the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet stating, "Look out; negotiations have ceased; an aggressive movement by Japan is expected and here is what has been indicated: We know they are going to do that."

My understanding was, certainly, that that would not be the only thing that might have happened, such as Admiral Turner has said, but that was certainly the one thing that was very evident and, of course, did occur.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any knowledge that [4962] there was a movement that would cause an amphibious landing?

Admiral WILKINSON. Oh, yes. I think the basic information under the conditions that existed had been prepared and received in various detail by my office and furnished to him. There were ships and transports and landing boats and men-of-war streaming down the South China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the earliest you remember coming to the conclusion that there would be an amphibious landing?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say certainly by December 1.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, where would this amphibious landing in your opinion be made, would you say?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not know, of course. There was a possibility they might be getting around to make an advance base in Indochina, they might be going down to go into Thailand—Siam at that time—and from then to expand their influence into that free country, or they might be making a direct assault on the British territories in the Malay Peninsula.

It integrated with my conception, as I have said earlier, that I felt that they might well be feeling their way southward and by the infiltration method to gain all the ground and solidify their position as far as they could before they made any definite act which would antagonize the British into [4963] the war, including certain nations, just as they had done for some years past. If they followed that course they would limit their activities to Indochina and perhaps Siam. If they wanted to make a direct attack, they would go, as in fact they did go, into the Malay Peninsula.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if they went into the Malay Peninsula how would that involve us in war from the knowledge you had?

Admiral WILKINSON. I know that if there was an attack on British possessions, I knew it would involve England in war. I knew that the relations between England and the United States were close, the actual details I did not know, but I knew that we would be concerned and I thought it probable that the Congress would be sufficiently concerned to consider whether it was a cause of war. As far as I knew there were no binding commitments. I did know that there had been the geographical lines set up, the passage of which would be a cause for concern on the part of this country and that the Malay Peninsula was beyond those lines.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall the three men-of-war memorandum here?

Admiral WILKINSON. I recall it now. I did not see it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not see it prior to the 7th?

[4964] Admiral WILKINSON. I am quite sure I did not. It was quite new to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was quite new to me when I saw it here. I am quite sure I did not see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know whether or not you ever got any information from those three men-of-war or any one of them?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't think so, sir. I don't think it ever got out of the station. I do know with the aerial patrol that was so. That was established and we got information from it but I doubt if the men-of-war were ever stationed.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you getting information from the aerial patrol at the Philippines?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, via the commander in chief of the Asiatic.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you get any from the aerial patrol at Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you using the aerial patrol at the Philippines as a source of information?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was not using it. I was looking for it.

[4965] Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is what I mean.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; I did not order it.

Senator FERGUSON. It was being used by your office?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know when Singapore actually went on alert?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that it had gone on alert on the 6th, their 6th?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be on our 5th.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I may have seen the dispatches but at what precise moment I did I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not the purple code was used for that wind message or was that a minor code that was used on that wind message?

Admiral WILKINSON. Setting it up?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. To set it up was a code. To implement it was in the middle of a weather broadcast as I remember. There is no code that set it up. It might be evident on the face of the dispatch. I would not ordinarily know particularly what code any message came in because they came to me after translation.

[4966] Senator FERGUSON. And the name on the code as a rule was not on the translation?

Admiral WILKINSON. Exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. When would you say your office was alerted to war, for real war?

Admiral WILKINSON. My office was alerted to the Far Eastern crisis about 10 days or 2 weeks before the 7th of December and my office was not alerted to war as war until it actually occurred, but we were in a crisis condition and standing watches and 24-hour service and responsible officers on call outside of their own office hours.

Senator FERGUSON. How much effort did you put in Saturday evening trying to reach Admiral Stark after they delivered those 13 parts to you at your office, or at the moment?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I called him up, sir, and failed to get him. I don't think I put much more effort into it because I thought at the time, and I was in agreement with the people I had been discussing it with, Captain McCollum, General Miles and Captain Beardall, that it was a diplomatic paper, a justification of the position of Japan, a so-called white paper such as governments frequently issue in connection with negotiations which they are conducting. I did not consider it a military paper and it was not until the fourteenth [4967] part came in that I considered it was a final paper. We had sent dispatches of almost that same character, I think, indicating that propositions made by the Japanese were not satisfactory to us and this was one being made by them that our propositions were not satisfactory to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you knew about the message of the 26th having been sent?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew that we had considered their message of the 20th of November as an ultimatum?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not know that because one does not reply to an ultimatum. I would have considered their message of the 20th, and I do consider it, as a step in the negotiations and ours of the 26th as a further step, although I did not think that they would accept ours of the 26th.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, why did you want to reach Admiral Stark then that evening if this was only an ordinary white paper diplomatic message?

Admiral WILKINSON. Just to tell him that we had it. He had seen the pilot message. To tell him that we had it and as far as we read it there was nothing particularly alarming in those parts and I would show it to him in the morning.

Senator FERGUSON. That pilot message said that they were [4968] to get another message as to when it was to be delivered. Was that very significant to you, the placing of a zero time for delivery?

Admiral WILKINSON. The pilot message said two things, sir. It said, "We are going to give you an answer and it is going to be in 14 parts. We will tell you when to deliver that note." The second thing was, "You are going to receive it and you are to dress it up in good language and we will tell you when to deliver it." The fact that there was a certain time for the delivery was not significant to me. Perhaps it should have been. I was not familiar with diplomatic language, that the time of presentation is characteristic of an ultimatum rather than an ordinary note, which would not ordinarily be presented at some certain time. I did not appreciate it if that is the case. In other words, the time element, the fact that they were to deliver it at a certain time, it didn't mean any more to me than as being a time with respect to negotiations and here they said to them to "dress it up and then we will tell you when to present it."

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that was because of or caused by your lack of knowledge of diplomatic procedure?

Admiral WILKINSON. Or my general lack of intelligence or appreciation, sir, I don't know which. I certainly did not appreciate it.

[4969] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Admiral Beardall was at your office that night?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was the President's military aide?

Admiral WILKINSON. Naval aide.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me; naval aide.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And had been familiar with the magic?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you could properly discuss and freely discuss with Admiral Beardall and General Miles, who was also familiar with magic this question?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, and my recollection is we all agreed that it was a diplomatic justification of their position.

Senator FERGUSON. Normally Admiral Beardall would have been the man to receive it for the President, would he not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Kramer, who had delivered it to you, he delivered it at the White House?

Admiral WILKINSON. He saw that as he was at the White House—he delivered it at the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. He advised you of it?

Admiral WILKINSON. It was not necessary for Beardall to [4970] take it there.

Senator FERGUSON. You were advised of that fact?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he had any discussion with Kramer about it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Whether Beardall had?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. No. Kramer was there with all three of us. I don't remember any particular discussion between those two. Kramer was there during our talk and sat in there with us.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he advise you of his conversation with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At least that the Secretary of the Navy was going to have a meeting with the Secretary of State and War on the following morning at ten?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; for two reasons: First, because they were to discuss this diplomatic message; and, second, on the presumption that the fourteenth part would be available by then, as in fact it was. In fact, I thought that message was primarily of concern to the State Department rather than the Navy and the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you put on any special effort [4971] to decode the fourteenth message which you were intercepting, which would have been the one o'clock message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not myself because that was under Communications but I knew from Kramer that Communications was on the lookout for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew that America was not bluffing in this negotiation?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. We were going to adhere to our principles.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. But I also knew that we were making an effort to delay the break-off of the negotiations and any actual conflict until we got our positions in the Philippines sufficiently garrisoned.

Senator FERGUSON. From the intelligence did you think that the Japanese were bluffing or not, from the intelligence that came through your hands?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not think they were bluffing but I did not think they would strike America. I thought, as I have said, that they would confine their efforts to working to the south and possibly appreciating that we did not want to precipitate anything in the temper of our country, that they would try to consolidate their position and gain all they could before they did have to risk a [4972] war.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand that you believed prior to the 7th because of the movement of the troops and the intelligence you had that there was going to be war with Britain but you did not believe that there was going to be war with the United States? Is that a fair summary?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believed there would be war with Britain if the Japs went into the Malay Peninsula. I was not sure they would go there. If there was in that case a war with Britain, I thought there was a possibility that the United States would come into the war but I did not think there would be any certainty of it. I did not think that the Japs would attack the United States direct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Saturday morning a message came from Admiralty that they were going across the Gulf of Siam, 14 hours, I think, was the message, from the Kra Peninsula, and the message from our Ambassador Winant to the same effect, which came in at 10:40 Saturday morning. Do I understand that you did or did not get that information?

Admiral WILKINSON. I got it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get it?

Admiral WILKINSON. And my recollection, without checking it, is that that course that they were on was a westerly course, which would be a clear possibility of attacking Siam, [4973] which was one of the alternatives I spoke of. I would like to see that dispatch to check that course.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you show it to him, both the Winant and the Admiralty message?

While he is looking for it, did you get that Saturday, Admiral, on the 6th?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So when you got the 13—

Admiral WILKINSON. That is just long range, I am not certain, but I think I did.

Here is one message, sir, again from Cadogan.

"Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties"—which is the Japanese force—"is Kra or Bangkok."

Bangkok, of course, was Thailand and Kra was the Malay Peninsula.

The message they referred to was the 3 a. m. this morning and "the parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time."

In that same dispatch from the Admiralty—or from Mr. Winant, I find that:

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before [4974] British have opportunity to guarantee support.

In other words, the British also were in doubt as to whether the attack were to be made on Thai or the Kra Peninsula or not.

[4975] Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you did not even come to the conclusion Saturday that they would attack in such a way that Britain would come into the war?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not come to the firm conclusion, no, sir. I thought they might be working their way to Siam, rather than challenge England immediately. I thought it probable, and almost certain, that Britain would shortly be drawn into the war, but in support of Siam rather than as against a direct attack on them.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, would Senator Ferguson yield to a question?

Senator FERGUSON. I will yield to my colleague.

Senator BREWSTER. It is in connection with this: You reiterated it is your firm opinion that they were likely to move south instead of coming to Hawaii, to attack us. Whether or not the fact that the United States Fleet in the Pacific even at Hawaii was inferior in strength to the Japanese, would not be calculated to incline the Japanese to the opinion that they could move south without any immediate danger of serious interruption from the United States?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not quite understand you. I got the first part.

Senator BREWSTER. Will the reporter read it?

[4976] (The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Senator BREWSTER. Without any immediate danger of serious interruption from the United States, because of the fact that the fleet, as presumably they knew, was not sent to the western Pacific or moving to the Philippines and striking.

Admiral WILKINSON. They could move southward without immediate danger. There was a risk. The further they extended their lines southward, the more possible a threat from Hawaii would be, because they were more exposed to us. But they could, and did, move south along the China Coast, and into Indochina, with comparative freedom.

Senator BREWSTER. I assume that probably was one factor in your consideration of the situation, your knowledge of the relative strength of the fleet.

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know that I went into the strategic consideration, so much, sir. The very evident factors were the known presence of the ships moving down there, and then there was, as a background, the knowledge that you have just stated, that the lines of communication were short; they had air fields and harbors and bases on Formosa which they could use in the protection of those lines, and it was, in fact, a Japanese sea, and it would [4977] be very difficult for us to interfere with it.

Senator BREWSTER. If the United States Pacific Fleet had been twice as powerful as the Japanese Fleet, with adequate supply trains, to move promptly to the Philippines, your estimate of the likelihood of the Japanese moving south, rather than moving in our direction might have been materially altered? Would that be a fair statement?

Admiral WILKINSON. Certainly they would have been more reluctant to move in the open sea to the south. They might have moved along the coast. Certainly they would have anticipated our fleet would come into the Philippines and establish its base there and then it would be in a position to cut the water transport, so they would have to work overland.

Senator BREWSTER. And so they would have materially altered the strategic concept on both sides if that situation had prevailed?

Admiral WILKINSON. Certainly.

Senator BREWSTER. You did, of course, take all of those factors into account in forming your opinions as to the situation, I assume?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I naturally would, sir, even without formally estimating them. They would influence [4978] me by virtue of my familiarity with naval matters.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, that brings up the question about these lost Japanese carriers. You were quite sure from the intelligence that you received, that these six carriers that were lost could not have been used in the movement south, because you had that covered and had the information on that; isn't that correct?

Admiral WILKINSON. There could not have been any movement of those carriers through the China Sea, or we would have detected it. There might well have been a movement south into the Carolines, the Palaus, Saipan, and Guam; there might have been a movement into the Marshalls, and in fact we had some information from the radio intelligence at Pearl Harbor that they thought there was a force of carriers and submarines into the Marshalls, which would have accounted for them, although Corregidor did not believe it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we find this situation, that at least these six lost carriers could not be used in the movement south in the China Sea, and the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral WILKINSON. They were not there at that time. They might have been home getting ready to start there.

Senator FERGUSON. If they were in the Carolines then there was a possibility that they could attack Guam?

[4979] Admiral WILKINSON. If they were where, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. If they were in the Carolines, they could have attacked Guam?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then were we, from your evidence, anticipating an attack, an air attack from these six lost carriers at Guam?

Admiral WILKINSON. There was a possibility, if Japan was determined upon war, that they would attack anywhere, if Japan was determined upon opening the war against us. The probabilities, we felt, were most probable, the Philippines, next Guam, next Wake, next Midway, and last Hawaii, because of the distance and the extension of the line, the increased risk of interception by our forces, and the greater boldness required.

Senator FERGUSON. When the message was sent on the 27th, the war warning message to the Navy, that was, as I understand it, because of this movement to the south that you knew about?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think everything boiled into that. I did not prepare the message or was not consulted in preparing it, but my assumption would be not only the movement to the south, but also the diplomatic messages and preparation of the fleet. We knew the fleet was getting [4980] ready for almost anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on page 22 of Exhibit 2, there is a message that I want to speak to you about. Do you have the book before you?

Admiral WILKINSON. The yellow book, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is the one in relation to the lights and want ads and radio.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that first come to your attention?

Admiral WILKINSON. Some 3 or 4 days after Pearl Harbor. I note it was translated on the 11th. Whether this was intercepted or not I do not know. It was, however, picked up in code form on the 8th from the cable station in Hawaii, and turned over to the Navy then. I am not sure whether it had been earlier intercepted by an intercept station or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know, or did you ever hear that it was intercepted here at Fort Hunt in Virginia?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I would not know it, since that was a matter of communications.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by a code being translated in the rough, or a message being translated in the rough?

[4981] Admiral WILKINSON. In the rough?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. I suppose it is the first draft before they went over it and removed inconsistencies and dug out some of the things that might have puzzled them the first time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Dorothy Edgers?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know she was a translator in the ONI, the Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. If this message had been translated in the rough, and put on Kramer's desk—was it Commander Kramer at that time, or Captain Kramer?

Admiral WILKINSON. Commander then.

Senator FERGUSON. Commander Kramer's desk on the afternoon of the 6th, completed in the early afternoon of the 6th of December 1941, and was brought to the attention of Captain Kramer, I would like to ask why that would not be called to your attention, if your office was alerted on that day? Was it because of this 14-part message?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would have every idea that it would be, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with the Hewitt [4982] testimony, Admiral Hewitt's testimony?

Admiral WILKINSON. His personal testimony, or the testimony he collected?

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Admiral WILKINSON. His personal testimony, or the testimony he collected?

Senator FERGUSON. Not his testimony.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I am only familiar with my testimony. I read none of the others.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with the Dorothy Edgers testimony?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I did not know she had testified.

Senator FERGUSON. How was that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not know she had testified.

Senator FERGUSON. So, if this was translated in the rough and put on Commander Kramer's desk, it should have reached you then on the 6th, even though it was in the rough?

Admiral WILKINSON. If the translation was sufficiently intelligible, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at that message and see whether you see any significance to it in relation to an attack on Pearl Harbor?

[4983] Admiral WILKINSON. I would say certainly it was an indication to vessels lying off Pearl Harbor, presumably submarines, as to the movement of the ships within Pearl Harbor.

I would say probably, without hindsight now, that it would be a substitute for more rapid means of communication, such as radio and cable, if they had been broken, and that this was a last minute or last resort, rather, method of communication where, if they had no other means, they would hang a light in the indow, just as we were told Paul Revere did, burning a light in the window to show that ships had left, or by day they could have made some other signal.

[4984] Senator FERGUSON. Then this message, even though it had been laid on your desk on the 6th, would not have meant anything to you in relation to an attack, a warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. It would have indicated a further interest in the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, but it would not have meant that an attack was imminent, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would not have seen, as the intelligence officer, any need, having that message, to send any more information to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. I doubt if I would, except to tell them that the last resort signals were being arranged to take the place of the radio and cable communications, which they had been having theretofore. You know the meaning of these signals is just an indication of what the movements of ships were. It did not give any information as to ships present, only ships that had left. It did not give information as to the locations of ships other than whether they had left or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask counsel whether this has actually been put in the record, this exhibit?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That particular one?

Mr. GESELL. This whole book is Exhibit 2, I think.

[4985] Senator FERGUSON. It was not printed; it is just an exhibit?

Mr. GESELL. I think that is all. It is not in the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Wilkinson, I understand from your testimony, or I want to ask you whether it is a fair assumption on my part from your testimony that at no time during your service as Chief of Naval Intelligence, from October 15 down to the 7th day of December 1941, did you have any idea or form any conclusion yourself that the Japs intended to attack Pear Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It was your impression, from the intelligence that you had, that they intended to continue their movement down into the South China Sea, but your personal impression was that they would not attack what you were pleased to call the Anglo-Saxon nations, is that right?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is correct, sir. "Anglo-Saxon" is the common term. I thought England and America were generally understood by that term.

[4986] Mr. KEEFE. You meant England and America when you used that term?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. That was purely a personal impression, and of course was erroneous.

Mr. KEEFE. It was your personal impression?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, personal impression, and obviously erroneous.

Mr. KEEFE. And you came to that conclusion as the result of your review of all the naval intelligence that came to your attention as the Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, plus the history of the Japanese opportunistic moves in China and Manchuria in the past few days, plus their negotiations which they had endeavored to stay, that they were going into China and they could not get out of China itself, there was nothing to force an issue there.

Mr. KEEFE. You of course were familiar with the entire world situation and the rapidly moving events that were taking place?

Admiral WILKINSON. Roughly, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. During that period and that which had taken place prior thereto?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that your personal opinion was arrived at [4987] as the result of a survey of the entire situation?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. When you concluded that they would not attack Britain and the United States?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is correct, is it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now I assume that, as a naval officer of 40 years' standing, and having been to sea with the fleet for years, and having served in Honolulu, or in Hawaii, as well as in the Far East, that you thoroughly understood that Pearl Harbor was developed as a bastion for defensive and offensive operations in the Pacific area?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. Primarily as a base for the fleet, and secondarily as a means for the protection of our territory in the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. KEEFE. It was the cornerstone of our defenses, was it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. In the Pacific; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. In the Pacific?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And for years maneuvers had been held and plans had been drawn contemplating the possibility that Pearl Harbor might be attacked?

[4988] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And Japan was the enemy against whom we were preparing all these years, was it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you thoroughly understood that?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; in connection with those maneuvers, there had, of course, been counter maneuvers by our fleet, wherein they had obtained contacts, and so on, of Japanese movements.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you agree with the general sentiment that appeared to have been expressed by Mr. Hull and others who have testified here, that the possibility of an attack on the Hawaiian area envisioned fundamentally and primarily an air attack, secondly a submarine attack, as being the most possible means of attack?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes sir; and probably both.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought perhaps a submarine attack was the most probable, because submarines could get there unnoticed and without risk.

Mr. KEEFE. So in your thinking in the years before you became Chief of Naval Intelligence you never ruled out the possibility of attack on Pearl Harbor and Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; while I was there, of course, [4989] we were concerned with that possibility and had maneuvers, as you say, to that effect.

Mr. KEEFE. But you did not consider it probable, although it might have been possible, in 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, for a double reason. I thought, in the first place, that the Japanese would be loath to encounter the hazard of sending a sufficient force into such dangerous waters, and, in the second place, I anticipated such a force would be detected before it arrived at any threatening position.

Mr. KEEFE. Now you were out there with the fleet in 1940, were you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. 1939-41, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you were there in 1940?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were familiar with the operations of the fleet in 1940?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was in them, in fact.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were familiar with the liaison that existed between the fleet and the Army in that period?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you recall that the Army was alerted at Pearl Harbor on the 17th of June 1940?

Admiral WILKINSON. I remember it was that summer. I do [4990] not remember the date particularly.

Mr. KEEFE. You remember there was an all-out alert in June 1940?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; I was quite close to General Herron, because I was the chief of staff of Admiral Andrews, who had been his colleague, until the Fleet arrived there in the spring of 1940.

Mr. KEEFE. You are familiar with the fact that the Army was alerted in Panama at that time, are you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not know Panama had been altered at that time. I now know.

Mr. KEEFE. Now do you know of any other time prior to that that the island garrison at Oahu had ever been alerted?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not know specifically, but I know that drills and maneuvers were occurring quite frequently, and partial or full alerts took place in connection with them, just as on a similar occasion, I think, when the fleet came out in 1934, and I believe I came there with the fleet, and the Army was alerted at that time as part of the maneuvers.

[4991] Mr. KEEFE. I mean other than mere maneuvers.

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I do not know of my own knowledge of any time that the Army was alerted against an enemy threat.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, this alert in 1940, in June, was a real alert, wasn't it.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So far as the Army was concerned?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. They were alerted against a possible trans-Pacific attack by air?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That meant Japan, did it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that according to the developments of that particular period, the growing tension and strains were such that the chief of staff here in Washington, in consultation with his advisors, decided that the Army ought to go on an all-out alert against possible attack, as early as the 17th of June 1940?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; Japan was, of course, not preoccupied with any other movements at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. I did not ask you that, Admiral.

Admiral WILKINSON. It seemed to be a diplomatic situation that would favor her taking such a step. [4992]

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield at that point?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. In connection with this alert matter, I call your attention to your own report to the Chief of Naval Operations that you put in the record yesterday, on the testimony of General Herron, wherein you make the following statement:

After my testimony, Lieutenant General C. D. Herron, who relinquished command in early February in Hawaii, testified mainly about his preparations and his general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter—

I assume that was the winter of 1941—

he had had them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently modified that in some degree, although he had maintained guns at their field stations.

Does that recall to you the matter of the alert during that period?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think it does, sir. Of course, it was not the winter alert that Mr. Keefe was speaking of. It was the summer alert. I might have misquoted it, or it might have been mistyped, or General Herron himself might have misstated his recollection by saying winter instead of summer. I think that is the summer alert.

Senator BREWSTER. That is the summer alert?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. I call your attention to the fact that this was given within a very few days after General Herron testified, so I think your recollection would undoubtedly be accurate. This was on December 19, 1941, which must have been within 3 or 4 days of the events.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. As I say, it might have been that I dictated it wrong, or the stenographer might have written it wrong, and General Herron himself might have said it wrong. I left in May, 1941, and I do not think that there was any alert in the winter there of 1940-41; that I knew of, at least.

[4994] Senator BREWSTER. Was General Herron's testimony taken down, or was that off the record?

Admiral WILKINSON. That was in the same status as mine. I think it preceded me. General Herron was relieved, in fact, on the 7th of February, I think, so that to have the 6-week alert in the winter, it would have been very early in the winter.

Mr. KEEFE. May I suggest that the evidence is already in in the form of the order for the alert and all of the reports in reference to it, and it is quite conclusively shown that the alert took place on the 17th of June, 1941. We have all that proof here.

Senator BREWSTER. I am not questioning that. What I am questioning is whether there was another alert during the winter as Admiral Wilkinson reported General Herron as testifying. That is why I thought it was pertinent in connection with your question.

Mr. KEEFE. I may say I think I have gone into it quite carefully and I think the evidence is quite conclusive there was not an all out alert during that period, and he must have been mistaken as to the time, and that the actual alert took place in June 1940.

Admiral, you, as an officer with the Navy at that time, knew that so far as the Army was concerned, in June, 1940, [4995] they considered the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii to the extent that an alert was ordered to prepare against it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir, we didn't know why it was ordered.

Mr. KEEFE. You mean the Navy didn't know?

Admiral WILKINSON. I personally didn't know, and I don't think Admiral Andrews knew, and I think that some of the evidence I have seen indicates that Admiral Richardson was not informed and had to ask the Department about it.

Mr. KEEFE. I am not talking about the Navy side.

Admiral WILKINSON. I though you were. Excuse me.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not know, and you did not know that the Navy was even alerted so far as you were concerned, did you?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. The Navy was not alerted. We made a maneuver toward the southeastward for several days, but we were not alerted for any defense of Panama.

Mr. KEEFE. But your connections with General Herron were such that you knew the Army was alerted?

Admiral WILKINSON. I knew the Army was alerted, but I didn't know why.

Mr. KEEFE. You saw the operations order, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. It might well have been [4996] a maneuver alert.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you know that it was a serious alert?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, I did not know.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you didn't know whether it was a real alert or a maneuver alert?

Admiral WILKINSON. No.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the evidence before us now is that it was a real alert. And you so understand that?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You saw the evidences of it out there, did you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Can you describe what took place under that alert so far as the Army was concerned?

Admiral WILKINSON. Such evidence as came to my notice was that they manned the coast defense guns, moved their anti-aircraft artillery to prepared positions, they had searchlight battery exercises. In fact, I think I went to witness a searchlight battery exercise wherein they flew a plane into the searchlight for test purposes, and I recall I was interested in the working of the mechanical ears in connection with it. They had, in other words, [4997] the defense stations manned both against air and against landing expeditions.

Mr. KEEFE. At that time did it impress you that in 1940, there must have been some situation developed that indicated the possibility of an attack on Oahu?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I thought it was an excellent maneuver. I thought it was a practice maneuver, and well done.

Mr. KEEFE. What was that answer?

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought it was a practice maneuver. I thought it was an excellent maneuver, and well done.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as far as the Navy was concerned and speaking for yourself as an individual officer in the Navy, you just thought that it was an excellent practice maneuver.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You didn't know that it was a real alert?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to counsel, you will recall that I asked General Marshall when he was on the stand for a statement of the reasons for that alert of June 17, 1940, and upon a number of occasions he referred to the fact that it would be taken up with General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Plans [4998] Division at that time, and that General Strong was preparing a statement of the reasons for the 1940 alert, and on the 18th of December, just yesterday, I was furnished with this statement from General Strong, and I believe, Mr. Counsel, that it would be a

suitable and proper place, in view of the questions asked of the Admiral, to offer it in evidence, so that it will be a part of the record.

Mr. GESELL. You have the only copy we have, so we will have to put yours in.

Mr. KEEFE. I shall turn it over to you.

And I would like to read this, if I may, Mr. Chairman, into the record, without all the supporting affidavits, because to me it is rather illuminating.

This is dated December 15, 1945 [reading]:

Memorandum for General Marshall:

Subject: Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940.

1. In connection with your testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, you were asked repeatedly for the reasons which prompted you to alert the Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June, 1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division at that time, I was responsible for advising the action you took, and I feel that it may complete the [4999] story (in case it is not self-evident to the committee from a review of contemporaneous historical events) if I summarize the situation leading to the alert which I recommended and you approved.

2. You will recall that Axis ascendancy in May and early June of 1940 gave us cause for gravest concern. The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms. Germany had a good chance of acquiring the French Fleet intact. Russia appeared to be cooperating with the Axis; on 12 June she moved in on Lithuania; on 16 June she demanded a change of government in Esthonia and Latvia. On 10 June Russia and Japan signed a treaty fixing the Manchukuo-Outer-Mongolia border, and the inference was that these two had composed their differences with a view to negotiating a neutrality pact. The Japanese Navy would then be free for any adventure. Japanese land forces were concentrating in Hainan, Formosa, and Kyushu, apparently for further aggressive action.

3. You may remember a conference held in your office at 0830 on 17 June 1940, at which I was present, along with General Andrews and General Moore. We believed at that time that German control of the French Fleet would create a very serious situation in the South Atlantic [5000] Should Great Britain fall, a hostile move toward South America was far from unlikely. Anticipating a desperate need for troops in Brazil, and Uruguay, General Andrews and I recommended at this meeting that the National Guard be ordered into Federal Service. That was our frame of mind on 17 June 1940. At the conclusion of the conference, you directed us to consider the questions which had been raised.

4. In looking to our own security I apprehended the most immediate threat to be a raid or major sabotage effort which would effectively close the Panama Canal. Evidence of sabotage plans existed; certain specific evidence is mentioned below. In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. Accordingly on 17 June, 1940, I recommended placing these two departments on an alert status. The documents directly bearing on my decision do not tell the story nearly so well as does a vivid recollection of Axis capabilities and American weakness at that time when the collapse of France was imminent, and the fall of Britain by no means impossible. However, I cite and summarize below a few significant papers which reflect those times, and give some indication of what was in our minds during those late spring days of [5001] 1940.

Then follows, which I won't take the time to read, a series of messages from Ambassador Grew, two in number, as a matter of fact; some information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of the *Argentina Maru* that the Jap ships were to be sabotaged in the canal if they went through and sunk; some information taken from a drunken German sailor out in Eureka, Calif.; and an unused draft of a letter prepared, giving the commanding general of the Panama Department, the reasons and the background for the alert.

[5002] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would you yield for a question?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I probably misunderstood you but in the first part of your reading there I understood you to read that the fall of "Bataan" was evident. Is that right?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, I caught that too.

Mr. KEEFE. The fall of Bataan? No. Petain.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Petain.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Maybe I mispronounced it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I understood you to read that as "the fall of Bataan was evident."

Mr. KEEFE. No. "The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms."

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thought if Bataan was about to fall then that is something we want to learn about.

(The balance of the memorandum above read is as follows:)

a. State Department 793,94119/640, dated 25 May, 1940. Mr. Grew discusses "a flurry of official activity" in Tokyo. Although he sees no reason to attack on the Netherlands East Indies he acknowledges that preparations for such an attack "would presumably be guarded with utmost secrecy." (This, to our minds, did not exclude, but rather drew our attention to, the possibilities of attack or raids elsewhere.)

[5003] b. State Department 711. 94/1518, dated 3 June 1940. In surveying the Japanese situation Mr. Grew states in diplomatic terms that "a complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted." He cites the opinion of Japanese militarists that their fleet had nothing to fear from the use of force and expresses his own belief that Japan "may be tempted to resort to desperate courses."

c. State Department 811 F. 812 PROTECTION/165, dated 10 June 1940. The Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of *Argentina Maru* that all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in the Panama Canal when the United States "declares mobilization."

d. War Department WPD 3730-18, undated. Information from a Navy source describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquor, revealed to an American petty officer on 1 May 1940, at Eureka, California, some specific and detailed plans to blow up the Panama Canal if our entry into the war "became imminent".

e. War Department WPD 4326, undated. In an unused draft of a letter prepared for your signature at your request, the Commanding General, Panama Department, was informed that "the background of the instructions (for the alert of 17 June) has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in the public press", and that "the increasing [5004] tension and uncertainty in the world situation, as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come." (The letter remained unsent on my recommendation, largely because I considered the reasons for the alert to be obvious, as indeed they were.)

5. I can think of no more conclusive way to summarize the situation as of 17 June 1940 than to point out that the factors which guided my decision in recommending alerting these overseas bases were essentially those which made it necessary for the President of the United States to issue his Confirmation of 27 June 1940 (F. R. Doc. 40-2639), which extended the scope of the national emergency proclaimed 8 September 1939 and gave additional and exceptional authority in regard to safeguarding the Panama Canal."

(Signed) GEORGE V. STRONG,
Major General, U. S. A. (Retired).

Mr. KEEFE. I have called your attention to this communication, Admiral Wilkinson, because it summarizes what was in the minds of the Army and General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Plans Division at that time.

Based upon those facts, which involved world conditions, they thought that the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii [5005]

was so probable that they ordered an all-out alert on the 17th of June 1940.

Now, I ask you again, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, with all of the subsequent information which was obtained by you as Chief of Naval Intelligence, you, down to the 7th of December 1940, did not believe that an attack——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 1941.

Mr. KEEFE. 1941. You did not believe that an attack on the Hawaiian area was probable?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believed it was possible. I did not believe it was probable. I don't think that one awaits for an attack to be probable before an alert is ordered. An alert is ordered on a possibility of an attack.

You note that General Strong said that a diversionary attack on Pearl Harbor could not be ruled out. That is a very slight phraseology but even on such a slight possibility he ordered an alert.

Now, similarly, on November 27 both the Army and the Navy ordered an alert at Pearl Harbor, again on the possibility of an attack. I contended I was quite convinced there was a possibility of an attack, yes, sir, but I did not believe that there was a probability. I certainly agreed in the desirability of an alert. I agreed in the desirability of full defense measures. But I did not believe from my own [5006] conclusions that there would be—that there was a probability of an attack.

Mr. KEEFE. I call your attention to the fact, in view that you have quoted part of this communication, to the fact that——

Admiral WILKINSON. As I understood it.

Mr. KEEFE. What Strong released was:

In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I call your attention to the fact that as I recall General Marshall's testimony, and that of other witnesses that have testified here, it was their opinion that Japan would not go on with its movement to the south and leave its flank exposed by the presence of our fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Did you believe that in the summer and fall of 1941?

Admiral WILKINSON. I did not believe that they would attack Pearl Harbor up to the moment they did. I believed that their preoccupation in south China would engage them in a military way and I believed that their political progress would be headed toward, be directed toward, making the greatest advance, consolidating their positions to the greatest degree, [5007] before they were involved in a war with England and America.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I have asked for the log of the *Enterprise* and I have not had a chance to see it as yet, but I might want to ask Admiral Wilkinson a couple of questions in reference to that, and also a couple of questions with reference to the *Lexington*, and I understand it will be here at 2 o'clock.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

May I ask, Congressman Keefe, if it was your intention that all of the papers relating to this alert from which you read be spread upon the record?

Mr. KEEFE. No; just the letter itself from General Strong to General Marshall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What you read into the record?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the whole letter.

Mr. GESELL. There is part of the letter you didn't read so we will spread it all on the record.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the rest of the documents be made an exhibit.

Mr. GESELL. This document can be designated "Exhibit 87."

Mr. KEEFE. May I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that the documents attached are referred to in the letter and that is the reason I didn't suggest putting them in.

[5008] Senator BREWSTER. Would that be too extensive to put in the record?

Mr. KEEFE. I don't think it is necessary to spread them on the record because they have been condensed in General Strong's report and he simply attaches the photostat copies of the originals.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87.")

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to advise the members of the committee that immediately upon the recessing of the committee at 4 o'clock the Chair wishes to have an executive session here for the consideration of two or three matters that the committee should consider.

Mr. KEEFE. Where will that be, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Right here. We will remain here after the recess after the rest of the people leave.

We will recess now until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[5009]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Mr. Keefe from Wisconsin will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON (Resumed)

Mr. KEEFE. I have just one or two questions, Admiral.

Am I correct in my understanding that prior to your assumption of your responsibilities as Chief of Naval Intelligence on the 15th of October 1941, you had had no previous experience or tour of duty in that particular field?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; only attendance at two sessions of the conferences on the limitation of armaments.

Mr. KEEFE. You had no previous experience in the field of intelligence, had you, prior to that time?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not specifically under the Office of Naval Intelligence. As Chief of Staff, and again as fleet gunnery officer in a preceding tour of duty at sea I had been concerned with the intelligence at sea, but I had not been under the Office of Naval Intelligence or in it before.

Mr. KEEFE. You had been essentially a line officer at sea?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Most of your experience has been in that connection?

[5010] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; such shore duties as I had done were not connected with intelligence.

Mr. KEEFE. When did you leave your duties as Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral WILKINSON. The 20th of July 1942.

Mr. KEEFE. So you had an experience in that office which lasted from the 15th of October 1941 to the 15th of July, did you say?

Admiral WILKINSON. 20th of July.

Mr. KEEFE. 20th of July 1942.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; a little over 9 months.

Mr. KEEFE. And you went back to sea?

Admiral WILKINSON. Went back to sea immediately, and I have just returned therefrom.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, when you did begin as head of Naval Intelligence, was there any change in the staff or the subordinates who were under you?

Admiral WILKINSON. No general change, sir. There are always recurring changes as one officer after another is relieved, but I brought no one in with me and no one left.

[5011] Mr. MURPHY. Substantially the same organization as it existed under your predecessors remained under you, except there was a new chief; isn't that right?

Admiral WILKINSON. Exactly.

Mr. MURPHY. When you did go there you brought to that office a good many years' experience in the Navy—36, wasn't it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Thirty-six; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Thirty-six years. Now I would like to direct your attention, Admiral, to page 430 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence at the Pearl Harbor Investigation, Volume 2, and I note there the following—do you have a copy of it available for the Admiral?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. As a preliminary to that, Admiral Wilkinson, will you state for the record the full name of Admiral Newton?

Admiral WILKINSON. Admiral John Henry Newton.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice there the following:

Admiral Newton, as stated infra page 578, left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful task force, including the aircraft carrier *Lexington*, two cruisers, U. S. S. *Chicago* and U. S. S. *Portland*, and five destroyers, on a mission to Midway Island where he was to fly off a squadron of airplanes. Even up to and at the time of his sailing and thereafter he [5012] remained in ignorance of the existence of the war warning message of 27 November 1941, as well as the similar warning messages of 24 November and 16 October 1941.

That states that it was taken from the Hart Inquiry at pages 316 and 318.

Do you, Admiral, know of any reason in the world why Admiral Kimmel would not have told Admiral Newton, who was going in the direction of Japan, after he had received a war warning, of the fact that such messages had been sent to him?

Admiral WILKINSON. I know of no reason, sir, but of course I am not a judge.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, if you were Admiral Newton and you were going in the direction of Japan, you would certainly have liked to have had that kind of information, would you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now one question, Admiral.

In Exhibit 8-A, which was introduced in evidence yesterday, and which, for identification, is headed "General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers," and dated 4 December 1945—will you make that available to the witness, please?

Mr. GESELL. He has it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now I direct your attention to the page numbered 2, which is actually the third page in the exhibit, [5013] under the heading "A," and preliminarily, as I understand it, this was a statement as explained on page 1:

Since the staff officer connected with the document reporting the above facts has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of Commander Tachibana Tomo who worked in the same department at that time.

Now on page 2—

Admiral WILKINSON. And who I imagine, Mr. Congressman, is the same gentleman we arrested on the west coast a few months before. I am not sure, but I think so.

Mr. MURPHY. You think he was the same?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think he was the same. He was in intelligence work, and of the same name.

Mr. Murphy. Someone of the same name was arrested on the west coast of the United States some months prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir, for espionage on the west coast. I just know it was Commander Tachibana Tomo.

Mr. MURPHY. I noticed the following:

American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The United States broadcasts of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in Pearl Harbor was overheard.

[5014] Admiral, so far as any messages that were sent from the United States by the Navy are concerned, they would certainly be in code, would they not, if they were sent to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral WILKINSON. Unquestionably, sir; I see no reason why they would report on the number of battleships, cruisers, and so forth, entering Pearl Harbor. Any message back from Pearl Harbor would certainly be in code.

Mr. MURPHY. So far as naval messages are concerned in and out of Pearl Harbor, they would be in code, would they not?

Admiral WILKINSON. On a subject such as this I should be almost certain of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any idea as to what, if any, kind of broadcasts might be referred to there, Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral WILKINSON. Possibly some local news broadcast speaking of a unit of the fleet coming in for the benefit of the local Hawaiian population. I know there was no censorship going on there. I think they had been requested not to comment on the ships, but there was

no formal censorship. Possibly some amateur radio people talking together.

[5015] Mr. MURPHY. But so far as you know, Admiral, was there any official broadcast by the American Government, by the United States Army or by the United States Navy that would contain that kind of information at that particular time?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; I suggest that we make an inquiry, and if the committee so pleases, I will initiate it, of our district intelligence officer out there to see if he knows anything about it.

Mr. MURPHY. I would appreciate it if you would take the necessary steps to put such action into motion.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, I have been provided with the original log of the *Enterprise*, and I not having had a chance to see it before, I may have a question of Admiral Wilkinson.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. In the meantime Congressman Clark—

Mr. KEEFE. I have no questions otherwise until I get a chance to go through this.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday Senator Lucas, I think, inquired of you as to when you graduated from the Naval Academy. I should like to ask you when you went on active sea duty in this last war?

[5016] Admiral WILKINSON. I think the 15th of August of 1942.

Mr. CLARK. 1942?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Would you state, please, for the record, briefly, your services from then until the close of the war, and also state whether you received any recognition of any kind in connection with your services?

Admiral WILKINSON. From the 15th of August until early January of the following year, 1943, I was commander of battleship division 2, comprising three battleships, and operating in Hawaiian waters, and in the west coast waters of the United States.

In early January I was detached and directed to proceed by air, which, of course, I did, to Noumea to report to Admiral Halsey as his deputy commander. I arrived there in late January and remained as his deputy commander until the end of June, when I reported as understudy to Admiral Turner, in command of the amphibious forces of the South Pacific.

I joined him in time to participate in the attack on New Georgia and relieved him in the later stages of that campaign on the 15th of July, 1943.

From then until the 15th of November of this year, 1945, I was in command of the South Pacific Amphibious [5017] Force which subsequently was entitled the Third Amphibious Force, and remained in command of the Third Amphibious Force when it shifted its operations from the South Pacific into the Western Pacific as a whole.

During this time I was engaged in the South Pacific campaign with the amphibious operations in connection with the later stages of the New Georgia campaign, with the seizure of Vella Lavella, the

capture of the Treasury Islands, and the landing and capture of a portion of Bougainville in November of 1943.

Then in 1944, with the seizure of Green Island and the capture and occupation of Emirau Island in, respectively, February and March.

In June the South Pacific campaign was over and I was transferred to the Pacific as a whole and operated with Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet in the capture of the two islands in the Palau Islands, Peleliu and Angaur, in September, 1944, and in the capture and occupation of the Ulithi atoll.

Immediately after that I was transferred to the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kincaid for duty with his fleet and General MacArthur's single command as a whole in the Philippine campaign.

I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces [5018] which landed at Leyte on the 20th of October, and was present there, although not actively commanding any combat forces, during the sea battles for Leyte of October 20.

Again I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces which landed at Luzon in Lingayen Gulf on January 9, and initiated the campaign that resulted in the capture of the entire Philippines.

After leaving there, I was—I wasn't relieved of duty, but most of my ships were then assigned to the Fifth Amphibious Force under the command of Admiral Turner, who then proceeded with his force to the capture of Iwo and Okinawa. I was not concerned in either of those operations except for a visit I made to Okinawa, but was engaged in the planning for subsequent operations under Admiral Halsey.

During the development of the Okinawa campaign, these particular operations which we were planning for were abandoned, and I then fell in with the general plan and began to work up the invasion of Japan with Admiral Turner in command of all the amphibious forces consisting of my own, Vice Admiral Hill's, and Vice Admiral Barbey.

Upon the surrender of Japan my duties in the invasion were, of course, automatically canceled, and I become an amphibious commander to bring in the Eighth Army under General Eichelberger into Japan from Tokyo, including Tokyo Bay and a short area to the south of it, throughout northern Honshu, and Hokkaido and all of northern Japan, from that line I have spoken of to the southward of Tokyo.

[5019] I brought in the first of the major installments of troops on surrender day, the 2d of November, some 25,000 troops of the First Cavalry Division and the One hundred and twelfth Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, and I supervised the arrival of other divisions in northern Honshu and in Hokkaido, and remained there in Yokohama in general command of reinforcement and supply operations for the Eighth Army until I left there on the 8th of November.

That, I think, sir, is the narrative.

As to any awards, I have been honored by the Distinguished Service Medal of the Navy for the capture of Bougainville, by a second Distinguished Service Medal for the Palau campaign, and by a third for the Philippines campaign.

Mr. CLARK. Admiral, this committee, as you understand, is sitting on this inquiry, the ultimate purpose of which is the finding of the facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor incident. Do you know of any other fact or circumstance relating to that or bearing upon it that you have not related that might be helpful to this committee in that connection?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir.

Mr. CLARK. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman—

[5020] The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I have now before me the memorandum on your testimony before the Roberts committee.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Referring to the bottom of page 12, "Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, United States Navy, Director, Naval Intelligence Division."

Admiral WILKINSON. I beg your pardon. I haven't the Roberts commission report itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just look at the testimony.

(Paper handed to Admiral Wilkinson.)

Senator FERGUSON. The other part is in the record and I wanted to have you read this in. It is a very short memo.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What you gave to Admiral Stark is already in the record.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. This is headed "Precis of Testimony".

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, define that word.

Admiral WILKINSON. It is headed "Precis",—p-r-e-c-i-s.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that mean?

Admiral WILKINSON. It means a brief, I think, or summary.

[5021] The CHAIRMAN. That is not our language?

Admiral WILKINSON. I believe it is a French word meaning brief.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words it means a brief or résumé?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A summary of whatever it is dealing with?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral WILKINSON. The heading is "Precis of Testimony Given Before the President's Investigating Commission." Statements by Admiral Stark and several others.

Turning to the part that Senator Ferguson has spoken of:

Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Director, Naval Intelligence Division.

In replies to questions, the witness described naval avenues of intelligence, including naval attachés and additional naval observers and consular shipping advisers who had been maintained in the Far East. Frequent reports were received from these officers. The witness mentioned other methods through which the Navy received secret information. Frequent exchange of dispatches had occurred between the Intelligence organization in Washington and in the field.

In general, the sources reported their information to Washington, at the same time informing the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets. Care was taken here to see that these two officers were kept fully advised as to developments. [5022]

From the evidence available the Navy had concluded in November that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack. The witness considered that both Commanders in Chief had available to them the same information on which this conclusion was drawn here. Nevertheless, warning dispatches had been sent out.

The witness gave information concerning the control of fishing boats in the vicinity of Hawaii, and described the delimitation of the spheres of activity of the naval and military intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

[5023] In April, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a dispatch indicating from past experience that the Axis could be expected to initiate new activities on Saturdays, Sundays, and national holidays. Steps were taken in March 1941, placing the Naval District intelligence organizations in an advanced state of readiness; coastal information sections were placed in an active status last May. District intelligence organizations were further extended in that month, and a complete state of readiness of the intelligence organizations was directed last July.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, were those the only questions that you had gone into before the Roberts Commission?

Admiral WILKINSON. I should say so, sir. It was a brief hearing, a half-hour only, as I remember.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only time you testified?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that there was a Presidential commission to find all of the facts and that is the only question they went into with you? Was there anything said why they were limiting your scope?

Admiral WILKINSON. I don't know, except that they were in a hurry to get out to Hawaii, I think, and you will note that this is a summary of the statements of Admiral Stark, [5024] Admiral Turner and myself, and I think on the same day they questioned me, they also had General Herron and General Miles.

Senator FERGUSON. When they got back they didn't go into it any further, they didn't call you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Didn't call me at all, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were here in the Intelligence Branch?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, reading that, I think it is the second or third paragraph, about the knowledge that the Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet had, do you want to let that stand as your testimony, that they had the same amount as you had here in Washington, or to that effect?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think it is too broad a statement, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is too broad a statement?

Admiral WILKINSON. They had the same information by reason of their radio intelligence centers which they had there as to the movements of the Japanese vessels, and the position and location of the Japanese fleet; they had the same information as to those factors that we had. They did not have the same information as to the diplomatic negotiations, no, sir, nor as to some of the code messages.

[5025] Senator FERGUSON. And some of the other messages?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say that ought to be corrected?

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Admiral WILKINSON. It should if it is to be narrowed down and my own statement, my own draft of memorandum for Admiral Stark, mentioned a number of points about the movement of ships, and I said they had that information.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the Sundays and Saturdays, that is in the last paragraph, I wish you would clear up what they had asked you about that.

Admiral WILKINSON. Oh, that, I think, is in one of our exhibits, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that your own or were you just telling what General Herron had said?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was telling what my office had done. It was Admiral Kirk's action on the preceding April. Let me have the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice they questioned both you and General Herron on that same subject.

Admiral WILKINSON. That dispatch is shown on page 1 of exhibit 37 counsel tells me.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 1 of 37.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

[5026] Senator FERGUSON. Will you just read that?

Admiral WILKINSON (reading)—

1 April 1941

From: Chief of Operations—

but I know this dispatch was initiated by Admiral Kirk.

To: Commandants of all Naval Districts—

which would, of course, include Manila and Hawaii.

NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa.

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Senator FERGUSON. And had that been called to your attention when you came in?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you had that in mind while you were in the office?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be true because of a relaxation on that day?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I think the British and America, both countries, paid a good deal of attention [5027] to Saturdays and Sundays.

Senator FERGUSON. The same would be true of civilians; the same thing would be true of civilians?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were going to send a message on Sunday or Saturday, would you say that you would be more apt to get better attention from the civilian services or the Army and Navy?

Admiral WILKINSON. Purely as a matter of personal attention. I would say from the Army and Navy because we maintained a regular

24-hour watch. We don't relax established routines on communications on those days.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say then that any Army or Navy establishment that had been alerted, should be alerted on Saturdays and Sundays even more so than on other days, owing to what you stated in your report, or what was stated in this report?

Admiral WILKINSON. This dispatch, sir, was not as broad as perhaps would have been desirable for it to be. It was initiated by Admiral Kirk and sent out as applicable to the service over which he had authority, which is to say the Intelligence Service. This was not warning all the communications services, was not warning all the combat field. It was only applicable to Intelligence Service of itself, which was Admiral Kirk's service and consequently my service.

[5028] Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you were specially alerting the intelligence services—they were—on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I notice that when you gave your résumé as to what you heard before the Commission you gave the—this is already in the record but I want to call it to your attention—the Commission asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time in the defenses and, consequently, the most advantageous time for an attack. He said that—

with regards to the reserves, yes, because they were more likely to be on leave or other privileges, but with regards to the actual stations in the field he considered that they should be as efficient and as fully manned on Sunday as on any other morning.

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I was quoting General Herron there, was I not, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. All right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, he personally made many dawn inspections on Sunday to check on and insure their readiness.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I had seen him on his return from at least one of those.

* [5029] Senator FERGUSON. Now, he was a general in the Army. What would you say about that in relation to the Navy at Hawaii?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would not like to express an opinion on that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you had been there Saturdays and Sundays and holidays?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is your opinion?

Admiral WILKINSON. Well, I think stations which were required to be manned would be manned very definitely just as much on Sunday morning or Saturday afternoon as on any other weekday or any other day. There were established watches on all the ships and those watches were maintained regularly regardless of the calendar day or the day of the week or the holiday.

The ships were placed on certain conditions of readiness, of which I think you are already aware. Condition 1 was all battle stations manned; condition 2, half the batteries manned; and condition 3 was a somewhat smaller element of the battery.

Condition 3, as I recall, was the standard condition in which we would be when in port. That would require a certain number of guns manned, and I believe from what I have [5030] heard that that was the case on Sunday morning, that all the ships were manned in that condition.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, No. 3?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would say they would be equally manned on Sunday morning or Tuesday morning or Monday afternoon, in that same rotation I mean, that they would be just as carefully manned then as at any other time.

Senator FERGUSON. So, then, you don't think it made any difference?

Admiral WILKINSON. It did make this difference: that in the normal work on the ships they would be having a drill for all hands and all officers in the forenoon, say, of Thursday or Friday and they would be having inspections on Saturday. All officers and all men would be required back aboard.

Now, on a Sunday morning, as a matter of a holiday there would not be these drills and inspections and some officers might be allowed to return late; some few others—I think there was a limitation to those who might stay away—some few others might be allowed to stay away all day Sunday, so there would be that slight difference in that instead of probably being aboard for the work of the day some few might have been excused because there was no work of that day.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

[5031] The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Wilkinson, despite the schedule of organizations which is dated October 23, 1940, which requires the Office of Naval Intelligence in both Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Intelligence to evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable; despite Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of the 22d of March 1941 which reads as follows:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by despatch;

and despite Admiral Kirk's memorandum of March 11, 1941, his memorandum reading:

4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this Division to keep the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet adequately [5032] informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States.

you testified in June of 1945 before Admiral Hewitt's special investigation on the order of the Secretary of the Navy in response to Mr. Sonnet's questions that I will read:

Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation of Japanese

plans or deductions to be drawn from these movements would be the function of War Plans or Chief Naval Operations?

Your answer being:

The latter part of your question "Yes." The first part, the day by day information of Japanese movements would not according to my then and present understanding be sent out by Intelligence but, rather, by Operations after their evaluation.

My statement to this point is correct, is it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I believe that in the closing portion of my examination of you the other day you explained the discrepancies between the schedule of organizations of 23 October 1940 and your conception of your duties by pointing out that you had received verbal orders from someone which [5033] changed your responsibility?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I forgot to inquire then as to who gave you those verbal orders?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think I stated that I was officially informed by my predecessor as part of my relieving him that he had been orally directed by Admiral Stark to that effect in the presence of Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner as well, and that I myself had received verbal instructions from Admiral Ingersoll and the authoritative assistant to Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. GEARHART. Has that schedule of organization order ever been changed?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as you know it is still in effect?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not know, sir. I know that frequently papers of that sort are drawn up and modified from time to time and there is no machinery, perhaps, in existence to make sure that each particular modification, such as I said with respect to removing the public relations department from the Office of Naval Intelligence, that there is no machinery set up to keep up these instructions in writing to date.

Mr. GEARHART. As long as you were the Director in the [5034] Division of Naval Intelligence you never received from any source a written order changing the schedule of organization to which I have just referred?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. I did not feel it was necessary.

Mr. GEARHART. Who was it that issued the written order "Schedule of Organizations"?

Admiral WILKINSON. I am not sure when Admiral Stark assumed office. It was either he or his predecessor, whoever was Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. GEARHART. Could it have been—

Mr. GESELL. I can answer that question for you, Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. I would appreciate it if you would.

Mr. GESELL. Because I have the original memorandum. It was approved by H. R. Stark, October 23, 1940.

Mr. GEARHART. October 23, 1940?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. And did Admiral Stark tell you personally that he had changed that order?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. I was satisfied to receive that information from my official predecessor and to receive it from his authoritative assistant.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, drawing upon your experience as a [5035] naval officer, if Admiral Stark desired to change that order he would do it himself, naturally, by another and succeeding written order, wouldn't he?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not think so, sir. I think he would tell the man that had charge of it to act otherwise than as was laid out under written order. I do not think Admiral Stark attached perhaps very great importance to the existence of this series of long documents outlining for their guidance the duties of the respective divisions. I think he felt free to add to them or change them orally from time to time as he saw fit.

Mr. GEARHART. Both Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Kirk were of lesser rank than that of Admiral Stark, were they not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, Admiral Stark was their commanding officer, wasn't he?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, and mine as well.

Mr. GEARHART. And yours as well.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. It was not then possible for either Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Kirk to have issued an order contravening an order of a higher ranking officer in writing, was it?

[5036] Admiral WILKINSON. For Admiral Kirk, no, sir. For Admiral Ingersoll, yes, if he were acting in his stead.

Mr. GEARHART. But he could only do that while acting in the name of Admiral Stark?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When people or other officers, associates of yours, come to you and tell you that written orders that are plain on their face in respect to import and meaning—tell you that verbal orders have been issued setting them to one side, do you not at once feel that you are on inquiry that you should make inquiries at the source as to whether or not that has been done?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not necessarily, sir. If I were relieving an officer of rank and responsibility in command of a ship and there were general orders extant and he said that he had received certain particular orders in variance to those orders, I would accept his statement unless I felt there was something distinctly wrong with them, which I did not in this case.

Mr. GEARHART. And despite the fact that you had before you a written order for your guidance, despite the fact that you had been advised orally that you were not supposed to do the evaluating and not supposed to do the disseminating, you did continue as long as you were the head of the ONI to [5037] evaluate and to disseminate didn't you?

Admiral WILKINSON. I had the orders which were applicable except as they were modified. They had been modified in a brief, in a limited way. I continued to evaluate and by "evaluation" I mean

determining the accuracy, the authenticity, and the consistency of information. I do not mean by that the deduction of enemy intentions. I continued to evaluate all information in that sense and for my own satisfaction I attempted to figure out what the enemy intentions were but I did not spread that out because I was ordered not to.

I continued to disseminate in every respect, including a number of papers and articles and publications which I have mentioned, but I did not disseminate information which would immediately affect the operations of the fleet until I had consulted with the War Plans Department about it, because those were the limitations that I felt had been placed upon me.

Mr. GEARHART. Insofar as the receipt of these intercepts, you disseminated them through the agency of your courier, Captain Kramer, did you not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Within the limited distribution that was turned over to me to be carried out.

Mr. GEARHART. And he delivered them in most instances [5038] to the White House, to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State and to the two Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral WILKINSON. They were delivered to those officers, sir. He did not deliver them himself to them, to all of those you mentioned. He delivered them to the Secretary of the Navy, to the White House, and to the Chief of Naval Operations, but not to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, or the Chief of Staff. That was an Army distribution on that side.

Mr. GEARHART. The Army took care of the Army side?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; and to the Secretary of State.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. GEARHART. First I would like to make a request, if you will yield the floor.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. First I would like to make a request of counsel.

Counsel will recall that I called to the attention of the committee that I had received letters from enlisted men who were serving at Hickam Field, who had reported to me that on the 1st day of December 1941 a formal all-out air alert was ordered, an all-out alert was invoked which required all [5039] battle stations to be manned, all men to be in full battle regalia, the mounting of machine guns and the mounting of antiaircraft guns, and I asked you at that time to furnish me with the copies of the orders establishing that alert and the copies of the orders calling off that alert on the afternoon of Saturday, December 6.

Since that time I have received letters from far separated parts of the United States, from other enlisted men advising me that the alert was not confined to Hickam Field but that there was a general all-out alert at other bases in the island. Is there a Wright Field?

Mr. KEEFE. Wheeler Field.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, it is Wheeler Field, which is the combat airfield, or was at that time, in the islands; that an all-out air alert was called on or about December 1 requiring the same activities at Wheeler Field that I have described at Hickam Field, and that that air alert was called off by an order of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, the sus-

pension of the all-out alert, which required the taking down of the machine guns and the anti-aircraft guns and the packing of them away in grease and the return of ammunition to the arsenals; and I would like to have copies of the orders establishing the alert at Wheeler and a copy of the orders calling off that alert at the same base, together with any [5040] similar orders that were issued at about the same times, creating an air alert upon other bases in the islands and also any orders, if there be any, calling off the alert at those other bases.

Mr. GESELL. We will ask the Army to broaden their request. I might report, Congressman, that at the time you made that inquiry, that initial request, it was necessary for the War Department to direct the inquiry to Hawaii where those orders are if there are any, and they have not yet received a reply from Hawaii.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. We are already at work on that subject.

Mr. GEARHART. I appreciate that. And there is one other thing. If these field orders at Wheeler and Hickam were purely field orders, I would like to have that fact certified. If those orders were inspired from higher authority, I would like to know the history of their issuance.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe, do you want to ask a further question?

Mr. KEEFE. Admiral Wilkinson, I have before me now the original log of the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* and the photostatic copy of the log of the aircraft carrier *Lexington*.

The log of the *Enterprise* dates from Monday, November [5041] 24, 1941, to December 15, 1941, and the photostatic copy of the *Lexington* log is for the period December 5, 1941, to December 8, 1941.

Now, purely for information in order to be able to evaluate and understand the language appearing in these logs I ask you as an expert on naval affairs, a log such as that which I have does not show the action or battle action report, does it, normally?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think it would normally, not a full report but it would state whether the ship was engaged or when she had sighted the enemy and what had happened at once. There would be a separate action report in greater detail.

Mr. KEEFE. There would be a separate action report?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, I find language in this log which I have some difficulty, due to my inexperience in dealing with those matters, to understand.

For instance, on the 30th of November at 12:45 appears the language: "Sounded flight quarters." What does that mean?

Admiral WILKINSON. That on a bugle they sounded call to flight quarters, which is to say "stand by the planes, we are ready to launch planes" or "get ready to launch planes" [5042] or perhaps "get ready to recover planes." That is to stand by for flight operations of planes, in other words.

Mr. KEEFE. That would mean the planes were either going to take off or land, would it not?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. Calling the men to their stations in connection with that operation, that was the purpose.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, I find this: On December 1, 1941, as near as I can make out, the *Enterprise* at this time was proceeding westward.

¹ See information submitted by the War Department, Hearings, Part 5, p. 2490 et seq.

It left Honolulu a few days before. It was carrying planes to Midway or to Wake, counsel, do you recall? I think they were going to Midway and perhaps the *Lexington* was going to Wake at this time. Well, all it says—

Admiral WILKINSON. Excuse me one minute. Senator Ferguson, do you remember what page that was on, that reference to Admiral Newton?

Mr. MURPHY. 430.

Admiral WILKINSON. 430? That would give us a clue.

Mr. KEEFE. There appears information of this character, Admiral, as of December 1.

Admiral WILKINSON. You are speaking now of the *Lexington* or the *Enterprise*?

Mr. KEEFE. I am speaking now of the *Enterprise*.

[5043] Admiral WILKINSON. She had been with Admiral Halsey.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Admiral WILKINSON. Because the *Lexington* was with Admiral Newton.

Mr. KEEFE. With Admiral Newton?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. There appears this:

1716 darkened ship; out in the de-Gaussing gear for half hour test. 1746, secured the de-Gaussing girdle.

What does that mean?

Admiral WILKINSON. "Darkened ship" means turn out all lights so the ship cannot be seen after dark. It is usually done at sunset so that there will be ample time to check, probably, before the actual dark sets in and lights could be seen.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that a normal operation?

Admiral WILKINSON. That is a normal operation when cruising at sea and at any times—certainly at any times of danger or crisis and often just for maneuvers.

In the degaussing process that you mentioned, magnetic mines were used to some extent early in this war and the answer to it was found to be putting a magnetic girdle or belt around a ship and when you were in mineable waters, that is to say, where you were not too deep for mines to be employed, the ship would normally cut in the current on this degaussing girdle so that that would counteract the magnetism of the ship and defeat the magnetic mines which otherwise would be affected by the magnetism of the ship.

Mr. KEEFE. I understand that. So that, then, the order to darken ship was either a precautionary measure, to be indulged in by the commander of the ship in the event they were in waters where there might lurk some danger, is that it?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think we were doing it regularly for some time because of the possibility of an attack from Japanese submarines and, of course, if we were showing lights it would be an open invitation to discovery.

Mr. KEEFE. That is just exactly what I thought.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. That you would darken a ship because you had knowledge or thought, at least, there might be an attack by Japanese sub-

marines and this ship going out there is preparing itself against that particular attack by darkening the ship?

Admiral WILKINSON. I think they had been doing that for some time, sir, in fact.

Mr. KEEFE. For some particular time prior to December 1?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes; the darkening of ships at night.

[5045] Mr. KEEFE. All right. Now, then, it says:

Set condition of readiness 3, ship control and fire control.

What does "set condition No. 3" mean?

Admiral WILKINSON. No. 3 is to characterize a condition wherein a certain number of guns are manned but a certain number of others are not manned, so that the crews in rotation can get some rest; roughly about one-third of the guns.

Mr. KEEFE. That means they are manning the guns?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; or the guns were manned at all times against a surprise submarine attack when at sea.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that the highest condition of readiness?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. The highest condition is all hands at the battle stations, which is condition 1. Condition 2 is about half the battery and condition 3 is from one-third to one-fourth, depending upon the ship.

Mr. KEEFE. So that I am to understand that when the log says, "Set condition of readiness No. 3, ship control and fire control," that that means that at least a part of the guns of that ship were manned and ready for action?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And what does "ship control" mean and "fire control," what does that mean?

Admiral WILKINSON. Fire control is to say—fire control [5046] has to do with the guns. Ship control has to do with the readiness to counteract any damage incurred to the ship and that would mean that they should have certain damage-control parties on at the time, nucleus damage controls. Of course, if all hands were at the battle stations they would have full damage control. This would be smaller and fewer damage-control stations but enough to take action in the event of a surprise attack.

Mr. KEEFE. I do not want to appear so naive as my questions might appear, Admiral, but I want this for the purpose of the record.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. Well, I admit they are very technical terms as well.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. All of these things that you have described are conditions of alerting this vessel to prepare it for any possible surprise attack that might be made upon it?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Isn't that true?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that so far as the *Enterprise* is concerned, in accordance with the log, this ship as it was proceeding out toward Midway, at least in these days for which the record appears in this log, the commanding officer of that ship was preparing against the possibility of a surprise attack?

[5047] Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir; and doubtless on orders from Admiral Halsey, the commander of that detachment, who had probably had similar practices in all other ships of that detachment.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, I find also that planes were constantly being launched into the air for patrol. That would be for the same purpose, wouldn't it?

Admiral WILKINSON. To ascertain if there were any submarines in the path of the ship; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. And then I find as they steamed on that December 3, 1941, appears for the first time this language:

1015 commenced zig-zagging according to plan No. 11.

What does that mean? What was that plan No. 11?

Admiral WILKINSON. One of several plans. In order to have a variety of plans available so that no enemy could determine that we had one single method of zigzagging, we would have a number of plans wherein at different intervals of time we would make different changes of course. Plan No. 11 was just one of those plans. Which one that was I do not know.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event if the ship on December 3, 1941, adopted plan No. 11 and commenced zigzagging, it would be quite safe to assume that that action was prompted by the fact that they were in waters where they expected the possibility of submarine attack, isn't that true?

[5048] Admiral WILKINSON. It might, of course—that is very true. It might, of course, have been for a drill that morning as well but it might well be—if it were a drill only it would be indicated by an entry afterward that they ceased zigzagging an hour or two later.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I am glad you said that because right in the next entry, 1216, appears this:

Changed course to 314 degrees T. and commenced zigzagging in accordance with plan No. 2.

Would that indicate that it was a drill or a maneuver?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir. That would indicate they intended to do it all day.

Mr. KEEFE. I beg your pardon?

Admiral WILKINSON. It would indicate they intended to do it all day. They have to stop every ship to change courses and then all ships would resume together and then they would begin zigzagging apparently on another plan.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, the next entry contains this language:

1748 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2.

What is plan No. 2? Just another one of these zigzag plans?

Admiral WILKINSON. Just another one. I think we had about 20 at that time.

[5049] Mr. KEEFE. That is a different type of zigzag?

Admiral WILKINSON. Slightly different.

Mr. KEEFE. Then I find on December 4 the same language, "Zigzagging."

Admiral WILKINSON. The ship's course was west of the Hawaiian Islands and we had had reports of strange submarines being sighted,

I think, in the past few months and the ship was taking no chances, obviously.

Mr. KEEFE. Then all of this language that all ships in the task force are steaming darkened, maintaining condition of readiness No. 3, in ship control, fire control, ships zigzagging according to plan No. 11 or plan No. 2 or some other plan, indicated that so far as Admiral Halsey was concerned in going west from Honolulu in this period between, I think, November 26, when he left Honolulu, and the time when he got out to Midway, he was taking the precaution that would normally be taken by the commander of a task force and the commander of this aircraft carrier *Enterprise* against a possibility of submarine attack, isn't that true?

Admiral WILKINSON. It certainly appears so, sir, and I believe he is to be here and he can further testify directly, but I would certainly say yes.

Mr. KEEFE. And if they manned the antiaircraft guns and were in readiness at their stations at the antiaircraft guns [5050] you would consider that that was a precaution and a safety measure against the possibility of a sudden air attack, wouldn't you?

Admiral WILKINSON. What time was that entry about condition 3, sir? If it was at night he might be standing off a night submarine attack, but the guns could be used, of course, against both submarines and airplanes, the antiaircraft guns. Some other guns cannot be used against airplanes.

Mr. KEEFE. In your opinion, Admiral, as an expert of 40 years in the Navy, with these entries appearing in this log and also similar entries in the log of the *Lexington*, and I shall not burden the record with putting them all in at this time, it would appear that so far as the commanders of those two task forces were concerned, Admiral Halsey on the one hand and Admiral Newton on the other, that in carrying out the task assigned to them, which was to deliver planes to Midway and Wake and return, they were doing it under the principle that they might be attacked by Japan either by submarine or by air attack? Isn't that a fair conclusion for me to draw?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I think that the situation was certainly strained and they were not neglecting any precautions. They may not have been expecting it but they were taking precautions against surprise.

[5051] Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, you say they may not have been expecting it?

Admiral WILKINSON. No, sir; but they were taking precautions against surprise.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you think they might have had the same idea which you have expressed so frequently here, that you did not think there was any probability of any such attack being made?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. If I was in a similar situation I would not have expected a probable attack but I certainly would have done the same thing with regard to my ships.

Mr. KEEFE. You would be ready for it if it came?

Admiral WILKINSON. I would.

Mr. KEEFE. Is that right?

Admiral WILKINSON. And I believe I would have done what they did.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in order to clear the record in connection with the questions that have been asked, I would like to read from page 578—

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a question?

Mr. MURPHY. It is an official record and answers the questions of the gentleman from Wisconsin.

[5052] Mr. KEEFE. Mr. Chairman, may I state that the gentleman from Pennsylvania is repeatedly referring to a book that has not been offered here, entitled, "Narrative Statement of Evidence of Pearl Harbor Investigations," which I have a copy of, but which I do not understand has been offered in evidence, is not part of the record in this case and I understand it has a sort of nebulous character from what I have been able to hear about it, and until such time as the full character and background of that instrument has been produced and it appears as part of the record in this case I do not intend to be interrupted, nor do I want to be interrupted by reading from something that is not in the record and may or may not state the facts as they may ultimately develop.

So I do not accept anything that appears in this statement as being of verity nor do I think it will assist me in clarifying anything that I may think in regard to it until it is properly identified.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Chair explained the other day when these documents were furnished that they were prepared by the Navy Department at the request of the Committee on Naval Affairs, possibly before this hearing started, I am not certain about that, but that upon the completion of this narrative story they turned them over to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs and he turned them over to me for [5053] distribution to the members of the committee, for the information of the committee.

I do not think they were made part of the record or filed as exhibits, but for whatever they might be worth in giving the committee and to the individual members a running story of this Pearl Harbor situation. They are not yet officially parts of the record as the Chair understands it and were not offered for that purpose; that is, not at that time. They might be so made, but have not as yet been made part of the record or filed as exhibits.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to interrupt the gentleman. I understood he had concluded.

I want to read from a part of the Hart report, made by Admiral Hart, now Senator Hart, and reported on page 578 of volume 2, precisely along the line of the questions put to the witness and if the questions are pertinent, this is certainly pertinent.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has inquired whether this was a further inquiry of Admiral Wilkinson? If the committee are through with the Admiral, unless there are some further questions from him, we might excuse him.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me just say this, Mr. Chairman: I was about to read into the record the explanation by Admiral Newton as to why he zigzagged, in answer to the question of [5054] the gentleman from Wisconsin. It is at page 578 of the record and there are further references at 430 and 578 and 562 of volume 2, for those who are interested.

The CHAIR. All right. Are there any further questions of Admiral Wilkinson?

Senator BREWSTER. I had one or two I wanted to ask him.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral, on the general questions of your responsibilities and the preparedness to meet it at the time, what, if any, opinion have you formed about the psychological effect of the repeated warnings which had gone out over the course of the past 2 years, in 1940 and 1941? We have seen these warning messages and one of those, at least, if not the two—we do not seem to be clear about the second one—as to the state of mind of commanders in evaluating these warnings in view of the recognized inadequacy of the forces at their command to carry on a continuing state of reconnaissance and alertness; that is, they did not have actual control; as to whether or not it had sort of the effect of hearing a cry of “wolf, wolf” from them every 2 or 3 months or every month or so, with the result that they did not take it as seriously as they would have taken it if they were in the position that you were at Washington, where you knew this time it meant business?

[5055] Certainly the state of tension in Washington and the knowledge of the situation indicated that this was very different from any of the preceding crises that had arisen.

What would be your comment as to the lessons which we all might derive from that experience, looking to the future?

[5056] Admiral WILKINSON. I do not recall, sir, that there were very many alarms sent out there. Up to the time I left in May there had not been an excessive number. We knew that Japan was restless on the other side of the ocean, we knew that difficulties might ensue, and from then on until the actual attack I do not know that very many were sent. I think perhaps the Department refrained from sending an excessive number for that very reason, that they did not want to add up, to produce a wolf-wolf situation.

In answer to your question, I do not believe that there was an allayment or subsidence, you might say, of apprehension because of having received too many warnings.

Senator BREWSTER. You do not think that the alert they had sent out in June of 1940, when they really put them on the alert—was that about the date?

Admiral WILKINSON. That was the date, I understand.

Senator BREWSTER. And the earlier episode in keeping the fleet there that Admiral Richardson testified about, his visits and his concern, and then in the winter and spring, 1941, when certain indications were given and the situation was very tense, you felt all of those were not sufficient to in any sense put them to sleep?

Admiral WILKINSON. I do not think so, sir. The Navy, for instance, was not disturbed or concerned in the summer [5057] alert of 1940. The fleet remained out there in the eyes of most of the officers, and it was an idea that it was a good operating ground, good climate, and of course it had the supposed effect upon the Japanese.

Senator BREWSTER. I think you are not familiar with the testimony on that point. Admiral Richardson testified he was very much concerned about that alert, and he came on to find out whether it was simply an exercise. At first he was told it was an exercise and later he was told it was really a war warning.

Admiral WILKINSON. I thought you were speaking about the effect on the fleet as a whole. Concerning the effect on the commanders, I could not say. Admiral Richardson was concerned in that, but the general effect on the fleet was little, if anything.

Senator BREWSTER. I am thinking now in terms of the command and what their appraisal would be of these warnings. I think that is one of the questions which demands most consideration, concerning the effect upon these men.

One other question. I think you testified about wanting certain additional legislation to take care of espionage in Hawaii. Did you speak about that yesterday?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir. I said, I think, that the Department had asked for legislation to prohibit the [5058] photographing of a naval reservation at Pearl Harbor, and that that legislation, I believe, was introduced by the Navy Department but was not enacted. I mean it was requested by the Navy Department.

Senator BREWSTER. Question has also been raised about these something over 200—I now have the figure before me—200 consular agents of the Japanese there. I quote now from the Roberts Report as it seems to have pertinence:

In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under the Japanese Consul, who was stationed in Honolulu, territory of Hawaii. The Naval District Intelligence Office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with the Intelligence Officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. In conferences respecting this question, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until they had been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest would tend to thwart the effort which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment toward the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was [5059] taken against the agents.

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu.

You were familiar with that, were you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Very. We discussed it, General Miles, Mr. Hoover and myself, in one or more of our weekly conferences and we were all concerned about it, and the Department was endeavoring to secure authority or action on that subject. But the Army, the War Department, on the recommendation of the commanding general out there, took the action, or requested the action that he had set, that it would be delayed and they would be given an opportunity to register, in order not to disturb the feeling of loyalty which they were trying to build up among the Japanese.

Senator BREWSTER. That is as far as that phase of it was concerned, but there was no need for additional legislation, was there? You had all the legal authority that was needed?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, indeed.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in relation to the one Senator Brewster just asked?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read to you, Admiral from page 127 some questions and answers from the Army Pearl Harbor [5060] Board record. Your opposite in the Army was General Miles?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read from his testimony:

General GRUNERT: Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?

General MILES. That could have been, sir.

General GRUNERT. Do you think that the G-2 message—we call it "the G-2 message" of November 27—and the sabotage message—we call that the "Arnold message", of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signature—did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the command "down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27 was a war warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms of attack or dangers might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

[5061] General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?

General MILES. There was no report required.

Were you familiar with those messages that went out to the Army?

Admiral WILKINSON. I was not familiar with the Army message. I think I knew General Miles' message as to sabotage, and I knew that the Army had sent a parallel message to our war-warning message, although I was not familiar with its language.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you agree with General Miles there on that one question, No. 135, asked by General Grunert:

Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying wolf, wolf," so that they became confused, or "fed up"?

General MILES. That could have been, sir.

Admiral WILKINSON. I could not say as to the Army, sir. I do not think that situation arose in the Navy. I think the Chief of Operations Office was careful not to send too many for that reason.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, taking the alert in the summer of 1940 and the other alerts along in the winter of [5062] 1941, even in the summer of 1941, up to the 27th of August, 1941, they did not constitute a sufficient number of alerts as to create the "wolf" sign in the minds of the commanders in the field, so that they would abandon or disregard them as just one more repetition of something which had already happened?

Admiral WILKINSON. Not in the Navy, sir. I do not think so, sir. I cannot speak for the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Mr. GESELL. There are two small points that ought to be clarified, Mr. Chairman. It will just take a second.

Admiral, I understand you to state the code designation did not appear on the Japanese intercepted messages. That was an error. The code designation did appear on the top under the name of the sender and addressee.

Admiral WILKINSON. Speaking of what message?

Mr. GESELL. Of the intercepted messages appearing in exhibits 1 and 2 here, these diplomatic and other messages. They do not appear on our copies of the exhibit because, as we advised the committee, we had stricken them off.

Admiral WILKINSON. That is what I was referring to.

Mr. GESELL. That may have misled you?

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. I think the evidence is and the record ought [5063] to show that those code designations did appear.

Admiral WILKINSON. On the original draft, yes.

Mr. GESELL. Also I think we neglected to ask you whether or not your December 1 summary was sent to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral WILKINSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee thanks you, Admiral, for your co-operation in eliciting the facts in this inquiry. We appreciate your forthright replies to all questions asked.

Admiral WILKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committee for the courtesy they have shown me.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness, Counsel?

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Turner.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be excused, Admiral Wilkinson.

Admiral WILKINSON. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Turner.

[5064] **TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER,
UNITED STATES NAVY**

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state your present rank, Admiral, and station?

Admiral TURNER. My rank is Admiral. My name is Richmond Kelly Turner.

[5065] Mr. MITCHELL. You were Chief of the War Plans Section in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations at one time, were you not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, from October 24, 1940, until June 13, 1942.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state briefly what your service has been since you left that post?

Admiral TURNER. I left Washington on June 13, 1942; proceeded to the west coast; had 10 days' leave; went to the South Pacific by air; took command of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific, later the Third Amphibious Force; landed troops at Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, and then continued in command of the operations at Guadalcanal for several months, taking troops and supplies back and forth.

In February of 1943, after Guadalcanal had been secured, we engaged in the occupation of the Russells Islands as a preparatory move for the capture of New Georgia.

On June 30 of 1943, we made the landings at Rendova, and other parts of New Georgia Islands.

On June 15, I was relieved by Rear Admiral Wilkinson. I proceeded to the Central Pacific on August 24, 1943, assumed command of the Fifth Amphibious Force, which was a new force.

We then engaged in the capture of the Gilbert Islands [5066] in November, and in the Marshalls in February of 1944.

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In about the end of March I was promoted to Vice Admiral, and about that same time was given command of the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, which then comprised only the Fifth Amphibious Force.

In the late spring the Third Amphibious Force was added to the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.

In June we began the capture of the Marianas Islands, and after that I returned to Pearl Harbor and turned over all my ships to the commanders of the Third and Seventh Amphibious Forces, which were in the Southwest Pacific under Admiral Kincaid, who was under General MacArthur's command.

In February of 1945, we made the capture of Iwo Jima, and the 1st of April 1945 began the campaign against Okinawa, and I remained at Okinawa for about 7 weeks and then went to Guam and the Philippines to prepare for the Kyushu invasion.

At that time, the Seventh Amphibious Force was made available for use in the invasion.

I was relieved as the Fifth Amphibious Force commander, which I held in addition to the office of commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, by Vice Admiral Hill, in May, and then on August 15, the Seventh Amphibious Force was added to the [5067] Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, as an administrative organization, which then comprised the Third, Fifth and Seventh Amphibious Forces.

I organized the movement of ships and troops into Japan for the occupation, and on November 14 of this year, I was relieved and came to shore duty. I was promoted to Admiral on May 14, of 1945.

My present duty, to which I have just been assigned, is the representative of the Chief of Naval Operations on the military staff committee of the United Nations Organization.

Mr. MITCHELL. When do you have to leave for that job?

Admiral TURNER. About the 29th or 30th of this month.

Mr. MITCHELL. If you are finished here?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will you state, Admiral, what were the functions of the War Plans Division, and War Plans Director in 1941 when you were there?

Admiral TURNER. May I quote from the pamphlet which I turned in to the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. I offer in the record at this time, and ask to have it transcribed in the daily transcript, as Exhibit 88, those sections in the document heretofore described as "Organization of the Office of Chief of Naval [5068] Operations, October 23, 1940," which relates to the War Plans Division. The committee has already had as exhibit 82 those sections that prescribed the duties of the Intelligence Division.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be ordered printed as part of the transcript. That is Exhibit 88.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 88.")

Admiral TURNER (Reading):

WAR PLANS DIVISION (OP 12)

12-1. DUTIES:

(a) *Policies and Projects Section:*

- (1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans.

(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems.

(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects affecting national defense.

(4) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(5) Action in advisory capacity in current [5069] administrative matters referred to the War Plans Division.

(b) *Plans Section:*

(1) Direction of war planning.

(2) Preparation of designated war plans.

(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans.

(4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic War Plans.

(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting national defense.

12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board (General Order No. 7).

12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees:

Joint Board.

Joint Planning Committee.

Joint Aeronautical Board.

Joint Air Advisory Committee.

Shore Station Development Board.

12-4. The War Plans Division is non-administrative.

(OP 12)

[5070] Also in addition to that, shortly after this order was issued, we established section (c), which was the Pan American Defense Section.

That section had liaison with the military personnel of the other American countries except Canada, and with other agencies of the Government, and War Department, who were interested in the war-making powers and plans of Pan America.

Also in addition to that, and at just about this time, the War Plans Division had membership with two members in the Joint United States-Canadian Defense Committee, which had been established by the President, I think, in July of 1940.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, there is one phase of your work that especially interests me, and that is to try and find the line of demarcation between the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Office of War Plans, on the subject of evaluating intelligence information and disseminating it to the field commanders.

Maybe I can approach the thing better by saying we have gone into that subject with the Army, the General Staff, and the impression we have is that General Gerow, head of War Plans, who was your apparent opposite in the Army, War Department, did not issue and was not called upon to issue messages or directions to field commanders unless [5071] they involved some operations.

If it was a mere question of dissemination and evaluation of information about enemy affairs that did not require any operational order or directive, then it was a G-2 function to do that.

Was the situation in the Navy precisely parallel to that, in the Navy Department?

Admiral TURNER. So far as war plans were concerned, I think that both the War Department and Navy Department War Plans Division actually operated in exactly the same way. I have heard General Gerow's testimony, and if you will recall, he said it was his business to issue major evaluations of strategic situations. Those were not his exact words.

It was his business to keep the responsible commanders in the field informed as to prospective operations.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean enemy operations or our operations?

Admiral TURNER. Both. That was exactly the same as we had in the War Plans Division. The only difference in practice that I know of is that in the Army, the MID, the G-2, makes the enemy estimate of the situation, which is an over-all estimate of capabilities and probable actions, and keeps that current. In the Navy that is the function of the War Plans Division, to make and keep current the estimate as to the enemy, as well as to our own probable future actions.

[5072] I have heard the testimony here in regard to this subject and I will say now that there was no change ever at any time to my knowledge made in the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence as set down in the pamphlet. There was an interpretation made before, I think it was during the first part of Captain James' tenure of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

I conceived it to be the duty of War Plans to be consulted on and to have major advice on the general and major strategic situation of the country and of all other countries.

About that time estimates as to probable actions by foreign powers then at war or not at war started to go in from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations not routed by me and giving estimates as to what was going to happen. I was shown some of these by the Chief of Naval Operations and I disagreed with them very much.

So that I talked to Captain James and I later talked to then Captain Kirk on this subject and said that when they prepared any evaluations as to strategic matters to send to the Chief of Naval Operations I would like to have them consult me in advance or if not convenient at least they should be routed by my office so that I could make a comment on them because that was my function, to give major strategic advice.

[5073] We had in our Division officers who were experienced in matters of that character and more experienced than the officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, who, generally, were more junior, and were trained rather for the collection and dissemination of information, rather than its application to a strategic situation.

Now, there apparently became a misunderstanding of that situation, through, probably, the use of the word "evaluation." There are several kinds of evaluation of information. One is as to its authenticity, its probability, its probable effect on the future in general terms, the trends which it may indicate. That evaluation was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence and is perfectly properly assigned.

If you will look at the letter—I don't know whether it has been introduced in evidence or not—of December 12, 1940, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Intelligence, which was prepared by myself, directing that the fortnightly bulletins with fresh information be issued, you will find in there nothing that differs in the slightest degree from the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence as laid down in the rules.

Frequently they would put in their estimates as to what the meaning of certain types of movements or certain actions by political or

military members of foreign governments mean. [5074] They would put in that and it was perfectly proper.

My function was to give the major strategic over-all picture for the use of my superiors and disseminate that. I had no responsibility whatsoever for disseminating information as such and never did at any time, although from time to time I would suggest that the Office of Naval Intelligence should put out certain types of information. But I never initiated anything of that sort. It was not within my function.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, please refer now to this document marked "Exhibit 88," covering the functions and duties of the War Plans Division, and point out any provision in it which calls upon the War Plans Division to get out these over-all strategic estimates of the situation.

Which one is it that you say covers that?

Admiral TURNER. Under the "Plans Section." "Direction of War Planning."

Mr. MITCHELL. "Direction of War Planning"?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct. The War Planning is a very widespread and complicated matter. One of the important parts of any plan, major operating plan, or a basic plan, is the strategic estimate that goes along with it and forms a part of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, of course, these strategic estimates weren't always related to the War Plans, were they? That is, [5075] you weren't limiting your strategic estimates to cases where you were developing a war plan. Didn't you make those regularly whether your plans were settled or not?

Admiral TURNER. We kept running estimates. We made a basic national policy estimate shortly after I came in the Division which supplanted a long estimate that had been used in the preparation of the Rainbow war plans and from time to time memoranda, letters, and so forth, memoranda, were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, letters were sent to the Secretary and to the commanders in chief, in development, and so on, of that plan.

Our basic plans were founded on those estimates. They were part of it. You had to make the estimate in order to make the plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, of course, if you had your plans, basic plans made, and then from day to day you were watching the situation around the world and making estimates of the probable operations and strategic intentions of possible enemy nations, you weren't doing that with a view to changing the plan, were you?

Admiral TURNER. If necessary, to keep the plan alive. We tried to have a realistic plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am talking more about the question of getting information out to the field commander. You wouldn't [5076] have to send them to the field commanders to use those estimates for the basic information, your office, War Plans?

Admiral TURNER. I sent no information to any field commander at any time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am anticipating a little bit, but we are getting down to a specific case here, where on November 27, 1941, what was called a war warning was sent out to the commander of the Pacific

Fleet at Hawaii which warned him that diplomatic relations had been broken, or words to that effect, that a hostile attack might be expected by the Japanese in any direction at any time, and so on.

Now, was it your function to have any part in the drafting of this kind of a document?

Admiral TURNER. I drew that document up. That was my conception and the conception of the Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant Chief, that that was exactly the type of thing the War Plans was responsible for preparing.

[5077] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, didn't that include information about—

Admiral TURNER. Only in connection with the change in the strategic situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did that warning contain any kind of a directive for action?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was that?

Admiral TURNER. That was putting into effect preparatory measures for the Rainbow-5 War Plan which was then extant.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, we have in that message first a warning that this is a war warning, second a statement of the information on the diplomatic situation, negotiations with Japan have ceased, another warning that a strategic estimate may be that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next 3 days, and finally an order to do something, to wit, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out of the task assigned in WPL-46. There was all sorts of things in there, wasn't there?

Admiral TURNER. That is a preparatory order with necessary parts showing reasons for the officers addressed to get ready to execute WPL-46 from a defensive situation.

[5078] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, was it because that message of that date contained an order or directive to take appropriate defensive action that you came into it?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. I would have come into it in sending out an over-all picture of the strategic situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, turning to the part of this Naval regulation which has been labeled "Exhibit 82," which deals with the Intelligence Division, it says:

Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces, evaluate the information collected, and disseminate it as advisable.

Now, will you explain to us just what you understand that required of the Intelligence Division?

Didn't it require everything that you had in your message of the 27th except the order to take appropriate defensive deployment?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I think not. This says "Secure all classes of pertinent information." It does not say to prepare a strategic estimate of the situation, and to give a strategic estimate to the forces in the field. It [5079] says "from pertinent information of all foreign countries," and that comes in from time to time.

One of the usual ways of distributing such information was through the fortnightly summary and to evaluate the matter with respect to

what effect that information has on future intentions. Those are minor matters. If at any time the Office of Naval Intelligence wanted to send out a long estimate, as a matter of fact which they did in a Russian section of the fortnightly bulletin late in 1941, why, that is perfectly all right for them to do that, provided it goes by the War Plans Division so that the Chief of Naval Operations can be given ultimate advice from the War Plans Division as to the strategic situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then your idea, as I hope I understand it, is that there were certain things the Intelligence Branch was supposed to do, but that you felt that owing to your broader field of operation, and the chance that your strategic estimates and theirs might conflict, you brought about an arrangement by which the Intelligence estimates on their way to the Chief of Naval Operations passed through your office, so that you could make your comment and they wouldn't be confused; is that it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. But, there really was a duplication of [5580] function there in a way, was there not?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me ask you this question:

a. 1. says:

Intelligence Branch. Secure all classes of pertinent information with particular attention to the strength, disposition, and probable intention of foreign naval forces.

Do you mean that they were to get the information that might bear on the probable intentions, but not state what the intention was, is that it?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. They could do exactly as that is there, if it referred to a major situation, but an over-all picture, then it had to go through War Plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why wasn't there an over-lap then? I don't understand. They could do it, but merely had to route it through you? Why wouldn't there be both functions performed by both of these divisions with a check-up through your Division?

Admiral TURNER. The War Plans Division collected no information whatsoever. We had no agent. We were not an administrative organization. We depended on the Office of Naval Intelligence and through them on the Military Intelligence Department of the Army for all of the information that we got with one or two exceptions.

[5081] For example, we got information as to diplomatic activities through Captain Schuirmann of the Central Division. We got information as to the future activities of the British, the United Kingdom, through the British Admiralty delegation which was set up here during the spring of 1941.

We got information as to Canadian activities, and plans directly from the naval attaché, or through the naval attaché at Ottawa.

We got a great deal of information from the newspapers.

That all went into our thinking. But the collection of the information and its effect, general effect, of any particular kind of information was up to ONI.

[5082] Mr. MITCHELL. Was up to what?

Admiral TURNER. Office of Naval Intelligence. It was not their function, and I see nothing in there to show it, to maintain a general estimate of the situation. That was up to War Plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. When it says in subdivision 2, after saying the Intelligence Division is to collect information relating to the strength, disposition, and probable intention of the foreign naval forces, in the next sentence when it says "evaluate the information collected," that is evaluate it, the information, as to the strength, disposition, and probable intentions of foreign nations, and disseminate as advisable, do you feel that that does not place upon them any share of the responsibility or duty of making any evaluation available to Intelligence and dissemination of it, which gives anybody in the field any idea of the probable intentions of the possible enemy forces?

Admiral TURNER. If their evaluation affects the general situation or affects our view as to the general situation then before they put it out it was customary, and nearly always done, that it was cleared through War Plans. If we objected, why, we would come to an agreement.

Now, they would send their information out weekly or periodically, or something of that sort, and they would collect [5083] certain information, certain classes of information, and as to this class, this one little pigeonhole that they would collect, why, they would give their estimate of what the effect of that particular thing had on the general situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have arrived at the hour of adjournment. Do you think you could confer with Admiral Wilkinson over the evening and possibly prepare for the committee a very condensed and short statement of the relative functions that you two would agree on under this order?

Admiral TURNER. I can't give anything more, Mr. Counsel, than we have here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I am pinning myself right down on some written document and wondering what the words mean. A lawyer would construe them to mean something. I haven't a clear idea. But if you can't do that, all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Think it over, Admiral, and see if you can give more specific answers to the questions.

We will suspend until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The committee and counsel will remain for a brief session.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 10 a. m., Thursday, December 20, 1945.)

[5084]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[5085] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. The admiral has some minor corrections in the transcript that he would like to suggest.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. On page 5067, line 5, the date "November 14" should be "October 14."

On page 5080, line 12, the word "but" at the end of the line should be changed to "that is," and the word "but" inserted previously in the same line before the phrase beginning "if it."

Page 5065, the fourth line from the bottom, insert the word "and" before the words "on August 24, 1943."

Page 5083, about the middle of the page, Admiral Wilkinson is shown as being the witness and that should be changed to Admiral Turner.

That is all.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Turner, I think my questions last night about the respective duties of ONI and War Plans Division were couched in general terms. Possibly if I make some, present some specific examples of messages that were sent, we could get a more definite idea of the relations between the two Divisions.

[5086] So I will call your attention first to the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and others, found on page 32 of Exhibit 37,

Exhibit 37 is the basic exhibit of the Navy dispatches to and from Honolulu.

That message says:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful period This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility period Chief of staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior army officers their areas period Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action period Guam will be informed separately period

Now, the record shows that the authorization for the sending of that dispatch was signed by Admiral Ingersoll. Would that be a dispatch that you had a part in preparing or the duty of getting ready or having to do with?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I prepared that dispatch and after some changes by the Chief of Naval Operations and by the War Plans Division of the War Department that was sent [5087] in that form. It relates to the over-all picture of the situation vis-à-vis Japan which might lead to war and thus invoke our war plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that message did not contain any directive or or order for action, did it?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So that the War Plans Division had a broader function in participating in the preparation and sending of messages to the fleets involving directions as to operations?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. It had to do with the presentation of advice as to the over-all picture of the international situation which might result in war for the United States. And that was my conception of the function of the War Plans Division. That is, to advise the Chief of Naval Operations on matters of that character.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your function was not to send dispatches direct over your own signature but to take the matter up with the Chief of Naval Operations, make your recommendations and suggest a form of dispatch you ought to send; is that the way it worked?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct. We practically never sent a dispatch from War Plans without it having been released either by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief. [5088] I believe on only about one occasion did I release a dispatch and that was after talking over the telephone to Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. MITCHELL. These dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations to the fleets, none of them seem to bear any signature. That is, we have a record of the officer who authorized the release or sending of the message. In this particular case it was Admiral Ingersoll. When these messages reached the addressees did they bear the signature of the officer who had authorized them, or were they generally messages from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral TURNER. Almost invariably the naval practice is to send the dispatch from the official and not the person. We never mention the name of the sender unless there is some special reason, such as a somewhat personal dispatch from one person to another. That differs from the War Department practice.

[5089] Mr. MITCHELL. The War Department record shows that some of these dispatches to Honolulu were signed by Marshall, others

by the Adjutant General and some by General Miles, and so on. That was not your custom in the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. Almost invariably we merely put it as the official, originating from the official.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is, when the various persons to whom these naval dispatches were addressed—those in Exhibit 37—received their dispatches there were no person's signatures on them and they came with the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, that was the situation?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, let us pass on to the warning message of November 27 on page 36 of Exhibit 37; that is the message that reads:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning;

and among other things it directed that the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

There we have a warning, plus information, plus a directive. Now, what part did you take in preparing that message?

Admiral TURNER. I prepared that message and submitted it in the same manner as the other to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General [5090] Gerow of the War Plans Division of the War Department. That message had some changes made in it and this was the final draft as approved. That was also released by Admiral Ingersoll, but Admiral Stark had approved it himself.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is another one on December 3, page 40 of Exhibit 37, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in chief Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District at Honolulu and commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District.

That message appears to have been—the sending of it appears to have been authorized by Admiral Wilkinson, initialed by Ingersoll, and that is the one that says that:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Now, that was not an over-all picture, was it?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it did not require any action, that is, any directive for a movement of the fleet, did it?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; and it did not change the over-[5091] all picture. That was initiated by 16-F-2 in Admiral Wilkinson's division and was shown to me and was released—initialed, that is, by Admiral Ingersoll before sending. It was pure information.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was not the type of message that under the arrangements between the War Plans Division and the ONI was your function to prepare?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is one of the things that passed through your hands so there wouldn't be any conflict, is that the idea?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I call your attention next to the subject where a message was not sent. Those were the messages that have been referred to as target area messages in Pearl Harbor in exhibit 2, commencing on page 12 and extending up through page 14, a series of Japanese intercepts, Japanese messages from Tokyo to Honolulu and so on which were intercepted by our agencies and decoded and translated a considerable time before the Pearl Harbor attack.

I am not asking you to express any opinion as to whether that information ought to have been sent at all, but I am just assuming for the sake of argument that those messages were significant and if properly evaluated would have pointed [5092] to the fact that the Japs were doing more than just getting ship movements; they were getting up some kind of a bombing pattern for pin-pointed dive bombing in Pearl Harbor.

Let us assume that for the sake of argument, and let us also assume that if they had been evaluated in that way, the information should have been sent to Honolulu.

Now, whose business would it have been under the system between ONI and the War Plans Division at that time to bring that message and its evaluation to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations and suggest a dispatch to the fleet at Honolulu? Whose function would that have been? Do I make myself clear there?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I conceive that to be the duty and function of the Office of Naval Intelligence. As a matter of fact, I have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch of the 24th of September until I returned here recently and saw the dispatch in this book. I would never have initiated a dispatch on that subject. However, our relations with ONI and the other divisions were close, and if I had seen that dispatch I surmise that I would have talked it over or brought it specifically to the attention of Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know why I did not see that. I believe that I would have remembered it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, do you not think that this message [5093] of the 24th of September on page 12 of this book did change the overall picture that we had up at that time, to wit, that there was no definite information of any particular animosity toward Pearl Harbor and this changed the picture—I assume it did—in that aspect, at least, does it not?

Admiral TURNER. I think it changed it sufficiently so that if I had seen it I would have taken it up with Admiral Wilkinson or possibly talked it over with Admiral Ingersoll, but I would not have initiated any dispatch on that subject myself.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, as a matter of principle, what would have been the difference between that dispatch and the dispatch about destroying codes of December 3, the destruction of the codes?

Admiral TURNER. There is no difference in principle between the two dispatches in my opinion.

Mr. MITCHELL. While we are on the subject I will continue with what I was doing on that.

Now the diplomatic intercepts in exhibit 1—there is a whole series of them and I will try and sum up the situation there.

There was a dispatch intercepted from the Japs to their Ambassadors here giving a proposal on November 20, 1941, to our Government, which we received, the gist of which was that [5094] the Japs demanded that we cease our aid—in substance, cease our aid to China, stop our embargoes, the freezing of assets and other economic sanctions, furnish oil to Japan which she would be free to use against China or anybody else, and the record also shows dispatches to their Ambassadors here to the effect that they must by, originally, the 25th of November, and finally on a deadline of November 29, obtain from the United States an affirmative agreement agreeing to these things, and that the British and the Dutch would have to sign also on the dotted line; and that if we did not affirmatively agree to her proposals, the abandonment of China and the furnishing of war materials to Japan, by that date, something was going to automatically happen. And there was a further statement in some of those dispatches that the Ambassadors here were not to allow us to prolong this thing or put them off.

Now, if I have correctly stated the summary of that situation, and I am assuming that it would have been desirable for any reason to send that information to the commander of the fleet at Honolulu, whose function would it have been to frame a message giving the story of that situation and have it sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral TURNER. Those dispatches considered by themselves were informatory but all of them entered into the back? [5095] ground from which was derived the reasons for sending the dispatches, first of November 24 and then of November 27. In other words, the detailed information, if it had been desirable to have acquainted the commander in chief with those dispatches, would have been the function of Office of Naval Intelligence. The effect on the international situation, which was very large, would have been treated by the War Plans Division.

I would like to add that it was my belief at that time, and it was Admiral Stark's belief, that all of these major diplomatic messages, at least in the Pacific, were being decrypted by both Admiral Hart and by Admiral Kimmel, and I did not know that Admiral Kimmel did not hold the code for those dispatches until I was so informed at the time of the Navy court of inquiry on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, your answer to my specific question would be that the situation exposed by those diplomatic intercepts I referred to did have a broad effect on the strategic situation, and were a subject which the War Plans Division had a responsibility for, and you supplemented that with the statement here that all of the messages which had been sent on November 24 and November 27, represented your evaluation of that information, and was sufficient, as I understand?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

[5096] Mr. MITCHELL. Now we are getting a little bit into the question of having seen these and who delivered them, and so on, and I have been trying to avoid that for the present and stick to our ques-

tion of respective duties between the two divisions. I only have one other question to ask along this line and that is this:

On the 6th and the 7th of December 1941, there came in this 14 parts message and the 1 p. m. message, and I think the record shows now that the 13 parts of the message were decoded on the evening of the 6th and that the fourteenth part definitely breaking off negotiations and the 1 p. m. message which followed it, which set the delivery at 1 p. m., Sunday, came in on Sunday morning.

Now, information of that kind, coming in suddenly and properly evaluated as General Marshall evaluated it, suggesting that there might be a serious significance to the 1 p. m. delivery, whose business was it in the Navy Department, in the Chief of Naval Operations set-up, to get ahold of that message and see that the information about it was dispatched immediately to the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral TURNER. I believe that was the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence. My recollection of the delivery of the 13 parts and of the fourteenth part is not entirely clear, but if you wish I will tell you the story of it.

[5097] Mr. MITCHELL. No; I will go into that shortly.

Admiral TURNER. All right, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I just assumed that the message came in in that way, and my question is whose responsibility was it to act on it by giving the information to the fleet? Whose responsibility was it to bring it to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations, and see that a message was sent promptly to Honolulu?

Admiral TURNER. I believe it was the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, when I saw the 13 parts, which I believe was about 11:30 on the night of December 6, I inquired from the officer who showed it to me and brought it to my house as to who had seen that dispatch, and he informed me that Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll and Secretary Knox had all seen it before it had been shown to me. I considered the dispatch very important, but as long as those officers had seen it, I did not believe it was my function to take any action.

The question of the 1 p. m. delivery, I saw that dispatch in Admiral Stark's office about noon, recognized its very great importance, and asked him if anything had been done about it. He told me that General Marshall was sending a dispatch, and I did nothing further about it because I considered that would cover the situation.

[5098] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, in defining that message—those messages—as something that the Office of Naval Intelligence and not the War Plans Division had any responsibility for, where do you draw the distinction between that type of message and the one about these diplomatic messages, and the dead line that we talked about, which you do think came under the jurisdiction of the War Plans Division, as affecting the overall situation or changing it in some way. How do you draw a distinction between the two types in assigning responsibility back and forth between the ONI and the War Plans?

[5099] Admiral TURNER. I did not consider that that message and the fact that it appeared to be an ultimatum changed the over-all situation in the least degree, because I was certain in my mind that there was going to be war immediately between the United States and

Japan, and this was merely confirmatory. The full orders, and what I felt was the full picture of the situation had been given to the fleet commanders in the dispatch of November 27, and confirmed definitely by the later dispatches regarding the destruction of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders for our people to destroy codes in exposed positions.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, of course, the question as to whose responsibility it was would not have any connection with your judgment as to whether or not that responsibility had been discharged. I am not asking about that. Your judgment was that whoseever responsibility it was, it was sufficiently taken care of.

Don't you think, Admiral, that the relations between the ONI and War Plans Division, as to the over-all picture and whose responsibility it was, was in a very fuzzy condition at that time?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I do not. I think the line among staff officers—and that applies to all staff officers—can never be exactly drawn for every particular [5100] and every detail. So long as they have proper relationships with each other and keep each other informed as to matters near the dividing line, which we did, I believe that the instructions were adequate.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you not think that this interpretation of the Intelligence Division rules that we have been told about, without any formal change in the literal terms of the order, was something more than a change in interpretation? Don't you think it was really contrary to the expressed provisions of the orders prescribing the duties of the Intelligence Division?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I have a statement here, Mr. Chairman, presented by Admiral Wilkinson, which he has asked me to have put in the record, and I will do that, and then I will ask the Admiral to present any further ideas that he has on this picture.

Admiral Wilkinson presents this letter. He says:

In view of the apparent variance in the testimony of Admiral Turner and my testimony with respect to the responsibility for the development of enemy intentions, and the supplying to the staff of information bearing upon and relating to fleet operations, I respectfully suggest, if the committee pleases, the enclosed papers be [5101] read into the record. These papers comprise memoranda from my predecessor, Vice Admiral Kirk, regarding his instructions from Admiral Stark, and two dispatches containing inquiry on this subject from me to Rear Admiral Janes, now in the Mediterranean, and his reply.

Very respectfully.

T. S. WILKINSON, *Vice Admiral.*

The first thing he presents is a memorandum from Vice Admiral Kirk. I suppose Admiral Kirk can be called directly, but I think there is no impropriety in reading this statement into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL (reading):

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 19 December 1945.

Memorandum for Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

1. Confirming my statement to you upon turning over the duties of Director of Naval Intelligence in October 1941, the following represents the gist of the oral decision of the Chief of Naval Operations as to the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding interpreting and evaluating information concerning intent of possible hostile [5102] nations.

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2. On April 1941, following a discussion in the office of Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, with the Director of War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself, the three of us entered the office of Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, where the points at issue were reviewed.

3. It was maintained by me that the Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for interpreting possible enemy intentions after evaluating information received from whatever source. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence was comparable to G-2 in the War Department General Staff in these respects, and should likewise prepare that section of the formal Estimate known as "Enemy Intentions".

4. This position was contested by Rear Admiral Turner who maintained that the War Plans Division should prepare such section of the Estimate, and should interpret and evaluate all information concerning possible hostile nations from whatever source received. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence was solely a collection agency and a distributing agency, and was not charged with sending out any information which would initiate any operations on the part of the fleet, or fleets, anywhere.

5. Admiral Stark then approved the position taken by [5103] Rear Admiral Turner.

6. I abided thereby and so advised my principal chiefs and subsequently yourself.

A. G. Kirk,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT CNO

Naval Message
From: COMNAVNAW
Date: 5 Dec. 45
TOR Code Room: 1050
Decoded by: Carroll
Typed by: Curtis
Routed by: Thompson
041134
From Admiral James

NCR 3435.

Refers CNO 031500. Believe information regarding written instructions in error but probably based on following facts. Director War Plans Admiral Turner came to my office and requested that ONI make no estimate of prospective enemy intentions for CNO but furnish information to War Plans who would make the required estimates. Turner was informed that existing printed organization instructions of CNO required Intelligence to make these estimates. McCullum can verify and perhaps elaborate. No written or other instructions [5104] of which I have knowledge were issued.

Change action to OP10... Add: OP10... 20-9C... (Per 2-9C 171432) BUPERS... Act.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Naval Message.
From: DCNO.
Released by: L. E. Denfeld:
Date 3 Dec. 45. COMNAVNAW
TOR Code Room: 1632.
Typed by: Polindexter/Grusky.
Routed by Thomsen
031500
For Admiral James.

NCR 7368

"Question arising Pearl Harbor investigation regarding written instructions given ONI early 1941 by CNO not to disseminate any estimates of enemy or prospective enemy intentions. These instructions although recalled by officers of ONI cannot be located. Do you remember incident and can you suggest location of the order or memorandum. Would appreciate your recollection. Request reply care Bupers. Wilkinson."

ADD: 2019C... (PER 20-9C 171432)
ADD BUPERS... (PER BUPERS SVC NO 63)
OP10... ORIG.

[5105] Now, Admiral, did you have a summary of the situation as you saw it, that you wanted to present?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; if I may be permitted to read this memorandum.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; you may read that.

Admiral TURNER. My principal point is that I did not consider the oral instructions of the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Intelligence on this subject to be a change in existing orders, but merely an interpretation of them.

The interpretation was that the War Plans Division was responsible for advising the Chief of Naval Operations and preparing papers for dissemination regarding the over-all international situation, which might involve the United States in war, and thus bring the war plans into effect.

It was, of course, essential that communications from the Chief of Naval Operations to the fleets be consistent as regards predictions as to the future involvement of the United States in war, and therefore that estimates which might be prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence should be cleared through the War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, will you please explain to us what the system was in the Navy Department for delivery to you, or your office by the agency in the Communications [5106] Division, which I understand was charged with the matter of decoding and translating these Jap messages, delivery to you of copies of those messages? How would that work in your case?

Admiral TURNER. The Communications Division delivered copies to the Office of Naval Intelligence. When I first came to the War Plans Division, daily an officer of the Office of Naval Intelligence brought a folder to me, and waited until I had read the various dispatches. As these dispatches increased in number, sometime in the spring, approximately, of 1941, the system was changed, and a daily file of dispatches was delivered to me in a locked pouch.

I would then open that pouch and read the dispatches sometime during the day, and on the following day that pouch would be exchanged for another with that day's dispatches.

In this one folder were Japanese intercepts and intercepts from other countries of all character.

It was customary for the Office of Naval Intelligence to put a paper clip on the dispatches which they considered of importance, because there were many dispatches circularized which had very minor importance. I would always read the ones with the paper clips, and usually would glance through those without paper clips and read those which a glance showed [5107] to be of interest.

Mr. MITCHELL. In your absence from your office, or being out of the city, who would accept delivery of those documents and make the examination?

Admiral TURNER. The senior officer remaining in the War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. You said that you do not remember ever seeing those intercepts on pages 12 to 15 of exhibit 2, what we call the target planning division of Pearl Harbor into areas and location of vessels in each section.

Admiral TURNER. I said I did not see the dispatch on page 12. I saw many dispatches concerning the location of ships in Pearl Harbor, and on the movement of the United States war vessels in and out of other ports.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the one on page 12 says:

To divide the waters of the harbor up into areas A, B, C, D, and E, for the purpose of describing the location of vessels.

On page 13 is another message from Honolulu to Washington that sets up a code system for describing each one of these areas. Then there is one on page 14, which was translated very late, it is true, translated December 6, which speaks of areas in the harbor there.

Do I understand you mean it was only the one on page [5108] 12 that you failed to see and that you did see the others?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I do not remember these specific dispatches as to locations of ships. There were a good many of them. I saw many of them. I definitely fail to remember the dispatch on page 12.

Mr. MITCHELL. Might not your failure to remember be due to the fact that under the circumstances under which you examined it, it did not make any definite impression on you as being important? Would not that make you fail to remember?

Is your recollection affirmative that you did not see it, or are you just in a state of mind that you cannot recollect whether you did or not? That is what I am after.

Admiral TURNER. It is rather in between. I definitely do not remember seeing it. I think that if I had seen it I would have remembered it, but that is pure surmise.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

Do you remember having any discussion with Admiral Wilkinson or any other officer, respecting any significance to be attached to this message, and this series of messages about the division of Pearl Harbor into areas?

Admiral TURNER. I do not remember ever hearing that discussed.

Mr. MITCHELL. Am I right in thinking that Admiral [5109] Wilkinson has testified that according to his recollection he did notice such a thing, and had some discussion with you about it. Do you remember his testimony to that effect?

Admiral TURNER. I did not hear that. But I have no recollection of such conversation.

Mr. MITCHELL. To change the subject, Admiral, I want to go back to this series of joint war plans: One, the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore; another, the British-American conversations, called ABC-1 and ABC-2, and the joint Canadian-United States conversations on basic defense plan No. 2.

In order to make it clear just what I am after, I will say what I am interested in is to find out, if I can, from these documents or any other evidence, whether or not anybody representing the United States, from the President down, made any commitment, or promise, to the British or the Dutch to join in a war against Japan before Japan attacked us, and without prior authority from the Congress. That is what I want to know. I am not interested in the plans in any other respect.

[5110] Now you had something to do with all these plans, did you not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let us take up first the American-Dutch-British conversations. I call your attention to a document dated December 12, 1940, signed by H. R. Stark, directed to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, entitled "Instructions Concerning the Preparation of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan Rainbow 3."

Would you look at that document?

Admiral TURNER. What was the question?

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that document?

Admiral TURNER. I prepared it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you read it into the record? It does contain the instructions that were sent out to the United States representatives who were planning to take part in that British-Dutch-American conversation at Singapore, is that not true?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Please read it into the record.

Admiral TURNER (reading):

Secret. OP-12-Dy

(SC) A16 (R-3)

December 12, 1940.

[5111] From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. 8941.

Subject: Instructions Concerning the Preparation of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan "Rainbow 3."

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet is informed that a plan designed for governing naval operations in case of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy, and entitled "RAINBOW 3" has been prepared. Two copies of this plan are forwarded to you by special officer messenger. While it is not to be considered as the policy of the United States Government to become involved in war under this plan, such a war appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are requested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation of your operating plans, and also to the preparation of your vessels, aircraft, and personnel.

2. The officer messenger carrying this plan, Commander J. L. McCrea, U. S. N., is authorized to remain in the Manila area for about nine days. He is prepared to present you the general views of the Chief of Naval Operations as to various political and strategic matters which have influenced the preparation of "RAINBOW 3." You are requested to make a study of the plan and to forward to the Department via Commander McCrea recommendations and suggestions for changes which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be [5112] stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under the existing situation, to effect material changes in the Assumptions of the plan.

3. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would be fought with the United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in London and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating plan and command arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations would appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region. It is believed that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British. There is a considerable doubt as to the extent of the conversations which may become possible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan.

4. You are, therefore, authorized to conduct staff conversations with the British and Dutch Supreme Commanders, with the specific understanding that you are in no way committing the United States Government to any particular political or military decisions, and that the purpose of the staff conversations is solely to facilitate joint operations should war eventuate under the approximate conditions shown in the Assumptions of "Rainbow 3." It is requested that these

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[5113] conversations be conducted in secret; in particular the most extreme care should be taken not to permit the Japanese to become aware of your attempt to establish contact with the Dutch.

5. You will note that "RAINBOW 3" will require agreement between the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and U. S. Fleet, concerning the routing and protection en route of the Asiatic Fleet Reinforcement. It might be necessary for the Reinforcement to join you via the south of Australia, but this will depend upon the situation at the time.

6. Questions as to special personnel or material which should go forward to you via the Asiatic Fleet Reinforcement should be settled by direct arrangements between you and the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. These arrangements should include all questions concerning the cargoes of the two XAF and two XAK which it is proposed to send you from the East Coast via the south of Africa.

7. All matters concerning the logistic supply of your forces should be decided by you, with the understanding that, so far as possible, only personnel and technical materials would be supplied from the United States.

8. It is requested that you take advantage of the presence of Commander McCrea to inform him as to your views concerning various pending matters, and particularly those [5114] which require the assistance of the Navy Department in solving the problems which you foresee may arise in war. Specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations desires further light on matters connected with the following:

(a) Your recommendation concerning a further reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet during peace, due consideration being given to political reactions and to the present capability of existing facilities to care for reinforcements.

(b) It is proposed to send you, probably, in February, four "Bird" class minesweepers fitted for both ordinary and magnetic sweeping, and fitted to lay contact mines. Advise as to whether or not these minesweepers should be sent.

(c) Are additional patrol seaplane squadrons desirable, and can they be supported with present facilities?

(d) It is possible the next reinforcement after the 'Bird' minesweepers may be four 1,200 ton destroyers converted to high speed minesweepers fitted for both kinds of minesweeping. Would these ships be desirable?

(e) In view of the fact that the *Crete Macrsk* cannot be purchased or chartered, what is the present situation as regards the support of your submarines? Can six more (or a total of 23) submarines be supported if a cargo ship with spares and supplies is sent from the United States to the Asiatic to augment the *Canopus*?

[5115] (f) Advise concerning sending motor torpedo boats to the Philippines.

(g) There are now in store in San Francisco portable facilities and equipment for establishing advance bases for patrol seaplanes. These facilities are made up in sets capable of supporting either two or four squadrons each. Would you desire to have sent to you one or more sets of these facilities for either two squadrons or four squadrons?

(h) Do you need increases in personnel and material? Under consideration are renewing, or adding to, the machine tool and crane equipment of the Cavite Navy Yard; adding to the facilities of the submarine base; and establishing an airplane overhaul base with a capacity for overhauling two patrol squadrons including engines. Under this heading, would the establishment of minor base facilities for submarines and aircraft in Mariveles Bay in addition to those at Corregidor and Cavite be advisable? Would the establishment of similar facilities near Cebu or Iloilo or elsewhere be desirable?

(i) What is your present view with respect to increases in ammunition, including bombs, mines, and torpedoes? What increase in stowage and upkeep facilities for these items are required?

(j) We desire your recommendations as to booms, nets, loops, etc. This is in connection with your "front door" problems.

[5116] (k) Advise as to the location and adequacy of quantity of gasoline, fuel oil, diesel and lubricating oil stowage.

9. The Chief of Naval Operations has under consideration a visit to Australia by two light cruisers, one the cruiser now under your command, and the other the cruiser carrying to Manila the spares and personnel of the patrol squadron.

It may be proposed that the *Marblehead* would return to the Asiatic Fleet after this cruise, provided you consider that you still need her out there. On the other hand, since the *Marblehead* might perhaps be more suitably employed in war in either the Atlantic or the southeastern Pacific, it may be preferable to withdraw her now from the Asiatic. Your advice on these matters is requested.

10. Information is also requested as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations should take up with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, any of the problems affecting the closure of the "back door" referred to in one of your letters.

11. It is recognized that the above list is comprehensive and that you may be unable at this time to furnish answers to the questions involved or to other items you have in mind. If this should prove to be the case, you are requested to forward them by air mail or dispatch as soon as practicable. If it seems advisable, you should forward your recommendations by dispatch in order to save the time involved in Commander McCrea's return to Washington.

H. R. STARK.

Copy to: Cincus.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mitchell, that is from the Chief of Naval Operations to whom?

Admiral TURNER. To the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart.

Mr. MITCHELL. And Admiral Hart it was, I think, that designated the men who went to that conference.

Now, Admiral, you produced a file here from the files of the Navy Department that has something to do with this Singapore business, and I think in that you have a copy of the instructions which the British gave their representatives at that Singapore conference, have you not?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, not at that conference. I have instructions which were given for the conference which was held in Singapore in April.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, a later one?

Admiral TURNER. That is the paper in which the British give instructions to their conferees.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now there was an earlier conference prior to April?

Admiral TURNER. I think, in answer to that question, the committee might be interested in a brief résumé of all of [5118] the conferences that were held between the American authorities and the British and the Dutch.

The first contact with the British in Singapore was made by our naval attaché, Commander Thomas, who was going to Thailand in October, about the 23d.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What year?

Admiral TURNER. October of 1940. That was merely exploratory. On November 11, in response to a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, Captain Purnell, the chief of staff of Admiral Hart, went to Singapore and had exploratory conversations with them, with instructions that no commitments were to be made. There were no written documents issued from those two preliminary conferences.

The next conference that was held—and it was in compliance with the letter which has just been read—was from January 14 to January 16, 1941, at Batavia, between the Commander in Chief of the Dutch Forces and Captain Purnell. We have in this paper a dispatch summary of the result of those conversations, and I have in my possession the minutes of that meeting, which I believe the counsel has not seen, which I just very recently got. It adds nothing particularly.

Then we received word that finally the British and Dutch were going to get together in Singapore in the latter part of [5119] February of 1941. Captain Purnell attended this British-Dutch conference and was authorized to agree to tentative methods of command, tentative methods and areas of operations, either jointly or separately, and to exchange of communication facilities and intelligence, but of course under the instructions that there would be no political or definite military commitments.

Nothing very definite came out of that conference.

The next conference—and on which there is another letter directing that this conference be held, and a letter or a dispatch from the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the conference—was held in Singapore about the 19th of April, 1941. Out of that conference was evolved the ADB paper which is here, and which the counsel has just produced.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is exhibit 50.

Admiral TURNER. That paper contained a lot of objectionable features, and the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff in the Army, on July 3, 1941, in a letter to the British Joint Staff Mission here, rejected that paper in toto and requested that additional instructions be issued, so that we could get another agreement.

In brief, the objections were two: First, there were some political implications in the paper which were not acceptable to us, and one of them was this deadline down in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The other objection [5119] was that the plan was not very realistic and did not seem to advance in many respects the possible cooperative effort between the different countries.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me for interrupting you, but that document that the Admiral just referred to, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the British rejecting this Singapore proposal has already been introduced in evidence as exhibit 65.

Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral TURNER. As a result of that rejection, and after considerable conversations between our representatives and the British representatives here in Washington, the British Chiefs of Staff produced a paper which was a proposal for a draft of an agreement, and which had the title "ADB-2." The date of that is August, 1941. That paper was not entirely acceptable but was closer to our ideas.

Negotiations on the basis of that draft agreement were proceeding rather slowly, until the arrival of Admiral Phillips, the new British Far Eastern Commander in Singapore, in November. Admiral Phillips and some staff officers went to Manila and had conferences there with our authorities, chiefly Admiral Hart, and Admiral Hart on the 6th of December, his date, which would have been the 5th here, sent a dispatch to us concerning arrangements which he had made with Admiral [5121] Phillips as to command, and so on, in the war which then was coming, within a day or two.

That agreement, with some slight modifications and remarks, was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, it being only a naval agreement, on the 7th of December, and the dispatch went out on the 8th.

[5122] In none of these papers was there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of

action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should the United States enter the war, then these papers would be effective, provided they were approved by the proper authorities.

None of ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of War, or to the President, although all of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations were being held from time to time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you in that file any instructions by the British about this United States-British-Dutch conference and the powers of their representatives?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. If you find any clause there stating the limits of their authority in these matters, will you please read it into the record?

Admiral TURNER. This appears in a note from the British Military Mission in Washington to the United States Chief of Staff, and transmits a copy of the British instructions to the British representatives at the forthcoming conference at Singapore.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the date of the note?

[5123] **Admiral TURNER.** The date of the note from the British Military Mission is April 13, 1941.

Paragraph 7 of the enclosure, which is the British instructions, reads as follows—I beg your pardon. To make it clear, I will read paragraph 6 as well.

6. The conference will be in two parts: Part 1 to be British-United States-Dutch staff conversations; Part 2 to be British-Dutch staff conversations with the United States representatives attending as observers, should this be desired.

7. In both cases, the following conditions will apply:

- a. No political commitment is implied.
- b. Any agreement is subject to ratification by the Government's concerned.
- c. Conversations to be conducted in spirit of complete frankness.

Mr. MITCHELL. We will offer in evidence at this time and have it read into the daily transcript, a report from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations dated December 7, 1941, which I understand is a dispatch report of the discussions that took place at that earliest conference in Singapore.

Admiral TURNER. That is 1941.

[5124] This is the final conference with Admiral Phillips.

Mr. MITCHELL. The very last one?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is one of the documents that Senator Ferguson has asked us to produce.

The other is the reply dated December 7, 1941, released by Admiral Stark and addressed to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Shall I read those, or do you want them transcribed?

[5125] **The CHAIRMAN.** I think if they are not very long you might read them.

Mr. MITCHELL. No, they are not long. The report dated December 7, 1941, coming from the Asiatic commander states:

This is the first of five parts.

(1) We have met and discussed the problems with which we are faced in the Far Eastern area.

(2) In the early stages of a war with Japan occurring at the present time, the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese.

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(3) It is consequently not possible for us to draw up definite plans to be carried out by all our forces at the outbreak of war, and the most we can do is to decide upon the initial dispositions that appear to us best suited to meet the probable Japanese actions. Plans for submarines and naval aircraft are definite and ready.

(4) We are agreed that it is of great importance to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay barrier. Part two will follow.

Second part of 979327.

(5) We are agreed on the following initial dispositions:

(A) British battle fleet to be based upon Singapore and operate as required from there as a striking force in [5126] connection with any Japanese movement in the China Seas, Dutch East Indies and through the Malay barrier.

(B) Cruiser striking force to be based on East Borneo—"Surabaya-Darwin" to act as a striking force in connection with air reconnaissance. This force can provide cover, and when necessary, escort, for convoys within the Dutch East Indies and Philippines area or for an occasional important convoy from Australia to Singapore.

(C) The minimum cruiser force should be maintained in the Australia-New Zealand area to deal with a moderate scale of raider attack or escort important convoys.

(D) The minimum cruiser force to be maintained in the Indian Ocean to escort important trade.

(6) The actual dispositions of forces to give effect to "5" are contained in Appendix 1.

(Part Three.)

(7) We consider it very important that action in the Far East area should be co-ordinated with the movements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and we hope we may be informed of the time table visualized for the movement of this Fleet to Truk in accordance with plan "Rainbow V". The release of cruisers from Australia and New Zealand is intimately connected with the movements of this Fleet.

(8) All operations of U. S. Army aircraft which touch the operation of any naval forces to be co-ordinated [5127] through CINCAF.

(9) The setting up and use of a joint headquarters is found impracticable at this time.

(10) Strategic Control. Strategic control as between H. M. and U. S. Forces for the present to remain under respective Commanders in Chief and their operation to be co-ordinated under the principle of mutual co-operation.

(11) Tactical Command. The policy in force in North Atlantic will be followed.

(12) We consider that liaison officers should now be exchanged between the United States Asiatic and British Eastern Fleets, and are taking the necessary action.

(13) We consider that if the above is agreed to in principle by Dutch, Australian and New Zealand authorities in consultation with British Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet, next week, then all that remains to do in the way of conference is the perfection of details by our respective staffs.

Signed THOS. C. HART and TOM S. V. PHILLIPS.

(Part Four) In addition to the items reported in the first three parts we are also agreed as to the following:

-1- With the growth of our forces in the Far East, it will be important to be in a position to undertake more offensive operations. Such operations are not practicable from Singapore, and we consider that it is necessary to have, [5128] in due course, a base further north from which to operate.

-2- Manila is the only suitable base available, and we consequently consider that the necessary measures should be put in hand to enable Manila to be used by the British Battle Fleet. The question of just what action is necessary for this purpose will be discussed by our staffs.

-3- We consider that we should aim at having Manila available as a base by the first of April 1942, if this can be done.

(Part 5)—Appendix 1—Singapore; Battleships: PRINCE OF WALES, REPULSE, REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN; Cruisers: MAURITIUS, ACHILLES, TROMP, DE RUYTER, (AUSTRALIA?) (AND LATER HOBART?) Destroyers: Ten British, 6 Dutch, 4 U. S. (See note.) SOURABAYA—DARWIN—EAST BORNEO. HOUSTON, MARBLEHEAD, CORNWALL, JAVA, 4 Destroyers (U. S. see note). AUSTRALASIA, AUSTRALIA OR CANBERRA, PERTH, LEANDER, THREE AMC. INDIAN OCEAN. EXETER, GLASGOW (29 Knots) Two "E" Class, 3 "D" Class, four "C" Class, 5 AMC.

Footnote: Hart's understanding is that we build up destroyer force to operate with the British battleships as they increase in number. At present, the two destroyer divisions are deployed with his cruisers, one division being in full readiness at Balikpapan to proceed to Singapore upon declaration of war.

(CINC Eastern Fleet requests above be forwarded First [5129] Sea Lord as personal message from him.)

And the reply from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart, dated December 7, 1941, reads:—

Senator BREWSTER. Is the time of that shown, the time of day? Was that before the attack or after, does it appear?

Admiral TURNER. May I answer that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you a copy of this?

Admiral TURNER. This was actually transmitted on the 7th about 8:00 p. m. It had been written, I believe, late on the 6th or early on the 7th, and would have gone out a little earlier except for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator BREWSTER. It was prepared then entirely before the attack and was not changed after that?

Admiral TURNER. I don't remember that it was changed. It might have been slightly changed. It was still in the process of drafting at the time of the attack.

Senator BREWSTER. Excuse me for interposing.

Mr. MITCHELL. The original dispatch from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, bears date December 7, 1941. I will ask you what that date is here and if the hour is noticeable there.

Senator BREWSTER. That would be the 6th here, wouldn't it, Admiral?

Mr. MITCHELL. We want to know when that message was received in Washington, the original.

[5130] Admiral TURNER. It doesn't show the time of receipt. That was sent on noon of their 7th which would have been—

Senator BREWSTER. That would be the 6th here, wouldn't it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are there any hieroglyphics on that photostat that would help you state the hour it was received?

Admiral TURNER. That would be about 11 p. m. on the 6th, 11 p. m. on the 6th. So we did not see that until the next day. I will modify my other answer. I think that was entirely prepared after the attack in the afternoon of the 7th because I know if it had come there at 11 o'clock at night nothing would have been done on it that night and I think it came to my attention when I came down to the Department the next morning.

So that I believe now that that was prepared in the forenoon of the 7th. Actually our time of 11 p. m., the time of transmission, time of coding out there, time of transmission, decoding, of that long message, it wouldn't have been available for less than 8 or 9 hours after the date that it was started to be coded.

Mr. MITCHELL. This reply to Admiral Hart reads as follows:

The five parts of your dispatch beginning with 070327 approved with comment as follows x Part one approved x [5131] Part two approved but CNO invites attention to possibility that the major Japanese attack against Philippines may come from the eastward and that a Japanese concentration may be established in Halmahera or Mindanao approximately in accord with ideas expressed in WPL44 x Part three approved para seven make arrangements direct x Para

eight approved by CNO and COS x Part four approved when practicable x Regarding paras two and three inform me what additional personnel material and minor forces you require for the projected fleet base in Manila or alternatively in Mindanao x Footnote approved x Question of transfer to you of additional destroyers cannot be decided at this time xx Para 3315 WPL46 provisions are extended to include Army x You are authorized by SECNAV to time charter US and foreign flag merchant vessels of your station as necessary to accomplish this objective suggest possible use of British vessels formerly in service on China Coast x Request prompt information as to loading of supply vessels from US which will be sent you via Indian Ocean approximately in accord WPL44 tables xx Inform Army British and Dutch xx Sent CINCAF for action and CINPAC and SECNAVO for info.

Copy to: BAD

WPD, U. S. Army.

[5132] Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, counsel at the beginning, as I understood, said that was a reply of Admiral Hart.

Mr. MITCHELL. Reply by Admiral Stark, I mean.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. I misspoke. It is a reply by Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart, Asiatic Fleet.

Now, Admiral, you know also about the ABC conversations, British conversations, 1 and 2. The record so far shows that those conversations never were finally approved.

Is that in accord with your recollection? That is, before the war started, anyway. I think there has been correspondence offered here in connection with Rainbow 5, which the President refused to approve, because it was based on the British-American conversations, and they hadn't been approved.

What is your recollection about the conferences between the British and United States staff officers here in Washington, called ABC-1 and 2?

Admiral TURNER. It is in accord with the record except for one curious thing, that the British Chiefs of Staff and the war cabinet approved ABC-2, which was an appendix of ABC-1. I had been under the impression that the British War Cabinet had approved both but I can find no record of it and the man, then a clerk, now an officer, who had care of all [5133] the papers in connection with that, assured me that ABC-1 was never approved by a war cabinet, by the British nor by the President.

Mr. MITCHELL. The other joint war plan of that date was the one arranged with the Canadians for the defense of areas in Canada, Alaska, and the United States in case of an attack on this continent. That is covered by Exhibit 51. That document was approved, was it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. In all your dealings with these war plans, joint conversations, and so on, did it ever come to your attention that anybody in the services of the United States, in the executive branch, military or civil, had ever assumed to commit the United States to engage in a war with Japan before we were attacked?

Admiral TURNER. I know definitely that there never was any such commitment. All instructions that we had from the President and from the Secretary were that, and that was entirely in accord with the views of all of the officers of the War and Navy Departments who were directly concerned, that it was the province of Congress to declare war, and that any agreements that we entered into were pro-

visional, and to a large extent for the purpose of getting our ideas together and for establishing the machinery for [5134] cooperation.

Mr. MITCHELL. Turning attention next, Admiral, to Exhibit 44, which is a document containing extracts from various of our war plans, basic war plans, Army and Navy with special reference to the defense of Pearl Harbor against an air attack, you have seen that document, have you not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you also are familiar with the various basic documents that are listed in the 13 items in the contents?

Admiral TURNER. Not with all of them. I was familiar with No. 1 "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange (1938)."

No. 2, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1."

No. 3, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5."

No. 4, "Extracts from War Department Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5."

No. 5, "Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940."

No. 6, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii."

No. 7, "Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense [5135] Plan, Hawaii."

No. 8, "Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)."

I was not familiar with No. 9, "Five November 1941, Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department." I never saw it until I saw this document.

Mr. MITCHELL. You are giving now the list of the ones you were familiar with prior to December 7, 1941, that had come to your attention prior to that date?

Admiral TURNER. I beg your pardon. I thought that was what you wanted.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I do want.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. 9 hadn't come to your attention?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. That would not come to me normally.

I never saw No. 10, "Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department."

No. 11, "Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan"—I was familiar with.

Familiar with 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41 (Revised)—Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

And also No. 13, which was the Operations Plan No. 1-41. [5136] Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District.

Mr. MITCHELL. The ones you have specified, you did know about prior to December 7, 1941, are plans that you had directly to do with in the War Plans Division?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. Either joint plans made here or out there, or navy major plans, the basic plans, made here, and major plans which were made out there. Never minor plans, which never even came to the department.

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Mr. MITCHELL. Recently, in preparation for testifying here, you have examined the items on this list that you did not know about prior to December 7?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. Not too carefully.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, what I am leading up to, is this. I asked General Gerow of the War Plans Division of the War Department to sum up as briefly as he could from these various plans that are listed here, a statement showing the respective responsibilities of the Naval forces and the Army forces at Oahu and in Hawaii in connection with defense against an air raid, limited to that, and he did prepare such a document and it was read into the record here, but I would like to label it Exhibit 89, and have it attached as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be ordered.

[5137] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 89.")

Mr. MITCHELL. In which he made a statement in summary fashion as to the separate and joint responsibilities or respective responsibilities of the Naval forces and the Army forces in connection with defense against an air raid.

Did you examine that before General Gerow presented it here?

[5138] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, and I agreed with it as to the over-all picture.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, getting back to the development of the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands against an air attack, the record shows that on November 22, 1940 that a study of that situation was initiated in a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson in which he asked Richardson to make a study of the situation. Do you know about that letter, or did you know about it at the time?

Admiral TURNER. May I examine the letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. I think the first part of it is all that relates to this matter.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I saw that letter before Admiral Stark sent it to Admiral Richardson.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of it or the making of the suggestion?

Admiral TURNER. Very little; that was related to matters that had been discussed between Admiral Richardson when he was here in early October, I think, and Admiral Stark. It was before I arrived.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, the record shows that as a result of that letter Admiral Richardson made a study. He went out himself and examined the Army defenses and all that in connection with or in conjunction with Admiral Bloch, who [5139] was commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and it resulted in what is known as the Bloch Report. Did the Bloch Report come to your attention? That is part of Exhibit 9.

Admiral TURNER. Mr. Counsel, there is a letter intervening, I believe, of date November 22, an official letter on this subject to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, which gives specific directions for preparing that report. Is that in evidence?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is in the file I just handed you, is it?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I have a copy here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Admiral Stark's letter refers to the fact that he previously asked Admiral Bloch for a report, but it was not quite as complete as he wanted and so he asked Richardson to pursue it. That is in the letter of November 22. Do you remember that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I have a copy of that here, if I may refer to it?

Mr. MITCHELL. Surely; what I am trying to find out, Admiral, is how much you personally had to do with the preparation of all these studies and plans for defense against an air attack at the Hawaiian Islands that was generated by this request of Admiral Stark's for an inquiry out there.

Admiral TURNER. Admiral Stark started the matter of a [5140] better defense of the fleet at Hawaii before I arrived here on October 24 and he had some notes on the matter which he turned over to me with a directive to make the matter official, as he had talked it over orally with Admiral Richardson.

As I recall, I drafted the letter of November 22, at least it was drafted in the War Plans Division. I do not have a copy of that here. That went out and then Admiral Stark decided that Admiral Richardson should take a greater part in the reply to that and I believe that was the occasion for his letter of the 28th, personal letter to Admiral Richardson.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the 28th or 22nd? That is what puzzles me because the very first letter we found from Stark to Richardson raising this issue was the 22nd.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, that is correct. Well, I am a little confused on that other letter—

Mr. MITCHELL. Prior to that?

Admiral TURNER. No; I thought there was a letter between the letter of about that same date to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, maybe there was.

Admiral TURNER. I think so.

Mr. MITCHELL. But it is enough for our present purposes to call attention to that and my last question was [5141] whether you saw the Bloch Report in which he made a report about the situation regarding an air attack, dated December 30, in evidence here, and which bears an endorsement by Admiral Richardson of January 7. I think I handed that to you, did I not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I am familiar with it and as a result of these letters here, the one of November 22 and November 28 I started to get information from the War Department and such information as we had here in the Navy Department on that subject. As soon as the letter came from Admiral Bloch with Admiral Richardson's endorsement, I immediately took that material, added some of our own and drafted the letter of January 24th from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War.

Mr. MITCHELL. So that this letter, Exhibit 10, written by Knox to Stimson, in which he labels the dangers at Pearl Harbor in their order of importance and probability:

1. Air bombing attack.
2. Air torpedo plane attack.
3. Sabotage.

4. Submarine attack.
5. Mining.
6. Bombardment by gun fire.

You prepared that letter yourself?

[5142] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And took it to the Secretary for transmission?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; it was approved by some of the other divisions of operations, approved by Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Stark and then sent to the Secretary because it was an official communication of the greatest importance to the War Department and we felt that it should be taken up in that manner rather than informally.

Mr. MITCHELL. You drafted that letter partially on the basis of the result of Bloch's Report, inquiry and report?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it is obvious if you drafted it you were at that time of the views expressed in this letter about the possibilities or order of importance, and probability of these various kinds of attacks, were you not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; except I was of the opinion that the word "probable" ought to have gone in there instead of "possibility" as to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in advance of a declaration of war. However, it was felt, and I was entirely agreeable, that "possibility" was a perfectly good word.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see the letter of Secretary Stimson that came back in reply to the Knox letter that you [5143] drafted?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and we made sure that a copy of that letter went to the Commander in Chief.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am showing you a letter that came in from Admiral Richardson from Pearl Harbor, dated January 25, 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, which has to do with this very problem of defense against an air attack, which is part of Exhibit 9. Did you see that letter when it came in?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I judge from this that you had an active part in what happened from that time on in connection with the working out of any sort of plans for defense against air attack at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral TURNER. Not the working out of the detailed plans; the providing of the material and the providing of the necessary units, the improvement in the defenses and general directives as to individual services and joint preparation and training for such an attack—joint training in preparation for such an attack. There is a letter of February 10 in reply to the letter of the Commander in Chief of January 25 which I drafted in addition.

Mr. MITCHELL. I am not sure that we have had that, have we?

[5144] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I sent it to the committee some days ago.

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me look at it.

Admiral TURNER. And received the return of the originals.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, well Admiral, you took some share in the efforts to obtain the action by the War Department towards increasing its antiaircraft guns and plane equipment?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, and also action by the Navy Department on this question of the study on the subject of protective measures in the waters of the harbor and in the entrance, but the actual prosecution of that project was in the hands of the Naval District's Division.

There were a number of letters written to the War Department requesting that they increase their antiaircraft defenses and increase their air defenses and we recognized that the War Department had little equipment and did not have many trained men and they were most sympathetic and cooperative in attempting to supply material and formations. We never had any refusals from the War Department to provide defenses out there where, in our opinion, they could have provided them.

Mr. MITCHELL. You stated, I think, that you were familiar with the Martin-Bellinger Report, which is contained in [5145] exhibit 44 and in which General Martin, commander of the air force there, and Admiral Bellinger, commander of the air force of the Fourteenth Naval District, made a joint report?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; that is an estimate which they used in drawing up their operating plans, joint operating plans.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the report in which it says:

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

And then they said:

A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

They said again:

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above.

Which is speaking from the Japanese viewpoint.

After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success.

Now, that was a pretty wise report, was it not?

[5147] Admiral TURNER. That was, indeed. We agreed thoroughly with it, approved it, and it was very comforting and gratifying to see that officers in important commands out there had the same view of the situation as was held in the War and Navy Departments.

Mr. MITCHELL. Turning to another subject, did you know of the diversion of merchant shipping from the northern ship lanes to the Central Pacific area which occurred in October 1941 and later?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; that subject had been under discussion for some little time between Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Brainard, whose business it was, and myself, whose interest was in War Plans, and we were prepared to execute that when conditions became tense and we believed that war was imminent. That was initiated by Admiral Ingersoll, who talked to me about it before it was sent out and I was heartily in favor of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. There was a large area up there that even normally had a very slight amount of marine traffic in it, was there not?

Admiral TURNER. There was very little marine traffic north of Hawaii, except such as was going to Vladivostok and there wasn't very much of that. By no means all, but a large proportion of the maritime traffic that was going from the [5148] United States or from Panama to the Far East went via Hawaii and thence going to Japan would go north to Midway, and going to China I think also went north of Midway. The other that went to South China and the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines went rather close to Guam. The composite great circle course from Puget Sound or from San Francisco, that goes south of the Aleutians to Japan or to China, runs very close to Japan itself and approximately parallel to the general trend of the land.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that was the traffic that you diverted, was it?

Admiral TURNER. We diverted that and also the traffic that went via Honolulu. We sent that down via Torres Straits, so that the track that the Japanese task force actually took would cross the composite great circle course close to Japan and they would be clear of any traffic that would be there in a very short time and that traffic that went on that composite course went through the normal operating areas where the Japanese held their maneuvers.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Counsel, I wonder if we could have one of the maps of the Pacific put up, which would enable us to understand very much better this question of the routes, if that map were put up on one of the standards.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will have it set up. It is 12 [5149] o'clock now.

The CHAIRMAN. We have changed our schedule to 12:30.

Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, we have?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Those routes illustrate exactly what I have just said.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, on the map that has just been placed on the easel, south of the Aleutians, going from our northern Pacific coast, there are a number of lines drawn from the United States over to the Japanese area. Are those lines representative of the ship lanes, so-called, for that traffic?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. That is what is called the composite great circle course.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that is the traffic that by these orders was diverted to a southerly course?

Admiral TURNER. It was that traffic and also all of the traffic that went westward, that is, all of the merchant traffic that went westward from Hawaii. Now, from Hawaii all traffic except naval traffic was sent down around, too, in that direction; some of it had to go via Suva and the Fiji to get water—no, it didn't go that far south. It went through the Solomons. Possibly I had better trace it.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

[5150] **Admiral TURNER.** All of this traffic, this traffic—

Senator BREWSTER. You will have to identify it a little more because in the record that won't be clear.

Admiral TURNER. I beg your pardon. All of the composite great circle routes from San Francisco and from Puget Sound which went to the Asiatic points, either to Japan or to China or even around to the Philippines and Malasia, plus all of the traffic that went from Hawaii to Japan, to China direct, to the Philippines, was diverted south roundabout to go first east—the Puget Sound and San Francisco ships were sent first to Hawaii and then all ships from Hawaii, merchant ships, went approximately west of Howel and Baker Islands, through the Solomons, then west of the Santa Cruz Islands, thence south of New Guinea and through Torres Strait, which is between Australia and New Guinea. We had Australian pilots to take them through there.

We for a time sent some of the naval traffic which had freight for Guam and the Philippines, direct from Honolulu to Guam and thence to the Philippines and that is the traffic that we started escorting at about that time. Shortly before December 7 even that traffic, which included naval freight and freight and passenger vessels, was also sent south and around South New Guinea and thence up to the Philippines.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, there is an area on the map, Ad- [5151]
miral, that lies south of this ship lane, of those ship-lane lines from Puget Sound through to Japan and north of the Hawaiian Islands, that does not have any ship-lane lines drawn on that. Is that a part of the ocean that was not generally used?

Admiral TURNER. Practically never do any ships go through that part of the ocean.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that term "vacant sea" a recognized maritime expression?

Admiral TURNER. I never heard that term before but I think it is a good term.

Mr. MITCHELL. So that after that diversion took place, according to the map there, there was practically little or no traffic in the areas followed by the Jap fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor, as shown in red on that map?

Admiral TURNER. There was very little traffic there in any case. After the freezing of Japanese assets on July 26, within a short time there was no Japanese shipping between the United States and Japan and the American-flag shipping dropped off to practically nothing. Because those lines are there, it does not show a stream of ships even at any time. When shipping was going full blast even before the war there were very few ships in through there and going between Honolulu and Japan. I have gone that route and the chances [5152] are we didn't even see a ship there. That was much quicker than these

northern routes. It is very easy to miss a ship if you do not want to be detected because there is only one ship along there every 2 or 3 days and sometimes by shifting your course a few miles every few hours, why, it is practically impossible for merchant shipping ever to detect a naval task force that wants to be undetected.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Mitchell, could I ask the witness a question?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. What happens to the Russian ships going to Vladivostok that were moving out of Seattle? Was there any change in those?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Those continued to move?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Those had been going from Japanese ports, had they not?

Admiral TURNER. No, they did not.

Senator BREWSTER. Did the Japanese have surveillance of those ships?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, but they went through the Kurile Islands. I think they had no patrol, the Japs had no patrol. They had surveillance up there but they did not stop [5153] them and they would normally have gone through that area up here during the summer. Well, very few of them went into Vladivostok during the winter.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, could you give an approximate difference in distance, for instance, going from Seattle and San Francisco to the Philippines via the two alternate routes?

Admiral TURNER. You mean via the maritime ports?

Senator BREWSTER. The great circle or the Hawaii-Torres Strait.

Admiral TURNER. Oh, I would say roughly 4,000 miles farther.

Senator BREWSTER. So that this was a very important change when you rerouted these ships?

Admiral TURNER. It was extremely important and was taken only because the shipping companies were very much opposed and we ourselves because it meant a longer time to get our production and our material in the Philippines, very much longer.

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, I call your attention to a dispatch dated July 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in chief of the Pacific and other fleets in the Pacific, found on page 14 of Exhibit 37, that has to do with economic sanctions. That is the dispatch that informed them that

[5155] At 1400 GCT July Twenty Sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan—

and describes them.

Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I drafted it.

Mr. MITCHELL. It says:

Do not anticipate immediate hostile acts by Japan through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventuality.

You realized at that time that the imposition of these sanctions and embargoes produced very strained relations?

Admiral TURNER. I believed it would make war certain between the United States and Japan.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you come to examine the intercepted diplomatic dispatches which showed us Japan was fretting and deteriorating under these embargoes, and her demands and our refusal to remove those embargoes and to keep on furnishing her war materials, what is your judgment as to the extent the embargo and our refusal to stop aid to China and release those embargoes had on compelling Japan to attack us?

Admiral TURNER. I think it made sure the fall of the [5155] third Konoye Cabinet, which had begun in the middle of July, and I think that it made sure the going in of the militaristic Cabinet. It undermined the Konoye Cabinet which I believe was trying to keep from war with the United States, but not trying to keep out of war with Britain and the Dutch.

Senator BREWSTER. Could I have the question and answer previous to the last one read, please?

(The question and answer referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. MITCHELL. I call your attention to another dispatch dated October 16, 1941, page 18 of Exhibit 37. Did you have any part in the preparation of that? That is the one that refers to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I drafted that dispatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. You say:

There is a strong possibility of hostilities since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation.

To what did you refer in the words "desperate situation"? Were you referring to her economic condition?

Admiral TURNER. Very largely to her economic condition, and to the fact that through our action, her trade had been cut off not only with the United States, but with the British possessions and the Dutch had reduced their commitment to furnish oil, a certain amount of oil annually, to something like one-third, or two-fifths of that. That meant that since the United States and the Dutch possessions were the sources of nearly all of the petroleum products that Japan was using, in a comparatively short time her own large stocks maintained in the Empire would be exhausted. She could not get cotton from India, upon which she depended for a large part of her cotton industry, and she also got rice from the Dutch and India.

It meant, of course, that her trade with the world was practically stopped and that was a very serious matter for an industrial nation.

In addition to that, of course, was her very large extension in China, and the help that the United States and the British were giving to the nationalist government in China.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that message almost amounted to an alert, didn't it? It said the Japs may attack, and "you will take due precautions, including preparatory deployments" and so on.

Was it your judgment at the time that you wrote that dispatch on the 16th of October, that the conditions you had spoken of might result in war in a very short time?

[5157] **Admiral TURNER.** No, sir; not a short time. That is relatively. The new Cabinet would have to be formed. It took a cer-

tain amount of time to do that, to make their pronouncement, get the approval of the Emperor, and to issue orders to deploy their forces, and to load their ships. So at that time, so far as the United States and the British and Dutch were concerned, I did not believe that there would be any possibility of war for at least a month.

It was somewhat different with respect to the Russians, because there they were close to the Russians. They already had an army in Manchuria, deployed or not, we did not know.

They had a great part of the Navy in her home waters, so that action against Russia could have been taken at an earlier date possibly.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I notice in exhibit 38, dated October 18, 1941, it appears that the War Department had their attention called to this message of October 16, 1941, from the CNO to the Pacific Fleet and felt, or maybe gave the impression that the hostilities were very imminent, and so the Army sent this dispatch to their commander out there:

Calling the War Department estimate of the Japanese situation to your attention, tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no rapid, no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

I gather you are really not at all in disagreement with that view, are you?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. I saw that dispatch before it went; I did not have any disagreement with it.

Mr. MITCHELL. The Army dispatch I read is dated October 18, 1941. The dispatch of November 24, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets and others, page 32 of Exhibit 37, we have already referred to this morning. That contains the statement:

The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful—and—

Surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines and Guam is a possibility.

That is the dispatch that you say you initiated and that Admiral Ingersoll authorized, is it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. That was also cleared with Admiral Stark and with General Gerow who cleared it with General Marshall.

I have an impression, not confirmed by the minutes of the Joint Board, that that was discussed at a meeting of the Joint Board before it went out.

May I say this in addition:

Before that went out it was cleared with Mr. Knox, and [5159] I think with the President.

Mr. MITCHELL. Coming down now to the war warning message of November 27, 1941, appearing on page 36 of Exhibit 37, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, what part did you take in the preparation of that message? Will you state the circumstances as you remember them?

Admiral TURNER. The dispatch of the 24th we did not consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another warning.

As a result of the Japanese intercept which had postponed the final date to the 29th, we felt it necessary to put this dispatch out, because

we could not tell whether the 29th was to be the day that the attack was to take place, or whether it was to be the day when the expeditions would start from their ports.

[5160] So that this gave 2 days for deployments, proper deployments to be made, which was enough. I think that one of the immediate reasons for that was our learning, or my learning on the 26th from Captain Schuirmann, who was the liaison officer with the State Department, that Mr. Hull had decided, or felt, that negotiations were of no further use and that the matter was in the hands of the War and Navy Departments.

My recollection is—I am not too sure on this part—my recollection is that Captain Schuirmann came back from the State Department about 10:30 on the 26th and immediately told me, Admiral Stark, and Admiral Ingersoll about this matter where the State Department had decided not to send the *modus vivendi*, but he did not know then that they were going to send the note of the 26th.

The scheduled meeting of the Joint Board was for 11 o'clock. That was put off by Admiral Stark until, I think, 11:35, while I drafted this, the original form of this dispatch. And I think, without making any particular change, that that was taken up and discussed in the Joint Board meeting that morning, which General Marshall attended.

There were some objections to the phraseology of the dispatch and it was finally changed almost to this form, partly by the Army and partly by Admiral Stark.

[5161] Now, I believe that either that night or early in the forenoon of the 27th, I am not sure which, that dispatch was then cleared with Mr. Knox and sent to the President and we got it back in the afternoon from the White House.

Now, there is a possibility that it was telephoned to the President, but I believe that Admiral Beardall took it to the President himself.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the Joint Board minutes, the minutes of the Joint Board of November 26, are in evidence, and we don't find anything in them at all that mentioned any discussion whatever of any warning messages going out either from the Army or the Navy.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, and that was rather customary. It mentions a discussion of the Asiatic situation, or the Pacific situation. Dispatch of this character, while it might be discussed in the Joint Board—this may be rather a fine point, but it is, I believe, correct—was not the function of the Joint Board to send. It was the business of Admiral Stark and General Marshall. The Joint Board, which is a constituted body, consisting of eight people, would give their advice, but the action would be by those two officers.

So that customarily, when something of that sort came up that required action, it was not put down in the Joint Board minutes, because then it would look as if the Joint Board had decided to do such and such, which would not be the case.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

Who was present with you and, I suppose, Admiral Stark, when the terms of this message were finally agreed on, this message of November 27, can you remember who was in the conference?

Admiral TURNER. I think after the Joint Board conference, the only people that were then concerned with that after that were Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and myself, possible Admiral Brainard.

Mr. MITCHELL. On what day was it you met and agreed upon this draft? Was it the 27th?

Admiral TURNER. We discussed it several times on both the 26th and the 27th, and this was what emerged. I will say that it had some of the thoughts of the Army in it, because we wanted to always try, in anything of this nature, to take exactly the same action. As we know, that did not occur in this particular case.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that is one of the things I wanted to mention to you. The record shows that when the Army got up their dispatch, Secretary Stimson telephoned Mr. [5163] Hull about whether negotiations were terminated or not, and Mr. Hull said they were terminated to all practical purposes with only a bare possibility that the Japanese Government might come back, and that was the way their message read.

Your message doesn't contain that. It is a flat statement.

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days . . .

Now, when you drew this dispatch in this form and sent it, did you know that the War Department dispatch had been toned down a little?

Admiral TURNER. I knew it before the dispatch went but our idea was to make this sharp and clear so there was no possibility of misunderstanding.

We also took cognizance of the fact that in one of the magic messages, the Japanese had said even after the 29th to go on and make the motions of continuing to discuss things from the diplomatic viewpoint.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you really then disagreed with the State Department, Mr. Hull's evaluation, if I may use that word, of the state of negotiations, did you? A little bit, I mean?

[5164] Admiral TURNER. I felt that for the military personnel, stating the matter, the situation in this way, was necessary and was really factual, and realistic.

Mr. MITCHELL. And it was better to give them a stiff jolt than to be easy under the circumstances?

Senator BREWSTER. You say military personnel?

Admiral TURNER. I say for the military personnel this was a much more realistic and direct message.

Senator BREWSTER. You mean military as distinct from naval?

Admiral TURNER. No, no, sir. I beg your pardon. That was a general term.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you ask him if he was trying to differentiate between civilian and military in that?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes; I think when you said "military" you used the term in a broad sense to include Navy and Army and everything in the armed services, did you not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is now 12:30. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12:30 p. m., to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[5165]

AFTERNOON SESSION, 2 P. M.

Mr. CLARK. The committee will come to order. I will take responsibility for calling the committee to order in the absence of the chairman and vice chairman who, I think, were detained on the floor.

Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, when we recessed we were engaged in making some comparisons between the warning message of November 27 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Pacific commander and the warning message of the same date sent by the War Department to the commanding general of the Army forces at Hawaii.

The first difference is this, your dispatch—withdraw that.

Before you finally settled on the form of your dispatch I imagine you had some preliminary discussions with the Army officers who were engaged on similar work as to the form the dispatch should take?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. They saw our dispatch and I am quite sure before they drafted their final form of their dispatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, after you had had that conference you separated, you went to the Secretary of the Navy with yours, and they went to the Secretary of War with theirs; is that the way you understand it?

Admiral TURNER. I left the draft of the dispatch with Admiral Stark and, as I understand it, he took that up with Mr. Knox, and I think, sent it to the President by the aide, but he may have talked to the President about it over the White House telephone.

Mr. MITCHELL. You don't know whether the original draft of the Army dispatch contained the words "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning"?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I do not. I first saw the Army dispatch after it had been drafted when General Gerow came over with it to clear it with Admiral Stark and they called me in and showed it to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was after General Gerow had had it up with Secretary Stimson?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Your dispatch suggests, or states:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

The Army dispatch mentions no area in which the attack may come. Do you notice that? The Army dispatch is on page 7 of Exhibit 32.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why did you put in a reference to the Philippines, Thai, or Kra, or Borneo?

Admiral TURNER. We wanted to emphasize the fact that this was a very important major effort, that there was an amphibious expedition or expeditions en route. We knew that these ships had sailed in convoy from Shanghai and, I believe, from Hainan, and that they had, some vessels had already arrived in the ports of Indochina.

Also from the locations of Japanese naval vessels there was a definite movement of a fair-sized force down through the China Sea even at this date. There was no definite indication at that time of a movement towards the Philippines. We could get very little information as to intentions toward the Philippines. We expected the attack to come from Formosa, which it did, but we couldn't get any information from there.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the fleet at Hawaii wasn't tied down to the Hawaiian Islands, was it?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It had an interest in the campaign anywhere in the Pacific?

Admiral TURNER. Not outside of the provisions of Rainbow [5168] 5 War Plan, and that did not permit them to go out into the Asiatic without directions from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, coming to the next sentence in your message it says:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

What is meant by that? In the first place, what is meant by "appropriate defensive deployment," and next, what was WPL46?

Admiral TURNER. Before coming to the meat of the answer, I invite attention to the fact that this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as if it were the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to each, but both in identical terms.

A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment means to spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the best positions from which to execute the operating plans against the enemy. The defensive deployment as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief interest, was for the defense of Hawaii and of the west coast of the United States, because one of the tasks of WPL46 is to defend the territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal [5169] zones, and to defend our shipping.

Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the forces under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could take station for the most probable attack against them or against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities for covering the United States and Panama.

The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east, and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not, an attack on the west coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch going out the same day to the commandants of districts to take precautions against subversive activities, but we did not tell them to make any defensive deployment.

[5170] The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of different ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the plans that should have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes would have been sent to Midway, if not already

there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance planes as well as defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance would have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to those positions constituted part of the defensive deployment.

The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against undamaged fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would bring over slow ships unless they were making their full and complete effort against Hawaii, so that a proper deployment for the battleships would have been in the best position to do what was within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii against actual landings. In other words, if they had been at sea and in a retired position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings, they would have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated the landings.

Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger position of Hawaii was to the north, because [5171] there were no little outlying islands there from which observation could have been made, since there was no possibility of detecting raiders from the north except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate deployment would have been to have sent some fast ships, possibly with small seaplanes, up to the north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors against approach, which the long range reconnaissance could not have done. Of course, these ships would naturally have been in considerable danger, but that was what they were there for, because fighting ships are of no use unless they are in a dangerous position so that they can engage the enemy and inflict loss on them.

Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would not be moved, would have been to put them on operating air fields scattered throughout the islands so that they could be in a mutual supporting position with respect to other fields and to cover a somewhat wider arc.

Another part of the deployment would have been to have sent submarines, as many as were available, out into a position from which they could exercise either surveillance or could make attacks against approaching vessels.

It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for submarines. The offensive action, of course, would have been to send them into Japanese waters.

[5172] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, can you identify for us WPL-46?

Admiral TURNER. WPL-46 was the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, derived from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, which in turn was derived from ABC-1 and 2, the American-British conversations.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, is WPL-46 involved in any one of these 13 items on Exhibit 44, which lists various war plans?

Mr. KEEFE. Is it the same as Rainbow No. 5?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I would like to get cleared up.

Admiral TURNER. Yes. I said that WPL-46 is Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, shown in No. 11, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5, is it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. WPL-46 is a war-plans number.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you are familiar with WPL-46 and Rainbow 5. Can you state in a very brief way what the defensive tasks assigned in that plan were?

Admiral TURNER. May I see the tasks assigned to the Commander-in-Chief from Rainbow 5? I do not think they are all in here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you want the original Rainbow 5, do you, the original document?

[5173] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I haven't anything but a summary of certain items.

Senator BREWSTER. You remember that was a question we had when it was up the other day, that that exhibit described the defensive actions but it did not show the affirmative actions of the fleet. I raised that question at the time. I do not know whether we have ever had the complete plan, have we?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Not in evidence. We have it in the office.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have it down in the office, all these plans.

Admiral TURNER. I believe counsel has that plan, a copy of that plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, while we are waiting for it to be brought up I will go on with these questions about this warning message.

Now, there is nothing in this message about the Japanese taking, performing, or committing the first overt act. The Army had that in there "on direction of the President" and I understand that this message of yours went over to the President. I am not sure whether it was before or after it was sent.

[5174] Did you have any directions from the President to say anything about Japan committing the first overt act?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. The situation was this: The question was discussed as to whether we would issue an order that if Jap forces came within a certain distance of Hawaii, whether or not we would attack them. Naturally, if strong forces were even within 500 or 600 miles of Hawaii their intention would be very apparent.

The decision as to when and where to consider that they had committed an attack or were about to commit an attack on us was felt to be within the province of the commander in chief and that we should avoid any details at all.

The Army was in a slightly different situation. We felt that the Navy could not afford, if it were possible to prevent it, to let the attack come in and be made without taking action, and I am quite sure that if our deployed ships had encountered an enemy task force there would have been no question whatsoever immediately as to the commission of overt acts by the Japanese. It was not a situation capable of exact definition.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you knew when you drafted the order, I assume, that that desire existed in the administration that Japan should commit the first overt act however you define it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and if they had brought a task force within 500 miles of Hawaii, under the circumstances that most assuredly would have been an overt act.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice here at the end of this dispatch you say:

Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Well, did you have an idea at that time that the only danger that Guam and Samoa were under was a sabotage operation?

Admiral TURNER. The category of defense of Guam was "E", which meant that no resistance was to be offered; that the only action they would take would be the destruction of military facilities in our possession.

We had no force there except a small number of marines and a small number of naval personnel and the defense of Guam was entirely out of the question. Therefore, in order to avoid too much difficulty for the natives, why, the decision had been made previously that no defense whatsoever would be offered for Guam.

Samoa—I have forgotten their category of defense. I think it also was "E". They had a couple of hundred native troops, I think they had three or four emplaced 6-inch guns, I am not sure as to that, and there was no defense that Samoa could offer that was of any account at all. Therefore, [5176] the only measures that they could take effectively were against sabotage.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, on the 27th of November, on page 37 of exhibit 37 there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of all the naval districts except the 14th at Hawaii and—the 16th was in the Philippines?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Which read:

Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent probability extension orange operation. Publicity to be avoided.

Why didn't you warn the commandant of the naval district in Hawaii against sabotage?

Admiral TURNER. Because the commandants of the naval districts in Hawaii and in the Philippines were subordinate officers of the two commanders-in-chief and it was the duty of the two commanders-in-chief to issue the necessary instructions to those commandants. Their existing orders in their war plants were all written out and that was one of the tasks of those commandants but there were many other tasks, too.

[5177] You will note also that the commandant of the navy yard in Washington and the Governors of Guam and Samoa were also included as action addressees in that dispatch.

The reason we did not send a stronger dispatch to those districts was that we did not expect there anything except possible sabotage and we did not want to spread that other war warning throughout all those districts because it would have been in the newspapers half an hour after it got there, in most of the places probably.

Mr. MITCHELL. I notice on November 28, page 38 of exhibit 37, there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations for action of the commander-in-chief PNNCP. What is that?

Admiral TURNER. Pacific northern naval coastal frontier and Pacific southern naval coastal frontier.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is on the mainland?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. For the information of the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet among others.

Admiral TURNER. And commander, Panama naval coastal frontier.

Mr. MITCHELL. And Panama.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. There you sent them a copy of the warning [5178] dispatch that had just been sent out by the War Department to its commander?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What was the purpose of that?

Admiral TURNER. The purpose was to make sure that those commanders knew what the Army was doing in their districts.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Counsel, may I at this point make an observation? The first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress is about to come to a conclusion, probably tomorrow. There are important matters of legislation and other matters over there on the floor of the Senate that require my attention in connection with the winding up of this session and I am compelled to go to the floor. I wanted the Admiral to know that my absence is in no sense an indication of my lack of interest in his testimony, but I cannot be in two places at a time and I feel I must be on the floor, so that I am sure you will understand and excuse me if I am not here during the balance of your testimony today.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy in making that statement.

[5179] Mr. MITCHELL. Now, you had been sending what are called joint messages. If you sent a message to the Navy commander, you might say there "Inform the Army commander," or vice versa. That was a common practice, wasn't it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have a special reason to fear that the commanders in Hawaii would not get the War Department message? Was that why you adopted a rather unusual way of sending a copy of the War Department message to your commander?

Admiral TURNER. I did not know that the War Department had sent that particular dispatch to the commander of the Western Defense Command, for example, as shown on page 8 of the pink book (Exhibit 32). There is nothing in there that tells the Army commanders to disseminate this to the Navy commanders. On the contrary, it says:

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum number of officers.

So I felt it might easily be that the Army commanders would construe that so that the Navy commanders would not know what they were doing, and so, with the concurrence of the War Plans Division, I sent this out. There was also the very minor matter after the end of the quote concerning WPL-52.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, of course the War Department [5180] message that you thus sent copy of to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor contained all of this material about overt act. "Do not disturb the population," and "negotiations appear to be terminated but maybe not quite," and various things that you deliberately cut out, or did not put in your warning message. That is a fact, is it not?

Admiral TURNER. It is a fact, and this dispatch was sent to the commander in chief, purely for information, so he would know what

the orders were that were given to the Army. I presumed that General Short already had shown him that, but it was necessary that Admiral Kimmel know that we were sending this information to the frontier commanders, the three frontier commanders, so he would not have to send something himself.

Mr. MITCHELL. You would assume that he would naturally obtain, from General Short, the War Department message or the warning to Short, and you would not be adding anything to the possible confusion by sending him a copy direct; is that the idea?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct. As I said, the chief reason was so he would know what had been sent to these other officers, because the commanders of the two coastal frontiers immediately WPL-46 came into effect went [5181] under the command of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, so far as regards all matters connected with cooperation with the fleet.

[5182] Mr. MITCHELL. Now regarding WPL-46, we have it here now. It is a voluminous document, but can you briefly state to the committee just what the operation in general called for, so we may know what the preparatory deployment would be referred to in your warning message?

Admiral TURNER. The tasks assigned to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet are not very long in number. They are two pages.

Mr. MITCHELL. Read them right into the record.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you can comment on them as you go along, if you like.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that section 3212, Admiral?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. Section 3212, WPL-46:

The U. S. Pacific Fleet is assigned the following tasks within the Pacific area:

That limits the area in which he can operate, because the Asiatic area is another area.

Mr. MITCHELL. How far out was that line of division?

Admiral TURNER. I will look it up in just a minute.

Mr. MITCHELL. Go on with your analysis and we will get the other later.

Admiral TURNER. It is a little ways to the eastward of the Philippines, about 500 miles, as I recall it, offhand. [5183] It included in the Asiatic the Palau Islands, but Guam was included in the Pacific area.

Task A: Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

That meant that we would attempt to raid the lines of supply leading from Japan southward to the Malay Barrier both by submarines and by surface ships, if we could, and also raid the positions in the Marshalls in the hope of drawing enemy air and naval strength in that direction and get them off the backs of the forces in the Far East.

Task B: Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.

That was a purely preparatory task for the assembly of forces and material. In another part of the plan is the direction that that will

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not be undertaken within 6 months, which is allotted for the assembly of material and forces.

Task C: Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

That meant that we would capture or sink enemy vessels, [5184] merchant vessels or Government vessels, engaged in carrying troops or material, and we would also do the same for neutral vessels. The only neutral vessels that would be involved might have been some South American-owned vessels which might attempt to carry goods to Japan proper.

Task D: Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° east.

The longitude is along the east coast, or just off the east coast of Australia and includes New Zealand.

That was a long ways away. We did not expect much in the way of Axis effort down there except possibly from raiders. We put that in there so that the New Zealand and Australian Governments would feel free to turn over their cruisers to the British commander in chief at Singapore, so that they could operate there along the Malay Barrier, instead of being kept useless down south.

[5185] We expected a very small diversion of our force to that area.

Task E: Defend Samoa in category D.

That was a defense, which I could not remember. It was category D which was to be prepared for rather heavy attacks, but do not expect immediate attempts at occupation.

Task F: Defend Guam in category F.

I think I referred previously to that category as "E" which was in error. Category F is merely to blow up facilities, destroy stores which might be useful to the enemy as we expected the place to be captured.

Task G: Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling as required by circumstances and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

That was a matter of protecting our lines of vessels that were supplying our forces, and also to protect the British ships that were going from the west coast to Australia and New Zealand.

We had a plan for joint escort where we would escort ships from San Francisco down two-thirds of the way, for example, to Australia, and then their ships would pick them up, if necessary, and escort them the rest of the way.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the counsel [5186] whether we have any comparable document? I have here Exhibit 44, which purports to be a copy of defense plans. It is apparently identified as 1938.

I wonder if we have any comparable document?

Mr. MITCHELL. The comparable document is Rainbow Five that we are talking about. Is that right?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, item 11. That refers only to matters connected with the defense of Hawaii, as I recall it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 44, Senator, is extracts directly of portions of all these plans having to do with defenses of Hawaii against air attack, so that the complete basic plan he is now reading is not in Exhibit 44, only the air provisions that are based upon it. So there is no comparable document that has been mimeographed that contains all that this war plan does. There are a mass of them here, that are identified as the items in the index of Exhibit 44, but we never had them mimeographed. They can be made available to the committee, if you want them.

Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest on page 103 of volume I the offensive tasks are outlined. It may be of some help.

Senator BREWSTER. That is the document that we have not had presented in evidence?

Mr. MURPHY. That is the document given to us by the [5187] Naval Affairs Committee, Senator Walsh.

Senator BREWSTER. It has not been offered as an exhibit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Not as an exhibit, but each member was furnished with a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether the testimony now going in is under the instrument of November 27, 1941, page 46 of Exhibit 37, where the task is assigned to WPL-46?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5. I have established that a few minutes ago.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But that WPL-46 is not in this Exhibit 44, except as it relates to the air defense of Hawaii; is that true?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right.

Admiral TURNER. May I make an amendment to that?

The only thing from WPL-46 that is in this exhibit that Senator Brewster has, is assignment of tasks for the naval coastal frontier forces as applied to the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. It is an extract from this full plan, part 3, chapter 2, section 3; and it is only a part of section 3.

It merely shows this task "Defend the naval coastal [5188] frontier in category D." That is all it has got.

Senator BREWSTER. What I have purports to be extract from Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, Section 7, tasks Pacific area, Army tasks 33, 35, Navy tasks, under which there is F, G, H, which letters do not at all correspond with what you have been reading. F is to prepare, capture, establish, control, protect Caroline and Marshall Islands.

"G" is to defend Midway, Johnston, Guam.

I could not reconcile that program under Rainbow No. 5.

Admiral TURNER. You cannot reconcile it, Senator. They are from two different documents. What you have there is from the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Admiral TURNER. What I am reading from is the Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, which is the Navy part of the joint plan.

Senator FERGUSON. We have a further over-flow, we have 3233. That is another section?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have another section, as I understand that you are reading.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. That 3233 only refers to [5189] the task that was assigned by the Department to the commandant of the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier, and is merely a defense plan, to defend in category D.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Admiral TURNER. Now, in addition to that task assigned to Admiral Bloch, since Admiral Bloch was a subordinate officer of Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel could, from his own tasks, and he did, assign additional tasks to Admiral Bloch, but they are different documents. I mean the first part that you read is the joint plan, and this is the Navy plan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Admiral, from where you left off.

Admiral TURNER. "Task H: Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the expansion of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the use of land positions in that hemisphere."

That is the major defensive task of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that would include Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. That says "protect the territory of Associated Powers," and we are defined as one of the associated powers.

[5190] Mr. MITCHELL. Then when you ordered him to "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46," did you mean the commander of the Pacific Fleet should take preparatory deployment measures for all those operations that you just read about, except those that were not to start for 6 months?

Admiral TURNER. It says "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment."

Mr. MITCHELL. Defensive?

Admiral TURNER. Yes. That immediately fixes attention on task H and task G, which is "protect the sea communications."

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that include the associated territory?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, your warning message said nothing about reporting measures taken, did it? You did not order him to report what measures he had taken.

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was not the naval practice?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. I never had seen it done, unless something has occurred to indicate that you suspect he is not carrying the thing out, and then action will be taken, but in a case of this kind I have never seen a report on measures taken, I have never seen it.

Mr. MITCHELL. You did not ask him to acknowledge your [5191] message? Or was that a practice that would be expected to be followed? There is nothing said about acknowledge, is there?

Admiral TURNER. It is routine always to acknowledge an important operating signal. This hasn't all of the operating procedure on it. I do not see the signal sign for "Acknowledge" here.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral—

Admiral TURNER. There are three more tasks.

Mr. MITCHELL. I beg your pardon. I thought you had finished them.

Admiral TURNER (reading) :

Task I. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces.

That means to operate in such position that the weak naval coastal frontier forces if encountered, or if attacked by superior forces, will be driven off by the forces of the fleet.

Task J: Establish fleet control zones, defining their limit from time to time as circumstances require.

That means that in the vicinity, the general area of where the fleet is operating, a zone is established which is under the control of the fleet and into which no vessel of any kind can come, except under rules established by the fleet.

Task K: Route shipping of associated powers within the [5192] fleet control zones.

In other words, the routing generally in the open ocean was done by the commandant of the naval coastal frontiers, but within the fleet control zone it was done by the commander in chief.

That is the end of the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, whether you got an acknowledgment of the receipt of this dispatch of November 27 or not, did you get a report from Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7 as to what, if any, measures he had taken under that?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have any information prior to December 7 as to whether or not the commander of the fleet at Hawaii had taken any action, or as to what it was?

Admiral TURNER. We had none.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you any information as to what, if any, state of alert he placed his forces in?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Had you any information prior to December 7 as to what General Short had done in response to the message sent him by the War Department?

Admiral TURNER. I saw the message, his reply. I remember very distinctly seeing that reply about alert against sabotage [5193] and liaison with the Navy. We had a regular exchange of messages of that character between the Army and Navy War Plans, and I wondered at it. I thought, without referring to that dispatch, it mentioned the War Department dispatch, that it referred to the order that had gone out regarding sabotage. I rather expected a later dispatch on the subject.

However, that was a matter within the entire province of the War Department, and I did nothing about it.

Mr. MITCHELL. How did it happen that you had copies of the reports that these officers in the Army command had sent in in response to the warning messages? Did you receive copies of General DeWitt's report, and one from the Philippines, and the Pacific coast, and so on, that the Army got from their commanders?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was that a regular practice? You had seen messages of that kind?

Admiral TURNER. General Gerow would send to me and I would send to him, on personal initiative, dispatches which we thought we would

be interested in. In addition to that, an officer from my Division would go to the Army War Plans Division daily, look over their dispatches and get copies of any that he thought that we should see, and the Army did a similar thing with the dispatches that came to my Division.

[5194] Mr. MITCHELL. Well, if in that way you got a copy of General Short's report and it attracted your attention because of its brevity, and other things, as compared with other reports, what reason was there that you could not call the attention of the Army authorities to it?

Admiral TURNER. There was no reason whatsoever. I felt a little hesitancy in doing it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would they feel offended?

Admiral TURNER. It did not occur to me to call his attention to it. I felt if anything was wrong it would be attended to. It was only a passing matter, and it then passed out of mind.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the security of your fleet depended somewhat on it, didn't it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. So it was not purely an Army affair. If the command had been separate from any fleet command I can understand it, but if the security of the Pacific Fleet were in danger, do not you feel you should have called the Army's attention to what you might have thought was an inadequate response to the warning?

Admiral TURNER. I do not know that I went so far as to formulate the idea that it was an inadequate response. I could have done so and I would have done so if I had felt that [5195] the matter would not be fully attended to.

Mr. MITCHELL. One member of the committee wanted me to ask you what the effect of this diversion of shipping would have been, from the northern lanes down to the southern area, if measured in length of voyages or additional mileage?

Admiral TURNER. It probably would increase the time of passage, depending on the speed of the ships, from 9 to 15 days from, say, San Francisco to Manila.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that was a very serious matter with the shortage of shipping, was it not?

Admiral TURNER. Extremely serious.

Mr. MITCHELL. A measure that would only have been resorted to if you felt there was real danger to that shipping in the old lanes?

Admiral TURNER. We were certain there was danger there, and we felt we would rather put the extra time in than lose the ships.

Mr. MITCHELL. You sent a message to Hawaii December 3, to the commander there, the Navy commander, about code burning, which is found on page 40 of Exhibit 37. That is a dispatch which read:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,

and to [5196] different places, including Washington, D. C., and London, to destroy most of their codes. That appears to be initiated by Wilkinson and initialed by Ingersoll. Did you have anything to do with that?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. I saw it. I had a conversation with Admiral Ingersoll on that subject. I do not know whether he brought

it up or I did. That was with respect to informing our forces about this code burning, because to me that was a definite indication of immediate war. I entirely approved sending the dispatch, but I did not initiate it.

Mr. MITCHELL. There has been put in evidence here a document in the nature of reports on Japanese Fleet locations which were available here in Washington, prepared here in Washington, and in one part of that report it indicates the number of Japanese ships, troop ships, and several carriers that were afterward in the expedition which attacked Pearl Harbor, that had been located, so far as these information sheets are concerned, in various Japanese ports.

Now would these reports have come to your attention at that time?

Admiral TURNER. They did come to my attention. I saw that and did not believe it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the record will show—we haven't got to that evidence yet, but it was established, I think, at [5197] prior hearings that out in Hawaii, where they had prepared Japanese Fleet location reports, that along about the latter part of November, the 28th or 29th, or the 1st of December, the officers there who were collating the information of this direction finder work found that they lost track of three Japanese carriers, they did not know where they were, they had been silent for days, and the fact that those carriers had been lost track of was brought to the attention of the commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet out there.

Did you know anything more about the failure to locate those carriers during that period than was available to you here? These reports that seem to have been available here purport to locate the carriers at certain Japanese ports because that is where they were last known to be, and they left them there until they found they had moved, but the reports out in Hawaii were a little different, they found they lost track of them, and the fact that they had was noted.

Did you know that fact before December 7, that the carrier had been lost sight of?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. How would you know it?

Admiral TURNER. I think I saw the dispatch from the commander in chief stating that fact, or else somebody told me that they had been lost sight of. But there was another [5197-A] very significant—

Mr. MITCHELL. Just before you pass that, we have not seen any dispatch from Hawaii reporting to Washington that they had lost track of a carrier. Is your recollection right on that?

Admiral TURNER. Maybe I am mistaken. I am not positive.

Mr. MITCHELL. When you say somebody told you, are you sure they told you before December 7 or you heard it afterward? I am curious to know how anybody here could have known it if their own ship location reports here did not show it.

Admiral TURNER. I was under the impression that they had received that information from the commander in chief, but it is very vague. I am not at all firm on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean you were under the impression, prior to December 7, that we had lost track of those carriers?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I will tell you the reason, if you wish.

Mr. MITCHELL. I wish you would, now that I have gone into the subject. What was your reason for it?

Admiral TURNER. A very significant thing occurred. I have forgotten the date. I think my recollection is around the 25th or 26th of November. For about 3 weeks the traffic level of the Japanese Fleet had been unusually high.

[5198] Mr. MITCHELL. You mean the radio traffic level, the messages?

Admiral TURNER. The number of messages and length of messages had been unusually high and had involved the entire Japanese Fleet and their bases. Suddenly somewhere around the 25th or 26th of November the traffic level dropped very markedly and the Japanese changed their code, or their cipher, and changed their calls. They certainly changed their calls, and I think it changed the cipher.

Well, that was extremely significant that very important operations were contemplated, and it was probable that nearly the entire Japanese Fleet had put to sea.

Well, that overweighed anything of this sort. I thought that besides the ships that were headed down through the China Sea the entire fleet had gone to sea. Well, now, where they were going to go is a matter that could be easily determined. One large part of them were bound to go down with the expeditionary forces in the South China Sea. As a matter of fact I expected more, a stronger force to go down there than actually went, a somewhat stronger force.

Now the rest of the fleet, including the battleships and carriers, could go one of two places: They could either proceed down in the vicinity of Eniwetok, of Kwajalein, or Palaus, or Truk to take up a covering position against any [5199] attempt of our fleet to proceed to the Far East—although such a proceeding was out of the question unless we wanted to commit suicide—or the major portion of the force could go to the eastward and attack Hawaii, either for a raiding or for landing operations, which we did not expect in the least degree because we analyzed they wanted the far eastern region and that they would make their major amphibious effort and their shore effort in that direction.

So that the possibility, the percentage chance of whether they would come to Hawaii or go down and take up a covering position in the Mandates, you could put that into anything you wished, depending on the person doing it.

Roughly, I thought the chances, as I had no other definite means, I thought the chances were about 50-50 that we would get a heavy raid in Hawaii or that the Japanese Fleet that would not be used in the China Sea would deploy in the Mandates.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you had an impression then, when you heard of the reports relating to the location of all these carriers and a couple of battleships, you had it in mind that there was a 50-50 chance that Hawaii would be attacked?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; at least.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you gained that impression around the 1st of December in connection with these ship location reports?

[5200] Admiral TURNER. No. That had been the opinion all along, expressed by the Navy Department, expressed in Hawaii, expressed by the War Department, expressed by everybody else, that

there was a strong possibility that there would be an attack, a raid, that is, against Hawaii. That was merely following along the line the Navy officers and Army officers had been thinking about for 25 years or more. There was no change.

Mr. MITCHELL. They had been thinking about it hard up to August 1, 1941, as all these plans against an air attack show, but we haven't found any officer here yet, Admiral, that has testified that they had any idea that the chances of a raid at Hawaii were any 50 percent. Some of them thought it was a bare possibility. Some didn't expect it. But they thought it ought to be guarded against, and so on.

Did you stand alone in your rating of the possibility of an air raid?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. There were a good many naval officers in the department that felt the same way about it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Then at that stage of the game, or on November 27, if the Navy felt that way about the chances of an air raid on the fleet in Pearl Harbor, why didn't they send some further message that at least mentioned the possibility of such a thing?

[5201] Admiral TURNER. That had been in correspondence right along. The dispatch of November 27 fully covers it, in my opinion. I think on the 5th, the afternoon of the 5th of December, after canvassing the situation with officers in my Division, I went into Admiral Ingersoll's office and we talked for an hour as to what more the Navy Department could do to warn the forces in the field, the fleets, what ought to be done, should we send any more dispatches, or what. We came, both, to the conclusion that everything had been done covering the entire situation that ought to be done and we then proceeded into Admiral Stark's office, discussed the same question with him for 15 minutes, and it was the unanimous decision that the orders that we had sent out for Admiral Kimmel to take a defensive deployment there were sufficient.

What was he going to take a defensive deployment against? Just one thing. That is the meat of that dispatch. It is all in there.

Mr. MITCHELL. You think that the defensive deployment referred to is necessarily covered by that provision in the plan which calls for participation in the defense of our territories in the Pacific against—

Admiral TURNER. Attack.

Mr. MITCHELL. Attack.

[5202] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, here is a message that says:

This is a war warning.

That is good. It says that—

an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

That is all right.

Number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, there you direct attention to the fact that your best judgment is that the indications are that there will be an expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, we will say that within a few days after that you, or at that time, you thought there was a 50-percent chance that that lost carrier fleet might be headed for Hawaii.

Do you think that this was an adequate warning? You were talking about the possibility of Borneo. Why not say something about the possibility of Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. The major effort, the major war effort, was definitely, or was defined right there, and that was correct. Well, Admiral Kimmel had nothing to do with that except as a later task to attempt to keep as much of the Japanese Fleet in play in the Marshalls as possible to give our resources out there a better chance. So that the order [5203] to him, and I again invite your attention to the fact that this is directed to CINPAC, the order to him is "Execute a defensive deployment."

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the admiral point out on the map the area that the Pacific Fleet was supposed to cover. It is covered at page 107 of volume 1 of this document. And none of those items are in the Pacific Fleet area. It might be good for the committee to understand at this point. It is page 107.

North of latitude 30° North and west of longitude 140° East.

(The witness went to the map.)

Admiral TURNER. The longitude was 140°?

Mr. MURPHY. North of latitude 30°, north and west of longitude 140° east.

Admiral TURNER. Yes. The Far East area runs across here [indicating]. This was the responsibility of Admiral Hart [indicating]. [5204] Senator BREWSTER. What was that? 144?

Mr. MURPHY. 140° east.

Admiral TURNER. This is 140 [indicating] 30 is this right here [indicating]. South of KYUSHU. Then all the way down here is the far-eastern area.

Mr. MURPHY. That would cut right through Japan, would it not?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; that would cut over here [indicating].

Mr. MURPHY. But the 140° line.

Admiral TURNER. It wouldn't go any higher than 30 latitude.

Mr. MURPHY. It is north of 30 and north and west of 140.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Senator BREWSTER. South of the tip of the Japanese Islands?

Mr. MURPHY. South. It would be north of the Equator and east of longitude 140° east.

Mr. MITCHELL. That line 140° east if projected down through the Japanese Islands, where does it hit in the Dutch East Indies?

Admiral TURNER. It didn't go north of—

Mr. MITCHELL. I said projected

[5205] Admiral TURNER. Down here [indicating].

Mr. MITCHELL. Both ways, it goes up through Japan projected.

Admiral TURNER. This is longitude 143 [indicating].

Of course this part [indicating] has nothing to do with the definition of the area.

Mr. MITCHELL. I didn't say it did, but we are trying to get the general location. As projected in each direction it passes through the Japanese Islands. Where does it land? Down toward Australia, New Guinea?

Admiral TURNER. It strikes New Guinea about 1° west of the dividing line between the Netherlands and British New Guinea.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was the area west of that, south of 30, that was in the area that these tasks imposed by WPL-46 laid the burden on the fleet. That was the general area in which those tasks were to be performed?

Admiral TURNER. It was the area outside of that. This is the far-eastern area.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was the area east of that line and south of 30?

Admiral TURNER. North of 30.

Mr. MITCHELL. That they were to operate in?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; north of 30 and east of 140 is [5206] the Pacific area.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that cover the ground?

Mr. MURPHY. No. 2 would be—

north of the equator and east of longitude 140 east.

No. 3:

south of the equator, and east of longitude 180 to the South American Coast, and longitude 74 degrees west.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him locate one at a time.

Mr. MURPHY. No. 2:

North of the equator and east of longitude 140 east.

Admiral TURNER. Here [indicating].

Mr. MURPHY. No. 3:

South of the Equator and east of longitude 180 to the South American coast, and longitude 74 degrees west.

That wouldn't all be on that map.

Admiral TURNER. Pretty nearly. Across this way [indicating] 180, [indicating] and then over here to the Southeast Pacific area [indicating], which as I recall was along—

Mr. MURPHY. 74° west.

Admiral TURNER. There is something wrong about that.

Mr. MURPHY. 74 is not on the map, is it?

Admiral TURNER. There was a line that ran here—

Mr. MURPHY. 74 would be to the right.

[5207] Admiral TURNER. Yes. I will have to see that book.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. While you are at that map, Admiral—does it disturb you General Mitchell if I ask a question at this point?

Mr. MITCHELL. Not a bit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral while you are at the map, please point out the area coming within the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral TURNER. It was from the China Coast, latitude 30° north, over eastward to longitude 140 east. Everything north of that within the Pacific was under Admiral Kimmel. Then from the point 30—140 south to the Equator, everything east of that was under Admiral Kimmel. Then the line went on along the Equator to 140°. Then everything east of that, and I think that book is wrong—my recollection is to longitude 100, and that was in the Southeast Pacific area under another command.

I know that for a fact. That was under the command of the Southeast Pacific, responsibility starting all the way south, came up along 100 west to about the Galapagos Islands, then over to the boundary between Mexico and Guatemala.

Everything west of the west coast of the United States, Canada, and Alaska.

[5208] So that was the area under Kimmel's responsibility.

In addition to that he had a supporting task in a segment that went down here [indicating].

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, your message suggested movements of the Japanese in certain directions, either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or Borneo. Which one of those areas, if any, was the area covered by Admiral Kimmel's responsibility?

Admiral TURNER. None.

I beg your pardon, it doesn't say movements, it says "amphibious expedition."

Mr. MITCHELL. That is right, an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, one of the objectives were within this, Kimmel's area, at all, were they?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

The purpose in that was to indicate to all the addressees the major nature and the direction of the major war effort, of the Japanese.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think maybe the committee would like to have you take your seat again.

Thank you, Admiral.

Well, now in these conversations you had with Admiral [5209] Stark and other people in the Navy after December 1, in which you discussed at great length the advisability of sending some additional warning to Admiral Kimmel, did they express the view in your presence that there was a 50-percent chance, or anything like it, of this lost carrier group attacking Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. I would like to correct what apparently was an erroneous impression that I gave.

I wasn't thinking about any lost carrier group in particular. I was thinking about the major portion of the Japanese Fleet which we had not detected going down through the China Sea.

Attention was not centered on any of the six. My attention was not particularly centered on six carriers to the exclusion of others.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then on that basis, what did these other officers say at this conference about the possibility of a raid on Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. I can't remember any of the specific lines that the conversation took. We discussed what we had done and looked over the dispatches, looked over the charts, and just how much attention was paid to the question of a raid on Hawaii, how much of the time on other matters, why, I can't remember, can't recall it.

[5201] Mr. MITCHELL. Did you express your opinion to them at that time that these ship location reports that you had available here in the Navy Department at Washington, such as you had, did not, to your satisfaction locate the three carrier divisions?

Admiral TURNER. No, I don't think I mentioned that particularly. I think more than likely I mentioned the radio silence which was in effect, and the change of codes.

That would have been the natural thing.

Mr. MITCHELL. Bearing in mind all these plans and estimates that had been made over the months during 1941 about an air attack, all of them reached the conclusion that an air attack would be from

a carrier, some specified the direction and some hit within 450 miles of where it came from, they all emphasized the carrier aspect.

Wouldn't you place special significance on the failure to locate three divisions of carriers as indicating a possibility of a raid on Hawaii, more than you would the failure to locate some battleships and cruisers? Wasn't there any special significance in that?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I think we had failed to locate quite a lot of the rest of the fleet as well. Carriers don't go out alone, and the whole sum of all of the variables and all of the parts of the situation pointed, as I say, to [5211] me, to one of two things, and I believe we discussed the whole thing.

After reading these splendid plans that had been sent in by the commander in chief, and by the Fourteenth Naval District, why, my feeling was that these people knew their business. They knew what to do about it, probably a lot more than I did, or the rest of here, because they were the ones that were on the firing line.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, let's pass on to something else now.

I want to call your attention to the Japanese diplomatic intercepts setting up what was known as the winds code particularly, circular 2353 on page 154 of Exhibit 1.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The bottom of the page. Among the Japanese intercepts that were decoded, translated, and given to you, was that among them?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I saw it at the time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see the one on the top of page 155 under the same date, establishing a more abbreviated system for the general intelligence broadcasts?

Admiral TURNER. That is vaguely familiar. I won't say specifically whether I saw it or not. I think I did.

Mr. MITCHELL. The one on the bottom of page 154 is [5212] the one that is known as the winds code because some of the words there refer to east wind, west wind, north wind.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you know whether after the receipt of that and translation of that message on page 154, the Navy took any steps to put any monitoring stations on the alert to endeavor to receive that message when it did come, if it did come? Was that in your functions at all?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. Not in the least. It was Communications.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have to go to them for the story?

Admiral TURNER. I understand it was done, but I know nothing about the details.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have no accurate and detailed information as to what monitoring stations were available and whether they had Japanese language representatives?

Admiral TURNER. I know several places. I know they had them in Guam, Samoa, Pearl, and Bainbridge Island.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you know whether they had Japanese language men listening on those or whether each was equipped with a Japanese language man, or would I have to go to Communications for that?

Admiral TURNER. Well, that would depend on whether [5213] this was voice or key procedure. I believe that we did not at that time, at least I had never heard of it. I believe we ourselves did not monitor voice circuits, but depended on the FCC and other services.

That is what I was told.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, we will let that go because we will get the accurate information from Communications.

Now, after this intercept of the 19th of November, translated November 28, was received, and you saw it, did you ever have given to you, prior to December 7, any "execute message" using that code which used the words, east wind rain, or west wind clear, or north wind cloudy, meaning war with the United States, war with Britain, and war with Russia?

Did you ever have a message of that kind given you among the information you received?

Do you understand my question?

Admiral TURNER. I understand thoroughly. I would like to start with what happened and then give you a direct answer.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right, tell it your own way.

[5214] Admiral TURNER. On Friday afternoon, I think it was—

Mr. KEEFE. What date was that?

Admiral TURNER (continuing). Of December 5 Admiral Noyes called me on the telephone or the interphone, I do not know which, and said "The weather message," or words to this effect, "The first weather message has come in" and I said, "What did it say?" And he said, "North wind clear." And I said, "Well, there is something wrong about that," and he said, "I think so, too," and he hung up.

I never saw a draft of that, I do not know from my own knowledge where he got it from. I assumed until recently that it was an authentic message. From what I can determine since coming back here it was something entirely different, but it was never told to me. If it had come in and had been authentic I am certain that I would have received a copy of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the phrase in English for "War with the United States" which would have been used in such a message was the phrase "East wind rain."

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever see that?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The phrase in case there was war with [5215] Russia was "north wind cloudy."

Admiral TURNER. Well, maybe it was "cloudy" instead of "clear" but it was "north wind," which was ridiculous.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, maybe this will refresh your recollection: In the FCC report of their monitoring station, which will go in evidence here and was offered in evidence in one of the other inquiries, that FCC station record shows that they intercepted a weather broadcast from the Tokyo station transmitted at approximately 2200 Greenwich meridian time December 4, 1941 and the Japanese language man at that monitoring station reported that he had heard words to this effect:

Tokyo today north wind, slightly stronger; may become cloudy tonight; tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Now, you will notice that that comes close to the phrase "North wind cloudy," which meant war with Russia, but doesn't quite fit in with the man that picked it up. Could that have been the message?

Admiral TURNER. I think it is. It comes even closer to my recollection, which is very distinct, "North wind clear." Now, he was being rather guarded.

Mr. MITCHELL. Maybe he is right about that because he said "North wind and may become cloudy," which would indicate [5216] at the time it was clear, would it not?

Now, there is another message that was intercepted by the FCC on December 7th at approximately 2130 Greenwich meridian time—no, I have got that wrong. This is another one, exhibit 3, intercepted 2130 Greenwich meridian time December 5, 1941 and this message says:

Today north wind; morning cloudy; afternoon clear.

and still that was not quite "North wind cloudy." Was that the one?

Admiral TURNER. It might have been that message; I do not know. He only called me once and that was, to the best of my recollection, in the late afternoon of the 5th, which would have been about 22 or 23 hundred Greenwich time.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you are sure that was "North wind" and not "East wind," though?

Admiral TURNER. I am sure it was "North wind" because I questioned it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, here is a final report of the FCC station, a message from Tokyo station transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 Greenwich meridian time, December 8, 1941. That would be December 7 here, would it not, Greenwich meridian time, December 8?

Admiral TURNER. No; it is 5 hours earlier than that the same date.

[5217] Mr. MITCHELL. Five hours earlier?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, here is the English translation:

This is in the middle of the news but today especially at this point we are giving the weather forecast: West wind clear.

Now, that was the exact phrase set up in the winds code for war with Great Britain and that came in after the attack at Pearl Harbor. Did you ever see or hear of that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I saw that. That is, I have a strong recollection of having seen that.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is some evidence here that Captain McCollum sometime between the 1st of December and the 7th of December indicated or showed a view that some further warning ought to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and I was here yesterday when Senator Ferguson read my testimony from the Navy court of inquiry, and I was a little confused in that. I had nothing to refer to, I had not received any warning of more than 2 or 3 days about the proceedings and since that time in going over it myself and thinking about it I arrived at what I believe is a correct statement on that subject.

From time to time Captain McCollum would come to me with [5218] drafts of memoranda to the CNO concerning the situation and we would discuss them. I think that he had such a memorandum about the 1st of December but I do not believe that it was intended to

go out as a dispatch but was merely for the information of the Chief of Naval Operations. Now, I have not seen such a memorandum but I have a recollection of that.

Now, about the 1st or 2d of December—and this is sure, I am completely sure of this, I remember it very distinctly—about the 1st or 2d of December Commander McCollum came into my office and handed me a proposed dispatch written on one sheet of paper and approximately the length of the dispatch of November 27 which he proposed that the Chief of Naval Operations send out to the fleets concerning the imminence of war. It covered the same ground approximately as the CNO dispatches of the 24th and the 27th.

Now, I know that Admiral Wilkinson and some other officers in ONI had seen those two dispatches and I asked McCollum if he had seen them.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean seen the officers or seen the dispatches?

Admiral TURNER. If he had seen the two dispatches of the 24th and 27th, and he said, "No." So I pulled the two dispatches out and handed them to him and said, "Well, read these over and then see if you think your dispatch ought to go."

[5219] He sat down and read them over and handed them back to me and he said, "No," and tore up his proposed dispatch. It had the same general coverage but was not as specific as these two messages.

Mr. MITCHELL. Not as specific as those two that were sent?

Admiral TURNER. Not quite, no, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Can you give us any more information from your recollection as to what his proposed dispatch contained?

Admiral TURNER. I agreed with it entirely, he and I agreed on the situation and he was afraid that a warning had not been sent out and he had prepared himself a dispatch which he wanted to send out to the commander in chief. I did not ask him not to send it but I just merely said, "See if you think it ought to go after you read these dispatches" and he read the two dispatches and he said, "No." He said, "That is enough."

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, turning now to the messages that were intercepted between Japan and her ambassadors here in Washington on the day of the 6th and 7th of December 1941, what are known as the pilot message, the fourteen part message and the 1 p. m. message, when did you first have called to your attention or see any part or all of those messages? You know what I am talking about?

[5220] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I think I testified that my recollection is that some time just preceding the 7th, some night, and I now believe it to have been the night of December 6, about 11:30 p. m. an officer came to my house, and I was in bed, and went down and read a long dispatch in several parts. I believe that that was the dispatch in question. I asked the officer to whom he had shown these and he said, "Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox" and I did nothing more about it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, when you say that was the dispatch in question, my question was probably too broad.

Admiral TURNER. The first 13 parts.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. The first 13 parts, I believe.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What time did he say he saw it?

Admiral TURNER. 11:30 p. m.

Mr. MITCHELL. 11:30 in the evening at his house.

Admiral TURNER. About 11:30 at night.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of the 6th?

Admiral TURNER. Of the 6th, yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Where had you been at about that time?

Admiral TURNER. I had been home.

Mr. MITCHELL. All evening?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. That is confirmed by a telegram which I just received from my wife as to where we were that night. She said we were home and that is my recollection. [5221]

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, the next day what was the first hour you say at which you saw the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m.?

Admiral TURNER. I do not recall seeing the 14th part until after the attack. I did see the 1 p. m. part.

I had stayed at home Sunday morning and about 10:30, as I recall it, Admiral Stark called up and said there was a dispatch from Admiral Hart or a letter, rather, and he wanted me to come down to the office. I went down to the office, arriving there some time, I believe, about 11:15, it may have been a little ahead of that, and it was quite urgent that a letter be written to Admiral Hart and he gave me the necessary information. I went to my office and started writing the reply and had just about finished and looked over my dispatches for the day and Admiral Stark called me on the interphone and told me to come to his office. That, as I recall, was about 12 or 12:15.

He then showed me the 1 o'clock message and I asked him if any action had been taken on it and he said that he had called General Marshall or General Marshall had called him and they had discussed it and at first Admiral Stark had [5222] advised against sending anything further because it might be confusing and then he said about 3 or 4 minutes later he changed his mind and had called up General Marshall and had told him that he thought the dispatch should go and asked him, if he was going to send one, to inform the naval authorities.

Mr. MITCHELL. That dispatch he thought should go was one along the lines that Marshall tried to get through?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Calling attention to the effect of the 1 p. m. delivery?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; exactly, because it was evidently an ultimatum with something very serious attached to it.

Mr. MITCHELL. During the time that you were at home Sunday morning did anybody call you from your office to see if anything should be done about the fourteenth part or the 1 p. m. message?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; they did not call me at the house and I had an officer on watch in the office and he did not report that anything had been sent in there.

Mr. MITCHELL. And as far as the first 13 parts were concerned you satisfied yourself the night before that the Secretary of the Navy knew about it and who else?

[5223] Admiral TURNER. And Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Wilkinson. If it had been a change in the situation, why, I might

have called up Admiral Ingersoll and recommended something going in but it constituted no particular change; it was information of value and I presumed that either Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Wilkinson would do what they considered to be necessary in that case.

Mr. MITCHELL. The pilot message had not been called to your attention on the afternoon of the 6th?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I do not remember seeing that until possibly as part of the 13 parts.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the ordinary course of business the whole 14 parts and the 1 p. m. would go to your office as soon as translated, would they not?

Admiral TURNER. They would come to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. They would come to you?

Admiral TURNER. They were not delivered—well, they would go to my office but they would not be delivered to anybody else except me.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you did not get to your office Sunday morning until about 10:30?

Admiral TURNER. Until about 11:15.

Mr. MITCHELL. 11:15?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

[5224] Mr. MITCHELL. Were these messages, the translations of the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m., delivered to you then?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. I had seen them. I did not see the fourteenth.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had seen the 13 parts you told me.

Admiral TURNER. I had seen the 13 parts; yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. They were delivered to your house?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and taken away.

Mr. MITCHELL. But the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m. did not even come to you?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; they did not.

Mr. MITCHELL. As late as 11:30 Sunday?

Admiral TURNER. They had not.

Mr. MITCHELL. How do you account for that?

Admiral TURNER. I do not account for it.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, did you receive delivery in a locked pouch of the fourteenth part and the 1 p. m. any time on Sunday?

Admiral TURNER. I think they came in the locked pouch some time during the afternoon. The only thing that I saw or have a recollection of seeing was the 1 p. m. part, which was Admiral Stark's copy and which he showed to me.

Mr. MITCHELL. During this time after around November [5225] 27 to December 7, in all your discussions around the Navy with those in authority was any consideration given to the question of whether the fleet should be moved out of Pearl Harbor and sent to sea?

Admiral TURNER. No; there was not that I recall. I assumed that most or all of it would be at sea.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, why did you assume that?

Admiral TURNER. Well, that was the place for them under Admiral Kimmel's operating plan for their deployment.

Mr. MITCHELL. You mean that that was the place for them under your dispatch of the 27th ordering the preparatory deployment?

Admiral TURNER. Ordering a defensive deployment, yes, sir, and the commander's operating plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. And you say that prior to the 7th of December you did not know what, if any, state of alertness after the warning messages of the 27th had been established by either the Navy or the Army command?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, for that one dispatch, short dispatch from General Short.

Mr. MITCHELL. The committee may inquire.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now exactly 4 o'clock. We will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning. You will be here then, please, Admiral.

[5226] **Admiral TURNER.** I will, yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Thursday, December 20, 1945, a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Friday, December 21, 1945.)

[5227]

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[5228] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please. Counsel, I believe, desires to ask Admiral Turner again before turning him over to the tender mercies of the committee.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, two points were mentioned toward the end of your testimony yesterday that I would like to inquire about.

One is a statement you made that neither you nor Admiral Stark had any knowledge prior to December 7, 1941, as to what, if any, equipment existed at Pearl Harbor, naval equipment, to decode or decrypt Japanese messages. Had you no information at all about that?

Admiral TURNER. I did not know the details at all of the decryption methods or codes that were employed by the Army and the Navy except in a very general way. On three occasions, I think all three times at Admiral Stark's initiative, I asked Admiral Noyes as to whether or not Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart were receiving the same decrypted information that we were receiving here. I do not know that I specified diplomatic intercepts.

On each occasion Admiral Noyes assured me that since these dispatches were being intercepted by both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel, that those officers had the same information that we had.

[5229] Now, in the testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry Admiral Noyes states that he knew that the particular codes that we were using for the decryption of the diplomatic messages were not in the possession of either Admiral Hart or Admiral Kimmel and in his testimony he said that he could not understand how he could have given me any such information.

The only conclusion that I can arrive at is that I did not make my question to Admiral Noyes clear and that he misunderstood what I was trying to get at. It was true that Admiral Kimmel's organization and Admiral Hart's were doing the traffic analysis and that they had such codes and ciphers as were in the military's possession concerning Japanese naval codes. We were not doing that type of work here but only, as I understand it now, the diplomatic decryption. It is possible that Admiral Noyes thought I was referring to that type of decryption and not to the—I mean to the tactical type of decryption—and not the diplomatic.

However, as a result of those three conversations at three widely separated times during 1941 I believed and so informed Admiral Stark that those officers were receiving the same information on all decrypted messages, at least concerning the Pacific, that we had here in Washington. I now know that that belief is entirely in error as regards diplomatic codes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Noyes was in charge of what at that time?

Admiral TURNER. He was in charge—he was the Director—of Naval Communications.

Mr. MITCHELL. And if there was any one man in the Navy Department that knew what the set-up was about intercepting, decoding and translating these Jap intercepts, he would be the man, would he not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And, of course, he knew or must have known when you had any conversations with him just what the situation was?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And he would not have any object, of course, in deceiving you about it?

Admiral TURNER. Not the least. He gave me at all times all information that I requested.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, here is a situation where according to the set-up that you described and the responsibilities of the War Plans Division it was your duty to keep these fleet commanders fully advised and report to them any over-all information that affected the possibilities of war and, of course, it was not possible to discharge that duty if you did [5231] not know what means they had of obtaining information of their own. You could not do that unless you knew precisely just what they had and what they needed from you, isn't that so?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; that is not correct. It was not my duty to inform the commanders in chief as to Intelligence, as to information. It was my duty to inform them as to the major aspects of the international situation that might lead to war with the United States or might affect war with the United States. Sending the intercepts or summaries of the intercepts or evaluating them as to authenticity or probability was not War Plans province and we never under any circumstances sent such information out.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, these so-called diplomatic intercepts, this magic code stuff that you were getting here and seeing every day, did bear directly on the over-all situation, did they not?

Admiral TURNER. They affected very greatly our estimate as to the over-all situation. I will modify that and say they affected them.

They probably affected them in general terms about 15 percent, because we were gathering information from many other sources and we knew we were not intercepting all of the diplomatic dispatches.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, then, assuming the diplomatic intercepts only affected your estimates to the extent of 15 [5232] percent, in judging what you ought to communicate to the fleet commander it was important for you to know whether they already had available that 15 percent through the intercepts and translating of the diplomatic purple code?

Admiral TURNER. Yes; that is true.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Because they would understand—if they had at least the more important parts of those intercepts—it would certainly influence their understanding of any general estimate that we sent out from the Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. Precisely. Now, the situation was, though, as a fact, whatever caused it, that War Plans Division assumed then or believed that at Honolulu the Navy had a system and equipment to decode all that stuff when in truth and in fact it had not; that was the actual situation, wasn't it?

Admiral TURNER. That was the actual situation and I thought and Admiral Stark thought that we had taken due precautions to inform ourselves on exactly that point, but there was apparently a misunderstanding in the conversations. It was all done orally.

Mr. MITCHELL. Another question I want to ask you about is with reference to your statement that you submitted this warning message of the 27th and the previous one of November 24, submitted it or transmitted it, to the President. Now, [5233] did you do that personally?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. I left those messages with Admiral Stark with the understanding that he would clear them with the Secretary and if necessary with the President. I believe that he did in the case of both of those dispatches, but I have no knowledge except that Admiral Stark on one or both occasions informed me that either one or both dispatches, and my memory is not clear on that, had been approved by the President.

Mr. MITCHELL. Before they were sent?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Or after?

Admiral TURNER. Before they were sent.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, now, one of the things that the President was very keen about here was having these warning messages tell the commanders not to commit the first overt act and he brought that to Marshall's attention and they were careful to weave that into the War Department warning. Here you have a dispatch of the same type sent to the naval commanders and the President, if he saw it, apparently did not say a word about any overt act or anything of that kind.

Admiral TURNER. I have no recollection that the President told Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox anything at all concerning any overt act. The fact that the President ap- [5234] proved one or both of those dispatches, and I know that he approved them in general terms even if—

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you knew it because somebody told you so, isn't that about all the basis for your knowledge?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. My relations were in these—

Mr. MITCHELL. We are going to try to draw a distinction, Admiral, between things that you were told and things that you know from your own personal knowledge or activity.

Admiral TURNER. I know from my own personal knowledge that I was never informed that any such warning dispatches should by direction of the President contain any prohibition against any overt act.

Senator BREWSTER. Did he ever talk to the President about it?

Mr. MITCHELL. I am trying to get that clear.

You never did talk to the President, did you, about these messages, these warning messages?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You never took them personally to him?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. All you did was to leave them with Admiral Stark, with the understanding, as you put it, that he would clear them with the Secretary of the Navy and, if necessary, with anybody else, including the President?

Admiral TURNER. With the Secretary of the Navy and the President.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, you said before, "If necessary, with the President."

Now, was it your definite understanding that these messages could not be sent until they had been submitted to President Roosevelt?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. The messages were sent when Admiral Stark released them—gave directions to Admiral Ingersoll to release them.

I know Admiral Stark believed, and I believed, that certainly the President and the Secretary ought to be informed as to any definite war warning and as to any message similar to the one of November 24, because they were extremely important.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I was not asking you whether you had any instructions from the President about putting something in this message to warn our commanders not to commit the first overt act, my curiosity was aroused by the fact that the President had a good deal of emphasis laid on that, and he insisted that it be put into the War Department dispatch.

I was wondering how it could be that this warning message of the Navy of November 27 went over to the President before it was sent, and he examined it and approved it, and yet the message as drawn does not say one word above overt act. Would not you think, yourself, that if it actually got to the Commander in Chief in that way, and he had been so interested in the overt act business, he would then have made a similar suggestion to you or to the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. Well, Mr. Counsel, that would be a pure surmise on my part. I know that I was never informed—

Mr. MITCHELL. I think you were right about that.

Admiral TURNER. That the President required such a phrase to be put in the Navy's messages, and so far as [5237] I am aware, no evidence that the President directed the Navy to put anything about overt acts, as has been introduced in this inquiry.

Mr. MITCHELL. When did you first see the Army warning message that went to the commander of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral TURNER. It was when General Gerow brought it to Admiral Stark's office, I think on the afternoon of November 27.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that message had a provision in it about overt acts.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, and in it, the statement is made that you undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act—I am mistaken about that. I have missed where the quotation started. The message of November 28, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandant PNCP, for information to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, quotes the Army message which contains the statement that the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Then after the quotation is ended, the Navy message goes on and states—

WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in [5238] effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific subarea and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.

That is not a copy of the Army message, that part. That is an order from the commander in chief, or the Chief of Naval Operations.

I suppose you had something to do with preparing that message. Have you found it? It is on page 38 of exhibit 37.

Admiral TURNER. That was sent to the commander in chief for information, so that he would know what orders had been given by the War Department to their subordinate commanders primarily on shore, and so that the commander in chief would know what orders we were giving to those two officers of the Pacific Northern and Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontiers, as to what they should do, since those two officers, as soon as war eventuated, would come under the commander in chief for certain merits [*sic*].

Now, the overt acts that could be committed by those officers were possibly arrests—

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Admiral, excuse me, but I am afraid I have not made my question clear. I am trying to find out where you got any directions or instructions to [5239] put into a Navy command order an explicit direction to undertake no offensive action against Japan until Japan had committed an overt act. It is not the Army dispatch I am quoting from, it is part of your dispatch of the 28th that follows after the quotation of the Army dispatch.

Who told you, or suggested that you give this caution against the first overt act?

Admiral TURNER. The commanders of those two naval coastal frontiers—

Mr. MITCHELL. That is not my question.

Admiral TURNER. I will answer it, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. MITCHELL. All right, sir.

Admiral TURNER. The commanders of those two naval coastal frontiers were ashore in the United States. Alongside of them were Army commanders who had been given orders to commit no overt act, and it seemed entirely suitable in that case that the orders to the naval officers should be parallel to their associates in the Army.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, on that basis, why, then, in your November 27 warning message, in order to make it parallel with the Army order to Pearl Harbor, did you not notify your commander in chief in Hawaii not to commit the first overt act?

Admiral TURNER. The commander in chief in Hawaii was in a very much more exposed position where hostilities were far more likely to ensue than were the commanders of the naval coastal frontiers.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, I will ask you again if you will state to us just who was it? Was it the President, or if not he, who was it that suggested or directed that this warning against committing the first overt act be put in the message from the Chief of Naval Operations on November 28, which I have just read?

Admiral TURNER. I drafted that dispatch and put those words in, so that the actions of the commanders of the naval coastal frontiers should be parallel with the actions of the Army commanders who were their associates.

Mr. MITCHELL. But you did not want them parallel at Hawaii? Is that the way I understand it; you wanted different orders there? You wanted the Army to look out for the first overt act but the Navy not?

Admiral TURNER. The Navy dispatch of the 27th of November was written first. It was cleared and we were agreed on it before any of us ever saw the Army dispatch. I consider that the dispatch to the commander-in-chief of November 27 was couched in the proper terms to meet that particular situation, which was a very dangerous one, with which they were faced.

[5241] Mr. MITCHELL. When you saw the draft of the Army dispatch of the 27th and the words that cautioned against overt acts in it, did you inquire why that was there or who had suggested it?

Admiral TURNER. We discussed—that is, Admiral Stark, General Gerow and I, discussed—the Army dispatch for a few minutes. I do not recall the nature of the discussion. I do recall feeling, as I probably expressed, that the Army dispatch was not as strong as the Navy's dispatch.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, Admiral, I think you had one or two proposed corrections of the transcript of your evidence that you wanted to mention. Will you please do that now?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. On page 5130, the bottom of the page, I would like to clarify my answer as to the time, the hour of preparation of Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Hart's dispatch report of December 7 concerning the report of the Hart-Phillips conversations.

From a study of the date and time books of the two dispatches and a knowledge as to times of decoding and coding, and the times of transmission, I believe that I received Admiral Hart's dispatch of his date, December 7, about 11:30 a. m. on the morning of our December 7, and that I prepared a reply to it late in the afternoon of the 7th, after knowing about the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.

[5242] Page 5152, the first sentence, change to read "Maritime traffic between Hawaii and Japan ordinarily was much heavier than maritime traffic on the northern great circle routes."

On the same page, line 5, change the word "every" to the words "for a few."

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you want to add something about the ship location information?

Admiral TURNER. I have a little more.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me.

Admiral TURNER. Page 5152, the next to the last line, in two places change the words "no patrol" to read "a patrol".

Page 5153, line 7, change "maritime ports" to read "maritime routes".

Page 5153, line 15, insert after the word "because" the words "of necessity", and insert a period after "necessity".

Page 5153, lines 16 and 17, change the word "production" to "troops".

That is all, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now did you want to add anything to your testimony about the information available here as to the location of Japanese vessels?

Admiral TURNER. It may be that I gave an incorrect impression as to my impressions concerning the Japanese vessels that had been lost sight of by our analysts during the first [5243] part of December. I knew that we had not definitely located a considerable number of vessels of the Japanese Fleet. I did not identify them at all as forming any particular task force, but knew that a number of vessels of various classes had not been located.

I said yesterday, and was not too firm on it, that I believed I had seen dispatches or information here in Washington showing that these vessels had not been located, and that I did not agree with the deductions by the Office of Naval Intelligence that these vessels were necessarily in home ports.

A good deal of information was sent to the Navy Department by both the commandant of the Fourteenth and commandant of the Sixteenth Naval Districts, giving analyses of their information as to the location of Japanese naval vessels and the organization of fleets.

I have here two dispatches, one from each of those officers, dated November 26, 1941, which go into considerable detail as to organization and locations. They are not significant of the information that I believe I saw about the 1st of December, but they are indicative of the types of reports that were coming in every day or 2 or 3 days concerning the Japanese Fleet. I think that there were other dispatches than these about the 1st or 2d of December which gave estimates that certain vessels of the Japanese Fleet had not been located for several days.

Mr. MITCHELL. That last phrase "for several days" answers the question I was just about to ask you on that. You say "had not been located". Now our understanding from the old records in prior inquiries on the situation at Oahu was that these carrier divisions had been previously located up to about maybe the 25th or so of November, and then had vanished into thin air, and they got no further trace of them, there was absolutely radio silence as to all of them from that time up to the 7th.

So that is a little bit different from the statement that they had not been located. They had been once, and then they had been lost track of for that period.

That is what you mean by saying they had not been located?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think that is all.

[52/5] Mr. KEEFE. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of information, was there a lieutenant commander, or commander, Layton out at Hawaii, who was in charge of this matter of ship locations?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. He is the man that was sending those reports into Washington. Were you acquainted with him, Admiral?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I know him very well. He is at the present time, or was, Admiral Nimitz's intelligence officer, and during the time that I was out there, why, he was the adviser for Admiral Nimitz.

Mr. KEEFE. He was the intelligence officer for Admiral Kimmel, wasn't he, at the time?

Mr. MITCHELL. The evidence will show later, Mr. Congressman, that it was Layton who had charge of this ship location business; it was he who reported to Admiral Kimmel, and it was he that noticed and called attention to the fact that the carriers had disappeared.

Mr. KEEFE. I merely wanted to identify him in my mind at this time.

Admiral TURNER. There is one small point about that, at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the actual mechanical work of decryption was under the commandant of the Fourteenth [52/6] Naval District—

Mr. KEEFE. That was Admiral Bloch?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and not directly a part of the staff organization of the commander in chief?

Mr. KEEFE. I see. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair at the moment has no questions to ask, because I have missed most of Admiral Turner's testimony. Therefore, he will waive his right.

Mr. Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Turner, I desire to commend you very highly on the splendid record that you have made during the fighting in this recent war with Japan, as I understand it from the information you gave us. I understood you to indicate that you were engaged in some of the greatest battles in the Pacific area. Is that correct?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; the amphibious operations.

Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I commend you very highly on that. Any questions I might ask you about the period of time during which you served as Chief of War Plans of the Navy would not in any way reflect on this distinguished record which you have made during the fighting period, but I do want to inquire briefly about some of these matters that have developed during your testimony in connection with the period of time [52/7] during which you served as Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy. And I may say that my impression is that much of the information you have given us is somewhat in conflict with other information we have received during the hearing.

Naturally, we want to try to reconcile all of these matters as much as we can.

Now, how long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?

Admiral TURNER. I entered the Navy as a midshipman of the Naval Academy in June of 1904; graduated in 1908.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From what State did you enter the Academy?

Admiral TURNER. California.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, during what period of time was it that you served as Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. From October 24, 1940, to June 13, 1941—1942; I beg your pardon.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From 1940 in June—

Admiral TURNER. October, 1940.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. October 1940.

Admiral TURNER. June 13, 1942.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. October 1940 to June 1942?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5248] The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was your rank at that time?

Admiral TURNER. I came to War Plans as a captain. In January I was appointed by the President as a rear admiral. That was for the purpose of giving me rank for the ABC conversations. That was not a rank that involved an increase of pay. It was what they call a spot promotion.

In October, I believe, of 1941, I was promoted to the temporary rank of rear admiral, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and in December of 1941 I was made, given the permanent rank of rear admiral.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, during this period about which we are inquiring here, you held the rank of rear admiral either temporary or permanent?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, it was your duty and responsibility as Chief of the War Plans Division, to make plans for war in case this country became involved in war?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And also to direct any operations that might become necessary in connection with those plans?

Admiral TURNER. To give the orders for the initiation of operations and to give advice as to major changes or major aspects of the operations. Minor routine operations were taken care of by the Ship Movements Division.

[5249] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, most of my inquiries are for the purpose of securing information.

Now, would it be fair to assume that from the standpoint of the real effect of operations that the War Plans Division perhaps had the highest responsibility for the advice given to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Office of Naval Intelligence was largely charged with the responsibility of disseminating information?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But your Division, War Plans, was the responsible operations division?

Admiral TURNER. So far as regards the major aspects of war.

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The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you were kept fully advised and informed as to the development of all diplomatic relations between this country and Japan and other foreign countries, were you?

Admiral TURNER. I was kept advised and I think had fully adequate information. There were lots of details, of course, that I didn't know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did you reach the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable?

[5250] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. When did you reach that conclusion?

Admiral TURNER. I thought that war with Japan was inevitable for a number of years—for quite a number of years—before the war, that at some time the Nations would clash in war.

I became convinced that war was certain under the conditions that existed in 1941 during June and July of 1941, and that it was only a question of a few months at most before we would be in war with Japan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. During June and July of 1941, you became convinced that war, and you were certain that war between the United States and Japan would occur?

Admiral TURNER. Within the next few months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Within the next few months from June or July of 1941?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You at that time held the position of Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you express those views to other responsible and high ranking officers of the Navy Department?

Admiral TURNER. I did, and also to officers of the [5251] War Department.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did any of those other high ranking and responsible officers of the War and Navy Departments agree with you in that conclusion?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, there were quite a number in the Navy Department that agreed. I am quite sure that Admiral Stark had a strong opinion in that direction. I am sure that Admiral Ingersoll did. And other officers with whom I talked. They felt that the situation was developing so that we would definitely be at war within a few months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you knew that Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll, and perhaps other high ranking officers agreed with you in the conclusion and the conviction that you had that war was inevitable with Japan within a few months from June or July 1941?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I believed that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not Admiral Wilkinson agreed with those views?

Admiral TURNER. I knew then that Admiral Wilkinson did not agree with them. On December 6 he, much to my surprise, because I had not fully realized his belief before that, he informed me that he felt that I was mistaken, and I asked him, "Mistaken in what," and he said, "Mistaken that Japan would attack the United States."

[5252] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did you have the conviction that Japan would attack the United States?

Admiral TURNER. I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that was your conviction, that you have spoken of, that you reached that conclusion along about June or July of 1941, that it would be within a few months?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I did. I thought that that was a very important part, a fundamental part of a war that we would have with Japan. The Navy generally and the Army generally had thought so for a long time.

Under the circumstances that existed at the time of the outbreak of war, as I testified yesterday, I felt that there was at least a 50-50 chance that we would get a severe attack on, that is, a severe raid, not a landing attack—I did not expect that, because they could not do important operations in the South China Sea and also conduct an amphibious operation against Hawaii simultaneously.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The type of raid of which you speak was what did occur on December 7, 1941, wasn't it?

[5253] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, did you have any conviction in June or July of 1941 that this type of raid would be made on Pearl Harbor within a few months?

Admiral TURNER. I don't know that I thought a great deal about it at that time, because we were interested in the general situation, but it was part of our thoughts and part of our plans, I had written the draft of the Secretary's letter of January 24, 1941, which I think brought that matter to the fore, and so that throughout the whole time, and throughout the whole time I was here, up to the time of the war, here was a great effort being put forth by the Navy Department and by the fleet, and by the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare that position and the ships for just such an attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the effort was being made over a period of many months?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To prepare Hawaii for just such an attack as was made on December 7, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider the fleet in Hawaii prepared for that attack at the time it did come?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, within the limits of the material improvements program, I felt that the fleet was efficient and was ready for war.

[5254] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready for war within the limits of the material that we had been able to provide. We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the fleet and the command ashore.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it is probably always true, isn't it, Admiral, that the commander in the field, whether it be the Navy

or Army, always wants still more in the way of supplies and equipment and forces, doesn't he?

Admiral TURNER. Mr. Congressman, you never have enough, you always want more and you want things to be better.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think General Marshall conveyed that very clear impression to us and also the impression that he wouldn't be worthy of his command and responsibility unless he did feel that way about it.

Admiral TURNER. I agree with that, sir. I will say further—you were speaking of the Navy——

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Further, I felt from all indications, all my contacts with the Army, that the Army headquarters here and the Army in Hawaii had done everything that they could in the way of preparing for war. They were limited in a great many things [5255] but that was due to other conditions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I remember General Marshall testified that he had stripped practically every other post in the United States of vital aircraft and many other things in order to give it to the Hawaiian Department and that, he gave us the impression that that was the best prepared post in the Army of the United States in December 1941.

Would that probably hold true also as to the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. If I may say, they had also put a good deal of material, or were putting a good deal of material, in the Philippines and, of course, just by so much was the availability of formations, troops, reduced for Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As a senior officer of the United States Navy of long experience and the Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy on December 7, 1941, it was your conviction that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was prepared for war?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, back for a moment to the question of your views or convictions as to the imminence of war, please, Admiral.

You stated that during June or July of 1941 it was your conviction that war with Japan was imminent within a few months. Then I asked you, did you ever think an attack would be made [5256] on Pearl Harbor. I understood you to indicate that your conviction on that point was not quite as definite and certain as that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable within a few months.

Could you help me a little further on that point?

Admiral TURNER. I am sorry, I think that is the wrong impression. I was concerned at this time with the over-all picture and not specifically concerned with parts of the picture. Inherent in war with Japan was an attack on Hawaii and all through the entire time I felt that that was a part of it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But in June or July, Admiral, you had the conviction that war with Japan was inevitable within a few months?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that Japan would attack the United States?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Where did you think that first attack would come?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I thought the major effort, the major part of the attack, would certainly come, I mean, the permanent amphibious, the conquest part, would certainly come in the Philippines and would come either against the [5257] Malay Peninsula, Kra Isthmus, or against Borneo, thence Java and thence westward to Singapore. The Japanese were strong enough by that time to launch two major efforts. I believed that they were pretty well convinced, by June or July, that they could not detach the United States, although they continued efforts to do so, from very definite military interest in the Far East.

For example, if they had attempted to go down to the China Sea and to have made a major effort against Malaysia without having a definite assurance from the United States that the United States would not intervene, they couldn't possibly have gone on down without the capture of the Philippines, because it would leave on their flank an extremely important position, which we could build up and later attack them and cut them off from the south.

So that I believe the whole diplomatic effort during that time, the summer and fall, was toward getting an arrangement with the United States for us to keep out of war while they went after the British and Dutch.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of course, as subsequently developed, they did make their main effort along the line that you have indicated; is that correct?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you ever at any time think there [5258] would be a raid on Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I thought there was always a strong possibility and even a probability that a raid in Hawaii would precede any declaration of war and would be simultaneous with other operations. I always thought that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you thought then that probably the first thrust or the first raid that Japan made, and even before the declaration of war, would be at Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; unless we could build up their strength so great that the raid would almost certainly be disastrous in a large way for Japan. We were engaged in building that strength up.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You had that conviction then in June or July of 1941, that such a raid or thrust at Hawaii would come within a few months?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; unless we could be so superior in strength that they would be afraid to take a chance.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the Pacific Fleet based at Hawaii was prepared for war on December 7, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. That was my conviction.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And was it sufficient at that time to have defeated or greatly reduce the effect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if it had been fully alerted?

Admiral TURNER. I believe so.

[5259] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the raid made by Japan on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, could have been defeated or the effect of that raid greatly reduced if proper measures had been taken by the local commander?

Admiral TURNER. I believe so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, after seeing these various messages that were intercepted from Japan along during the period immediately preceding December 7, 1941, for a few weeks before that, did your conviction become firmer and stronger that war with Japan was inevitable?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and it was daily approaching the point where it would occur.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent?

Admiral TURNER. Probable.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you say you drafted the war warning message of November 27, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that that message was adequate and sufficient as a war warning to him?

Admiral TURNER. I did, particularly with the addition of the information that was sent later concerning the Japanese destruction of codes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was one of the highest ranking [5260] officers of the United States Navy at that time, wasn't he?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He was a full Admiral, wasn't he?

Admiral TURNER. He was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Of long experience?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And regarded as among the best of the senior naval officers in the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. Indeed so. I personally had the utmost confidence in him and respect for his ability, and I believe that that was a generally shared opinion in the Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And it is your conviction if he had carried out the order drafted by you and sent to him on November 27, 1941, that the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor could have been defeated or the effects greatly reduced?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And that he had sufficient equipment, material, and other things necessary at his disposal to have accomplished that result?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, to have inflicted very serious damage on the Japanese Fleet.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated yesterday that in your opinion his fleet should not have been concentrated in Pearl Harbor on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

[5261] Admiral TURNER. I did not say that in those words. I said the business of the fleet out there was to be so deployed as best to be able to carry out a defense of the region and to prepare to carry out the other tasks of the war plan. If Pearl Harbor was the best place for them to be to carry out those tasks, why—and it might be a question of judgment on that—then Pearl Harbor was the best place for those ships to be. If it was the best place, if the best place was at sea, why, then, they should have been at sea.

Personally, I would have had them at sea, except those under repair.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You thought then that the ships and naval forces there should have been at sea on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you certainly do not think that they should have been tied up two and two in the harbor?

Admiral TURNER. Well, two and two was the only way that you could tie them up there, and, as a matter of fact, the antiaircraft fire, development of fire, was nearly as good, not quite, when tied up in that manner and, of course, in addition to that, and this actually occurred on the attack, the inside ships got far less damaged than the outside ships did; that is, the ones toward the water were the ones worst [5262] damaged.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. From a naval standpoint, could the fleet be prepared to protect itself, or maneuver or move about so as to not catch the full force and effect of an air raid of that type, tied up and standing still as if it had been out to sea?

Admiral TURNER. They could not maneuver, naturally. They did have the advantage that the waters of the locks in Pearl Harbor are very narrow. The torpedo runs were short and difficult. It was a difficult attack to make by torpedoes.

They had, presumably, around them the antiaircraft guns of the Army. And it was far easier to have a combat patrol of airplanes overhead in a defensive position, than it would have been if the ships had been several hundred miles away.

[5263] In that case, you see, it would have been necessary to have given the fighter cover over the fleet from the carriers, and thus take them away from any offensive missions which they might wish to undertake.

So that from many aspects the defense of the battleships primarily had advantages with them in Pearl Harbor over the conditions outside. On the other hand, being at sea offered other types of advantages.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you stated a moment ago that if you had been in command there, you would have had your fleet at sea.

Admiral TURNER. I believe so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then, considering all of these various elements to which you have referred, and considering it from a practical standpoint, it is your view that best over-all results could have been accomplished if the fleet had been at sea?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Just one or two questions, if I may, with respect to this message.

Well, was it solely within the discretion and jurisdiction of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, as to whether his ships were all in Pearl [5264] Harbor, as they appeared on December 7, 1941, or were out at sea?

Admiral TURNER. It was within his province entirely.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And he was the one that made that decision as to just what he did with his fleet and how he handled it, and used it rather than somebody here in Washington?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, the message of November 27, 1941, which was drafted by you, and sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, is

addressed, and, as I understand, was sent to CINCAF. Is that the commander of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And CINPAC. Is that the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. This message was sent to these two commanders who were at that time Admiral Hart, in command of the Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel, in command of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral TURNER. It was sent to them for action.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Sent to them for action?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5265] The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the word "action" appears on the message?

Admiral TURNER. It does.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, then "INFO," does that mean "information"?

Admiral TURNER. It does.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. To CINCLANT. Who was that?

Admiral TURNER. Commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral King.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And SPENAVO. Who was that?

Admiral TURNER. That is the special naval observer in London, Admiral Ghormley, who was there acting as the head of our naval mission to the British Admiralty.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then this action message of November 27, 1941, was sent directly to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart for action on their part, and was sent for information to the commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral King, and the naval observer in London, Admiral Ghormley?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and Admiral Ghormley was directed by the dispatch to inform the British Admiralty.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But that was drawn by you and was sent by Admiral Stark as an action message to Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

[5266] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, at my request, you have kindly indicated to us yesterday on the map the areas coming within the responsibility of Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel at the time this message was sent.

Now, in this message the following occurs about the middle of the message:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

All of those points were within the area coming under the responsibility of Admiral Hart, were they not?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. None of them were within the area coming under the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then, Admiral, if you had the conviction at the time this message was sent that at least a 50-50 chance existed

for a raid or a thrust at Pearl Harbor why did not, either in this message or in some subsequent message, you convey some more information to Admiral Kimmel on that point?

Admiral TURNER. The message tells Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment. That is [5267] perfectly specific and entirely clear and must be separated from the orders to Admiral Hart that the Pacific Fleet was to execute a defensive deployment. That is to take care of territory and take care of itself.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My purpose is to try to secure information, and I certainly haven't drafted as many naval orders as you have, and I wanted to get your views on that.

Then, if I understand it correctly, the part of this message conveying general information applied to both Admirals Hart and Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the part specifically pointing out these places within the area coming under the responsibility of Admiral Hart were primarily for his attention and only for information to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now then, following the words I have read from the message, ending with the word "Borneo," these words next appear:

Execute an appropriate defense deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

That part of the message applied with equal force and effect to both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5268] The VICE CHAIRMAN. In your opinion, Admiral, did Admiral Kimmel comply with that part of this order?

Admiral TURNER. He did not, in my opinion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If he had complied with that part of this order do you think the disastrous effects suffered by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, would not have occurred or would have been materially reduced?

Admiral TURNER. I think they would have been materially reduced and I believe there would have been a good chance of inflicting considerable damage on the Japanese Fleet. We know from experience now that an offensive raid by carriers against positions and against ships is very difficult to stop and almost always can get in. With the ships in Pearl Harbor, why, no matter what had been done I believe a considerable portion of the attack might have gotten in but it would have been broken up and been of considerably less effect.

We had land-based in Oahu at that time a total of 185 fighter aircraft. The total fighter aircraft that the Japanese had, according to my information, in their fleet was 112 and a portion of those and a portion of their reconnaissance planes were maintained over their carrier group for protection.

Now, if even a considerable portion of our fighters had been in the air and been able to intercept—and that is not [5269] too easy—why, I believe that the Japanese attack would have been very much less severe in its results and I believe then that we could have, with our land-based bombers, done considerable damage to the Japanese carriers.

We know, however, from subsequent experience that high altitude bombers have little chance of doing much damage to maneuvering ships. Our principal possibility of damaging the carriers, as was shown in the Midway Battle, is from the carrier planes that we ourselves have.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Kimmel ever reply to this message of November 27, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. He made no reply so far as I know.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did he ever acknowledge receipt of it?

Admiral TURNER. I do not know. That would not come to my attention. Probably he did. We know that it was receipted for by his communications organization. There is a difference between acknowledge and receipt. When an operator finishes sending a dispatch the operator at the other end receipts for the dispatch.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand that.

Admiral TURNER. But "acknowledge" means that it has gone to the commander in chief and he has seen it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I can understand that, Admiral, but here was an important action order drawn by you and issued by [5270] the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander of the Pacific Fleet. Now, did you ever receive any information that he got that message?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. The standing orders at that time were that whenever an operating dispatch went to an officer he was required to acknowledge. Now, that part of it would have come under Communications people to check. I think there is no question but that he did receive it.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. May I ask counsel on that point whether or not the record shows that the Admiral did reply?

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. That he did reply.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is no question but what he got it. We have not put in evidence the receipt for it. He actually got it, there is no question about that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have any record of any message from him making acknowledgment?

Mr. GESELL. No.

Mr. MITCHELL. We haven't got any of that information. We can look at the communications record; but there isn't any doubt but what he received it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I have never understood that there [5271] was any question about Admiral Kimmel receiving it.

Mr. MITCHELL. No, there is not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But the point I had in mind in this question, Admiral, was to check you a little bit, as well as Admiral Kimmel. If you drew an important action order to go to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, I was just wondering why you did not have the interest, or even the curiosity, to satisfy yourself as to whether he got that directive order or not.

Admiral TURNER. Mr. Congressman, I will agree that the word "Acknowledge" should have been on the end of that message. It would have been a proper thing to do.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You should have included that word "Acknowledgment" at the end of this message you drafted?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I believe so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But even not having included that word "Acknowledgment" at the end of the message, didn't you have the interest, or at least the curiosity, to satisfy yourself as to whether Admiral Kimmel received it or not?

Admiral TURNER. I knew that it had gotten into the Communications organization of Admiral Kimmel because our radio people never quit until they get an "R" for it. Now, the chances of a dispatch like that being lost in the Communications organization without getting to Admiral Kimmel may be [5272] one in a million; I doubt if they are that much.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I can understand that but what I was trying to get at is whether you felt an interest in the matter sufficient to want to satisfy yourself that Admiral Kimmel received it?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, I was satisfied he had it, perfectly satisfied.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Without ever inquiring or checking it or indicating any further interest on your part, you were satisfied that he got it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not have any information as to what he had done, if anything, after receiving it, did you?

Admiral TURNER. None.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, if he had complied with this message of November 27, 1941, would his command have been properly alerted? In other words, was this message of November 27 to him sufficient to require the proper alert of his command?

Admiral TURNER. I believe it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And if he had complied with this message his command would have been on the proper alert?

Admiral TURNER. I believe so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Do you have any knowledge or any [5273] information as to why Admiral Kimmel did not so alert his command?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have not received any information since then that would indicate to you why he did not alert his command or comply with this order as you had written it and had intended it?

Admiral TURNER. I have never seen a report on the subject by Admiral Kimmel. I have not read any of the testimony given before the various courts of inquiry from officers of the fleet or in Hawaii. The only things that I have seen on it are matters that have appeared in the newspapers and reading the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you continued as Chief of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department from December 7, 1941, until June of 1942, didn't you?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. If Admiral Kimmel had made any report or conveyed any information to the Navy Department as to the reasons for his action or lack of action on that it would have come to your attention, wouldn't it?

Admiral TURNER. I believe so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Any you never received any such information?

[5274] Admiral TURNER. I have no recollection of receiving any explanation at all. We received further dispatches as to action being taken subsequently by Admiral Kimmel but I have no recollection of an explanation.

I read, also, in addition to the other matters I mentioned, I read the report of the Roberts Board.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, was it customary in the Navy Department when an exceedingly important order had been issued to a commander of an important part of the fleet, or in this case the Pacific Fleet itself, and that order was not complied with, was it the practice of the Navy Department to call on him for some explanation?

Admiral TURNER. The matter was taken out of the Navy Department's hands as regards responsibility by the President's decision to appoint the Roberts Commission and also it was taken out of the Chief of Naval Operations's hands by Mr. Knox's personal investigation at Hawaii.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that you do not consider that the Chief of Naval Operations, or you as one of the chief divisions under him, which was the Division of War Plans, had any further responsibility to inquire into the reasons or the causes for his failure to comply with your order?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. That was a matter—let me change that Admiral Kimmel was relieved from his command before [5275] he could possibly have submitted a formal report to the Department and once it had been put into the inquiry stage, naturally none of the naval officers would have expected him to make any statement to the Department, but only to the various courts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, almost immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, flew out in person, didn't he?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And made an investigation?

Admiral TURNER. He did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, if he found out anything about the reason for Admiral Kimmel's failure to comply with this order of November 27 did you secure any such information from him after his return, or anybody else coming from him?

Admiral TURNER. Mr. Knox made a report to the President. I do not recall whether or not I ever saw that report, or not. Shortly after Mr. Knox returned he made a very short oral statement to several officers in his office. I was present amongst them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, did that short oral statement which was made in your presence convey to you any information as to why Admiral Kimmel had not carried out the order you had written which had been sent to him by Admiral Stark?

[5276] Admiral TURNER. No, sir; no reasons.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, did you consider the Pacific Fleet as safe at Pearl Harbor as any other place that it could have been based?

Admiral TURNER. If I may, Mr. Congressman, before making a specific answer to that, I would like to put some qualifications ahead of it.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could not stop the competition with the witness. I want to hear the witness. There is a terrific noise coming from the left; I do not mean at the table here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the committee will be in order and also the spectators.

Mr. MURPHY. I do not mean the committee. I mean the spectators.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, all right, whoever is in disorder will now resume order.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, I am sorry to have detained you this long, but just as briefly and specifically as you can answer the question, why, that will be sufficient.

Admiral TURNER. The reason for the fleet's being in Hawaii was not for its own safety or its own security. The reason was for the security of Hawaii and the security of the United States. Hawaii was, under war conditions, a dangerous [5277] place. Any place where fighting is going on is dangerous. The fleet would have been more safe if it had been on the Pacific coast or if it had been in the Atlantic, but it was out there for the purpose of engaging in a fight with the Japanese and winning the fight.

So far as regards its own immediate safety, that is, the battleships, which was of far less importance than of carrying out its tasks against the enemy, there is great disagreement. There are two opinions as to whether it was better in port or at sea. Since then we in the Navy have maintained our ships in port many times against very severe air attacks because we had things to do in port, at other times they have been at sea, and under the conditions which existed at that time I, myself, feel that local safety could have been obtained better if the fleet had been at sea but, certainly, that opinion is subject to challenge.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, considering the world condition as it existed at that time did you think it was appropriate and best for the fleet to be based at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral TURNER. I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Inasmuch as I am compelled to go to the floor I would like to ask one question, if it is agreeable, prompted by Congressman Cooper's interrogation.

[5278] Admiral, you sent, or Admiral Stark sent, on the 27th of November this command message to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In which you thought you were sufficiently specific, in view of the possible danger, to notify him or any other officer in a similar position that it was essential that all proper steps be taken to protect not only the Navy, but protect whatever the Navy was out there to protect, is that right?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And on the following day you wrote and Admiral Stark sent an additional message in which you specified the Philippines and the Kra Peninsula, I believe Thai and possibly Borneo, as the more imminent objects of attack.

When you sent that message Admiral Hart had jurisdiction over all those places you mentioned in that message of the 28th?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. I know the 27th, but I am talking now about the message of the 28th, the next day. You mentioned all those points over which Admiral Hart had jurisdiction and you did not mention points over which Admiral Kimmel had jurisdiction.

Did you give any thought, in view of the previous message of the 27th, did you give any thought to the possibility that the emphasis that you placed upon the Philippines and Borneo and these other places would justify any relaxation on the part of the commander in the Hawaiian area whose area was not specifically mentioned in the telegram of the 28th? [5279]

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I did not. You see, that dispatch of the 28th, which transmitted the Army dispatch, was sent for action to the shore-based Navy commanders on the west coast and only for information to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet so that he would know of the several orders we were giving his subordinates.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the command nature and the imperative nature of the message you sent on the 27th, regardless of the fact that you mentioned other points that might appear to you and to Admiral Stark as more imminently in danger, would that have justified a prudent officer in relaxing his effort in that area though it was not mentioned specifically?

Admiral TURNER. We did not think so and reviewed that very subject, as I testified yesterday, on Friday afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, one other question. It is in evidence here that on the 6th day of December there was no reconnaissance of any kind, either Army or Navy, at Pearl Harbor; that the only reconnaissance within that region any- [5280] where was from the airplane carrier *Enterprise*, which was some 200 or more miles west of Oahu.

Would you say that you regarded the failure of any reconnaissance of any character on the 6th, the day before the attack, whatever may have happened between the 28th or the 27th and the 6th, that the failure to have any sort of reconnaissance at Pearl Harbor on the 6th of December was a compliance or a violation of the command order you had sent out on the 27th?

Admiral TURNER. It was a violation of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I want to ask.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire at this point.

Mr. CLARK. Following up the question that was just touched upon by the chairman, I have no disposition to be super-critical about this message of the 27th. I call your attention to the fact that after referring to cessation of negotiations it says—

An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

I am struck by the fact that is limited to the singular, and it continues—

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against

the four places you mentioned, all of which were in Admiral Hart's district.

[5281] In fairness to Admiral Kimmel, might he not have assumed reasonably from that that the authorities in Washington were expecting a movement only in the direction of the places indicated and not in his naval district at all?

Admiral TURNER. An answer to that, I believe, would be surmise, but I invite attention to the fact that Admiral Kimmel was directed to take an appropriate defensive deployment.

Mr. CLARK. I am not speaking of that at all. The thought in my mind is whether he might have been justified in reading this message and giving the words a simple meaning, that it was the opinion of Admiral Stark who sent this message, or in whose name it was sent, that there would be an aggressive movement and in the direction of one of these four places mentioned in the message?

[5282] Admiral TURNER. An aggressive movement.

Mr. CLARK. One?

Admiral TURNER. One. An aggressive movement was intended to include the over-all effort, military effort exerted by Japan. It was that Japan as a whole was making a move. That was the intention there.

Now with regard to the singular, in the next sentence, the opinion was rather generally held here by officers that the amphibious movement, amphibious expedition by Japan, only one at a time could be undertaken in sufficient strength. I personally feel that the dispatch would be improved by saying "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates one or more amphibious expeditions", but I think the singular in the first part there, as indicating the whole picture, is all right.

Mr. CLARK. I am only interested in the impression this might reasonably have made upon Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. You refer here to only one amphibious expedition.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And you point out the direction that the circumstances indicate it would take. Might that not easily have lulled him into some sense of security as to his district [5283] insofar as the opinion of Washington was concerned?

Admiral TURNER. I do not know, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. CLARK. I believe you testified before this committee that if Hawaii, or our establishment on Hawaii, had not been considerably damaged—if our establishment there had not been quite severely damaged—it would have constituted a serious threat to the Japanese flank as this large movement to the south unfolded. I think you said that in your testimony.

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I beg your pardon. That testimony was given by another witness. I have not made any such statement.

Mr. CLARK. I did not want to repeat if you did. What do you say about that now?

Admiral TURNER. The threat to the flank would not have been particularly serious for some months. It would, under no circumstances, have affected the Japanese action in the South China Sea and against Malaysia. We could not possibly move the fleet, as it was then constituted or as it would ever be constituted, direct from Hawaii to the Philippines and establish a base and leave all of those Japanese islands in between. We could not have supported the fleet. The only threat to the Japanese flank would be operations against the islands in the way of raids for some months, and that was about the only thing that would be done, the idea being that [5284] we would try to contain the Japanese naval forces and air in the Mandates and take them off the backs of our forces in the Far East.

Mr. CLARK. I understood you, Admiral, to say that the only kind of an attack that could be made on Hawaii would be by a surprise air attack.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and submarines.

Mr. CLARK. And submarines, yes.

Admiral TURNER. That is the only kind we anticipated.

Mr. CLARK. Now you do agree that a surprise air attack of the character made by the Japanese was a right risky thing for them, was it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Then why would they undertake that unless Hawaii was a serious threat to their flank?

Admiral TURNER. For two reasons. Hawaii was a serious threat to their flank ultimately, not immediately. In other words, with the fleet practically destroyed it meant that any action of ours against the Mandates with the idea of making an advance across the Pacific must be postponed possibly indefinitely, and that would give the Japanese time to get themselves set in a better defensive situation, and it might so discourage the United States—I think that is the second point—that we would be willing to let things go and leave [5285] them in possession of their spoils.

Mr. CLARK. The only thing I am getting at, in my own thinking, is whether the presence of our establishment on the Hawaiian Islands along during the days from the 27th of November to the 7th of December constituted such a threat to what Japan had in mind doing, that they would have been interested in taking a desperate chance on removing that threat.

Admiral TURNER. By all means, Mr. Congressman, from a long-range point of view, not very much from within a few months, or something like that.

But that was very definitely an ultimate threat against their position, because it formed a base from which we could undertake later strong operations.

Mr. CLARK. Then, as I understand you, while you expected or thought the chances of a raid on Hawaii were about 50—50 you would not have expected it to come for some months?

Admiral TURNER. No, no; I mean that was the time to do it right then. It was unquestionably the time to do it. I am sorry I cannot make myself plain. A raid on Hawaii, from the Japanese viewpoint, if successful might have such tremendous effects as to insure their success not only in conquering these positions but in holding them indefinitely.

Mr. CLARK. Well, now, to my mind that seems inconsistent with your statement that Hawaii was not a serious threat to [5286] their flank all the time.

Admiral TURNER. It was not any particular immediate threat that would prevent their major operations from being successful within a few months. It was a definite threat against their ultimate success in the war and holding their conquests.

In other words, whatever happened there at Hawaii would have very little effect on the operations for the capture of the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies and Malaya.

However, from Hawaii, with an intact fleet built-up—as they knew we could—we could, in the course of time, move across the Pacific, as we did, and then threaten their position and relieve them of their conquests.

For the immediate operations, unless we wanted to commit suicide, why, we could not possibly interfere with their success.

Mr. CLARK. Would you say the strategic importance of Hawaii increased or diminished or remained static from the 27th of November to the 7th of December, having in mind the movement of the Japanese south?

Admiral TURNER. Well, it remained the same. It was a fundamental of our position in the Pacific—for any future offensive it was fundamental that we should hold Hawaii. Probably I did not understand the question.

[5287] Mr. CLARK. I do not think I made myself clear; I am sorry. I really was thinking of the Japanese point of view when I asked that question. From their point of view, with this rather extensive movement unfolding to the south, did the strategic importance of the Hawaiian set-up to them increase?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, no; it was the same, the same as it had always been and the same as it continued.

Mr. CLARK. I want to ask you about the diversion of this traffic that you spoke of in your testimony. Was that known to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. All of those dispatches were sent to him.

Mr. CLARK. Did that or not enhance the opportunity for the Japanese to make a successful surprise attack along the route they did take?

Admiral TURNER. Not in my opinion. I think it made no difference one way or the other. They could have easily avoided any of that traffic. They could pass the trade routes at night darkened and they could send airplanes out to let them maneuver clear, and in fact the route through which they came was a normal operating area, they operated out there for maneuvers and drill a good deal of the time.

Mr. CLARK. You don't think the likelihood of the discovery [5288] of that expedition would have been greater if traffic had still been moving along normal channels?

Admiral TURNER. Not in the least.

Mr. CLARK. Now may I ask you one more question about the message that was sent by General Short in response to the message from the Chief of Staff. I believe you said you saw that.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. It had in it I think the phrase "liaison with the Navy".

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. CLARK. What did you make of that?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I assumed that full arrangements were in effect for the exchange of information and for the issuing of orders by one service to the other in such situations as the one service worked for the other.

For example, we had some fighters on shore and the Army was charged with the fighter defense. I assumed that those communications were set up and functioning and that arrangements had been made for full exchange of information and for putting in, or standing by to put into, effect operating orders for both services with the knowledge of the other.

Mr. CLARK. But the words in the preceding sentence of that message indicated that they had become alerted only as [5289] to sabotage.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct as regards that message.

Mr. CLARK. Now applying that same rule, would not you have understood there was cooperation between the two forces as to sabotage only?

Admiral TURNER. That conclusion is, I believe, entirely justified. It was not drawn at the time of the receipt of that message, although I distinctly remember the message and thought it was rather queer.

Mr. CLARK. I would like to ask you, Admiral, with the greatest respect, what other conclusion could have been drawn from that message?

Admiral TURNER. Well, another message had been sent by G-2 with respect to special measures against sabotage, and while I do not recall distinctly my thoughts about that dispatch, my thoughts at that time, I think that I assumed that additional reports would come in as regards the deployment of the troops.

[5290] Mr. CLARK. Yes; but that does not really get to my question.

Admiral TURNER. Your question is what other conclusion could have been drawn?

Mr. CLARK. That is right.

Admiral TURNER. I am telling you what conclusion I drew at the time.

Mr. CLARK. You concluded that other reports would come?

Admiral TURNER. Might come; yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. But as to the meaning of the Short message, when you read it—I am not talking about other reports, I am talking about that particular message, as to its meaning—what other meaning could you draw from it than that which I have just suggested?

Admiral TURNER. I think I should have drawn the conclusion that sabotage was the only one that was concerned in it, but I certainly did not draw that conclusion, nor did any of the other officers that saw it draw such a conclusion.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I am inclined to agree with you on that, but that still does not answer the question I am asking you.

Admiral TURNER. I am not saying we were right.

[5291] Mr. CLARK. Did that not raise even a suspicion in your mind that your order of the 27th had not been complied with?

Admiral TURNER. I remember the dispatch very well, and I read it over several times and thought it was a rather peculiar dispatch. It certainly did not have any connotation, nor does it now, that the action taken by the Navy was confined to sabotage, not the least, and I cannot see how that conclusion can be drawn, because there were additional orders issued to General Short with regard to sabotage, and knowing the order about sabotage had been issued, I just drew the conclusion that that was the message that related to sabotage.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Admiral.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral Turner, I want to refer just briefly to this message that was prepared by you and sent out on November 27. The beginning of that message reads:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Could there be any question about the interpretation of those words by anyone who was in command of a fleet anywhere in the Pacific or otherwise?

Admiral TURNER. I do not see now, and I did not see [5292] then, that there was any possibility of misinterpreting that sentence.

Senator LUCAS. Well, our main fleet was located at that particular time in Hawaii, was it not?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. You also state:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46X.

Admiral TURNER. "X" is a period, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. WPL-46, then. I presume counsel will probably ask you what WPL-46 is.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He covered that.

Senator LUCAS. You covered that thoroughly, so I will not go into that.

Admiral TURNER. That was covered yesterday.

Senator LUCAS. Presumably Admiral Kimmel also knew what that was, did he not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, in addition to that warning sent out on November 27, as a matter of precaution I take it, you also sent to Admiral Kimmel, on November 28, a copy of the message that was sent by General Marshall to General Short in Hawaii.

Admiral TURNER. The primary reason for sending that [5293] dispatch was to inform the commanders of the Pacific northern and Pacific southern naval coastal frontiers as to what orders had been given to the commander of the Western Defense Command.

Since those two officers, the commanders of those two naval coastal frontiers on the outbreak of war automatically came under Admiral Kimmel's command for certain purposes, it was appropriate that we should inform Admiral Kimmel what orders the department had given to two of his future subordinates, and that is the sole purpose of that dispatch.

Senator LUCAS. That may be the sole purpose of the dispatch, but certainly it also had a significant additional warning, it seems to me, to Admiral Kimmel, in view of the type and kind of message that was sent to General Short. He could not overlook the following day, it seems to me, a message which meant really action. Am I correct in that?

Admiral TURNER. I do not believe that had any influence in drafting that dispatch, because we were satisfied, as was the case, that General Short would show to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch which he had received, and which was identical with that.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming that he did do that, and I presume General Short did show the warning he received from [5294] General Marshall to Admiral Kimmel, but nevertheless, here was an additional warning to Admiral Kimmel that was sent from the Chief

of Naval Operations from Washington, D. C. There cannot be any question about that even though it may have been, as you have stated, insofar as the northern and southern spots were concerned.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I misunderstood you before.

I agree with that.

Senator LUCAS. Now, on December 3, the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington also sent to Admiral Kimmel this message:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Did you prepare that message?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, that was prepared by a subordinate of Admiral Wilkinson's, but I knew about it, and we talked about it ahead of time, and we all considered that that was an exceedingly important piece of information to send to Admiral Kimmel and to Admiral Hart, because the destruction of codes in that manner and in those places [5295] in my mind and experience is a definite and sure indication of war with the nations in whose capitals or other places those codes are destroyed.

Senator LUCAS. Am I correct in my understanding that that is about the last thing a potential enemy does before war is started?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. It indicates war within 2 or 3 days.

Senator LUCAS. I am only a layman, but I believe I can understand that, and I could understand that if I were on the ground and knew something about the burning of codes.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And especially in view of the message sent on December 6, which is as follows:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands—

He is talking about Hawaii there as well as the Philippines, and others, is he not?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; not about Hawaii.

Senator LUCAS. It went to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, did it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, but the "outlying Pacific islands," that was a phrase, while not appearing to be specific in this dispatch, that we used in correspondence and dispatches [5296] and indicated Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Guam.

Senator LUCAS. It further says:

You may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Did you prepare that message in exhibit 37, page 45?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. That was prepared by the Office of Naval Communications, but it was referred to me.

As I recall it, Admiral Noyes and I talked it over before it was sent. We held on as long as we could, and then it was decided that that was the last minute that was proper to send it. But we did not send that

direct to those outlying islands, because it is bad practice to give orders to subordinates.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. But this message did go direct to Admiral Kimmel, who was in charge of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Could I ask counsel whether or not the record shows that Admiral Kimmel received all these [5297] messages?

Mr. MITCHELL. It may be presumed he received all in this book. There is no question about it, that I know of. We can get the communications record, if you like. Everybody has assumed so, including his own counsel.

Senator LUCAS. Then on that same day, on page 46 of that same exhibit, you sent to the commanding officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, a message as follows:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included in your eighteen double five of third.

Will you explain to the committee just exactly what that means?

Admiral TURNER. That, Senator, is from the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District to operations, and gives us information. Now, it does not show information to the commander in chief, but customarily since they go out through the same offices, why, as the dispatches are customarily delivered to the commander in chief, undoubtedly they knew it.

Senator LUCAS. All right. In other words, on the 6th of December, this message came from Admiral Bloch, who was then commanding the Fourteenth Naval District in Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5298] Senator LUCAS. He advised you that the local consul—he means Japan there, does he not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. The local consul of Japan has destroyed all but one system, although presumably not “included in your eighteen double five of third.”

Now, under the arrangement that was had there between the Army and Navy, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, had the duty to inform General Short, as well as Admiral Kimmel with respect to this important piece of information?

Admiral TURNER. It was.

[5299] Senator LUCAS. So the result of all these messages that were sent from November 27 up to December 6 and the message that was received from Admiral Bloch on December 6 by the authorities here in Washington indicated, from the 27th on, that a serious crisis was existing between this country and Japan, and that war was imminent, if not inevitable, between these two nations?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. Now, after all of these messages had gone forward advertising Admiral Kimmel of the situation between these two nations, as the Chief of Naval Operations here saw them, what he did with the fleet upon these instructions was his own responsibility under Navy orders?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Senator LUCAS. I want to ask you, Admiral Turner, a question which probably is not pertinent or material, but inasmuch as a lot of

questions of that kind have gone into the record, I don't believe that I am going to be stopped by the chairman if I ask this one question.

Assuming that Japan had not struck Hawaii, assuming they had struck the Philippines, as it seems most Navy officers thought they would if they did attack the United States, what war plans did you have to aid the Philippines in the event that Japan struck them first and made a landing [5300] there?

Admiral TURNER. It was the same war plan, Rainbow No. 5, WPL46. That was a global plan and included orders to the Asiatic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, all of the naval coastal frontiers and the entire naval department and all of the services in the Navy Department.

Senator LUCAS. Assuming that Japan had not destroyed our fleet in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, would it have been possible, in the opinion of naval experts, to have given relief to General MacArthur and his men before they were captured at Bataan in the following spring?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; it would be completely impossible.

Senator LUCAS. I gleaned that from your statement a moment ago with respect to the fleet being a threat on the flank of Japan and I wanted to ask that question.

In other words, it has been stated many times—it hasn't been stated, but it has been questioned—by many people as to why we did not give relief to MacArthur and his forces in the Philippines after the Japanese invaded in December 1941.

It is your studied opinion now that, even though we had not been attacked in the Hawaiian Islands by the Japanese, we still would not have been able to deliver to our forces in the Philippines supplies and support before they were captured?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct. It would have been [5301] completely impossible. That is, from that direction. Now, we made an effort and got some supplies, small in amount, up from the south, but that had nothing to do with the Pacific Fleet. I believe we sent one or two submarines from the Pacific Fleet, but as far as any material effect on the situation is concerned, why, the Pacific Fleet could not have gone out and relieved the situation.

Senator LUCAS. Well, it was my understanding that a certain amount of relief did reach them, but it was only through submarines landing there at night.

Admiral TURNER. And a few little, small ships from the south.

Senator LUCAS. But so far as taking out the fleet to convoy a group of merchant ships with supplies and men, and so forth, it is your opinion that that could not have been done before we were captured there?

Admiral TURNER. It could not. The only way that could be done was the approximate manner in which it was done. That is, step by step, and that took 2 years.

Senator LUCAS. You stated in the examination of Congressman Cooper that, in your opinion, war had been more or less inevitable with Japan for many years. Didn't you say years?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. What factors did you take into consideration [5302] when you reached that conclusion years ago?

Admiral TURNER. The general national policy of Japan towards expansion in the Far East, starting with, actually, with their war with China in 1893, and the continuation of that; the growth of the militaristic spirit, the increasing education of the Japanese people to be completely submissive to the military leaders; the increased military influence in the Government; their actions in China from the earliest time, toward trying to get advantages of all kinds; their attempt to hold on to Shantung after World War I; the Tanaka Memorial, so-called—that may have been later, it may have been 1925—which, while he died, Mr. Tanaka was the epitome of Japanese aspirations toward military conquest and world conquest; [5303] their moving into China and refusal to make any arrangements, and gradually thereafter the formation of those associations “to bring light and happiness” to the Asiatic people.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it was the aggressive nature of the Japanese to expand that caused you to believe that sooner or later this country would be engaged in war with Japan.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and a definite crossing of our national policy and the threat to the Philippines and our position in the Far East which such aggressive tendencies had.

Senator LUCAS. Was there anything during that period, upon the part of any of the officials in the War, Navy or Executive branches of the Government that caused you to reach that decision?

Was there any action or any opinions expressed either in the War, Navy or Executive branches of the Government that influenced your opinion that sooner or later we might get into war with Japan?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, and on the part of the American people. The demand generally of the American people that we put an embargo on Japan for some years, and the refusal of American officials to completely back down and let Japan [5304] have their own way.

Of course that is not a criticism of them, naturally, but our adherence to our policy right along in support of China, and in support of the British and our refusal to just let the field, leave the field open to Japan, let them do what they pleased.

Of course, that had a very definite influence.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, we would have had to forget completely about our basic and fundamental policies that we had pursued over a long period of years in this country, so far as our foreign policy in the Pacific is concerned?

Admiral TURNER. That is my opinion.

Senator LUCAS. And we would have had to yield completely to Japan if we wanted to stay out of war with them?

Admiral TURNER. I believe so.

[5305] **Senator LUCAS.** Now, do you know of anything in the last 3 or 4 months before December 7, 1941 in the Navy, the War, the diplomatic or any executive branch of the Government that tricked Japan into this war?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; far from it. We wanted to hold them off as long as we could and there was—I knew pretty well what people in all branches of the Government were doing with respect to this matter—and I think there was absolutely complete loyalty on their parts to the Constitution and to our constitutional methods of prosecuting foreign affairs and prosecuting war. There was never the

slightest tendency to do anything but what I believe was honest and sound.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Murphy has some questions to ask at this time.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Turner, as I understand it, you were very close personally to Admiral Stark prior to December 7, 1941.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I find at one point that before the naval court of inquiry you stated that your duties included being a sort of professional adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations in matters pertaining to military operations and particularly [5306] with regard to preparation for war, to future operations, and also in respect of relationships with the War and State Departments. Would that be an accurate statement?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; not too much with the State Department. I had some direct relations. It was mostly as an adviser on questions that were of concern to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you state before Admiral Hart that you considered yourself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers and that you were close personal friends as well as closely associated officially?

Admiral TURNER. I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, as I understand it you felt that the possibility of an attack on Hawaii was a 50-50 proposition.

Admiral TURNER. Approximately.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also felt that that would be one of the starting points of the war?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you in close contact with Admiral Hart in the month of October 1941?

Admiral TURNER. Admiral Hart?

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Stark. I beg your pardon.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to the file of [5307] letters between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel and particularly to a letter dated October 17, 1941.

Will you make that available, please? The letter I am referring to is dated October 17, 1941, and at the top of the page it says, "Received 23 October."

Admiral TURNER. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have that letter?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I direct your attention, Admiral, to the second paragraph, a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel [reading]:

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility." In fact, I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

Would you say that that was Admiral Stark reflecting a 50-50 possibility of an attack on Hawaii and that war was certain on that date?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. I was very much astonished when I first saw that because I had not and did not later detect any opinion

like that. Of course, with regards to the 50-50 [5308] possibility we referred to a time that was about 7 weeks later.

Mr. MURPHY. Except that you said that—

Admiral TURNER. And I do not believe that Admiral Stark held that opinion around the latter part of November.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you said yesterday before us that you felt that war was certain in July.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And when do you think the 50-50 possibility arose? Was that before when war was certain?

Admiral TURNER. War was certain. I believed war was certain, but in the event of war probably—well, right about the time of Pearl Harbor—I felt that there was at least a 50-50 chance that they would raid Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, what was there that occurred between July 26, 1941, and December 7, 1941, to change the situation so that it became a 50-50 proposition?

Admiral TURNER. I am afraid I did not make myself clear. I was satisfied in July that we would be at war with Japan certainly within the next few months. I believed during the first part of December that the probability of a raid on Hawaii was 50-50. There was no change, Mr. Congressman. I do not know that I evaluated it in July as regards a raid. I was certain there was going to be war.

[5309] Mr. MURPHY. I understood you to say that something happened right before December 7 that made you come to the conclusion that a raid on Hawaii was a 50-50 possibility or probability.

Admiral TURNER. Nothing occurred to change any relative probability there at all. I said that I felt that there were two methods, two strategic methods that the Japanese Fleet could pursue. One was to go down and base their fleet in the mandates with the hope that our fleet would go after them and they would be in a good position. The other was to make a raid on Hawaii. There were two major methods and without evaluating it too much, too greatly, I thought it was about a 50-50 chance of the raid on Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, as I understand it in July you felt that it was certain that we would be at war with Japan in a few months and yet in the month of August you made a report and a forecast that they would attack Siberia, didn't you?

Admiral TURNER. That was a possibility there and was a new development, and I believe that they had taken it in mind. You remember the attack by Germany on Russia was, I think, the 24th of June and by August Russia was in a—had suffered some severe defeats and there were movements up to Manchuria of Japanese troops which started, I think, along in the first [5310] part of August and continued on into October.

Mr. MURPHY. Do we have here, Admiral—

Admiral TURNER. Sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Do we have here available your forecast of the Japanese attack on Siberia in August? Do we have that available?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, I have that. I think it is the dispatch of the 3d of July, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, that would be a message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various outlying theaters, but wasn't there some fore-

cast made by you to Admiral Stark at that time, a written report or something, upon which this message was based?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Murphy, it is 12:30 and I presume during the luncheon hour maybe you can get that straightened out.

The committee will stand in recess until 2 p. m.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[5311]

AFTERNOON SESSION, 2 P. M.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Murphy will resume his examination.

Mr. MURPHY. What was the status of the record at the time of adjournment, Mr. Reporter, please?

(The record was read by the reporter, as follows:

Mr. MURPHY. Do we have here available your forecast of the Japanese attack on Siberia in August? Do we have that available?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, I have that. I think it is the dispatch of the 3d of July, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, that would be a message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various outlying theaters, but wasn't there some forecast made by you to Admiral Stark at that time, a written report or something, upon which his message was based?)

Mr. MURPHY. Do you understand the question now before you, Admiral?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I ask for a moment.

So far as I recall there was no memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations covering the subject matter of the dispatch of July 3, 1941, addressed for action to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and for information to a number of addressees. I beg your pardon, I have the 'incorrect reference. The dispatch I referred to is No. 031939.

Mr. MURPHY. It is the dispatch of July 3, 1941, contained on page 4, Exhibit 37.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. So far as I recall there was no memorandum on that subject. It was discussed with various officers, including War Department officers and officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. MURPHY. I understood your testimony to be that on July 26 war with Japan was certain, and that the probability of an attack on Hawaii was 50-50. Did you have that in mind at the time of the sending of this dispatch of July 3, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, ultimately, within the next several months. Also at that time, on July 3, owing to troop movements of Japanese troops and through magic intercepts which showed the Germans were urging the Japanese to join in against the Russians, it looked like the first move might have been against Russia instead of to the south, but I felt that that would be succeeded, if successful, by war by the Japanese against the United States; that in any war by the Japanese against the United States, where they initiated it, that there was a very good probability, on the order of 50-50 [5312] that the first move would be accompanied by a raid against Hawaii. That was—

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, can you point out to the committee anywhere, at any time, any single word in writing where you said that, anywhere, at any time, to anyone, where you made such a statement in writing?

Admiral TURNER. That is the 50-50?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. I am talking now about before December 7. Incidentally, I have never seen a Monday quarterback of a football game. What we want is what happened before December 7, 1941. Now, is there anywhere, at any time, where you said to any person anything like that in writing or to anyone in the Navy Department, any paper that will show it by anyone in the Department?

Admiral TURNER. No, not anything on the 50-50, but I invite your attention to the consideration of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, to the Bellinger-Martin agreement, to the estimates that were made by the Commander in Chief in his war plan and in his estimate, to letters between the War and Navy Departments as to the strong possibilities that war would be initiated with a raid, an air raid on Hawaii.

Mr. MURPHY. That was in the —

Admiral TURNER. On the 50-50, I was asked my opinion [5314] as to what I thought the chances were, and I said I thought about 50-50. I never put that in writing.

Mr. MURPHY. The letter of the Secretary of War and the letter of the Secretary of the Navy spoke about what would happen if there was an attack on Hawaii, but where do you find in either of those letters anything that would indicate that the war would start by an attack on Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. I invite your attention to the wording in the first paragraph of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24. The last sentence says:

If war eventuates with Japan it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.

That is, if a war under any circumstances occurred it would be initiated by such an attack. That is the same thought that is in the Martin-Bellinger agreement, it is the same thought that many, many officers of the Navy Department and the War Department have had for many years, that the war would probably start and be fought generally in the Asiatic lands but it would be accompanied by an air raid and an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will you point out anything in your [5315] estimate of the situation of July 3, 1941, that would point anything like that out or indicate anything like that? That was a current estimate of the situation, wasn't it, July 3d?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct. As I have mentioned before, this was the major—it was speaking of the major principles—and inherent in any eventual war with Japan was the belief in the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, is there anything like that in your dispatch of July 3, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. That is not mentioned there.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 108 of the Navy's Narrative Statement of Evidence in the Pearl Harbor

Investigation, volume 1. Do you have a copy that the Admiral can use?

Mr. GESELL. No; we do not have a copy.

Mr. MURPHY. Does anyone have a copy of volume 1 that he might let the Admiral use?

Admiral TURNER. I have never seen that.

Mr. HANNAFORD. Here it is.

Mr. MURPHY. I am referring, Admiral, to page 108, in which is set forth section 1333 of WPL 46 and I will read section 1333:

To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward

[5316] (a) Capture of Guam:

(b) Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea by the establishment of advanced bases and by the destruction of United States and Allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon;

(c) Capture of Northern Borneo;

(d) Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Carolines-Mariannas area, by the use of fixed defenses and by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet;

(e) Reinforcement of the mandate islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces;

(f) Possibly register like stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

Now, I am wondering where in there there is anything that would indicate that there was a 50-50 possibility of commencing the war by a raid on Hawaii? That is the alternate plan.

[5317] Admiral TURNER. I said that my estimate was 50-50, and that that estimate was shared by other officers. In "f", which you last read, possibly raids on other outlying United States possessions.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything in Rainbow 5, section 1333 that agrees with your estimate of the situation?

Admiral TURNER. That does.

Mr. MURPHY. Where?

Admiral TURNER. Possibly raids.

Mr. MURPHY. "Raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying possessions." You mean the 50-50 proposition would be covered in general terms in section F in what Japan would have to accomplish in her initial action, that the 50-50 proposition would be covered in section F, in general terms?

Admiral TURNER. This is a Navy Department publication. The WPL46 is a Navy Department publication. While War Plans prepared it, those estimates also reflected the opinion of the War Department, and that is the official publication. I have not said at any time that either the War Department or the Navy Department thought there would be a 50-50 chance of a raid on Hawaii, because I do not believe they did.

Mr. MURPHY. Your message, Admiral, of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel tells him "Execute an appropriate defensive [5318] deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46", and when you go to WPL46, to section 1333, I do not see the name of Hawaii mentioned.

Admiral TURNER. Those are not the tasks. The tasks were read yesterday, and the defensive task read yesterday was the task requiring the defense of the Territory of the Associated Powers. This is part of the estimate which is in the front part of WPL 46.

Mr. MURPHY. It does say, however, Admiral, "to accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be outlined in these paragraphs," doesn't it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. Those are not the tasks.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the tasks are in section 3212, are they not? The tasks are on page 103, and I find on page 103 of volume 1 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence in the Pearl Harbor Investigations paragraphs A, B, G, H, and I of the Rainbow Plan, or WPL 46, reading as follows:

The U. S. Pacific Fleet is assigned the following tasks Pacific areas, and then there is outlined "A" which pertains to the Malay Barrier. Let me read it exactly:

Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and [5319] positions.

B. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.

G. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling as required by circumstances and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

H. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of any military power in the Western Hemisphere by supporting land and air forces and denying the enemy the use of such positions in that hemisphere.

And

I. Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

That would cover Hawaii in H and I, would it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. There are tasks omitted, of course.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. They are in the record as you read them yesterday.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you see anything in section 3212 that would make Hawaii a 50-50 proposition for a starting point in case of war?

[5320] **Admiral TURNER.** There is no estimate in there as to a 50-50 chance. It orders him to protect the territory.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, I would like to direct your attention to the memorandum that was given to the President of the United States on November 5, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations. Will you kindly look at that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I see it.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention, if you please, to page 13:

The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war in cooperation with the British and Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced.

I assume you are referring there only to the Far East as apart and distinct from the Pacific?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, down below:

The potency of this threat will then have increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the area south and west of the Philippines.

In that memorandum of the 5th of November there is a statement from the Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark to the effect, as I read it, that if we succeeded in building up our [5321] forces as expected at that time, that we would deter Japan from going to war. Is that right?

Admiral TURNER. That is in there; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And yet you say we were certain we were going to war back in July.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you change your estimate now, in view of the memorandum which was prepared by your department, I take it, on the 5th of November 1941?

Admiral TURNER. That was prepared in cooperation with the War Department and represents the views held at that time by the War Department and by the Navy Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, what were your views as to the certainty of war at the time this statement was issued?

Admiral TURNER. I believed it was certain.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not believe then what was being told the President as the true reflection of the true situation at that time?

Admiral TURNER. I thought that the increase of forces in the Philippines as then planned would be a deciding factor in deterring them.

Mr. MURPHY. If it did deter them would war be certain? I mean those statements are contradictory, I take it. You said war was certain back in July. On the 5th of November, [5322] there is a statement to the President by the leader of each force, the Navy and Army, that we may avoid war by having the necessary forces there, and deter the Japs from going to war, as I read it.

Admiral TURNER. That is the statement by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations.

[5323] Mr. MURPHY. Did you agree with that?

Admiral TURNER. I did not agree that any plan of reinforcement of the Philippines would be a deciding factor in deterring Japan from making war.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, did you ever express yourself in that manner to Admiral Stark?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is there anything in writing anywhere that will show your attitude at that time as head of the War Plans Division.

Admiral TURNER. No, I do not believe there is.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, at that time, 1 month preceding Pearl Harbor, when the Navy and Army were giving the President an estimate of the situation, it was at variance with the opinion of the Chief of the War Plans Division of the Navy; is that right?

Admiral TURNER. In that sentence; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, you have stated on the record that you believed that war was certain in July of 1941, and I take it that your reason for stating that was because of these economic sanctions, or was it because of the course of action which Japan had been pursuing ever since 1931?

Admiral TURNER. The course of action which Japan had [5324] been pursuing, and the course of our diplomatic negotiations with them, and recent statements by the Japanese, because the economic sanctions were not put on until the 26th of July, I think.

Mr. MURPHY. The Army witnesses before us testified that they had given an opinion to their superiors, and to the President in their estimates of the situation, in which they encouraged the placing of economic sanctions. Was the Navy ever asked for its opinion and did they express it?

Admiral TURNER. It was asked for its opinion on several occasions. Admiral Stark was asked for an opinion by either Secretary Hull or Secretary Knox. I discussed the matter with him several times, and each time expressed the view that the putting on of economic sanctions would hasten the war with Japan and make it almost certain.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, assuming that we did not put economic sanctions on, that we would have continued to give them scrap, we would have continued to give them oil, they would have continued to build up their war machine, do you believe if we had not put the sanctions on them that would have resisted the onward advance of their military forces?

Admiral TURNER. I did not say that I opposed putting on the economic sanctions. I merely said—which I believed and which is borne out to be correct—that putting the [5325] economic sanctions on would hasten war, and I think it had a very decided influence in hastening the war.

Mr. MURPHY. You think then, if we had not put the economic sanctions on, and Japan had built up its forces, that they would have been law-abiding citizens?

Admiral TURNER. I said hastening war. It would not have prevented it at all. The only object that I could see in putting off the war with Japan was so we could get our war potential higher. We were improving at a rate considerably greater than the Japanese were during the fall of 1941.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I take it while you say you felt in time that war with Japan was certain, you felt it was certain, did you not, back in January when you prepared that letter for the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. My statement, as I recall it, was not that it was certain. I said I felt for many years that ultimately war was inevitable with Japan and I became convinced in about June and July that war was imminent within the next few months.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you feel that way in January, that we were going to go to war with Japan, when you prepared that letter for the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. I believed it would come at some time.

[5326] At that particular time I felt it might be put off.

Mr. MURPHY. How long?

Admiral TURNER. No definite term. It might even be put off until the end of the European war.

Mr. MURPHY. What was your opinion in April of 1941?

Admiral TURNER. About the same, that it was certainly worth working for, to put the war off, and it was greatly to our advantage, assuming that we would be at war with Germany in the course of time, that we should keep out of war with Japan, if possible until after we had obtained success in the Atlantic.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you make a statement, Admiral, on the 17th day of April, to the effect, "I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike even against Indochina"?

Did you make that statement in writing?

Admiral TURNER. May I see what document that is from?

Mr. MURPHY. Referring to a note on the bottom of the paper headed "Memorandum for the Director," dated April 17, 1941, reading entirely as follows:

I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike, even against Indo-China. See my memo of Feb. 5th. R. K. T.

That would be you, would it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; that is my writing. The word, "decided" is underlined.

[5327] Mr. MURPHY. That is right. What did you mean by that?

Admiral TURNER. I meant exactly what it said. I did not agree that Japan at that particular time had come to a definite decision to send troops or to make war then against anybody, even against Indochina, that is "decided" as regards any particular date or period.

It was not until June and July and subsequently that I came to the conclusion that war then was imminent. At this time I still believed it might be possible to put it off, to postpone it for some time.

Mr. MURPHY. And yet you did prepare the letter for the Secretary of the Navy in January?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. That does not say we were going to have war, that it is immediate.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, will you produce that memorandum of February 5, to which you refer? Do you have that, Admiral, or can you get it?

Admiral TURNER. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I do not know what the reference is.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I was just wondering. You say there "See my memo of February 5th," and I was wondering what that memo would say.

Can you tell me where I could find it?

[5328] Admiral TURNER. I remember what it was. I have not seen a copy of it since coming back here.

About the time of the starting of the ABC conversations the British sent in a very urgent alarm to us saying that they had very strong evidence that Japan was going to attack Singapore about the 10th of February, and there was considerable excitement about it.

I wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations in which I pointed out that it was not possible for them to strike Singapore on February 10, because they were not deployed for it; they did not have troops deployed to the south, and most of their Navy was in Empire waters, and I discounted the report from the British, I said that they would not strike at any time until they had deployed their troops and had acquired bases in the south.

[5329] Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, I request the liaison officer of the Navy to find the exact memorandum of February 5 of Admiral Turner, so we might have it for the record.¹

May I inquire of counsel if this letter of April 17, 1941, has been offered as exhibit 81, but the particular letter and note of Admiral Turner have not been spread in the record?

Mr. GESELL. That is right. The entire exhibit has been introduced.

¹ The Navy Department subsequently advised the committee that search of its files failed to disclose a copy of this memorandum. See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5188.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask that the memorandum of April 17, 1941, and the note of Admiral Turner be spread in the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

In reply to No.
Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, April 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: British-Japanese Crisis.

1. On April 16, 1941, the Domei (Japanese) News Agency reported from Bangkok that repeated attacks by British troops on Thai territory along the Thailand-Malaya frontier caused the Thai Government to lodge a protest with British authorities. Domei said the protest was announced by the Thai Foreign [5330] Ministry, and added that no further details regarding these attacks were given.

2. For some months past the Japanese have been concentrating troops at Formosa, Hainan Island and Kyushu. There has been a gradual shortening of lines in Central China, and movement of troops from this area to Formosa and Hainan Island. There has been also a gradual reduction of Japanese troops in North China, which were in some instances replaced by Manchukuo levees. Within the last two weeks some 8,000 Japanese troops, 3,500 of whom had received special instruction in jungle warfare, left Indo-China for unannounced destinations. During about the same period, some 11,000 fresh troops from Japan arrived in Central China, and 11,000 veterans left Central China for Formosa. The Japanese Fleet is in home waters. A strong force is near the Palau Islands. It is probable that in case of a drive on Singapore, a strong flanking force would be maintained in the Palau Island area.

3. A report from the Naval Attaché, Tokyo, states that there are persistent rumors in Tokyo that Japan plans an early attack on Singapore. Although the Japanese deny this, credence is lent the story by the above facts, and by the severe blows suffered by Britain in the Balkans. Britain's merchant tonnage is suffering so heavily that the question of American convoys is coming prominently to the fore. [5331] Some move to keep the American Fleet in the Pacific and thus prevent the diversion of any American strength from the Pacific to convoy duty in the Atlantic would seem logical for the Axis to make at this time.

4. When to all this is added Japan's new position with regard to Russia, whereby she apparently has a Russian guarantee of non-interference in case of a southward drive, it may be that the Domei article is the beginning of a Japanese drive on Singapore. Newspaper attacks have often preceded Japanese military attacks, and newspaper attacks invariably precede the military attacks of her Axis partners.

/S/ A. H. McCollum.
A. H. McCOLLUM.

CC—OP-16-1
OP-16-F

[The following written in longhand:] The Japanese Fleets have been re-organized, also. C. H. C.

I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike, even against Indo-China. See my memo of Feb. 5th.

RKT.

[5332] Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral Turner, there has been some testimony by General Miles to the effect that during 1941 there was an attempt made by the Army and Navy to have the Joint Intelligence Committee set up and there was testimony to the effect that there was a preliminary meeting held but that no actual meeting was

held until after Pearl Harbor, and the reason given by General Miles was that the Navy could not find office space.

Was that the real reason why that was not set up?

Admiral TURNER. I can give you the entire history on that, if you will give me a moment or two.

Mr. MURPHY. I wish you would.

[5333] The VICE CHAIRMAN. You may proceed if you are ready, Admiral.

Admiral TURNER. Sometime in the late spring, I think it was about June, there was a proposal made to set up a superintelligence organization under the command of then Colonel Donovan, an organization which developed later into the OSS.

The proposal, as I recall it, was that the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Department, would become integrated into this new office under Colonel Donovan. That proposal so far as relates to those two divisions was opposed by both the War and Navy Departments.

Then there was a proposal made that these two offices would absorb Colonel Donovan's organization.

On the 16th of July 1941, the joint board considered a memorandum from General Miles dated the 14th of July, the subject Coordination of military and naval intelligence with the office of coordinator of information.

That was the one that wanted to amalgamate them, and put them all directly under the joint board.

And there was a memorandum on the subject also, dated the same date, from the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Now, these papers were read to the board, but the [5334] memorandum I had here, looked up recently, says they were not put in the file. They were summarized in paragraph 1 of Joint Board No. 329, serial 710, a copy of which I have.

Now, a part of the recommendation was that the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, should become members of the joint board and form an organization which would report directly to the joint board. That was referred to the planning committee, and the planning committee made a report to the joint board dated 10 September 1941.

In that report the Planning Committee, by previous or intervening action of the Joint Board, had stricken out the question of bringing Colonel Donovan's organization and also the Joint Board by an intervening action had decided that they did not want these two officers on the Joint Board because it would make the Board too large.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you oppose it personally?

Admiral TURNER. Oppose making them members of the Joint Board?

Mr. MURPHY. Did you oppose making the Office of Naval Intelligence a member of this board?

Admiral TURNER. That was, I believe, unanimous on the part of the eight members.

[5335] Mr. MURPHY. Didn't you express yourself personally on the matter?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why? Will you tell us what your opinion was and why they shouldn't have this working arrangement, so that Navy and Army Intelligence would report and be a part of the Joint Board, with war certain, in your judgment, at that time?

Admiral TURNER. I beg your pardon. I said that these two officers would become members of the Joint Board. That was opposed.

Mr. MURPHY. Why did you oppose it?

Admiral TURNER. Because the Board would then be too large, and it was agreed to unanimously that we didn't want any more members of the Joint Board.

Mr. MURPHY. Why? What harm would there be in having the Army and Navy Intelligence there going over this situation with war, in your opinion, certain, so that you could have the benefit of their judgment and they have the benefit of your judgment, in order to understand the coming of war, which, in your opinion, was certain?

Admiral TURNER. They didn't need to be members for us to have their opinion.

Mr. MURPHY. Your only objection was that by having [5336] these two members additional on the Board it would make the Board too large?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. You were opposed to the Office of Naval Intelligence particularly being on the Board, weren't you?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Didn't you express yourself to that effect?

Admiral TURNER. I don't recall saying particularly. I was opposed as the other members were to either one being on the Board.

Mr. MURPHY. What were the relations between you and Admiral Wilkinson between the months of September and December of 1941? Were they friendly?

Admiral TURNER. Very friendly.

Mr. MURPHY. Are they still friendly?

Admiral TURNER. They are still friendly. They have always been friendly.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, then, when you talked about this decrypting and decoding at Hawaii, and you talked to Admiral Noyes about it, did you talk to Admiral Wilkinson about it?

Admiral TURNER. I didn't talk to Admiral Wilkinson about decrypting because he had nothing to do with decrypting.

Mr. MURPHY. You said yesterday that you understood that [5337] Admiral Kimmel was getting all of this decrypted material and the person who was in charge of Naval Intelligence and the person in charge of distributing it to the various people in Washington, and certainly who knew considerable about it, was the Chief of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson. Don't you think he would have known what they had in the outlying fields?

Admiral TURNER. He had nothing to do with the codes and I believe he testified he didn't know what the codes were.

That was exclusively within the Communications organization until it was decrypted here and delivered to the Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence.

[5338] Mr. MURPHY. I don't mean the codes. I am talking about facilities. He testified before this committee that he knew all

about it, told us what facilities they had there. He must have had that information at that time.

Admiral TURNER. Decoding facilities, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, decoding and decrypting and translating facilities.

Admiral TURNER. I misunderstood that.

Mr. MURPHY. Here is a man, an Admiral at the time, the head of one of the Departments in the Navy, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations on a very vital matter, yet no consultation is had between the head of War Plans and the head of Naval Intelligence on that very subject.

Can you explain that?

Admiral TURNER. I have already explained it, and I will say again that the Office of Naval Intelligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the technique of decrypting and receiving and intercepting magic messages. The Communications Office did all of that work and after it had been decrypted and translated by either them or MID they delivered the copies in English to the Office of Naval Intelligence for further processing.

Mr. MURPHY. And they in turn delivered it to you; that [5339] is right, isn't it?

Admiral TURNER. Correct.

Mr. MURPHY. During this time, from the time you felt that war was certain, did you have staff meetings of Naval Intelligence, of War Plans, of the Chief of Naval Operations, consultations and discussions?

Admiral TURNER. There was daily a meeting in the Secretary's office of the heads of the Divisions of the Office of Naval Operations in which the situation was presented by the Director of Naval Intelligence and general discussion was held.

Mr. MURPHY. In all those discussions wasn't there any time, in this critical period, when there was some discussion of what kind of material was available to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. The only times that there was any discussion, that I know about, was when I, on my own initiative, took the matter up to inform myself, because that was not within my province to do.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't it within somebody's province at your staff meetings to discuss what information was available to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet who was about to be confronted with war, wasn't that discussed generally back and forth and each one adding their ideas?

Admiral TURNER. Not with respect to the decryption of magic. That was secret, and properly so.

[5340] Mr. MURPHY. It wasn't secret to any man in the room, because every man in the room was getting it regularly. The Chief of Naval Operations, head of Naval Intelligence, and you, as head of War Plans, each one of you had it each day and had had for months before then.

Why wouldn't you be able to discuss how much of this material, if any, was going to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. The Secretary's meetings were held and were attended by about 25 or 30 officers and civilians. We had no regular meetings of the heads of the Divisions.

Mr. MURPHY. You say you never—

Admiral TURNER. In the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. You say that Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson did not sit down together from time to time to discuss the progress of events coming up to a war which you felt was certain, apart from civilians and apart from everyone else?

Admiral TURNER. There were many occasions when we held conferences, those three, with others that were interested, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There were many occasions when I consulted Admiral Wilkinson in his office or he consulted me in my office or we talked matters over with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

[5341] Mr. MURPHY. Were there ever occasions when Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson were in the same room discussing the progress of events in the Pacific, and just you three? If not, why not?

Admiral TURNER. I don't recall any particular occasions. I remember that there were many times when we were called into Admiral Stark's office and possibly others—

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't—

Admiral TURNER. For discussing some particular aspect of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't there ever a time that you can recall when the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson were together discussing the situation in the Pacific?

Admiral TURNER. I recall no specific dates.

Mr. MURPHY. But do you recall what occurred between September and December 1941 at any time?

Admiral TURNER. I recall no specific dates.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you recall any specific meetings?

Admiral TURNER. Not about any specific subject. I know that—I am quite sure—that during that time there were many occasions when those officers, plus possibly others, were in Admiral Stark's office discussing various matters with regard to the situation.

[5342] Mr. MURPHY. Well, you asked Admiral Noyes about what was available to Admiral Kimmel. Did you ask Admiral Wilkinson what was available to him?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; because it was not within Admiral Wilkinson's province to supply such material and the decryption and translation of that material was a matter of Communications, of which Admiral Noyes had charge.

[5343] Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever discuss it in Admiral Wilkinson's presence?

Admiral TURNER. I don't remember that I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever tell Admiral Stark that Admiral Kimmel was getting that information?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, on three occasions he requested me—asked me—if Admiral Kimmel was, and I said I would find out, and I asked Admiral Noyes about it and so reported to Admiral Stark.

Mr. MURPHY. You were asked three times about it, and not once did you ask the Chief of Naval Intelligence what was available to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral TURNER. Because he had nothing to do with that particular matter.

Mr. MURPHY. Yet you were friendly?

Admiral TURNER. Entirely.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, I come to the next proposition. If you will go back to the exhibit which is before you, Admiral, the memorandum—

Admiral TURNER. I have not fully answered your previous question concerning this.

Mr. MURPHY. No, you did not. I want you to pursue that, yes.

Admiral TURNER. Do you wish the rest of the story?

[5344] Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. After eliminating those questions about Colonel Donovan's organization, and the questions about the membership on the Joint Board, the Joint Planning Committee drafted a report in which they were agreed, with one exception, and that exception was that in accordance with previous practice, the Military Intelligence Department wanted to prepare the enemy estimate of the situation. I beg your pardon. The agreement was to form a joint intelligence committee composed of four members from the Army—three members from the Army—and three members from the Navy intelligence systems, and have additional civilian personnel and to have separate office space, near the joint strategic committee, which had office space in the Navy Department, War Plans Division.

The only point of disagreement was on the preparation of the enemy estimate of the situation.

In accordance with custom, the War Department felt, that is, in accordance with War Department custom, the War Department members of the Joint Planning Committee desired to have the reports of the Joint Intelligence Committee cover the entire estimate of the strategic situation in their reports to the Joint Board.

The custom of the Navy had been, and always has been, [5345] that the planning body makes the entire estimate of the situation, our own estimate, and the enemy's estimate. That still prevails. The report was delayed possibly 2 weeks while settling that point.

Mr. MURPHY. When was the first meeting of the Board?

Admiral TURNER. The report—

Mr. MURPHY. The day after Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?

Admiral TURNER. There are one or two minor matters.

Mr. MURPHY. All right.

Admiral TURNER. The report was sent to the Joint Board on the 10th of September, 1941, was approved about a week after that—I haven't the date right here, was approved by the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, by the Secretary of the Navy on the 10th of October, and general orders were issued, although that was put into effect immediately, general orders were issued by both the War and Navy Departments the latter part of November.

There was a very great difficulty about setting up this Joint Intelligence Committee because of the lack of space. Everybody was very badly crowded. And the committee, or the Director of Naval Intelligence, took the matter up immediately with the Room Assignments Officer in the Department, but it was not for some considerable time.

Mr. MURPHY. They had a meeting, did they not, within 24 hours after war started? [5346]

Admiral TURNER. They had some meetings before that.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you familiar, or can you name the date? General Miles said they had one meeting to organize and then they never functioned until the war was started.

Admiral TURNER. The information that I have is somewhat different from the statement of General Miles. We have no record of any meeting of the committee attended by General Miles and Admiral Kirk, or Admiral Wilkinson, because they were not members of the committee.

There was on October 11, in memorandum No. 1, Record of Initial Meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, on October 11, you had a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee from which was excluded the head of Intelligence of the Army and the head of Intelligence of the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. They were not members of the Board. The Joint Intelligence Committee was not composed of those two officers. Those two officers appointed their own people without any interference by anybody else, and they did not appoint themselves as members of that Joint Intelligence Committee.

They had a meeting, an informal meeting, on October 11, at which organizational matters were discussed.

[5347] **Mr. MURPHY.** Now, will you give me the date of another meeting, between October 11 and December 8, 1941, if there were any?

Admiral TURNER. There was some informal action taken, I don't know whether it was a formal meeting or not; there was a recommendation on October 29 by that committee concerning office space, and final decision on the initial membership.

On November 6, it reports an action of the acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Miles appointing his members of the committee.

Then on November 14, there is further correspondence relating to the question of office space.

December 3 is the next one. A memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Committee, subject "Agenda for first full meeting." It does not give the proposed date of that. It gives the agenda.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate the meeting was held after the war started?

Admiral TURNER. I take that back. On December 3, minutes of the first formal meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the committee assembled in room 4548, Munitions Building, at 11:30 a. m., December 3.

Mr. MURPHY. What was that?

[5348] **Admiral TURNER.** The committee assembled in room 4548 Munitions Building at 11:30 a. m., December 3.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was present?

Admiral TURNER. Part-time members: Colonel Hayes A. Kroner, G. S. C., Chief, Intelligence Branch, M. I. D. (for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2).

Captain W. A. Heard, U. S. N., Head, Foreign Branch, ONI (for the Director of Naval Intelligence).

The decision was that those heads would not devote their full time to the committee, but only part time.

Present as full-time members were :

Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Fortier, G. S. C., from M. I. D.

Commander J. H. Foskett, U. S. N., from ONI.

Lieutenant Commander W. T. Kenny, U. S. N., from ONI.

Major Ludwell L. Montague, Cavalry, from M. I. D.

It was noted that a third full-time Army member, Lieutenant Colonel Vincent J. Meloy, G. S. C., designated by the Chief of the Army Air Forces had not yet arrived in Washington for this duty.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you state what business was transacted at that meeting, if any?

Admiral TURNER. Colonel Kroner was recognized as Chairman of the committee, and Captain Heard as vice chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you state, in substance, without [5349] burdening the record, if you can state in substance, what did occur.

Admiral TURNER. It was decided to organize the committee into a Secretariat and four geographical sections, and there was a decision that this subdivision was for internal convenience only; the committee would act as a unit; assignment of officers to those sections; discussion of space assignments; establishment of the Secretariat in the War Department, pending acquisition of space in the Navy Department.

Mr. MURPHY. You say they did have space then?

Admiral TURNER. Assignment of the Secretariat in a room in the War Department until they had ample space.

There were several trial runs of a daily summary of military intelligence, that matter was considered.

All formalities necessary to the establishment of vacancies for the planned civilian personnel had been completed.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at any rate, on December 8, they met and did some business, didn't they?

Admiral TURNER. I have no record here—oh, yes. Here is a paragraph:

The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee was not fully activated until 9 December 1941 because, until that date, the Head Foreign Branch, ONI, was unable to obtain [5350] agreement within the Navy Department as to the office space to be provided. Except for this difficulty, the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee might have been activated by 1 November 1941.

That is a statement by the former Secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee, Colonel Ludwell Montague, dated 21 November 1945.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral, if you will come back with me for one more question to the memorandum to the President of November 5, 1941, and referring to page 4 of that memorandum—do you have it?

Admiral TURNER. I have it.

Mr. MURPHY. Paragraph B, reading as follows:

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territory whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies.

Did you also disagree with that portion of the memorandum to the extent that you felt war could not be avoided and that it was certain?

Admiral TURNER. I didn't agree with that at all.

[5351] Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I direct your attention to a paper which was presented by you at the convening time at 2 o'clock.

Congressman Cooper questioned you this morning as to whether or not there had been received a report from Admiral Kimmel, and as I understand it that paper—which I think should be marked as an exhibit—is the report from Admiral Kimmel, immediately after December 7, or on December 8, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I saw this at the time. I have not read it today.

Mr. MURPHY. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that that should be spread on the record at this point.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Suppose we have the Admiral read it now.

Mr. MURPHY. Will you read it please, Admiral?

Admiral TURNER. From CINCPAC, Action, to OPNAV, priority, dated December 8, 1941, No. 080450 [reading]:

In spite of security measures which were in effect surprise attack by Japanese bombing and torpedo planes damaged all battleships except *Maryland*. Damage to *Tennessee* and *Pennsylvania* was moderate. *Arizona* a total wreck. *West Virginia* resting on bottom. Still burning *Oklahoma* capsized. *Honolulu*, *Helena*, *Raleigh* damaged and unfit for sea. *Vestal* [5352] damaged and beached. *Curtiss* moderately damaged. Destroyers *Shaw*, *Cassin*, *Downes* in drydock complete wrecks. As result of attack army airplane losses severe. There remain thirteen Baker Seventeen, nine Baker Eighteen, and about twenty pursuit planes. Approximately ten patrol planes remain available. Oahu, one patrol squadron at Midway. Recommend all available army bombers be sent to Oahu. Fire was opened promptly by all ships and number of enemy aircraft were destroyed. One enemy submarine was sunk. Possibly two more. Two carriers, seven heavy cruisers, three squadrons destroyers and all available planes search for enemy. Personnel behavior magnificent in face of furious surprise attack. Personnel casualties believed to be heavy in *Oklahoma* and *Arizona*.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was that report from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. On December 8, 1941?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Turner, as I understand your testimony, you felt that inasmuch as there had been a message sent out on November 27 to the effect that "this is a war warning" that Admiral Kimmel was told to prepare a defensive deployment, you felt there should be no more [5353] warnings, or additions sent to that, because that was sufficient?

Admiral TURNER. I would like to say that that dispatch, neither that dispatch nor any other single dispatch concerning the military situation, certainly back as far as the one of October 16, should be considered alone.

Beginning October 16, that was the time of the fall of the Third Konohe Cabinet, a series of dispatches relating to the war or the pending war were sent. They included the one of the 24th. They included several others that went out. They also included the matter about the codes.

Looking at the matter as a whole, as Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and I did on December 5, we felt that they were adequate to give all necessary directions to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 64 of the United States News. Do you have a copy of that available?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I read from that the following from the Navy Board of Inquiry:

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with [5354] this as a premise.

Is that true?

Admiral TURNER. It is true that the plans were drawn with that as a premise.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if that is so, and you sent your message of the 27th, wouldn't it be important if you could supplement your message of the 27th with an additional memorandum which would narrow the time limit and give some indication of the immediacy of the attack?

Admiral TURNER. That was done with the dispatches concerning the destruction of Japanese codes.

Mr. MURPHY. The 1 o'clock message was also important?

Admiral TURNER. Very.

Mr. MURPHY. Why was there a reluctance in the Navy Department to send word about that?

Admiral TURNER. I don't think there was—oh, you mean Admiral Stark's first decision not to send it and then his change. Why, he told me that he had told General MARSHALL that he felt nothing further was necessary.

Mr. MURPHY. But if this is true, that they wanted to have it down within narrow limits, the 1 o'clock message is in the Navy Department several hours before General Marshall sees it, why didn't someone in the Navy Department send it to Admiral Kimmel?

[5355] **Admiral TURNER.** I didn't know it was in the Navy Department several hours. As I recall Admiral Wilkinson's testimony, he showed it to Admiral Stark about 11:15. That is my recollection.

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think so.

Admiral TURNER. The 1 o'clock message?

Mr. MURPHY. The 1 o'clock message was translated and available for distribution about 9:30. I don't want to misspeak. What is the correct time?

Mr. GESELL. My recollection of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony is that at 9:30 he showed the 14th part and about 10:30 the 1 o'clock message.

Mr. MURPHY. But it was available for distribution long before that.

Mr. GESELL. As to 10:30 he is not clear as to whether he took the 1 o'clock message to Admiral Stark, or whether Admiral Stark had it earlier. I believe that is his testimony.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, Admiral, you were the Head of War Plans. You felt from July that war was certain, on the night of the 6th you have 13 parts and it is apparent that another part is coming, or it is apparent that more is coming, yet you didn't arrive at your office until about 11:30 that morning?

[5356] **Admiral TURNER.** Eleven-fifteen.

Mr. MURPHY. You would have been the person to prepare the additional message in order to give notice of the exact time to Admiral Kimmel, wouldn't you?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. That message did not change the situation in the least degree. It was a matter of information as to the

time, and it was not my business to send that dispatch out. I consider that that was entirely the province of the office of Naval Intelligence, to send out information.

It was no evaluation whatsoever. My office never sent out information.

Mr. MURPHY. Well—

Admiral TURNER. Except in connection with operations.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, who was it that sent out about the codes?

Admiral TURNER. That was sent out by Communications. One of them was sent out by communications, one by Office of Naval Intelligence. I have photostat copies of those here.

Mr. MURPHY. Page 40 says "From OPNAV." Who would that be?

Admiral TURNER. The photostatic copy says it originated by OP-16, F-2, from OPNAV, released by TS. Wilkinson's [5357] signature isn't there.

Admiral Ingersoll's initial is. And they get—OP 16, which is Admiral Wilkinson, gets back the original.

Mr. MURPHY. Would that have to go over your desk before it could be sent?

Admiral TURNER. That has a note, it hasn't my initials, but it says "OP-12 has seen."

Mr. MURPHY. Didn't that have to go over your desk before it could be sent?

Admiral TURNER. It did not have to, no, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What about the one on page 41?

Admiral TURNER. The one on page 41 was released by J. R. Redman, who was the assistant to the Director of Naval Communications.

Mr. MURPHY. Did that go over your desk?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; it did not. It was not necessary.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you say that the fourteen-part message would not be your particular function to handle, and yet I see on page 64:

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise.

[5358] Would not that tend to indicate that the time was getting short, the fact that they had severed relations and particularly in view of the fourteenth part of the message?

[5359] Admiral TURNER. Those plans referred to were local plans drawn up in Hawaii with respect to the reconnaissance solely of airplanes, not with respect to anything else. The other plans which were drawn by the Commander in Chief and by the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District did not have to have any such affair. In addition to that, the security order, as I recall it, of the Commander in Chief did have a certain air condition where additional reconnaissance was to be made without respect to the war plans.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you were familiar, were you not, with the Martin-Bellinger report?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And that was the report that would require—the plans under that report would require time in order to figure out as closely as possible when the attack would occur, isn't that right?

Admiral TURNER. I did not agree particularly with that. That was unnecessary. Since that time and before that time, as a matter of

fact, we have maintained reconnaissance with that types of planes for months on end.

Mr. MURPHY. It is a fact, sir, is it not, Admiral, that if you have so many planes that you can use in the air and you might have to use them, and you gave out a warning on October 16 and another warning on November 24 and another [5360] other warning of November 27, that it would have been of great assistance to the Admiral in control of the Pacific to have something that would point to a certain time or to an approaching time so that he could accelerate his reconnaissance and do whatever he thought necessary under the circumstances, isn't that so?

Admiral TURNER. There was only one war warning and that was on the 27th of November. Of course, it would have been highly desirable for the Commander in Chief to have known exactly when the attack was coming and he certainly should have had at least a summary of the first thirteen parts and also the fourteenth part and have known about the other matter. Remember that from my standpoint I was under the impression that he was getting that.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, if there was anybody to send it out in Washington it was not your department, is that right?

Admiral TURNER. It was not my department. That was information.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to page 65 of the United States News, the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, column 2, and right at the end of Section 12 I read the following:

The attack of 7 December 1941, on Pearl Harbor [5361] delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was unpredictable.

Do you agree with that?

Admiral TURNER. I agree with the first sentence. I think the exact date possibly was unpredictable, although after we got the 1 o'clock message it looked like that day.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you agree that the attack was unpreventable and rest on that statement? I understood you to say that while it was not preventable, that is, to prevent it entirely, that if some things were done it would have been considerably mitigated in its effect.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, that is correct, but I believe that I also said that an attack of that nature is most difficult to stop entirely.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I direct your attention to page 67, section 15 [reading]:

The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes.

Whose function was it in Washington to keep Admiral Kimmel informed as to the progress made with torpedo planes in the European war?

Admiral TURNER. The Office of Naval Intelligence would [5362] provide him, and I think did, with such information, technical information as they could obtain with regard to the use of torpedoes. A great deal was sent out on that. I think also the Bureau of Ordnance sent out Ordnance bulletins from time to time giving the latest information they had on that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if the situation was such at Hawaii that they were proceeding on the theory that torpedo planes would not be particularly effective because of the shallowness of the water and if they were going on that premise, would the War Plans have something to do with changing the situation so that they would be ready for torpedo planes in shallow water?

Admiral TURNER. Nothing whatsoever. We had nothing to do with material, except from an advisory viewpoint.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about—

Admiral TURNER. That matter was under the Bureau of Ordnance.

Mr. MURPHY. But I am not talking about the supplying of them. I am talking about the effectiveness and the kind of a defense to have to meet it. Wouldn't that be War Plans?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes. That was initiated by War Plans in a letter of January 24, 1941 and in memoranda and consultations with the Naval Districts Division which had all defenses, water defenses and fixed defenses, under [5363] their cognizance which were in the districts.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you think then that War Plans did all it should in order to apprise Admiral Kimmel as to the danger from that kind of attack?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. This Naval Districts Division took the matter up and there was correspondence with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District concerning the use of nets and barriers and also sending them information on two occasions regarding the probable effectiveness of torpedoes in water of the depths in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, Admiral, the position of the ships at Pearl Harbor on December 7 was as a result of an order of Admiral Kimmel dated in September of 1941. Was there ever any order out of Washington by anybody in authority which changed the order of September 1941 of Admiral Kimmel's?

Admiral TURNER. The order of September 21, if that is it, had three conditions. It had an enclosure (b) which on the date of September 21 gave the conditions that would be effective until further orders. In case of worse conditions expected it was the intention, which is evident from reading the order, to change those conditions and put other conditions into effect that would deal with the worse situation. That was Admiral Kimmel's order.

[5364] **Mr. MURPHY.** Did anyone in Washington ever advise or command, either one, Admiral Kimmel to change his order of September 1941?

Admiral TURNER. No. Under the conditions that would exist up to the time of sending out the dispatch of 27 November that situation covered—the conditions prescribed by that order were entirely adequate.

Mr. MURPHY. But the defensive order in the message of the 27th was still within the discretion of Admiral Kimmel as to what particular defensive deployment there should be, isn't that right?

Admiral TURNER. Entirely; entirely so.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, was there ever any order from anyone in Washington that necessitated having more ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7 than were the direct result of the orders of Admiral Kimmel himself?

Admiral TURNER. Not that I know of.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there is one thing that concerns me a little bit, Admiral. In your message of the 27th it states:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46.

As I understand it, WPL 46 itself would not come into effect until there was an order from Washington to put it into effect, is that right?

[5365] Admiral TURNER. That is correct, modified by the understood condition of all military forces at all times, in all circumstances, to defend themselves if attacked.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, under section 0211, under the heading, "Execution of the entire plan," I see the following:

(a) Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV dispatch the naval establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war. "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5."

(b) The date on the above dispatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

Do I understand that in the event of an attack such as had occurred, there would be no necessity whatever for the message from Washington to execute Rainbow 5?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. We sent out such a dispatch very shortly after we got the news of the attack but that did not affect the prior defense matter.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there has been some discussion about whose particular duty it was to estimate enemy action and I find some conflict in the record on that point. I would like to direct your attention to the testimony of Captain Glover on page 11 of volume 1 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation.

[5366] Captain Glover was assigned at that time, was he not, to War Plans Division?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I notice that he says on page 12, and I am now quoting from testimony by Captain Glover before Admiral Hart in the Hart hearings at page 174, under the heading (c):

The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan.

Do you find that? That is under subheading (c).

Admiral TURNER. I see it, yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as I understand it, Captain Glover's impression was that that was his job and his duty. Was that your impression?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, that was his duty.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, in other words, your Department had to make continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you give information from November [5367] 27 to December 7, 1941 as to the composition and distribution of forces? I assume that would be enemy forces, wouldn't it?

Admiral TURNER. No, that is in regard to the composition and distribution of our forces. That is what that means. I assume that is

what he means. Those are his words, the composition and distribution of our forces, boat operations and other matters in relation to our execution of the plan.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will go into that further in connection with the testimony before Admiral Hart. My impression is, however, that he is referring to enemy forces.

Now, then, I see on page 12 under subhead 4 Captain Glover states, and this was before Admiral Hart, page 176:

Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the head of the Plans Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this order designated Commander Ansel, in collaboration with Captain Wright, to draft daily and submit to the Director (Admiral Turner) a short strategic summary of the international military and political situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these summaries, had made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press.

And I am wondering if we have available those daily estimates [5368] which would cover your feeling that it was a 50-50 proposition and that war was certain; I mean if there was anything like that.

Admiral TURNER. I do not know. Those were Commander Ansel's estimates. I do not know whether they were saved or not. They were drawn up and circulated within the division. I do not know who else had copies. There might still be copies in the War Division files.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, at a time of crisis like this daily estimates of that kind would be highly important papers to keep, would they not?

Admiral TURNER. I have no doubt they were kept; they were filed, I think, probably; I am not sure, I wouldn't say.

Mr. Murphy. Well, counsel, will you make those papers available, or try to make those papers available?¹

Now, you have said that Captain McCollum came to you with a proposed message which he felt should be sent out to the forces in the Pacific and you said that the language of Captain McCollum's report was substantially in the same language as the one that had gone out and you said that you did not find any particular—you said, "No, I did not ask him not to send it."

If Captain McCollum's message was in substantially the same language as the one that you had sent on the 27th wouldn't [5369] he be infringing on your department and wouldn't you tell him not to send it if it was in effect an operational order?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. In the first place, in my testimony I said that it covered the same ground but the language was not considered as firm and specific as the language in the dispatches of November 24 and 27. By no means would I have told him not to send it. As I have testified before, when the Office Of Naval Intelligence wanted to send out material even if it included strategic estimates and they cleared the matter with me and I felt it ought to go out, I would certainly approve sending it out. The decision not to send it was made entirely by Captain McCollum.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as I understand it, on Sunday morning, December the 7th, despite the fact that the 14 parts of the message were in and despite the fact that the 1 o'clock message was in, you received no word at your office and no word at your home that they were available?

¹ Copies of the estimates were subsequently furnished to Representative Murphy. See Hearings, Part 10, pp. 5133-5134.

Admiral TURNER. I did not. As I recall it, I saw the pouch with them in during the middle of the afternoon. The first I saw of the 1 o'clock message was, as I recall it, when I went to Admiral Stark's office the second time about 12 o'clock. He did not show it to me when I got into his office the first time at 11:15, I am quite sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't that 1 o'clock message be im- [5370] portant to you in connection with this paragraph, page 64 again of the United States News:

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this premise.

That would be important, that 1 o'clock message, wouldn't it?

Admiral TURNER. That 1 o'clock message would have been exceedingly important and when I saw it I asked Admiral Stark what had been done about it and he said that General Marshall was sending a dispatch out to the Army and was telling the Navy what had happened.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you inquire in your Department as head of War Plans from those in the several departments as to why that had not been delivered to you before the time that it was?

Admiral TURNER. No, I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it was important and it would have been a big help in Hawaii, would it not?

Admiral TURNER. It would not have been delivered to me much in advance—or it would not have been delivered to me in advance of the time Admiral Stark got it. It was customary for them to start with him and then go to Admiral Ingersoll. [5371] I was in my office from about 11:15 until 12 or possibly 12:15 and so far as I can recall no dispatch came in my office during that time.

Mr. MURPHY. As I understand it, then, the Navy had a 1 o'clock deadline, they had seven copies of the message and even with the 1 o'clock deadline the Navy went step by step over the same routine as they would day after day before that instead of making it available to each one of you as quickly as possible, is that right?

Admiral TURNER. I did not see the dispatch until it was shown to me by Admiral Stark.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I understood you to say that you spent an hour with Admiral Ingersoll discussing messages, discussing the message of the 27th of November and you spent 15 minutes with Admiral Stark discussing the message and you also say that it was the duty of the Naval Intelligence to send out any additional information. Did you discuss the message with Admiral Wilkinson and whether or not something in addition should be sent out?

Admiral TURNER. My statement was that we discussed the whole situation, reviewed all the messages relating directly to it and canvassed to see whether or not we should send anything else out to the Commander in Chief that would help them in the present situation.

[5372] Mr. MURPHY. Did you, Admiral, have Admiral Wilkinson present at any of those discussions?

Admiral TURNER. I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Why?

Admiral TURNER. I went to talk to my superior and he did not send for Admiral Wilkinson.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, was Admiral Wilkinson consulted by anybody that you know on the sufficiency of the message of November 27?

Admiral TURNER. Not by me.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you have any reason that you can give the committee why Admiral Wilkinson, the head of Naval Intelligence, was not called into those discussions if it was his duty to send out the information, if any was available?

Admiral TURNER. This was a matter which related to the major strategic situation. I do not know why he was not consulted during the two days that was under discussion. I do not know why I did not consult him. It was initiated with a discussion between—well, at different times the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief, Captain Schuirmann and myself.

Mr. MURPHY. My last question is this: Did you at any time during the week of December preceding Pearl Harbor have a meeting at which time you and Admiral Wilkinson discussed [5373] the situation in the Pacific?

Admiral TURNER. I saw Admiral Wilkinson several times and discussed the situation in the Pacific with him. As I testified, he told me on December 6 that he considered my report and that Japan was not going to attack the United States.

Mr. MURPHY. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

[5374] The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster of Maine will inquire, Admiral.

Senator BREWSTER. Admiral, in connection with the point about overt act, I was interested in your commentary about that. I found in the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, headed by Admiral Murphy and Admiral Andrews, this statement, on which I would like your comment, at the bottom of page 64, referring to Admiral Kimmel:

Therefore, he had issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule "shoot first and explain afterwards."

That seemed to me to be somewhat in conflict with your idea that he was not ordered not to do such a thing. What is correct on that?

Admiral TURNER. He was never—pardon me. Let me consult the dispatch of November 24.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. He was never ordered, so far as I know, not to commit an overt act, and I am glad this point came up because that may be the key to the reason he was not. The [5375] fleet was operating around in that area and for 16 or 17 months we had been operating under an order very similar to that one of the 21st of September. That was the second revision. The first had been issued about June of 1940 by Admiral Richardson, and we were taking the precautions—with the purpose of taking precautions—against some irresponsible Japanese in a submarine around our areas.

Now at a number of times during that 16 months they thought they had detected submarines and investigated, but could not find them. So that a few days before Pearl Harbor, why, this order was issued, and the Chief of Naval Operations was informed, and I knew it.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, Admiral, if you will confine yourself right to it, that is a statement of the Naval Board, that in so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority.

As I understand you, you do not agree that that statement is correct.

Admiral TURNER. There were no orders from higher authority whatsoever to Admiral Kimmel not to commit an overt act.

Senator BREWSTER. And you know of no basis for that statement of the Court?

Admiral TURNER. Other than a possible confusion with the Army dispatch.

Senator BREWSTER. All right. Now on the matter of the [5376] estimate in Washington, on page 72, the first column,

It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

Now I had not supposed there was any question that you were a responsible official at that time in the Navy Department. You would come under that category, would you?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I was Staff Officer to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator BREWSTER. You would not agree with that statement. That was the statement of the Judge Advocate General T. L. Gatch.

Admiral TURNER. I do not agree with that.

Senator BREWSTER. Now they go on, and I quote again:

Those witnesses who, on 7 December 1941, held positions in the Navy Department which qualified them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was that [5377] any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating.

As I understand it, you would not agree with that.

Admiral TURNER. No. There were a good many officers who felt that the attack was coming, and that there was a good possibility that Pearl Harbor would be involved. However, there were a great many officers here in the Department that did not think so, did not even think there was going to be war.

Senator BREWSTER. Could you name any of the responsible officers who agreed with you at that time in your estimate?

Admiral TURNER. I cannot remember any of the senior officers that made a definite statement that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked. There were not too many of them that had the information that was held by the Chief of Naval Operations.

I believe that Admiral Stark thought there was a good possibility, and I believe that Admiral Ingersoll did. I think that Admiral Towers was of the opinion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was a good possibility.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that covers it, Admiral.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. He goes on with the further statement, and I quote again:

[5378] Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions.

That, too, you would not think was a warranted statement?

Admiral TURNER. No, it was not warranted, Senator, as far as I was concerned, and these other officers. There were subordinate officers that considered the attack was probable.

Senator BREWSTER. Now I quote this opinion of an Army officer, a General at the time, and I ask your comment on it. He is referring to these various intercepts, and he says this:

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with battle order and tactical background, beginning with November 14, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion, that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25 or November 29 as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

What would be your comment on that expression of opinion?

Admiral TURNER. I believe if those dispatches had been adequately analyzed that his conclusion is correct.

[5379] Senator BREWSTER. Now, about the matter of the defense of the island. I understand you to say with the facilities there they could have done a much better job than they did. I guess that is about the way you put it.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. What would you say as to the contention which I find running through these reports, that while it was quite correct that they had enough facilities there to have possibly detected this approach of carriers, if they knew within narrow limits of time it was coming, that they had a warning as far back as October 24, they had an alert there, the Army had, a year earlier, there were a good many communications along this line, there were several warnings that they did not have the air reconnaissance facilities to maintain at all continuous control day by day?

They had the primary responsibility of having the fleet ready to function?

I call your attention to what Admiral Kimmel said in his letter to Admiral Stark on page 69, which perhaps puts it as well as it can be put, on this point, although it is referred to several times, where Admiral Kimmel is seeking much fuller information about what is going on, and he said he needed this information in order to estimate, and he said,

This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific [5380] situation where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities.

As I understand, in commenting on that, very serious weight was attached to that position of Admiral Kimmel, in view of this warning, and the question of whether or not he exercised proper judgment in deciding that he would not allocate the reconnaissance planes which he had available for aerial patrol.

What is your view as to balancing those two responsibilities?

Admiral TURNER. I do not consider the dispatch of October 16—you said October 24. I think you are referring to the one about the fall of the cabinet, and to take proper deployment measures.

Senator BREWSTER. I think there was a letter of Admiral Stark on the 24th. Perhaps that was what I was confused with.

Mr. MURPHY. Translated on the 23d.

Senator BREWSTER. What is that?

Mr. MURPHY. Translated on the 23rd.

Admiral TURNER. The first dispatch of that series [5381] that is the fall of the Konoye Cabinet was dated on October 16. Neither that, in my opinion, nor the dispatch of November 24 required any immediate action of a tactical nature in general.

The one of October 16 was to get his forces put out in the islands, and so on. It was only the war warning of the 27th.

Now as regards an effective patrol, he had 82 planes, I believe, some of which, of course, were under overhaul. Over a long period of time, under more severe conditions than he had there in Pearl Harbor or Kaneohe, I operated patrol planes directly against the enemy, from the open sea, sheltered, and have been able to get up daily from between one-third and one-fourth of the planes. That is as good as you can do.

Now I say he could have, from the 27th on, could have had in the air for an all-day flight, at least one-fourth of the planes and continued on indefinitely for months.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now how much of a sector could that have covered?

Admiral TURNER. Assuming that he would have available 60 planes, that would be 15 planes which, 50 miles apart, would cover a front at the north 750 miles long.

Senator BREWSTER. At a 700-mile quadrant, how many degrees would that cover?

[5382] Admiral TURNER. I do not know. You take the length of the arc.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. 50 miles apart—and you could have them a little farther apart—50 miles apart with 15 planes in the air is a total arc 750 miles in length.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, but that is not the way they conduct it, is it? Don't they have each plane go out from the base and they cover so many degrees of the arc?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct. I will have to do a little figuring.

Senator BREWSTER. Was not it about 4° to the 700-mile limit that they covered? Are you familiar with the August 24 report of Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral TURNER. I saw it. I never had a copy of it.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is Exhibit 13. Do you want to look at it?

Admiral TURNER. That is roughly pretty closely 60° of arc, is a 700-mile radius for 15 planes.

Senator BREWSTER. That is 4°.

Admiral TURNER. 700 miles.

Senator BREWSTER. That is a 700-mile radius. Admiral Richardson had considered the southwest sector the most dangerous, and he con-

ducted his patrol in that area. That [5383] was, I take it, the Mandated Islands.

Admiral TURNER. Southwest?

Senator BREWSTER. Southwest; yes.

Admiral TURNER. Well, there was a different situation then, than there was under Admiral Kimmel, because when I was originally there the naval air stations at Johnston Island and at Midway were not activated.

Now a smaller number of planes at those radii, you see, could cover a far greater arc. I always considered, and have expressed at various times, much the more dangerous sector was directly to the north where there were no outlying islands.

Senator BREWSTER. Then your estimate would have been, if you could only patrol a certain area, you would have gone into the northwestern sector, north and northwest, covering 60°, with possibly a variation from day to day?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; and I would have taken some of those planes—probably not covered the 60°—I would have taken a few of those planes and sent them to Midway and possibly Johnston Island, possibly some at Palmyra, although I doubt it.

Senator BREWSTER. On the Winds message, I wanted to clear up a little of your testimony from your former statement.

At that time you said in your examination, Admiral Turner, if I may quote from the questions which were asked [5284] you on page 1006:

In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the execute signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

Your answer at that time was, "Yes".

As I understand now, you feel you got it somewhat clearer.

Admiral TURNER. Was that before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Senator?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, because, up until the time I returned to San Francisco about 2 months ago, I thought the entire thing in that Wind message was authentic and that they had merely made a mistake about that "North Wind so-and-so".

On talking to some of the officers who had gone into it in San Francisco, why, they said it had been found out later that that was a false broadcast picked out of the ordinary news, but it was news to me at that time.

Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.

Mr. GESELL. May I interpose a moment, Mr. Chairman?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GESELL. A question was raised by Senator Brewster having [5285] to do with the submarines being bombed by Admiral Kimmel, and I wanted to call attention to a letter of Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which appears in that folder of correspondence dated September 23, 1941, in which Admiral Stark states, among other things, "The existing orders were not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defense of sea areas."

I thought perhaps those were the orders you referred to, that he subsequently violated. I believe you will find in Admiral Kimmel's letter, or Admiral Kimmel's correspondence, a letter to Admiral Stark saying he had decided to bomb.

I just wanted to call attention to that. I do not know what the significance of it is.

Mr. GEARHART. Admiral Turner, when I heard you state that you believed the conflict with Japan was inevitable and that you had believed it for a long time, I said to myself, "Spoken like a true Californian." It is because that belief has been shared for many years in the West that nearly all of us are big Navy men and efficient Army advocates. That is why I voted for more money for national defense ever since I have been in Congress, when the President asked for it.

While you believed that war was inevitable for a great many years, our relations with Japan began to deteriorate rapidly about the middle of 1941, is that not correct?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. They had been deteriorating [5386] ever since Matsuoka came in there and had the Axis enter the Tripartite Pact. Beginning in the middle of 1941 it went down much more rapidly.

Mr. GEARHART. And because it was apparent from the information that you were receiving that there was an increasing rapidity in that deterioration you began to give closer attention to the activities of the Japanese and to the intercept messages that were coming over your desk?

Admiral TURNER. Yes. We put in an organization in War Plans that would follow the affairs much more closely than they had before.

I personally continued to follow them in about the same way as I previously had.

Mr. GEARHART. When you began to see messages like this one that appears on page 100 of Exhibit 1, reading, "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month," when the idea of the deadline began to appear over and over again in the dispatches that were being intercepted, you began to think there was some probability of imminent action by the Japanese, did you not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And that was further intensified when you received the message, which is reported on pages 137 and [5387] 138 of the same exhibit, containing this phrase, "I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my No. 736, and there will be no change." That, too, had its effect upon your mind?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then when the message came through that is recorded on page 105 of the same exhibit containing this phrase, "This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen," that further had an effect upon your mind?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I saw those.

Mr. GEARHART. With respect to the imminency of war?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Then I find one occurring at page 173 of the same exhibit, reading as follows, "That time limit set in my message No.

812 is in Tokyo time," that and all the other messages I have just adverted to served to impress upon your mind that the Japs, for one reason or another, were determined upon a course which was going to go one way or another depending upon what happened in their relations with the United States?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. Now you knew from those messages, you knew from conferences in regard to negotiations between the [5388] Japanese and the Americans, the outcome of which the Japs hoped would be an agreement which would be acceptable to them, you knew about that, did you?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you hear about the offer of an agreement which the Japanese made to our Government on the 20th of November, 1941, and which appears in Foreign Relations, volume II, at page 755?

Admiral TURNER. Yes. Yes; I knew that they had made an offer. I have forgotten whether I had seen it in these intercepts or I saw a draft which was brought back from the State Department by Captain Schuirmann, but sometime about that time I saw this offer, which I felt would certainly never be accepted by the United States.

Mr. GEARHART. That is the message which Mr. Hull in his testimony has referred to as an ultimatum by the Japanese to the United States. You recall that, don't you?

Admiral TURNER. I do not recall that he had referred to it as an ultimatum, but I recall having seen the message. I do not recall all the terms of it at the moment.

Mr. GEARHART. In view of the fact that the acceptance of the Japanese tender of agreement would have required the United States to have scrapped the so-called Nine Power Treaty and torn up the Kellogg Peace Pact, abandoned the John Hay [5389] Open-Door Policy, the very fact that it would have been necessary for the United States to have done those things made the acceptance of their agreement utterly impossible, unless we were willing to abandon all the principles for which we had stood for years and years; is that not correct?

Admiral TURNER. I believed so.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, the acceptance of the Japanese program would have been a complete humiliation to the United States, would it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now with the Japanese deadline messages and agreements in mind, what was the reaction within your mind when you heard of this tender of agreement by the Japanese, in the light of all of these deadlines?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I thought the deadline meant definitely war, that we were going to be attacked by Japan either on that date or within a very short time after that.

Mr. GEARHART. But the problem which you had, a problem which was shared by the Army, was one of gaining time, is that not correct?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. Our defenses were beginning to come in. The Army was beginning to get some things, some troops. If we could put it off for even 3 months, why, we would have gained a decided advantage. In addition, the [5390] British Fleet,

which they had agreed to send to the Far Eastern area, part of that fleet was en route, but it would take time to get them ready.

We felt 3 or 4 months would be of immense advantage to the United States.

[5391] Mr. GEARHART. Now that you had learned that the Japanese had served upon us an ultimatum, what did you do about it or what was done in which you participated to obtain that very much needed time?

Admiral TURNER. The memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff to the President, of date, I think, November 26, was a last attempt to gain time. I don't believe we had much hope that it would be effective. We had said and advised right along, that is, Admiral Stark and General Marshall, had advised Mr. Hull and the President, that we wanted time in the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that message—

Admiral TURNER. And there wasn't very much more that we could do about it.

Mr. GEARHART. That message, which is dated November 27, was prepared a day before that, was it not; or do you know?

Admiral TURNER. The preparation of that started, as I recall, immediately after the Joint Board meeting on November 24, and it took a day or two to get that up and to get an agreement and perfect it in that form.

Mr. GEARHART. Who were present at that Joint Board meeting? I am referring to Exhibit 17.

Admiral TURNER. Which is Exhibit 17, sir?

Mr. GEARHART. The document to which we are now referring [5392] is Exhibit 17 in this proceeding. That is the letter of November 27, 1941.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I have the joint board minutes. No; there was no meeting on November 24.

I suppose it probably was drawn up with relation to the dispatch of November 24 and to our knowledge of the proposed *modus vivendi* and the ultimate terms of settlement which were being considered by the State Department.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you attend any meetings between—say the 23d, 24th, 25th or 26th—at which the Secretary of State was present?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have any discussions with Admiral Stark or General Marshall after they had had conferences with the Secretary of State, in reference to his intended action toward the Japanese?

Admiral TURNER. I think every time Admiral Stark attended one of those meetings he would call me in and acquaint me with the pertinent facts, and every day I would talk to Captain Schuirmann as to the latest development in the situation. He would go over there once a day or twice a day.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of the letter of November 27, 1941, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

[5393] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; that was jointly written by General Gerow and myself. That was typed in my office. I think there is a stenographer's initials up there that I recognize.

Mr. GEARHART. Did the fact that Secretary Hull had delivered the Japanese a notice or tendered agreement on the 26th day of November have anything to do with inspiring this message, Exhibit 17?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, because we didn't know at the Navy Department until we got it through magic on the 28th.

Mr. GEARHART. On the 28th you learned that Mr. Hull had delivered a strong note to the Japanese?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, that note was practically the opposite of what the Japanese had tendered as an agreement, was it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It would have required the Japanese to reaffirm their allegiance to the Nine Power Treaty?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And would have required the Japanese to again acknowledge the Kellogg Peace Pact which they had disregarded when they started the trouble in the East?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. It would have required the Japanese to [5394] recognize the Nationalist Government of China?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. GEARHART. And it would have required the Japanese to withdraw their armies from China, from Indochina, from Manchuria, and cease to use force and violence as a means of achieving nationalistic ends, would it not?

Admiral TURNER. In general terms; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, those are principles to which the United States was firmly committed, are they not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Those are principles from which the United States could not withdraw without humiliation; is that not correct?

Admiral TURNER. I agree.

Mr. GEARHART. What was your opinion in reference to the propriety of serving upon the Japanese such a drastic memorandum at that particular time, or was that discussed among the higher ranking officers of the Army and Navy?

Admiral TURNER. I didn't hear the question as to propriety discussed. I think we, all of us closely connected with the on-coming operations, were convinced that our note would have no possible chance of acceptance by the Japanese.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the handing of that note in effect and in your opinion marked the end of negotiations, actual [5395] negotiations, between the two countries?

Admiral TURNER. Well, they had stopped, they had practically stopped; there was no progress being made.

I personally think that that note had no effect whatsoever on the situation.

[5396] Mr. GEARHART. In other words, the situation had jelled before the note was handed to the Japanese?

Admiral TURNER. I believe so; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The Japanese war fleet left the Japanese islands on their fateful mission on the 27th and 28th of November, did they not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And they were under steam and on their way before the Japanese could have possibly analyzed what the Hull message was of November 26?

Admiral TURNER. I think so.

Mr. GEARHART. It probably had one effect, did it not, Admiral? It convinced the Japanese that there would be no occasion for sending a note to their fleet to return to their home ports?

Admiral TURNER. It might have had that effect.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I am one that doesn't deprecate that November 26th message. I think it is one of the glorious diplomatic documents of American history, and it is going to be so regarded, despite the Secretary's inclination to treat it lightly. It is America's declaration to the world that we stand, still, for principle. Regardless of whether the war was inevitable, and whether the Japanese force was on its way to strike us down, it is very, very [5397] fortunate that that great message to the world, and to the Japanese in particular, was given before the strike at Pearl Harbor.

I believe that is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Admiral.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, what time did you get the information from Admiral Noyes for Admiral Stark that Kimmel was getting all magic and decoding it there?

Admiral TURNER. Senator, I can't remember definitely. I have a vague recollection that I discussed it first with Admiral Noyes about January 1941. Then in the summer, July or August, about the time of the embargo or freezing of assets, and then sometime in the early part of November.

Those are only approximate.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account then, for these letters that were put in the record the other day where Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941:

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with information of secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed any- [5398] thing, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet will you kindly fix the responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding.

Then a letter back on March 22:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCAF, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

How do you account for that letter if you had told Stark in January that they had the means of getting all of this secret information?

[5399] Admiral TURNER. I do not believe that that word "secret" refers or relates exclusively to this magic at all. I think that it relates to secret information, of which we were getting a great deal from other sources. The totality of the information that we got was several times as great from all sources as from the magic. That implication never occurred to me until you bring it up now, that that related to the ultra.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Admiral, did you approve the message sending the information that the codes were being destroyed? Did you send that?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I did not send it. I saw one of them.

Senator FERGUSON. You approved it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would you send that if you thought that they had a code there and were getting the same messages that you were sending them? If you thought they were getting the information, why would you send that information that came to you by virtue of magic? They would already have seen it and had it.

Admiral TURNER. That is true, but this was for the purpose of centering attention on that particular thing and I did not know—I do not believe I knew—whether that in- [5400] formation had come—just exactly how that information had come. I had seen some dispatches, it is true, from Tokyo ordering the destruction of codes. I cannot explain to you how the mistake about—the misunderstanding—on the code occurred. It is just a mystery to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Those two things seem to be contradictory to that idea that was in the first message and the fact that you sent these other out, isn't that true?

Admiral TURNER. They seem to be, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Admiral, you had a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on July 21, 1941, at your home. Do you recall that?

Admiral TURNER. I recall several conversations I had with Mr. Nomura, Ambassador Nomura.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why you were speaking on these subjects that you were talking to him on?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Admiral TURNER. I knew his—it is a rather long story—I had known his naval attaché when I went to Japan in 1939. He came here about the same time I did and I became aware very shortly after I arrived that this attaché was trying to make contact with me for the sake of pumping me and so I permitted him to do it and informed the Director of Naval [5401] Intelligence and Admiral Stark.

Shortly after Admiral Nomura came in February he asked me to come to his house and have a talk with him. That talk, I think, occurred about the 1st of March, and he wanted to discuss the whole general situation. I went back and wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations covering this matter and said it put me in a rather embarrassing position but I felt that I ought to continue the talks for what I could get from it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, on the one that I am talking about, July 21, 1941, your memoranda was transmitted to President Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral Stark?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get any reactions from those two sources or from Admiral Stark that they did not believe, or did not want to back up, what you were saying?

Admiral TURNER. They never gave me any such indication at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, I want you to read, if you will, the last sentence of 12 on page 519 of Foreign Relations, Volume 2.

[5402] Admiral TURNER (reading):

Furthermore, anything that affects the future security of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the defensive viewpoint.

13. The occupation of Indochina by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United States since it might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well then be overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo in the southern portion of the Far East."

That was expressed to him as a personal opinion of my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that was your personal opinion.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you also transmitted it to the President after you told it to the Ambassador, is that true?

Admiral TURNER. I gave it to Admiral Stark.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[5403] Admiral TURNER. And I believe he sent it to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is what it says in the book.

Now, you were of the opinion at that time that if the Japanese took Singapore or Burma it was self-defense as far as we were concerned—that is the word you used, isn't it—and therefore we would go to war?

Admiral TURNER. I was of the opinion——

Senator FERGUSON. You made it clear to the Ambassador.

Admiral TURNER. I told the Ambassador that I believed that Congress would declare war if they attacked either the Dutch or the British in Malaya.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, did you know about the parallel action to be taken by the President and Mr. Churchill? You were at the—no, you were not at the——

Admiral TURNER. Yes, I was at the Argentina conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You were?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then did you know about the parallel action?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I knew nothing about it at all until about a month or 2 months later, when it was brought up before the Joint Board by Captain Schuirmann. Now, others here in the Department knew about that at the [5404] time. I did not because I stopped in Connecticut for about a week or 10 days leave on the way back from Argentina, so I was not here when the thing occurred.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, on the 17th of August 1941, page 556 Foreign Relations, volume 2, this, among other statements, was told to the Japanese Ambassador [reading]:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Now, how much different is that than what you told the Ambassador on the 20th of July?

Admiral TURNER. I told him as a personal opinion that I believed that the United States would declare war against Japan if they went against the British in Singapore, as a matter of opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how much does yours differ from [5405] that? In what way does your statement differ from what the President said?

Admiral TURNER. I expressed an opinion and that is an expression of policy of the Executive.

Senator FERGUSON. But do they amount to practically the same in effect? That is what I am trying to get at.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Very close.

Admiral TURNER. Very close I agree.

Senator FERGUSON. And you referred in this Exhibit 16 to some information from Captain Schuirmann. You say that is the first that you knew about it. He used this language:

"He pointed out that on August 17th"—I will read back what this is so that you will know it. It is not in that book. [Reading:]

Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November the 1st, at which a discussion was held of the Far Eastern section.

Do you recall that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5406] Senator FERGUSON. And then he said among other things:

He pointed out that on August 17th, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression.

Admiral TURNER. I remember the occasion and that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that discussed? Was that your understanding or—

Admiral TURNER. It was not my understanding that it was an ultimatum.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark about it?

Admiral TURNER. I do not believe I ever discussed that note of August 17 with anyone, except very shortly with Captain Schuirmann.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you discussed it with Schuirmann, did you and he disagree on it?

Admiral TURNER. I did not consider it an ultimatum.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where he said he got his information or idea that it was an ultimatum?

[5407] Admiral TURNER. I think that he got that—he used that word himself. I have talked to him recently about it and he says that that is his word, as I recall it, and he still thinks it is an ultimatum.

Senator FERGUSON. He still thinks so?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, with that in mind, on the 27th—well, this is on the 5th of November you heard this discussed and then knew that the President had sent this note. Now, did it mean anything to you when you discovered that the ships were going down to attack the Malay Peninsula? What did that mean to you after having this knowledge?

Admiral TURNER. Well, it meant that Japan was on the move and going to attack the Dutch and British and also, because they had not obtained an agreement with us, that they were going to attack us in the Philippines; that is what it meant.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did it mean war?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then on the 6th, the morning of the 6th at 10:40, a note came from Winant confirming what you had had other information on, that the Japanese were moving in violation of what you had told them back in July would mean [5408] war, that was your opinion to the Ambassador?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had the idea then on the 5th that the President had given them official notice to the same effect?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as far as you were concerned this meant war on the 6th? You had confirmation that we were in war, going to War?

Admiral TURNER. No—well, I believed that we would be attacked, definitely—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral TURNER (continuing). In the Philippines and if we were attacked in the Philippines I knew it would be war. I thought it would be war if we were not attacked, I thought it would be war if they attacked the British and the Dutch, but there would have been some delays possibly.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. In other words, if they attacked the British and the Dutch alone you thought it meant war and you make a distinction that if they attacked the Dutch, the British, and the Americans at the Philippines it did mean war?

Admiral TURNER. Definitely; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the distinction you made?

[5409] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, there would have had to have been a Congressional act, a declaration of war, if they would have only attacked the two places?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, were you familiar with the so-called men-of-war, the three small ships being sent out there?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, I knew about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you draft that message?

Admiral TURNER. I did not. That was drafted by Admiral Brainard and was at the direction of the President.

Senator FERGUSON. A special direction of the President?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulted on that matter?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how did you account—how do you now account for those three ships going out to get information of the movement south, but no specific orders to go out to get information around Hawaii? How do you account for that? Here were these three men-of-war sent out to go over to Camranh Bay to see whether these ships were going across into the Kra Peninsula, and not one sent out specifically around Hawaii. How do you account for that?

[5410] Admiral TURNER. We informed—the Chief of Naval Operations informed—the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in at least three official communications during 1941 that it would be desirable to use ships to the northward and on one occasion to the southward of Hawaii for detecting approaching raiders, in addition to the use of airplanes, and we had endeavored to get small craft to send out and be on look-outs. One of these letters suggests the use of five sampans that had just been condemned by a court out there and the use of yachts which we were trying to get to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't we use those then?

Admiral TURNER. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't you give special notice, just like the President did, about sending these three men-of-war out if you thought war was coming as close as you thought it was and you were the man in War Plans to execute this action? Why didn't you send some out around Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. I never would have sent or requested that those three craft would go up in the China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that.

Admiral TURNER. We had never suggested to Admiral Hart that he send any out previously. We had suggested to Admiral Kimmel that he employ, when necessary employ, small craft out there as look-outs on three different occasions.

[5411] Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, in your message of the 27th you say this:

"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory"—not actual, but preparatory—"to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46."

Now, there was nothing in WPL 46 about sending small boats out around Hawaii, was there?

Admiral TURNER. No, not at all, but there were around in the—certain small craft in the—14th Naval District which were patrol craft and the Commander-in-Chief had been informed or directed in two letters at least during the latter part of 1941 that he would have to supply any patrol craft to the 14th Naval District and this deployment meant that he would have certainly put his ships out in such a manner as best designed to effect the defense of Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Admiral, you have told me that you did not have really anything to do with the President's message about the three craft.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But you knew it went out and it went out about the third?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, knowing that, that the President had personally intervened to send that out to ascertain if [5412]

there was going to be an attack to the south, didn't you think it would be essential, you realizing that they were going to attack the Philippines and we had a fleet on their flank, that something ought to be done specifically to look out around Hawaii?

Admiral TURNER. I never would have sent that dispatch, if left to my own initiative, to Admiral Hart; I thought it was unnecessary, that he was competent to take care of the situation with the forces at his disposal.

Senator FERGUSON. But when the President of the United States thought otherwise and sent the message, didn't it make you feel that you should do something specifically about this fleet that was on the flank?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It did not occur to you?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there any other way to put Rainbow 5 into effect than the wording on page 6, "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5?" Would there have been any other message to put that into effect?

Admiral TURNER. Nothing except giving words that meant the same general thing.

Senator FERGUSON. The same thing, yes. So when you sent these other messages, the one to the Army being described [5413] as a do-don't message, you were not attempting to put this plan into effect?

Admiral TURNER. Not at all. We were out there until an overt act was committed against us and then automatically we would defend ourselves and then the matter would go into effect, but it was important to prevent any damage from it.

Senator FERGUSON. But now do you say that first there had to be an overt act? I understand you to say that the Navy was not concerned with the overt act idea.

Admiral TURNER. No, that was a misunderstanding I think, Senator. I said, what I intended, that if the Japanese fleet came within somewhere around 500 miles of Hawaii that we were justified in considering that an overt act and attack them.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, I want to know whether you ever sent a message to Admiral Kimmel defining to him that if they came within 500 miles that would be an overt act and we would attack them?

Admiral TURNER. We did not because, as I said in my testimony yesterday, we considered that trying to define in specific details a situation that might be so varied in so many ways would have hampered him rather than to help him and that the best way, and that is the usual way that the Navy has performed, is to give the greatest possible leeway to the sub- [5414] ordinate that has the job to do and we gave him a general order and everything that we had and it was up to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, on the 30th of November in a message from the—it is: "Subject: Threat of Japanese attack in South Pacific area," from the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, on page—the pages are not numbered. It is on page 6 of Exhibit 21 [reading]:

R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three days commencing November 20th and our Commander in Chief, Far East has

requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.

Did you know about that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Asiatic commander in chief do that?

Admiral TURNER. He did, on the order of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been requested by the British to do that?

Admiral TURNER. We had.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have that request, counsel, where the British requested us to have the commander in chief [5415] of the Asiatic put this reconnaissance out?

Mr. GESELL. I do not believe we do, Senator.

Mr. MITCHELL. We never heard of it.

Admiral TURNER. If it was not, it might have been oral, Senator. Sometimes we would get a written request from the Joint Staff mission over here, and sometimes they would bring down a paper such as they had there from their authorities and show it to us, and ask for action, but we definitely got a request to perform that scouting.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, as I understand it we had a working plan with the British. They could do it very easily either orally or in writing prior to the 7th and we would put an action on, such as we did here, a reconnaissance.

Admiral TURNER. That is not a war action.

Senator FERGUSON. No. It is a reconnaissance action, is that true?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what was that reconnaissance action for, that specific action?

Admiral TURNER. That was to detect the movement south of the amphibious expeditions for attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, having lost sight of, here, of six carriers and another part of the fleet, can you tell me why [5416] specific orders were not sent out to Kimmel to make a reconnaissance such as you sent out to Hart here about the 30th?

Admiral TURNER. We would not have sent those orders to Admiral Hart except at the request of the British, because we would have left it exclusively to his own judgment, and he sent reconnaissance planes out. As a matter of fact, we have gotten into trouble for going over Formosa. He had planes going out, they were performing their scouting, and we assumed that that was occurring also in Hawaii.

When you give a major order for a subordinate to carry out, it is considered very bad practice, not only then, but now, to go and put a lot of details that state how that officer is going to carry out his duty.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, here is a question on November 30, 1941, put to Mr. Hull by Lord Halifax. Here is the question:

He was desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus. (Exhibit 21, p. 4)

Did you ever as the head of War Plans have an answer to that? Do you understand the question?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I understand and I remember the occasion and I do not remember that the British were ever given [5417] a definite answer on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you given a definite answer? What would you have done? What was Hart to do? What was America to do?

Admiral TURNER. The recommendation had been made to the President about that time that he issue a warning, with such backing as he believed politically necessary, that crossing that line would mean war with the United States, but that recommendation was made with the full understanding that it would be necessary to get the support of Congress for any such warning.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was any such warning ever sent?

Admiral TURNER. Not to my knowledge. I know it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did you discuss that with?

Admiral TURNER. That particular warning?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. I discussed it with the Army. The British asked us to join in that tripartite affair and to give them definite assurance that we would. Our reply was that we could not give them any such definite assurance but that we would take the matter up with the President and make a recommendation to see if the Government was willing to make that a cause of war.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, was that the reason [5418] that you sent the recommendation, Exhibit 17, the letter of November the 27th? Are you familiar with that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes. That part containing crossing that line was that occasion; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the occasion?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5419] Senator FERGUSON. That was the occasion. So it came from the British to you and you made this recommendation to the President?

Admiral TURNER. That a warning be issued?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that a warning be issued in relation to Thailand. I want to call to your attention the last paragraph. It does not relate to the line that was drawn about the notice. Have you got your copy?

Admiral TURNER. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got it now, Admiral?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I am afraid not.

(Exhibit 17 was handed to Admiral Turner.)

Admiral TURNER. The first one of those three subparagraphs, Senator, covers United States, British and Dutch territory. Then, because Thailand is not one of the three, that is put in as a separate matter. But it covers the whole thing. It is the entire line.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me go up a paragraph:

After consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter-action against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or [5420] should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° east or south of 10° north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

In other words, they are saying that we had agreed, and you recommended, that in case they moved into Thailand west of 100° east or south of 10° north, that we were to take action.

Now down in the next to the last paragraph you say this:

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand—
that is not west of 100° East, but just in Thailand—

Japan be warned by the United States, the British and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken.

Now am I clear in this, that this recommendation has two parts? In the one case you recommend that if they cross this line that you set up, 100° east or south of 10° north, Portugese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands, that action is to be taken, but in case they go into any other part of Thailand you want a notice given, is that correct?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Admiral TURNER. But with regard to that second paragraph it says, you see, "after consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East [5421] agreed" on certain things.

Now, that was never approved by either the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, or anybody in Washington, nor by the British Chiefs of Staff, but that was taken as a basis for this paper here, which was a new thing to fit the exact situation here.

Senator FERGUSON. But then when the Ambassador of Britain was asking the United States Secretary of State for an answer to this question he was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus? That is a specific question.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now would not that have been a violation of the thing that you had in mind here, moving across this line 100° west?

Admiral TURNER. It certainly would have been a violation if the British had gone in there.

Senator FERGUSON. If the British had gone in?

Admiral TURNER. Yes. They had a proposition that they wanted to go in. That was opposed. We refused to support it, either the State Department or the military.

Senator FERGUSON. You oppose that?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; because that would have taken [5422] out the whole basis of our nonaggression.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if they would have gone in first to protect that, that would have been against nonaggression, is that right?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have been a violation of the first overt act proposition, would it not?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And we were doing everything we could to avoid the first overt act?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, we were watching the Jap ships going in and as soon as they crossed the line that was the overt act on their part?

Admiral TURNER. That is right. We wished to define it as that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why we had scouts out and patrols, and so forth, to see whether or not they were going over that line and committing that overt act, is that right?

Admiral TURNER. That was way south of any place our people were in. We were over there merely to look and see the size of the forces, and to see how much they could undertake at one time.

Senator FERGUSON. You said one of our scouting planes [5423] was in trouble over Formosa. When was that?

Admiral TURNER. That was about the 2nd or 3rd of December, or even a few days before that. Planes had gone up in that general direction and apparently one of our planes had gotten over or close to Formosa, because it got a protest from the Japanese about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Got a protest?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 30th of November, 1941, from OPNAV, action: CINCAF, and information: CINCPAC, I want to read this to you:

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition. In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila-Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked.

In other words, they were armed, is that true?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, they were armed with machine guns and ammunition.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops [5424] to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora. If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British mission here informed.

Now is that the message that was sent out, that the British had asked for, here where I read the Commander-in-Chief Far East has requested the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on the line Manila and Camranh Bay on the same days?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, that is the message.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the message sent out. Now here is the wording, "Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus". How do you account for that in line with what you told me before, that that would be an act of aggression by the British?

Admiral TURNER. My recollection of the position of Singora is, it is just outside the nearest town to the northern border of the British territory, and that they were going to move troops to that northern border.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not going to cross the line, in other words?

Admiral TURNER. I believe so. I believe that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you believe that the Tanaka memorial was an actual instrument, or did you have any ideas [5425] on that?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I do not believe I ever formed any definite opinion as to whether it was authentic or not. I always felt that it expressed generally the Japanese militaristic viewpoint.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert in the record, where I read the statement that the Admiral had made to the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to put into the record the whole statement, because I think it will make better sense in the record and explain what we were talking about.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. Would you mind identifying that for the reporter by volume, book and page?

Senator FERGUSON. It is Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-41, volume II, page 516.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

[5426] The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department (Rear Admiral Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) . . . (Transmitted to President Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral Stark).

Op-12-CTB
(SC)EF
Serial 083412
Memorandum

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941.

1. On July 20, 1941, about 3 p. m., Ambassador Nomura called on me at my residence. After some general conversation, he informed me that on Friday or Saturday (July 18-19, 1941) he had gone to Virginia Hot Springs [White Sulphur Springs] to call on Mr. Hull, but the latter's physician had not permitted an interview. Subsequently, as I understand, Ambassador Nomura had a conversation with Mr. Welles. Prior to coming to my residence, he had called at Admiral Stark's house, but he had not found him in. He did not say whether he had then tried to get in touch with Admiral Ingersoll (Rear Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations). I understand the latter was not at home at that hour.

2. Ambassador Nomura indicated that he desired to have a conversation with Admiral Stark as soon as convenient; he intended to go to New York the 21st or 22d but will return shortly. I informed the Ambassador that I would convey his request to Admiral Stark, and assured him that the latter [5427] would be glad to talk with him.

3. The Ambassador then explained at considerable length what he proposed to discuss with Admiral Stark. He said that he is not a professional diplomat, and is occupying his present position because none of the trained diplomats in whom the government had confidence had been willing to accept the Washington Mission; he had demurred for a considerable period, and had accepted the duty only after great insistence by his friends, particularly high ranking naval officers and the more conservative groups of Army officers. He noted that Admiral Toyoda, now Foreign Minister, had been more than insistent that he accept the mission; it was evident that he felt he had a greater measure of Toyoda's confidence than of Matsuoka's. He stated that he particularly wished to discuss the international situation with Admiral Stark because, if the United States and Japan could not remain at peace, it was obvious that a devastating naval war would ensue.

4. Ambassador Nomura stated that for some weeks he had had frequent conferences with Mr. Hull, in an endeavor to seek a formula through which the United States and Japan could remain at peace. He no longer hoped for 100 percent agreement on all points, but would be content if a partial agreement

could be reached which would prevent war between the two countries. Such an agreement would necessarily be informal, since Japan is now committed by treaty to Germany, and this treaty could [5428] not be denounced at this time. However, he noted that the decision as to when the military clauses of the treaty would come into effect lies entirely in Japan's hands, and that these would be invoked only if Germany were to be the object of aggression by another power. He stated that Japan entered the Axis solely because it seemed to be to Japan's interest to do so. Japan's future acts will be dominated solely by Japan, and not by any other power. Whatever military action Japan takes will be for her own ultimate purposes.

5. He then talked at length on the points which Japan considered essential for an agreement between the United States and Japan. The fundamental basis of such an agreement necessarily would be that either Power would be free to take such steps as seem to be required by its own responsibility for self-defense. He mentioned that, owing to export restrictions against Japan by the United States and the Philippines, and owing to a reduction in shipping tonnage available for trade, Japan's present economic position is bad and steadily getting worse. It is essential that Japan had uninterrupted access to necessary raw materials, particularly iron ore and iron products, oil, rubber, cotton and food. There are other important items as well.

6. The second point is that the United States is constantly providing greater support to China. If China is left without industrial and military support, it will not be long before the [5429] Chungking regime will be unable to continue the present "China incident"; Japan will then be able to withdraw from the greater part of China. However, Ambassador Nomura noted that the United States is improving the Burma Road, and is supplying airplanes and pilots to be sent to Chungking. He understands that there are over a hundred American pilots now en route, who have been supplied from the armed forces of the United States. Japan must make some arrangement through which support of this nature will be reduced, rather than increased. The British are also contributing more and more to measures designed to sustain the Chungking regime.

7. The third point which the Ambassador mentioned as essential for Japan's security is the more or less permanent stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia in order to break the connection between Russia and China, and in order to suppress the extensive Chinese Communist elements in that general region. Japan has an agreement with Wang Ching Wei which will permit Japanese forces to remain in Inner Mongolia; how long such measures will continue necessary can not be foretold. I inferred that, were this agreed to, Japanese troops would be withdrawn from the greater part of China.

8. He then informed me that within the next few days Japan expects to occupy French Indochina. How the occupation would be made he is not informed; presumably, it would be chiefly by an over-land march from Hanoi southward, but on [5430] this he is not yet informed. In any case, for the immediate future security of Japan, both against a possible attack from the south and for a better control over the activities of Chungking, this occupation has become essential.

9. It was evident that Ambassador Nomura had some apprehension that the United States would take further action against Japan, either economically or militarily, as soon as Japanese troops were known to be occupying French Indochina. He anticipates an intensification of the present press campaign against Japan in the United States. It seems, though he did not so state categorically, that Japan contemplates no further move to the south for the time being. He made no mention of possible activity against Siberia.

10. Ambassador Nomura indicated that these points were essential to any informal agreements which might be made between the United States and Japan. Rather cautiously he conveyed the impression that were the United States to accept these conditions, any action it might take in the Atlantic would not be a matter of great concern to Japan. The one great point on which agreement might be reached, he again emphasized as the inherent right of self defense.

11. The Ambassador set forth all the foregoing without interruption on my part. I informed him that I would present these points to Admiral Stark's attention. However, I desired to point out one important thing to him, speaking solely [5431] from a personal viewpoint, and as one naval officer to another, on a certain broad strategic aspect of the situation which I envisaged. I agreed that there would be a decidedly adverse reaction in the United States to Japanese

occupation of Indochina. Entirely aside from matters of policy, it would be evident to him that this move had an important bearing on the strategic position of the United States.

12. I pointed out that, speaking from the standpoint of self defense, the greatest danger to the United States in the future lies in the continued military success of Germany. The United States has been able to live in peace because powerful military nations in Europe have checked each other and prevented a military penetration by any of them in the Western Hemisphere. If Great Britain were to collapse, German military power might very well be directed against South America, and such moves would cause great difficulties for the United States. So long as the United Kingdom continues to exist as a military and naval power, the problems of the United States as regards its security will not be very great. Therefore, aside from racial and social ideals, it is decidedly against the military interests of the United States to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by Germany. For this reason any action which the United States could take against Germany is necessarily one of self defense and could never be considered as aggression. Furthermore, anything that affects the future [5432] security of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the defensive viewpoint.

13. The occupation of Indo-China by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United States since it might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well then be overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo in the southern portion of the Far East.

14. I suggested that Japan really has very little to fear from American, British or Dutch activities in the Far East. It might well be, were these Powers to be displaced, Japan would find Germany facing her in that region, which would put an entirely different complexion on the military situation there.

15. Ambassador Nomura stated that, regardless of his own personal opinions in the matter (which were clearly sympathetic to the above point of view) he was bound to support the policies of his government, which at present include collaboration with the Axis.

16. The interview then closed after the Ambassador again [5433] reiterated his desire to discuss these matters with Admiral Stark.

R. K. TURNER.

[5434] Senator FERGUSON. At that time, as I recall it, he was telling you that they were going into Indochina.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were attempting to tell him, and I think in no uncertain language, just how you felt about it.

Admiral TURNER. It was on that occasion that I became convinced, after discussing the matter with him, that the future diplomatic effort they would make with us would be to keep us out while they attacked Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, did you have, after the conversation that you had, any definite ideas that we were going to get into a war with Japan? Could that have changed your thinking, that conversation?

Admiral TURNER. I think that had a very decided effect. My recollection of that conversation is that it was the latter part of June. Now this was, as you have it there, in July, but I remember it as the latter part of June.

Senator FERGUSON. This is dated July. It says he was over to Hot Springs to see the Secretary of State and could not see him on the 20th of July 1941, and he apparently came back to see you.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now does that refresh your memory?

[5435] Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I thought it was June, when I said I might have been influenced in June or July, because that had a very decided influence.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, I want to call your attention to pages 200 and 202 of exhibit 1. Do you have exhibit 1 there?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a message intercepted from Berlin, dated November 29, 1941, translated by the Navy on December 1, 1941, in which the Ambassador of Japan was telling Von Ribbentrop that he had no official word on the status of the American-Japanese negotiations and that he could make no definite statement, since he was not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan.

Now on the next day, on the 30th—and I want to call your attention to the fact that they had extended the time from the 25th to the 29th, and you are familiar with those deadlines, are you not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That on the next day, on pages 204 and 206, another message from Tokyo to Berlin, on just the following day, November 30, 1941, in which the Japanese Government instructed its Ambassador in Germany to tell Hitler and Von Ribbentrop that American-Japanese negotiations [5436] stood ruptured, broken, and that an American-Japanese war "may come quicker than anyone dreams."

Now did those facts mean anything to you? Here on the one day they are telling the Germans they do not know a thing, on the day following the 29th, which was the deadline—and, by the way, that is exactly the deadline, because there is a message on that in here saying that it was Japanese time—they tell them that the negotiations are ruptured and that "war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

Did that mean anything to you?

Admiral TURNER. The dispatch of the 29th of November is from Berlin, from the Ambassador.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Admiral TURNER. The dispatch of the 30th is from Tokyo. It is evident that the Berlin Ambassador had not received news as to the intentions of the government and he was just giving them some double talk on this matter, and then he was instructed in the matter on the 30th.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, he gave them some double talk on the 29th and then they instructed him on the 30th, which was the very day of the deadline, and the troops were going south, that they were ruptured and war may come quicker than anyone thought.

Did not that mean something to your intelligence brains? [5437] If they had evaluated that would not they have found that the Japs were making a move, and that that meant war?

Admiral TURNER. That was the conclusion I drew from it.

Senator FERGUSON. You did draw that conclusion from it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I am wondering—the question that Congressman Murphy asked—you had sent a message on the 27th, your plans were in flux, and here you had new information which really meant war at that time, why did not you give them more information?

Admiral TURNER. I do not understand, Senator, what you mean when you say "your plans were in flux."

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the Congressman read to you, and he will be able to find that part in that report. Do you remember the part where it was a live subject? You read it out of the United States News. I wish you would read that again.

Mr. MURPHY [reading]:

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise.

I was reading from column 1, paragraph 2, page 64 of the full text of the official report, United States News, Naval Court of Inquiry.

[5438] Admiral TURNER. These dispatches that you have just referred to, of the 29th and 30th of November, relate to the over-all picture of the war. They added nothing to the warning that we had given on the 27th, just 3 days before. There was no development here with respect to Hawaii any more than with respect to the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you have a ship movement plan, do you not? Did you not send out on the 30th, did I not read this message that you sent out for the 70 scouting planes when you said one got into trouble over Formosa?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did take action in the Asiatic?

Admiral TURNER. At the request of the British, in order to co-ordinate for 3 days the scouting that they were doing in those 3 days, to find out the movement of a definite force some place, that we knew something about.

Senator FERGUSON. But here, Admiral, we have many carriers that were out of our sight, out of our hearing, we did not know where they were. We knew at least they were not down in the Kra Peninsula because we had that one sighted, and the British came along and ask us to make a specific reconnaissance at a specific time, which is after the 27th, and we do that and find this fleet going into the Kra [5439] Peninsula, but no specific orders to see if they were taken out to Hawaii. How do you account for that?

Admiral TURNER. I account for that by what I said previously, that the commanders in chief had been given a large definite order, and giving them specific orders as to how they were going to do it, or take details of how they were going to do it, is very bad military command practice.

[5440] Senator FERGUSON. Well, it could not have turned out any worse than it did, could it?

Admiral TURNER. Not very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Not very well, but it was the duty of your office, as I understand you to say, to alert any and all naval posts of the Government of the United States in the event that a war involving the United States was imminent. That was your job and duty, was it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And when you received this information after the 27th, you did not so alert Hawaii, did you?

Admiral TURNER. We had already alerted Hawaii. We reviewed the matter daily. We felt that nothing further was necessary, and I

still hold to the same opinion, up to the point where the matter of the 1 p. m. deadline came up, which was very unfortunate.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not trying to change your opinion. I am just trying to get what the facts were, and what you had in mind at that time.

Now, Admiral, when did you first hear there was a pilot message in relation to the 13 parts message?

Admiral TURNER. I think the same time that I got the 13 parts. I have no recollection of seeing it at any other time.

[5441] Senator FERGUSON. And at that time you thought that was so important that a new information bulletin should go to Hawaii: is that right?

Admiral TURNER. I did not think it important enough without the 14th part to have interceded in the matter.

I knew Admiral Wilkinson knew about it, and Admiral Ingersoll did.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Admiral, at that time, you thought that Admiral Kimmel was getting the 13 parts?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, and the 14th part.

Senator FERGUSON. And the pilot message as quickly as you did?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I do not know about "as quickly." Of course, those things are delayed, and you do not know just how long it is, how long it might be. There might be some of those things that would be delayed somewhat. Something urgent, why, it might be sent, or a dispatch sent "Have you seen such and such series?"

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, you and Admiral Wilkinson differed on one point, as to whether or not they were going to attack the United States.

Admiral TURNER. We differed on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you and Admiral Kimmel disagreed on that point?

[5442] Admiral TURNER. No, sir; I do not. I saw Admiral Kimmel when he was in Washington sometime during the summer and discussed with him and other staff officers, his situation in case of war with Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, you have mentioned the so-called reply of General Short, a very short message.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the wording of it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, as I understand it now, all the officers in Washington misunderstood it.

Admiral TURNER. All that saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. All that saw it. You saw it; General Marshall saw it; General Gerow saw it; General Miles, and who else?

Admiral TURNER. Bundy.

Senator FERGUSON. Bundy. Who else in your department?

Admiral TURNER. I think that Captain Hill, who was my first assistant, saw it, customarily. There may have been somebody else. I think probably Captain Glover saw it, because I showed him all those things.

Senator FERGUSON. The Secretary of War saw it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5443] Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Secretary of the Navy saw it?

Admiral TURNER. I think not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, all you gentlemen not understanding his message, my question is, how do you account for the fact that none of you can see, at least you do not see, how he could have misunderstood your message?

Admiral TURNER. If you are comparing the two messages as to clarity and meaning—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Why, then I will say it does not follow that the two points of view are analogous.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your message is perfectly clear?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And his message is fuzzy and cloudy?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

[5444] Senator FERGUSON. That is what you want to tell us?

Admiral TURNER. Exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. So that is the reason you can say that reasonable men can differ on his message but reasonable officers would not differ on your message, is that what I understand?

Admiral TURNER. Those words are not my words, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want you to let me put any words in your mouth. What is your answer to that?

Admiral TURNER. My answer is that the Short message can be interpreted and was interpreted by a number of persons as applying to a partial situation and did not apply at all to the general situation in which General Short found himself. I have no idea that he meant he was only taking sabotage precautions, in view of the specific orders in the War Department dispatch, which is perfectly clear to do certain things.

Senator FERGUSON. You had an operational room in the Munitions Building, did you not, a ship board?

Admiral TURNER. In the Navy Department?

Senator FERGUSON. In the Navy Department.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How far was that from your office?

Admiral TURNER. I had one of strategic movements; there [5445] was one of general information and all foreign merchant ship movement in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and I know there was a big one in two rooms, in Ship Movements, that showed the movements of all our forces and all shipping of the United States and Great Britain.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Admiral, you had access to a ship movement board that showed all the ships in Pearl Harbor daily? When a ship went out you could see, if you looked at your board, isn't that true?

Admiral TURNER. I think not. I do not know whether they kept the information as to whether the ship was in Pearl Harbor or outside of Pearl Harbor. They did keep information showing what ships were in that vicinity.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then after the 27th there were two orders issued to Admiral Kimmel, were there not, sending two carriers in two different deployments, one to Midway and the other to Wake?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct, they issued those orders.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would appear on your board?

Admiral TURNER. I do not know whether that movement would appear or not. Presumably it would. It would not appear on my board.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not the orders come from your office to do that? [5446]

Admiral TURNER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did they come from?

Admiral TURNER. I beg your pardon. No; I think the orders actually went from Ship Movements to do that. We had an arrangement for them to take those planes out there, and there was some delay, and there was a longer delay out there, due to uncontrollable factors, than we expected.

[5447] Senator FERGUSON. Now, Admiral, these two movements were after the 27th, were they not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what effect do you think that had upon the commanding officers at Pearl Harbor, after the 27th, the so-called warnings I am talking about, as far as an attack is concerned, at Pearl Harbor, of sending two carriers with planes, taking them from the Pearl Harbor district, as to whether or not there was going to be an attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral TURNER. I think it would have had no effect whatsoever, because we also had to defend these other places, and the attacks would, if they were made on Pearl Harbor, would probably be made on the other places too, which they were, except not by airplanes at Midway.

Senator FERGUSON. Did I understand you to say some time in your testimony that we didn't intend to defend Guam?

Admiral TURNER. Correct. Midway and Wake.

Senator FERGUSON. Midway and Wake we did intend to defend?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we have an attack on the 7th at Midway and Wake?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[5448] Senator FERGUSON. The same day?

Admiral TURNER. By night, by two destroyers at Midway and, I believe, the next day by destroyers on Wake, and I think on the 7th by airplanes at Wake.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if we expected an attack on the 27th, up to the 30th, and we were routing our ships, how do you account for sending these two carriers with planes to Wake and Midway, if we actually expected an attack?

Admiral TURNER. I haven't those dispatches ordering that movement. My impression is that the orders from the Department were issued prior to the 27th. However, even so, it was necessary to increase the defenses on those two islands, and we—I agree that it was proper to go ahead with the plan up until the time it was pretty definite that an attack was imminent and that ships ought not to go out.

I call your attention to the fact that, with most of the planes on those two carriers, they left few back at Pearl, and their western

position put them actually in quite a good position from which to counterattack from the north on Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this true; that left no carriers at Pearl Harbor, so that Admiral Kimmel could take his battleships out and have air protection if he wanted to take them out?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct. If he had taken them out, in order to get fighter protection, he would have had to keep pretty close to land.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, when you said this morning that if you had been in his place, you would have taken your planes out when you got the warning message—let's say he had the orders to take carriers and go to Wake and Midway. That left him without any air support at all for eight or nine battleships that he had and the cruiser.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct—No. The cruiser, that is a somewhat different matter. But by moving the eight or nine battleships down to the southeastward, 200 or 300 miles, why, they wouldn't need any protection, off down there.

Carriers act on the offensive.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he know which way the attack would come from? You say go south that many miles.

Admiral TURNER. Southeast.

Senator FERGUSON. Southeast. How did he know the attack wouldn't come from there?

Admiral TURNER. The probability of its coming from that direction, Senator, was, I think, extremely small.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was a probability from the [5450] north in the vacant sea.

Admiral TURNER. That was the much more likely place; that is well recognized.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference between an alert message and a war warning?

Admiral TURNER. We don't use the term, ordinarily, alert; at least we didn't at that time. The only time we use the term "alert" in the Navy is referring to, ordinarily, to an air attack, and the orders were never issued in those terms anyway. That is, we have conditions of readiness which mean alert 1, 2, or 3, and various subsequent ones.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 24th is that an alert, or a war warning?

Admiral TURNER. Neither. An estimate of the major strategic situation. And it doesn't give, and is not intended to give, to put them on the alert, except to start getting ready for it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the war warning message of the 27th, I just want to ask you a few questions in relation to that.

Do you, in the Navy, in drawing an instrument such as this, when you use specific terms and then have a general term, does it relate to specific terms of the same nature? I am trying to put this in a layman's language and not in a [5451] lawyer's language.

Admiral TURNER. Could you illustrate that, please, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

You say here:

An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines—

you expressly name them—

Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

You have got three definite places, either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, and then one possibility, Borneo.

Now, doesn't that exclude others?

Admiral TURNER. It excludes others against which an amphibious expedition will be launched within the next few days.

Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't the fact that you mention an amphibious expedition reject other kinds of expeditions, because you specify amphibious and do not say anything about the others? Wouldn't an ordinarily prudent naval officer read it that way?

Admiral TURNER. We said in the dispatch of the 24th [5452] that a surprise aggressive movement might be expected in any direction. In this case, the amphibious expedition is the major effort by the Japanese war machine, and it does not mention the many, many other types of activities.

For example, it doesn't mention submarines, but it is obvious that submarines will go out and raid our trade as they did, and it doesn't mention raids against our trade by surface vessels which we expected. It doesn't mention expansion of the area occupied by Japan in the Mandates, down in the little islands, which is certainly to be expected.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, we had all our merchant ships in convoys and had battleships with them?

Admiral TURNER. No. I beg your pardon, we did not.

Senator FERGUSON. We did not?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir. Many of them were entirely single. There were only one or two convoys. Most of them were alone.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't expect Admiral Kimmel to take care of these single ships on the ocean, did you?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; by covering the patrol areas and general covering operations.

Senator FERGUSON. But you knew he wasn't doing any of that, if you looked at the ship board you could have told he had the ships still in the Pearl Harbor district. You [5453] said you knew he wasn't doing that; is that true?

Admiral TURNER. I don't know whether he would have made the reports as to the movements of those ships or not.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 996 of the record of the Navy top secret, I want to read this question and this answer:

Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is indicated."

That is the one of the 24th, is it not?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

This language is omitted from the dispatch of 27 November, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of 27 November done intentionally?

Here is your answer:

A. I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th, it says, "a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated." Now, that movement in any direction could be by naval forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or anything else. In this other dispatch, we said "an amphibious expedition is enroute." It was moving down the China Sea.

Now, those two are quite different. They don't cover [5454] the same kind of a subject, and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact.

Now the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of amphibious forces, but the movement of any forces.

Do you stand by that answer now?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I do; and also I stand by the answer I gave previously, that all of these dispatches that were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, certainly as far back as October 16, should be considered as a whole, as forming a single series, and they related to the same subject, and the ground covered in any one is not intended to be the entire ground.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, but on the 24th, you sent the message.

Now, what happens between the 24th and the 27th to send this other message?

Admiral TURNER. It is getting closer to the deadline of the 29th. We waited as long as possible. We also find out the final breakdown, practical breakdown of negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, if we could have drawn here in Washington the conclusions from the 13 parts and the [5455] pilot message that there was another deadline of the delivery of that message, that would have made a change so that another message should have been sent?

Admiral TURNER. I agree that a message should have been sent about the 1 o'clock note.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for why you didn't send it, whose province it was to send it?

Admiral TURNER. Because when I first saw it, I was informed that the War Department was already sending it and that Admiral Stark had taken action.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the delay was in getting the action to you, the message to you?

Admiral TURNER. I think there was very little delay in getting it to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral, suppose it is 2 hours.

Admiral TURNER. I was in my office from about 11:15.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your office alerted for war on the 6th and the 7th?

Admiral TURNER. I had an officer on watch and a stenographer in there that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it alerted for war on the 6th and the 7th?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir; it was alerted so far as anything that we had to do. There was an officer in there [5456] and I could always be gotten.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody there to take action?

Admiral TURNER. There were officers there who could get me on the phone at once, and there was an officer there, a duty officer, who could take it up with me, or with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever made an investigation to see why the messages didn't get to you quicker than they did?

Admiral TURNER. I have not, because I believe that they got to me as fast as they customarily did.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all. I want to thank the committee for staying on. And if my voice was loud, Admiral, it was because I was hurrying to get through.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I have just one concluding question.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral, in Exhibit 1, on page 72, in a message from Nomura at Washington to Tokyo on October 16, 1941, in subparagraph C, is the following:

It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a 50-50 compromise between Tokyo and Washington (Turner [5457] does not think that we are compromising).

Did you at any time leave any inference that you thought there should be a 50-50 compromise with Japan?

Admiral TURNER. No, I did not.

I thought that was the only possible basis for continued negotiations.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to make a request. I was wondering if during the interim I would be permitted to inspect all of the original intercepts which bear the date of December 6, regardless of the date upon which they were decoded. I would like to make a comparison.
 [5458] **Mr. MITCHELL.** What is the request?

Mr. GEARHART. I wanted to be permitted to inspect all of the original intercepts that bear the date of December 6, regardless of when they were decoded, that appear in Exhibit 1 and the first 30 pages of Exhibit 2.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want the photostats or the originals?

Mr. GEARHART. The photostats would do but I want all of the markings upon them.

Mr. MITCHELL. I don't see any reason why we can't get those into your hands.

Mr. GEARHART. During the interim.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, there is one other question that I want to ask the Admiral.

Admiral, I would like to have you look at page 22 of Exhibit 2. That is a message of the 3d of December 1941 and it shows it was translated on the 11th of December.

Are you familiar with that message?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, if that message was translated by 1:30 or 2 o'clock on the day of the 6th as shown by the record of Admiral Hewitt, and in the Navy Department, on Kramer's desk, in the rough, would that have made any difference in your planning to send notices, and so forth, [5459] so far as Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral TURNER. I think I would certainly have taken it up with the Office of Naval Intelligence to find out what had been done about it, to send a check—at least a check—message out there to see if they were familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have meant that there could be an attack on Pearl Harbor and they wanted this information for that purpose?

Admiral TURNER. It could be, but it also could easily be what actually occurred at a later time when Japanese submarines made contact with the people on shore and exchanged signals with them both by day and night.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was an important message?

Admiral TURNER. Quite.

Senator FERGUSON. And normally would have come to you?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Admiral Turner, is there any other statement or any further information that you desire to give to this committee on the subject here under investigation?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, there is not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else you think the committee ought to know about this that you are prepared to tell us?

[5460] Admiral TURNER. No, sir; there is not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We desire to thank you for your appearance, for the information you have given to the committee, your cooperation at this hearing, and to assure you that we feel that you have endeavored to cooperate fully, and we appreciate the assistance you have given us in the testimony presented.

Admiral TURNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I thank the members of the committee and counsel for their courtesy and kindness to me in this hearing.

(The witness was excused.)

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Committee wishes the press and all others who have worked with us a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, and the committee now stands adjourned until December 31, at 10 a. m.

(Whereupon, at 5:40 p. m., December 21, 1945, a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, December 31, 1945.)

Part 5—December 31, 1945, and January 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946—follows.

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